G.R. No. L-6287 December 1, 1911THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, plaintiff-appellee, vs.THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, rere!e"#$"% #&e I"!'()rGo*er"me"#, e# )(., defendants-appellants.W. A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan, for appellant.Antonio Constantino, for appellee. MORELAND, J.:This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance ofthe Province of Tarlac dismissing the action before it on motion ofthe plaintiff upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction ofthe subject matter of the controversy.The question for our consideration and decision is the poer andauthorityof aCourt of First Instanceof oneprovincetota!ecogni"ance of an action by a railroad company for thecondemnation of real estate located in another province.In the month of #ecember, $%&', the plaintiff began an action inthe Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac for thecondemnation of certain real estate, stated by the plaintiff in hiscomplaint to be located in the Province of Tarlac. It is alleged in thecomplaint that theplaintiff isauthori"edbylatoconstruct arailroad line (from Paniqui to Tayug in the Province of Tarlac,( and itis for the purpose of condemning lands for the construction of suchline that this action is brought. The land sought to be condemned is)%,%$&squaremetersinarea. Thecomplaintstatesthatbeforebeginning the action the plaintiff had caused to be made athorough search in the office of the registry of property and of theta* here the lands sought to be condemned ere located and tohom they belonged. +s a result of such investigations the plaintiffalleged that the lands in question ere located in the Province ofTarlac. The defendants in one action all of the different oners oforpersonsotheriseinterestedinthe)%,%$&squaremetersofland to be condemned. +fter filing and duly serving the complaintthe plaintiff, pursuant to la and pending final determination of theaction, too! possession of and occupied the lands described in thecomplaint, buildingits lineandputtingthesameinoperation.#uringtheprogressof theactionacommissiontoappraisethevalueof thelandsasdulyappointed, hich, after ta!ingoraltestimony, amounting to $,& typeritten pages hen transcribed,and after much labor and prolonged consideration, made a reportconsistingof about--typerittenpages,resolvingthequestionsubmitted to it. .n the coming in of this report the court, by orderentered the /'th of 0eptember, $%&%, set the $$th day of .ctoberfolloing for the hearing thereon..n the ,th day of .ctober the plaintiff gave notice to thedefendants that on the %th day of .ctober a motion ould be madeto the court to dismiss the action upon the ground that the courthad no jurisdiction of the subject matter, it having just beenascertained by the plaintiff that the land sought to be condemnedas situated in the Province of 1ueva 2cija, instead of the Provinceof Tarlac, as alleged in the complaint. This motion as heard and,after due consideration, the trialcourt dismissed the action uponthegroundpresentedbytheplaintiff.Thisappeal ista!enfromsaid judgment of dismissal.The decision of the learned trial court as based entirely upon theproposition, already referred to, that in condemnation proceedings,and in all other proceedings affecting title to land, the Court of FirstInstance of a given province has no jurisdiction, poer or authorityheretheland is located in anotherprovince,and that nosuchpoer, authority, or jurisdiction can be conferred by the parties.0ections -- and -) of +ct 1o. $3) of the Philippine Commissionconfer jurisdiction upon the Courts of First Instance of theseIslands ith respect to real estate in the folloingords41awphi1.net02C. --.Jurisdictionof Courts of First nstance. 5Thejurisdiction of Courts of First Instance shall be of to !inds4$. .riginal6 and/. +ppellate.02C. -). ts original !urisdiction. 5 Courts of First Instanceshall have original jurisdiction4 .* * * * * ** * */. In all civil actions hich involve the title to or possessionof realproperty, or any interest therein, or the legality ofany ta*, impost, or assessment, e*cept actions of forcibleentry into, and detainer of lands or buildings, originaljurisdiction of hich is by this +ct conferred upon courts ofjustice of the peace.It is apparent from the ording of these sections that it as theintention of the Philippine Commission to give to the Courts of FirstInstance the most perfect and complete jurisdiction possible overthe subject matters mentioned in connection thereith. 