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Management of the Radioactive Wastes Generated in the Response

to the Radiological Accident in Goiânia, Brazil

Roberto Vicente Instituto de Pesquisas Energéticas e Nucleares (IPEN)

Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear

February 11, 2013

This presentation is based mainly on the 1988 IAEA’s Report “The Radiological Accident in

Goiânia” – a detailed account of the accident, its causes, consequences and response, on

other published material, and on my personal experience as member of the response team.

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Climate: temperature: 18 – 30 C; average rainfall: 1576 mm

1.33 million inhabitants and 2.17 million inhabitants in the metropolitan

area (~1,000,000 in 1987, at the time of the accident)

1st most socially unequal capital city in Brazil and 10th in the World

Per capita income: US$ 7,500 (2010) (Brazil: US$11,800)

Present day view of Goiânia

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Background Information

National Nuclear Energy Commission

•Brazilian Regulatory Body

•Government Policy Advisor on Nuclear Issues

•Executive Agency of R & D on Nuclear Applications

Founded: 1956

Headquarters: Rio de Janeiro

Subordinated to Ministry of Science and Technology

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Regulatory role Executive role

Responsibilities

Initial storage: licensees

Interim storage

Final disposal CNEN

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Indústrias Nucleares do Brasil

The public company responsible for exercising

the State monopoly over nuclear materials and

that process uranium, from mine to nuclear fuel

fabrication.

A public company in charge of building and operating

nuclear power plants, presently produces about 3 %

of the Brazilian eletricity supply with Angra units I and

II (600 MWe Westinghose PWR + 1300 MWe KWU

PWR), and constructing unit III (1300 MWe)

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Final Disposal Facility of “Goiânia

Accident” Wastes – Abadia de Goiás

Central-West Regional Center of

Nuclear Science - Goiânia

Northeast Regional Center of

Nuclear Science - Recife

Uranium Mine - Caitité

Nuclear Technology Development

Center - Belo Horizonte

Uranium Enrichment and Fuel

Fabrication Plant - Rezende

Nuclear Engineering Institute

Rad.Protect.& Dosimetry Institute

CNEN Headquarters - Rio de Janeiro

Nuclear Power Plant - Angra

Nuclear and Energy Research

Institute – São Paulo

Navy Research Center - Sorocaba

Research Reactor

o - operational; p - planned

NPP

p

o

o

o

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Roots of the accident

Instituto Goiano de Radioterapia ( IGR), a private institute

owned by a medical partnership, was licensed in 1971 to

import the Caesium-137 teletherapy unit;

In 1985, ceased operating in the former premises and a

new partnership took over other premises;

Ownership of the content of the clinic was disputed and

the equipment was left in place.

The circumstances that led to the abandonment of the

machine had not been completely clarified. Every one

involved tried to evade responsibility and some years

after the accident all were still responding to lawsuits.

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At the time of the accident, the derelict Radiotherapy

Clinic from which the teletherapy equipment was

taken, was in the area of a re-urbanization project.

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The teletherapy equipment

(1987): 50 TBq

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Chronology of the accident

13 Sept. – Two men take the rotating assembly from the

clinic, transport it in a wheelbarrow (~ 0.5 km) to the house

of one of them and leave it in the courtyard.

18 Sept. – The source wheel is separated from rotating

shutter, the window of the source is punctured with a

screwdriver and some of the source scooped out. The

pieces of the assembly are sold to junkyard 1 where a blue

glow is noticed, later that evening.

18 – 26 Sept. – Fragments of the source are distributed to

many individuals. Parts of the assembly are taken to

junkyards 2 and 3.

26 Sept. – The shielding container (300 kg) is also removed

from the clinic and taken to the junkyard 2.

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Chronology of the accident

28 Sept. – Convinced that the glowing powder was

causing illness to her family, junkyard manager wife

collected the remnants of the rotating assembly in a bag

and took it by bus to a Health Surveillance Office.

29 Sept. – The material is recognized as radioactive, the

source is left over a chair in a courtyard of the Health

Surveillance Office and the response is initiated.

29 Sept – 02 Oct – Emergency phase

Early Oct. – 23 Dec. – First phase of decontamination.

Jan 1988 – March 1988 – Second phase and fine

cleaning decontamination work.

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Plan of Goiânia showing the principal sites of contamination

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Other cities with contaminated sites

Anápolis - Go

Aparecida de Goiânia – Go

Inhumas – Go

Araras – SP

São Carlos – SP

Osasco – SP

São Paulo - SP

Early response: health care of ill people

49 people were admitted to hospital

22 needed intensive medical care (10 in critical condition)

14 transferred to specialized care in Rio de Janeiro

4 of whom died in late October, including a 6 year old girl (LN)

Estimated doses incurred : 4.5 Gy to 7 Gy

Early response: Sept. 29 - 30

Evacuation of contaminated sites and

isolation of contaminated people

Early response: radiation screening of population

112,000 people were scanned for radiation

129 identified with significant internal/external contamination.

120 found with significant external contamination only.

Early response: Oct. 1 – 3

With a crane, concrete pipes were put around the chair

and used as a mould for shielding with pumped concrete

Early response:

Establish radiation protection checkpoints in Hospitals

Note: Skin contact dose rate in one of the patients: 15 mSv/h

Early response: Radiological survey of the city

Aerial survey with a portable NaI(Tl) spectrometer

mounted in a helicopter on 7-8 Oct., covering about 67

km2 and later complemented with a survey by car

- 42 sites of contamination found in Goiânia

Early response:

Each contaminated area was fenced and radiation

protection checkpoints were built in each site

Early response: Purchase drums and

containers, and design and manufacture

steel boxes

Early response: Provide individual protection

equipment for the response team.

