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Transcript of ManEc 300Day 1 Bryson 1. This daily outline is subject to revision and upgrading. It might be wise...
ManEc 300 Day 1Bryson
1. This daily outline is subject to revision and upgrading. It might be wise to rely on the syllabus as an agenda2. Review syllabus 3. On the significance of economics.Review Power Point presentation on the methodology and power of microeconomics
3. Personal introduction and testimony4. Feedback on concerns. What concerns do you have about ManEc 300?
ManEc 300 Day 1Bryson (Cont’d)
Course Objective I: Help you understand the firm in its competitive environment and its internal organization by mastering these concepts.
My objectives will be achieved by understanding.
Bounded rationality and private information
Central economic planning vs. markets.
Competitive markets Competitive advantage
How markets work Elasticities Isoquants and Isocost
curves Industrial regulation Isoquants and isocosts Coordination and
motivation in organizations
Mathematics and Micro-economics Market models: competition and imperfect
comp. Contracting and opportunistic behavior Performance Incentives Porter’s five competitive forces. Strategy and
Economics Production and Costs Property Rights and Ownership
Course Objective II: Help you gain the conviction through class activities that all these concepts are useful in application.
For Tomorrow’s (Second) Session
Look over syllabus Read Chap. 1, pp. 14-19, 34-39,
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Get accustomed to web site See online: Markets, 300.ppt
ManEc 300 Day 2Bryson
1. Make seating chart2. Discuss student presentations
(Review syllabus)3. Introduce TA for the course,
Plarent [email protected]
4. Sign up for The Wall Street Journal
ManEc 300 Day 2Bryson
Discuss markets and the market economy by reviewing concepts in “Markets, 300” Non-price variables Demand curve
Substitute products Ceteris paribus Change in supply Change in q supplied Equilibrium Surplus/shortage Consumer surplus Producer Surplus Market automaticity Government intervention
ManEc 300 Day 2Bryson
Review of first text reading assignment and Markets, 300.ppt.
Look at the end of Chapter 4, “Demand Estimation.”
Review Econometrics.ppt
For Tomorrow’s (Third) Session
Finish reading (or review) chapter 4 and brush up on elasticities
No quizzes yet. Just do the homework assignment due on Thursday.
Group 1: CEO Compensation Scott Brinkerhoff, Jason Greenwood, Rob Murtagh, Jonathan Nielsen Group 2: Intellectual Property RightsHayden Arnold, Shaun Bailey, Sunne Drinkwater, David Stevens
Group 3: K-Mart Bryan Barney, Brian Cooley, Andrea Everts,
David Jensen
TEAMS, Summer, 2004
Group 4: Microsoft as a MonopolyNathan Palki, Travy Ka Ying Wong, Sabrina Wu, Sandra Woodruff Group 5: Apple Computers and Technology Corey Davis, Aubrey Duncan, Rich Hamilton, Will Kearl
TEAMS, Summer, 2004
Team Organization
Introductions. Choose team spokesman. Exchange phone numbers, etc.
Team meeting time.
Team name?
Team Organization
Choose three issues your team would like to present. If there are no conflicts, you will be assigned your first preference.
o Choose a major firm and explain its strategies and describe its performance,
o Describe the problems of an entire industry,
o Talk about an important problem in the environment of the economy or for a particular industry
Team Organization Spokesman. Meeting time. Team name? Select presentation topic priorities:
Choose three issues to present. If there are no conflicts, you will be assigned your first choice.
o A major firm o An industry, o An important micro problem
Elasticity, Alfred Marshall
• Consumer response to price change
• ($1 off on gum/washing machine) ∆p0, ceteris paribus The Definition %∆Quantity %∆Price
ManEc 300 Day 3Bryson
Another way to write that ∆Q x 100
Q (mean)
∆P x 100
P (mean)
or, point elasticity is: η = (P/Q)(dq/dp)
ManEc 300 Day 3Bryson
%∆Quantity ∆Q x 100%∆Price Q (mean) ∆P x 100
P (mean)
P1=30
P2=40
Q1=133 Q2=200
= -[∆Q/(Q1+Q2)/2] /
[∆P/P1+P2)/2]
=-[-67/(200+133)/2] / [10/(30+40)/2]
= 1.4
4. Elasticity and revenues
5. Elastic >1 P TR
Inelastic <1 P TR
Unitary =1 TR max
*Diagrams showing each as well as
summary diagram
ManEc 300 Day 3Bryson
Cross of Demand% change in Q of X% change in P of Y
(∆Qx/Qx)
(∆Py/Py)+ sign: substitutes- sign: complementsCloser relationships indicated by higher coefficient
For tomorrow’s (fourth) session
1. Review Power Point Presentation:Markets vs. Hierarchies (“Hierarchies”)2. Complete first homework assignment, which
is due tomorrow.
3. For subscribers, the Journal is available on line.
When it starts to come, get on line and go to http://services.wsj.com/ Enter your account number, which is on the address sticker.
Day 4 For the next (5th) Session
See Power Point presentation:The Firm’s Coordination of Plans and Activities (“Firm Coordination”)
Be prepared in class to discuss or take a quiz on the following:
Should there be market coordination within the corporation?
What are design attributes? Firms don’t always have dispatchers or
coxswains, so what organizational problem do they have?
