his Joint Strategic Plans andOperations Group (JSPOG), shift-ed to an amphibious operation inSeptember.

Under the U.N. Flag

On that same busy 10 July,MacArthur's mantle of authoritywas embroidered with a newtitle—Commander in Chief, UnitedNations Command or "CinCUNC."From then on operations in Koreaand surrounding waters would befought under the light-blue-and-white flag of the United Nations.

The sailing of the 1st ProvisionalMarine Brigade from San Diegobegan on 12 July. Core of theground element was the 5thMarines; the air element wasMarine Aircraft Group 33. Fillingthe brigade had gutted both the 1stMarine Division and the 1st MarineAircraft Wing.

General Cates was in San Diegoto see the Marines off. His longcigarette holder was famous; notmany Marines knew that he used itbecause gas in World War I hadweakened his lungs. GeneralShepherd was also on the dockand it gave him the opportunity todiscuss with Cates his promise toMacArthur of a full division. Couldthe 1st Marine Division be assem-bled and made ready in such ashort time?

"I don't know," said Gates dubi-ously; it would drain the MarineCorps completely.

"Clifton," said Shepherd simply,"you can't let me down."

Visitors from Washington

In Tokyo, where it was already13 July, MacArthur was meetingwith visitors from Washington—Army General Collins and GeneralHoyt S. Vandenberg, chief of staffof the newly independent AirForce. Also present were Admiral

Radford, General Almond, andLieutenant General Walton H.Walker. It had just beenannounced that Walker was shift-ing his flag from Japan to Korea,and the Eighth Army wouldbecome the Eighth U.S. Army inKorea, which yielded the acronym"EUSAK." MacArthur explained hisreasons for cancelling Blueheartsand said that he had not yet cho-sen a new target date or locationfor an amphibious strike, butfavored Inchon.

As soon as the meeting wasover, Collins and Walker flew toKorea, where Walker opened afield headquarters at Taegu for hisEighth Army. Collins spent only anhour on the ground and did notleave the airport before returningto Tokyo.

Next day, the 14th, he wasbriefed by General Almond andAdmiral Doyle, who had com-manded Amphibious Group Onesince January. Before that for twoyears Doyle had headed theAmphibious Training Command,Pacific Fleet. During World War IIhe served on the staff ofAmphibious Force, South Pacific.

Collins questioned the feasibilityof landing at Inchon. Doyle saidthat it would be difficult but couldbe done. Before leaving Tokyo,Collins assured MacArthur that hewould endorse the sending of afull-strength Marine division.

Earlier, during the planning forOperation Bluehearts, Doyle hadexpressed reservations over theuse of the 1st Cavalry Divisionbecause it was not amphibiouslytrained. His relations with Almondwere strained. He thought Almondarrogant and dictatorial and a per-son who "often confused himselfwith his boss."

Lieutenant Haig, Almond's aideand the keeper of his war diary,found his chief "volcanic" in per-sonality, "brilliant" but "irascible,"

76

and, with all that, a "phenomenal-ly gifted soldier." Almond, like hisidol, General George S. Patton, Jr.,designed his own uniforms andwore a pistol on a leather beltadorned with a huge crested buck-le. He did this, he said, so as to beeasily recognized by his troops.

General Walker, a tenaciousman who deserved his nickname"Bulldog" (although he was"Johnnie" Walker to his friends),continued the piecemeal buildupof the Eighth Army. All of the 24thDivision was committed by 7 July.The 25th Division completed itsmove from Japan on 14 July.

Tactical Air Control Problems

The 1st Cavalry Division was inprocess of loading out from Japanin Doyle's PhibGruOne whenBluehearts was cancelled in favorof an unopposed landing on 18July at Pohang-dong, a port some60 air miles northeast of Pusan.Plans developed for Bluehearts byboth PhibGruOne and 1st CavalryDivision were used for the opera-tion. For this non-hostile landingthe Navy insisted on control of anair space 100 miles in diameter cir-cling the landing site. This Navyrequirement for control of air traf-fic over the objective area conflict-ed with Air Force doctrine whichcalled for Air Force control of alltactical aircraft in the theater ofoperations.

Lieutenant General Earle E.

"Pat" Partridge, whose Fifth AirForce Joint Operations Center wasin Taegu side-by-side withWalker's Eighth Army headquar-ters, protested the Navy require-ment that would have caused himto vacate the control of air overvirtually all of the Pusan Perimeter.This began a doctrinal disputeinvolving the tactical control of airthat would continue for the rest ofthe war.

Major General Oliver P Smith

O liv r Prince mith did nm fLil the 1arine orp"warrior" image. He , a' deeply religiou . did notdrink, Idom rai 'ed his voi e in anger, and

almo. t never w reo Tall, 'I nder, and white-haired, heI ked like a liege profeor i . upp . ed to look andseldom d ome f hi com mporarie th ught himpedamic and a bit low. IT ,mok d a pip in a meditativewa , but when hi mind \va' made up he could be a r­olute as ark. H al ays mmanded r spect and, withthe passage of year , that respect I cam love and d 0­

tion on th' part of those 1arines who, erved under himin Korea. Th y came to know that h would never wa tetheir Ii es needlessly.

s c mmanding generdl of the l:t Marin Divi ion,,mith's feud with the mercurial commander of rp',Major Gen 'ral Edward M. Almond, , \ ould be omethe stuff of legends.

o ne i. ever knm\ n to have called him" lIie." To hisfamily he wa' "Oli er." T hi' cont mp rari and ven­wally t th pr ,whi h at ftf t t nd d to onfu e hinlwith th ntrover ial Holland M. "IIowlin' Mad" mith f'; arid'; ar 11. h wa always "0. P." mith. ome calledhim '·the Profe or" becau e of hi studi U' way and de preading in military hist ry.

Born in Menard, Te'a , in 1 93, he had by the tinle ofAmeri a' entry into the Fu t \1 orld ar worked hi.< wathrough dle njv rsity f alifornia at B rkeley, Cia' of191. hi! a tudent at Berkeley he qualifi d for a om­mi i n m th Army R erve whi h he exchang d, a we kafter neri a' entry into dle war n 6 pril 191 for dleg ld bar of a 1arine orp .. ond li utenanL

Department of Defense Photo (r.; ~IC) A83"l7

77

The war in Eur pe where the ~1arine gained imerna­ti nal fam ,pa' ed him by: hepem the war years in lone­ly xile with the garri 'on on uam. Afterward, in the192 " he followed an unremarkable equence f duty,much like that of 010 t lieutenants and captains of thetime: barracks duty at Iare Island, ea duty in dle Te,wI'.taff duty at Headquart rs 1\larin ~ orps, and a tour with

the Gendarnl rie d 1laiti.Fr m June 1931 to Jun 1932, he attend d the Field

Officer' our'e at Fort Benning. ext came a year atQuantic . most of it spent as an instm tor at th ompanyOfficer's ourse. He was aSSigned in 193~ to a two-yearcurse at th Ecole. uperieur la de Guerre in Paris. thencon'id red the w rid'. premi I' sch I for rising youngoffi er. Afterward h return d to Quamico for m reduty a an instructor.

The outbreak of \1 orld ar II in 1939 found him at , anDi go. s commanding officer of th 1 t Battalion. 6thMarine, he wem to I eland in the. ummer of 19'-11. He leftthe regiment after its r turn to the ,'tates, for duty onceagain at Headquarters in Washington. He went to thePa ifi in January 19'14 in time to command the 5thMarin 'during th Tala ea pha:e of the ape lou 'esteroperation. He wa, th a, sislant commander of the 1stMarin Divi. ion dUring P 'Ieliu and for Okina\\'a was theMarine Deputy Chief of laff of the Tenth AImy.

After the war he was dl corrunandam of Marin rphools and ba e commander at uanti 0 until the, pring

of 1918 wh n he be ame the a' istam commandant andchi f of 'raff at Headqualter.. In late July 1950, he r c ivedcommand of the 1st Marme Divi ion de tined ~ r Kor a,and held that corrunand until May 1951.

After Inchon and eoul, a larger, mor d 'perat fightat ho in Re ervou' wa ahead f him. In arly 195J, the1st 1arine Di i ion wa, witched from Almond's orpsto Major Gen 'ral Blyant E. Moore', IX Corp. Moore diedof a heart atrack on 2~ Febmary 19~1 and, by eniority, O.P. 'mith became the corp commander. D', pite his expe­rience and qualifications. h' held that command onl ,0

long a, it took the AImy to rush a mor nior g neral toKorea.

O. P. mith" myriad of medals included the ArmDistiJ1gui.<;h d ervi e Cra:: and I lh the AImy and the

a Distinguished 'ervi e r for hi Korean \J arervice.

n his return to the nited. tat s, he became the com­manding general f the base at Camp Pendleton. Th n mJul 1953, with a promotion to lieutenant g neral, movedto the Ea't Coa t to the ommand of Fleet Marine Force,

dantic. with headquarter' at orfolk, Virginia. 11 retiredon 1 pt mber 1955 and for his many oml at award waspr m ted t four-star gen ral. lIe died on Christma Day19 at hi h me in Lo Alto lIilI alifornia, at age 81.

Joint Chiefs Reluctant

Returning to Washington,Collins briefed his fellow chiefs on15 July. He gave them the broadoutlines of MacArthur's plannedamphibious assault, but expressedhis own doubts based on his expe-rience in the South Pacific and atNormandy.

The JCS chairman, General ofthe Army Omar N. Bradley,thought it "the riskiest military pro-posal I ever heard of." In his opin-ion, MacArthur should be concen-trating on the dismal immediate sit-uation in South Korea rather thandreaming up "a blue sky schemelike Inchon." Bradley wrote later:"because Truman was relying onus to an extraordinary degree formilitary counsel, we determined tokeep a close eye on the Inchonplan and, if we felt so compelled,finally cancel it."

The JCS agreed that the 1stMarine Division should be broughtup to strength, but stopped shortof committing it to the Far East. On20 July, the Joint Chiefs informedMacArthur that the 1st MarineDivision could not be combatready until December. MacArthurerupted: the 1st Marine Divisionwas "absolutely vital" to the planbeing developed, under the code-name Chromite, by GeneralWright's group. A draft, circulatedat CinCFE headquarters on 23 July,offered three alternatives:

Plan 100-B: A landing atInchon on the west coast.

Plan 100-C: A landing atKunsan on the west coast.

Plan 100-D: A landing atChunmunjin-up on the eastcoast.

MacArthur's mind was now fullyset on Inchon. He informedCollins, in his capacity as executive

by 3 September.

agent for the JCS, that lacking theMarine division, he had scheduledan amphibious assault at Inchon inmid-September to be executed bythe 5th Marines and the 2d InfantryDivision in conjunction with anattack northward by the EighthArmy. His message caused thechiefs to initiate a hurried teletypeconference with MacArthur on 24July. MacArthur prevailed and onthe following day, 25 July, thechiefs finally approved Mac-Arthur's repeated requests for the1st Marine Division.

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A New CG

Late in the afternoon of 25 July,Major General Oliver P. Smitharrived from Washington andchecked in at the Carlsbad Hotel inCarlsbad, California. He was totake command of the 1st MarineDivision at nearby CampPendleton on the following day.He phoned Brigadier GeneralHarry B. Liversedge, the base com-mander and acting division com-mander, to let him know that hehad arrived. Liversedge said that

Gen Oliver P. Smith Collection, Marine Corps Research Center

MajGen Oliver P. Smith, lefl assumed command of the 1st Marine Division atCamp Pendleton on 26 July 1950. Col Homer I. Litzenberg, Jr., right, arrived on16 August with orders to reactivate the 7th Marines and have it ready for sailing

Colonel Lewi B.' Chesty Puller

The younger Marine~ in the 1st huines were 'c~ta­

tic \ hen they learned their regiment was going tobe commanded by th ' legendary "Chesty" Pull·r.

Older officer. and non-commissioned officers in th' reg­iment \\ere les. enthu~iastic. They remembered the longcasualty liM the 1 t Marin , had suffered at Peleliu '" hileunder 01 nel Puller'. command. I Ii . tyle was to I 'adfrom the front, and. '" hen he \\ ent into Korea, he alrcad}had an unprecedented four, ,1\)' ros.es.

B rn in 1898, Puller had grown up in Tidewaterirginia wh 're the scar~ of the Civil War were ~till

unh aled and where many Con~·derate veterans werestill alive to tell a young boy how it \ a" t go to war.Lewis (which is what his family alway' called him) \\ entbriefly to Virginia 1\lilitaf) In~titute but dropped out in

ugusl 1918 to enIi. t in the ~1<uines. To hi eli. app int­ment, the war end d before he could get to france. InJune 1919, he wa. promoted to s cond lieutenant :lI1dthen, 10 da ~ later, ""ith d mobilization was placed oninactive duty. Befor the month \Va. out h· had reenliM­ed in the I:uines specifically to serve as a se ond lieu­tenant in th endarm·rie d'11aiti. MOM of the officer~ inthe Gendarmerie were" hit Marines; the rank and file\'ere black Ilaitians. Puller sp nt five year~ in Haiti fight­ing "Caco" rebeL and making a reputation as a bushfighter.

I Ie relLlrned to the State~ in ,\larch 192,* and receivedhi~ regular commi . ion in the ,'vlarine Corp . During then xt two years he did barracb duty in I orfolk. attendedBa'i : hool in Philad 'Iphia. ~er\"ed in the 10th ~Iarine

at Quantico, and had an unsuccessful try at aviati n atPensacola. Barracks duty for two ear at Pearl [Iarborfollowed Pensacola. Th n in 192 he was as~igned to the

uardia 'a ional of i aragua. lIere in 1930 he won hisfirst 'avy 1'0. s. Fir. t Li utenant Puller. his citationreads, "led hi - forces int five. uccessive engagemenL'>againM sup rior numbers of armed bandit fore ~."

lie carne hom in July 1931 t the year-long ompanyfficers ourse at Fort Benning. That taken, he return·d

to icaragua for more bandit fighting and a -econd 'a\)'ross this time for taking his patrol f 10 icaraguans

through a . erie. of ambushe~, in partnership with thealmost equally leg ndaf)' unne,y, ergeant \1 illiam"Iron 1an" L e.

0\: a captain, Puller cam> back to the est oa~t inJanuary 1933, stayed a m nth, and th n I ft to join theLegmi n uard at Peiping. This included command ofthe fabled "Horse 1arines." In eptember 193'-1, he leftPeiping to become the commanding ofllcer of the \Iarinedetachment on board the Augus/a, flag. hip of the ~iatic

Flee!.In June 1936, he cam to Philadelphia to insu'uct at

the Basi ,chool. Ilis performance a~ a tacti s instru tor

79

I

Cen Olher P :->Illllh CollectIon

and on the parad ' ground left its mark on the lieutenant­""ho would be the captain. major., and lieutenantcolonel. in the \\orld \\ ar that \"as coming.

