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1

M/s. SRF Limited

Vaibhu Safety Consultants Risk Assessment Study July -2015

M/s. SRF LIMITED PLOT NO. D-2/1 , G.I.D.C. Phase II,

PCPIR, Dahej, Taluka : Vagra,

District: Bharuch 392130,

Gujarat

RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY (Manufacturing of Fluorochemicals and Specialty Chemicals)

July-2015

PREPARED BY

VAIBHU SAFETY CONSULTANTS FF 10-11, Akshat Complex,

Nr. Reliance petrol pump,

High Tension Road, Subhanpura,

Vadodara-390023

Phone: 9825756467 / 8980004562(M)/ 0265-2395798(O)

Email: [email protected]

[email protected]

Web site: www.vaibhusafety.com

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

http://www.vaibhusafety.com/

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M/s. SRF Limited


INDEX

SECTION NO.

PARTICULAR

PAGE NO.

SUB

SECTION

1 Executive Summary

4

2 Objectives, Philosophy and methodology of Risk assessment

6

3 Introduction of the unit

8

3.1 Company Introduction 8

3.2 Details of Unit 10

3.3 Project setting 14

3.4 Organizational setup 19

3.5 List Of product 19

3.6 List of Raw material 23

3.7 Details Of Storage Of Hazardous Materials In Bulk & Control

Measures

29

3.8 Hazardous Material Storage and Handling Safety 31

3.8.1 For Above ground storage tank farm and PESO licensed

premises

31

3.8.2 For SMPV licenced premises.( n-Butane, Ethane and Ehtylene) 32

3.8.3 For Hydrogen cylinders

32

3.8.4 For Anhydrous Ammonia cylinders 33

3.8.5 Bromine Storage & Handling Safety

33

3.8.6 Hydrofluoric acid (AHF) 37

3.8.7 Safety Measures for AHCL gas cylinder 38

3.8.8 Safety Measures for Oleum storage tank area 38

3.8.9 For Drum Storage area 38

3.8.10 For Acid and Alkali storage area (Sulfuric Acid and Hydrochloric

Acid )

39

3.8.11 Process Safety 39

3.9 Transportation, Loading and handling procedure for hazardous

chemicals

40

3.9.1 For Flammable chemicals 40

3.9.2 Bromine Transportation, Unloading and handling Procedure 42

3.9.3 Transportation , Unloading and handling procedure for Oleum 46

3.9.4 Drums Transportation , Unloading and handling procedure 48

3.10 HAZARDOUS PROPERTIES OF THE CHEMICALS,

COMPATIBILITIES AND SPECIAL HAZARD

51

3.11 Occupational health impact on employees, control measures,

action plan if accident occur

65

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M/s. SRF Limited


3.12 Brief Description Of Process. 80

3.13 Existing Fire Prevention & Protection System 81

3.13.1 Fire Fighting System (Fire Hydrant System ) 81

3.13.2 Emergency Mitigation Measures And Emergency Control

Facilities

89

4 Hazard identification

90

4.1 Introduction 90

4.2 DOW’s Fire and Explosion Index 91

4.3 Identification of Hazardous area 91

4.4 Failure Frequency

92

5 Risk Assessment

94

5.1 Effects of Release of Hazardous Substances 94

5.2 Tank on Fire / Pool Fire 94

5.3 Fire ball/BLEVE 95

5.4 UVCE 95

5.5 Dispersion Cases 95

5.5.1 Plumes 95

5.5.2 Puffs 95

5.5.3 Spill Pool 95

5.6 Identification of High Risk Areas 95

5.7 Modes of Failure 95

58 Damage Criteria for heat radiation

96

6 6.0 Consequence Analysis

98

6.1 Consequence Analysis 98

6.1.1 Maximum Credible loss scenarios (MCLS) 98

Scenarios 1 to 41 100-183

6.2 Detail regarding consequences analysis table 184

6.3 Conclusions 187

7 Risk Reduction Measures

188

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M/s. SRF Limited


SECTION I

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Executive Summary

M/s. SRF Limited intends to Manufacturing of Fluorochemicals and Specialty Chemicals which is

set-up at PLOT NO. D-2/1 , G.I.D.C. Phase II, PCPIR, Dahej, Taluka : Vagra, District: Bharuch

392130, Gujarat

1.1 Experts from our organization visited the site on 20.07.2015 and subsequently inspection of

site as per site plan and the environs along with collection of relevant information about the

proposed installation and the operations of the plant. Also a detailed discussion was held on

various aspects including storage facilities, process safety and emergency preparedness with

the officers of the company.

1.2 Petroleum product like Toluene, Ethanol, Methanol etc. solvents are received through road

tanker and stored in PESO approved above ground storage tank farm area as per Petroleum

Act and Rules. All safety measures are provided at design level and foolproof safety features

are adopted.

1.3 Anhydrous Hydrofluoro Acid(AHF) stored in dedicated tank farm area. All safety measures

are adopted at design level and constructed as per PESO requirements.

1.4 Hydrogen and Ammonia cylinder storage area will be constructed at separate locations and

all safety measures to be adopted as per Gas cylinders rules and all preventive and protection

system to installed for safety.

1.5 Bromine storage tank will be installed away from the existing process and storage area. All

safety measures are to be provided at design level and foolproof safety measures are to be

adopted.

1.6 N-Butane, Ethane and ethylene tank farm area away from the other tank farm area and safe

distances maintained as per SMPV rule and PESO requirements.

1.7 Some flammable/combustible/ Toxic liquid/solid chemicals will be received in drums or

bags or in carboys and it will be stored in drum storage area and in RM store as per its

incompatibility and other properties like flammable, toxic, corrosive and reactive.

1.8 Based on the data furnished and the study of the installation, certain hazards have been

identified and their consequences are modeled mathematically using HAMSGAP software.

Mapping of various scenario are with hazardous distances and safe distances are drawn on

site plan for easy understanding of the consequences of the accident/ incident.

The study indicates that possible hazards associated with the plant are confined to (a)

Petroleum product PESO licence premises.(b) Liqufied petroleum storage (SMPV) PESO

area.(c) Non petroleum product but highly flammable class A chemical storage tank farm

area.(d) Hydrogen gas cylinder storage area. (e) Ammonia gas cylinder storage area.(f)

Bromine storage tank area (g) AHF tank farm area (h) AHCL cylinder storage (e) Oleum and

Sulfuric acid storage tank farm area. (f) Drums storage area ( Warehouse). Various hazardous

scenarios have been identified for Risk Assessment and the consequences modeled.

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M/s. SRF Limited


1.9 The results of the analysis have been summarized in the table appended.

1.10 It is observed from the summary that the consequences of hazards associated with any

possible spills / leaks for catastrophic failure of storage tanks, road tanker release scenarios

would be of large in nature and would be taken care of with the proposed emergency

facilities and manpower employed.

1.11 The possibility of occurrence of such hazards and their effects could be further reduced by

implementing the suggestions made in this report.

1.12 Catastrophic failure of storage tanks, road tanker, resulting in major disaster due to fire and

explosion and toxic releas due to AHF, Bromine, AHCL, Ammonia are very unlikely events

barring gross neglect of time tested safety standards and procedures set up by the industry.

1.13 The possibility of occurrence of major disaster due to fire, explosion and toxic release and

mishaps are considered very remote.

1.14 However considering the potential for major hazards, however remote they may be,

associated with storage area, some suggestions are made in the subsequent chapters for

further improvement in the areas of safety, environmental impact, Emergency facilities and

emergency preparedness plan.

1.15 Conclusion Based on the

1) Risk Analysis study and information regarding the layout plan and safety systems.

2) Discussions with company officials,

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M/s. SRF Limited


SECTION II

OBJECTIVE, PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY OF RISK ASSESSMENT

2.1 Objective :

The main objectives of the Risk Assessment (RA) study is to determine damage due to major

hazards having damage potential to life & property and provide a scientific basis to assess

safety level of the facility.

The principle objective of this study was to identify major risks in the manufacture of

specialty fine chemicals and storage of hazardous chemical at site and to evaluate on-site &

off-site consequences of identified hazard scenarios. Pointers are then given for effective

mitigation of hazards in terms of suggestions for effective disaster management, suggesting

minimum preventive and protective measures & change of practices to ensure safety.

2.2 PHILOSOPHY :

This report is limited to the following:-

Identification of major risk areas.

Hazard identification/Identification of failure cases

Consequential analysis of probable risks / failure cases

Evaluation of heat radiation & pressure wave profiles for identified failure cases

Risk assessment on the basic of the above evaluation & risk acceptability

Minimum preventive & protective measures to be taken to minimize risks to maximum

possible extent.

Giving pointers for effective disaster management

Suggesting other measures to further lower the probability of risk

2.3 Methodology

The procedure used for carrying out the Quantitative Risk Assessment Study is outlined

below:-

Identify Credible Loss Scenarios for the facility under the study by discussion with M/s. SRF

Limited Simulate loss Scenarios to determine the vulnerable zones for toxic dispersion, pool

fire, Tank on fire (Thermal Radiation ), Flash fire, Explosion over pressure (Vapour cloud

Explosion, Ball fire using software packages HAMSGAP.

Suggest mitigating measures to reduce the damage, considering all aspects of the facilities.

The flowchart of the methodology for the present study is shown in following page.

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M/s. SRF Limited


RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY METHODOLOGY FLOWCHART

START

FACILITY, PROCESS AND METEOROLOGICAL DATA COLLECTION

LISTING OUT OF HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS & STORAGE DETAILS

DEFINING OF PARAMETERS FOR EACH OF CHEMICALS & EACH OF HAZARDS

IDENTIFICATION OF FAILURE SCENARIOS & QUANTIFICATION OF PROBABLE HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH THEM

DEFINING RELEASE TYPE (CONTINUOUS OR INSTANTANIOUS ) & DETERMINE RELEASE RATES

SIMULATION OF SELECTED CASES FOR CONSEQUENCE MODELING

PREPARATION OF SUMMERY OF CONSEQUENCE RESULTS

EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL RISK TO THE SURROUNDING POPULATION

DISCUSSION & RECOMMENDATION OF MITIGATIVE / REMEDIAL MEASURES

END

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M/s. SRF Limited


SECTION III

INTRODUCTION OF THE UNIT

3.1 COMPANY INTRODUCTION:-

M/s. SRF Limited intends to Manufacturing of Fluorochemicals and Specialty Chemicals

which is set-up at PLOT NO. D-2/1 , G.I.D.C. Phase II, PCPIR, Dahej, Taluka : Vagra, District:

Bharuch 392130, Gujarat.