Day 4 (Cont’d) Preparation for next session
What problems of information flow does the firm have in its planning? What is brittleness?
When can the firm not rely on organizational routine for proper functioning of productive processes?
How do economies of scale and scope affect the firm’s coordination?
ManEc 300, Day 5 Review Questions from Session 4What problems of information flow does the firm have
in its planning? What is brittleness?When can the firm not rely on organizational routine
for proper functioning of productive processes?How do economies of scale and scope affect the
firm’s coordination?What problems of information flow does the firm have
in its planning? What is brittleness?When can the firm not rely on organizational routine
for proper functioning of productive processes?How do economies of scale and scope affect the
firm’s coordination?
ManEc 300 Day 5, cont.
Review “The Principle-Agent Problem” For tomorrow, you should be well into
the reading of Chapter 5 of the text.
When you get a chance, review Coase and transactions costs. (See the last part of Chapter 4 and the ppt, “Markets vs. Hierarchies”).
The Neo-classical Theory of the Firm, Part II, Production and costs.Start with an unspecified production function:
Q = f(a,b,...n) = f(X1, X2,…Xn)
ManEc 300 Day 6Bryson
A specific production function may appear as suggested in the text.
Q = S1/2 A1/2, where S = steel and A = Aluminum.Reminder: S1/2 =S and S1/n = n S
ManEc 300 Day 6Bryson
Law of Diminishing Returns: holding all inputs constant but one, increasing variable inputs will give rise first to increasing returns, but ultimately, additional units of the input will bring less than proportional returns.
Production Functions and costs.
Diminishing returns can be shown by exponents that add to less than one.
S1/2(S 1/2) = SS1/3(S 1/3) = S2/3
Production Functions and costs.
Stages of Production
Begin with a Total Product (TP) curve. With two geometric “tricks,” find Average Product (AP) and Marginal Product (MP) curves. Discuss these concepts.
Relationship between average and marginal values.
Stages of Production
At boundary of stages I/II, AP = MP, at boundary of stage II/III, MP = 0. Discuss other characteristics.
Why we produce in stage II of production.
Geometric Trick 1
Holding land constant and adding labor leads to a growth of TP until diminishing returns set in. APL = TP/labor. MPL = the change in TP when labor (a) increases by 1 unit. Geometrically, APL = TP/a or the slope of a ray from the origin, intersecting the TP curve at some level of output.
Geometric Trick 1
Land Labor TP APL MPL
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 2 5 9 12 14 15 15 14 12
0 2 2 /2 3 3 2 4/5 2 1/2 2 1/7 1 3/4 1 1/3
.. 2 3 4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2
Geometric Trick 1, the old ray from the origin trick. Slope = rise/run =
T/a APL = TP/a Draw a ray from O
through the relevant point on the TP curve.
Notice that this slope rises to point E, then falls again at larger outputs.
Geometric Trick 2, the old tangency trick.
Find the slope of TP ata given output to determine the MPa atat that output.. Find the slope geometrically by drawing a tangent lineto the TP curve at the interesting output.
The Stages of Production
Let us draw these and conclude by showing why we operate in
Stage II of production. In stage I, we keep going for more inputs because it results in growing average and marginal productivity. In stage III we are experiencing diminishing returns (negative MPa)
2. Review two geometric tricks:
1. Find SR: AVC, AFC, AC,
2. Find MC.
3. Relationship between average and
marginal values.
ManEc 300 Day 7Bryson
Total CostsAt first, TVC and TC rise gradually, Q rises faster than cost because of increasing returns.
Then, TVC and TC rise rapidly. Costs rise faster than output because of diminishing returns.
Average variable, average total costs
We can find the average costs from the totals, using geometric trick #1, the old ray trick.
Draw a ray from the origin through a point on the TC or TVC curve. The slope of the ray is the average cost
Average variable, average total costs
(Rise/Run = TC/Q = AC.
First it declines (increasing returns, then rises (diminishing returns.
Marginal Costs
Marginal cost is the change in TC or TVC when output is increased by one unit. Or, it is the slope of TC or TVC. Therefore, we can find it by taking the derivative of a TC function.
Marginal Costs
Or, we can use geometric trick #2, the old tangency trick. Draw a tangency to the TC (or TVC) curve. The slope of the tangent is MC. First, MC declines (increasing returns), but ultimately rises (decreasing returns).
Relate AVC to APP
Note that the APP rises and falls in correspondence with the decline, then increase of AVC. AP increases (AVC) falls as increasing returns to the variable factor occurs.
But as diminishing returns set in, APP falls, which means that AVC rises.
Discuss LR Costs
1. No fixed factors
2. Unlimited number of conceptual
SRAC curves
ManEc 300 Day 7Prof. Bryson (Cont’d)
Discuss LR Costs
3. Envelope curve
4. “For any output, min cost by using
the scale of plant whose SRAC curve is
tangent to the LRAC curve.”
ManEc 300 Day 7Prof. Bryson (Cont’d)
5. Why is it U-shaped?Economies of scale vs. Law of diminishing returnsEconomies of scale: division and specialization of labor, advanced technology, large machines, digitalization and electronics.Diseconomies of scale: control and coordination problems
ManEc 300 Day 7Bryson (Cont’d)
6. Learning curve 7.
7. Four LRAC curves
Textbook U
(Range of) constant returns
Constant returns through replication
Continually increasing returns
ManEc 300 Day 7Bryson (Cont’d)
For the next session, review pp.
