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    Cloud ComputingArchitecture, IT Security, & Operational Perspectives

    Steven R. Hunt

    ARC IT Governance Manager

    Ames Research Center

    Matt Linton

    IT Security Specialist

    Ames Research Center

    Matt Chew Spence

    IT Security Compliance Consultant

    Dell Services Federal Government

    Ames Research Center

    August 17, 2010

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    Agenda

    Introductions Steve Hunt

    What is cloud computing? Matt Chew Spence

    How can NASA benefit from cloud computing? Matt Chew Spence

    How is NASA implementing cloud computing? Matt Linton

    How does NASA secure cloud computing? Matt Linton

    Q&A Presentation Team

    Extended Presentation

    FISMA & Clouds Matt Chew Spence

    Steve Hunt

    Assessment, Authorization, & FedRAMP

    Steve Hunt

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    OBJECTIVE: Overview of cloud

    computing and share vocabularyAgenda

    Introductions Steve Hunt

    What is cloud computing? Matt Chew Spence

    How can NASA benefit from cloud computing? Matt Chew Spence

    How is NASA implementing cloud computing? Matt Linton

    How does NASA secure cloud computing? Matt Linton

    Q&A Presentation Team

    Extended Presentation

    FISMA & Clouds Matt Chew Spence

    Steve Hunt

    Assessment, Authorization, & FedRAMP

    Steve Hunt

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    Cloud Computing NIST Definition:

    A model for enabling convenient, on-demand

    network access to a shared pool of configurable

    computing resources (e.g., networks, servers,

    storage, applications, and services) that can be

    rapidly provisioned and released with minimal

    management effort or service provider

    interaction

    What is Cloud Computing?

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    Conventional Manually Provisioned

    Dedicated Hardware

    Fixed Capacity

    Pay for Capacity

    Capital & OperationalExpenses

    Managed via Sysadmins

    Cloud Self-provisioned

    Shared Hardware

    Elastic Capacity

    Pay for Use

    Operational Expenses

    Managed via APIs

    Conventional Computingvs.

    Cloud Computing

    What is Cloud Computing?

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    Five Key Cloud Attributes:

    1. Shared / pooled resources

    2. Broad network access3. On-demand self-service

    4. Scalable and elastic

    5. Metered by use

    What is Cloud Computing?

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    Shared / Pooled Resources:

    Resources are drawn from a common pool

    Common resources build economies of scale

    Common infrastructure runs at high efficiency

    What is Cloud Computing?

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    Broad Network Access:

    Open standards and APIs

    Almost always IP, HTTP, and REST

    Available from anywhere with an internetconnection

    What is Cloud Computing?

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    On-Demand Self-Service:

    Completely automated

    Users abstracted from the implementation

    Near real-time delivery (seconds or minutes)

    Services accessed through a self-serve

    web interface

    What is Cloud Computing?

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    Scalable and Elastic:

    Resources dynamically-allocated between

    users

    Additional resources dynamically-released

    when needed

    Fully automated

    What is Cloud Computing?

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    Metered by Use:

    Services are metered, like a utility

    Users pay only for services used

    Services can be cancelled at any time

    What is Cloud Computing?

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    VirtualMachines

    Virtual Networks

    IaaS

    Auto Elastic

    ContinuousIntegration

    PaaS

    Built for Cloud

    Uses PaaS

    SaaS

    Three Service Delivery ModelsIaaS: Infrastructure as a Service

    Consumer can provision computing resources within

    provider's infrastructure upon which they can deploy and

    run arbitrary software, including OS and applications

    PaaS: Platform as ServiceConsumer can create custom applications using

    programming tools supported by the provider and

    deploy them onto the provider's cloud infrastructure

    SaaS: Software as Service

    Consumer uses providers applications running onprovider's cloud infrastructure

    What is Cloud Computing?

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    What is Cloud Computing?

    SaaS

    PaaS

    IaaS

    Amazon Google Microsoft Salesforce

    Service Delivery Model Examples

    Products and companies shown for illustrative purposes only and should not

    be construed as an endorsement

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    Cost efficiencies

    Time efficiencies

    Power efficiencies

    Improved process

    control

    Improved security

    Unlimited capacity

    Cloud efficiencies and improvements

    Burst capacity (over-

    provisioning) Short-duration projects

    Cancelled or failed missions

    $

    Procurement Network connectivity

    Standardized, updated base images Centrally auditable log servers

    Centralized authentication systems Improved forensics (w/ drive image)

    Process

    Process

    Process

    What is Cloud Computing?