(Prevent contamination of staff was a critical issue)

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Radioactive Waste Management

Front line issues

Establish a strategy to remove contaminated material

Decide on criteria for screening ‘waste-not waste’

Find a suitable place to store the wastes

Estimate amount of waste that would be generated

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Junkyard II - Widespread contamination

Up to ~ 2 Sv/h in the doorstep of ‘LN’ house

Radioactive Waste Management

First step: remove the hot spots and place

the radioactive materials in drums.

Removal of a hot spot in LN bedroom

Demolition of all contaminated structures

Removal of topsoil

… to leave the ground completely clean

Rua 57 – The most contaminated site Dose rate: 1.1 Sv/h – 1 m above contaminated ground

The same steps were followed in all other sites

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Junkyard III

Tens of tons of contaminated metal scrap, mainly electrical wire coils

Paper recycling collection center – origin of most

contaminated material brought to cities in São Paulo.

Transport of the waste packages starts mid-November

The last job of each work shift: to load the packages in

trucks and transport them in a convoy to the storage site.

Temporary storage of the wastes

Meanwhile, contaminated paper bales transported to São Paulo before

the accident was recognized, were collected and stored at IPEN and

packaged in 50 boxes brought from Goiânia in August 1988.

The metal scrap collected in São Paulo as well wastes generated in the treatment

of the victims were packaged in drums and are also now stored at IPEN.

Final disposal of the radioactive wastes

Two repositories were built: one for the packages of

category I and another for the more active wastes

Construction of the disposal facility for Cat. I wastes

Construction of the disposal facility for Cat. II-V wastes

Disposal of Cat. I packages, completed in Dec. 1995

Disposal of Cat. II - V waste packages (1996)

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The remnants of the source and several drums

damaged by corrosion after 6 years stored over

the platforms, were repacked before disposal.

Eight drums with high dose rates were repackaged with

concrete overpacks.

Final disposal structures

Cat. 1 wastes in the foreground

Cat. 2 – 5 wastes in the background

Note the skyline of ‘Abadia de Goiás’ on the right

Radioecology Laboratory at the entrance of the disposal site

WASTE DISPOSAL SITE

A – Cat. I wastes

B – Cat. II – V wastes

C – Radioecology Lab.

A

B

C

In Dec. 1995, Abadia de Goiás, a former district of

Goiânia, was raised to the category of municipality,

and proudly sports the radiation symbol in its flag.

Problems/difficulties that the response team faced in the emergency phase

1. Decide what was, what was not radioactive waste

Comment: Initially, it was proposed to collect contaminated material in drums,

measure the dose rates at contact and at 1 m from the surface of the package,

estimate the activity concentration and decide on the classification of the material.

The threshold value of transport regulation (75 Bq/g) or even the derived

concentration limit for ingestion of Cs-137 in milk powder were considered as

criterion. Prevailed the idea of collecting everything that deflected the scale of the

detectors.

2. Implement procedures for screening

Comment: In most sites the ambient dose rate prevented from taking

measurements of specific materials. Sampling of materials for characterizing

contamination was useless because of the inhomogeneity of the contamination.

3. Waste treatment

Comment: As the amount of contaminated paper was large, incineration as a

means of reducing the volume was cogitated but the idea was abandoned

because of the high costs and the low impact on the total waste volume to be

disposed of. Decontamination of soil was attempt but results were not good.

Biological materials were stabilized by addition of lime. Excreta of patients and

other wastes from health care of victims were immobilized in cement.

Problems/difficulties that the response team faced in the emergency phase

4. Estimate the amount of waste in order to select or design a temporary

storage

Comment: Any reasonable estimate seemed impossible in view of the chaotic

appearance of some sites and the uncertainty on the extent of contamination.

5. Find a suitable storage site

Comment: The first site visited by the team had the next morning every access

closed by barricades.

6. Find materials and equipment, for instance shielded containers,

manipulator arm, in the emergency phase

Comment: Some improvisation was necessary in early action.

7. Prevent people from furtively entering the contaminated sites

Comment: Although fenced, posted and guarded by police force, the sites were

systematically invaded by locals to recover property, feed pets etc.

Problems/difficulties that the response team faced in the emergency phase

8. Dogs, cats, pigeons, rats and other animals walked and fed in heavily

contaminated ground

Comment: In the beginning it seemed that nothing could be done to prevent this.

Later, captured animals were sacrificed and then packaged in plastic bags with

lime and cement powder, before being placed in drums as radioactive waste.

9. Salvage of some pieces of property was necessary

Comment: In some cases, the team made efforts to retrieve and decontaminate

photographs, jewelry, documents, etc.

10. Detailed account of the work done each day

Comment: In the first days of the response, the team was so committed to trying

to solve the problems that ended up forgetting to leave written records.

Problems/difficulties that the response team faced in the emergency phase

11. Indemnification of property collected as radioactive waste

Comment: Many people involved directly or not in the accident have lost all their

possessions and were indemnified by the government despite the lack of legal

and regulatory basis.

12. Stress and anxiety

Comment: At last once, the team received death threats from the owners while

initiating the demolition of their houses.

13. Work under bad weather conditions

Comment: Most of the time, the decontamination work was done under adverse

weather conditions – heavy or copious rain and high temperature.

14. Harassment by the press, opposition discourse by NGO’s, mistrust of

site neighbors

The end

Thank you

Roberto Vicente

rvicente@ipen.br