0uchjurisdiction is not made to depend upon locality. There is nosuggestionof limitation.Thejurisdiction isuniversal.1ordo theprovisions of sections ,7, ,%, -&, -$, and -/ at all militate againstthe universality of that jurisdiction. Those provisions simplyarrange for the convenient and effective transaction of business inthe courts and do not relate to their poer, authority, or jurisdictionover the subject matter of the action. 8hile it is provided in thesesections that a particular court shall hold its sessions in any otherprovince 9e*cept under certain specified conditions:, the assertionsis nevertheless true that the jurisdiction of a particular court is innoiseandinnosenselimited6andit isnoheresuggested,much less provided, that a Court of First Instance of one province,regularly sitting in said province, may not under certain conditionsta!e cogni"ance of an action arising in another province or of anaction relating to real estate located outside of the boundaries ofthe province to hich it may at the time be assigned.Certain statutes confer jurisdiction, poer, or authority. .therprovidefor theprocedurebyhichthat poer or authorityisprojected into judgment. The one class deals ith the poers oftheCourtinthereal andsubstantivesense6theotheriththeprocedure by hich such poers are put into action. The one is thething itself6 the other is the vehicle by hich the thing istransferred from the court to the parties. The hole purpose andobject of procedure is to ma!e the poers of the court fully andcompletely available for justice. The mostperfect procedure thatcan be devised is that hich gives opportunity for the mostcomplete and perfect e*ercise of the poers of the court ithin thelimitationsset bynatural justice. It isthat onehich, inotherords, givesthe mostperfectopportunityforthepoers ofthecourts to transmute themselves into concrete acts of justicebeteen the parties before it. The purpose of such a procedure isnot to restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter,but to give it effective facility in righteous action. It may be said inpassing that the most salient objection hich can be urged againstprocedure to-day is that it so restricts the e*ercise of the court;spoers by technicalities that the part of its authority effective forjustice beteen the parties is many times an inconsiderable portionof the hole. The purpose of procedure is not to thart justice. Itsproper aimistofacilitatetheapplicationof justicetotherivalclaims of contending parties. It as created not to hinder and delaybut to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It doesnot constitute the thing itself hich courts are alays striving tosecuretolitigants.It isdesignedasthe meansbest adopted toobtain that thing. In other ords, it is a means to an end. It is themeans by hich the poers of the court are made effective in justjudgments. 8hen it loses the character of the one and ta!es onthat of the other the administration of justice becomes incompleteand unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave criticism.The proper result of a system of procedure is to insure a fair andconvenienthearingtothepartiesithcompletejusticebeteenthemas a result. 8hile a fair hearingis as essential as thesubstantive poer of the court to administer justice in thepremises, and hile the one is the natural result o the other, it isdifferent in its nature and relates to a different thing. The poer orauthorityof thecourt over thesubject matter e*istedandasfi*ed before procedure in a given cause began. Procedure does notalter or change that poer or authority6 it simply directs themanner in hich it shall be fully and justly e*ercised. To be sure, incertain cases, if that poer is not e*ercised in conformity ith theprovisionsof theprocedural la,purely,thecourtattemptingtoe*erciseit losesthepoer toe*erciseit legally.Thisdoesnotmeanthat it loses jurisdictionof thesubject matter.It meanssimply that he may thereby lose jurisdiction of the person or thatthe judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lac! ofsomething essential to sustain it. There is, of course, an importantdistinction beteen person and subject matter are both conferredby la. +s to the subject matter, nothing can change thejurisdictionof thecourtoverdiminishitordictatehenitshallattach or hen