Macroeconomic rates of return of public and private investment

WORK ING PAPER SER IE SNO 864 / FEBRUARY 2008

MACROECONOMICRATES OF RETURN OFPUBLIC AND PRIVATEINVESTMENT

CROWDING-IN ANDCROWDING-OUTEFFECTS

by António Afonsoand Miguel St. Aubyn

WORKING PAPER SER IESNO 864 / FEBRUARY 2008

In 2008 all ECB publications

feature a motif taken from the

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MACROECONOMIC RATES OF RETURN OF PUBLIC

AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT

CROWDING-IN AND CROWDING-OUT EFFECTS 1

António Afonso 2,3 and Miguel St. Aubyn 3

This paper can be downloaded without charge fromhttp : //www.ecb.europa.eu or from the Social Science Research Network

electronic library at ht tp : //ssrn.com/abstract_id=1090278.

1 We are grateful to Peter Claeys, Hubert Gabrisch, José Marín, Thomas Stratmann, and to participants at the Vereins für Socialpolitik (Bayreuth), at the Netwerk Algemene en Kwantitatieve Economie (Amesterdam), at the 63rd International Atlantic Economic

Conference (Madrid), at the EcoMod (S. Paulo) conference, and to an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily refl ect those of the ECB or the Eurosystem.

2 European Central Bank, Directorate General Economics, Kaiserstraße 29, D-60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany; e-mail: [email protected]

3 ISEG/TULisbon – Technical University of Lisbon, Department of Economics; UECE – Research Unit on Complexity and Economics, R. Miguel Lupi 20, 1249-078 Lisbon, Portugal;

e-mails: [email protected]; [email protected] UECE is supported by FCT (Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Portugal),

fi nanced by ERDF and Portuguese funds. Miguel St. Aubyn thanks the Fiscal Policies Division of the ECB for its hospitality.

© European Central Bank, 2008

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ISSN 1561-0810 (print) ISSN 1725-2806 (online)

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Working Paper Series No 864February 2008

Abstract 4

Non-technical summary 5

1 Introduction 7

2 Literature and stylised facts 8 2.1 Related literature 8 2.2 Some stylised facts 10

3 Methodology 11 3.1 VAR specifi cation 11 3.2 Macroeconomic rates of return 14

4 Empirical analysis 17 4.1 Data 17 4.2 VAR estimation 18 4.3 The rates of return 20 4.4 Crowding-in and crowding-out effects 21

5 Conclusion 22

References 24

Appendix – Data sources 26

Tables and fi gures 27

European Central Bank Working Paper Series 53

CONTENTS

4ECBWorking Paper Series No 864February 2008

Abstract

Using annual data from 14 European Union countries, plus Canada, Japan and the United States, we evaluate the macroeconomic effects of public and private investment through VAR analysis. From impulse response functions, we are able to assess the extent of crowding-in or crowding-out of both components of investment. We also compute the associated macroeconomic rates of return of public and private investment for each country. The results point mostly to the existence of positive effects of public investment and private investment on output. On the other hand, the crowding-in effects of public investment on private investment vary across countries, while the crowding-in effect of private investment on public investment is more generalised.

JEL: C32, E22, E62

Keywords: fiscal policy, public investment, private investment, impulse response, vector autoregression, European Union

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Non-technical summary

In this paper we address two key questions: does public investment have a significant

effect on GDP, via computing macroeconomic rates of return, and does public

investment induce more private investment. From a theoretical perspective, a rise in

public investment can have two effects on private investment. First, the increase of

public investment needs to be financed, which may imply more taxes or impose a

higher demand for funds from the government in the capital markets, therefore

causing interest rates to rise. This would reduce the amount of savings available for

private investors and decrease the expected rate of return of private capital, leading to

a crowding-out effect on private investment. Second, public investment can create

additional favourable conditions for private investment, for instance, by providing or

promoting relevant infrastructure such as roads, highways, sewage systems, harbours

or airports. The existence of infrastructure facilities may increase the productivity of

private investment, which can then take advantage of better overall infrastructures and

potentially improved business conditions. This would result in having a crowding-in

effect on private investment.

Our work contains some innovative features worth mentioning. First, and for the first

time in the literature, public partial and total investment rates of return derived from a

VAR procedure are systematically computed and compared across countries and

periods of time. Secondly, we extend our analysis and methodology towards the

consideration of innovations in private investment, and therefore we are also able to

compute private investment rates of return. This allows us to analyse not only the

more studied question of private investment being crowded in or out by public

investment, but also the effects of private investment on public capital formation

decisions.

In our paper, by estimating VARs for 14 European Union countries, plus Canada,

Japan and the United States, we estimated that, between 1960 and 2005:

- public investment had a contractionary effect on output in five cases (Belgium,

Ireland, Canada, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) with positive public

investment impulses leading to a decline in private investment (crowding-out);


- on the other hand, expansionary effects and crowding-in prevailed in eight cases

(Austria, Germany, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Sweden).

These effects correspond to point estimates and care should be taken in their

interpretation, as 95 percent confidence bands concerning public investment effects on

output always include the zero value.

When it is possible to compute it, the partial rate of return of public investment is

mostly positive, with the exceptions of Finland, Italy and Sweden. Taking into

account the induced effect on private investment, the total rate of return associated

with public investment is generally lower, with the exception of France, and negative

for the cases of Austria, Finland, Greece, Portugal and Sweden, countries where the

increase in GDP was not sufficiently high to compensate for the total investment

effort.

Private investment impulses, by contrast, were always expansionary in GDP terms

and effects were usually significant in statistical terms. Public investment responded

positively to private investment in all but three countries (Belgium, Greece and

Sweden). The highest estimated return was in Japan (5.81 percent, partial), and there

were very few cases of slightly negative private investment rates of return, either

partial or total – Belgium, Denmark and Greece.

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1. Introduction

In this paper we address two key questions: does public investment have a significant

effect on GDP, via computing macroeconomic rates of return, and does public

investment induce more private investment. In other words, we ask if crowding-in

prevails or else, if the main result is crowding-out. From a theoretical perspective, a

rise in public investment can have two effects on private investment. First, the

increase of public investment needs to be financed, which may imply more taxes or

impose a higher demand for funds from the government in the capital markets,

therefore causing interest rates to rise. This would reduce the amount of savings

available for private investors and decrease the expected rate of return of private

capital, leading to a crowding-out effect on private investment. Second, public

investment can create additional favourable conditions for private investment, for

instance, by providing or promoting relevant infrastructure such as roads, highways,

sewage systems, harbours or airports. The existence of infrastructure facilities may

increase the productivity of private investment, which can then take advantage of

better overall infrastructures and potentially improved business conditions. This

would result in having a crowding-in effect on private investment.

Macroeconomic rates of return this have been previously computed by Pereira (2000)

and Pina and St. Aubyn (2005), but this method has not been widely used in the

literature. Building on such framework, and in order to tackle the main issue of the

paper, we evaluate the macroeconomic effects of public and private investment

through a Vector Autoregression analysis using annual data from 14 European Union

countries, plus Canada, Japan and the United States. We use impulse response


functions to assess the extent of crowding-in or crowding-out of both components of

investment.

Our work contains some innovative features worth mentioning. First, and for the first

time in the literature, public partial and total investment rates of return derived from a

VAR procedure are systematically computed and compared across countries and

periods of time. Secondly, we extend our analysis and methodology towards the

consideration of innovations in private investment, and therefore we are also able to

compute private investment rates of return. This allows us to analyse not only the

more studied question of private investment being crowded in or out by public

investment, but also the effects of private investment on public capital formation

decisions.