111-117 on Isoquants and
Isocost lines.
ManEc 300 Day 7Bryson (Cont’d)
Isoquant/Isocost approach to
production, trade, equilibrium and
efficiency.
ManEc 300 Episode 8Bryson
Isoquants--purpose for use
Get up to speed on diagrams.
Tight logic (and math) vs.
Scientists prize
-- skepticism,
-- rigorous reasoning, and
-- empirical experimentation.)
ManEc 300 Episode 8Bryson
Appreciate and understand
Tradeoffs
Budget constraints
Logic of maximization
Representation of efficiency
Get ready for a quiz next session on the
production box.
Learning Objectives
The analysis
1. Intuition on isoquants:
Movement NE = improvement.
Discovering substitutability of inputs.
MRTSlk = ∆ K/ ∆ L
one unit of L will compensate.
ManEc 300 Day 8 (Cont’d)
The analysis
2. Characteristics of isoquants
a. No intersection
b. Downward slope
MRTSlk = amount of K lost for which
one unit of L will compensate.
ManEc 300 Day 8 (Cont’d)
Total Cost = C = wL + rK
Rewrite: rK = C - wL
K = C/r - (w/r)L
Intercept
ratio of factor
prices = slope of
budget line
Budget line
Slope of isoquant =
MRTSlk = MPl/MPk = ∆ K/ ∆L
Discuss diminishing MRTSlk Notion
of tradeoff
∆Q = MPl(∆L) ∆Q = MPk(∆K)
Budget line
On the isoquant
MPl (∆ L) + MPk(∆K) = 0
At equilibrium
Slope of Isoquant = Slope of isocost
ManEc 300 Day 8Bryson
Mpl /MPk = w/r
Mpl /w = MPk/r
(Mpl /Pl = Mpk/Pk)
4. Show changing slope of isocost line
5. Show changing isocost line (shift when
budget changes)
ManEc 300 Day 8Bryson
Preparation for quiz on isoquants and
the Edgeworth Box:
1. Review the effect of price changes
2. Explain the Edgeworth-Bowley Box
Trading from any point off the
contract curve to a point on the contract
curve.
3
ManEc 300 Day 9Bryson
Preparation for quiz on isoquants and
the Edgeworth Box:
3. Gains of trade.
Efficiency is being on the contract
curve.
ManEc 300 Day 9Bryson
4. How does one move on the
contract curve?
Theft, violence, opportunism--
Elaborate according to time on
“economic man” as rational
optimizer vs. more modern
problem of opportunism.
ManEc 300 Day 9Bryson (Cont’d)
Contrast utility maximization to
opportunism
5. Show connection of points on
the contract curve to points on
PPF.
ManEc 300 Day 9Bryson (Cont’d)
Begin with a Total Product (TP) curve. With two geometric “tricks,” find Average Product
(AP) and Marginal Product (MP) curves. Discuss these concepts.
At boundary of stages I/II, AP = MP, at boundary of stage II/III, MP = 0. Discuss
other characteristics.Why we produce in stage II of production.
Geometric Trick 1
Holding land constant and adding labor leads to a growth of TP until diminishing returns set in. APL = TP/labor. MPL = the change in TP when labor (a) increases by 1 unit. Geometrically, APL = TP/a or the slope of a ray from the origin, intersecting the TP curve at some level of output.
Geometric Trick 1
LanLandd
LaborLabor TPTP APLAPL MPLMPL
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
00 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9
00 2 2 5 5 9 9 12 12 14 14 15 15 15 15 14 14 12 12
00 2 2 2 1/2 2 1/2 33 3 3 2 4/5 2 4/5 2 ½ 2 ½ 2 1/72 1/7 1 1 3/43/4 1 1 1/31/3
.... 22 3 3 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 0 -1 -1 -2 -2
Geometric Trick 1, the old ray from the origin trick.
Slope = rise/run = Slope = rise/run = T/aT/a
APL = TP/aAPL = TP/a Draw a ray from O Draw a ray from O
through the through the relevant point on relevant point on the TP curve.the TP curve.
Notice that this Notice that this slope rises to point slope rises to point E, then falls again E, then falls again at larger outputs.at larger outputs.
Geometric Trick 2, the old tangency trick.
Find the slope of TP at a given output to determine the MPaat that output.Find the slopegeometrically by drawing a tangent line to the TP curveat the interesting output.
Show why we operate in Stage II In stage I, we keep going for more In stage I, we keep going for more inputs because it results in growing inputs because it results in growing average and marginal productivity. average and marginal productivity. In stage III we are experiencing In stage III we are experiencing diminishing returns (negative MPa).diminishing returns (negative MPa).
Total Costs
At first, TVC and TC rise gradually, Q rises faster than cost because of increasing returns.
Then, TVC and TC rise rapidly. Costs rise faster than output because of diminishing returns.
Average variable, average total costs
We can find the average costs from the totals, using geometric trick #1, the old ray trick.
Average variable, average total costs
Draw a ray from the origin through a point on the TC or TVC curve. The slope of the ray is the average cost (Rise/Run = TC/Q = AC. First it declines (increasing returns, then rises (diminishing returns).