The plant of SRF Ltd. was commissioned in 2012 at Dahej, Gujarat and at present the major

products being produced are Tricholoethylene, Perchloroethylene, Anhydrous Hydrofluoric

Acid( AHF), 1,1,1,2 Tetrafluroethane (HFC 134a) and Captive Power.

SRF began as Shri Ram Fibres in 1970 when its parent company DCM decided to set up a

separate entity to manufacture nylon tyre cord fibres. Its formation was a result of the

foresight that nylon was the future material for tyre cord fibres. The company established its

first plant in Manali near Chennai in 1973. With an initial annual capacity of 2000 tonnes of

nylon cords, the plant started operations in 1974. Shri Ram Fibres thus became one of the

first companies in India to start manufacturing nylon tyre cords. Over the years, the company

expanded its product line in technical textiles and also diversified into other businesses like

Chemicals, Packaging Films and Engineering Plastics. The company was no longer

manufacturing fibres alone, a fact that necessitated the change in the name of the company.

Shri Ram Fibres thus became SRF Ltd. in 1990. SRF Ltd. is a multi-business entity engaged in

the manufacture of chemical based industrial intermediates. Its business portfolio covers

Technical Textiles, Fluorochemicals, Specialty Chemicals, Packaging Films and Engineering

Plastics. As a manufacturer of a wide range of products that make people'sdaily lives safer

and more comfortable, SRF Ltd. claims to touch everyone's life every day in more ways than

one.

With headquarters in Gurgaon, India, the 5500-strong global workforce company has

operations in two more countries, Thailand and South Africa. SRF Ltd. is the market leaders

in most of its businesses in India and also enjoys significant global presence in some of its

businesses, the company exports its products to over 60 countries.

The company, equipped with state-of-the-art R&D facilities, boasts of its Chemical

Technology Group that is actively involved in process innovations and product development.

A winner of the prestigious Deming Prize for two of its businesses, tyre cord business in 2004

and Chemicals Business in 2012, SRF Ltd. adopts TQM as a management way.

The company through its social wing, SRF Ltd. Foundation, remains committed to continue to

contribute towards the cause of education, vocational skills, health, natural resource

management and affirmative actions.

SRF Ltd. boasts of a lineage which is a century old. The company remains committed to

creating wealth for its stakeholders in business while holding fast to the rigid standards of

ethics and morality of its founders. The company continues to cherish and defend the values

of serving the needs of its community.

SRF Ltd. is also keeping the traditions of its founders alive through promoting arts, culture,

music and sports. Building on the legacy of its founding group that established some of the

premiere academic institutes of the country, SRF Ltd. continues to strive to advocate the

cause of quality education in India.

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M/s. SRF Limited


With our state-of-the-art R&D facilities and an ingenious team of scientists and technologists

we are making tomorrow happen today. We at SRF Ltd., make efforts to develop products,

which not only meets the specifications, but also are economical and ecological.

Committed to provide cutting-edge solutions to its customers, most of businesses of SRF Ltd.

today boast their own dedicated R&D centre.

The Chemicals Technology Group (CTG), created specifically to focus on developing new

processes and technologies for specialty chemicals, has been the silent performer behind the

success of Fluorochemicals and Specialty Chemicals Business of SRF Ltd. The team of

scientists working in the Chemicals Technology Group continues to develop products to cater

needs of agrochemical, pharmaceuticals and other niche customers through two R&D centres,

one at Bhiwadi in Rajasthan and the second one at Manali near Chennai in Tamil Nadu.

Equipped with state-of- the-art facilities, the R&D centres under CTG, employ the best of

talent from some of the most reputed educational institutions in the country. The R&D teams

work on synthesis of new halogenated organic compounds as well as development of

analytical methods for them. The R&D labs are equipped with cutting edge in-process and

product testing facilities like LC, LC/MS, GC,GC/MS, FT-IR, Spectrophotometer etc.

SRF Ltd. provides an integrated service from research (process development) to kilo scale

synthesis to commercial scale supply, supported by its in-house process development and

engineering expertise. SRF Ltd. has a rich experience and successful track record of

development & commercialization of various complex organic molecules, while maintaining

high standards of EHS. At SRF Ltd., the focus is on providing highest value to its customers,

while supporting them throughout the life cycle of their products with a high level of

professionalism, ensuring confidentiality and transparency to them.

At its new site at Dahej, a couple of projects have already been commercialized and more are

in pipeline, based on in-house technologies. Captive power plant has also been setup to

cater to the current requirement of the Power & Steam.

The manufacturing operations of SRF’s Fluorochemicals Business & Specialty Chemicals Business are located at two locations: Dahej in Gujarat & Bhiwadi in Rajasthan. The business

derives its revenue from the sale of Specialty Chemicals & Fluorochemicals Products.

In the Specialty chemicals segment, further strategic tie-ups with global agro and pharma

majors have been established. New products have been introduced and fructification of

others is in the pipeline.

Refrigerants are primarily used as a cooling medium in the air conditioning and refrigeration

industry. SRF Ltd. continues to be one of the larger and more credible players in the industry

globally. It is the domestic market leader with about 50 percent share. Exports of the

business are spread across 60 countries worldwide, and account for over 60 percent of the volumes produced. SRF’s portfolio of refrigerants includes hydrochlorofluorocarbon-22

(HCFC-22), the new-generation refrigerant, hydrofluorocarbon-134a (HFC-134a), and the

refrigerant blend R410a. The company continues to invest in further capacities of HFC-134a

keeping in view the medium and long-term growth of India’s automobile industry, as well as in the rest of the developing world.

Currently, in line with long-term strategy, SRF Ltd. has contemplated expansion of Specialty

Chemicals & Fluorochemicals manufacturing plant at Plot No. D-2/1, Village: Suva, GIDC-

Phase II, Dahej, Taluka: Vagra, District: Bharuch (Gujarat).

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M/s. SRF Limited


22. Explosive License

Sr.

No.

Name License Number Valid Up to Chemical

Name

No's tank

/cylinder

/jugs/can

Qty of

Chemical

/Gas

Storage

1. Ammonia cylinder

storage shed

G/WC/GJ/06/17

85 (G31700)

30.09.2022 Ammonia _ 44

Cylinders

2. Anhydrous HCl

cylinder storage

shed

G/WC/GJ/06/17

85 (G31700)

30.09.2022 Anhydrous

HCl

_ 96

Cylinders

3. Petroleum Class -

A storage shed

(Barrels)

P/WC/GJ/16/43

3(P311879)

31.12.2023 Petroleum

Class A

(Barrel)

_ 18 KL

4. R -22 & HFP

storage tank farm

S/HO/GJ/03/13

78(S50692)

31.03.2017 R-22 2 Nos. (65 M3

each)

140544

Kg

HFP 1No. (65 M3

each)

67925 Kg

5. Petroleum Class -

A & B storage tank

farm

P/HQ/GJ/15/52

08 (P269396)

31.12.2015 Class-A:

Toluene,

Methanol,

Ethanol,

Acetone,

Hexane

7 Nos. (35 KL

each)

210 KL

Class-B:

Xylene

35 KL

6. Liquid Nitrogen

storage tank farm

S/HO/GJ/03/13

53 (S49959)

31.03.2017 Liquid

Nitrogen

02 Nos. (01

tank19.411

M3) (02 tank

52.961M3)

01 tank-

13976 Kg

02-38132

Kg

7. Chlorine Tonner

shed

G/HO/GJ/06/69

8 (G29142)

30.09.2022 Chlorine _ 168

Cylinders

8. Chlorine Bulk

storage

S/HO/GJ/03/13

84 (S47422)

31.03.2018 Chlorine 3Nos.

(132 M3

each)

02 operation

01 standby)

300960

Kg

9. Petroleum class B

& C storage

S/HO/GJ/15/52

00 (P27033)

31.12.2024 Class-

B,HSD

1 No. 50 KL

Class-C,FO 1 No. 150 KL

10. AHF Tank Farm

storage.

S/HO/GJ/03/15

10(S55654)

31.03.2016 AHF 6 Nos.

(87974 M3

each)

526044

Kg

11. R134a Storage

tank farm

G/HO/GJ/05/75

2&06/742

(G35688)

31.03.2016 HFC 134 a 3 Nos.

(110.51 M3

each)

289758

Kg

12. HFC 134 a filling

shed & storage

G/HO/GJ/05/75

2 (G35688)

G/HO/GJ/06/74

30.09.2021 HFC 134 a

Storage 1.

Cylinder

1.(5 Kg & 10

Kg) 2. (62 Kg

/ 61 Kg)

1.:- 3600

2.:- 1000

3:- 21000

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M/s. SRF Limited


2 (G35688) R-

134a/R22

2. Cylinder

R-

134a/R22

3.R-134a /

R-22 4. R-

134a & R-

22 :-

345000

Nos 5.CAN

R-134a

3.DOT.39

JUGS :-

4.Tonner

(825 Kg) 5.

CAN (340 /

450 Gm)

4.:-100

5:-

345000

HFC 134 a

Filling

1. R-

134a/R22

2. R-

134a/R22

3. R-134a

/ R-22

4. R-134a

& R-22

:-02 Nos

5. R-134a

(340 / 450

Gm)

1.Cylinder (5

Kg & 10 Kg)

2.Cylinder

(62 Kg/61

Kg)

3.DOT.39

JUGS

4.Tonner

5.CAN

1.:-02 Nos

2.:-02 Nos

3.:-08 Nos

4.:-825

Kg

5. :-02

Nos

13. Hydrogen Storage G/WC/GJ/06/19

84 (G39948)

23.09.2024 Hydrogen 50

Cylinders.

3.3 PROJECT PROPOSAL SETTING:

M/s. SRF Ltd. has proposed for expansion of existing Specialty Chemicals & Fluorochemicals

manufacturing Plant (1, 75,000 MTPA to 22, 08, 600 MTPA) and Captive Power Plant (25 MW

to 75 MW) at Plot No. D-2/1, Village: Suva, GIDC-Phase II, Dahej, Taluka: Vagra, District:

Bharuch (Gujarat).The existing, proposed expansion and the total plant production capacities

after the proposed expansion are given in Figure: 1.1.

Latitude ° ’ . N to ° ’ . N

Longitude ° ’ . E to ° ’ . E

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M/s. SRF Limited


Figure 1.3

Site Plan.

18

M/s. SRF Limited


Figure 1.4

Fire Hydrant Network.

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M/s. SRF Limited


3.4 OHC ORGANIZATIONAL SET UP

3.5 LIST OF PRODUCTS

The proposed expansion project has 80 products and 52 co-products. The quantity of each

existing and proposed products and co-products has been given in Table: 3.2.

TABLE NO: 3.2

Product list

Sr.

No.