[n June 1939. h' went back to hina, returning t theAU/{IiS/Ci to command its ~Iarine~ once again. year laterhe left the ship to j in the '-nh ~1arines in Shanghai. Ilereturned to the L'nited 'tates in ugust 1911, fourmonths before the war began, and ""as given commandof the lst Battalion, 7th Marines, at amp Lejeune. I Iecommanded (he would 'ay "led") this battalion at

Guadalcanal and ~ n his third 'avy Cros~ for hi~ suc­cessful defense of a mile-long line on the night of 2·,October [9..12. The fourth a\)' ross cam' for ()\ erallp rformance, from 26 December ] 913 to J9 January19-1 at ape GlouceMer as executive officer of the -thMarines. In February 191 I, he took c mmand of the 1stMarines and led it in the ten'ible fight at Peleliu in,eptember and rober.

fterwards, he came hack to 'ommand the InfantryTraining Hegiment at amp Lejeune. lext he \vasDir ct r of the 8th brine orp~ Reserve Di triet withh aclquarters in '\\ rleans, and then took comm,lndof the Iarine Barracks at Pearl Ilarbor. From h re hehammered IIeadqual1ers to be given command, on eagain, of his old regim nt, the lst larines.

After Inchon, there ",'as to be a ruth 'a\)' ro. ~.

earned at the hosin Re~ervoir. In January 19-1, here eived a brigadier general' star and assignment a" thea . -i tant division commander. In 1ay, h cam' back to

amp Pendl 'ton to command the newly activated 3dMarine Brigade which became the 3d Marine Di\ ision.lIe moved to the Troop Training Unit, Pa ific, onCoronado in June 1952 and from there moved ea~t, nowwith the two. tar of a major general, to amp L jcuneto take command f the _d Marin' Division in July 19'5,*.Hi. health I egan to fail and he \\ a~ retired for disabilityon 1 , O\'ember 1955. From then until hi d ath on 11o tober 19 1 at age 73 he Ii ed in the little town ofaluda in Tidewater Virginia.

he had just received a tip fromWashington that the division wasto he brought to war strength andsail to the Far East by mid-August.Both Liversedge and Smith knewthat what was left of the divisionwas nothing more than a shell.

Smith took command the nextday, 26 July. He had served in thedivision during World War II, com-manding the 5th Marines in itsTalasea landing at New Britain andwas the assistant division comman-der at Peleliu. Only 3,459 Marinesremained in the division at CampPendleton, fewer men than in asingle full-strength regiment.

When the Joint Chiefs askedGeneral Cates how he planned tobring the 1st Marine Division up towar strength, he had ready a two-pronged plan. Plan A would pro-vide three rifle companies andreplacements to the brigadealready deployed. Plan B woulduse Reserves to fill up the division.Essential to the filling out of the 1stMarine Division—and the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing as well—wasthe mobilization of the MarineCorps Reserve. "Behind everyMarine regular, figuratively speak-ing," wrote official historians LynnMontross and Captain Nicholas A.Canzona, "stood two reservistswho were ready to step forwardand fill the gaps in the ranks."

The 33,527 Marines in theOrganized Reserve in 1950 werescattered across the country inunits that included 21 infantry bat-talions and 30 fighter squadrons.Virtually all the officers and non-commissioned officers had WorldWar II experience, but the rankshad been filled out with young-sters, many of whom did not get toboot camp. Subsequent reservetraining had included both weeklyarmory "drills" and summer activeduty. Someone wryly decided theycould be classified as "almost com-bat ready."

Behind the Organized Reservewas the Volunteer Marine CorpsReserve—90,044 men and women,most of them veterans, but with nofurther training after their return tocivilian life. President Truman,with the sanction of Congress,authorized the call-up of theMarine Corps Reserve on 19 July.An inspired public informationofficer coined the phrase, "MinuteMen of 1950."

On 26 July, the day followingJCS approval of the 1st MarineDivision's deployment, a courierarrived at Camp Pendleton fromWashington with instructions forSmith in his fleshing-out of the 1stMarine Division: ground elementsof the 1st Provisional MarineBrigade would re-combine withthe division upon its arrival in theFar East; units of the half-strength2d Marine Division at CampLejeune, North Carolina, would beordered to Camp Pendleton andre-designated as 1st MarineDivision units; all possible regularswould be stripped out of posts andstations and ordered to the divi-sion; and gaps in the ranks wouldbe filled with individual Reservesconsidered to be at least minimallycombat-ready.

Eighth Army Withdraws to Pusan

In Korea, at the end of July,Walker ordered the Eighth Army tofall back behind the Naktong River,the new defensive line forming theso-called "Pusan Perimeter." Bothflanks of the Eighth Army werethreatened. In light of this deterio-rating situation, the Joint Chiefsasked MacArthur if he still plannedan amphibious operation inSeptember. An unperturbedMacArthur replied that "if the fullMarine Division is provided, thechances to launch the movementin September would be excellent."

Reinforcements for Walker's

80

Eighth Army began arriving direct-ly from the United States, includingthe 1st Provisional Marine Brigadewhich debarked at Pusan on 3August.

In Tokyo, General Stratemeyerbecame agitated when he learnedthat the 1st Provisional MarineBrigade, as an integrated air-ground team, intended to retainmission control of its aircraft. Anuneasy compromise was reachedby which the Marines were tooperate their two squadrons of car-rier-based Vought F4U Corsairswith their own controllers underthe general coordination ofPartridge's Fifth Air Force.

Reserve Comes to Active Duty

The first reservists to reachPendleton—the 13th InfantryCompany from Los Angeles, the12th Amphibian Tractor Companyof San Francisco, and the 3dEngineer Company fromPhoenix—arrived on 31 July.Elements of the 2d Marine Divisionfrom Camp Lejeune began theirtrain journey the same day. In thatfirst week, 13,703 Marines joinedthe division.

On 4 August, the Commandantordered the reactivation of the 1stMarines and 7th Marines. Both reg-iments had been part of the 1stMarine Division in all its World WarII campaigns. The 1st Marines wasactivated that same day undercommand of the redoubtableColonel Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller,who, stationed at Pearl Harbor ascommanding officer of the MarineBarracks, had pestered Headquar-ters Marine Corps and GeneralSmith with demands that he bereturned to the command of theregiment he had led at Peleliu. By7 August, the strength of the 1stMarine Division stood at 17,162.

The experiences of LieutenantColonel Thomas L. Ridge's 1st

Battalion, 6th Marines, were typicalof the buildup being done at adead run. Ridge had just taken

transferred to Fleet Marine Force,Pacific, in time for staff duty forIwo Jima and Okinawa. As an

command of the battalion. A crack observer at Okinawa he was twicerifle and pistol shot, he had spentmost of World War II in intelli-gence assignments in LatinAmerica, but in late 1944 was

wounded.Ridge's battalion,

returned to Camp Lejeunemonths deployment

Mediterranean, traveled by ancienttroop train to Camp Pendletonwhere it became the 3d Battalionof the reactivated 1st Marines. Inabout 10 days, the two-element,half-strength battalion expandedinto a three-element, full-strengthbattalion. The two rifle companies

Major General Field Harris

D uring the course of the Korean War, MajorGeneral Field Harris would suffer a grievous per-sonal loss. While he served as Commanding

General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, his son, LieutenantColonel William F. Harris, was with the 1st MarineDivision, as commanding officer of 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, at the Chosin Reservoir. The younger Harris'battalion was the rear guard for the breakout fromYudam-ni. Later, between Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri, Harrisdisappeared and was posted as missing in action. Later itwas determined that he had been killed.

Field Harris—and he was almost always called that,"Field-Harris," as though it were one word—belonged tothe open cockpit and silk scarf era of Marine Corps avi-ation. Born in 1895 in Versailles, Kentucky, he receivedhis wings at Pensacola in 1929. But before that he had12 years seasoning in the Marine Corps.

He graduated from the Naval Academy in March 1917just before America's entry into World War I. He spentthat war at sea in the Nevada and ashore with the 3dProvisional Brigade at Guantanamo, Cuba.

In 1919 he went to Cavite in the Philippines. Afterthree years there, he returned for three years in the officeof the Judge Advocate General in Washington. While soassigned he graduated from the George WashingtonUniversity School of Law. Then came another tour of seaduty, this time in the Wyoming, then a year as a studentat Quantico, and flight training at Pensacola. His newgold wings took him to San Diego where he served in asquadron of the West Coast Expeditionary Force.

He attended the Air Corps Tactical School at LangleyField, Virginia, after which came shore duty in Haiti andsea duty in the carrier Lexington. In 1935, he joined theAviation Section at Headquarters, followed by a year inthe Senior Course at the Naval War College in Newport,Rhode Island. In August 1941, he was sent to Egypt fromwhere, as assistant naval attache, he could study theRoyal Air Force's support of Britain's Eighth Army in itsdesert operations.

After Egypt and United States entry into the war, hewas sent to the South Pacific. In the Solomons, he servedsuccessively as Chief of Staff, Aircraft, Guadalanal;Commander, Aircraft, Northern Solomons; and comman-der of air for the Green Island operation. Each of these

81

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A310952

three steps up the chain of islands earned him a Legionof Merit. After World War II, he became Director ofMarine Aviation in the Office of the Chief of NavalOperations (and received a fourth Legion of Merit). In1948 he was given command of Aircraft, Fleet MarineForce, Atlantic. A year later he moved to El Toro,California, for command of Aircraft, Fleet Marine, Pacific,with concomitant command of the 1st Marine AircraftWing.

His Korean War service was rewarded with both theArmy's and the Navy's Distinguished Service Medal. Onhis return to the United States in the summer of 1951, heagain became the commanding general of Air, FleetMarine Force, Atlantic. He retired in July 1953 with anadvancement to lieutenant general because of his com-bat decorations, a practice which is no longer followed.He died in 1967 at age 72.

barelyfrom sixto the

in the battalion each numberingabout 100 men were doubled insize with a third rifle platoonadded. A third rifle company wasactivated. The weapons companyhad no heavy machine gun pla-toon and only two sections in itsantitank assault and 81mm mortarplatoons. A heavy machine gunplatoon was created and third sec-tions were added to the antitankassault and 81mm mortar platoons.World War II vintage supplies andequipment came in from the mobi-lization stocks stashed away at thesupply depot at Barstow,California—sufficient in quantity,poor in quality. The pressure ofthe unknown D-Day gave almostno time for unit shake-down andtraining.

Simultaneously with the groundunit buildup, Reserve fighter andground control squadrons werearriving at El Toro, California, to fillout the skeleton 1st Marine AircraftWing. The wing commander, MajorGeneral Field Harris, NavalAcademy 1917, and a naval aviatorsince 1929, had served in the SouthPacific in World War II. Morerecently he had been Director ofAviation at Marine CorpsHeadquarters. He was one of thoseprescient senior Marines who fore-saw a future for helicopters inamphibious operations.

7th Infantry Division and KATUSA

In parallel actions, MacArthur on4 August ordered Walker to rebuildthe Army's 7th Infantry Division—the last division remaining inJapan—to full strength by 15September. The division had beenreduced to less than half-strengthby being repeatedly culled forfillers for the three divisionsalready deployed to Korea. UntilMacArthur's directive, the divisionwas not scheduled to be up tostrength until 1 October and not

ready for amphibious operationsuntil 1951. Now, the division wasto get 30 percent of all replace-ments arriving from the UnitedStates. Moreover, a week later, on11 August, MacArthur directedWalker to send 8,000 South Koreanrecruits to fill out the division.

The first of 8,600 Koreanreplacements, straight out of therice paddies of South Korea andoff the streets of Pusan, beganarriving by ship at Yokohama afew days later. This infusion of rawuntrained manpower, called"KATUSA"—Korean Augmentationof the U.S. Army—arrived for themost part in baggy white pants,white jackets, and rubber shoes. Inthree weeks they had to beclothed, equipped, and made intosoldiers, including the learning ofrudimentary field sanitation as well

82

as rifle practice. The "buddy sys-tem" was employed—each Koreanrecruit was paired off with anAmerican counterpart.

Major General David G. Barr,the 7th Infantry Division's com-mander, had been chief of staff ofseveral commands in Europe dur-ing World War II. After the war hehad headed the Army AdvisoryMission in Nanking, China. Henow seemed a bit old and slow,but he knew Chinese and theChinese army.

1st Marine Division Loads Out

Loading out of the 1st MarineDivision from San Diego began on8 August. That same day, GeneralFellers, back from Japan, toldSmith that the division would heemployed in Korea between 15

1)epartrnent of Defense Photo (USMC) A20115

MajGen Field Harris and a portion of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing staff arriveat Barber's Point in Hawaii in early September enroute to the Far East. Leavingthe Marine transport are from left, Col Edward C. Dyei ('ol Boeker C. Batterton,Col William G. Manley, and Gen Harris.

Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg,]r.

His troop called him "Litz the Blitz" for no pani ­ular reason x ept the alliteration of sound. Hehad come up from the rank, and was extraordi­

naril proud of it Immediatel before the Korean \! arbegan he wa in command of the 6th .\Iarines at ampLejeune very much interested in his regimental baseballteam., and about to turn a er the conunand to anotherolonel. hen war ame he \ a~ restored to ommand

of the regiment and sadl watched his. keleton battal­ion depart for amp Pendleton to f rm the cadre for there-activated 1 t Marine . Thi' wa' scarcely done when her ceived order to re-acti ate the th Marines on theWe t oa~t

Litzenberg was a up nnsylvania Dutchman," born inteelton, Pennsylvania, in 1903. lib family moved to

Philadelphia and, aft r graduating from high school andtwo year, in the arional Guard, he enlisted in the1arill rp in 1922. ubsequem to recruit training at

PalTi Island, h was. ent to Haiti. In 1925 he be 'ame a. e ond lieutenant Ea t oa. t duty \ a followed byexpediti nalY ervice in icaragua in 192 and 19-9, andthen b sea 'ervice in a tring of battle -hips--Idaho,Arkansas, Arizona, Veu' Jlexico--and the crui 'erAl/gl/ 'tao fter graduating from the Infantry , hool atfort Benning in 1933, he had tw year with a larinRe 'erve battalion in Philadelphia.. ext came two y arson Guam as aide to the govern r and in, pector-in truc­tor of the local militia. I Ie cam home in 1938 to serveat 'everal Ie el a a \V,H planner.