Marginal Costs
Marginal cost is the change in TC or TVC when output is increased by one unit. Or, it is the slope of TC or TVC. Therefore, we can find it by taking the derivative of a TC function.
Marginal Costs
Or, we can use geometric trick #2, the old tangency trick. Draw a tangency to the TC (or TVC) curve. The slope of the tangent is MC.First, MC declines (increasing returns), but ultimately rises (decreasing returns).
AP increases (AVC) falls as increasing returns to the variable factor occurs.
But as diminishing returns set in, APP falls, which means that AVC rises
Discuss LR Costs
1. No fixed factors
2. Unlimited number of conceptual
SRAC curves. Choose your output,
then the SRAC that produces it at the
lowest cost.
Discuss LR Costs
3. Envelope curve
4. “For any output, min cost by using
the scale of plant whose SRAC curve is
tangent to the LRAC curve.”
Why is it U-shaped?
Economies of scale vs. Law of diminishing returns
Economies of scale: division and specialization of labor, advanced technology, large machines, digitalization and electronics.
Diseconomies of scale: control and coordination problems
Learning curve.
Four LRAC curves
Textbook U
(Range of) constant returns
Constant returns through replication
Continually increasing returns
Isoquant/Isocost approach to
production, trade, equilibrium and
efficiency.
Isoquants--purpose for use
Get up to speed on diagrams.
Tight logic (and math) vs.
Isoquant/Isocost approach to
production, trade, equilibrium and
efficiency.
Scientists prize
-- skepticism,
-- rigorous reasoning, and
-- empirical experimentation.)
Appreciate and understand
Tradeoffs
Budget constraints
Logic of maximization
Representation of efficiency
Get ready for a quiz next session on
the production box.
1. Intuition on isoquants:
Movement NE = improvement.
Discovering substitutability of inputs.
MRTSlk = ∆ K/ ∆ L
2. Characteristics of isoquants
a. No intersection
b. Downward slope
MRTSlk = amount of K lost for which
one unit of L will compensate.
Total Cost = C = wL + rK
Rewrite: rK = C - wL
K = C/r - (w/r)L
Intercept ratio of factor
prices (or slope of
budget line)
Slope of isoquant:
MRTSlk = MPl/MPk = ∆ K/ ∆L
Discuss diminishing MRTSlk (and tradeoffs)
∆Q = MPl(∆L) ∆Q = MPk( ∆ K)
On the isoquantMPl(∆ L) + MPk(∆K) = 0
Preparation for quiz on isoquants and
the
Edgeworth Box:
1. Start with the two-producer barter
case of production: the Edgeworth-
Bowley Box
Gains of trade.Efficiency is being on the contract curve.
Trading from any point off the contract
curve to a point on the contract curve.
O Labor
Ca
pit
al
(Food Producer Origin)
0(Clothing Producer Origin)Labor
Ca
pital
C
A
Observe a movement frompoint A to a point on theContract Curve.
B Who has gained here?Is this a net social gain?
O Labor
Ca
pit
al
(Food Producer Origin)
0(Clothing Producer Origin)Labor
Ca
pital
C
A
Observe a different movement from point A to a point on theContract Curve.
D
Who has gained here?Is this a net social gain?
O Labor
Ca
pit
al
(Food Producer Origin)
0(Clothing Producer Origin)Labor
Ca
pital
C
A
Observe a more reasonable movement from point A to point D on the Contract Curve.
D
Who has gained here?Is this a net social gain?
Movement along the contract curve
To move to the contract curve is to achieve
efficiency. What does movement along the
curve represent?
Theft, violence, opportunism–
“economic man” as rational optimizer
vs. opportunism.
Say we have a budget of $100, Pl = $.50 and Pk = $1
$100 = .50L + K
K = 100 – 0.5L 100 is the Y intercept, K = 100 – 0.5L 100 is the Y intercept, the slope is -1 times the slope is -1 times
the ratio of the two prices (Pl/Pk).the ratio of the two prices (Pl/Pk).
Ownership and Property Rights.ppt,
1. Review slide (power point)
presentation for chapter 5.
2. The ppt presentation reviews
Millgrom & Roberts notes.
ManEc 300 Day 10Bryson
Ownership and Property Rights, II1. Complete property rights discussion (& “tragedy of commons”)
Coase Theorem2. Read about government actions and other solutions to externalities problem. A. Cooperation and Group OwnershipB. ReputationC. Taxes and Subsidies
ManEc 300 Day 11Bryson
2. a. Discuss overhead “The Nature of
Profits”.
b. Millgrom & Roberts on “Ownership
of Complex Assets”.
ManEc 300 Day 11Bryson (Cont’d)
ManEc 300 Day 12Prof. Bryson The Profit Motive
Definition I. Normal Profit (as
opposed to accounting profits) assumes a return high enough to include:
A. Normal (opportunity cost) return to stockholders
ManEc 300 Day 12Prof. Bryson The Profit Motive
B. Normal (opportunity cost) return to management (and all other factors).
II. Economic Profit or “Pure” Profit is any profit in excess of normal profit.
The Function of Profit
Pure or Economic Profit permits:1. Higher than normal returns (dividends)
to owners2. Increase in value of owners’ holdings (Or, profits “plowed back” into
investments)
The Function of Profit
3. Higher than normal (opportunity cost) returns for other factors of production.
Profit can be a vitally important market signal of great social benefit.