Name of Product Existing Capacity

(MT/Annum)

Proposed Capacity

(MT/Annum)

1. Trifluro Acetic Acid - 2000

2. Parabromofluorobenzene - 500

3. Tetrafluorobenzyl Alcohol 10000 100

4. Ethyldifluoroacetate 4000

5. Ethyltrifluoroacetate 1000

6. Ethyltrifluoroacetoacetate 1000

7. Amino crotonate 1000

8. Trifluoroacetic anhydride 500

9. Pentafluorobenzoic Acid 500

10. Pyrazole Acid 2000

11. Chloro Trichloro Methyl-

Cyclopentene

2000

12. 2-methyl-4- (1,1,1,2,3,3,3-heptafluoro-

2-propyl aniline)

1000

20

M/s. SRF Limited


Sr.

No.


(MT/Annum)

Proposed Capacity

(MT/Annum)

13. Fluoromethyl ester 1000

14. Diphenylphenol 1000

15. Tetrafluoropropane- 1234yf 10000

16. 1,1,2,2- Tetrafluoroethyl Methyl Ether - 4000

17. Hexafluropropylene - 1000

18. Ethyl Difluoroacetoacetate - 1000

19. Difluoromethanesulphonylchloride - 1000

20. Triflic Acid - 1000

21. Trifluoromethanesulfonic Anhydride - 1000

22. Trimethylsilyl

trifluoromethanesulfonate

- 1000

23. 3-Trifluoromethylacetophenone - 1000

24. 2,6-dichloro-4-(trifluoromethyl)

aniline

- 1000

25. Cyanapyrazole - 2000

26. Trifluoromethylbenzamide - 2000

27. Trifluoroacetyl chloride - 1000

28. Sulphur Tetrafluoride - 500

29. 2- Trifluoromethyl benzochloride - 1000

30. Trifluoromethyl-2-EthoxyVinyl Ketone - 1000

31. 2-(2-Methoxy-ethoxymethyl)-6-

Trifluoromethyl-nicotinic acid ethyl

ester

- 2000

32. Mefenamic Acid - 1000

33. Hexafluoropropylene oxide - 500

34. Pentafluorophenol - 500

35. Monomethylhydrazine - 4000

36. [3-(4,5-dihydro-1,2-oxazol-3-yl)-4-

mesyl-o-toly](5-hydroxy-1-

methylpyrazol-4-yl) methanone

- 500

37. Tri Fluro acetone - 500

38. Methyl tri fluoro acetate - 500

39. Chlorodifluoroacetic Anhydride - 100

40. Bromopentafluorobenzene - 500

41. 4-Chlorobenzotrichloride - 600

42. 4-Chlorobenzotrifluoride - 600

43. Methyl hydroxy Pyrazole - 100

44. 6-Fluoro methyl indole - 100

45. Difluoroethoxy ethanol - 20

46. 5-Bromo-2-2-difluoro-1-3-

benzodioxide

- 1000

47. Difluorobenzodixole methyl ester - 20

21

M/s. SRF Limited


Sr.

No.


(MT/Annum)

Proposed Capacity

(MT/Annum)

48. 2-Fluoro-5-nitrobenzoic acid - 30

49. 5-Chloro-3-(difluoromethyl)-1-

methyl-1H-pyrazole-4-

carboxaldehyde

- 500

50. 3-Difluoromethyl-5-fluoro-1-methyl-

1H-pyrazole-4-carboxaldehyde

- 500

51. 2,5-Dichloro-4-(1,1,2,3,3,3

hexafluoroprppoxy) benzenamine

- 500

52. 2,4,5-Trifluorophenyl acetic acid - 50

53. 3-Aminobenzotrifluoride - 1000

54. 2,4-Dichloro-3,5-

dinitrobenzotrifluoride

- 1000

55. 3-phenoxy benzaldehyde - 4000

56. 3-phenoxy toluene - 200

57. Methyl-2-Fluoroacrylate - 400

58. Lithium tetrakis (pentafluorophenyl)

borate

- 100

59. 2-fluoro-5bromobenzonitrile - 50

60. Ethyl-Trifluoropyruvaqte - 200

61. Isoflurane - 250

62. Desflurane - 100

63. Sevoflurane - 200

64. Trichloroacetyl chloride - 2000

65. Trichloroethylene 80000 62727

66. Perchloroehtylene 27273

67. Caustic Chlorine 60000 80000

68. Anhydrous Hydrofluoric acid 15000 40000

69. Chlorotrifluoroethane (HCFC 133a) - 500

70. 1,1,1,2 Tetrafluoroethane (HFC 134a) 10000 20000

71. Pentafluoroethane (HFC 125) - 20000

72. Difluoromethane (HFC32) - 20000

73. R600a (ISO Butane) - 1000

74. R290 (Propane) - 1000

75. R410a - 500

76. R404a - 500

77. R407c - 500

78. Blend of R152a + R134a - 500

79. Blend of R142b + R22 - 500

80. Blend of R134a + DME (Di Methyl

Ether)

- 500

22

M/s. SRF Limited


TABLE NO:-3.3

CO-PRODUCT

Sr. No. Name of Co-Product Proposed

Capacity(MT/Annum) 1. 2-methyl-4-(1,1,1,2,3,3,3-heptafluro-2-propyl aniline &

Toluene

1250

2. Acetone, Trimethylorthoformate, Ethyl acetate & Acetic

anhydride

9782

3. Aluminium trifluoride 1000

4. AmmoniumSolution (10-15%) 6871

5. Ammonium Chloride 5811

6. Bromopentaflurobenzene 17

7. Calcium Chloride 176

8. Calcium Fluoride 8479

9. Caustic Iye/Flakes 260116

10. Copper chloride 52

11. Dicyclopentadyene &Chlorobenzene 436

12. Diethylether & Toluene 295

13. Dimethylformamide 810

14. Ethane 205

15. Ethanol 684

16. Ethyl acetate & Ethanol 3963

17. Ethyldifluroacetate & Methyldifluroacetate 76

18. Ethyldifluroacetate & Polydifluroacetate 4

19. Gypsum 162400

20. hydrochloric acid Anhyudrous 1500

21. hydrochloric acid (15-30%) 933681

22. Hydrofluoric acid (20-60%) 34641

23. Hydrofluorosilic acid (15-40%) 24000

24. Hydrogen 2240

25. Hydrogen bromide Solution (40-50%) 5691

26. Methyl isobutyl Ketone & Mix Xylene 938

27. Methylene chloride 59390

28. Mix Xylene , Triethylorthoformate, Ethyl acetate &Acetic

anhydride

6519

29. n-Butane 4981

30. Ethyl acetate, Methylene Chloride, Hexane &Toluene 6630

31. Phosphoric acid (25-75%) 2421

32. Phosphorus trichloride 1837

33. Potassium carbonate 30

34. Potassium fluoride & Potassium bromide 2039

35. Potassium fluoride & Potassium chloride 1704

36. Potassium fluoride & Potassium sulphate 1288

37. R & D Based Products 2000

38. R 290 (Propane) 688

23

M/s. SRF Limited


Sr. No. Name of Co-Product Proposed

Capacity(MT/Annum) 39. R 600a (Isobutane) 1453

40. Sodium bromide 30

41. Sodium chloride 4270

42. Sodium fluoride 47

43. Sodium hydroxide, Barium hydroxide & Barium chloride 40

44. Sodium hypo chlorite 149516

45. Sodium methoxide Solution 120

46. Sodium sulphate 15

47. Sulphuric Acid (70%-95%) 117932

48. Succinimide (C4H5NO2) 31

49. Terpene 75

50. Toluene 23

51. Trichloethylene & Perchloroethylene 33395

52. Zinc fluoride & Zinc oxide cake

787

3.6 LIST OF RAW MATERIALS:

TABLE: 3.4

Sr. No. Material Name Quantity

tons

/day

Quantity

tons /Month

Physical

form

Mode of

Storage

1. 1,1,2,2-Tetrafluoroethyl Methyl

Ether

17.0 424.3 Liquid Tank

2. 1,3 Benzodioxole 0.1 1.7 Liquid Barrels

3. 1,3-Dimethyl-2-imidazolidinone 0.1 3.5 Liquid Barrels

4. 1,4-Dioxane (C4H8O2) 1.6 39.2 Liquid Tank

5. 1-3 Benzodioxide 2.7 66.9 Liquid Barrels

6. 20% H2SiF6 Solution 29.6 739.8 Liquid Barrels

7. 2-Fluorobenzonitrile 0.1 3.2 Liquid Barrels

8. 3-Aminobenzotrifluoride (TFMA) 4.4 110.8 Liquid Barrels

9. 3-Nitro-o-xylol 2.5 62.6 Liquid Barrels

10. Acetaldoxime 50% 4.3 108.3 Liquid Barrels

11. Acetic Acid 16.9 421.6 Liquid Tank

12. Acetic Anhydride 40.0 1000.8 Liquid Tank

13. Acetone 15.8 394.7 Liquid Tank

14. Acetonitrile 0.4 9.2 Liquid Barrels

15. Activated Carbon 3.2 80.3 Solid Barrels

16. AIBN 0.5 12.8 Fine

crystals

Barrels

17. Alumina 0.1 1.7 Solid Barrels

18. Alumina Balls 0.5 12.6 Solid

Barrels

24

M/s. SRF Limited



tons

/day

Quantity

tons /Month

Physical

form

Mode of

Storage

19. Alumina Carbon 0.1 1.7 Solid Barrels

20. Aluminium Chloride 15.4 384.9 Powder Barrels

21. Aluminum 1.1 26.7 Solid Barrels

22. Ammonia (NH3) 1.8 44.1 Gas Cylinder

23. Ammonium hydroxide solution

(25%)