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    OBJECTIVE: Discuss requirements,

    use cases, and ROIAgenda

    Introductions Steve Hunt

    What is cloud computing? Matt Chew Spence

    How can NASA benefit from cloud computing? Matt Chew Spence

    How is NASA implementing cloud computing? Matt Linton

    How does NASA secure cloud computing? Matt Linton

    Q&A Presentation Team

    Extended Presentation

    FISMA & Clouds Matt Chew Spence

    Steve Hunt

    Assessment, Authorization, & FedRAMP

    Steve Hunt

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    How can NASA benefit from cloud computing?

    Current IT options for Scientists

    Science-scaleapplication

    development

    Very large dataset processing

    Compute

    intensiveprocessing

    Timely sharing of

    results withcollaborators andthe public

    Missions

    BUILD IT

    Build my own IT infrastructurethat may/may not comply withF

    ederal/Agency IT securitystandards.

    BUY IT

    Go through a lengthyprocurement and provisioningprocess for basic IT services

    DO NOTHINGThe current basic IT servicesmodel is cost prohibitive and Icannot afford to process my dataand share with collaborators andthe public at large.

    Current Options*Requirements*

    * Requirements and Options documented in over 30+ interviews

    with Ames scientists as part 2009 NASA Workstation project.

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    Mission Objectives

    Explore, Understand, and Share

    Exploration Space OpsScienceAeronautics

    High Compute Vast StorageHigh Speed

    Networking

    Process

    Large

    Data

    Sets

    Scale-out for

    one-time

    events

    Require

    infrastructure

    on-demand

    Store

    mission &

    science

    dataUSEC

    ASES

    Share

    information

    with the

    public

    Run

    Compute

    Intensive

    Workloads

    M

    ISSION

    OCIO

    INNOVATION

    Shared Resource

    Mission Support

    How can NASA benefit from cloud computing?

    Scientists direct access to Nebula cloud computing

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    High-endCompute

    Vast StorageHigh SpeedNetworking

    TARGET

    COMPUTE

    PLATFORM

    Server-base

    d

    computeresou

    rces

    Super

    Computer

    Desktop

    Excellent example

    of how OCIO-

    sponsored

    innovation can be

    rapidlytransformed into

    services that

    address Agency

    mission needs

    How can NASA benefit from cloud computing?

    Offer scientists services to address the gap

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    *15% utilization based on two reports from Gartner Group, Cost of Traditional

    Data Centers (2009), and Data CenterEfficiency (2010).

    ROI and ARC Case Study

    How can NASA benefit from cloud computing?

    POWER: Computers typically require 70% of their

    total power requirements to run at just 15%

    utilization.

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    Operational Enhancements:

    Strict standardization of hardware and infrastructure

    software components

    Small numbers of system administrators due to thecookie-cutter design of cloud components and

    support processes

    Failure of any single component within the Nebula

    cloud will not become reason for alarm

    Application operations will realize similar efficienciesonce application developers learn how to properly

    deploy applications so that they are not reliant on any

    particular cloud component.

    ROI and ARC Case Study

    How can NASA benefit from cloud computing?

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    OBJECTIVE: Overview of how NASA

    is implementing cloud computingAgenda

    Introductions Steve Hunt

    What is cloud computing? Matt Chew Spence

    How can NASA benefit from cloud computing? Matt Chew Spence

    How is NASA implementing cloud computing? Matt Linton

    How does NASA secure cloud computing? Matt Linton

    Q&A Presentation Team

    Extended Presentation

    FISMA & Clouds Matt Chew Spence

    Steve Hunt

    Assessment, Authorization, & FedRAMP

    Steve Hunt

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    How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

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    How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

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    How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

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    Nebula Principles

    Open and Public APIs, everywhere

    Open-source platform, apps, and data Full transparency

    Open source code and documentation

    releases

    Reference platform Cloud model forFederal Government

    How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

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    Nebula UserExperience

    Nebula IaaS user will have an experience

    similar to Amazon EC2:

    Dedicated privateV

    LAN for instances Dedicated VPN for access to private VLAN

    Public IPs to assign to instances

    Launch VM instances

    Dashboard for instance control and API access

    Able to import/export bundled instances to

    AWS and other clouds

    How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

    Products and companies named for illustrative purposes only and should not be

    construed as an endorsement

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    Architecture Drivers

    Reliability

    Availability Cost

    IT Security

    How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

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    Shared Nothing

    Messaging Queue

    State Discovery

    Standard Protocols

    AutomatedAutomated

    IPMI

    PXEBoot

    Puppet

    How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

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    Nebula Infrastructure Components

    Cloud Node

    Network Node Compute Node

    Volume Node

    Object Node

    Monitoring / Metering / Logging / Scanning

    How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

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    Cloud Node

    LDAP

    Data

    Store

    Ubuntu OS

    Puppet

    Nova

    Cloud

    Node

    PXE

    RabbitMQ

    Redis KVS

    How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

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    Ubuntu OS

    Puppet

    KVM

    LibVirt

    Nova

    Compute

    Node

    802.1(q)

    Brctl

    PXE

    Project VLAN

    Running Instance

    Compute Node

    How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

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    Ubuntu OS

    Puppet

    LVM

    AoENova

    Volume

    Node

    PXE

    Exported Volume

    Volume Node

    How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

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    Object Node

    Ubuntu OS

    Puppet

    Nova

    ObjectNode

    PXE

    Nginx

    How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

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    Network Node

    Ubuntu OS

    Puppet

    NovaNetwork

    Node

    802.1(q)

    Brctl

    PXE

    Project

    VLAN

    IPTables

    Public

    Internet

    How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

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    Pilot Lessons Learned- Automate Everything

    No SysAdmin is perfect

    99% is not good enough

    NEVER make direct system changes

    When in doubt - PXEBoot

    How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

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    Pilot Lessons Learned- Test Everything

    KVM + Jumbo Frames

    Grinder Unit Tests / Cyclometric Complexity

    TransactionID Insertion (Universal Proxy)

    How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

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    Pilot Lessons Learned- MonitorEverything

    Ganglia

    Munin

    Syslog-NG + PHPSyslog-NG

    Nagios

    Custom Log Parsing (Instance-centric)

    How is NASA implementing cloud computing?

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    OBJECTIVE: Overview of technical

    security mechanisms built into NebulaAgenda Introductions

    Steve Hunt

    What is cloud computing? Matt Chew Spence

    How can NASA benefit from cloud computing? Matt Chew Spence

    How is NASA implementing cloud computing? Matt Linton

    How does NASA secure cloud computing? Matt Linton

    Q&A Presentation Team

    Extended Presentation

    FISMA & Clouds Matt Chew Spence

    Steve Hunt

    Assessment, Authorization, & FedRAMP

    Steve Hunt

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    Technical Security Overview

    Issues with Commercial Cloud Providers

    Overview of Current Security Mechanisms

    Innovations

    OBJECTIVE: Overview of technical

    security mechanisms built into Nebula

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    How does NASA secure cloud computing?

    Commercial Cloud Provider Security Concerns

    IT Security not brought into decision of how & whenNASA orgs use clouds

    IT Security may not know NASA orgs are usingclouds until an incident has occurred

    Without insight into monitoring/IDS/logs, NASAmay not find out that an incident has occurred

    No assurances of sufficient cloud infrastructureaccess to perform proper forensics/investigations

    These issues are less likely with a private cloud likeNebula

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    How does NASA secure cloud computing?

    IT Security is built into Nebula

    User Isolation from Nebula Infrastructure

    Users only have access to APIs and Dashboards

    No user direct access to Nebula infrastructure Project-based separation

    A project is a set of compute resourcesaccessible by one or more users

    Each project has separate: V

    LAN for project instances VPN for project users to launch, terminate,and access instances

    Image library of instances

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    How does NASA secure cloud computing?

    Networking RFC1918 address space internal to Nebula

    NAT is used for those hosts within Nebulaneeding visibility outside a cluster

    Three core types of networks within Nebula: Customer

    CustomerVLANs are isolated from eachother

    DMZ

    Services available to all Nebula such asNTP, DNS, etc

    Administrative

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    Security Groups

    Combination ofVLANs and Subnetting

    Can be extended to use physicalnetwork/node separation as well (future)

    How does NASA secure cloud computing?