The paper is organised as follows. In Section Two we briefly review some of the

literature and previous results. Section Three outlines the methodological approach

used in the paper both regarding the VAR specification and the analytical framework

to compute the macroeconomic rates of return. In Section four we present and discuss

our results. Section Five summarise the paper’s main findings.

2. Literature and stylised facts

2.1. Related literature

The relevance of public investment is usually stressed in the implementation of

budgetary measures taken by governments, notably its particular growth enhancing

potential. For instance, in the European Union (EU), in the context of the recent

discussions about the revision of the Stability and Growth Pact, some proposals have

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called for the exclusion of public investment from the budget deficit threshold

established under the Maastricht Treaty. Moreover, the significance of public

investment has been further illustrated by the idea of the Golden Rule, suggesting that

such spending should only be financed by issuing government debt, and also by the

imposition of formal rules that budget deficits cannot exceed public investment.1

Since Aschauer’s (1989a, 1989b) initial contributions regarding the derivation of the

elasticity of output with respect to public capital stock, there has been considerable

interest in measuring the effects of public investment on aggregate economic activity,

as well as in assessing whether public investment crowds in or crowds out private

investment. The results of Aschauer (1989b) indicated that for the US, public

investment had an overall crowding-in effect on private investment, and that public

and private capital could be seen as complementary.2 Therefore, the related relevant

economic policy question seems to be whether or not public government investment is

productive and does contribute positively to growth, either directly or indirectly via

private investment decisions.

Some related studies have addressed the effects of public investment on GDP, and the

crowding-in hypothesis in the context of VAR analysis. For instance, Voss (2002)

estimates a VAR model with GDP, public investment, private investment, the real

interest rate, and price deflators of private and public investment, for the US and

Canada, for the period 1947-1996. According to the reported results, innovations to

public investment crowd out private investment. Mittnik and Neumann (2001)

1 Musgrave (1939) discussed the appropriateness of financing via government debt, the so-called self-liquidating investments, which he critically considered to be limited. 2 The high output elasticity estimated by Aschauer with respect to public capital was later criticised on econometric grounds.


estimate a VAR with GDP, private investment, public investment and public

consumption for six industrialised economies. Their results indicate that public

investment tends to exert positive effects on GDP, and that there is no evidence of

dominant crowding-out effects.

Argimón, González-Páramo and Roldán (1997) present results that support the

existence of a crowding-in effect of private investment by public investment, through

the positive impact of infrastructure on private investment productivity, for a panel of

14 OECD countries. Additionally, Perotti (2004) and Kamps (2004) assess the output

and labour market effects of government investment in a VAR context.

2.2. Some stylised facts

The share of both public and private investment in GDP varies across our country

sample and also throughout the time sample dimension. These developments are

summarised in Table 1.

Overall, the public investment-to-GDP ratio has declined for most countries in the

sample. On the other hand, a somewhat different pattern emerges in the cases of

Greece, Italy and Portugal, where the public investment-to-GDP ratio either increased,

particularly in the 1980s and in the 1990s, or did not decrease significantly. For

instance, the rising of the public investment ratio in Spain can be compared to the

historical decreases that occurred over the period in such countries as Austria,

Belgium, Germany and Denmark. These developments have to be seen against the

background of a catching-up effort undertaken by countries like Greece, Portugal, and

Spain after EU accession, while in other more mature European economies public

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investment ratios were already on a downward path.3 Additionally, it is also possible

to observe a decline from quite above-average sample levels in the investment ratio

for the case of Japan, and a rather stable ratio for the US.

In terms of private investment ratios, some heterogeneity also prevails in our country

sample. For instance, in 1970, private investment-to-GDP ratios ranged from around

15 per cent in such countries as the UK, the US and Sweden, to around 24 per cent in

the cases of Finland, Spain; the ratio even went as high as 28 per cent in the case of

Japan. In more recent years, the private investment-to-GDP in Spain was above

average, while some upward trends were visible from the second half of the 1990s

onwards in countries such as France, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the US.

3. Methodology

3.1. VAR specification

We estimate a small five-variable VAR model for each country throughout the period

1960-2005. The variables in the VAR are the logarithmic growth rates of real public

investment, Ipub, real private investment, Ipriv, real output, Y, real taxes, Tax, and

real interest rates, R. The inclusion of output, private investment and public

investment is crucial in what concerns the computation of macroeconomic rates of

return, as explained later. Taxes and real interest rates are included as they may have

important linkages with the above mentioned key variables.

The VAR model in standard form can be written as

1

p

t i t i ti

X c A X . (1)

3 Greece entered the EU in 1981, with Portugal and Spain following suit in 1986.


where Xt denotes the (5 1) vector of the five endogenous variables given

by'

log log log logt t t t t tX Ipub Ipriv Y Tax R , c is a (5 1) vector of

intercept terms, A is the matrix of autoregressive coefficients of order (5 5) , and the

vector of random disturbances'Ipub Ipriv Y Tax R

t t t t t t contains the

reduced form OLS residuals. The lag length of the endogeneous variables, p, will be

determined by the usual information criteria.

By imposing of a set of restrictions, it is possible to identify orthogonal shocks, , for

each of the variables in (1), and to compute these orthogonal innovations via the

random disturbances:

t tB . (2)

The estimation of (1) allows Cov( ) to be determined. Therefore, with the orthogonal

restrictions and by means of an adequate normalisation we have Cov( )=I, where

(5 5)I identity matrix, and we can write

( ) ( ) ( ) 't t tCov Cov B BCov B , (3)

( ) 'tI BCov B . (4)

Since B is a square ( )n n matrix, which in our case has dimension five, B has then 25

parameters that need to be identified. By imposing orthogonality, from (4) only 15

parameters can be determined, essentially from the five variances and from the ten

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covariances.4 For the complete identification of the model we need ten more

restrictions. The use of a Choleski decomposition of the matrix of covariances of the

residuals, which requires all elements above the principal diagonal to be zero,

provides the necessary additional ten restrictions, and the system is then exactly

identified.

We can then impose a lower triangular structure to B-1,

11

21 221

31 32 33

41 42 43 44

51 52 53 54 55

0 0 0 0

0 0 0

0 0

0

d

d d

B D d d d

d d d d

d d d d d

, (5)

which makes possible to write the residuals t as a function of the orthogonal shocks in

each of the variables:

t tD . (6)

Our VAR is ordered from the most exogenous variable to the least exogenous one,

with public investment ordered first. As a result, a shock in public investment may

have an instantaneous effect on all the other variables. However, public investment

does not respond contemporaneously to any structural disturbances to the remaining

variables due, for instance, to lags in government decision-making. In other words,

4 A n-variable VAR provides automatically n(n+1)/2 restrictions and an identical number of known parameters, which requires an additional (n2-n)/2 restrictions to be imposed on the system in order to identify all the n2 parameters.


private investment, GDP, taxes and the real interest rate affect public investment

sequences with a one-period lag. For instance, a shock in private investment, the

second variable, does not have an instantaneous impact on public investment – only

on output, taxes and the real interest rate.

Moreover, this ordering implies that private investment responds to public investment

in a contemporaneous fashion, but not to shocks to the other variables. Indeed, one

can recall that governments typically announce their spending and investment plans in

advance, in the context of their budgetary planning. Therefore, economic agents can

use such information in making their investment decisions. Additionally, private

investment affects GDP contemporaneously. The real interest rate is the least

exogenous variable, and it is assumed that its shocks do not affect the other variables

simultaneously. Moreover, it does react contemporaneously to shocks to the

remaining variables in the model.

3.2. Macroeconomic rates of return

Based on impulse response functions, we compute four different rates of return:

- r1, the partial rate of return of public investment;

- r2, the rate of return of total investment (originated by an impulse to public

investment);

- r3, the partial rate of return of private investment;

- r4, the rate of return of total investment (originated by an impulse to private

investment).