3.1 76.8 Liquid Barrels

Anhydrous Calcium Chloride 0.4 10.5 Crystalline Barrels

24. Anthranilic acid 0.1 2.4 Solid Barrels

25. Antimony Chloride based Catalyst 0.0 0.3 Solid Barrels

26. Barium Hydroxide/ Sodium

Hydroxide

4.1 102.8 Powder Barrels

27. Benzaldehyde 8.8 220.4 Liquid Barrels

28. Benzonitrile 1.3 31.5 Liquid Barrels

29. Benzotrichloride 4.4 110.8 Liquid Barrels

30. Benzyl Chloride 2.0 49.2 Liquid Barrels

31. BF3.etherate solution (50%) 0.0 0.6 Liquid Barrels

32. Boron trifluoride ethereate 0.6 14.3 Liquid Barrels

33. BPFB 2.9 71.4 Liquid Barrels

34. Bromine 10.4 259.0 Liquid Tank

35. Bromobenzene 1.2 30.1 Liquid Barrels

36. Butyl Acetate 13.4 334.5 Liquid Tank

37. Butyl Nitrite 3.1 77.5 Liquid Barrels

38. C2 2.6 65.8 Gas Cylinder

39. Calcium Hydroxide 1.9 47.2 Solid Barrels

40. Calcium oxide 8.9 221.7 Solid Barrels

41. Calcuim Chloride 0.0 0.7 Solid Barrels

42. Carbon monoxide 0.5 12.8 Compresse

d gas

Cylinder

43. Carbontetrachloride 4.7 116.5 Solid Tank

44. Catalyst - Nitrile based 0.1 1.7 Solid Barrels

45. Catalyst cromia based 0.1 3.3 Solid Barrels

46. Caustic lye 48% 325.16 8129.1 Liquid Tank

47. Celite 0.1 2.7 Solid Barrels

48. Ceramic Balls 0.0 0.2 Solid Barrels

49. Charcoal 2.1 53.0 Solid Barrels

50. Chlorine 763.4 19084.4 Liquid/gas Cylinder

51. Chloro Malonic Ester 4.9 121.4 Liquid Barrels

52. Chlorobenzene 2.2 54.4 Liquid Tank

53. Chlorobenzonitrile 0.2 4.7 Crystalline Barrels

54. Chlorodifluoroacetic acid(CDFA) 0.7 17.8 Liquid Barrels

55. Chlorodifluoromethane (R 22) 41.3 1032.6 Liquefied

Gas

Tank

56. Chloroform 0.1

2.5 Liquid Barrels

25

M/s. SRF Limited



tons

/day

Quantity

tons /Month

Physical

form

Mode of

Storage

57. Chlorosulfuric acid 1.1 26.8 Liquid Barrels

58. Copper 0.4 9.5 Powder Barrels

59. Copper Acetate 2.9 73.2 Powder Barrels

60. Copper chloride 0.2 4.1 Powder Barrels

61. Crome- Alumina 0.5 11.9 Granules Barrels

62. Cromia 0.0 0.7 Solid Barrels

63. Cuprous Chloride 0.0 0.8 Crystals. Barrels

64. CuSO4 Solution 10.7% 2.6 64.2 Liquid Barrels

65. Cyclohexane 0.5 12.3 Liquid Barrels

66. Cyclohexanone 14.7 368.1 Liquid Tank

67. Dichloroacetophenone 0.4 10.9 Needles Barrels

68. Dichlorobenzotrichloride 4.1 101.7 Liquid Barrels

69. Dichlorobenzotrifluoride 2.6 64.2 Liquid Barrels

70. Dichloromethane (DCM) 0.5 12.2 Liquid Barrels

71. Dichlorophenol 1.0 25.0 Crystalline Barrels

72. Dicyclopentadiene (DCPD) 2.5 63.5 Liquid Barrels

73. Diethyl ethoxymethylenemalonate

(DEMM)


74. Diethylamine (DEA) 0.0 1.0 Liquid Barrels

75. Diethylether 0.8 18.8 Liquid Barrels

76. Difluorobenzene 1.8 44.0 Liquid Barrels

77. Difluoromethane R-32 24.3 608.3 Liquefied

Gas

Tank

78. Dimethyl disulfide (C2H6S2) 1.5 36.7 Liquid Barrels

79. Dimethyl Sulfoxide (C2H6OS) 0.7 16.9 Liquid Barrels

80. Dimethylamine 2.3 56.4 Liquid Barrels

81. Dimethylether 0.8 20.8 Liquid Barrels

82. Dimethylformamide 16.8 421.2 Liquid Tank

83. Dioxane 0.3 8.3 Liquid Barrels

84. DMAN 6.2 155.1 Liquid Barrels

85. Ethanol 8.5 213.7 Liquid Tank

86. Ethyl Acetate 36.7 916.7 Liquid Tank

87. Ethyl Vinyl Ether 2.9 71.4 Liquid Barrels

88. Ethyldifluoroacetate 21.9 546.6 Liquid Tank

89. Ethyldifluoroacetoacetate 6.2 154.8 Liquid Tank

90. Ethyledichloride 316.6 7915.0 Liquid Tank

91. Ethylene 1.5 38.2 Gas Cylinder

92. Ethyltrifluoroacetate 3.0 75.8 Liquid Tank

93. Ethyltrifluoroacetoacetate 6.8 171.0 Liquid Tank

94. Ferric Chloride 0.7 18.6 Solid Barrels

95. Ferric Chloride based (Catalyst) 0.0 0.8 Solid Barrels

96. Flourinating catalyst 0.1 2.1 Solid Barrels

97. Fluorine 1.3 33.1 Gas Cylinder

26

M/s. SRF Limited



tons

/day

Quantity

tons /Month

Physical

form

Mode of

Storage

98. Fluorobenzene 0.9 23.3 Liquid Barrels

99. Fluorspar 346.7 8666.7 Solid Covered

Shed 100. Formic acid 3.1 76.9 Liquid Barrels

101. Heptane 2.9 71.7 Liquid Barrels

102. Hexafluoroacetone 1.2 29.5 Compresse

d gas

Cylinder

103. Hexafluoroisopropanol 1.1 27.8 Liquid Barrels

104. Hexafluoropropylene (HFP) 9.9 246.8 Gas Cylinder

105. Hexane 3.8 95.0 Liquid Tank

106. Hydrazine Hydrate 100% 10.9 272.3 Liquid Tank

107. Hydrochloric Acid (HCl) 82.6 2064.7 Liquid Tank

108. Hydrochloric acid Anhydride 19.7 492.6 Gas Cylinder

109. Hydrofluoric acid Anhydride 248.0 6199.2 Gas Tank

110. Hydrogen 0.8 19.2 colorless

gas

Cylinder

111. Hydrogen bromide 8.6 214.1 Liquid Tank

112. Hydroquinone 0.0 0.4 Crystalline Barrels

113. Hyflow 0.2 6.1 Solid Barrels

114. Hyodrogen Peroxide (H2O2) 5.324 133.1 Liquid Barrels

115. Iron Powder 0.9 22.4 Granules Barrels

116. Isoflurane 1.3 32.7 Liquid Barrels

117. Isopropanol 3.1 76.5 Liquid Barrels

118. KHCO3 Solution 25% 0.5 13.6 Crystalline Barrels

119. Liquified Petroleum Gas 31.1 777.3 Liquefied

Gas

Tank

120. Lithium aluminium hydride 3.3 83.5 Solid Barrels

121. Magnesium 0.3 7.0 Solid Barrels

122. m-Cresol 0.4 10.3 Liquid Barrels

123. Methanesulfonyl chloride (MSCl) 3.9 97.4 Liquid Tank

124. Methanol 52.2 1306.2 Liquid Tank

125. Methoxy AA 5.1 128.4 Liquid Barrels

126. Methyl Acetoacetate 0.7 16.4 Liquid Barrels

127. Methyl isobutyl ketone (MIBK)


128. Methyl tert-butyl ether (MTBE) 4.1 101.5 Liquid Barrels

129. Methylene Chloride 128.1 3201.6 Liquid Tank

130. MHP (C4H6N2O) 0.6 15.0 Liquid Barrels

131. Mix Xylene 4.8 120.2 Solid Barrels

132. Molecular Sieve 3.7 91.3 Solid Barrels

133. Monochlorobenzene (MCB) 0.5 13.0 Liquid Tank

134. Monoethylene glycol 0.8 20.3 Liquid Barrels

135. Monoglyme 0.2 4.9 Liquid Barrels

136. Monomethylhydrazine 22.2 554.8 Liquid Tank

27

M/s. SRF Limited



tons

/day

Quantity

tons /Month

Physical

form

Mode of

Storage

137. Morpholine 0.3 7.6 Liquid Barrels

138. N-Bromosuccinimide (C4H4BrNO2) 0.2 4.6 Solid Barrels

139. n-Butyllithium 0.0 0.9 Liquid Barrels

140. NH3 Solution 25% 17.3 432.8 Liquid Tank

141. Nitric Acid 8.8 219.5 Liquid Barrels

142. Nitrogen 184.8 4619.4 Gas Cylinder

143. NMP 3.8 96.0 Solid Barrels

144. Oleum 165.0 4123.8 Liquid Tank

145. O-Toluidine 2.2 55.2 Liquid Barrels

146. O-Xylene 10.6 264.6 Liquid Tank

147. P2O5 4.4 108.8 Crystaline Barrels

148. Paladium /alumina 0.2 4.9 Solid Barrels

149. Palladium chloride (PdCl2) 0.0 0.1 Solid Barrels

150. Palladium on carbon 0.3 8.6 Powder Barrels

151. Parabromofluoro Benzene 1.8 44.5 Liquid Barrels

152. Paraformaldehyde 1.2 30.8 Crystalline Barrels

153. P-Chloro toluene 11.5 287.8 Liquid Tank

154. Pentafluoro Benzonitrile 0.6 15.1 Liquid Barrels

155. Pentafluorobenzene 1.5 38.5 Liquid Barrels

156. Perchloroethylene 103.3 2583.3 Liquid Tank

157. Phenol 7.8 194.4 Liquid Barrels

158. Phosphoric Acid (85%) 0.2 4.1 Liquid Barrels

159. Phosphorus oxychloride (POCl3) 9.4 235.4 Liquid Barrels

160. Phosphorus pentachloride 8.7 216.3 Powder Barrels

161. Potassium Carbonate 6.1 151.6 powder Barrels

162. Potassium Fluoride 10.1 251.7 Solid Barrels

163. Potassium methoxide 1.9 47.3 Solid Barrels

164. Potassium Phosphate 0.0 1.1 Solid Barrels

165. Potassium sulfite 0.1 2.4 Crystaline Barrels

166. Potassiun Hydroxide 32.6 815.2 Solid Barrels

167. Precipitated Silica 0.1 3.7 Solid Barrels

168. Process Water 5037.2 125929.3 Liquid Tank

169. PTC 0.0 0.9 Liquid Barrels

170. p-Toluenesulfonic acid 0.0 1.2 Liquid Barrels

171. Pyridine 1.2 30.9 Liquid Barrels

172. R 134a (1112 - Tetrafluoroethane) 20.3 508.3 Liquefied

Gas

Tank

173. R 142 b (Chlorodifluoroethane) 0.8 20.8 Liquefied

Gas

Tank

174. R 152 a (Difluoroethane) 0.8 20.8 Liquefied

Gas

Tank

175. R-125 39.7 991.7 Liquefied

Gas

Tank

28

M/s. SRF Limited



tons

/day

Quantity

tons /Month

Physical

form

Mode of

Storage

176. R-143a 17.3 433.3 Liquefied

Gas

Tank

177. Raney nickel 0.1 1.7 Slurry Barrels

178. Sidium Tungstate Dihydrate

(Na2WO4.2H2O)