\; hen orld \! ar II came, h >was sent a a major, toEngland to serve with a combined planning taff. Thito k him t orth Afri a for the amphibious a. sault of

asablanca in November 19q2. Ire came home to formand command the 3d Battalion, 24th Marines, in the new

th Marine Di i ion, m ing up to regimental e. ecutivofficer for the as, ault of Roi- amur in the larshalls. Hthen went t the planning staff of the Amphibi uCorps for Saipan and Tinian.

Aft l' the war he \ ent to China for duty 'ith the,eventh FI et and rayed on with aval Force - 'J e, ternPacific. He 'ame hom in 19-t and was given commandof the 6th Marine in 1919.

After Inchon, he c minued in command of the thMarine through the battl s of eoul, hosin Heservoir.and th pring ffensive, coming home in pril 19-1.oon promoted to brigadier general and ~ubsequentl)' to

major gen ral, he had many re~ponsible a 'signmemsincluding assismm command of the 3d larine Divisionin Japan. In~pe tor General of the brine orps, com­mand of Camp Pendleton, and command of Parris bland.I fc returned to Korea in 1957 to sen e as senior memberof the nited ation' componem negotiating atPanmunjom. t the end of the year he 'arne I ack forwhat would be his last assignmem, another tour of dutyas Inspector eneral.

I Ie retired in 1959, with an de ation to lieutenantgeneral because of his combat awarcL., that includ >d a

a y Cro , a Di tinguished 'en'ice Cro , and threeih er tars. He died in the Bethesda aval Ho~pilal n

27 June 1963 at ag 6 and ""as buried in Arlingtonational emetery with full military han rs.

and 25 September.Much of the heavy equipment to

be loaded arrived at dockside fromthe Barstow supply depot with notime for inspection. GeneralShepherd arrived on 13 August toobserve and encourage, joinednext day by General Cates. Puller's1st Marines sailed from San Diego

on 14 August, 10 days after activa­tion. The Navy had very littleamphibious shipping on the WestCoast, and much of the divisionand its gear had to be lifted bycommercial shipping.

Among the pressing matters dis­cussed by Smith with his superiorsCates and Shepherd was the reacti-

83

vation of the 7th Marines. Nucleusof the 7th Marines would be theskeleton 6th Marines, which hadalready lost two battalions to the1st Marines. The 3d Battalion, 6thMarines, a half-strength peacetimebattalion with pieces scatteredaround the Mediterranean, becamethe 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, with

orders to proceed to Japan by wayof the Suez Canal. Fillers for thebattalion and a completely newthird rifle company would have tocome from Camp Pendleton.

What was left of the 6th Marinesarrived at Pendleton on 16 August.The 7th Marines activated the nextday. Colonel Homer L. "Litz theBlitz" Litzenberg, Jr., a mercurialman who had commanded the 6thMarines at Camp Lejeune, contin-ued as commanding officer of the7th Marines with orders to embarkhis regiment not later than 3

September.

Joint Chiefs Have a Problem

Although the National DefenseAct of 1947 was in effect, the rela-tionship of the Joint Chiefs to thetheater commanders was not tooclear. As a theater commanderMacArthur had broad leeway inhis actions. The JCS faced theHobson's choice of askingMacArthur no questions and mak-ing no challenges, or exertingtheir capacity as the principaladvisors to President Truman inhis role.

The Joint Chiefs held an inten-

sive series of briefings in the WhiteHouse on 10 August, culminatingin an afternoon meeting with theNational Security Council.President Truman was told that awar-strength Marine division wasbeing assembled for service inKorea. Admiral Sherman assuredthe President, however, that theJCS would have to pass onMacArthur's plans for an amphibi-ous operation.

On 12 August, MacArthur issuedCinCFE Operations Plan 100-B,specifically naming Inchon-Seoulas the objective area. No copy ofthis plan was sent to the JCS.

0. P. Smith Departs Pendleton

General Smith sent off the firstechelon of his division headquar-ters by air on 16 August. Two dayslater he closed his command postat Camp Pendleton and left by airfor Japan. Delayed by shippingshortages, outloading of a third ofSmith's division—essentially thereinforced 1st Marines—was com-pleted on 22 August. In all, 19ships were employed.

Following close behind, Litzen-berg beat by two days the

embarkation date given him bySmith. The 7th Marines, filled upwith regulars pulled away fromposts and stations and reservists,sailed from San Diego on 1

September.

Marine Versus

Air Force Close Support

General Stratemeyer, Mac-Arthur's Air Force component com-mander, apparently first heard ofthe possibility of an Inchon landingon 20 July. His first action was toinstruct his staff to prepare a smallcommand group with which hecould accompany MacArthur onthe operation. Almost a monthlater, on 14 August, MacArthur dis-cussed the proposed landing withStratemeyer, pointing out thatKimpo Airfield, just west of theHan River from Seoul, was the bestin Korea. MacArthur emphasizedthat the airfield must be quicklyrehabilitated from any battle dam-age and put to use.

By then news stories wereappearing that compared Fifth AirForce support of the Eighth Armyunfavorably with the close air sup-port being provided the Marine

USS Mount McKinley (AGC7) was the command centerafloat for the Inch on landing. It also served as a floating

84

hotel for the large number of VIPs who were in Gen DouglasMacArthur's official party or were simply passing through.

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-424523

brigade by its organic squadrons.On 23 August, Stratemeyer sent amemorandum to MacArthur statingthat the news stories were anotherstep "in a planned program to dis-credit the Air Force and the Armyand at the same time to unwarrant-edly enhance the prestige of theMarines." He pointed out that theMarine squadrons, operating fromtwo aircraft carriers, were support-ing a brigade of about 3,000Marines on a front that could bemeasured in yards as compared tothe Fifth Air Force which had tosupply close air support for a frontof 160 miles.

General Walker, collocated atTaegu with General Partridge,pulled the rug out from underGeneral Stratemeyer's doctrinalconcerns and contentions ofunfairness, by commenting official-ly: "Without the slightest intent ofdisparaging the support of the AirForce, I must say that I, in commonwith the vast majority of officers ofthe Army, feel strongly that theMarine system of close air supporthas much to commend it . . . . Ifeel strongly that the Army wouldbe well advised to emulate theMarine Corps and have its own tac-tical aviation."

Top Brass Gathers in Tokyo

General Collins and AdmiralSherman—the latter had not beento Korea before—made a quickvisit on 22 August to Walker'sEighth Army headquarters atTaegu. Collins found Walker "tooinvolved in plugging holes in hisleaky front to give much thoughtto a later breakout." On the morn-ing of 23 August, Collins accompa-nied Walker on a visit to all U. S.division commanders and theMarine brigade commander,Brigadier General Edward A. Craig.Collins found these field comman-ders confident hut weary. Collins

then returned to Tokyo for the cru-cial conference at which Mac-Arthur must overcome JCS reserva-tions concerning the Inchon land-ing.

Major General Smith arrived atHaneda airport in Japan on 22August and was met by his oldfriend, Admiral Doyle, theprospective Attack ForceCommander. Smith later remem-bered that Doyle "was not veryhappy about the whole affair."They proceeded to Doyle's com-mand ship, USS Mount McKinley(AGC 7). Smith's orders were toreport his division directly toCommander in Chief, Far East, foroperational control. His appoint-ment with General MacArthur wasset for 1730 that evening at the DaiIchi building. Colonel Alpha L.

Bowser, Jr., the division G-3, whohad come out with the first eche-lon of Smith's staff, gave him a hur-ried briefing on the tentative plansfor the division. "For the first time

85

I learned that the division was toland at Inchon on 15 September,"Smith wrote later.

On arriving at GHQ comfortablybefore the appointed time of 1730,Smith found that he was to meetfirst with Almond, who kept himwaiting until 1900. Almond calledmost soldiers and officers "son,"but when 58-year-old Almondaddressed 57-year-old Smith as"son," it infuriated Smith. Almondfurther aggravated Smith by dis-missing the difficulties of anamphibious operation as being"purely mechanical."

Having had his say, Almondushered Smith into MacArthur'soffice. MacArthur, in a cordial andexpansive mood, confidently toldSmith that the 1st Marine Divisionwould win the war by its landingat Inchon. The North Koreans hadcommitted all their troops againstthe Pusan Perimeter, and he didnot expect heavy opposition atInchon. The operation would be

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-422492

Gen Douglas MacA rthui center, greets GenJ. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff US.Army, and Adm Forrest P Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, upon theirarrival in Tokyo on 21 August 1950. A critical conference would be held two dayslater at which MacArthur would have to convince these two members of the JointChiefs of Staff that a landing at Inchon was feasible.

somewhat "helter-skelter," but it

would be successful. It wasMacArthur's feeling that all handswould be home for Christmas, ifnot to the United States, at least toJapan.

Smith reported to Doyle his con-viction that MacArthur was firm inhis decision to land at Inchon on15 September. Doyle replied thathe thought there was still a chanceto substitute Posung-Myun, a fewmiles to the south of Inchon, as amore likely landing site. Doyle washaving his underwater demolitionteams reconnoiter those beaches.

Next day, 23 August, Smith metagain with Almond, this timeaccompanied by General Barr,commander of the 7th InfantryDivision. When Smith raised thepossibility of Posung-Myun as alanding site, Almond brushed himoff, saying that any landing atPosung-Myun would be no morethan a subsidiary landing.

Critical 23 August

Conference Convenes

Smith was not invited to the 23August conference. Nor wasShepherd. The all-important sum-mit conference began with briefopening remarks by MacArthur.General Wright then outlined thebasic plan which called for anassault landing by the 1st MarineDivision directly into the port ofInchon. After the capture ofInchon, the division was toadvance and seize, as rapidly aspossible, Kimpo Airfield, the townof Yongdung-po, and the southhank of the Han River. The divi-sion was then to cross the river,capture Seoul, and seize the domi-nant ground to the north.Meanwhile, the 7th InfantryDivision was to land behind theMarines, advance on the rightflank, secure the south bank of theHan southeast of Seoul and the

high ground north of Suwon.Thereafter, X Corps—lst Marineand 7th Infantry Divisions— wouldform the anvil against which theEighth Army, breaking out of thePusan Perimeter, would deliver thehammer blows that would destroythe North Korean Army.

After Wright's briefing, Doyle, asthe prospective Attack Force com-mander, gave a thorough analysisof the naval aspects of the landing.Of greatest concern to Doyle werethe tides. A point of contentionwas the length of the naval gunfirepreparation. Doyle argued forthree to four days of pre-landingbombardment by air and navalgunfire, particularly to take out theshore batteries. MacArthur's staffdisputed this on the basis of theloss of tactical surprise. AdmiralSherman was asked his opinionand replied, "I wouldn't hesitate totake a ship up there."

"Spoken like a Farragut," saidMacArthur.

With his concerns brushedaside, Doyle concluded his brief-

ing with "the best that I can say isthat Inchon is not impossible."

Collins questioned the ability ofthe Eighth Army to link up quicklywith X Corps. He suggestedKunsan, to the south, as an alter-nate landing site. Sherman, in gen-eral terms, supported Collins'reservations. General MacArthursat silently, puffing his pipe, forseveral moments. He then spokeand all agree that his expositionwas brilliant. He dazzled and pos-sibly confused his audience withan analogy from the French andIndian War, Wolfe's victory atQuebec: "Like Montcalm, the NorthKoreans will regard the Inchonlanding as impossible. Like Wolfe I[can] take them by surprise."

As he himself remembered hissummation years later in his mem-oirs:

The Navy's objections as totides, hydrography, terrain,and physical handicaps areindeed substantial and perti-nent. But they are not insu-perable. My confidence in the

MajGen David G. Barr, left, Commanding General of the U S. Army's 7thInfantry Division meets with MajGen Edward M. Almond, CommandingGeneral, X Corps, to discuss the Inchon landing. The 7th Division would landbehind the Marines, advance on their right flank, and seize the commandingground south of Seoul. National Archives Photo (USA) 111-5C349013

86

Navy is complete, and in factI seem to have more confi-dence in the Navy than theNavy has in itself . . . . As tothe proposal for a landing atKunsan, it would indeedeliminate many of the hazardsof Inchon, but it would belargely ineffective and indeci-sive. It would be an attempt-ed envelopment which wouldnot envelop. It would notsever or destroy the enemy'ssupply lines or distributioncenter, and would thereforeserve little purpose. It wouldhe a "short envelopment,"and nothing in war is morefutile. But seizure of Inchonand Seoul will cut theenemy's supply line and sealoff the entire southern penin-sula. . . . This in turn will par-alyze the fighting power ofthe troops that now faceWalker . . . . If my estimate is

inaccurate and should I runinto a defense with which Icannot cope, I will be therepersonally and will immedi-ately withdraw our forcesbefore they are committed toa bloody setback. The onlyloss then will be my profes-sional reputation. But Inchonwill not fail. Inchon will suc-ceed. And it will save 100,000lives.

Others at the conferencerecalled MacArthur's closing wordsat the conference as being: "Weshall land at Inchon, and I shallcrush them." This said, MacArthurknocked the ashes of his pipe outinto a glass ashtray, making it ring,and stalked majestically Out of theroom.

General Collins still harboredreservations. He thought a mainpoint had been missed: what wasthe strength of the enemy at

Inchon and what was his capabili-ty to concentrate there?

Admiral Sherman was momen-tarily carried away by MacArthur'soratory, but once removed fromMacArthur's personal magnetismhe too had second thoughts. Nextmorning, 24 August, he gatheredtogether in Admiral Joy's office theprincipal Navy and Marine Corpscommanders. Present, in additionto Sherman and Joy, were AdmiralsRadford and Doyle and GeneralsShepherd and Smith. Despite gen-eral indignation over MacArthur'sfailure to give due weight to navalconsiderations, it was now abun-dantly clear that the landing wouldhave to made at or near Inchon.But perhaps there was still roomfor argument for another landingsite with fewer hydrographic prob-lems. Shepherd announced that hewas going to see MacArthur onceagain before returning to PearlHarbor and that he would make a

Command Structure for Inchon

Commander,Task Force 90RAdm James H. Doyle

7th Infantry DivisionMajGen David G. Barr

Commanding General1st Marine Division

MajGen Oliver P. Smith

Commander-in-Chief, Far EastGen Douglas MacArthur

Commander, Naval Forces, Far EastVAdm C. Turner Joy

Commander, Joint Task Force SevenVAdm Arthur D. Struble

Commander AmphibiousGroup One

RAdm James H. Doyle

Commanding General, X CorpsMajGen Edward M. Almond

Commanding General

87

final plea for a landing south ofInchon in the vicinity of Posung-Myun.