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The partial rate of return of public investment is computed as suggested by Pereira

(2000). Following an orthogonal impulse to public investment, we can compute the

long-run accumulated elasticity of Y with respect to public investment, Ipub, derived

from the accumulated impulse response functions of the VAR, as

log

logIpub

Y

Ipub. (7)

The above mentioned long-run elasticity is the ratio between the accumulated change

in the growth rate of output and the accumulated change in the growth rate of public

investment, which will be obtained from the estimation of the country-specific VAR

models.

The long-term marginal productivity of public investment is given by

Ipub

Y YMPIpub

Ipub Ipub. (8)

Then r1, the partial-cost dynamic feedback rate of return of public investment, is

obtained as the solution for:

201(1 )r MPIpub . (9)

As discussed by Pina and St. Aubyn (2005, 2006), this rate could either overestimate

or underestimate the return on public investment, as public investment can either


crowd in or crowd out private investment respectively. Suppose, for example, that

more public capital induces more private investment. The total investment that caused

the detected product increase exceeds the public effort, and if one only considers the

latter, the rate of return is overstated.

Since private investment also changes, the long-term accumulated elasticity of Y with

respect to Ipriv can also be derived from accumulated impulse response functions of

the VAR in a similar fashion:

log

logIpriv

Y

Ipriv, (10)

and now the long-term marginal productivity of private investment is given by

Ipriv

Y YMPIpriv

Ipriv Ipriv. (11)

Therefore, computing the marginal productivity of total investment, MPTI, implies

taking into account both the long-term marginal productivity of public and private

investment, as follows:

1 1

1YMPTI

Ipub Ipriv MPIpub MPIpriv. (12)

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Following Pina and St. Aubyn (2006), we compute a rate of return of total investment.

The rate of return of total investment (originated by an impulse to public investment),

r2, is obtained as the solution for:

MPTIr 202 )1( . (13)

In our described benchmark framework we use 20 years to compute both the partial

and the total rates of return. In other words, we assume an average life of 20 years for

a capital good. For instance, while the average life of a personal computer could be

three or four years, the life expectancy of a bridge is certainly to be measured in

decades.

The partial rate of return of private investment, r3, is computed in a way analogous to

r1. Using the accumulated impulse responses of the VAR following an impulse on

private investment, the long-run output elasticity is obtained, and then a marginal

productivity and a rate of return can be calculated. As public investment may also

respond positively or negatively to private efforts, a rate of return of total investment,

r4, is also estimated.

4. Empirical analysis

4.1. Data

We use annual data for 14 EU countries (sample in parenthesis): Austria (1965–2005),

Belgium (1970–2005), Denmark (1971–2005), Germany (1970–2005), Finland

(1961–2005), France (1970–2005), Greece (1973–2005), Ireland (1971–2005), Italy

(1970–2005), the Netherlands (1969–2005), Portugal (1981–2005), Spain (1979–


2005), Sweden (1971–2004) and the UK (1970–2005), plus Canada (1964–2004),

Japan (1972–2004), and the United States (1961–2004). In order to estimate our VAR

for each country, we use information for the following series: GDP at current market

prices; price deflator of GDP; general government gross fixed capital formation at

current prices, used as public investment; gross fixed capital formation of the private

sector at current prices, used as private investment; direct taxes, indirect taxes and

social contributions, aggregated into taxes; the nominal long-term interest rate and the

consumer price index..

GDP, taxes and investment variables are transformed into real values using the price

deflator of GDP and the price deflator of the gross fixed capital formation of the total

economy.5 A real ex-post interest rate is computed using the consumer price index

inflation rate. All data are taken from the European Commission Ameco database.6

4.2. VAR estimation

In the estimation of each country’s VAR, its GDP, public investment, private

investment, taxes and the interest rate are used in real terms. All variables enter the

VAR as logarithmic growth rates, except the interest rate, where first differences of

original values were taken. Moreover, the unit root analysis that we undertook showed

that these first differenced variables are mostly stationary, I (0) time series. Table 2

shows unit root test stastistics.

5 Due to the lack of information on a price deflator for private investment, we use the same deflator to compute both public and private investment variables. 6 The data sources are explained in the Appendix.

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Note that we chose not to estimate a “levels VAR” or to infer possible co-integration

vectors. In fact, there is no theoretical reason to expect a long-run relationship

between public investment, private investment, taxes, the real interest rate and GDP,

or between any two of these three variables, and to force this relationship could

introduce an unwanted structure into our empirical endeavour.

The chosen VAR order used in the estimation of each model was selected with the

Akaike and the Schwarz information criteria. Those tests led us to choose a more

parsimonious model with only one lag for most of the countries, which helped avoid

the use of too many degrees of freedom. With such specifications we usually could

not reject the null hypothesis of no serial residual correlation. In addition, we did not

reject the null hypothesis of normality of the VAR residuals in most cases. The

diagnostic tests regarding residual autocorrelation and normality are also reported in

Table 3.

Additionally, for the case of Germany we included a dummy variable that takes the

value of one in 1991 and zero otherwise in order to capture the break in the series

related to German reunification. This variable is highly statistically significant in all

equations. Moreover, for all cases we chose to privilege the absence of autocorrelation

of the residuals, even in the eventuality of the residuals being non-normal.7 As can be

seen from Table 3, all p-values exceed ten per cent. Therefore, even at a significance

level of 10 per cent, the null hypothesis of no residual autocorrelation cannot be

rejected for all countries.

7 Indeed, Lutkepohl (2005, pp. 297) points out that the assumption of normality does not impinge on the asymptotic properties of the estimated VAR parameters.


4.3. The rates of return

Table 4 contains information on accumulated responses of all VAR variables to public

and private investment innovations (the impulse response functions are plotted in the

Annex). A 95 percent (two standard deviations) confidence band around estimates is

also included. Figures in bold correspond to cases where those confidence bands

include positive or negative values only. Note that impulses to public investment are

never statistically significant at 95 percent level in what concerns effects on other

variables. On the other hand, impulses to private investment have in most cases a

positive and significant impact on output, and in some instances on taxes.

Table 5 reports the computed output elasticity and the rates of return of public and

private investment for each country for the respective period of available data.

Overall, one can observe that the output elasticity of private investment is always

positive and higher than the output elasticity of public investment.

In those cases where rates of return can be calculated or, in other words, whenever the

marginal productivity is positive, the partial rate of return of public investment is

mostly positive, with the exceptions of Finland, Italy and Sweden. Taking into


with public investment is generally lower, with the exception of France, and even

negative for the cases of Austria, Finland, Greece, Portugal and Sweden.

Regarding private investment (panel b) of Table 5), we can notice that partial

marginal productivity is positive for all countries. The same is true for the associated

total marginal productivity, which takes into account the effects of private investment

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on public investment. The partial rates of return of private investment are mostly

positive, with the exception of Belgium, Denmark and Greece, where the rate is

moderately negative. The total rate of return of private investment is mostly somewhat

below the partial rate of return, albeit slightly higher in the cases of Italy, Greece and

Sweden.

4.4. Crowding-in and crowding-out effects

On the basis of the values of the partial marginal productivity of public investment, it

is possible to determine the impact of public investment on output. That information,

taken from Table 5, is displayed on the horizontal axis of Figure 1. Additionally, on

the vertical axis we plot the marginal effects of public investment on private

investment, which allows us to assess the possible existence of crowding-in or

crowding-out effects of public investment on private investment. Such effects can be

easily derived from

Ipub

Ipriv

Ipriv Ipriv

Ipub Ipub. (14)

As Figure 1 demonstrates, public investment has a crowding-in effect on private

investment in eight of the 17 countries analysed. Of the nine countries in which there

is a crowding-out effect on private investment, four (France, Italy, Japan and the US)

still experience a slight output expansion, while Belgium, Ireland, Canada, the

Netherlands and the UK show a contractionary effect.