0.0 0.2 Crystals

and

fragments

Barrels

179. Silica Gel 0.1 3.2 Crystal Barrels

180. Soda ash 0.7 16.7 Granual Barrels

181. Sodium Acetate 0.2 6.1 Solid Barrels

182. Sodium Bi sulphite 0.0 0.1 Solid Barrels

183. Sodium bicarbonate 7.3 183.1 Crystalline Barrels

184. Sodium Borohydride 0.1 2.2 Powder Barrels

185. Sodium Carbonate 0.7 17.9 Powder Barrels

186. Sodium Chloride 459.2 11480.3 Solid Barrels

187. Sodium dithionite (Na2S2O4) 0.9 22.3 Powder Barrels

188. Sodium Ethoxide 15.3 383.2 Powder Barrels

189. Sodium Fluoride 0.2 4.0 Solid Barrels

190. Sodium iodide 1.5 38.3 Crystalline Barrels

191. Sodium Methoxide (30%) 0.8 20.0 Liquid Tank

192. Sodium Nitrite 3.0 75.7 Solid Barrels

193. Sodium Sulphite 0.0 0.4 Solid Barrels

194. Sodium thiosulphate 0.8 20.1 Powder Barrels

195. Stabilizer (Thymol) 1.7 41.8 Crystalline Barrels

196. Sulfolane 0.1 3.1 Crystalline Barrels

197. Sulfur 0.6 14.2 Solid Barrels

198. Sulphuric acid (98%) 509.0 12724.2 Liquid Tank

199. Synthon-2 1.9 47.1 Liquid Barrels

200. Terpene 0.3 6.3 Liquid Barrels

201. tert-Butyllithium in pentane

solution (24%)


202. Tetrabutyl ammonium

hydrogensulphate

0.9 21.6 Crystalline Barrels

203. Tetrafluoroethylene 2.0 49.1 Gas Cylinder

204. Tetramethyl ethylene diamine 0.1 3.3 Liquid Barrels

205. TFEMe 5.3 133.3 Liquid Barrels

206. Therminol 55 0.2 5.3 Liquid Barrels

207. THF 0.5 12.4 Liquid Tank

208. Thiourea 3.0 74.2 Crystalline Barrels

209. Toluene 27.3 683.7 Liquid Tank

210. TPP 0.1 1.6 Liquid Barrels

211. Tri ethyle amine 4.8 120.3 Liquid Barrels

212. Trichloroacetyl chloride 12.6 314.3 Liquid Barrels

213. Trichloroethylene 95.4 2384.0 Liquid Tank

29

M/s. SRF Limited



tons

/day

Quantity

tons /Month

Physical

form

Mode of

Storage

214. Trichlorofluoromethane 5.4 133.8 Liquid Tank

215. Triflic Acid 6.8 170.0 Liquid Barrels

216. Trifluoro acetal fluoride (TFAF) 4.3 107.3 Liquid Barrels

217. Trifluoro acetic acid 3.5 88.5 Liquid Barrels

218. Trifluoro Acetyl Fluoride 4.8 119.0 Gas Cylinder

219. Trifluoroethanol 0.8 18.8 Liquid Barrels

220. Trifluoromethyl-2-ethoxyvinyl

ketone


221. Trimethylorthoformate 30.1 752.3 Solid Barrels

222. Trimethylsilyl chloride 1.8 45.3 Liquid Barrels

223. Trioxane 0.2 6.0 Crystalline Barrels

224. Xylene 0.7 18.1 Liquid Tank

225. Zinc 1.6 39.5 Solid Barrels

3.7 DETAILS OF STORAGE OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS IN BULK & CONTROL MEASURES:

TABLE: 3.5

SR.

NO

AME OF

HAZARDOUS

SUBSTANCE

MAX.

STORAGE

CAP.(QTY)

EXISTING

MAX.

STORAGE

CAP.(QTY)

PROPOSED

PLACE OF IT’S STORAGE

OPERATIN

G

PRESSURE

AND

TEMP.

TYPE OF

HAZARD

CONTROL

MEASURE

PROVIDED

.

1. Methanol 35 KL X 2

Nos. A/G

tanks= 70 KL

35 KL X 11

Nos. A/G

tanks= 385 KL

Tank

farm area

ATP

Ambient

Fire Provided

below as

point No: 3.8.1

2. Toluene 35 KL X 2

Nos. A/G

tanks= 70 KL

35KL X 4

Nos. A/G

tanks= 140 KL

Tank ATP

Ambient

Fire Provided

below as

point No: 3.8.1

3. Acetone 35 KL X 1 Nos. A/G

tanks= 35 KL

35 KL X 3 Nos. A/G

tanks= 105

KL

Tank farm area

ATP Ambient

Fire Provided below as

point No:

3.8.1

4. Isopropyl alcohol Nil 35 KL X 1

Nos. A/G tanks= 35

KL

Tank ATP

Ambient

Fire Provided

below as point No:

3.8.1

5. Ethanol 35 KL X 1

Nos. A/G tanks= 35 KL

35 KL X 1

Nos. A/G tanks= 35

KL

Tank

farm area

ATP

Ambient

Fire Provided

below as point No:

3.8.1

6. Ethyl Acetate 35 KL X 1

Nos. A/G

tanks= 35 KL

35 KL X 7

Nos. A/G

tanks= 245 KL

Tank

farm area

ATP

Ambient

Fire Provided

below as

point No: 3.8.1

30

M/s. SRF Limited


7. Diethylether 35 KL X 1 Nos. A/G

tanks= 35 KL

Nil Tank farm area

ATP Ambient


point No:

3.8.1

8. Hexane 35 KL X 1

Nos. A/G

tanks= 35 KL

Nil Tank ATP

Ambient

Fire Provided

below as

point No:

3.8.1

9. Butyl Acetate Nil 50 KL X 2

Nos. A/G tanks= 100

KL

Tank ATP

Ambient

Fire Provided

below as point No:

3.8.1

10. O-Xylene 35 KL X 1

Nos. A/G

tanks= 35 KL

Nil Tank ATP

Ambient

Fire Provided

below as

point No: 3.8.1

11. Acetic Acid 35 KL X 1 Nos. A/G

tanks= 35 KL

35 KL X 2 Nos. A/G

tanks= 70

KL

Tank ATP Ambient


point No:

3.8.1

12. Monomethyl Hydrazine (MMH)

(35%) Solution

35 KL X 1 Nos. A/G

tanks= 35 KL

35 KL X 4 Nos. A/G

tanks= 140

KL

Tank ATP Ambient


point No:

3.8.1

13. Ethylene

dichloride

100 KL X 1

Nos. A/G 250 KL X

2Nos.=600

KL

250 KL X

4Nos. =1000 KL

Tank ATP

Ambient

Fire Provided

below as point No:

3.8.1

14. Acetonitrile 10 KL X 1 Nos. A/G

tanks= 10 KL

Nil Tank ATP Ambient


point No: 3.8.1

15. MIBK Nil 10 KL X 1 Nos. A/G

tanks= 10

KL

Tank ATP Ambient


point No:

3.8.1

16. Acetic Anhydride 50 KL X 1


50 KL X 4

Nos. A/G tanks= 200

KL

Tank ATP

Ambient

Fire Provided

below as point No:

3.8.1

17. Dicyclopentadien

e (DCPD)

50 KL X 1


Nil Tank ATP

Ambient

Fire Provided

below as point No:

3.8.1

18. n-Butane Nil 60 KL X 1

Nos.

Bullet= 60 KL

Tank ATP

Pressure

storage

Fire Provided

below as

point No: 3.8.2

19. Ethane Nil 10 KL X 1 Nos. Bullet

= 10 KL

Tank ATP Pressure

storage


point No:

3.8.2

20. Ethylene Nil 20 KL X 1

Nos. Bullet = 20 KL

Tank ATP

Pressure storage

Fire Provided

below as point No:

3.8.2

31

M/s. SRF Limited


21. Hydrogen 50 cylinders 700 cylinders

CS Cylinder

ATP Pressure

cylinder

Fire /Explosion

Provided below as

point No:

3.8.3

22. Ammonia (NH3) 50 kgX 44

Nos. cylinders

50kg X 200

Nos.

cylinders

CS

Cylinder

ATP

Pressure

cylinder

Toxic Provided

below as

point No:

3.8.4

23. Bromine 16 KL X 2

Nos=32 KL

Nil Tank ATP

Ambient

Toxic Provided

below as point No:

3.8.5

24. Anhydrous

Hydrofluoric acid

88 KL X 6

Nos=528 KL

88 KL X 5

Nos=440

KL

Tank ATP

2 kg/cm2

Corrosive/

Toxic

Provided

below as

point No: 3.8.6

25. Hydrochloric acid Anhydride

40 kgX 96 Nos. cylinders

40 kgX 520 Nos.

cylinders

Cylinder ATP Pressure

cylinder

Corrosive/

Toxic

Provided below as

point No:

3.8.7

26. Oleum 250 KL X 2Nos. tanks=

500 KL

Nil Tank ATP Ambient

Corrosive/

Toxic

Provided below as

point No:

3.8.8

3.8 Hazardous Material Storage and Handling Safety :

3.8.1 For Above ground storage tank farm and PESO licenced premises.

1. Class A petroleum products are received through road tanker and stored

in PESO storage tank as per petroleum rules .

2. Tank farm is constructed as per explosive department requirement and

separation distance will be maintained.

3. Static earthing provision is made for road tanker as well as storage

tank.

4. Flame arrestor with breather valve will be provided on vent l ine.

5. Road tanker unload ing procedure is prepared and implemented.

6. Fire load calculation is done and as per f ire load Hydrant System is

provided as per Indian std. and Fire extinguishers are provided as per

f ire load calculation.

7. Spark arrestor on tanker exhaust l ine is being provided to al l vehicles in

side premises.

8. Flame proof type equipment s and l ighting are provided.

9. Trained and experience operator s are employed for tank farm area.

10. NFPA label (hazard identif ication ) capacity and content are displayed

on storage tank training for the same

11. Solvents are transferred by pump only in plant area and day tanks are

providedin process area . DCS operation logics provided in tanks and all

controls with interlocking system provided for process as well as

storage tank farm safety.

12. Double Jumpers are provided on f lammable chemical handling pipeline

f langes.

13. Flexible SS hose are used for road tanker unloading and loading

purpose.

32

M/s. SRF Limited


14. Satic earthing automation arrangement provided at unloading and

loading station for road tanker.

15. Nitrogen blacketing provided whre is it is required.

16. Dyke wall wil l be provided to storage tank

17. Double static earthing provided to storage tank.

18. Nitrogen blanketing & vapor balancing l ine provided to minimize VOC

levels .