it shall be removed. That is a matter of legislativeenactment hichnonebut thelegislaturemaychange. .ntheother hand, the jurisdiction of the court over the person is, in someinstances, made to defend on the consent or objection, on the actsor omissions of the parties or any of them. ut the principle assertedin the cases hich hold thus is no authority for the proposition thatto persons having a controversy hich they desire to havedecided by a competent tribunal may not, by appropriateprocedure, submit it t any court having jurisdiction in the premises.In the one case the relation is contractual to be enforced over theobjection of one of the contracting parties. In the other relation isnot contractual because not beteen the parties6 but, rather,beteen the parties and the court. In the one case it is a contractto be enforced6 in the other, a condition to be met.This being so, e say again, even though it be repetition, that afterjurisdiction over real property in the Islands has been conferred sogenerally and fully by +ct 1o. $3), it is not tobe presumed or construed that the legislature intendedto modif" or restrict that jurisdiction hen it came to frame a Codeof Civil Procedure the object of hich is to ma!e that jurisdictioneffective. 0uch modification or restriction should be held only byvirtue of the clearest and most e*press provisions.The ording of that section should be carefully e*amined. It readsas follos402C.3''.#enueof actions.5+ctions toconfirmtitle toreal estate, or tosecureapartitionof real estate, or tocancel clouds, or remove doubts fromthe title to realestate, or to obtain possession of real estate, or to recoverdamages for injuries toreal estate, or toestablishanyinterest, right, or title in or to real estate, or actions for thecondemnation of real estate for public use, shall be broughtintheprovinceerethelands, or somepart thereof,issituated6 actions against e*ecutors, administrators, andguardians touching the performance of their official duties,and actions for account and settlement by them, andactions for the distribution of the estates of deceasedpersons among the heirs and distributes, and actions for thepayment of legacies, shall bebrought intheprovinceinhich the ill as admitted to probate, or letters ofadministration ere granted, or the guardian asappointed. +nd all actions not herein otherise provided formay be brought in any province here the defendant or anynecessarypartydefendantmayresideorbefound, orinany province here the plaintiff, e*cept in cases ere otherspecial provision is made in this Code. In case neither theplaintiff nor the defendant resides ithin the PhilippineIslands and the action is brought to sei"e or obtain title toproperty of the defendant ithin the Philippine Islands andthe action is brought to sei"e or obtain title to property ofthe defendant ithin the Philippine Islands, the action shallbebroughtintheprovinceherethepropertyhichtheplaintiff see!s to sei"e or to obtain title to is situated or isfound4 $ro%ided, that in an action for the foreclosure of amortgage upon real estate, henthe service upon thedefendant is not personal, but is by publication, inaccordanceithla, theactionmust bebrought intheprovince here the land lies. +nd in all cases process mayissue from the court in hich an action or specialproceedingispending, tobeenforcedinanyprovincetobring in defendants and to enforce all orders and decrees ofthe court. The failure of a defendant to object t the venue oftheactionat thetimeof enteringhisappearanceintheaction shall be deemed a aiver on his part of all objectiontotheplaceor tribunal inhichtheactionis brought,e*cept in the actions referred to in the first si*teen lines ofthis section relating to real estate, and actions againste*ecutors, administrators, and guardians, and for thedistribution of estates and payment of legacies.?eaving out of discussion for the moment actions and proceedingsaffecting estates of deceased persons, they resting upon a differentfooting being governed by speciallas, it is to be observed thatthesectioncontains noe*press inhibitionagainst thecourt. Itprovides simply that certain actions affecting real estate (shall bebrought in the province here the land, or some part thereof, issituated.