Figure 2 shows the values of the marginal productivity of private investment and the

marginal effects of private investment on public investment. This chart is useful in

visualising both the effect of private investment on output and the existing crowding-

in or crowding-out effects of private investment on public investment.

Figure 2 also reveals that private investment has a crowding-in effect on public

investment for most of the countries in the sample, while it crowds out public

investment in the cases of Belgium, Greece and Sweden. In addition, private

investment has an expansionary effect on output for all countries in the sample. The

effects of both public and private investment impulses for all countries are

summarised in Figure 3.

Finally, we also performed a sensitivity analysis by using only ten years for both

public and private investment, and also by assuming differentiated horizons, with

twenty and ten years respectively for public and for private investment. The results,

not reported in the paper, provided similar overall conclusions.

5. Conclusion

Public investment can either crowd in or crowd out private investment. In strong

crowding-out cases, it is possible that increased public investment could lead to a

decrease in GDP. In our paper, by estimating VARs for 14 European Union countries,

plus Canada, Japan and the United States, we estimated that, between 1960 and 2005:

23ECB


- public investment had a contractionary effect on output in five cases (Belgium,

Ireland, Canada, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) with positive public

investment impulses leading to a decline in private investment (crowding-out);

- on the other hand, expansionary effects and crowding-in prevailed in eight cases

(Austria, Germany, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Sweden).8

These effects correspond to point estimates and care should be taken in their

interpretation, as 95 percent confidence bands concerning public investment effects on

output always include the zero value.

When it is possible to compute it, the partial rate of return of public investment is

mostly positive, with the exceptions of Finland, Italy, Japan and Sweden. Taking into


with public investment is generally lower, with the exception of France, and negative

for the cases of Austria, Finland, Greece, Portugal and Sweden, countries where the

increase in GDP was not sufficiently high to compensate for the total investment

effort.

Private investment impulses, by contrast, were always expansionary in GDP terms

and effects were usually significant in statistical terms. Public investment responded

positively to private investment in all but three countries (Belgium, Greece and

Sweden). The highest estimated return was in Japan (5.81 percent, partial), and there

8 In somewhat related work Zou (2006) reports that public and private investment have expansionary effects on Japanese economic growth, while in the US the relevance for economic growth of private investment is higher than the one from public investment.


were very few cases of slightly negative private investment rates of return, either

partial or total – Belgium, Denmark and Greece.

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public capital: An empirical analysis of the Portuguese case (1960–2001). Journal of

Policy Modelling 27, 585-598.

Pina, A. and St. Aubyn, M. (2006). How should we measure the return on public

investment in a VAR? Economics Bulletin 8(5), 1-4

Voss, G. (2002). Public and private investment in the United States and Canada.

Economic Modelling 19, 641-664.

Zou, Y. (2006). Empirical studies on the relationship between public and private

investment and GDP growth. Applied Economics 38, 1259-1270.


Appendix – Data sources

Original series Ameco codes *

Gross Domestic Product at current market prices, thousands national currency.

1.0.0.0.UVGD

Price deflator of Gross Domestic Product, national currency, 1995 = 100. 3.1.0.0.PVGD

Gross fixed capital formation at current prices; general government, national currency.

1.0.0.0.UIGG

Gross fixed capital formation at current prices; private sector, national currency.

1.0.0.0.UIGP

Price deflator gross fixed capital formation; total economy, national currency; 1995 = 100.

3.1.0.0.PIGT

Nominal long-term interest rates - % .1.1.0.0.ILN National consumer price index - 1995 = 100 .3.0.0.0.ZCPIN Current taxes on income and wealth (direct taxes); general government - National currency, current prices .1.0.0.0.UTYGF Taxes linked to imports and production (indirect taxes); general government - National currency, current prices

.1.0.0.0.UTVGF

Social contributions received; general government - National currency, current prices

.1.0.0.0.UTSGF

Note: * series from the EC AMECO database.

27ECB


Tables and figures

Table 1 – Public and private investment -to-GDP ratios

Public investment-to-GDP ratios Private investment-to-GDP ratios

1970 1980 2005 Average 1960-05 1970 1980 2005

Average 1960-05

AUT 4.8 4.2 1.1 2.9 19.8 20.4 19.7 19.9 BEL 4.1 4.5 1.8 2.4 20.4 18.0 17.6 17.3 DEU 4.8 3.7 1.3 2.7 21.5 19.5 15.8 19.1 DNK 4.4* 3.2 1.9 2.2 19.9 16.5 17.6 17.7 ESP 2.5 1.8 3.5 3.0 23.7 20.5 25.7 20.3 FIN 4.2 3.6 3.0 3.4 23.7 23.1 16.2 20.1 FRA 3.7 3.2 3.3 3.3 20.1 19.7 16.1 17.3 GBR 4.8 2.6 2.1 2.2 14.7 16.1 14.3 15.5 GRC 2.7 2.1 3.1 2.8 23.1 26.6 21.5 20.3 IRL 4.0 5.6 3.8 3.2 18.5 22.3 21.7 17.7 ITA 2.8 3.0 2.7 2.8 22.5 22.1 16.8 18.7 NLD 5.0 3.7 3.0 3.3 22.0 18.2 16.3 18.0 PRT 2.1 4.0 2.9 2.9 22.4 25.6 18.2 22.1 SWE 7.8 5.2 3.1 # 4.1 16.0 15.8 12.9 # 14.9 CAN 4.0 3.0 2.7 # 2.9 17.6 20.6 17.6 # 18.1 JAP 8.0 9.4 4.9 # 7.6 28.1 22.5 18.9 # 21.7 USA 3.2 2.7 2.6 # 2.6 14.7 17.6 16.0 # 15.9 Maximum 8.0

(JAP) 9.4

(JAP) 4.9

(JAP) 7.6

(JAP) 28.1

(JAP) 26.6

(GRC)25.7

(ESP) 22.1

(PRT)Minimum 2.1

(PRT)1.8

(ESP) 1.1

(AUT) 2.2

(GBR)14.7

(USA) 15.8

(SWE) 12.9

(SWE) 14.9

(SWE)

Source: EC, AMECO Database, updated on 14 November 2005. * - 1971. # - 2004.


Table 2 – Unit root tests, variables in first differences: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics

dlog(Y) dlog(Ipub) dlog(Ipriv) dlog(tax) dir t-Statistic critical

value t-Statistic critical




value Austria -4.97 -3.59 -5.23 -3.59 -6.57 -3.59 -4.46 -3.59 -4.83 -3.62 Belgium -4.84 -3.59 -4.87 -3.64 -4.27 -3.64 -4.94 -4.18 -8.42 -3.59 Denmark -5.76 -3.59 -4.73 -3.65 -3.78 -3.68 -3.82 -3.65$ -10.89 -3.59 Finland -3.84 -3.59 -6.56 -3.59 -3.78 -3.59 -5.49 -3.59 -6.53 -3.59 France -3.18 -2.93$ -4.45 -3.64 -3.70 -3.64 -4.29 -3.6 -7.49 -3.59 Germany -4.71 -3.59 -4.33 -3.59 -4.34 -3.59 -9.87 -3.64 -7.46 -3.59 Greece -4.85 -3.59 -6.57 -3.59 -5.68 -3.59 -4.79 -3.59 -8.15 -3.66 Ireland -3.74 -3.59 -2.22 -2.62# -4.39 -3.64 -7.26 -3.64 -4.95 -3.65 Italy -4.31 -3.59 -6.91 -3.64 -4.64 -3.64 -6.42 -4.26$ -5.98 -3.59 Netherlands -3.19 -2.93$ -4.62 -3.64 -3.90 -3.64 -3.79 -3.63 -6.25 -3.59 Portugal -3.83 -3.59 -5.49 -3.59 -4.66 -3.59 -6.40 -3.59 -7.60 -3.75 Spain -3.41 -3.59 -4.16 -3.64 -3.46 -2.95$ -4.79 -3.64 -5.63 -3.72 Sweden -4.11 -3.59 -3.65 -3.59 -3.32 -2.95$ -3.65 -2.95$ -12.23 -3.59 UK -5.25 -3.59 -3.80 -3.64 -3.58 -2.95$ -4.58 -3.59 -8.61 -3.59 Canada -4.26 -3.59 -5.70 -3.59 -4.89 -3.59 -4.73 -3.61 -7.25 -3.59 Japan -2.88 -2.60# -2.93$ -3.59 -3.05 -2.93$ -5.04 -4.18 -6.67 -3.65 US -4.96 -3.59 -3.65 -3.59 -6.05 -3.59 -5.43 -3.59 -5.23 -3.59

Note: critical values are for 1% level unless otherwise mentioned. # – 10% level; $ – 5% level.

29ECB


Table 3 – Diagnostic tests, dynamic feedbacks VAR

Autocorrelation test

(p-value) 1

Normality test (p-value) 2 Number of lags

Number of observations

Austria 0.423 0.000 1 39 Belgium 0.379 0.214 1 34 Denmark 0.100 0.247 1 33 Finland 0.931 0.754 1 43

France 0.138 0.481 1 34 Germany 0.514 0.000 1 34 Greece 0.215 0.335 1 31 Ireland 0.233 0.259 1 33

Italy 0.264 0.050 1 34 Netherlands 0.101 0.445 1 35 Portugal 0.349 0.112 1 23 Spain 0.397 0.003 2 24 Sweden 0.782 0.322 1 33

United Kingdom 0.934 0.310 1 34 Canada 0.226 0.451 1 40 Japan 0.220 0.100 2 31 United States 0.101 0.281 1 43

Notes: We considered the maximum VAR order to be three. For Germany we included a dummy variable that takes the value one in 1991 and zero otherwise. For Finland and Sweden, a similar dummy variable for 1992 was not statistically significant. 1 – Multivariate residual serial correlation LM test. For the null hypothesis of no serial autocorrelation (of order 1) the test statistic as an asymptotic chi-square distribution with k2 degrees of freedom. 2 – Multivariate Jarque-Bera residual normality test. For the null hypothesis of normality, the test statistic has an asymptotic chi-square distribution with 8 degrees of freedom.


Table 4 – Accumulated responses to shocks in public and in private investment

Shock to Public Investment Shock to Private Investment Accumulated responses of - 2 S.E. central + 2 S.E. - 2 S.E. central + 2 S.E.

DEU Ipub 0.027 0.048 0.069 -0.010 0.015 0.039 Ipriv -0.028 0.004 0.036 0.030 0.066 0.102 Y -0.007 0.002 0.011 0.008 0.019 0.029 Taxes -0.222 -0.080 0.063 -0.166 0.009 0.185 Interest rate -0.281 0.026 0.334 -0.463 -0.084 0.295 PRT Ipub -0.009 0.149 0.308 -0.075 0.085 0.244 Ipriv -0.059 0.103 0.266 -0.017 0.146 0.309 Y -0.030 0.023 0.075 -0.010 0.044 0.097 Taxes -0.031 0.027 0.086 -0.010 0.049 0.109 Interest rate -2.710 -0.839 1.031 -3.534 -1.640 0.253 BEL Ipub 0.051 0.109 0.166 -0.073 -0.016 0.041 Ipriv -0.101 -0.046 0.009 0.035 0.089 0.143 Y -0.013 -0.001 0.010 0.001 0.013 0.025 Taxes -0.027 -0.005 0.018 -0.026 -0.001 0.024 Interest rate -0.818 0.003 0.823 -1.434 -0.557 0.319 FIN Ipub 0.041 0.072 0.103 -0.022 0.009 0.040 Ipriv -0.054 0.004 0.063 0.036 0.097 0.157 Y -0.018 0.001 0.020 0.001 0.021 0.041 Taxes -0.019 0.006 0.031 -0.002 0.025 0.051 Interest rate -0.642 0.471 1.584 -1.232 -0.017 1.198 DNK Ipub 0.059 0.132 0.206 -0.029 0.042 0.114 Ipriv -0.049 0.025 0.099 0.048 0.120 0.193 Y -0.005 0.007 0.020 0.008 0.020 0.032 Taxes -0.005 0.018 0.041 0.009 0.032 0.056 Interest rate -0.933 -0.301 0.330 -0.907 -0.244 0.420 AUT Ipub 0.043 0.098 0.152 -0.023 0.029 0.082 Ipriv -0.024 0.005 0.033 0.030 0.057 0.083 Y -0.010 0.004 0.018 0.002 0.016 0.030 Taxes -0.022 -0.001 0.020 0.003 0.024 0.045 Interest rate -0.385 0.018 0.421 -0.850 -0.443 -0.036 CAN Ipub 0.032 0.058 0.084 -0.011 0.012 0.034 Ipriv -0.057 -0.022 0.014 0.028 0.061 0.093 Y -0.018 -0.004 0.011 0.000 0.014 0.028 Taxes -0.027 -0.006 0.014 0.006 0.026 0.045 Interest rate -0.507 0.099 0.705 -1.180 -0.592 -0.003 JAP Ipub -0.035 0.088 0.210 -0.089 0.073 0.235 Ipriv -0.082 -0.030 0.022 -0.018 0.060 0.138 Y -0.039 0.000 0.040 -0.012 0.040 0.093 Taxes -0.083 -0.005 0.073 -0.018 0.085 0.188 Interest rate -1.675 0.480 2.635 -1.713 1.104 3.921 ESP Ipub -0.048 0.040 0.127 -0.066 0.087 0.240 Ipriv -0.040 0.004 0.048 -0.008 0.071 0.150 Y -0.010 0.003 0.016 -0.001 0.022 0.046 Taxes -0.031 -0.002 0.026 -0.008 0.041 0.091 Interest rate -0.614 0.218 1.049 -1.493 -0.131 1.231

Notes: Ipub – public investment; Ipriv – private investment; Y – GDP; Taxes – direct and indirect taxes plus social security contributions; S. E. – standard error. The numbers in bold are statistically significant at the 95% level.

31ECB


Table 4 – Accumulated responses to shocks in public and in private investment (cont.)

Shock to Public Investment Shock to Private Investment Accumulated responses of - 2 S.E. central + 2 S.E. - 2 S.E. central + 2 S.E.