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    C

    L

    OU

    D

    A

    P

    I

    S

    S

    M

    R

    Project A

    (10.1.1/24)

    Project B

    (10.1.2/24)

    Operations Console

    (custom)

    Security Scanners

    (Nessus, Hydra, etc)

    Log Aggregation,

    SOC Tap

    RFC1918

    Space

    (LAN_X)

    BR

    I

    D

    G

    E

    Public IPSpace

    IN

    T

    E

    R

    N

    E

    T

    External

    Scanner

    DMZ

    Services

    Event Correlation

    Engine

    How does NASA secure cloud computing?

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    How does NASA secure cloud computing?

    Firewalls

    Multiple levels of firewalling

    Hardware firewall at site border

    Firewall on cluster network head-ends

    Host-based firewalls on key hosts

    Project based rule sets based on Amazon

    security groups

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    How does NASA secure cloud computing?

    Remote User Access

    Remote access is only through VPN (openVPN)

    Separate administrative VPN and userVPNs

    Each project has own VPN server

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    How does NASA secure cloud computing?

    Intrusion Detection

    OSSEC on key infrastructure hosts

    Open source Host-based Intrusion Detection

    Mirror port to NASA SOC tap

    Building 10Gb/sec IDS/IPS/Forensics device

    with vendor partners

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    How does NASA secure cloud computing?

    Configuration Management

    Puppet used to automatically push out

    configuration changes to infrastructure

    Automatic reversion of unauthorized changes

    to system

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    How does NASA secure cloud computing?

    Vulnerability Scanning

    Nebula uses both internal and external

    vulnerability scanners

    Correlate findings between internal and

    external scans

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    How does NASA secure cloud computing?

    Incident Response

    Procedures for isolating individual VMs,compute nodes, and clusters, including:

    Taking snapshot of suspect VMs, includingmemory dump

    Quarantining a VM within a compute node

    Disabling VM images so new instancescant be launched

    Quarantining a compute node within acluster

    Quarantining a cluster

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    How does NASA secure cloud computing?

    Role Based Access Control

    Multiple defined roles within a project

    Role determines which API calls can be

    invoked

    Only network admin can request non-1918

    addresses

    Only system admin can bundle new images

    etc

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    How does NASA secure cloud computing?

    Innovation - Security Gates

    API calls can be intercepted and security

    gates can be imposed on function being called

    When an instance is launched, it can be

    scanned automatically for vulnerabilities

    Long term vision is to have a pass/fail launch

    gate based on scan/monitoring results

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    How does NASA secure cloud computing?

    Vision - Security as a Service Goal - Automate compliance through securityservices provided by cloud provider

    Security APIs/tools mapped to specific controls

    Customers could subscribe to tools/services tomeet compliance requirements

    When setting up new project in cloud

    Customers assert nature of data they will use

    Cloud responds with list of APIs/tools for

    customers to use Currently gathering requirements but fundingneeded to realize vision

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    How does NASA secure cloud computing?

    Vision - Security Service Bus

    Goal - FISMA compliance through continuousreal-time monitoring and situational awareness

    Security service bus with event driven

    messaging engine Correlate events across provider and multiple

    customers Dashboard view for security providers and

    customers Allows customers to make risk-based security

    decisions based on events experienced byother customers

    Funding Needed to Realize Vision

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    Nebula Open Source Progress

    Significant progress in embracing the value ofopen source software release

    Agreements with SourceForge and Github

    Open source identified as an essential component of

    NASAs open government plan

    Elements of Nebula in open source release

    pipeline

    Started Feb 2010. Hope for release in June.

    Working toward continual incremental releases.

    Exploring avenues to contribute code to external

    projects and to accept external contributions to the

    Nebula code base.

    How does NASA secure cloud computing?