19. Foam making arranment provided in tank farm ar ea.

3.8.2 For SMPV licenced premises.( n-Butane, Ethane and Ehtylene)

1 Double Safety valve provided.

2 Dyke with separate fencing area is provided.

3 SOP prepared

4 Road tanker unloading procedure prepared

5 Flame-proof area.

6 Work permit followed

7 Firefighting equipment provided.

8 Hydrant system provided.

9 PPEs used

10 Safety shower, eye wash provided.

11 NFPA labeling system adopted for drums as well as storage tanks.

12 Level indicator at local as well as on DCS

13 Alarm for high level & temperature.

14 Sprinkler system is provided on bullet .

15 Foam arrangement provided for f ire f ighting.

3.8.3 For Hydrogen cylinders

1 Hydrogen cylinders will be stored in cylinder storage area. Cylinder

storage l icence will be obtained from PESO as per Gas cylinder rules .

2 Hydrogen cylinder storage area will be made well ventilated and safe

distance will be maintained as per gas cylinder rule.

3 Sprinkler system provision will be made in cylinder storage area.

4 Gas deptectors will be provided in Hydrogen cylinder storage area.

5 Copper tube will be used f or Hydrogen cylinder connection with header.

PRV station will be provided for Hydrogen and nitrogen cylinder jeader.

6 Non sparking tools wil l be used for cylinder connection with header.

For Hydrogen Cylinder connecting header :

1 Hydrogen cylinder will be received by road will be stored away from

process plant .

2 PRV station provided with shut off valve and safety valve .

3 Flame proof l ight f itt ing installed.

4 Static earthing and electric earthing (Double) provided.

5 Jumpers for static earthing on pipeline f lang es of f lammable chemical

wil l be provided.

6 Non sparking tools wil l be used for hydrogen l ine f itt ing.

Hydrogenation Plant:

1 FLP type area will be provided.

2 Total enclosed process system.

33

M/s. SRF Limited


3 Instrument & Plant Air System.DCS operational plant

4 Nitrogen blanketing in Hydrogenation reactor.

5 Safety valve and Rupture disc provided on reactor.

6 Cooling Chil l ing and power alternative arrangement have been made

on reactor.

7 Hydrogen and Nitrogen Cylinder bank away from the autoclavereactor.

8 PRV station with shut off valve, safety valve provision will be made for

hydrogenation reaction safety.

9 Before Hydrogen Gas charging in to reactor and after completion of

reaction Nitrogen f lushing will be done.

10 Flame arrestor will be provided on vent l ine of reactor and it wil l be

extended up to roof level .

11 Open well ventilated and fragile roof wil l be provided to on reactor.

12 Safe Catalyst charging method will be adopted.

13 SOP will be prepared and operators will be trained for the same.

14 Static earthing and electric earthing (Dou ble ) provided.

15 Rector vent extended out side the process area and f lame arrestor

provided on vent l ine.

16 Dumping vessel arrangement will be made.

17 Jumpers for static earthing on pipeline f langes of f lammable chemical

wil l be provided.

3.8.4 For Anhydrous Ammonia cylinders :

1 Ammonia cylinders will be stored in cylinder storage area. Cylinder

storage l icence will be obtained from CCOE as per Gas cylinder rules .

2 Ammonia cylinder will be made well ventilated and safe distance will be

maintained.

3 Sprinkler system provision will be made in cylinder storage area.

4 Ammonia cylinder leakage identif ication will be done by HCL torch.

5 Ammonia cylinder leakage control Kit wil l be kept available at store.

6 Hazard identif ication, control measures in case of leakage and f irst Aid

procedure will be prepared and displayed at handling locations.

7 Copper tube will be used for Ammonia cylinder connection with header.

8 Sprinkler point and Eyewash / Safety shower will be provided near

Ammonia header point .

3.8.5 Bromine Storage & Handling Safety

1. The amount of bromine in storage will be kept to a minimum.

2. Minimize the dispersal of bromine vapors by locating the storage area

on low ground. Low curbs or walls (called dikes), 200 mm high, wil l be

provided to protect the area from external f looding and to minimize the

dispersal of bromine vapors. The minimum diked volume will be

equivalent to the largest storage tank plus 10%.

3. Adequate size sump will be provided for collecting bromine spil ls and

pump away collected rainwater and f ire -f ighting water.

4. Floors will be of impervious construction, preferably concrete.

5. Bromine ISO tank should be stored no closer than 10 meters from

human or animal consumable articles . Explosives and f lammable

materials should not be stored close to bromine.

6. There should be a strengthened approach way for emergency vehicles on

two sides of the installation.

34

M/s. SRF Limited


7. Hoses will be PTFE with stainless steel braid covering and carbon steel

f langes. Screwed f itt ings will not used.

8. Provide l ightning protection.

9. There would be suff icient br omine storage tank capacity or an empty

ISO tank to accommodate the transfer of bromine from a leaking

container

10. Area where bromine will be used or stored will be enclosed so that

unauthorized persons and animals are prevented from entering the area.

Adequate l ighting will be provided to al low suff icient night surveil lance.

Surveil lance will be provided 24 hours a day.

11. Personnel escape routes will be clearly marked and it wil l be maintained

without any obstructions including adequately sized doors and

windows.

12. Facil it ies l ike off ices , eating, showering and changing rooms, wil l be

located in up wind direction and remote from the area where bromine is

handled or stored. Provide an adequate supply of clean water for

washing and showers.

13. Emergency siren, telephone will be provided in storage area for the

reporting of accidents or emergency situations. The emergency

telephone numbers will be displayed at prominent locations and it

include the f ire department, ambulance service, emergency response

team, hospital a nd police.

14. A wind sock will be provided which will clearly visible from all points

on the site and replaced as required. This is required for indicating

wind strength and direction.

15. Emergency respirator equipment cabinets( Cupboard) will be installed

not more than 30 meters or ten seconds walking distance from any

location in the storage area.

16. Showers and eyewash fountains will be provided, clearly marked, well

l it and with unobstructed access.

17. Signs will be posted prominently at the site entrance and throughout the

installation with area maps showing access ways, hydrant locations,

emergency showers, location of emergency equipment and emergency

telephone numbers.

18. All management and operating personnel involved in the use or handling

of bromine will undergo safety training, in addit ion to specif ic task

training.

19. Only experienced well -trained operators will be al lowed to receive and

unload bromine receptacles .

20. The management will ensure that emergency response plans have been

made and coordinated with th e emergency response local authorit ies .

21. Bromine glass bott le capacity 2.5 l itters and six bott les are stored in

one packing box.

22. Bromine will be stored in dry and cool place and well ventilated area.

23. Standard operating procedure for hazardous material load ing unloading will be

prepared and implemented.

24. Fire hydrant system and water sprinkler system installed at tank farm

area.

Safe Transportation procedure to be adopted for Bromine ISO container and bromine glass

bottle crate.

The driver and cleaner of any vehicle transporting bromine should comply

with the following requirements:

35

M/s. SRF Limited


25. GPS will be installed in al l the trucks and ISO container vehicle.

26. Driver and cleaner will be trained in using GPS.

27. Open space separated from public highway and public dwelli ngs, where

public does not normally pass. No passengers are al lowed.

28. The crew shall know how to use f ire -f ighting appliances.

29. The driver or driver's assistant may not open a package containing

bromine.

30. Bromine receptacles are not to be checked with open f l ames.

31. No smoking is permitted around the transport unit or in the vicinity of

the vehicle during handling operations.

32. The engine is to be shut off during all handling operations unless

required to drive pumps, hoist , etc.

33. Parking brakes are to be applied w henever parked.

34. If the vehicle is parked on a road at night or with poor visibil ity ,

warning signs are to be placed 10 meters ahead of and behind the

vehicle.

35. TREM CARD provided to al l transporters and trained for transportation

Emergency of Hazardous chemicals .

Following personal Protective equipments are to be made compulsory when handling Bromine.

36. Indian Standard Institute (ISI) approved chemical safety goggles at all

t imes when handling Br2.

37. Use a fullface shield over eyewear.

38. Full body protection PVC suite

39. Eyewash fountains should be located in areas where bromine is handled,

used or stored.

40. When in danger of contact with l iquid bromine, wear an approved

chemical resistant suit .

41. Leather or other non -woven ISI approved steel -toed shoes or Gum boot

42. Protective rubber boots should be worn over shoes for extra protection.

43. Have NIOSH approved respirators and self -contained breathing

apparatus available.

44. Gloves : Nitrile rubber gloves, Neoprene & Butyle gloves

Safety Practices in the Work Area

45. We will inform our all employees of the potential hazards of contact

with bromine and train them in appropriate f irst -aid procedures.

46. Bromine handling areas will be clearly marked and restricted to

qualif ied, trained personnel only.

Ventilation

47. We will maintain bromine vapor concentration in the work area to less

than 0.1 ppm with adequate exhaust hoods, ventilation systems and

scrubbers. Analyze air for proper control .

48. Transfer or repackage bromine only in a controlled, closed environment.

49. Exhaust ventilating systems will be used in enclosed areas where

bromine is handled.

36

M/s. SRF Limited


Containers And Storage

50. Bromine glass bott le capacity 2.5 l itters and six bott les are stored in

one packing box.

51. Bromine will be stored in dry and cool pla ce and well ventilated area.

Neutralization in case of spillage leakage

52. Neutralization with sodium bisulf ite requires 3 moles of sodium

hydroxide: 1 mole sodium bisulf ite: 1 mole bromine.

53. Neutralization with sodium sulf ite requires 2 moles sodium hydroxi de:

1 mole sodium sulf ite: 1 mole bromine.

54. The weights and volumes specif ied include a 10% excess of sodium

hydroxide and sodium bisulfate or sodium sulf ite .

Emergency Procedures

In case of bromine emergencies, follow recommended first aid and emergency response

procedures adopted

Transportation Emergencies

In emergency situations resulting from vehicle accidents:

55. Notify the local police, f ire departments, emergency responders and the

carrier .

56. Isolate the area.

57. Any person not dressed in proper protect ive clothing and not using a

NIOSH approved self -contained breathing apparatus should be kept a

safe distance away.

58. Call to the supplier

59. Seek immediate medical assistance for those injured and follow

recommended f irst aid procedures.

Leaking Containers

60. When handling a leaking bottle personal protective clothing, goggles

and NIOSH approved self contained breathing equipment must be worn.

61. Clear contaminated area of non -essential personnel and send them to

assembly point .

62. Maintain a sl ight ammonia atmosphere throughout the clean up.

Carefully release anhydrous ammonia gas to neutralize bromine vapor.