The Origins of Profit
Profits may result from -- the exploitation of a
monopoly position, -- from innovative
entrepreneurship and the effective introduction of new technologies (cost-cutting or revenue generating) in the face of risk, or
The Origins of Profit
Profits may result from --from a new and
superior means of satisfying consumer demands
Profit Maximization and Other Theories
1. Profit maximization, say most economists, is the best general theory. It has to work in pure competition.
2. Where a firm has little competition, or competitive “slack”, it may be at liberty to pursue other objectives, while “satisficing” profits.
Profit Maximization and Other Theories
Other objectives might include: A. Maximizing Sales Revenues B. Maximizing Market Share C. Ensuring Long-term Survival D. Pursuing growth and
Diversification for the firm E. Pursuing Social Objectives
The Simple Mathematics of Micro
Production theory. Begin with a production function:
showing output, Q, a function of the variable input, labor, a.
Marginal product of labor (MPa) isa) the addition to total product resulting from the use of one more unit of a.
The Simple Mathematics of Micro
Marginal product of labor (MPa) isb) the slope of the total product curve, andc) the first derivative of a total product, TP, function, thus,
dQ/da = MPa = 21 + 18a - 3a2*_______________________
Taking Derivatives
*You will remember about first derivatives that:
to get the derivative of a constant, dQ/da = 0. For example, in the expression
Q = 21 + 7a - a2 + 3a3, the number 21 is a constant, for which
dQ/da = 0.
Taking Derivatives
To get the derivative of a variable “a” preceded by a coefficient m, or ma, dQ/da = m.
For example, in the expression Q = 21 + 7a - a2 + 3a3,
the term 7a consists of the coefficient 7 and the variable a, for which dQ/da = 7.
Taking Derivatives
To get the derivative of a variable with an exponent, an, dQ/da = nan-1.
For example, in the expression
Q = 21 + 7a - a2 + 3a3,
the term a2 consists of the variable a and the exponent 2, for which dQ/da = 2a.
Taking Derivatives
(By the formula, this would read 2a1, but any number or variable taken to the first power, i.e., having an exponent of 1, is not changed. So we need not write the 1.)
Taking Derivatives To get the derivative of a variable with
both coefficient m and exponent n, such as man, we have dQ/da = n(m)an-1
For example, in the expression Q = 21 + 7a - a2 + 3a3, the term 3a3 consists of the variable a
with the coefficient 3 and exponent 3, for which
dQ/da = 9a2.
Taking DerivativesFor the entire expression, Q = 21 + 7a - a2 + 3a3, we get the derivative
dQ/da = 7 - 2a + 9a2.For average product, AP, we have
APa = (TP/a) = (21a + 9a2 - a3)/a = 21 + 9a - a2
Cost Analysis Now consider costs, using the same
kind of analysis. We recall the simple short-run relationships, specifically that total cost, TC, equals total fixed costs (TFC) plus total variable costs (TVC) or
TC = TFC + TVC
Cost Analysis
TC = TFC + TVC
Dividing both sides by Q, or quantity of output, we have
TC/Q = TFC/Q + TVC/Q, or AC = AFC + AVC.
Cost Analysis
For total cost, consider the expressionTC = 128 + 69Q - 14Q2 + Q3.
Here, TFC = 128 and TVC = 69Q - 14Q2 + Q3.
Cost Analysis
MC = dTC/dQ = dTVC/dQ = 69 - 28Q + 3Q2
AVC = TVC/Q = (69Q - 14Q2 + Q3)/Q = 69 - 14Q + Q2
The Demand Function
Consider now a demand function such as
P = 3200 - 13Q.
It will be recalled that demand = average revenue, AR, so we also have
AR = 3200 - 13Q
The Demand Function
Note that in this expression of a linear demand function, 3200 is the intercept, -13 the slope.
To get total revenue, TR, we observe that TR = P x Q, so
TR = 3200Q - 13Q2
Marginal Revenue
Marginal revenue, MR, is simply the slope of a total revenue curve, or the first derivative of a TR function,
so from P = 3200-13Q. TR = PQ = 3200Q – 13Q2
MR = dTR/dQ = 3200 - 26Q.
Marginal Revenue
It will be noticed that the MR has the same intercept (3200) as the demand or average revenue curve, while the slope(-26 rather than -13) of MR is twice as great as the slope of AR, i.e., the MR curve falls twice as fast as the demand curve.
Maximizing Profits
Now, maximizing the firm’s profits.TR = PQ = 3200Q - 13Q2
MR = 3200 - 26Q.Assume: TC= 24,000 + 500Q - 13Q2 + Q3,
MC = 500 - 26Q + 3Q2.
Maximizing Profits
To get profit maximization, we simply equate MC and MR, so MC = MR
3200 - 26Q = 500 - 26Q + 3Q2
2700 = 3Q2
900 = Q2
Q = 30
Optimal Price with Quantity = 30
Looking back at the demand function again, we have
P = 3200 - 13(30)P = 3200 - 390P = 2810.
This is the right price to charge for sales of 30 units of output in the pursuit of maximal profit.
Don’t forget the group math homework
due next session.
1. Math assignment Hints:
Problem 3: plug value of Q into formula
up front, not after you have
differentiated.