Disappointment for

General Shepherd

Shepherd, accompanied byKrulak, arrived at GHQ for hisscheduled visit with MacArthur butwas short-stopped by Almond whodismissed the Posung-Myun site,saying that Inchon had been decid-ed upon and that was where thelanding would be. The discussionbecame heated. Fortunately,MacArthur entered the room andwaved Shepherd and Krulak intohis office.

Shepherd had some expectationof being named the landing forcecommander. Admiral Sherman hadrecommended, without any greatamount of enthusiasm, thatShepherd command X Cr"ps forthe operation because of his greatamphibious experience and theexpertise of his Fleet Marine Force,Pacific staff. General Wright onMacArthur's staff also recommend-ed it, but a rumor was prevalentthat Almond would get X Corps.MacArthur confirmed this intention,saying he would liked to have hadShepherd as commander, but thathe had promised it to Almond. Heasked if Shepherd would go alongas his amphibious advisor.Shepherd hedged slightly. He saidhe would gladly go along as anobserver.

Shepherd showed no rancor,then or later, at not getting com-mand. He and Almond were bothVirginians and both had gone toVirginia Military Institute—Almond,class of 1915 and Shepherd, classof 1917. Their personal relationswere good but not close. Shepherdlater characterized Almond as "anexcellent corps commander. Hewas energetic, forceful, brave, and

in many ways did a good job underdifficult conditions." 0. P. Smithwould not come to shareShepherd's good opinion ofAlmond.

Plans Progress

The day following the 23 Augustconference, General Stratemeyerdirected his staff to develop a FEAFplan to support the landing. Theplan was to be separate from theCinCFE plan and was to providemission direction for all combat air-craft not essential to the close sup-port of the Eighth Army.

MacArthur, on 26 August, for-mally announced Almond's assign-ment as commanding general of XCorps. MacArthur had told him thathe would continue, at the sametime, to be the chief of staff of FarEast Command. MacArthur's pre-diction was that Almond wouldsoon be able to return to Tokyo.The landing at Inchon and subse-quent capture of Seoul would endthe war.

General Bradley's assessment ofAlmond was less than enthusiastic:

Ned Almond had nevercommanded a corps—ortroops in an amphibiousassault. However, he and hisstaff, mostly recruited fromMacArthur's headquarters,were ably backstopped by theexpertise of the Navy andMarines, notably that of OliverP. Smith, who commandedthe 1st Marine Division, whichwould spearhead the assault.

MacArthur had not asked Collinsand Sherman to approve his plannor would they have had theauthority to do so. The best theyhad to take back with them toWashington was a fairly clear con-cept of MacArthur's intended oper-ations.

88

Collins and Sherman reported toBradley and the other chiefs whatthey had learned about the Inchonplan, repeating their own misgiv-ings. On 26 August, Bradley briefedPresident Truman and SecretaryJohnson. The President was moreoptimistic than the chiefs.

'Conditional' Approval

On 28 August, the Joint Chiefssent MacArthur a "conditional"approval, concurring in anamphibious turning movement,either at Inchon or across a favor-able beach to the south. Chief"conditions" were that MacArthurwas to provide amplifying detailsand keep them abreast of any mod-ification of his plans. The JointChiefs specifically suggested prepa-ration of an alternate plan for alanding at Kunsan.

X Corps dated its OperationOrder No. 1, written largely by thefacile pen of Colonel Forney, as 28August; distribution was a day orso later. The 1st Marine Division"was charged with the responsibili-ty as the Landing Force to assaultINCHON, conduct beachheadoperations, seize and protectKIMPO airfield, then advance tothe I-IAN River line west of SEOUL.This achieved, the Division wasfurther directed to seize SEOUL,and the commanding ground northof SEOUL, on order."

0. P. Smith's division staff, thenon the Mount McKinley, was at halfstrength. Part of the remainder wasenroute from the United States; partwas with Craig's 1st Marine Brigadein the south of Korea. The brigade,although an organic part of thedivision, was still under the opera-tional control of General Walker.Smith's staff, directed by ColonelGregon A. Williams as chiefof staff, worked well with Doyle'sPhibGruOne staff. Above this har-monious relationship, the exact sta-

tus of the more senior commandswas indistinct and vaguely defined.From amidst a welter of paper, mis-understanding, ragged tempers,and sleep deprivation, DivisionOrder 2-50, expanding on thecorps order, emerged on 4September.

Smith wrote later in the MarineCoips Gazette:

By dedicated work on thepart of the Division staff, withthe wholehearted support ofAdm Doyle's PhibGruOnestaff, within three days a

detailed plan for the InchonLanding was drawn up, andtwo days later an advanceplanning draft of lstMarDivOp0 2-50 (Inchon Landing)was issued.

Time available for planning wasso short that the assault regiments,contrary to amphibious doctrine,would get rigid landing plansdrawn up completely by division.

The always dapper GeneralStratemeyer, seeking to solidify hiscontention that he was General

der, conferred with Joy, Struble,and Almond at CinCFE headquar-ters on 30 August. All that he couldget was a general agreement onthe adequacy of a CinCFE 8 Julydirective, "Coordination of AirEffort of Far East Air Forces andUnited States Naval Forces, FarEast." Building on that, Stratemeyersent a message to MacArthur, thegist of it being: "It is recognizedthat ComNavFE must have controlof air operations within the objec-tive area during the amphibiousphase. Air operations outside of

MacArthur's tactical air comman- the objective area are part of the

Junior officers and enlisted Marines did not get a briefing by then, because of leakage to the press, it was an openon their unit's role in the landing until embarked in secret that the Marines were going to land at Inchon.amphibious shipping enroute to the objective area. Howevei Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A2681

89

overall air campaign, and duringthe amphibious phase contributeto the success of the amphibiousoperation."

MacArthur's headquarters issuedOperation Order No. 1 on 30August, but neither a copy of thisorder nor any other amplifyingdetail had reached Washington by5 September. On that date thechiefs sent a further request fordetails to MacArthur. Choosing toconsider the 28 August JCS mes-sage to be sufficient approval,MacArthur dismissed the requestwith a brief message, stating "thegeneral outline of the plan remainsas described to you."

Later he would write that hisplan "was opposed by powerfulmilitary in Washington." He knewthat Omar Bradley, the JCS chair-man, had recently testified toCongress that large-scale amphibi-ous operations were obsolete. Hedisliked Bradley personally andderisively referred to him as a"farmer."

Both Bradley and Truman camefrom Missouri working-class fami-lies and were proud of it. A routinehad been established under whichthe Joint Chiefs kept Trumaninformed, usually by a personalbriefing by Bradley, of the currentsituation in Korea.

On 7 September, MacArthurreceived a JCS message which hesaid chilled him to the marrow ofhis bones. The message asked foran "estimate as to the feasibilityand chance of success of projectedoperation if initiated on plannedschedule."

The offending message remind-ed MacArthur that all reserves inthe Far East had been committedto the Eighth Army and all avail-able general reserves in the UnitedStates—except for the 82dAirborne Division—had been com-mitted to the Far East Command.No further reinforcement was in

prospect for at least four months.In light of this situation, a freshevaluation of Inchon was request-ed.

MacArthur Protests

An indignant MacArthur firedback an answer, the concludingparagraph of which said: "Theembarkation of the troops and thepreliminary air and naval prepara-tions are proceeding according toschedule. I repeat that I and all mycommanders and staff officers areenthusiastic for and confident ofthe success of the envelopingmovement."

The last sentence was manifest-ly not true. Lack of enthusiasm wasreadily apparent at all levels ofcommand.

Next day, 8 September, the JCSsent MacArthur a short, contritemessage: "We approve your planand the President has beeninformed." The phrase "thePresident has been informed"annoyed MacArthur. To him itimplied something less than presi-dential approval and he interpret-ed it as a threat on PresidentTruman's part to overrule the JointChiefs. General Collins, for one,had no recollection of Truman everexpressing any doubt about thesuccess of the Inchon landing orany inclination to override theactions of the JCS with respect tothe operation.

Beach Reconnaissance

According to the intelligenceavailable to General Smith, theenemy had about 2,500 troops inthe Inchon-Kimpo region, includ-ing at least two battalions of the226th Independent MarineRegiment and two companies ofthe 918th Artilleiy Regiment. TheNorth Koreans had apparently pre-pared strong defensive positions.

90

Reconnaissance reports indicated106 hard targets, such as gunemplacements, along the Inchonbeaches.

Some of the best beach intelli-gence was obtained by Navy off-shore reconnaissance. Best knownare the exploits of LieutenantEugene F. Clark, ex-enlisted manand an experienced amphibioussailor. He and two South Koreansleft Sasebo on 31 August on boardthe British destroyer HMS Charity,transferred the next morning to aSouth Korean frigate, and landedthat evening on Yong-hong-do, 14miles off Inchon and one of thehundreds of islands that dottedKorea's west coast. The islanderswere friendly. Clark organized theisland's teenagers into coastwatch-ing parties and commandeered theisland's only motorized sampan.For two weeks he fought a noctur-nal war, capturing more sampans,sending agents into Inchon, andtesting the mud flats for himself.His greatest accomplishment wasdiscovering that one of the mainnavigation lights for Flying FishChannel was still operable. GHQ atTokyo instructed him to turn onthe light at midnight on 14September. This he would do.

Anticipated hydrographic condi-tions were much more frighteningthan the quality of expectedenemy resistance. Doyle's AttackForce would have to thread its wayfrom the Yellow Sea through thetortuous Flying Fish Channel. Ashad already been determined, the15th of September was the bestday of the month because of theheight and spacing of the tides.The morning high tide—an incred-ible 31.5 feet—would be at 0659and the evening high tide at 1919.In between these times, as the tidefell, the currents would rip out ofthe channel at seven or eightknots, exposing mud flats acrosswhich even amphibian tractors

could not be expected to crawl.

Wolmi-do: Key to Operation

Wolmi-do ("Moon Tip Island"),the long narrow island that formedthe northern arm of Inchon's innerharbor, was thought to have about500 defenders. Wolmi-do harborwas connected to the Inchon dockarea by a 600-yard-long causeway."Wolmi-do," wrote Smith, was "thekey to the whole operation."

Brigade staff officers, headed bytheir chief of staff, Colonel EdwardW. Snedeker, were called to Japanfrom Pusan. They recommendedthat the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines,be used for the assault of Wolmi-do.

Smith's plan, as it emerged, wasto take Wolmi-do on the morningtide by landing the 3d Battalion,5th Marines, across Green Beach.Then would come a long wait of12 hours until the evening tidecame in and the remainder of thedivision could continue the land-ing. The rest of the 5th Marineswould cross Red Beach to thenorth of Wolmi-do, while Puller's1st Marines landed over BlueBeach in the inner harbor to thesouth. Designation of the landingsites as "beaches" was misleading;the harbor was edged with cut-granite sea walls that would haveto be scaled or penetrated.

Colonel Snedeker recommend-

91

ed that the new 1st Korean MarineCorps Regiment be added to thetroop list. The assignment of theRepublic of Korea (ROK) Marinesto the division was approved byGHQ on 3 September. The EighthArmy was instructed to providethem weapons.

Almond asked Smith to take partin a war-gaming of the operation.Smith saw it as nothing more thana "CPX" or command post exerciseand a waste of precious time. Hesent a major in his place.

Almond inspected units of Barr's7th Division at their camps—Fuji,McNair, McGill, Drake, andWhittington—between 31 Augustthrough 3 September. His aide,

Smith, commanding the landing force, considered Wolmi-

Terrain Handbook No. 65: Seoul and Vicinity (GHQ, Far East Command, 16 August 1950)

This pre-landing aerial photograph shows clearly the convo- do, the island at the lower left of the photo, the key to theluted nature of the Inchon "beachhead." MajGen Oliver P. whole situation. Seizure of Wolmi-do would precede the

main landings on Inch on itself

FSAI

First Lieutenant Haig, accompaniedhim and took extensive notes.With few exceptions, Almondgained a "good" to "excellent"impression of the units he visited.

On the morning of 2 SeptemberAlmond met with the officers of hisCorps staff who were involved inhis war game. He pointed Out thenecessity for frequent visits to sub-ordinate units by commanding offi-cers and the need for strong, well-organized, defenses for Corps

headquarters. "The front line is theperimeter of the place where youhappen to be," said Almond.

Meanwhile, the main body of the1st Marine Division arrived at Kobe,Japan—except for the 5th Marines,which was still at Pusan, and the7th Marines, which was still at sea.

1iphoon Jane

Disrupts Embarkation

Typhoon Jane, with winds up to

92

74 miles an hour, stmck Kobe on 3September. Two feet of water cov-ered the docks. One ship, with allthe division's signal gear, settled tothe bottom at her pier. All unload-ing and loading stopped for 24hours. Property sergeants, called infrom the outlying battalions,worked frantically to sort out theirunits' gear.

Adding to General Smith's wor-ries, the availability of the 5thMarines was now challenged.General Walker, deeply involved inthe bitter defense of the NaktongBulge, strongly opposed the releaseof this now-seasoned regimentfrom his Eighth Army. To meetWalker's objections, and influencedby his own favorable impression ofthe 7th Division, Almond sentColonel Forney, now the MarineDeputy Chief of Staff, X Corps, toask 0. P. Smith whether the 7thMarines would arrive in time to besubstituted for the 5th Marines, oralternatively, if not, would the 32dInfantry be acceptable?

A conference on the proposedsubstitution was held on theevening of 3 September. Present,among others, were GeneralsAlmond and Smith and AdmiralsJoy, Struble, and Doyle. Strangely,General Barr, the 7th Division'scommander, was not there. Thediscussion became heated. Smithargued that the proposal wentbeyond a considered risk. If thesubstitution were made, hedeclared, he would change hisscheme of maneuver. He wouldcall off the landing of the 1stMarines over Blue Beach and givethem the 5th Marines' mission oflanding on Red Beach with the 32dInfantry following behind.

Admiral Struble (Shepherdthought him "slippery") resolvedthe contretemps by suggesting thata regiment of Barr's 7th Divisionbe immediately embarked to standoff Pusan as a floating reserve,

SS

S

F S A 1.