( The prohibition here is clearly directed against the oneho begins the action and lays the venue. The court, before theaction is commenced, has nothing to do ith either. The plaintiffdoes both. .nlyhenthat is donedoes thesectionbegintooperate effectively so far as the court is concerned. The prohibitionis nor a limitation on the poer of the court but on the rights of theplaintiff. It isnotto ta!e something from the court but to grantsomething to the defendant. Its ording clearly deprives the courtof nothing hich it had, but gives thedefendant, asagainsttheplaintiff, certainrights hichhedidnot have. It establishes arelation not beteen the court and the subject ,after, but beteenthe plaintiff and the defendant. It relates not to jurisdiction but totrial. It touchesconvenience, not substance. It simplygives todefendant the unqualified right, if he desires it, to have the trialta!eplaceherehis landlies andhere, probably, all of hisitnesses live. Its object is to secure to him a convenient trial. If ithad been the intention of the la-ma!ers by section 3'' to put alimitation to the jurisdiction of the court, ho easy it ould havebeen to say so squarely. (1o Court of First Instance shall have orta!ejurisdictionof anactiontouchingtitletoorinterestinrealproperty lying holly in a province other than that in hich suchcourt is authori"ed to hold sessions,( or a similar provision, ouldhave been sufficient. This ould have been clearly a limitation onthe court rather than the party. There ould have been no room fordoubt. The legislature, hoever, did not do so. It, rather, chose touse language hichimposes alimitationonthe rights of theplaintiff.In saying this e do not desire to forceconstruction.1awphil.net Courtsshouldgivetolanguageitsplainmeaning, leaving the legislature to ta!e care of the consequences.The Philippine Commissionhaving, infullest phrase, giventheCourts of First Instance unrestricted jurisdiction over real estate inthe Islands by +ct 1o. $3), e are of the opinion that thejurisdiction ought not to be held to be ithdran e*cept by virtueof an +ct equally e*press, or so clearly inconsistent as to amountto the same thing. The fact that section 3'' is not such +ct, that itis found in code of Procedure rather than in the substantive la,thatitdealsiththerelativeprocedural rightsof partiesratherthan the poer of the court, that it relates to the place rather thantothe thing, that it composes theholeof achapter headedsimply (@enue,( lead us to hold that the Court of First Instance ofTarlac had full jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action at thetime hen it as dismissed.That it had jurisdiction of the persons of all the parties isindisputable. That jurisdiction as obtained not only by the usualcourse of practice 5 that is, by the process of the court 5 but alsobyconsent e*presslygiven, isapparent. Theplaintiff submitteditself to the jurisdiction by beginning the action. 9+yers %s. 8atson,$$3 A.0., -%,6 Fisher %s.0hropshire, $,' A.0., $33.: Thedefendantsarenointhiscourt as!ingthat theactionbenotdismissedbutcontinued. Theyarenotonly nor objectingtothejurisdiction of the court but, rather, are here on this appeal for thepurpose of maintaining that very jurisdiction over them.1or is the plaintiff in any position to as!ed for favors. It is clearlyguilty of gross negligence in the allegations of its complaint, if thelanddoes not lieinTarlac as it noasserts. It allegedinitscomplaint4,. That, according to the information secured after a minuteinvestigation in the offices of the land registry and of theland-ta* record of the municipalities ithin hosejurisdiction lie all the parcels composing the tract of land inquestion, the oners and occupants of the same, ith theirnames as they appear on the plan, are as follos.+t the time it commenced the action it as possessed of every facthich a complete !noledge of the location of the lands sought tobecondemnedrequired. It hadthemapof itsentirelinefromPaniqui to Tayug, shoing thepro%inces and the variousmunicipalities through hich it runs. 1ot only that4 >eforebeginning its action it had to !no the name of every necessarydefendant, the land he oned, and the e*tent of that portion to becondemned. Theinvestigationrequiredtoascertainthese factsould of necessity force into plaintiff;s mind the !noledgerequired to bring the action in the proper court. That the plaintiff atthe time it commenced this action did not !no in hat provinceits proposed stations and terminals ere is difficult to believe. Thatit did not !no in hat province the land lay hich it as about toma!e the subject of so important a