FOR THE NEXT SESSION
Note that dp/dq = 1/(dQ/dP),
dQ/dP = 1/(dP/dQ)
No quadratic equation used.
Follow problem 4's hint. Factor Q2 so
(...Q)(...Q)
FOR THE NEXT SESSION
As soon as the next discussion (on
competition) Is complete, we will have
a quiz on that topic.
Please look at the reading for the next
session..
ManEc 300 Conclusion, Day 12 Prof Bryson
Pure Competition The assumptions of pure competition.
– A large number of buyers and sellers– Product homogeneity– Free entry and exit
The assumption that makes for perfect competition– Rapid dissemination of low-cost, accurate
information
Pure Competition
Discuss the standard, market/firm, double diagram of competition.
Short-term profits lead to entry, which can impact costs: constant, increasing, decreasing.
3. Review of pure competition.a. TC, TR and NR diagrams for NR>0, NR=0, NR<0.b. When making losses? When shut down? (Go fishing)
ManEc 300 Day 13 Prof. Bryson Pure Competition
3. Review of pure competition.c. Why is perfect competition efficient?d. Show constant & increasing (then
decreasing) costs.4. Why all cost curves are equal in
competition
e.
ManEc 300 Day 13 Prof. Bryson Pure Competition
As soon as the next discussion (on competition) Is complete, we will have a quiz on that topic.
Please look at the reading for the next session..
The assumptions of pure competition. The assumptions of pure competition. A large number of buyers and sellersA large number of buyers and sellers Product homogeneityProduct homogeneity Free entry and exitFree entry and exit
The assumption that makes for The assumption that makes for perfect competitionperfect competition Rapid dissemination of low-cost, Rapid dissemination of low-cost,
accurate informationaccurate information
Discuss the standard, market/firm, Discuss the standard, market/firm, double diagram of competition.double diagram of competition.
P
Q qqq
Entry can impact costs: constant, Entry can impact costs: constant, increasing, decreasing.increasing, decreasing.
First, consider an increasing cost First, consider an increasing cost industry in pure competitionindustry in pure competition
1.1. Demand IncreasesDemand Increases2.2. Price risesPrice rises3.3. Entry Occurs, pushing S out to the Entry Occurs, pushing S out to the
rightright4.4. Costs change as a result of entry, here Costs change as a result of entry, here
they risethey rise
P=MR=AR
D
S
0
P
q
Consider now a decreasing-cost Consider now a decreasing-cost industry in pure competitionindustry in pure competition
1.1. Demand IncreasesDemand Increases2.2. Price risesPrice rises3.3. Entry Occurs, pushing S out to the Entry Occurs, pushing S out to the
rightright4.4. Costs change as a result of entry, here Costs change as a result of entry, here
they fallthey fall
P=MR=AR
D
S
0
P
q
1.1. Demand IncreasesDemand Increases2.2. Price risesPrice rises3.3. Entry Occurs, pushing S out to the Entry Occurs, pushing S out to the
rightright4.4. Costs usually change as a result of Costs usually change as a result of
entry, but here they remain the sameentry, but here they remain the same
P=MR=AR
D
S
0
P
q
When making losses? When shut down? (Go fishing)
NR
TC
TR
If we shut down, wemust pay?
Total Fishing Costs!
TFCIf we produce, we suffer only our operatinglosses
Why is perfect competition efficient?
The consumer pays only the minimalaverage costs of production.All factors of production get normal opportunity cost returns.
Why all cost curves are equal in competition
Firm A Firm B
Assume Firm A has a production factor thatreduces production costs, lowering cost curves
Firm B and many others will try to bid that factor away from A. If A doesn’t pay that factor more,It will leave. So A’s cost curves go back up.
Quiz on competition
Begin monopoly
See Power Point presentation
Day 15Review session before midterm.Day 16 Midterm at Testing Center.
ManEc 300 Day 14Bryson (Cont’d)
1. PowerPoint presentation of
monopoly.
2. There will be a multiple choice quiz
next class session on monopoly.
ManEc 300 Day 17Bryson
Discussion on monopoly regulation and contestable markets.
ManEc 300 Days 18, 19Prof. Bryson
Announcements:In the File Directory, see “Practice Multiple Choice Questions.doc.” At the bottom of the file are references to on-line multiple choice questions for practice and tips on doing them.
ManEc 300 Day 19Bryson
Competition from a spiritual perspective. . Discussion on Price discrimination Monopolistic competition
ManEc 300 Day 20Bryson
Begin oligopoly, which will cover The Kinked Demand Curve (see ppt) Baumol’s model of Sales Maximization with a profit constraint, and Game theory
Profit constrained sales maximization
Goal: maximize total revenue (dollar sales, not physical volume), while making sufficient profit.
Sufficient profit– Pays satisfactory dividends– Provides net investment for growth– Ensures financial safety, and– Retains capital market confidence.
Baumol on Sales Maximization Oligopoly and the real world
X
$
0
TR
TC
Min ΠNR
A
We used this model for Monopoly, and it applies here.
A = NR or Π maxC = Sales max, butwith big losses.
B = greatest sales that still yield sufficient and minimally requiredprofit.
B C
Baumol: conclusions
This is not really like cost-plus pricing, which produces some output, figures the cost and adds a profit markup. Baumol’s model pre-determines output B as the greatest one that yields sufficient profit.
