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(MAD ISO N)

To the People of the State of New York:AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accuratelydeveloped than its tendency to break and control the vio-lence of faction. The friend of popular governmentsnever finds himself so much alarmed for their characterand fate, as when he contemplates their propensity tothis dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set adue value on any plan which, without violating the prin-ciples to which he is attached, provides a proper curefor it. The instability, injustice, and confusion introducedinto the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortaldiseases under which popular governments have every-where perished; as they continue to be the favorite andfruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty de-rive their most specious declamations. The valuable im-provements made by the American constitutions on thepopular models, both anci~nt and modem, cannot cer-tainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwar-rantable partiality, to contend that they have aseffectually obviated the danger on this side, as waswished and expected. Complaints are everywhere heardfrom our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equallythe friends of public and private faith, and of public andpersonal liberty, that our governments are too unstable,

that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts ofrival parties, and that measures are too often decided,not according to the rules of justice and the rights of theminor party, but by the superior force of an interestedand overbearing majority. However anxiously we maywish that these complaints had no foundation, the evi-dence of known facts will not permit us to deny thatthey are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed,on a candid review of our situation, that some of thedistresses under which we labor have been erroneouslycharged on the operation of our governments; but it willbe found, at the same time, that other causes will notalone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and,particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust ofpublic engagements, and alarm for private rights, whichare echoed from one end of the continent to the other.These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the un-steadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit hastainted our public administrations.

By a faction, I understand a number of citizens,whether amounting to a majority or minority of thewhole, who are united and actuated by some commonimpulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rightsof other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate in-terests of the community.

Federalist No.1 0 from THE FEDERALIST papers, 1787.

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1 .:. FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN POLITICS: Basic Documents

manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyedinterest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessityin civilized nations, and divide them into differentclasses, actuated by different sentiments and views. Theregulation of these various and interfering interestsforms the principal task of modem legislation, and in-volves the spirit of party and faction in the necessaryand ordinary operations of the government.

No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause,because his interest would certainly bias his judgment,and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal,nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to beboth judges and parties at the same time; yet what aremany of the most important acts of legislation, but somany judicial determinations, not indeed concerning therights of single persons, but concerning the rights oflarge bodies of citizens? And what are the differentclasses of legislators but advocates and parties to thecauses which they determine? Is a law proposed con-cerningprivate debts? It is a question to which the credi-tors are parties on one side and the debtors on the other.Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet theparties are, and must be, themselves the judges; and themost numerous party, or, in other words, the most pow-erful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domesticmanufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by re-strictions on foreign manufactures? are questions whichwould be differently decided by the landed and themanufacturing ~lasses, and probably by neither with asole regard to justice and the public good. The appor-tionment of taxes on the various descriptions of propertyis an act which seems to require the most exact impar-tiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in whichgreater opportunity and temptation are given to a pre-dominant party to trample on the rules of justice. Everyshilling with which they overburden the inferior number,is a shilling saved to their own pockets.

It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will beable to adjust these clashing interests, and render themall subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmenwill not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, cansuch an adjustment be made at all without taking intoview indirect and remote considerations, which willrarely prevail over the immediate interest which oneparty may find in disregarding the rights of another orthe good of the whole.

The tnference to which we are brought is, that thecauses of faction cannot be removed, and that relief isonly to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.

If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief issupplied by the republican principle, which enables themajority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. Itmay clog the administration, it may convulse the society;but it will be unable to execute and mask its violenceunder the forms of the

Constifution. When a majority is included in a faction,the form of popular government, on the other hand, en-

There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of fac-tion: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by con.,trolling its effects.

There are again two methods of removing the causesof faction: the one, by destroying the liberty whiCh isessential to its existence; the other, by giving to everycitizen the same opinions, the same passions, and thesame interests.

It could never be more truly said than of the first rem-edy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to fac-tion what air is to fire, an aliment without whiCh itinstantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolishliberty, which is essential to political life, because it nour-ishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilati9nof air, whiCh is essential to animal life, because it impartsto fire its destructive agency.

The second expedient is as impracticable as the firstwould be unwise. As long as the reason of man continuesfallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opin-ions will be formed. As long as the connection subsistsbetween his reason and his self-love, his opinions andhis passions will have a reciprocal influence on eaChother; and the former will be objects to whiCh the latterwill attaCh themselves. The diversity in the faculties ofmen, from whiCh the rights of property originate, is notless an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests.The protection of these faculties is the first object of gov-ernment. From the protection of different and unequalfaculties of acquiring property, the possession of differentdegrees and kinds of property immediately results; andfrom the influence of these on the sentiments and viewsof the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the so-ciety into different interests and parties.

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the na-ture of man; and we see them everywhere brought intodifferent degrees of activity, according to the different cir-cumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinionsconcerning religion, concerning government, and manyother points, as well of speculation as of practice; an at-tachment to different leaders ambitiously contending forpre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descrip-tions whose fortunes have been interesting to the huinanpassions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties,inflamed them with mutual animosity, and renderedthem muCh more disposed to vex and oppress each otherthan to co-operate for theii common good. So strong isthis propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosi-ties, that where no substantial occasion presents itself,the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have beensufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excitetheir most violent conflicts. But the most common anddurable source of factions has been the various and un-equal distribution of property. Those who hold and thosewho are without property have ever formed distinct in-terests in society.

Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors,fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a

3. Size and Variety of the Union

abIes it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest boththe public good and the rights of other citizens. To securethe public good and private rights againSt the danger ofsuch a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spiritand the form of popular government, is then the greatobject to which our inquiries are directed. Let me addthat it is the great desideratum by which this form ofgovernment can be rescued from the opprobrium underwhich it has so long labored, and be recommended tothe esteem and adoption of mankind.

By what means is this object attainable? Evidently byone of two only; Either the existence of the same passionor interest in a majority at the same time must be pre-vented, or the majority, having such coexistent passionor interest, must be rendered, by their number and localsituation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemesof oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suf-fered to coincide, we well know that neither moral norreligious motives can be relied on as an adequate control.They are not found to be such on the injustice and vio-lence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportionto the number combined together, that is, in proportionas their efficacy becomes needful.

From this view of the subject it may be concluded thata pure democracy, by which I mean a society consistingof a small number of citizens, who assemble and admin-ister the government in person, can admit of no cure forthe mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interestwill, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of thewhole; a communication and concert result from theform of government itself; and there is nothing to checkthe inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an ob':noxious individual. Hence it is that such democracieshave ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention;have ever been found incompatible with personal secu-rity or the rights of property; and have in general beenas short in their lives as they have been violent in theirdeaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized thisspecies of government, have erroneously supposed thatby reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their po-litical rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectlyequalized and assimilated in their possessions, theiropinions, and their passions.

A republic, by which I lllean a government in whichthe scheme of representation takes place, opens a differ-ent prospect, and -promises the cure for which we areseeking. Let us examine the points in which it variesfrom pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both thenature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derivefrom the Union.

The two great points of difference between a democ-racy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the gov-ernment, in the latter, to a small number of citizenselected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citi-zens, and greater sphere of country, over which the lattermay be extended.

The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand,to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing themthrough the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whosewisdom may best discern the true interest of their coun-try, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be leastlikely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considera-tions. Under such a regulation, it may well happen thatthe public voice, pronounced by the representatives ofthe people, will be more consonant to the public goodthan if pronounced by the people themselves, convenedfor the purpose. on the other hand, the effect may beinverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, orof sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, orby other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then be-tray the interests, of the people. The question resultingis, whether small or extensive republics are more favor-able to the election of proper guardians of the publicweal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter bytwo obvious considerations:

In the first place, it is to be remarked that, howeversmall the republic may be, the representatives must beraised to a certain number, in order to guard against thecabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, theymust be limited to a certain number, in order to guardagainst the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the numberof representatives in the two cases not being in propor-tion to that of the two constituents, and being propor-tionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, ifthe proportion of fit characters be not less in the largethan in the small republic, the foimer will present agreater option, and consequently a greater probability ofa fit choice.

In the next place, as each representative will be chosenby a greater number of citizens in the large than in thesmall republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy can-didates to practise with success the vicious arts by whichelections are too often carried; and the suffrages of thepeople being more free, will be more likely to centre inmen who possess the most attractive merit and the mostdiffusive and established characters.

It must be confessed that in this, as in most othercases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconven-iences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much thenumber of electors, you render the representative too lit-tle acquainted with all their local circumstances andlesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you renderhim unduly attached to these, and too little fit to com-prehend and pursue great and national objects. The fed-eral Constitution forms a happy combination in thisrespect; the great and aggregate interests being referredto the national, the-local and particular to the State leg-islatures.

The other point of difference is, the greater numberof citizens and extent of territory which may be broughtwithin the compass of republican than of democraticgovernment; and it is this circumstance principally whichrenders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the

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.:. FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN POLITICS: Basic Documents

former than in the latter. The smaller the society, thefewer probably will be the distinct parties and interestscomposing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests,the more frequently will a majority be found of the sameparty; and the smaller the number of individuals com-posing a majority, and the smaller the compass withinwhich they are placed, the more easily will they concertand execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphereand you take in a greater variety of parties and interests;you will make it less probable that a majority of thewhole will have a common motive to invade the rightsof other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, itwill be more difficult for all who feel it to discover theirown strength, and to act in unison with each other. Be-sides other impediments, it may be remarked that,where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonor-able purposes, communication is always checked bydistrust in proportion to the number whose concur-rence is necessary.

Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantagewhich a republic has over a democracy, in controllingthe effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a smallrepublic,-is enjoyed by the Union over the States com-posing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitutionof representatives whose enlightened views and virtuoussentiments render them superior to local prejudices andto schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that therepresentation of the Union will be most likely to possessthese requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater

security afforded by a greater variety of parties, againstthe event of anyone party being able to outnumber andoppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increasedvariety of parties comprised within the Union, increasethis security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obsta-cles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of thesecret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here,again, the extent of the Union gives it ~e most palpable

advantage.The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame

within their particular States, but will be unable tospread a general conflagration through the other States.A religious sect may degenerate into a political factionin a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dis-persed over the entire face of it must secure the nationalcouncils against any danger from that source. A rage forpaper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal di-vision of property, or for any other improper or wickedproject, will be less apt to pervade the whole body ofthe Union than a particular member of it; in the sameproportion as such a malady is more likely to taint aparticular county or distinct, than an entire State.

In the extent and proper structure of the Union, there-fore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseasesmost incident to republican government. And accordingto the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being re-publicans; ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spiritand supporting the character of Federalists.

UBLIUS