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    Agenda Introductions

    Steve Hunt

    What is cloud computing? Matt Chew Spence

    How can NASA benefit from cloud computing? Matt Chew Spence

    How is NASA implementing cloud computing? Matt Linton

    How does NASA secure cloud computing? Matt Linton

    Q&A Presentation Team

    Extended Presentation

    FISMA & Clouds Matt Chew Spence

    Steve Hunt

    Assessment, Authorization, & FedRAMP

    Steve Hunt

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    Q & A

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    Extended Presentation

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    OBJECTIVE: Overview of Nebula C&A

    with Lessons LearnedAgenda Introductions

    Steve Hunt

    What is cloud computing? Matt Chew Spence

    How can NASA benefit from cloud computing? Matt Chew Spence

    How is NASA implementing cloud computing? Matt Linton

    How does NASA secure cloud computing? Matt Linton

    Q&A Presentation Team

    Extended Presentation

    FISMA & Clouds Matt Chew Spence

    Steve Hunt

    Assessment, Authorization, & FedRAMP

    Steve Hunt

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    FISMA & Clouds

    FISMA Overview

    Federal Information Security Management Act Requires all Govt computers to be under a security plan

    Mandates following NIST security guidance

    Required controls depend on FIPS-199 sensitivity levelRequires periodic assessments of security controls

    Extremely documentation heavy

    Assumes one organization has responsibility for majority of

    identified security controls

    FISMA is burdensome to cloud customersCustomers want to outsource IT Security to cloud provider

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    FISMA & Clouds

    FISMA Responsibilities in Clouds Clouds are a Highly Dynamic Shared ManagementEnvironment

    Customers retain FISMA responsibilities for aspects of acloud under their control

    Responsibilities vary depending on level of controlmaintained by customer

    Customer control varies relative to service delivery model(SaaS, PaaS, or IaaS)

    Need to define & document responsibilities

    We parsed 800-53 Rev3 controls per service delivery model

    Nebula currently only offers IaaS

    We parsed all three service models for future planning

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    Identifying data typesEnsuring data appropriate to system

    User/Account Management

    Personnel Controls

    Software Licenses

    Developer Testing

    App Configuration Management

    Software Development Lifecycle

    OS Config Mgmt

    Anti-Malware

    SW Install Controls

    OS specific Controls

    etc

    SaaS

    IaaS

    PaaSCloud

    Customer

    Security

    Responsibility

    Customer FISMA Responsibilities for Cloud

    Customer FISMA

    responsibilities Increase

    as Customers have more

    control over security

    measures

    62

    FISMA & Clouds

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    FISMA & Clouds

    IaaS Customer Security Plan Coverage Options

    At inception little guidance existed on cloud computing control responsibilities &security plan coverage

    FedRAMP primarily addresses cloud provider responsibilities

    Other than control parsing definitions Customers are given little guidance onimplementing and managing FISMA requirements in a highly dynamic sharedmanagement environment

    We have developed the following options:

    Option Description Issues

    Customer Owned Customer responsible for own

    security plan with no assistance

    from provider

    None to Providers

    Burdensome to customers

    Facilitated Customer responsible for own

    security plan using NASAtemplate

    May still be burdensome to

    customers. Not scalable unless

    automated.

    Agency Owned Agency or Center level Group

    security plans associated with

    Cloud providers serve as

    aggregation point for customer.

    May be burdensome to

    Agency or Center.

    Requires technology to

    automate input and aggregation

    of customer data.

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    FISMA & Clouds

    Current NASA Requirements/Tools may ImpedeCloud Implementation

    Default security categorization of Scientific and Space Sciencedata as Moderate

    Independent assessment required for every major change

    Currently requires 3rd party document-centric audit

    Not scalable to cloud environments

    e-Authentication/AD integration required for all NASA Apps

    NASA implementations dont currently support LDAP/SAML-based federated identity management

    Function-specific stove-piped compliance tools STRAW/PIA tool/A&A Repository/NASA electronic forms

    Cant easily automate compliance process for new apps

    64

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    FISMA & Clouds

    Emerging Developments in FISMA & Clouds

    Interagency Cloud Computing Security Working Group

    is developing additional baseline security requirements

    for cloud computing providers

    NIST Cloud Computing guidance forthcoming?