The ammonia gas will convert bromine to white ammonium bromide smoke. 63. Do not al low liquid bromine and l iquid ammonia to combine; a violent

reaction will occur . Ammonia (16 to 25% by volume) can form an

explosive mixture with air .

64. Pour hypo solution*, l ime and water slurry or soda ash solution over the

spil l . Hypo-bromine reactions produce hydrobromic acid .

65. Dry sodium thiosulfate and l iquid bromine produce a violent reaction;do

not mix them.

66. Using cold water, wash neutralized bromine into a sump for transfer to

an approved waste disposal facil ity where the waste can be processed.

37

M/s. SRF Limited


67. Ventilate the area to remove the ammonium bromide and any bromine

fumes. Scrub the f loors and equipment with soap and water.

First Aid Procedure

68. Immediate medical assistance is required if bromine is swallowed,

inhaled or has contacted the eyes or skin.

69. If bromine has been ingested, do not give anything by mouth. Seek

medical attention immediately. Do not induce vomiting.

70. If bromine has been inhaled, move the exposed person to a well

ventilated area. Seek medical attention immediately. The vict im should

be placed in a comfortable sitt ing or partly reclining posit ion. The

exposed individual should avoid exertion. I f vomiting occurs, turn the

patient on his side to avoid choking. Keep the patient warm. If the

patient is coughing and showing signs of respiratory distress , properly

trained personnel should administer oxygen.

71. For skin conta ct , the affected area must be f looded immediately with

large amounts of clean water from a safety shower or other appropriate

source of f lowing water. Seek medical attention immediately. All

contaminated clothing, including shoes, should be removed as quic kly as

possible while the vict im is under the shower. Washing should be

continued for a minimum of 30 minutes. I f possible, continue to wash

the affected area during transport to medical facil it ies . (Extended wash

t imes of two hours or more have proven ben eficial .)

72. If bromine l iquid or vapor contacts the eyes, they must be irrigated

immediately with large amounts of running water. Eye wash stations are

preferable for irrigation. I f one is not available, a hose, water source

with a l iberal , gentle f low may be util ized. The eyelids must be held

apart during irrigation to ensure contact of water with all accessible

t issues of the eyes and l ids . Eyes should be washed continuously for a

minimum of 30 minutes. I f possible, continue f lushing the eyes while

transporting the employee to a physician. In al l cases of bromine injury,

obtain immediate medical attention. Provide emergency personnel with

information about al l materials used by the person and provide

appropriate information about bromine and f irst aid proce dures.

3.8.6 Hydrofluoric acid (AHF)

1 Storage facil it ies and construction will be made as per SMPV Rules.

2 water curtain system and Hydrant system will be provided as per NFPA

std./ GFR 66A.

3 Mayur nozel curtaines system provided in tank farm area with auto start

provision.

4 Auto level transmeter and DCS operation tank farm area.

5 Gas detectors are provided in tank farm area and penal and alarm

provided in control room on DCS panel .

6 Double safety valve are provided.

7 Dyke wall is provided.

8 Rubbles are provided in dyke area.

9 CCTV camers are provided in tank farm area.

10 Double static earthing is provided.

11 Emergency breathing air l ine respirators are provided near bullets and

posit ive pressure suit with hood s are provided in tank farm area in a

box. SCBA sets and escape BA sets are provided in tank farm area.

38

M/s. SRF Limited


12 Emergency handling equipments with r equired PPEs with canister are

provided in tank farm area.

13 Lightening arrestor is provided in tank farm area.

14 Jumpers are provided to each f langes of the HF l ines.

15 No bottom drain valve provision in tanks.

16 Automation for level , pressure and temp. provided in DCS panel and

control interlocking & trip logics provided.

17 Wind direction indicator is provided.

18 Safety Shower provided near bullets .

19 Caution note will be provided.

3.8.7 Safety Measures for AHCL gas cylinder :

1. Stored in cool and dry place and PESO approved area.

2. Empty and f il led cylinders are stored separately.

3. Hazard identif ication, control measures in case of leakage and f irst Aid

procedure to be prepared and displayed at storage location.

4. Gas detector provided in storage area.

5. Cylinder store made well ventilated and safe distance maintained.

6. Sprinkler system provision made in cylinder storage area.

7. Cylinder leakage control Kit kept available at cylinder storage area.

8. Sprinkler point and Eyewash / Safety shower provided near cylinder

f il l ing point .

9. Gas detectors provided in cylinder storage area.

3.8.8 Safety Measures for Oleum storage tank area:

1. Storage tank stored away from the process plant .

2. Tanker unloading procedure adopted and fully implemented.

3. Caution note and emergency handling procedure displayed at unloading

area and trained all operators.

4. NFPA label provided.

5. Required PPEs l ike full body protection PVC Suit , Hand gloves, gumboot,

Respiratory mask etc. provided to operator as per need.

6. Neutralizing agents kept ready for tackle spil lage emergency.

7. Safety shower, eye wash with quenching unit installed in acid storage

area.

8. Material handling in close condition in pipe l ine and transferred by

pump only.

9. Flange guard provided on oleum pipelines.

10. Dyke wall provided to al l storage tanks, collection pit with valve

provision.

11. Double drain valve provided.

12. Radar type level transmitter provided on all storage tanks.

3.8.9 For Drum Storage area :

Some chemicals wil l be received at plant in drums by road truck and stored

in a separate drum storage area.

1. FLP type l ight f itt ings will be provided.

2. Proper ventilation will be provided in godown.

3. Proper label and identif ication board /stickers will be provided in the

storage area.

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M/s. SRF Limited


4. Conductive drum pallets wil l be provided.

5. Drum handling trolley / stackers/fork l ift wil l be used for drum

handling.

6. Separate dispensing room with local exhaust and static earthing

provision will be made.

7. Materials wil l be stored as per its compatibil ity study and separate area

will be made for f lammable, corrosive and toxic chemical drums storage.

8. Smoking and other spark, f lame generating item will be banned from the

Gate.

3.8.10 For Acid and Alkali storage area (Sulfuric Acid and Hydrochloric Acid )

1. Caution note and emergency f irst aid measures will be displayed and

train for the same to al l employees.

2. Carbouys wil l be stored away from the process plant .

3. Caution note and emergency handling procedure will be displayed at

unloading area and trained all operator s.

4. NFPA label wil l be provided.

5. Required PPEs l ike full body protection PVC suit , Hand gloves, gumboot,

Respiratory mask etc. wil l be provided to operator.

6. Neutralizing agent wil l be kept ready for tackle any emergency spil lage.

7. Safety shower, eye wash with quenching unit wil l be provided in acid

storage area.

3.8.11 Process Safety:

1. DCS control system for the exist ing plant as well as proposed facil it ies .

Any rise in temperature, pressure etc. wil l be indicated with alarm

followed by necessary corrective action. Also provided Safety interlocks

and redundancy in DCS.

2. All vessels & storage tanks are provided with high level alarms and

necessary pump tripping system.

3. Gas leak detection & alarm system provided for hydrogen and solvent

usage area.

4. Fire water tank & f ire hydrant piping are provided for entire plant with

ring mains for al l plants/tank farm etc. Jet monitor with foam trolley /

hydrant points / f ire extinguisher etc. are provided at strategic points .

Exist ing f ire hydrant system will be updated and extended for proposed

facil it ies

5. Solvents and other petroleum chemicals are stored in PESO l icensed

area with all regulatory requirements.

6. Standby DG power is provided for al l process requirements.

7. HSE management system is fully implemented. All procedures l ike work

to permit , Tanker loading and unloading, Accident investigation,

Preventive maintenance schedule, Static earthing and electrical

earthing, etc. prepared and implemented.

8. The reaction is carried by heating, cooling, chil l ing, brine as a util ity

through jackets/limpet coils .

9. Control loops for control of pressure and temp. in the reactor s are

provided.

10. PRV provided from steam boiler high pressu re l ine to control required

pressure in reactor jacket .

11. Util ity l ike Chil l ing, cooling, vacuum, steaming and its alternative

provided to control reaction parameters in a safe manner.

40

M/s. SRF Limited


12. Free Fall of any f lammable material in the vessel is avoided.

13. Static earthing provision made at design stage to al l solvent handling

equipments, reactors , vessels & powder handling equipments.

14. Vent l ine connected with ref lux unit or condenser in case of VOC or with

scrubber in case of toxic gas generation in reaction.

15. All emergency valves and switches and emergency handling facil it ies

are easily accessible.

16. Further al l the vessels are examined periodically by a recognized

competent person under the Gujarat Factory Rules 1963 -Rule 61(1) .

17. All the vessels and equipments are wel l earthed appropriately and well

protected against Static Electricity. Also for draining in drums proper

earthing facil it ies provided.

18. Materials transferred by pumping through pipeline from tanks .

19. Flame proof l ight f itt ings installed in the plant .

20. All the Plant Personnel provided with Personal Protection Equipments

to protect against any adverse health effect during operations, leakage,

spil lages or splash. PPE l ike Helmets, Safety Shoes, Safety Glasses, Acid -

Alkali Proof Gloves etc. provided to the emplo yees as per needs. All

employees trained and updated in Safety aspects through induction and

periodic training in safety.

21. Material Safety Data Sheets of Raw Materials & Products are readily

available at shop f loor.

3.9 Transportation , Unloading and handling procedure

3.9.1 For Flammable chemicals :-

TABLE: 3.6

SR.NO. ACTIVITY TYPE OF

POSSIBLE

HAZARD

PROCEDURES.

1 Transportation by

road tanker

Leakage,

Spillage, fire,

explosion, Toxic

release

Training will be provided to driver

and cleaner regarding the safe

driving, hazard of Flammable

chemicals, emergency handling, use

of SCBA sets.

TREM card will kept with TL.

Fire extinguishers will be kept with

TL.

Spark arrestor will be provided to TL

exhaust.

Instructions will be given not to stop

road tanker in populated area.

Clear Hazard Identification symbol

and emergency telephone number

will be displayed as per HAZCHEM

CODE.

Appropriate PPEs will be kept with

TL.

2 Road tanker

unloading at site.

Leakage,

Spillage, fire, Priority will be given to Tanker to

immediately enter the storage

41

M/s. SRF Limited


explosion, toxic

release

premises at site and will not be kept

waiting near the gate or the main

road.

Security person will check License,

TREM CARD, Fire extinguisher

condition, First Aid Box condition,

Antidote Kit, required PPEs as per

SOP laid down.

Store officer will take sample as per

sampling SOP from sampling point.

After approval of QC/QA department

unloading procedure will be allowed

be started.

Following precautions will be adopted

during unloading

Wheel stopper will be provided to TL

at unloading platform.

Static earthing will be provided to

road tanker.

Tanker unloading procedure will be

followed according to check list and

implemented.

Flexible SS hose connection will be

done at TL outlet line.