Baumol: conclusions
This model incorporates interdependence, which can shift around the TR curve greatly.
Lack of emphasis on profit here may help avoid anti-trust action and entry.
BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND CONTRACTING
ManEc 300 Session 22Bryson
The motivation problem. The question here is
motivation. Management must assure that the various actors and contract participants actually do their parts, both acting and reporting appropriately.
BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND CONTRACTING
ManEc 300 Session 22Bryson
Incentive Compatibility People will do only what they
perceive to be in their interests. Affairs need to be arranged so that while pursuing their own interests, peoples’ actions also promote the interests of the corporation and (from the standpoint of the economist) the interests of the society as well.
BOUNDED RATIONALITY Perfect, complete contracts. Contracts (or at least voluntary agreements)
are the means by which mutual interests are pursued.
The motivation problem: all relevant plans cannot be completely described in enforceable contracts. To write a perfect contract, parties would have to foresee all contingencies, then agree on an efficient course of action responding to each one.
BOUNDED RATIONALITY Perfect, complete contracts. But we must contract with bounded
rationality, i.e.,– limited foresight, – imprecise language,
In the face of bounded rationality, people act in an intentionally rational manner, doing the best they can given these limitations.
Contingency Responses
Especially when unforeseen contingencies
arise, parties often adapt opportunistically. Incomplete and unenforceable contracts lead
to problems of imperfect commitment.
Contingency Responses
Where contingencies are foreseen, impacts and probability of occurrence may be misperceived, so they may not be included in the contract.
Contracts usually relatively inflexible, covering many provisions very broadly.
Contingency Responses
Relational contracting avoids comprehensive contracts– agreement about goals and objectives – general provisions broadly applicable. – Procedures are outlined for making
decisions and mechanisms for appeal.
Private Information and Adverse Selection
In contracting, private information may prohibit a value-maximizing agreement.
If private information held by one party we can incur an adverse selection problem.
Private Information and Adverse Selection
The most famous example of asymmetric information and adverse selection:if the seller of a used car knows it is a lemon, the selection of products (cars) offered in a market is determined in a manner adverse to the buyers’ interests.
Pre-contractual Opportunism
Adverse Selection
Used Cars Insurance
(Maternity) Gifthorse, or
gifthamster
Auto air-conditioner– (Nissan/Calsonic-
Harrison Co.
A JV no. of Tokyo)
Cases of Asymmetric Information
Courtship
Market vs. Government Solutions
Where AS is strong enough, the price of insurance can be driven so high that nobody can afford it, so that market collapses. No insurer, facing costs of insurance payments, plus overhead, can afford to serve the set of customers who wish to buy insurance.
Market vs. Government Solutions
George Akerloff (“lemon markets”) showed that the volume of trade in markets with AS is inefficiently low. As we have seen, the market can also fail. That failure often leads to clever alternative arrangements and practices in the private sector. Too often, some advocate that the government jump in with subsidies before seeing what the private market will come up with.
Adverse Selection in Bank Loans
AS in Bank Loans. The interest rates that a bank charges can affect the selection of customers who apply for loans: when there is excess demand for loans, a bank may be inclined to raise its interest rates.
Adverse Selection in Bank Loans
But at high rates, only those customers with very risky investments may be seeking loans. The bank should ration credit in cases of excess demand, rather than raising the interest rate.
Signaling and Screening
Signaling is an attempt to communicate private information credibly.
Example:– Talented workers may gain additional
education as much for the value of credentials as to enhance their actual productivity.
Signaling and Screening
Screening is done to attract only desirable potential customers, workers, etc. Or, at least to sort groups into quality categories.
Signaling and Screening
Example:– offering some jobs with incentive pay
schemes and others with fixed wages may tend to sort the workers. The most productive ones will tend to select the incentive pay jobs.
Alert!
For tomorrow, go through the scheduled
Power Point on Moral Hazard. We will
have a quiz on it.
ManEc 300 Session 22Bryson
ContractIncomplete,
Bounded Rationality
Imperfect Commitment
Reneging
Holdup Problem
specific assets
co-specialized assets
ManEc 300 Session 22Bryson
Commitment and Reneging
One of the parties to an imperfect contract may try to renege -- payment won’t be made or the product won’t be delivered.
Commitment and Reneging
Contract ambiguity may make it difficult even to know who is reneging.
Fear of reneging may cause a contract not to be completed in the first place.
Contract Renegotiation
A second commitment problem is that sometimes it becomes necessary to engage in ex post renegotiation of the contract.
Contract Renegotiation
Example:– Some firms provide incentives to
executives by issuing stock options stating they can purchase stock at a specific price on future dates. The managers are supposed to work to get the stock price higher giving them a windfall gain.
Contract Renegotiation
Example:– But if after the options are issued a
firm’s stock price falls drastically, the options are worthless and won’t provide incentives. So it will pay to renegotiate.
The Hold-up Problem
Where both parties to a contract need to worry about being forced to accept disadvantageous terms later, after it has sunk resources into an investment, there is a hold-up problem.
The Hold-up Problem
The problem: specific use of particular assets in imperfect contracting.
Fearing that a big investment may lead to later vulnerability can lead to a refusal to make the efficient investment.