S

SS

SS

S.S

S

Plan ForInchon Assault

CRUISERS

— Destroyer Stotion0 — LSMR Statioi (L-Hour,H-Hour)

FS A — Fire Support Area000500 0 000 2000 3000

Yards kri.rLri.rij I

allowing the release of the 1stProvisional Marine Brigade. InGeneral Smith's mind, Almond'sproposal exemplified the wide gulfseparating Army and Marine Corpsthinking. As Colonel Bowser,General Smith's operations officer,remembered it, Doyle and Smith"came back about 11 o'clock hav-ing won their point, that the[Marine] brigade must come out ofthe Pusan perimeter and be part ofour landing force."

The Mount McKinley, flagship ofthe Attack Force—with Smith onboard so as to be in a better posi-tion to supervise the out-loading—

set sail from Tokyo for Kobe on 4September, arriving there early thenext afternoon. That evening Smithcalled a conference of all availableMarine Corps commanders tostress the urgency of the operation.

Almond Inspects Marines

A day later, 6 September,General Almond came to Kobe toinspect 1st Marine Division units.He lunched with the staff noncom-missioned officers at Camp Otsuaccompanied by General Smithand Lieutenant Colonel AllanSutter, then visited the 2d and 3d

Battalions of the 1st Marines.Afterwards he went to Camp Sakainear Osaka to see the 11thMarines, the division's artillery reg-iment commanded by ColonelJames H. Brower, and was favor-ably impressed." He commented inhis diary: "A large percentage ofthe troops were drawn from activeMarine reserve units . . . . TheArmy should have done likewisebut did not."

In the evening Smith and hisstaff briefed him on the division'soperation plan. Again Almond wasfavorably impressed, but hethought Smith's planned subse-quent moves ashore too slow anddeliberate. He stressed to Smith theneed for speed in capturing KimpoAirfield and Seoul itself. Smith wasless impressed with Almond, say-ing: "The inspection consisted [ofAlmond] primarily questioningmen, I suppose for the purpose offinding out what made Marinestick."

In the 1st Marine Division, oper-ational planning trickled down tothe battalion level. The 3dBattalion, 1st Marines, underLieutenant Colonel Thomas L.

Ridge, had steamed comfortably toJapan in the General Simon B.Buckner (AP 123) and wasensconced in what had been thebarracks for a battalion of the 24thInfantry Division at Otsu on thesouth shore of Lake Biwa. Therewas no room for field training andthe best the battalion could do wasroad-bound conditioning marches.The commanding officer and thethree majors in the battalion weresummoned to a meeting on boardthe regimental command shipberthed in Kobe. There had been aplethora of rumors, but now forthe first time they learned officiallythat they were to land at Inchon.The regimental S-2, Captain StoneW. Quillian, went over the beachdefenses, tapping a large map

President Harry S. Truman and Marine Commandant Gen Clifton B. Catesexchange warm greetings at a Marine Corps field demonstration at Quantico inJune 1950,10 days before the outbreak of the Korean War. This friendly rela-tionship dissolved when Truman, in an ill-advised note, called the Marine Corps"the Na vy's police force."

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A407260

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studded with suspected weaponsemplacements. The S-3, MajorRobert E. Lorigan, then briefed thescheme of maneuver. The 3dBattalion would be the right flankunit of the main landing. Thesewere the D-Day objectives. Tap,tap. This piece of high ground wasthe battalion's objective. Tap, tap.This hook of land on the extremeright flank had to be taken. Tap,tap. The landing would be at 1730;it would he dark at 1900. Therewere no enthusiastic cheers fromthe listeners.

Then the regimental comman-der, Chesty Puller, got to his feet."You people are lucky," hegrowled. "We used to have to waitevery 10 or 15 years for a war. Youget one every five years. You peo-ple have been living by the sword.By God, you better be prepared todie by the sword."

The troop list for the landingforce totalled 29,731 persons, to beloaded out in six embarkationgroups. Four groups would loadout of Kobe, one group out ofPusan, and one group—made upof the Army's 2d Engineer SpecialBrigade—out of Yokohama. Not allunits could be combat loaded;some compromises had to beaccepted.

One Marine Corps unit that wasnot ready to go was the 1stArmored Amphibian TractorBattalion, activated but not yetcombat ready. The Army'sCompany A, 56th AmphibianTractor Battalion, was substituted.

President Writes Letter

As the Marines combat loadedtheir amphibious ships at Kobe,the Pacific edition of Stars andStripes reached them with a storythat President Truman had calledthem "the Navy's police force."This compounded a previouslyperceived insult when the

President labeled the UnitedNations intervention in Korea a"police action." The enragedMarines chalked on the tarpaulinscovering their trucks and tanks,"Horrible Harry's Police Force" andsimilar epithets.

What had happened was that on21 August, Congressman GordonL. McDonough of California hadwritten President Truman a well-intentioned letter urging that theMarines be given a voice on theJoint Chiefs of Staff. The Presidentfired back a feisty note: "For yourinformation the Marine Corps isthe Navy's police force and as longas I am President that is what itwill remain. They have a propa-ganda machine that is almost equalto Stalin's . . . . The Chief of NavalOperations is the Chief of Staff ofthe Navy of which the Marines area part."

He had dictated the letter to hissecretary, Rose Conway, and sentit without any member of his staffseeing it.

McDonough inserted the letterinto the Congressional Recordwhere it appeared on 1 September.The story reached the newspapersfour days later and a great publicoutcry went up. By five o'clock thenext afternoon Truman's advisorshad prevailed upon him to send anapology to General Cates: "I sin-cerely regret the unfortunatechoice of language which I used."Truman, in further fence-mending,in company with Cates, made asurprise visit two mornings later ata Marine Corps League conventioncoincidentally being held inWashington's Statler Hotel andcharmed his audience.

Puffing Together

the Landing Force

General Craig's 1st ProvisionalMarine Brigade was relieved of itscombat commitment at midnight, 5

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September. The brigade had donemost of its fighting with a peace-time structure, that is, at abouttwo-thirds its authorized wartimestrength: two rifle companies to abattalion instead of three, fourguns to an artillery battery insteadof six. The 5th Marines did not geta third company for its threeinfantry battalions until just beforemounting out for Inchon.

The Korean 1st MarineRegiment, some 3,000 men, com-manded by Lieutenant ColonelKim Sung Eun, arrived in Pusan on5 September to join the 1st MarineDivision. They were in khaki uni-forms including cloth caps, andequipped with Japanese rifles andmachine guns. The South KoreanMarines were issued American uni-forms—including helmets—andeach was given one day on therifle range to fire his new Americanweapons.

Built around a cadre drawn fromthe ROK Navy, the Korean MarineCorps ("KlvICs" to the U.S. Marines)had been activated 15 April 1949.Company-size units had firstdeployed to southern Korea, andthen to Cheju Island, to rout outCommunist-bent guerrillas. Afterthe North Korean invasion, theKMCs, growing to regimental size,had made small-scale hit-and-runraids along the west coast againstthe flank of the invaders.

Craig assigned LieutenantColonel Charles W. Harrison, untilrecently the executive officer ofthe 6th Marines at Camp Lejeune,as liaison officer to the KMCs. Hisparty, given a radio jeep, wasmade up of three corporalradiomen, and a corporal driver.Harrison was well-chosen. His par-ents had been missionaries inKorea. He himself had graduatedfrom the foreign high school inPyongyang in 1928 and he had aworking knowledge of Korean.

While the 5th Marines were

loading out, a paper, marked"Confidential" and giving specificson a landing beach at Kaesong,was widely distributed and one ormore copies were purposely "lost."Perhaps the word got back to theNorth Koreans.

The amphibious assault trans-port Henrico (APA 45) known tothe fleet as "Happy Hank," hadbrought the 1st Battalion, 5thMarines, to Pusan. Now the shipreceived the same battalion, itsnumbers, thinned by the fightingin the Pusan Perimeter, nowbrought up to war strength. TheNavy crew did their best to pro-vide a little extra for their Marinepassengers. The wardroom wasmade available to the officers 24hours a day.

Marguerite "Maggie" Higgins, amovie-star-pretty blonde reportingon the war for the New YorkHerald-Tribune occupied one ofthe few staterooms. She had beena war correspondent in Europeduring the last years of World WarII and had been in Korea since thebeginning of the new war. Ribaldrumors as to her imagined noctur-nal associations inevitably circulat-ed throughout the ship.

Major General Field Harris,Commanding General, 1st MarineAircraft Wing—O. P. Smith's avia-tor counterpart—arrived in Tokyoon 3 September. His forward eche-lon of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing,was informed of the Inchon-Seouloperation three days later.Planning for the employment ofMarine air was completed on 9September. Marine Aircraft Group33, relieved of its close supportrole in the Pusan Perimeter, wouldbe the operating element. Harrisand his forward echelon embarkedat Kobe on 10 September asTactical Air Command, X Corps.

Meanwhile, Almond continuedhis restless visits and inspections.on 9 September, General Barr

briefed him on the 7th InfantryDivision's plan of operations.Almond thought the plan ade-quate, but was concerned overpossible problems of liaison andcoordination with the 1st MarineDivision. Events would prove himright

Almond's Good Ideas

A restive General Almondformed, for commando work, aSpecial Operations Company, XCorps, sometimes called a "RaiderGroup," under command ofColonel Louis B. Ely, Jr., USA. WithAlmond's encouragement, Ely pro-posed a raid to seize KimpoAirfield. Almond asked Smith for100 Marine volunteers to join theSpecial Operations Company;Smith, skeptical of the mission andunimpressed by Ely, stalled in pro-viding Marines and the requestwas cancelled. As it turned out, Elyand his company would make anapproach to the beach, but the dis-tance from ship to shore provedtoo great for rubber boats.

Brigadier General Henry I.

Hodes, USA, the assistant divisioncommander of the 7th InfantryDivision, visited Smith on theMount McKinley on 9 September.Almond, still concerned by Smith'sdeliberate manner, had come upwith yet another idea for the swiftseizure of Kimpo. Almond's newplan called for landing a battalionof the 32d Infantry on Wolmi-dothe evening of D-Day. It would"barrel" down the road to Seoul intrucks and tanks provided by theMarines. Smith, horrified by a planhe considered tactically impossi-ble, told Hodes that he had notanks to lend him.

The Secretary of the Navy, alert-ed by parents' complaints thatunderage sons were being sent toKorea, on 8 September sent a last-minute order to remove Marines

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under 18 before sailing, reducingthe landing force by about 500men. Those who were close tobeing 18 were held in Japan onother duties and eventually foundtheir way to the division asreplacements.

Second 1phoon

Weathermen said that a secondtyphoon, "Kezia," was followingclose behind "Jane." Rear AdmiralArleigh A. Burke, USN, had arrivedin Tokyo from Washington to beAdmiral Joy's deputy chief of staff.Burke attempted to make an officecall on MacArthur to express hisconcerns regarding the comingtyphoon and was blocked byAlmond. Burke refused to discussthe matter with Almond and wentback to his office. By the time hegot there, a message was waitingthat MacArthur would see him.Burke hurried back to GHQ andexplained to MacArthur that if thetyphoon came up and blew westthere could be no landing on the15th or 16th.

"What do we do, Admiral?"asked MacArthur.

"We sail early," said Burke.MacArthur agreed.

Navy meteorologists had firstpicked up signs of Kezia off theMariana Islands on 6 September.Whipping up winds of 100 milesper hour, the typhoon movedsteadily toward Japan and the EastChina Sea. Most endangered werethe amphibious ships of AdmiralDoyle's Attack Force. The route forall six transport groups to Inchonplaced them squarely in the pathof the on-coming oriental hurri-cane.

Both Doyle and OP. Smith, thetwo who would bear the burdenof directing the actual landing,were painfully aware that all thenormal steps of preparing for anamphibious operation were either

being compressed or ignored com-pletely in order to squeeze theoperation into an impossibly shorttime frame. During World War II, atleast three months would havebeen spent in planning and train-ing for an operation of this magni-tude. Beginning with Guadalcanal,a rehearsal—or rehearsals—wasconsidered essential. For Inchonthere would be no rehearsal.Doyle wryly concluded that a gooddeal would depend upon howskillfully the individual coxswainscould perform in finding their wayto the beaches.

Captain Martin J. "Stormy"Sexton, a World War II Raider andnow aide-de-camp to GeneralSmith, said later: "There was not

even time for landing exercises bythe LVTs. Some of the LVT crewshad not even had the opportunityto try their engines out in the waterand paddle around."

Execution

Marine aircraft squadrons VMF-214 and VMF-323 began the soft-ening-up of Wolmi-do on 10September with the delivery ofnapalm. Operating from the decksof the light carriers Sicily (CVE118) and Badoeng Strait (CVE 116)("Bing-Ding" to the Marines andsailors), the Marine fliers burnedout most of the buildings on theisland. Strikes by Navy aircraftfrom the big carriers Valley Forge

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(CV 45), Philiippine Sea (CV 47),and Boxer (CV 21) continued forthe next two days.

Joint Task Force 7 (JTF 7) wasofficially activated under AdmiralStruble the following day, 11

September. Almond and X Corpswould be subordinate to Strubleand JTF 7 until Almond assumedcommand ashore and JTF 7 wasdissolved.

Preliminary and diversionary airand naval gunfire strikes wereroughly divided into 30 percentdelivered north of Inchon, 30 per-cent south, and 40 percent againstInchon itself. Except for a few gun-nery ships held back to protect theflanks of the Pusan Perimeter, JTF7—in its other guise, the Seventh

Ma rifles prime an F4U-4B of VMF-323 for take-offfrom thedeck of the light aircraft carrier Badoeng Strait (CVE 116)standing off Korea. VMF-214, embarked in sister carrier

Photo courtesy of LtCol Leo J. Ihli, USMC (Ret)

Sicily (CVE 118), played a companion role in close supportof the assault. The bent-wing Corsairs would prove onceagain to be ideal close support aircraft.

Fleet—included all the combatantships in the Far East. Among themwere three fast carriers, two escortcarriers, and a British light carrier.In the final count, the force num-bered some 230 ships, including 34Japanese vessels, mostly ex-U.S.Navy LSTs (landing ships, tank)with Japanese crews. The Frenchcontributed one tropical frigate, LaGrandiere, which arrived atSasebo with a five-month supplyof wine and a pin-up picture ofEsther Williams, but no codingmachine.

Mount McKinley, with Doyle,Smith, and their staffs on board,got underway from Kobe themorning of 11 September—a dayahead of schedule because of theapproach of Typhoon Kezia—andsteamed for Sasebo. Winds of thetyphoon whipped up to 125 milesper hour. Doyle was gambling thatKezia would veer off to the north.