proceeding is still more difficulttobelieve. Inspiteof all this, hoever,it deliberatelylaidthevenue in a province here no part of the land lay, too! possessionof the land in controversy, constructed its line, sitches, andstations, and after nearly to years of litigation, accompanied ithgreat trouble to the court and trouble and e*pense to the parties,calmly as!s the dismissal of the case for the reason that it did not!no here its on railroad as located. Ander suchcircumstances a dismissalof the action over the objection of thedefendants ought not to be permitted e*pect upon absolutenecessity and then only on payment of the costs and e*penses ofthe defendants and of the actin. 9+yers %s. 8atson andFisher %s.0hropshire, supra.:There is no equitable ground, then, upon hich the plaintiff mayclaim that it has not yielded itself to the jurisdiction of the court.1or, as e have seen, is there a legal ground. +s e have alreadysaid, the plaintiff, having brought the action, of necessity submitteditself tothejurisdictionof thecourt. It too!advantageof thesituation it itself created to ta!e possession of the lands describedin the complaint, construct its lines, sitches, stations, yards andterminals, and to carry the cause through to years of e*pensivelitigation. It no attempts to ma!e all this go for naught allegingits on negligence as a reason for such attempt. 9+yers %s. 8atsonand Fisher %s. 0hropshire, supra.:8hile the latter part of section 3'' provides that (the failure of adefendant toobject tothevenueof theactionat thetimeofentering his appearance in the action shall be deemed a aiver onhis part of all objection to the place or tribunal in hich the actionis brought,( e*cept, a month other things, in actions affecting realestate, e apprehend that it as not intended that adefendant cannot aivesuchobjectioninsuche*ceptedcases.1or e do believe that such provision is controlling in this case. Inthe first place, the application is restricted to (the time of enteringhis appearance in the action.( It might ell have been in the mindof the lama!ers that, at the time of entering his appearance inthe action, the defendant ould not ordinarily be fully informed ofall thefactsof thecase, at leastnot sufficientlytoarranthisbeing held to a aiver of important rights6 hereas, later in thecause, ashenhefileshisanserorgoestotrial, beingfullyinformed, he might justly be held to have aived his right to ma!esuch objection. for this reason it might ell be that the ?egislaturepurposely refrainedfrome*tendingthe time for his protectionbeyond the (time of entering his appearance in the action.(=oreover, there is, in said clause, no prohibition againstan e&press aiver of his rights by the defendant. The general ruleof la is that a person may renounce any right hich the la givesunless such renunciation is e*pressly prohibited or the rightconferred is of such a nature that its renunciation ould be againstpublic policy. This right of renunciation is so thoroughly established,and as at the time of the enactment of the Code of CivilProcedure, that its e*ercise by a defendant in relation to the venueof the action ill not be held to have been abridged by section 3''ithout very clear provision therein to that effect. There is no partof that sectionclear enoughtoarrant suchaholding. 2venthough the terms of said section ere much clearer than they areinthisrespect,eshouldstill hold, if theyeremuchshortofe*press, thattherightof renunciationisnotabridged, foundingourselves not only upon the principles already laid don but alsoupon the proposition of general la embodied in section /%, of thecode of Civil Procedure hich provides that48hen a statute or instrument is equally susceptible of tointerpretations, one in favor of natural right and the otheragainst it, the former is to be adopted.itc'alf=oreover,it shouldbenotedthat thisprohibition, if it besuch,against aiver refers e*clusively to the defendant. The plaintiff isgivennorightsrespectingit. Bet it istheplaintiff hoisherecalling for the application of the provision even against the declaredill of the person ho is e*pressly named as the sole beneficiary.8e ill not by interpretation e*tend this provision so as tocontravene the principles of natural rights. 8e ill not construed itsoastoincludedinitstermsnornamedasitsbeneficiary.