The Hold-up Problem: Example
If a coal mine supplies a local power plant (as its only customer) and a big investment is required, will the relationship continue after the expensive investment? What will the price of coal be in the future?
The Hold-up Problem: Example Post-contractual
opportunism may result, so parties can exploit loopholes to gain unfair advantage. A common response to a cospecialized assets problem is for the same party or firm ultimately to own both assets.
Is this acceptable business behavior?
Is this fair behavior?
Is this OK behavior?
Is this behavior we all engage in?
Is this moral behavior?
Read George Q. Cannon Statement
We should critically evaluate opportunistic behavior
George Q. Cannon on Informational Asymmetry
Collected Discourses, Vol.5, George Q. Cannon, October 6, 1895I might go on and speak about stealing, and dishonesty, and many other sins. I believe that the Latter-day Satins as a people are a more honest people, that they respect their obligations more than other people.
George Q. Cannon on Informational Asymmetry
Collected Discourses, Vol.5, George Q. Cannon, October 6, 1895
We show this in our business associations and dealing. We have the credit for it everywhere. Men who have found fault with our religion frequently acknowledge that we are an honest people, and our credit is "gilt edged." But there are some things that we are still guilty of.
George Q. Cannon on Informational Asymmetry
I believe, however, that the young and rising generation will outgrow them. It is a strong temptation for a man, when he has got a piece of property and he has a chance to trade or sell it, to let the buyer think it is better than it is.
George Q. Cannon on Informational Asymmetry
Now, if we were strictly honest, we would tell exactly the character of that which we have to sell. We would not allow a man to deceive himself; we would tell him the facts. But I know that we are all under the influence of the old traditions.
George Q. Cannon on Informational Asymmetry
The old traditions were that a man should have his own eyesight, and that the seller should not furnish him with anything to aid his perception or to enable him to perceive something that he would not otherwise see. It is a hard thing for men who have grown up under that system of things to refrain from it.
George Q. Cannon on Informational Asymmetry
You see everywhere where things are for sale the endeavor to make them appear better in the eyes of the purchaser than they are. We have got to change in this respect. Whenever a man yields to do a dishonest thing he yields to Satan, and Satan has influence and power over him to that extent. We have got to learn to overcome these things, and to have Satan bound.
Suggestion: Begin Reviewing for Final
In just a few days we will have an in-class review for the final. Please bring your questions to that session for discussion.
Tomorrow there will be a quiz on moral hazard.
Post-contractual Opportunism:Moral Hazard, Session 24
The definition: MH is the form of post-contractual opportunism that arises because actions that have efficiency consequences are not freely observable and so the person taking them may choose to pursue his or her private interests at others’ expense.
Post-contractual Opportunism:Moral Hazard, Session 24
The term originated in the insurance industry, where the tendency of people was observed to change their behavior in a way that led to larger claims against the insurance company (e.g., being lax about taking precautions to avoid or minimize losses).
Commitment vs. Monitoring
Shirking, Fraud/Deceit .
In the case of the residual claimant, who
monitors the monitor?
South African Hosp
AMA, Doctors vs. Litigation
ManEc 300 Day 24 Bryson
Principle-agent relationshipCase of US Savings & Loan CrisisS&L’s borrow from savers, loan for
mortgages-- low interest ratesFSLIC Insurance1980’s Fed Interest Rates
Deregulation (cease monitoring)
ManEc 300 Day 24Bryson
S&LS CONTINUED:
Fraud (25% of S&L bankruptcies)
Depositors didn’t monitor (insured)
Politicians wouldn’t monitor
ManEc 300 Day 24Bryson
Note public insurance examples:
• Gov. Nat’l Mortgage Association
(GNMA)-- insurance against default
• Student Loans
ManEc 300 Day 24Bryson
Economic Strategy and Michael Porter
See and discuss Power Point, “Bryson on
Porter”
The firm’s competitive advantage
2.The Gershwin-playing hamster
ManEc 300 Day 25Bryson
A little final math practiceSuppose a firm’s TR is given as TR = 500Q - 4Q2Suppose a firm’s TR is given as TR = 500Q - 4Q2 When output is 100, TR isWhen output is 100, TR is
a. $2,000.a. $2,000.b. $20,000.b. $20,000. c. $10,000.c. $10,000.
d. $49,600.d. $49,600. e. None of the above.e. None of the above.
Suppose a firm’s TR is given as TR = 500Q - 4Q2Suppose a firm’s TR is given as TR = 500Q - 4Q2 When output is 10 units, AR isWhen output is 10 units, AR is
a. $460.a. $460. b. $560b. $560 c. More than c. More than $500$500
d. $360d. $360 e. None of the above e. None of the above
When TR = 500Q - 4Q2When TR = 500Q - 4Q2
At an output level equal to 20, MR isAt an output level equal to 20, MR is
a. $440.a. $440. b. $340b. $340 c. More than c. More than 500.500.
d. None of the above.d. None of the above.
Marginal revenueMarginal revenue
a. always exceeds marginal cost.a. always exceeds marginal cost.
b. always equals marginal cost.b. always equals marginal cost.
c. is the tangent of the average revenue c. is the tangent of the average revenue curve. curve.
d. is the slope of the total revenue d. is the slope of the total revenue curve.curve.
e. is the distance between total revenue e. is the distance between total revenue and total cost curves at optimal output.and total cost curves at optimal output.