Almond held a last meeting atGHQ on 12 September to deal withthe urgency for an early sailingbecause of the threat of Kezia.General Shepherd, General Wright,and Admiral Burke attended. Thatafternoon General MacArthur andhis party left Haneda airport to fly

to Itazuke air base. From therethey would go by automobile toSasebo.

MacArthur Goes to Sea

Because of the storm the MountMcKinley was late in reaching port.MacArthur's party waited in theBachelor Officers Quarters, pass-ing the time having sandwiches. Itwas close to midnight before theMount McKinley rounded thesouthern tip of Kyushu anddocked at Sasebo. MacArthur andhis party boarded the ship and shewas underway again within anhour. With General Shepherd camehis G-3, Colonel Victor H. Krulak,and his aide and future son-in-law,Major James B. Ord, Jr.

MacArthur had five generals inhis party—Shepherd, Almond, andWright, and two others: MajorGeneral Courtney Whitney—hisdeputy chief of staff for civil affairs,but more importantly his press offi-cer—and Major General Alonzo P.Fox. Fox was chief of staff toMacArthur in his capacity as"SCAP" (Supreme CommanderAllied Powers) and LieutenantHaig's father-in law. Absent from

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the group was Lieutenant GeneralGeorge Stratemeyer, USAF, whohad had some expectation ofaccompanying MacArthur as his airboss. In assignment of spaces,MacArthur grandly ignored tradi-tional ship protocol and took overDoyle's cabin. Doyle moved to hissea cabin off the flag bridge.Almond appropriated the ship'scaptain's cabin. 0. P. Smith man-aged to keep his stateroom.

After breakfast on the morningof the 13th, Admiral Doyle led theembarked flag officers in a tour ofthe Mount McKinley, hoping toimpress the Army generals thatamphibious operations requiredspecialization. MacArthur did notgo along.

The absence of General Strate-meyer from MacArthur's party wasa clear signal that the Navy hadbeen successful in keeping the AirForce from operating within theamphibious objective area—a circlewith a 100-mile radius drawnaround Inchon. There would be noFEAF operations within this radiusunless specifically requested byStruble. MacArthur remained abovethese doctrinal squabbles.

Joint Task Force Seven

Task Force 90

Task Force 91

VAdm Arthur D. Struble

Attack Force

Task Force 92

Task Force 99

Blockade and Covering Force

X Corps

Task Force 77

RAdm James H. Doyle

Task Force 79

Control and Reconnaissance Force

Fast Carrier Group

RAdm Sir William G.Andrewes

ROK Naval Forces

Service Squadron

MajGen Edward M.Almond

'Liaison and Advisor

RAdm George R. Henderson

RAdm Edward C. Ewen

Capt Bernard L.Austin

Cdr Michael L. Luosey'

Operation 'Common Knowledge'

Neither General MacArthur norAdmiral Struble favored extensiveair and naval gunfire preparationof the objective area, primarilybecause it would cause a loss oftactical surprise. Their concern waslargely academic. All sorts of leak-age circulated in Japan—and evenreached the media in the UnitedStates—that an amphibious opera-tion was being mounted out with aprobable target of Inchon. At theTokyo Press Club the impendinglanding was derisively called"Operation Common Knowledge."The North Korean commandalmost certainly heard theserumors and almost equally certainhad tide tables for Inchon. Mao TseTung is supposed to have pointedat Inchon on a map of Korea andhave said, "The Americans willland here."

American intelligence knew thatthe Russians had supplied mines,but how many had been sown inFlying Fish Channel? The lack oftime and sufficient minesweepersmade orderly mine-sweepingoperations impossible.

'Sitting Ducks'

The pre-landing naval gunfirebombardment began at 0700 on 13September with a column of cruis-ers and destroyers coming up thechannel. The weather was good,the sea calm. Four cruisers—Toledo(CA 133), Rochester (CA 124), HMSKenya, and HMS Jamaica—foundtheir bombardment stations severalmiles south of Inchon and droppedanchor. Six destroyers—Mansfield(DD 728), DeHaven (DD 727),Lyman K. Swenson (DD 729),Collett (DD 730), Gurke (DD 783),and Henderson (DD 785)—contin-ued on past the cruisers and wereabout to earn for themselves therueful title of "Sitting Ducks."

What appeared to be a string ofmines was sighted in the vicinity ofPalmi-do. The destroyers openedfire with their 40mm guns and themines began to explode. Leavingthe Henderson behind to continueshooting at the mines, the fiveother destroyers steamed closer totheir objectives. Gurke anchored800 yards off Wolmi-do, which wasbeing pounded by carrier air.

The remaining four destroyerstook station behind Gurke. Justbefore 1300 they opened fire.Within minutes return fire cameblazing back from hidden shorebatteries. Collett took five hits,knocking out her fire direction sys-tem; her guns switched to individ-ual control. Gurke took two lighthits. DeHaven was slightly dam-aged. Lyman K. Swenson felt a

near miss that caused two casual-ties. After an hour's bombardmentthe destroyers withdrew. One manhad been killed—ironicallyLieutenant (Junior Grade) DavidSwenson, nephew of the admiralfor whom the destroyer wasnamed—and eight were wounded.

From their more distant anchor-age, the cruisers picked up thebombardment with 6-inch and 8-inch salvos. After that the carrieraircraft resumed their attack.

Next day, 14 September, five ofthe destroyers came back (thedamaged Collett was left behind)and banged away again. At first thedestroyers drew feeble return fire.By the time they withdrew 75 min-utes later, having delivered 1,7005-inch shells, there was no returnfire at all. The Navy, with consid-erable satisfaction, reportedWolmi-do now ready for capture.

Attack Force Gathers

Admiral Doyle had won hisgamble against the typhoon. TheYellow Sea was quiet and all ele-ments of the Attack Force were in

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place off Inchon. General Craig'sembarked 1st Provisional MarineBrigade, having arrived fromPusan, was formally dissolved on13 September and its partsreturned to the control of the par-ent division. Craig became theassistant division commander.

The Attack Force eased its wayup Flying Fish Channel so as to hein the transport area before day-light on 15 September. GeneralMacArthur spent a restless night.Standing at the rail of the MountMcKinley in the darkness, heentertained certain morbidthoughts, at least as he remem-bered them later in hisReminiscences: "Within five hours40,000 men would act boldly, inthe hope that 100,000 others man-ning the thin defense lines in SouthKorea would not die. I alone wasresponsible for tomorrow, and if Ifailed, the dreadful results wouldrest on judgment day against mysoul."

George Gilman, an ensign in theMount McKinley, had less loftythoughts: "None of us boat groupofficers had ever had any experi-ence operating under such tidalconditions before, let alone everhaving been involved in anamphibious landing . . . . As themorning of September 15approached, we realized we hadall the ingredients for a disaster onour hands."

Destination Wolmi-do

L-hour was to be 0630. At 0545,the pre-landing shore bombard-ment began. Lieutenant ColonelRobert D. "Tap" Taplett's 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, was boatedby 0600. The carrier-based MarineCorsairs completed their last sweepof the beach 15 minutes later.

"G Company was to land to theright of Green Beach in the assault,wheel right, and seize the domi-

nant hill mass on the island, RadioHill," remembered Robert D."Dewey" Bohn (then a first lieu-tenant; he would retire a majorgeneral). His company wasembarked in the fast destroyertransport Diachenko (APD 123).She stopped her engines at about0300, the troop compartment lightscame on, and reveille soundedover the public address system.

Most of the Marines were

already awake. They hoped for thetraditional "steak and eggs" pre-landing breakfast of World War II;instead they got scrambled pow-dered eggs, dry toast, and cannedapricots. At about first light,Company G went over the sideand down the cargo nets into thebobbing LCVPs, which thencleared the ship and began to cir-cle.

Three LSMRs—medium landing

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ships converted to rocket ships—sent their loads of thousands of 5-inch rockets screeching shorewardtoward Wolmi-do. The islandseemed to explode under theimpact. Then the landing craftbegan the run to Green Beach.MacArthur, Shepherd, Almond,Smith, Whitney, and Doyle allwatched from the flag bridge ofthe Mount McKinley.

Seven LCVPs brought in the firstwave, one platoon of Company Gon the right and three platoons ofCompany H on the left. The land-ing craft converged on the narrowbeach—scarcely 50 yards wide—and grounded at 0633, three min-utes behind schedule. The remain-der of the two assault companiescame in as the second wave twominutes later. Resistance was limit-ed to a few scattered shots.

Captain Patrick E. Wildman,commanding Company H, left asmall detachment to clear NorthPoint and then plunged across theisland toward his objectives—thenorthern nose of Radio Hill andthe shoreline of the burning indus-trial area facing Inchon. After ashort pause to reorganize, Bohntook Company G towards thesouthern half of Radio Hill, 105meters high. Resistance was half-hearted. At 0655, Sergeant Alvin E.Smith, guide of the 3d Platoon,secured an American flag to thetrunk of a shattered tree.MacArthur, watching the actionashore from his swivel chair on thebridge of the Mount McKinley, sawthe flag go up and said, "That's it.Let's get a cup of coffee."

Ten tanks—six M-26 Pershingsand four modified M-4A3Shermans, all under SecondLieutenant Granville G. Sweet—landed in the third wave at 0646from three utility landing ships(LSUs). They crunched their wayinland, poised to help the infantry.

Lieutenant Colonel Taplett land-

brought in the fourth wave bearingCompany I, the battalion reserve.His company, following behindCompany H, encountered an angry

Moving on to the near end ofthe causeway that stretched toInchon itself, McMullen foundmore North Korean defenders hid-ing in a cave. One of Sweet's tanksfired a 90mm round into the mouthof the cave. There was a muffledexplosion and 30 dazed and deaf-ened North Koreans came stagger-ing out with their hands abovetheir heads. "Captured forty-fiveprisoners . . . meeting light resis-tance," radioed Taplett at 0745 tothe Mount McKinley.

Wildman's Marines were findingit slow going in the ruins of theindustrial area. Taplett orderedBohn to take the rest of Radio Hilland by 0800 the high ground wasMarine Corps property.

'Wolmi-do Secured'

Once again Taplett radioed theMount McKinley, this time:"Wolmi-do secured."

With the success of the Marinelanding blaring over the loud-speakers, MacArthur left the bridge

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A2686

Reveille in the amphibious ships went at 0300 on the morning of 15 September.Marines hoped for the traditional "steak-and-eggs" D-day breakfast of World WarII, but most transports fed simpler fare, such as powdered eggs and canned apri-cots. Breakfast on board the landing ships was even more spartan.

ed from his free boat a few mm- nest of about a platoon of by-utes later. At almost the same time, passed North Koreans. A flurry ofCaptain Robert A. McMullen hand grenades was exchanged.

McMullen signaled Sweet's tanks tocome forward. A Sherman with adozer blade sealed the die-hardNorth Koreans in their holes.

By 0655, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, had landed onWolmi-do and had an American flag flying at the top of a

shell-blasted tree. An hour later the battalion commanderreported resistance as light and 45 dazed prisoners taken.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-GK-2341-A2694

100

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A2798

Some North Korean defenders of Wolmi-do stubbornly remained in their cave-like positions and had to be burned out by flamethrowers. US. Marines werereadily distinguishable at this stage of the war by their wear of camouflage hel-met covers and leggings.

to pen a message to AdmiralStruble in his flagship Rochester:"The Navy and Marines have nevershone more brightly than thismorning."

Ashore, Taplett consolidated hisgains. His three rifle companies, byprearranged plan, took up defen-sive positions facing Inchon. Theempty swimming pooi at the tip ofNorth Point became a stockade forprisoners.

At about 10 o'clock Taplettordered Bohn to take Sowolmi-do,an islet dangling to the south ofWolmi-do with a lighthouse at theend of the causeway. Bohn sentSecond Lieutenant John D.Counselman, leader of his 3dPlatoon, with a rifle squad and asection of tanks. As a prelude tothe assault, a flight of Corsairsdrenched Sowolmi-do with na-palm. Covered by the two tanksand a curtain of 81mm mortar fire,Counselman's riflemen crossed thenarrow causeway, taking fire froma hill honey-combed with em-

taken and the job completed inless than two hours. Three Marineswere wounded, bringing Taplett'scasualties for the day to nonekilled, 17 wounded.

Word was passed that some ofthe North Koreans who hadescaped were trying to swim forInchon. A number of Bohn'sMarines lined up rifle-range fash-ion and shot at what they saw asheads bobbing in the water. Othersdismissed the targets as imaginary.Mopping up of the island wascompleted by noon.

Taplett, growing restless andseeing no sign of enemy activity,proposed to division that he makean assault on the city from his pre-sent position or at least a recon-naissance in force. Smith respond-ed to his proposal with a firm neg-ative.

Waiting for Evening Tide

The remainder of the divisionwas steaming toward the innertransport area. There would nowbe a long wait until the eveningtide swept in and the assault regi-

placements. Flamethrowers and3.5-inch rocket launchers burnedand blasted the dug-in enemy.Seventeen were killed, 19 surren-dered, and eight or more managedto hide out. The lighthouse was

M-26 Pershing tanks, new to the Marines, began to land in the third wave atWolmi-do and were soon put to use against North Korean fortified positions. Atank-infantry patrol assaulted and took Sowolmi-do, an islet dangling at the endof a causeway from the main island.

Department of Defense Photo (U5MC)

101

be found in the way of targetswithin a 25-mile radius of Inchon.(The D-Day action for the aircrafton board the carrier Boxer waslabeled "Event 15" and consisted ofa strike with 12 F4U Corsairs andfive AD Skyraiders.) The smoke ofthe bombardment and from burn-ing buildings mixed with the rainso that a gray-green pall hung overthe city.

H-Hour for the main landingwas 1730. Lieutenant ColonelRaymond L. Murray's 5th Marines,minus the 3d Battalion alreadyashore on Wolmi-do, was to landover Red Beach, to the left andnorth of Wolmi-do. Murray's regi-ment was to seize the 0-A line, ablue arc on the overlay to thedivision's attack order. On theground 0-A line swung 3,000yards from Cemetery Hill on thenorth or left flank, throughObservatory Hill in the center, andthen through a maze of buildings,including the British Consulate

ments could be landed. Marines,standing at the rail of their trans-ports, strained their eyes lookingfor their intended beaches butcould see nothing but smoke. Thebombardment, alternating betweennaval gunfire and air strikes, con-tinued.

During the course of the after-noon, Admiral Struble had hisadmiral's barge lowered into thewater from the Rochester ("Roach-Catcher"). He swung by the MountMcKinley to pick up GeneralMacArthur for a personal recon-naissance from close offshore ofWolmi-do and the harbor. Almondand Shepherd went with them.