>uteven if the plaintiff ere entitled to invo!e the aid of the provisionheisestoppedfromsodoing.98an"er %s. Coland,$&8is.,'6>abcoc! %s. Fareell, $,)Ill. +pp., 3&'68hite %s. Conn. =utual?ifeIns. Co.,,#ill 9A.0.:,$7360huttle %s. Thompson,$-8all.,$-%6 >eecher %s. =ill Co., ,- =ich., $&36 Tomb %s. Dochester D. D.Co., $7 >arb., -7-6 Ferguson %s. ?andram, ->ush9Ey.:, /3&60tate %s.=itchell, 3$.hio0tate, -%/6Counterman %s. #ublin,37.hio 0tate, -$-6 =cCarthy %s. ?avasche, 7% Ill., /'&6Dic!etts %s. 0pra!er, '' Ind., 3'$6 0trosser %s. City of Fort 8ayne,$&& Ind., ,,3:. 0ection 333 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads4Conclusi%e presumptions. 5 The folloing presumptions ordeductions, hich the la e*pressly directs to be made fromparticular facts, are deemed conclusive4$.8heneverapartyhas,byhisondeclaration,act,oromission, intentionally and deliberately led another tobelieve a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief,he can not, in any litigation arising out of such declaration,act, or omission, be permitted to falsity it.9Dodrigue" %s. =artine", - Phil. Dep., )'6 )%6 =unicipality of.as %s. Doa, ' Phil. Dep., /&, //6 Trinidad %s. Dicafort et al., ' Phil.Dep., ,,%, ,-36 =ac!e et al %s. Camps, ' Phil. Dep., --3, ---.:The fact is, there are very fe rights hich may not be renounced,e*pressly or impliedly. 9Christenson %s.Charleton, 3, +tl., //),//', )% @t., %$6 #onahue %s. 8indsor County Ins. Co., -) @t., %$6#onahaue %s. 8indsorIns. co.,33+tl.,%&/, %&,,))Conn.,/$,,&6 Fit"patric! %s. Cartford ?ife F +nnuity Ins. Co., -) Conn., $$),$3,, $' +tl., ,$$, ' +m. 0t. Dep., /776 ?eis %s. Phoeni* =ut. ?ifeIns. Co., ,, Conn., '/, %$6 0tate %s. Cartley, -/ +tl., )$-, )$', '-Conn., $&,6 First 1at. >an! %s. Cartford ?. F +. Ins. Co., ,- Conn.,//, ,,6 an! %s. =organ, $3/ A.0., $,$6 Fit"gerald2. =. Const. Co. %s. Fit"ergerald, $3' A.0., %7.:In the case of the nterior Construction and mpro%ement Co. %s.1i,ne" 9$)& A.0., /$':, the court held as follos4The circuit courts of the Anited 0tates are thus vested ithgeneral jurisdictionof civil actions, involvingtherequisitepecuniary value, beteen citi"ens of different 0tates.#iversityof citi"enshipisaconditionof jurisdiction, and,hen that does not appear upon the record, the court, of itson motion, ill order the action to be dismissed. >ut Theprovisionastotheparticular district inhichtheactionshall be brought does not touch the general jurisdiction ofthe court over suchacausebeteensuchparties6 butaffects only the proceedings ta!en to bring the defendantithin such jurisdiction, and is matter of personal privilege,hich the defendant may insist upon, or may aive, at hiselection6 and the defendant;s right to object that an actionithin the general jurisdiction of the court is brought in therong district, is aived by entering a general appearance,ithoutta!ingtheobjection. 9Gracie %s. Palmer,78heat,)%%6 Toland %s. 0prague, $/ Pet., 3&&, 33&6 -&parte 0chollenberger, %) A.0., 3)%, 3'76 0t. ?ouis F 0. F. D.Co. %s. =c>ride, $,$ A.0., $/'6 0outhern PacificCo. %s. #ento, $,) A.0., /&/, /&)6 Te*as F Pacific DailayCo. %s. 0aunders, $-$ A.0., $&-6 Central TrustCo. %s. =cGeorge, $-$ A.0., $/%6 0outhern 2*pressCo. %s. Todd, $/ A.0. app., 3-$.:In the case of Central Trust Co. %s. +c1eorge 9$-$ A.0., $/%:, thecourt disposed of the case as follos4The court belo, in holding that it did not have jurisdictionof the cause, and in dismissing the bill of complaint for thereason, acted in vie of that clause of the +ct of =arch 3,$77', as amended in +ugust, $777, hich provides that (nosuit shall bebrought inthecircuit courts of theAnited0tates against any person, by any original process orproceeding, in any other district than that hereof he is aninhabitant6( and, undoubtedly,if thedefendant company,hich as sued in another district than that in hich it hadits domicile, had, by a proper plea or motion, sought to availitself of thestatutorye*emption, theactionof thecourtould have been right.