    Move towards automated risk models and security

    management tools over documentation

    On the bleeding edge - changing guidance &

    requirements are a key risk factor (and opportunity)

    65

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    FISMA & Clouds

    Nebula is Contributing to Cloud StandardsNebula is Contributing to Cloud Standards

    Federal Cloud Standards Working Group

    Fed Cloud Computing Security WorkingGroup

    Federal Risk & Authorization ManagementProgram (FedRAMP)

    Cloud Audit project

    Automated Audit Assertion Assessment &Assurance API

    Providing Feedback to NIST and GAO

    GSA Cloud PMO

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    OBJECTIVE: Overview of how Nebula

    concepts may integrate with FedRAMPAgenda Introductions

    Steve Hunt

    What is cloud computing? Matt Chew Spence

    How can NASA benefit from cloud computing? Matt Chew Spence

    How is NASA implementing cloud computing? Matt Linton

    How does NASA secure cloud computing? Matt Linton

    Q&A Presentation Team

    Extended Presentation

    FISMA & Clouds Matt Chew Spence

    Steve Hunt

    Assessment, Authorization, & FedRAMP Steve Hunt

    F dRAMP

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    A Federal Government-Wide program to provide

    Joint Authorizations and Continuous Monitoring

    Unified Government-Wide risk management

    Authorizations can be leveraged throughout

    Federal Government

    This is to be an optional service provided toAgencies that does not supplant existing

    Agency authority

    Federal Risk and Authorization

    Management Program

    FedRAMP

    F dRAMP

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    Independent Agency Risk Management of Cloud Services

    Federal Agencies

    Cloud Service Providers (CSP)

    : Duplicative risk

    management efforts

    : Incompatible agencypolicies

    : Potential for inconsistent

    application ofFederal

    security requirements

    : Acquisition slowed by

    lengthy compliance

    processes

    FedRAMP

    F dRAMP

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    Federated Risk Management of Cloud Systems

    : Risk management cost

    savings and increased

    effectiveness

    : Interagency vettedapproach

    : Consistent

    application ofFederal

    security requirements

    Federal Agencies

    : Rapid acquisition

    through consolidated

    risk management

    Cloud Service Providers (CSP)

    FedRAMP

    Risk Management

    Authorization

    Continuous

    Monitoring Federal Security

    Requirements

    FedRAMP

    FedRAMP

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    FedRAMP Authorization process

    Agency X has a needfor a new cloud based

    IT system

    Agency X getssecurity requirementsfor the new IT systemfrom FedRAMP and

    adds requirements ifnecessary

    Agency X releasesRFP for new IT

    system and awardscontract to cloudservice provider

    (CSP)

    Agency X submitsrequest to FedRAMPoffice for CSP To be

    FedRAMP authorizedto operate

    CSP is put into FedRAMPpriority queue

    (prioritization occursbased on factors such as

    multi-agency use, numberof expected users, etc.)

    FedRAMP

    FedRAMP

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    FedRAMP Authorization process (cont)

    CSP and agency

    sponsor beginauthorizationprocess with

    FedRAMP office

    CSP, agencysponsor and

    FedRAMP officereview security

    requirements andany alternative

    implementations

    FedRAMP office

    coordinates withCSP for creation of

    system securityplan (SSP)

    CSP hasindependent

    assessment ofsecurity controls

    and developsappropriate reportsfor submission toFedRAMP office

    FedRAMP officereviews and

    assembles thefinal authorization

    package for theJAB

    JAB reviews finalcertificationpackage and

    authorizes CSP tooperate

    FedRAMP officeadds CSP to

    authorized systeminventory to bereviewed and

    leveraged by all

    Federal agencies

    FedRAMPprovides

    continuousmonitoring of CSP

    FedRAMP

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    Issues & Concerns

    FedRAMP doesnt provide much guidance for customerside e.g. Agency users of cloud services

    Current NIST guidance oriented primarily towards Static

    Single System Owner environments

    Lack of NIST guidance for Highly Dynamic Shared

    Owner environments e.g. Virtualized Data Centers &

    Clouds

    SSP generation & maintenance

    Application of SP 800-53 (security controls)

    Application of SP 800-37 (assessment & ATO)

    Continuous Monitoring

    Guidance may be forthcoming but NIST is resource

    constrained

    FedRAMP

    FedRAMP

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    Potential Solution

    Agency/Center level Aggregated SSPs:

    Plan per CSP e.g. Nebula, Amazon,

    Google, Microsoft etc.

    Plan covers all customers of a specific CSP

    Technology integration may be needed with

    SSP repository to dynamically update SSP

    content via Web Registration site.

    Or SSP may be able to point to dynamic

    content entered and housed on Web

    Registration site ... maintained in Wiki type

    doc.

    Presentation Title

    74

    March 5, 2010

    FedRAMP

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    Q & A