They swung close to the seawallfronting the harbor. "General," saidShepherd, "You're getting inmighty close to the beach. They'reshooting at us." MacArthur ignoredthe caution.

Naval gunfire and carrier airsought to hit everything that could

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A2723

Ma rines from the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, escorted a steady stream of prison-ers back to Green Beach on the seaward side of Wolmi-do. Landing ships andcraft could beach as long as the tide was high, but once the tide receded theywould be left high and dry on the mud flats.

A co'psman bandages the forearm of a wounded North Korean prisoner onWolmi-do. He and other prisoners were moved to one of the several prison stock-ades that were set up on the landing beaches.

Department of Defense Photo (IJSMC) A2802

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Department of Defense Photo (USA) SC348839Gen MacArthur indulged his passion for visiting the 'front." VAdm Arthur D. Struble's barge. Struble sits to MacArthur'sDuring the interval between the morning and evening land- right. On his left is Army MajGen Courtney Whitney, often-ings he personally "reconnoitered" the Inchon beaches in called MacA rthur's 'press secretary."

until it reached the inner tidalbasin.

The 1st and 2d Battalions, 5thMarines, under LieutenantColonels George R. Newton andHarold S. Roise respectively,would land abreast across RedBeach. The new 1st ROK MarineRegiment would follow themashore.

Newton and Roise had thePusan Perimeter behind them, hutnot much other infantry experi-ence. Newton, commissioned in1938 from the Naval Academy, waswith the Emhassy Guard at Pekingwhen World War II came on 7

December 1941 and spent the waras a prisoner of the Japanese.Roise, commissioned from theUniversity of Idaho in 1939, hadserved at sea during the war.

In the assault, Newton's 1stBattalion and Roise's 2d Battalionwould come away from the attacktransports Henrico and Cavalier(APA 37) in landing craft. Both bat-talions would land in column ofcompanies across the seawall ontonarrow Red Beach. Newton, on theleft, was to take Cemetery Hill andthe northern half of ObservatoryHill. Roise, on the right, was totake his half of Observatory Hill,

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the British Consulate, and the innertidal basin.

"Two things scared me todeath," said Roise of the landingplan. "One, we were not landingon a beach; we were landingagainst a seawall. Each LCVP hadtwo ladders, which would be usedto climb up and over the wall. Thiswas risky . . . . Two, the landingwas scheduled for 5:30 p.m. Thiswould give us only about twohours of daylight to clear the cityand set up for the night."

Captain Francis I. "Ike" Fenton,Jr., commander of Company B inNewton's battalion, sharply

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray

Seldom doe a Marin' Corp regim 'nt gointo ombat \ ith a I's:er grade than fullolonel in command. But \ hen Brigadier

G 'neral Edward raig arrived at CampPendleton in lui 19-0 to form the 1stProvi 'ional 1arine Brigade for ervic in Koreahe fund no rea 'on to supplant th command­ing offi er of the 5th 1arines, LieutenantColonel Raymond Murray. The tall rangy Te anwa' an ex ption to the general rule. He hadalready made hi reputation a. a fighter and ofbeing a tep ahead of hi' grade in his as. ign­ment. 'a major at Guadalcanal he had com­manded the 2d Ballalion 6th Marines. and forhi onpicuou gallantry had earn'd his fir·t:ilver 'tar.

fter Guadalcanal came Tara\ a for the baualionand a . econd Silv r tar for Murray. now a lieutenamolonel. Finall . at aipan, although he wa painfully

wound'd, Murray'. control of hi' batralion wa uchthat it brought him a avy ros ".

ovelist Leon ri' served in Murray' battalion.Later. when he wr te hi' book Bailie C1y, hued

urray a hi model for "High Po kets" Hu 'Ie , hi.hard- 'hargin fictional battalion commander.

Born in Alhambra, alifornia, in 1913. Murray grewup in lIarlingen, T xas. h n he accepted his com­mi. sion in Jul 1935. after graduating from Te a. 1

oil 'g " then the incubator of many rmy and Marineofficers. he had behind him four ear of the rmy'Re 'erve Officer Training Corp and two y ar of theTe a' ational Guard. He had also 'tarred at footballand ba ketball. After atrending Ba. ic ,chool, then inthe Philadelphia av Yard h' was detailed to the 2dMarine Brigade in an Diego. The brigade w'nt totroubl ~d China a year later. lurra served for a shorttim A in ,hanghai, then mo ed t a priz >d '!ot in theEm! a 'y Guard in Peking. H' 'ame back to an Diegoin 19'10 and r'turned to the 2d Marine Brigade whi hwithin month e panded into the 2d Marine Di i ion.

1st Pro i iona! Marin' Brigade \ 'I' pulled out of the2d Division in the summer of 19 1 forervic inIceland. lurray, nov. a aptain and soon to be amajor, ent with it. lIe" a ba k in , an Diego in pril19'12 and in October sailed with the 6th Marines forthe war in the Pacific.

He came hom in ugust 19H and cn-ed atQuantico Camp Lejeune, lIa\ aii, and CampPendl,ton. Prom tion' werc slo after 19'15 andMurra \J a till a lieutenant olonel when the K rean~ ar began in 1950. s command r f the infantry ele­ment of the later-da bt Pro isional larine Brigade inthe "fire brigade" defense of the Pusan Perimeter, he

receiv'd hi third and fourth :iher tars for hisslaunch leader hip.

t Inchon, Major General . P. :mith gave Murrayand hi., now- 'ea oned r 'giment the more complicatednorthern half of the landing. fter In hon and 'eoul,lurra would cominue in ommand through the

Cho'in R'servoir campaign. That battle in sub-z'roweath 'r brought him the rm 's DiMinguished "n'iceros as well a hi' 'econd a y ross. Finally, in

Januar 1951 he \ya promoted to colon I.Coming hom from Korea in pril 1951, he allend­

cd the ational War allege and then \Va: hand­picked to command The Basic School. since '\ aridWar II at Quantico. e t he sen cd at amp Pendletonand amp Lejeune. promotion to brigadier generalcam' in .June 1959. signmenL in Okinawa, th 'nPendlt:ton again, and Parris Island followed. 'en-ing atH adquarter Marine orps in 196 a a major gener­al, he \) a' ordered to ietnam as Deputy Commander,I1I 1arine mphibious Force. His strong physiqu'finall failed him. He \ as im alided home in F 'bruary196 to Betheda aval Hospital where he remainedumil hi: retirement on 1 ugust 196 . He now live. inOceanside. California, do e to amp Pendleton.

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Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A2865

Navy transports stand off Inchon and Wolmi-do before the rowed back from the Japanese, was a rusty travesty of thelanding. Amphibious hft for Inchon, some of it literally bor- great amphibious armadas of World War II.

remembered the characteristics ofRed Beach:

Once on the beach therewas an open area of about200 yards. The left flank wasmarked by Cemetery Hill.From the sea it looked like asheer cliff. To the right ofCemetery Hill was a brewery,some work shops, and a cot-ton mill. Further to the rightand about 600 yards in fromthe beach was ObservatoryHill, overlooking the entirelanding area and consideredcritical; it was the regimentalobjective. Further to the rightwas a five-story office build-ing built of concrete and rein-forced steel.

Captain John R. Stevens'Company A was to land on theright flank. In the assault would bethe 2d Platoon under SecondLieutenant Francis W. Muetzel andthe 1st Platoon under GunnerySergeant Orval F. McMullen. Inreserve was the 3d Platoon underFirst Lieutenant Baldomero Lopez,who had joined the company as itloaded out from Pusan.

Three miles to the south of the5th Marines, Chesty Puller's 1stMarines was to land across Blue

Beach. Puller's mission was tosecure the 0-1 line, a 4,000-yardarc that went inland as deep as3,000 yards, and then hookedaround to the left to cut off Inchonfrom Seoul.

Blue Beach One, 500 yardswide, had its left flank marked bya salt evaporator. What looked tobe a road formed the boundary tothe south with Blue Beach Two.

The 2d Battalion, 1st Marines,was under affable, white-hairedLieutenant Colonel Allan Sutter.After landing over Blue BeachOne, he was to take a critical roadjunction about 1,000 yards north-east of the beach, and Hill 117,nearly two miles inland, whichcommanded Inchon's "back door"and the highway to Seoul, 22 milesaway.

Sutter, a graduate of ValleyForge Military Academy andDartmouth College, had gained hisMarine Corps commission in 1937through the Platoon LeadersCourse, a program under whichcollege students spent two sum-mers at Quantico to qualify as sec-ond lieutenants. He then spent ayear at the Basic School inPhiladelphia before being assignedtroop duties. During World War II,Sutter was a signal officer atGuadalcanal, Guam, and Okinawa.

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Blue Beach Two, also 500 yardswide, had its left flank marked bythe supposed road and its rightflank by a narrow ramp jutting sea-ward. A cove, further to the right,named at the last minute "BlueBeach Three," offered an alternateor supplementary landing site.Ridge, with the 3d Battalion, wasto cross the seawall girdling BlueBeach Two and take Hill 233, amile southeast of the beach, and,on the extreme right, a small cape,flanking Blue Beach and toppedby Hill 94.

At best, the four assault battal-ions coming across Red and BlueBeaches would have but twohours of high tide and daylight toturn the plan into reality. Smith,after fully committing his two regi-ments, would have nothing left asa division reserve except two half-trained Korean Marine battalions.

Assaulting Red Beach

It would be a long ride to RedBeach for the 1st and 2d Battalionsof the 5th Marines. Troops begandebarking from the transports atabout 1530. "As you climb downthat net into the LCVP you'rescared," remembered Private FirstClass Doug Koch of Company D,5th Marines. "What keeps you

going is knowing this is what youhave to do."

The Horace A. Bass (APD 124),the Red Beach control vessel,slowly steamed ahead with a longfile of landing craft "trailing behindlike a brood of ducklings."

The supporting rocket ships letgo with a final fusillade of some6,500 5-inch rockets. The resultingcloud of dust and smoke corn-

pletely masked the beach area.The Horace A. Bass, an escortdestroyer converted into a high-speed transport and anxious to getinto the fight, banged away withher 5-inch guns. She then dippedher signal flag and the first waveheaded for Red Beach.

The eight LCVPs in the firstwave crossed the line of departureat H-8 with 2,200 yards to go. The

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four boats on the left carried thetwo assault platoons of CompanyA. Captain Steven's mission was totake Cemetery Hill and to securethe left flank of the beachhead.The four boats on the right carriedthe assault elements of CaptainSamuel Jaskilka's Company E,

which was to clear the right flankof the beach and then capture thehill that held the British Consulate.

As the first wave passed themid-way point, two squadrons ofMarine Corps Corsairs—VMF-214under Lieutenant Colonel Walter E.Lischied and VMF-323 under MajorArnold A. Lund—came in to strafeboth Red and Blue Beaches. Theyexhausted their loads and flewaway. Not satisfied, CaptainStevens called for further air strikesagainst Red Beach. Four Navy A-4D Skyraiders made strafing passesuntil the wave had only 30 yards togo.

On the right, First LieutenantEdwin A. Deptula's 1st Platoon,Company E, hit the seawall at1731, one minute behind schedule.Designated Marines threwgrenades up over the seawall, andafter they exploded, Deptula tookhis platoon up the scaling ladders.A few stray rounds whined over-head.

Deptula pushed inland about100 yards to the railroad tracksagainst no resistance. The rest ofCompany E landed about 10 min-utes later. Captain Jaskilka (whowould retire as a four-star general)quickly re-organized his companynear the Nippon Flour Companybuilding just south of the beach-head. Deptula's platoon continueddown the railroad tracks to theBritish Consulate. Jaskilka sentanother platoon to cross the rail-road tracks and then move up theslope of 200-foot-high ObservatoryHill.

On the left flank it was not quitethat easy. One of the four landing

craft, with half the 1st Platoon,Company A, on board, laggedbehind with engine trouble. Theremaining three boats reached theseawall at 1733. Sergeant CharlesD. Allen took, his half of the 1stPlatoon over the wall and receivedfire from his north flank and froma hunker directly to his front.Several Marines went down.

To Allen's right, SecondLieutenant Frank Muetzel found abreach in the seawall and broughthis 2d Platoon ashore. Facing themwas a pillbox. Two Marines threwgrenades and six bloody NorthKorean soldiers came out.

Cemetery Hill loomed ahead, hutMuetzel's immediate objective wasAsahi Brewery. He slipped southof Cemetery Hill and marchedunopposed down a street to thebrewery. There was a brief indul-gence in green beer.

Sergeant Allen, with his half-pla-toon, was making no progressagainst the bunker to his front. Thesecond wave landed, bringing inthe 3d Platoon under BaldomeroLopez and the missing half of the1st Platoon. Too many Marineswere now crowded into too smalla space.

Lopez charged forward alone.

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He took out the bunker with agrenade and moved forwardagainst a second bunker, pullingthe pin from another grenade.Before he could throw it, he washit. The grenade dropped by hisside. He smothered the explosionwith his body. This gained him aposthumous Medal of Honor. TwoMarines went against the bunkerwith flamethrowers. They wereshot down but the bunker wastaken.

Captain Stevens's boat landedhim in Company E's zone ofaction. Unable to get to his owncompany, he radioed his executive

Gen Oliver P. Smith Collection, Marine Corps Research CenterAerial photo of Red Beach shows the pounding it took in the Battalions, 5th Marines, landed across this beach immedi-pre-landing naval gunfire and air attacks. The 1st and 2d ately north of the causeway leading to Wolmi-do.

officer, First Lieutenant Fred F.

Eubanks, Jr., to take charge.Stevens then radioed Muetzel toleave the brewery and get back tothe beach where he could helpout.

On the way back, Muetzel founda route up the southern slope ofCemetery Hill and launched anassault. The summit was alive withNorth Koreans, but there was nofight left in them. Dazed and spir-itless from the pounding they hadtaken from the air and sea, theythrew up their hands and surren-dered. Muetzel sent them down tothe base of the hill under guard.

Eubanks' Company E Marinesmeanwhile had bested theobstructing bunker with grenadesand a flamethrower. His 1st and 2dPlatoons pushed through andjoined Muetzel's 2d Platoon. At1755, 25 minutes after H-Hour,Captain Stevens fired an amber

flare, signaling that Cemetery Hillwas secure. It had cost his compa-ny eight Marines killed and 28wounded.