FRA Ipub 0.009 0.040 0.072 -0.018 0.022 0.062 Ipriv -0.040 -0.004 0.031 0.024 0.067 0.110 Y -0.007 0.002 0.011 0.004 0.016 0.027 Taxes -0.010 0.007 0.023 -0.014 0.007 0.028 Interest rate -0.583 -0.009 0.565 -1.299 -0.573 0.153 GBR Ipub 0.063 0.170 0.277 -0.040 0.040 0.120 Ipriv -0.102 -0.049 0.004 0.024 0.065 0.106 Y -0.022 -0.006 0.009 0.006 0.019 0.031 Taxes -0.033 -0.011 0.011 -0.009 0.010 0.029 Interest rate -1.102 -0.170 0.763 -1.249 -0.448 0.353 GRC Ipub 0.036 0.127 0.218 -0.158 -0.055 0.047 Ipriv -0.025 0.028 0.081 0.035 0.092 0.149 Y -0.011 0.009 0.028 -0.005 0.017 0.040 Taxes -0.019 0.002 0.022 -0.017 0.007 0.031 Interest rate -1.966 -0.873 0.220 -2.348 -1.106 0.136 IRL Ipub -0.045 0.103 0.252 -0.008 0.188 0.383 Ipriv -0.131 -0.052 0.026 0.011 0.115 0.218 Y -0.039 -0.005 0.029 -0.008 0.038 0.083 Taxes -0.029 -0.007 0.015 -0.014 0.016 0.046 Interest rate -1.347 0.466 2.279 -3.137 -0.680 1.777 ITA Ipub 0.034 0.078 0.122 -0.008 0.044 0.096 Ipriv -0.041 -0.009 0.022 0.022 0.058 0.095 Y -0.011 0.001 0.013 -0.002 0.013 0.028 Taxes -0.006 0.019 0.044 -0.029 0.002 0.034 Interest rate -0.220 1.337 2.893 -2.719 -0.799 1.121 NLD Ipub 0.026 0.061 0.096 -0.010 0.026 0.062 Ipriv -0.066 -0.026 0.013 0.024 0.065 0.105 Y -0.021 -0.005 0.011 0.004 0.021 0.038 Taxes -0.058 -0.028 0.002 -0.016 0.016 0.048 Interest rate -0.776 -0.165 0.446 -1.113 -0.451 0.211 SWE Ipub 0.031 0.070 0.110 -0.072 -0.032 0.008 Ipriv -0.059 0.008 0.074 0.025 0.095 0.165 Y -0.014 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.015 0.031 Taxes -0.039 -0.005 0.030 -0.003 0.034 0.071 Interest rate -0.721 0.023 0.766 -0.969 -0.146 0.677 USA Ipub 0.018 0.049 0.080 -0.005 0.021 0.046 Ipriv -0.060 -0.024 0.012 0.031 0.061 0.090 Y -0.009 0.002 0.014 0.010 0.020 0.029 Taxes -0.023 -0.001 0.022 0.023 0.041 0.059 Interest rate -1.068 -0.440 0.187 -0.923 -0.371 0.182

Notes: Ipub – public investment; Ipriv – private investment; Y – GDP; Taxes – direct and indirect taxes plus social security contributions; S. E. – standard error. The numbers in bold are statistically significant at the 95% level.


Table 5 – Long-run elasticities, marginal productivity and rates of return (full period)

a) Impulse on public investment Output

elasticity MPIpub Partial

rate of return (%)

MPTI Total rate of return

(%)Austria 0.049 1.602 2.39 0.465 -3.76 Belgium -0.011 -0.434 na 0.215 -7.40 Denmark 0.055 2.540 4.77 1.000 0.00 Finland 0.015 0.441 -4.01 0.329 -5.41 France 0.050 1.526 2.14 3.500 6.46 Germany 0.047 1.719 2.74 1.121 0.57 Greece 0.068 2.390 4.45 0.927 -0.38 Ireland -0.052 -1.597 na 0.902 -0.51 Italy 0.014 0.510 -3.30 2.56 4.81 Netherlands -0.090 -2.721 na 2.02 3.57 Portugal 0.152 5.182 8.57 0.835 -0.90 Spain 0.079 2.665 5.02 1.551 2.22 Sweden 0.005 0.126 -9.81 0.317 -11.33 United Kingdom -0.036 -1.623 na 1.571 2.28 Canada -0.068 -2.308 na 1.769 2.89 Japan 0.001 0.014 -19.12 1.164 0.76 United States 0.047 1.826 3.06 -0.923 na

b) Impulse on private investment Output

elasticity MPIpriv Partial

rate of return (%)

MPTI Total rate of return

(%)Austria 0.289 1.454 1.89 1.353 1.52 Belgium 0.150 0.863 -0.73 0.886 -0.60 Denmark 0.168 0.949 -0.26 0.909 -0.47 Finland 0.213 1.061 0.30 1.044 0.21 France 0.233 1.351 1.52 1.272 1.21 Germany 0.280 1.468 1.94 1.423 1.78 Greece 0.186 0.915 -0.44 0.999 -0.01 Ireland 0.328 1.855 3.14 1.428 1.80 Italy 0.208 1.112 0.53 1.690 2.66 Netherlands 0.321 1.783 2.93 1.660 2.57 Portugal 0.298 1.348 1.51 1.252 1.13 Spain 0.317 1.558 2.24 1.321 1.40 Sweden 0.161 1.082 0.40 1.193 0.89 United Kingdom 0.285 1.839 3.09 1.689 2.65 Canada 0.232 1.284 1.26 1.245 1.10 Japan 0.671 3.09 5.81 2.168 3.94 United States 0.322 2.03 3.60 1.920 3.31

Notes: na – not available. The rate of return cannot be computed in this case since the marginal productivity is negative, see, for instance, equation (12) in the text. MPIpub –marginal productivity of public investment. MPIpriv – marginal productivity of private investment. MPTI – marginal productivity of total investment.

33ECB


Figure 1 – Public investment: marginal productivity (horizontal) and marginal effect on private investment (vertical), (1960-2005)

FRA

IRL

BEL

NLD

GBR ITA

PRT

DEU

GRC

ESP

DNK

FIN

AUT

SWE

CAN

JAP

USA

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

-9 -6 -3 0 3 6 9

Out

put

cont

ract

ion

Negative effect on private investment

Out

put

expa

nsio

n

Positive effect on private investment

Note: AUT – Austria; BEL – Belgium; CAN – Canada; DEU – Germany; DNK – Denmark; ESP – Spain; FIN – Finland; FRA – France; GBR – United Kingdom; GRC – Greece; IRL – Ireland; ITA – Italy; JAP – Japan; NLD – Netherlands; PRT – Portugal; SWE – Sweden; USA – United States.


Figure 2 – Private investment: marginal productivity (horizontal) and marginal effect on public investment (vertical), (1960-2005)

FRA

IRL

BEL

NLD

GBRPRT

DEU

GRC

ESPDNK

FIN AUT

SWE

USA

CAN

-0.15

-0.05

0.05

0.15

0.25

0.35

0.45

-0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0

Negative effect on public investment

Out

put

cont

ract

ion

Out

put

expa

nsio

n

Positive effect on public investment

Note: AUT – Austria; BEL – Belgium; CAN – Canada; DEU – Germany; DNK – Denmark; ESP – Spain; FIN – Finland; FRA – France; GBR – United Kingdom; GRC – Greece; IRL – Ireland; ITA – Italy; JAP – Japan; NLD – Netherlands; PRT – Portugal; SWE – Sweden; USA – United States.

35ECB


Figure 3 – Summary of public and private investment effects (1960-2005)

Public investment impulse Effect on priv. inv.

Effect on outputCrowding-in Crowding-out

Expansionary AUT, DEU, DNK, ESP, FIN,

GRC, PRT, SWE FRA, ITA, JAP, USA

Contractionary -BEL, IRL, CAN, GBR, NLD

Private investment impulse Effect on pub. inv.

Effect on outputCrowding-in Crowding-out

Expansionary AUT, BEL, CAN, ESP, DEU,

DNK, ESP, FIN, GRB, IRL, ITA, JAP, NLD, PRT

BEL, GRC, SWE

Contractionary - -


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37ECB


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PU

B

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.

-.02

.00

.02

.04

.06

.08

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.04

.00

.04

.08

.12

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.01

.00

.01

.02

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PR

IV

-.01

.00

.01

.02

.03

.04

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PR

IV

-1.2

-0.8

-0.4

0.0

0.4

0.8

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to

DLI

PR

IV

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.