>utthedefendantcompanydidnotchoosetopleadthatprovision of the statute, but entered a general appearance,and joined ith the complainant in its prayer for theappointment of a receiver, and thus as brought ithin theruling of this court, so frequently made, that the e*emptionfrombeingsuchout of the district of its domicile is apersonal privilege hich may be aive and hich is aivedby pleading to the merits.9Improvement Co. %s. Gibney, $) 0up. Ct., /'/, $)& A.0., /$'6 ,&?. ed., ,&$6 8al!er %s. 8indsor 1at. >an!, - C. C. +., ,/$, -) Fed.,'), - A.0. +pp., ,/36 @on +u. %s. Chicago Toy F Fancy Goods Co.,)%Fed.,,,7=c>ride %s.GranddeTour PloCo.,,&Fed.,$)/6>lac! %s. Thorne, Fed. Cas. 1o. $, ,%- 9$& >latchf., )), - Fish. Pat.Cas., --&:6 1orris %s. +tlas 0teamship Co., 3' Fed., /'%6 Coover F+llen Co. %s. Columbia 0tra Paper Co., )7 Fed., %,-6>lac!burn %s. DailroadCo., Fed., Fed., Cas. 1o. $, ,)'9/Flip.,-/-:6 @ermont Farm =ach. Co. %s. Gibson, -& Fed., ,/3.:In the case of .ecurit" Loan and Trust Co. %s. Kauffman 9$&7 Cal.,/$,:, the court said4Theconstitution, +rticle@I, section-, declaresthat, (+llactions for the enforcement of liens( shall becommenced inthe county in hich the real estate or some portion thereofis situated6 and at the time this action as (commenced(the property as situate ithin the boundaries of 0an#iego. The constitution does not, hoever, require propertyis situated, and the statutory provision in section 3%/ of theCode of Civil Procedure, that actions ;for the foreclosure ofliens and mortgages on real property; must be tried in thecountyinhichthesubject of theaction, or somepartthereof, is situated, (subject to the poer of the court tochange the place of trial,( shos that (the place of trial( isnot an element going to the jurisdiction of the court, but isa matter of legislative regulation. The provisionfor thetransfer of certain actions to the superior court of thecounty of Diverside, hich is contained in section $/ of theact providing for the organi"ation of that county, shos thee*tent of this regulation hich the legislature deemednecessary, and implies that only the actions theredesignated ere to be transferred for trial.In the case of Chouteau %s. Allen 9'& =o., /%&:, the court held asfollos4Thestatutoryprovisioninrespect topersonal actions ismore emphatic, requiring that (suits instituted by summons,shall, e*cept as otheriseprovidedbyla, bebrought4First, hen the defendant is a resident of the 0tate, eitherin the county ithin hich the defendant resides, or in thecounty ithin hich the plaintiff resides, and the defendantmaybefound,( andyet it asheldinreferencetothisstatute in the case ofHem,ree %s. Camp,ell 97 =o., -'/:,that though the suit as brought in the county in hich theplaintiff resided, and service had upon the defendant in thecounty of his residence, unless a plea in abatement to thejurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant,asinterposedinthefirstinstance, theobjectiononthescore of lac! of jurisdiction could not subsequently besuccessfully raised. +nd this, upon the generally recogni"edground that the court had jurisdictionover the subjectmatter of thesuit, andthat thedefendant;spleatothemerits ac!noledged jurisdiction over his person, andprecluded objection on account of absence of regularity inthe instituting of the action. 0o also, in 2lrici %s. $apin 9$$=o.., ,/:, here the then e*isting statute required (suits inequity concerning real estate, or hereby the same may beaffected, shall be brought in the county ithin hich suchreal estate or greater part thereof is situate,( and bydemurrer to the billit as objected that the suit as notbrought in the proper county in conformity ith thestatutory provision, ut all circuitcourtshaveageneral jurisdictionover theforeclosureofmortgages.In the case of Armendia3 %s. .tillman 9-, Te*as, )/3:, the courtdisposed of the question involved in the folloing ords4In our opinion, hoever, these common la rules respectinglocal and transitory actions have no more to do indetermining ith us here a suit can be brought andmaintained, than the li!e rules in respect to the form andnames of actions6 but this is solely regulated by anddependent upon the proper construction of the constitutionandstatutesof the0tate. Inthefirst, it isemphaticallydeclared in the billof rights as a fundamentalprinciple ofgovernment, (+ll courts shall be open, and every person foran injury done him in his lands, goods, person orreputation, shall have remedy by due course of la.( 1o aparty may not have an action in rem for or concerning landin foreign jurisdiction, because redress can not be given orhad by such proceeding in due course of la6 but personaldamages may be given for such injury and enforced by dueprocess of la ithin the 0tate. (+nd it ould seem if the0tate failed to give to one of its citi"ens a remedy againstothers for injuriesofthis!ind, it ould failinthe pledgemade in the constitution as plainly as if the injury had beenin a foreign jurisdiction to one;s goods or person.(Thereis,as