Coming in on the third andfourth waves, Company C, 1stBattalion, was to take the northernhalf of Observatory Mill, andCompany D, 2d Battalion, was totake the southern half. It did notwork out quite that way. Parts ofCompanies C and D were landedon the wrong beaches. CompanyC, once ashore, had to wait 12minutes for its commander,Captain Poul F. Pedersen. InPedersen's boat was the fifth wavecommander who had decided totow a stalled LCVP. Once ashore,Pedersen had trouble sorting outhis company from amongst thejumble of Marines that had gath-ered in the center of the beach.

Maggie Higgins, the Herald-Tribune correspondent, came off

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the Henrico in Wave 5 along withJohn Davies of the Newark DailyNews, Lionel Crane of the LondonDaily Press, and a photographer.As their landing craft hit the sea-wall, the wave commander, FirstLieutenant Richard J. "Spike"Schening, urged on his Marineswith, "Come on you big, braveMarines. Let's get the hell out ofhere."

The photographer decided hehad had enough and that he wouldgo back to the Henrico. Maggieconsidered doing the same, hutthen, juggling her typewriter, she,along with Davies and Crane, fol-lowed Schening over the seawall.

Eight LSTs crossed the line ofdeparture, as scheduled, at 1830and were headed for the seawall.Seeing the congestion on RedBeach, the skippers of the LSTsconcluded that the Marines wereheld up and could not advance.

Magness had taken his 2d Platoon,Company C, reinforced by SecondLieutenant Max A. Merritt's 60mmmortar section, up to the saddlethat divided the crest ofObservatory Hill. Their radios werenot working and they had noflares. They had to inform thebeach of their success by sendingback a runner.

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion'sreserve company—Company Bunder Captain "Ike" Fenton—hadlanded in the 2d Battalion's zone.Lieutenant Colonel Newtonordered Fenton to assumeCompany C's mission and take thenorthern half of Observatory Hill.Six Marines were wounded alongthe way, but by about 2000 Fentonwas at the top and tied in with theMagness-Merritt platoon.

In the right half of the regimen-tal zone of action, Roise was get-ting the congestion on the beachstraightened out. Company D,commanded by First Lieutenant H.J. Smith, had followed Company Eashore, but had landed to the leftin the 1st Battalion zone. Smith(called "Hog Jaw" to make up forhis non-existent first and secondnames) understood that Jaskilka's

The lead LST received some mortarand machine-gun fire and firedback with its own 20mm and40mm guns. Two other LSTs joinedin. Unfortunately, they were spray-ing ground already occupied bythe Marines.

The LST fire showered Muetzel'splatoon, holding the crest ofCemetery Hill. Muetzel pulled backhis platoon. As his Marines sliddown the hill, they came under firefrom a North Korean machine gun

in a building on Observatory Hill.A chance 40mm shell from one ofthe LSTs knocked out the gun.Weapons Company and Head-quarters and Service Company ofRoise's 2d Battalion landed about1830 and came under LST fire thatkilled one Marine and wounded 23others.

By 1900, all eight LSTs hadstopped firing and were nestledagainst the seawall. By thenSecond Lieutenant Byron L.

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Company E was already on thecrest of Observatory Hill. Underthat assumption he started hiscompany in route column up thestreet leading to the top of the hill.An enemy machine gun interrupt-ed his march. After a brisk firefightthat caused several Marine casual-ties, the enemy was driven off andCompany D began to dig in for thenight. A platoon from Company F,the battalion reserve, filled in thegap between Company D and theMagness-Merritt positions. Theonly part of the 0-A line that wasnot now under control was theextreme right flank where the lineended at the inner tidal basin.

Maggie Higgins, after seeing thewar, such as it was, found a boat

Department of Defense Photo (U5MC) A3701

Marines en route to Red Beach go over the side of their assault transport, downthe cargo net hand-over-hand, and into the waiting LCVP a version of theftmous "Higgins boat" of World War II.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A3190

Marines go over the seawall forming the shap edge of Red Baldomero Lopez. Moments later he would give his 4ft andBeach. The Marine on the ladder has been identified as lstLt earn a posthumous Medal of Honor.

on Red Beach that was returning tothe Mount McKinley, where, afterthe personal intercession ofAdmiral Doyle, she was allowed tostay for the night. She slept on astretcher in the sick bay. Next day,Admiral Doyle specified that in thefuture women would be allowedon board only between the hoursof nine in the morning and nine atnight. (About a month later,Maggie's transportation orderswere modified. She would still beallowed on board any Navy shipbut would have to he chaperonedby a female nurse.)

Murray, the regimental comman-

der, came ashore at about 1830and set up his command post atthe end of the causeway that ledfrom the mainland to Wolmi-do.Roise wished to stay where he wasfor the night, but Murray orderedhim to reach the tidal basin.Company F, under Captain Uel D.Peters, faced around in the darkand plunged forward. Shortly aftermidnight, Roise reported that hishalf of the 0-A line was complete.

Assaulting Blue Beach

The confusion was greater onBlue Beach than on Red Beach.

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Amphibian tractors, rather thanlanding craft, were used for theassault. The seawall was in disre-pair with numerous breaks upwhich it was presumed theamphibian tractors could crawl.The 18 Army armored amphibians(LVT[AlIs) forming the first wavecrossed the line of departure at1645 and headed toward Inchon.At four knots they needed three-quarters of an hour to hit thebeach at H-Hour.

The soldiers had the compassesand seamanship to pierce thesmoke and reached the beach ontime. The second and following

First Lieutenant Baldomero Lopez

Baldomero Lopez was always eager. During WorldWar II, he was 17 when he enlisted in the Navy inJuly 1943. Most thought him a Mexican American,

but his father, also named Baldomero, as a young manhad come to Tampa from the Asturias region of Spain.Los Asturianos, the men of Asturias, are known for theirvalor and honor.

He was appointed from the fleet to the NavalAcademy in July 1944. His class, 1948A, was hurriedthrough in three years. Lucky Bag, his class book, calledbin-i "one of the biggest hearted, best natured fellows inthe brigade." Otherwise he does not seem to have beenexceptional. His nickname at the Academy was "Lobo."This changed to "Punchy" after he came into the MarineCorps in June 1947, because it was generally believedthat he had boxed while at Annapolis. After Basic Schoolhe stayed on at Quantico as a platoon commander in thePlatoon Leaders Class. In 1948, he went to North Chinaas part of a Marine presence that was in its last days. Heserved first as a mortar section leader and then as a rifleplatoon commander at Tsingtao and Shanghai.

When the Marines closed out in China, he came backto Camp Pendleton. In the early summer of 1950, whenthe formation of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigadestripped the 1st Marine Division diy, he asked to beincluded but was left behind. He went out, however, toKorea in the draft that was sent to Pusan to fill the 5thMarines to war strength before embarking for Inchon. Hewas given the 3d Platoon, Company A, 1st Battalion.

Secretary of the Navy Dan Kimball presented theposthumous Medal of Honor to his father and mother atceremonies in Washington on 30 August 1951.Citation:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at therisk of his life above and beyond the call of duty asa Rifle Platoon Commander of Company A, FirstBattalion, Fifth Marines, First Marine Division(Reinforced), in action against enemy aggressorforces during the Inchon invasion in Korea on 15September 1950. With his platoon, First LieutenantLopez was engaged in the reduction of immediateenemy beach defenses after landing with theassault waves. Exposing himself to hostile fire, hemoved forward alongside a bunker and preparedto throw a hand grenade into the next pilibox

Department of Defense Photo (UsMc) A43985

whose fire was pinning down that sector of thebeach. Taken under fire by an enemy automaticweapon and hit in the right shoulder and chest ashe lifted his arm to throw, he fell backward anddropped the deadly missile. After a moment, heturned and dragged his body forward in an effortto retrieve the grenade and throw it. In critical con-dition from pain and loss of blood, and unable tograsp the hand grenade firmly enough to hurl it, hechose to sacrifice himself rather than endanger thelives of his men and, with a sweeping motion of hiswounded right arm, cradled the grenade under himand absorbed the full impact of the explosion. Hisexceptional courage, fortitude and devotion to dutyreflect the highest credit upon First LieutenantLopez and the United States Naval Service. He gal-lantly gave his life for his country.

any view of the beach. From thebridge of his ship, the Blue Beachcontrol officer watched the firsttwo or three waves disappear intothe smoke. He requested permis-

what was happening to them.Permission was denied.

As Major Edwin H. Simmons,the commander of WeaponsCompany, 3d Battalion, 1st

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We had been told that awave guide would pick us upand lead us to the line ofdeparture . . . . Two LCVPsdid come alongside our wave.

waves did not do so well. Rain and sion to stop sending any further Marines, remembered it:smoke had completely blotted out waves ashore until he could see

The first was filled with pho-tographers. The second wasloaded with Korean inter-preters. Two of these werehastily dumped into my LVT,apparently under the mistak-en notion that I was a battal-ion commander. Both inter-preters spoke Korean andJapanese; neither spokeEnglish. Time was passing,and we were feeling faintlydesperate when we camealongside the central controlvessel. I asked the bridge forinstructions. A naval officerwith a bullhorn pointed outthe direction of Blue Two, hutnothing could be seen in that

Marines setup a temporary barricade on the causeway to position a 3.5-inch rocket launcher and a machine gun justInchon, after mopping up and consolidating their positions in case. The 3.5-inch rocket launcher proved itself adequateon Wolmi-do. Although not expecting a counterattack, they against the vaunted T-34 tank.

National Archives Photo (USMC) I 27-N-A2747

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A2816

A key objective for the 5th Marines was the 200-foot-high Observatory Hill. Boththe 1st and 2d Battalions converged on the hill with Marines from Company Btaking the weather station on its top.

direction except mustard-col-ored haze and black smoke.We were on our way whenour path crossed that of

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Amphibian tractors (LVTs) churn away from the landingships fLSTs) that brought them to Inchon. "Amtracks" were

Department of Defense Photo (USMC)

used chiefly for the assault of Blue Beach within the innerharbor.

another wave. I asked if theywere headed for Blue Two.Their wave commanderanswered, "Hell, no. We'rethe 2d Battalion headed forBlue One." We then veeredoff to the right. I broke outmy map and asked my LVTdriver if he had a compass.He looked at his instrumentpanel and said, "Search me.Six weeks ago I was driving atruck in San Francisco."

The nine Army LVT(A)s makingup the first wave for Blue BeachOne got ashore on schedule, butfound themselves boxed in by anearth slide that blocked the exitroad. The remaining nine Armyarmored amphibian tractors, form-ing Wave 1 for Blue Beach Two,made it to the seawall shortly afterH-Hour but were less successful ingetting ashore. The "road" separat-ing Blue One and Two turned outto be a muck-filled drainage ditch.After exchanging fire with scat-tered defenders in factory build-ings behind the seawall, the Army

vehicles backed off and milledaround, getting intermixed withthe incoming troop-carrying Waves2 and 3.

From his seat on the bridge ofthe Mount McKinley, MacArthur,surrounded by his gaggle of gener-als and admirals, peered throughthe gathering gloom of smoke,rain, and darkness and listened tothe reports crackling over the loud-speaker. From his perspective, allseemed to be going well.

Lieutenant Colonel Sutter's sec-ond wave landed elements of bothhis two assault companies,Company D, under Captain WelbyW. Cronk, and Company F, underCaptain Goodwin C. Groff, acrossBlue Beach One shortly after H-Hour. Some of his amphibian trac-tors hung up on a mud bank about300 yards offshore and their occu-pants had to wade the rest of theway. Most of Sutter's last threewaves, bringing in his reserve,Company E, drifted to the right. AsSutter reported it: "For someunknown reason the third, fourth,and fifth waves were diverted from

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landing either on Beach BLUE-i oralong the rock causeway by a con-trol boat. Instead they were direct-ed to the right of the two beachesprescribed for the regiment andlanded at Beach BLUE-3."

Wave 2 for Blue Beach Two,with Ridge's assault companies,passed through the Army tractors,Company G under Captain GeorgeC. Westover on the left, Company Iunder First Lieutenant Joseph R."Bull" Fisher on the right. Theyreached the seawall about 10 min-utes after H-Hour. The tractorsbearing Company G formed up incolumn and muddled their way upthe drainage ditch. Company I

went over the seawall using alu-minum ladders, some of whichbuckled. Assault engineers fromCaptain Lester G. Harmon'sCompany C, 1st EngineerBattalion, reached the wall andrigged cargo nets to help the laterwaves climb ashore.

Ridge, the 3d Battalion comman-der, accompanied by his executiveoffice, Major Reginald R. Myers,seeing the congestion on Blue

Beach Two, moved in his free boatto explore the possibilities of BlueBeach Three. He found a mudramp broken through the seawalland some of his battalion wasdiverted to this landing point. Anenemy machine gun in a towerabout 500 yards inland caused afew casualties before it wasknocked out by fire from theArmy's armored tractors.

More serious problems confront-ed Lieutenant Colonel JackHawkins' 1st Battalion, which wasin regimental reserve. Boated inLCVP landing craft, he was orderedby Puller, who was already ashore,to land his battalion. If things hadgone well Hawkins should havebeached at about H+45 minutes or1815. Veering off far to the left inthe gloom, his leading waves mis-took the wall of the tidal basin forthe seawall of Blue Beach Two.

boated and sent on to Blue BeachTwo. Because of a shortage ofboats, however, one platoon wasleft behind. Marching overland toBlue Beach Two this orphan pla-toon gilded the lily by picking upa bag of prisoners enroute.

The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines'reserve—Company H underCaptain Clarence E. Corley, Jr.—landed across Blue Beaches Twoand Three. The 1st Platoon, led byFirst Lieutenant William Swanson,had the mission of securing theright flank of the bridgehead.Swanson slid his platoon behindCompany I and moved against aplatoon-sized enemy dug in onHill 94, which topped the fish-hook cape bounding the beach-

114

head on the south. The NorthKoreans were driven out, but at acost. Swanson himself was severe-ly wounded in the thigh and evac-uated. (Swanson returned to the 3dBattalion in late winter 1951, waswounded in the hand at the end ofMarch, and killed by one of ourown mines on 15 May 1951.)

Corley's Company H, less its 1stPlatoon, moved into the gapbetween Companies G and I. The2d Platoon, Company H, was sentforward at midnight to outpost Hill233, a mile to the front, gothalfway there, to Hill 180, andreceived permission to stay put forthe night.

Generals Almond and Shepherdcame in with the ninth wave, alongwith Admiral Struble, for a look-see at how events were progress-ing on Blue Beach. Almond's aide,Lieutenant Haig, had come in to

Most of Company B and some ofCompany A had landed beforeHawkins could correct the error.Most of those who landed were re-