39ECB


Fin

land -.0

4

.00

.04

.08

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

UB

-.03

-.02

-.01

.00

.01

.02

.03

.04

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

UB

-.010

-.005

.000

.005

.010

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PU

B

-.02

-.01

.00

.01

.02

.03

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PU

B

-0.8

-0.40.0

0.4

0.8

1.2

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to

DLI

PU

B

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.

-.03

-.02

-.01

.00

.01

.02

.03

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.02.0

0

.02

.04

.06

.08

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.008

-.004

.000

.004

.008

.012

.016

.020

.024

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PR

IV

-.008

-.004

.000

.004

.008

.012

.016

.020

.024

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PR

IV

-1.5

-1.0

-0.50.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to

DLI

PR

IV

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.


Fra

nce

-.02

.00

.02

.04

.06

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

UB

-.02

-.01

.00

.01

.02

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

UB

-.00

4

.000

.004

.008

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PU

B

-.01

0

-.00

5

.00

0

.00

5

.01

0

.01

5

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PU

B

-.6-.4-.2.0.2.4.6

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to

DLI

PU

B

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.

-.01.0

0

.01

.02

.03

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.01.0

0

.01

.02

.03

.04

.05

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.00

4

.000

.004

.008

.012

.016

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PR

IV

-.008

-.004

.000

.004

.008

.012

.016

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PR

IV

-1.2

-0.8

-0.40.0

0.4

0.8

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to

DLI

PR

IV

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.

41ECB


Ger

man

y

-.01

.00

.01

.02

.03

.04

.05

.06

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

UB

-.02

-.01

.00

.01

.02

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

UB

-.008

-.004

.000

.004

.008

.012

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PU

B

-.3-.2-.1.0.1.2

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PU

B

-.4-.2.0.2.4

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to

DLI

PU

B

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.

-.01

0

-.00

5

.000

.005

.010

.015

.020

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.01.0

0

.01

.02

.03

.04

.05

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.00

4

.000

.004

.008

.012

.016

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PR

IV

-.3

-.2

-.1.0.1.2.3

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PR

IV

-.3-.2-.1.0.1.2.3

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to

DLI

PR

IV

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.


Gre

ece

-.10

-.05

.00

.05

.10

.15

.20

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

UB

-.04

-.02

.00

.02

.04

.06

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

UB

-.02

-.01

.00

.01

.02

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PU

B

-.02

-.01

.00

.01

.02

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PU

B

-1.6

-1.2

-0.8

-0.4

0.0

0.4

0.8

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to

DLI

PU

B

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.

-.08

-.06

-.04

-.02

.00

.02

.04

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.02

.00

.02

.04

.06

.08

.10

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.01

.00

.01

.02

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PR

IV

-.02

-.01

.00

.01

.02

.03

.04

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PR

IV

-1.5

-1.0

-0.5

0.0

0.5

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to

DLI

PR

IV

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.

43ECB


Irel

and

-.04

.00

.04

.08

.12

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

UB

-.06

-.04

-.02

.00

.02

.04

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

UB

-.01

5

-.01

0

-.00

5

.000

.005

.010

.015

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PU

B

-.03

-.02

-.01

.00

.01

.02

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PU

B

-1.0

-0.50.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to

DLI

PU

B

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.

-.02.0

0

.02

.04

.06

.08

.10

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.04.0

0

.04

.08

.12

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.00

5

.000

.005

.010

.015

.020

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PR

IV

-.03

-.02

-.01.0

0

.01

.02

.03

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PR

IV

-0.8

-0.40.0

0.4

0.8

1.2

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to

DLI

PR

IV

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.


Ital

y -.10

-.05

.00

.05

.10

.15

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

UB

-.04

-.03

-.02

-.01

.00

.01

.02

.03

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

UB

-.01

2

-.00

8

-.00

4

.000

.004

.008

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PU

B

-.01

.00

.01

.02

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PU

B

-0.50.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to

DLI

PU

B

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.

-.02.0

0

.02

.04

.06

.08

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.01.0

0

.01

.02

.03

.04

.05

.06

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.01

0

-.00

5

.000

.005

.010

.015

.020

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PR

IV

-.015

-.010

-.005

.000

.005

.010

.015

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PR

IV

-1.5

-1.0

-0.50.0

0.5

1.0

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to

DLI

PR

IV

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.

45ECB


Net

herl

ands

-.02

.00

.02

.04

.06

.08

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

UB

-.04

-.03

-.02

-.01

.00

.01

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

UB

-.01

2

-.00

8

-.00

4

.000

.004

.008

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PU

B

-.02

0

-.01

6

-.01

2

-.00

8

-.00

4

.00

0

.00

4

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PU

B

-.8-.6-.4-.2.0.2.4

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to

DLI

PU

B

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.

-.01.0

0

.01

.02

.03

.04

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.02.0

0

.02

.04

.06

.08

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.00

4

.000

.004

.008

.012

.016

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PR

IV

-.010

-.005

.000

.005

.010

.015

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PR

IV

-.8-.4.0.4

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to

DLI

PR

IV

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.


Por

tuga

l

-.04

.00

.04

.08

.12

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

UB

-.04

.00

.04

.08

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

UB

-.01

0

-.00

5

.000

.005

.010

.015

.020

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PU

B

-.02

-.01

.00

.01

.02

.03

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PU

B

-3-2-10123

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to

DLI

PU

B

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.

-.02

.00

.02

.04

.06

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.04

.00

.04

.08

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.01

.00

.01

.02

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PR

IV

-.02

-.01

.00

.01

.02

.03

.04

.05

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PR

IV

-3-2-1012

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to

DLI

PR

IV

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.

47ECB


Spai

n -.04

.00

.04

.08

.12

.16

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

UB

-.02

-.01.0

0

.01

.02

.03

.04

.05

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

UB

-.004

.000

.004

.008

.012

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PU

B

-.01.0

0

.01

.02

.03

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PU

B

-.8-.4.0.4.8

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to

DLI

PU

B

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.

-.06

-.04

-.02

.00

.02

.04

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.02.0

0

.02

.04

.06

.08

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.004

.000

.004

.008

.012

.016

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PR

IV

-.01.0

0

.01

.02

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PR

IV

-.8-.4.0.4.8

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to

DLI

PR

IV

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.


Swed

en

-.02

.00

.02

.04

.06

.08

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

UB

-.03

-.02

-.01.0

0

.01

.02

.03

.04

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

UB

-.00

8

-.00

4

.00

0

.00

4

.00

8

.01

2

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PU

B

-.02

-.01.0

0

.01

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PU

B

-1.5

-1.0

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to

DLI

PU

B

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.

-.04

-.03

-.02

-.01

.00

.01

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.02.0

0

.02

.04

.06

.08

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.00

5

.00

0

.00

5

.01

0

.01

5

.02

0

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PR

IV

-.01.0

0

.01

.02

.03

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PR

IV

-2-1012

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to

DLI

PR

IV

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.

49ECB


UK

-.04

.00

.04

.08

.12

.16

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

UB

-.04

-.03

-.02

-.01

.00

.01

.02

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

UB

-.01

5

-.01

0

-.00

5

.000

.005

.010

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PU

B

-.01

5

-.01

0

-.00

5

.00

0

.00

5

.01

0

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PU

B

-1.5

-1.0

-0.50.0

0.5

1.0

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to

DLI

PU

B

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.

-.04

-.02.0

0

.02

.04

.06

.08

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.02.0

0

.02

.04

.06

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.00

5

.000

.005

.010

.015

.020

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PR

IV

-.010

-.005

.000

.005

.010

.015

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PR

IV

-1.0

-0.50.0

0.5

1.0

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to

DLI

PR

IV

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.


Can

ada

-.02

.00

.02

.04

.06

.08

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

UB

-.04

-.03

-.02

-.01.0

0

.01

.02

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

UB

-.012

-.008

-.004

.000

.004

.008

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PU

B

-.016

-.012

-.008

-.004

.000

.004

.008

.012

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PU

B

-.8-.4.0.4

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to

DLI

PU

B

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.

-.01

.00

.01

.02

.03

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.02

.00

.02

.04

.06

.08

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.01

0

-.00

5

.000

.005

.010

.015

.020

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PR

IV

-.01

.00

.01

.02

.03

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PR

IV

-.8-.6-.4-.2.0.2

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to

DLI

PR

IV

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.

51ECB


Japa

n

-.04

-.02

.00

.02

.04

.06

.08

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

UB

-.04

-.03

-.02

-.01

.00

.01

.02

.03

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

UB

-.01

0

-.00

5

.000

.005

.010

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PU

B

-.02

-.01

.00

.01

.02

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PU

B

-1.0

-0.50.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to

DLI

PU

B

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.

-.04

-.02.0

0

.02

.04

.06

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.04

-.02.0

0

.02

.04

.06

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.01

0

-.00

5

.000

.005

.010

.015

.020

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PR

IV

-.02

-.01.0

0

.01

.02

.03

.04

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PR

IV

-1.5

-1.0

-0.50.0

0.5

1.0

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to

DLI

PR

IV

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.


USA

-.02

-.01.0

0

.01

.02

.03

.04

.05

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

UB

-.03

-.02

-.01.0

0

.01

.02

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

UB

-.00

50

-.00

25

.00

00

.00

25

.00

50

.00

75

.01

00

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PU

B

-.01

5

-.01

0

-.00

5

.00

0

.00

5

.01

0

.01

5

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PU

B

-.8

-.6

-.4

-.2.0.2

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to D

LIP

UB

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.

-.00

8

-.00

4

.000

.004

.008

.012

.016

.020

.024

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PU

B t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.02

.00

.02

.04

.06

.08

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLI

PR

IV t

o D

LIP

RIV

-.01

.00

.01

.02

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLY

to

DLI

PR

IV

-.01

.00

.01

.02

.03

.04

.05

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DLT

AX

to

DLI

PR

IV

-.8-.4.0.4

24

68

1012

1416

1820

Res

pons

e of

DIR

to

DLI

PR

IV

Res

pons

e to

Cho

lesk

y O

ne S

.D.

Inno

vatio

ns ±

2 S

.E.

53ECB


European Central Bank Working Paper Series

For a complete list of Working Papers published by the ECB, please visit the ECB’s website(http://www.ecb.europa.eu).

827 “How is real convergence driving nominal convergence in the new EU Member States?” by S. M. Lein-Rupprecht, M. A. León-Ledesma, and C. Nerlich, November 2007.

828 “Potential output growth in several industrialised countries: a comparison” by C. Cahn and A. Saint-Guilhem, November 2007.

829 “Modelling infl ation in China: a regional perspective” by A. Mehrotra, T. Peltonen and A. Santos Rivera, November 2007.

830 “The term structure of euro area break-even infl ation rates: the impact of seasonality” by J. Ejsing, J. A. García and T. Werner, November 2007.

831 “Hierarchical Markov normal mixture models with applications to fi nancial asset returns” by J. Geweke and G. Amisano, November 2007.

832 “The yield curve and macroeconomic dynamics” by P. Hördahl, O. Tristani and D. Vestin, November 2007.

833 “Explaining and forecasting euro area exports: which competitiveness indicator performs best?” by M. Ca’ Zorzi and B. Schnatz, November 2007.

834 “International frictions and optimal monetary policy cooperation: analytical solutions” by M. Darracq Pariès, November 2007.

835 “US shocks and global exchange rate confi gurations” by M. Fratzscher, November 2007.

836 “Reporting biases and survey results: evidence from European professional forecasters” by J. A. García and A. Manzanares, December 2007.

837 “Monetary policy and core infl ation” by M. Lenza, December 2007.

838 “Securitisation and the bank lending channel” by Y. Altunbas, L. Gambacorta and D. Marqués, December 2007.

839 “Are there oil currencies? The real exchange rate of oil exporting countries” by M. M. Habib and M. Manolova Kalamova, December 2007.

840 “Downward wage rigidity for different workers and fi rms: an evaluation for Belgium using the IWFP procedure” by P. Du Caju, C. Fuss and L. Wintr, December 2007.

841 “Should we take inside money seriously?” by L. Stracca, December 2007.

842 “Saving behaviour and global imbalances: the role of emerging market economies” by G. Ferrucci and C. Miralles, December 2007.

843 “Fiscal forecasting: lessons from the literature and challenges” by T. Leal, J. J. Pérez, M. Tujula and J.-P. Vidal, December 2007.

844 “Business cycle synchronization and insurance mechanisms in the EU” by A. Afonso and D. Furceri, December 2007.

845 “Run-prone banking and asset markets” by M. Hoerova, December 2007.


846 “Information combination and forecast (st)ability. Evidence from vintages of time-series data” by C. Altavilla and M. Ciccarelli, December 2007.

847 “Deeper, wider and more competitive? Monetary integration, Eastern enlargement and competitiveness in the European Union” by G. Ottaviano, D. Taglioni and F. di Mauro, December 2007.

848 “Economic growth and budgetary components: a panel assessment for the EU” by A. Afonso and J. González Alegre, January 2008.

849 “Government size, composition, volatility and economic growth” by A. Afonso and D. Furceri, January 2008.

850 “Statistical tests and estimators of the rank of a matrix and their applications in econometric modelling” by G. Camba-Méndez and G. Kapetanios, January 2008.

851 “Investigating infl ation persistence across monetary regimes” by L. Benati, January 2008.

852 “Determinants of economic growth: will data tell?” by A. Ciccone and M. Jarocinski, January 2008.

853 “The cyclical behavior of equilibrium unemployment and vacancies revisited” by M. Hagedorn and I. Manovskii, January 2008.

854 “How do fi rms adjust their wage bill in Belgium? A decomposition along the intensive and extensive margins” by C. Fuss, January 2008.

855 “Assessing the factors behind oil price changes” by S. Dées, A. Gasteuil, R. K. Kaufmann and M. Mann, January 2008.

856 “Markups in the euro area and the US over the period 1981-2004: a comparison of 50 sectors” by R. Christopoulou and P. Vermeulen, January 2008.

857 “Housing and equity wealth effects of Italian households” by C. Grant and T. Peltonen, January 2008.

858 “International transmission and monetary policy cooperation” by G. Coenen, G. Lombardo, F. Smets and R. Straub, January 2008.

859 “Assessing the compensation for volatility risk implicit in interest rate derivatives” by F. Fornari, January 2008.

860 “Oil shocks and endogenous markups: results from an estimated euro area DSGE model” by M. Sánchez, January 2008.

861 “Income distribution determinants and public spending effi ciency” by A. Afonso, L. Schuknecht and V. Tanzi, January 2008.

862 “Stock market volatility and learning” by K. Adam, A. Marcet and J. P. Nicolini, February 2008.

863 “Population ageing and public pension reforms in a small open economy” by C. Nickel, P. Rother and A. Theophilopoulou, February 2008.

864 “Macroeconomic rates of return of public and private investment: crowding-in and crowding-out effects” by A. Afonso and M. St. Aubyn, February 2008.

Macroeconomic rates of return of public and private investment

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Transcript of Macroeconomic rates of return of public and private investment