All TL valves will be closed in TL.

Finally earthing connection and

wheel stopper will be removed.

Only day time unloading will be

permitted.

3 Storage tank safety Leakage,

Spillage, Fire,

Explosion, Toxic

release.

Appropriate MOC storage tank will be

provided as per IS code.

Dyke wall will be provided to storage

tank.

Level transmitter will be provided

with low level high level auto cut-off

provision.

Vent will be connected with flame

arrestor.

Fire hydrant monitor with foam

attachment facility will be provided.

Dumping / Drain vessel/alternate

vessel will be provided to collect dyke

wall spillage material.

FLP type pump will be provided.

Nitrogen blanketing will be provided

to storage tank.

Double static earthing will be

provided to storage tank.

Jumper clip will be provided to all

Solvent handling pipeline flanges.

4 Transfer from Leakage, Double mechanical seal type FLP type

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M/s. SRF Limited


storage tank to Day

tank

Spillage due to

Line rupture,

Flange Gasket

failure, Fire,

Explosion, Toxic

release.

pump will be provided.

Double on / off switch will provided

at tank farm and process area near

day tank. Pump auto cut off with day

tank high level will be provided.

Flame arrestor will be provided on

day tank vent.

Over flow will be provided for

additional safety.

NRV will be provided on pump

discharge line.

Double Jumper clip will be provided

to all solvent handling pipeline.

Double static earthing will be

provided to day tank.

5 Transfer from Day

tank to reactor.

Leakage,

Spillage due to

Line rupture,

Flange Gasket

failure, Fire,

Explosion, Toxic

release.

Transfer through closed pumping

system.

Total quantity of day tank material

will be charged in to reactor at a time.

NRV will be provided on day tank

outlet line.


storage tank.

Jumpers will be provided to pipeline

flanges.

3.9.2 Bromine Transportation, Unloading and handling Procedure :

TABLE: 3.7


POSSIBLE

HAZARD

PROCEDURES.

1 Transportation of

Bromine by ISO

container

Leakage,

Spillage, Toxic

release

GPS will be installed in all the trucks

and ISO container vehicle.

Driver and Cleaner will be trained in

using GPS.

Open space separated from public

highway and public dwellings, where

public does not normally pass. No

passengers are allowed.

The crew shall know how to use fire-

fighting appliances.

The driver or driver's assistant may

not open a package containing

bromine.

Bromine receptacles are not to be

checked with open flames.

No smoking is permitted around the

transport unit or in the vicinity of the

vehicle during handling operations.

The engine is to be shut off during all

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M/s. SRF Limited


handling operations unless required

to drive pumps, hoist, etc.

Parking brakes are to be applied

whenever parked.

If the vehicle is parked on a road at

night or with poor visibility, warning

signs are to be placed 10 meters

ahead of and behind the vehicle.

TREM CARD provided to all

transporters and trained for

transportation Emergency of

Hazardous chemicals.

All trucks having 1 kg Sodium

Thiosulfate bag.



driving, hazard of Bromine

emergency handling, use of SCBA sets

and neutralizing agent.

All the ISO container truck will be

equipped with Global Positioning

system (GPS) and route will be

predefined.




CODE.


Truck.

3 Bromine ISO container

unloading & handling Leakage,

Spillage, fire,

explosion, toxic

release

Directly ISO container will be placed

at storage area and connected with

process tank.

Wear recommended personal

protective equipment during

connection of ISO container.

Make sure the absorber unit is

working and capable of handling

vented bromine fumes.

BE SURE THAT DRY AIR (DEW POINT

-400C) OR DRY NITROGEN is available

in ample supply and its pressure is

controlled below 3 atm. gauge.

Check that all the Iso-container valves

are closed and blind flanges are in

place.

Remove the blind flange above the

red valve.

Connect your pressure release line to

the red valve outlet. Use a new rubber

gasket (use limit - 24 hours) to

ensure tight connection.

Open the red valve slowly and then

the depressurizing valve, to release

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M/s. SRF Limited


any pressure which might have

developed in the Iso-container.

Remove the blind flange above the

yellow valve.

Connect your line to the yellow valve

outlet. Use a new PTFE gasket (use

limit - 24 hours) to ensure tight

connection.

Open the yellow valve and all the

valves in your liquid unloading line.

Close the depressurizing valve.

Open the pressurizing valve, at first

slowly (to check for bromine leaks),

then fully, to start bromine unloading.

Use only enough pressure to lift the

bromine to the high point in the

unloading system.

NEVER EXCEED 3 ATM. PRESSURE.

When air/nitrogen blows through the

unloading line into your storage tank,

the Iso-container is empty.

Close the pressurizing valve.

Close the yellow valve and then all

the other valves in your liquid

unloading line.

Slowly open the depressurizing valve

to release the air/nitrogen pressure

on the Iso-container to your absorber

unit. Wait 5 minutes.

Close the red valve and then the

depressurizing valve.

Cautiously disconnect your liquid

unloading line from the yellow valve

of the Iso-container. Replace its blind

flange, tightening all the bolts. Do not

forget to reinstall the proper gasket.

Disconnect your pressure release line

from the red valve of the Iso-

container. Replace its blind flange,

tightening all the bolts. Do not forget

to reinstall the proper gasket.

If there has been a bromine spillage,

wash it off the Iso-container with

plenty of water to prevent corrosion.

Small bromine spills on the ground

may be neutralized with a clear soda

ash or a sodium thiosulphate

solution. Then dispose of in a manner

approved by the local authorities.

Close the cover dome and pin it

securely.

Mark the Iso-container EMPTY (use

erasable means).

45

M/s. SRF Limited


Bromine iso tanks should be stored

no closer than 10 meters from human

or animal consumable articles.

Explosives and flammable materials

should not be stored close to

bromine.

There would be sufficient bromine

storage tank capacity or an empty ISO

tank to accommodate the transfer of

bromine from a leaking container

Area where bromine will be used or

stored will be enclosed so that

unauthorized persons and animals

are prevented from entering the area.

Adequate lighting will be provided to

allow sufficient night surveillance.

Surveillance will be provided 24

hours a day.

Personnel escape routes will be

clearly marked and it will be

maintained without any obstructions

including adequately sized doors and

windows.

Facilities like offices, eating,

showering and changing rooms, will

be located in up wind direction and

remote from the area where bromine

is handled or stored. Provide an

adequate supply of clean water for

washing and showers.

Emergency siren, telephone will be

provided in storage area for the

reporting of accidents or emergency

situations. The emergency telephone

numbers will be displayed at

prominent locations and it include

the fire department, ambulance

service, emergency response team,

hospital and police.

A wind sock will be provided which

will clearly visible from all points on

the site and replaced as required.

This is required for indicating wind

strength and direction.

Emergency respirator equipment

cabinets( Cupboard) will be installed

not more than 30 meters or ten

seconds walking distance from any

location in the storage area.

Showers and eyewash fountains will

be provided, clearly marked, well lit

and with unobstructed access.

Signs will be posted prominently at

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M/s. SRF Limited


the site entrance and throughout the

installation with area maps showing

access ways, hydrant locations,

emergency showers, location of

emergency equipment and

emergency telephone numbers.

All management and operating

personnel involved in the use or

handling of bromine will undergo

safety training, in addition to specific

task training.

Only experienced well-trained

operators will be allowed to receive

and unload bromine receptacles.

The management will ensure that

emergency response plans have been

made and coordinated with the

emergency response local authorities.

Safety permit for hazardous material

loading unloading will be prepared

and implemented.

Fire hydrant system and water

sprinkler system installed at tank

farm area.

3.9.3 Transportation , Unloading and handling procedure for Oleum:

TABLE: 3.8


POSSIBLE

HAZARD

CONTROL MEASURES AND HANDLING

PROCEDURES.

1 Transportation of

Oleum by road tanker

Leakage,

Spillage, Toxic

release





of SCBA sets administration.







CODE.


TL.

Emergency telephone numbers list of

OFF site emergency agencies will be

provided in TREM CARD

2 Oleum Road tanker

unloading at site.

Leakage,

Spillage, toxic

release

Priority will be given to Tanker to




47

M/s. SRF Limited


road.

Security person will check Licence,


condition, SCBA set condition,

required PPEs as per SOP laid down.

Store officer will take sample as per

sampling SOP from sampling point.

After approval of QC/QA department


be started.


during unloading




followed according to check list and

implemented.

Flexible hose connection will be done

at TL outlet line and checked for no

leakage.

Every time rubber gasket will be

changed.

The quantity remaining in the hose

pipeline will be drained to a small

container, which will be

subsequently transferred to the main

storage tank thus ensuring complete

closed conditions for transfer from

road tanker.

All TL valves will be closed in TL.

3 Oleum Storage tank

safety

Leakage,

Spillage, Toxic

release.

Storage tank will be stored away

from the process plant.



Caution note and emergency

handling procedure will be displayed

at unloading area and trained all

operators.

NFPA label will be provided.

Required PPEs like full body

protection PVC Suit, Hand gloves,

gumboot, Respiratory mask etc. will

be provided to operator.

Neutralizing agent will be kept ready

for tackle any emergency spillage.

Safety shower, eye wash with

quenching unit will be provided in

acid storage area.

Material will be handled in close

condition in pipe line.

Dyke wall will be provided to all

storage tanks, collection pit with

48

M/s. SRF Limited


valve provision.

Double drain valve will provided.

Level Transmitter will be provided

on all storage tanks.

Safety permit for loading unloading

of hazardous material will be


TREM CARD will be provided to all

transporters and will be trained for

transportation Emergency of

Hazardous chemicals.

Fire hydrant system with jockey

pump as per TAC norms will be

installed.

4 Oleum transferred

from storage tank to

Day tank

Leakage,

Spillage due to

Line rupture,

Flange Gasket

failure, Toxic

release.

Double mechanical seal type pump

will be provided.

Double on / off switch will provided

at tank farm and process area near

day tank. Pump auto cut off with day

tank high level will be provided.

Vent will be provided with sulphuric acid tanks.

Overflow will be provided for additional safety i.e- HI & HI-HI level alarm trip

logics.

NRV will be provided on pump

discharge line.

Flange Guard will be provided to all

flanges.

5 Oleum transfer from

Day tank to reactor.

Leakage,

Spillage due to

Line rupture,

Flange Gasket

failure, Toxic

release.

Transfer by pump in Close loop.

Double valve will be installed on day

tank outlet line.


will be charged in to reactor at a

time.


outlet line.

Flange guard will be provided to

pipeline flanges.

3.9.4 Drums Transportation , Unloading and handling procedure

TABLE: 3.9


POSSIBLE

HAZARD

PROCEDURES.

1 Transportation of

Solvents drums

Leakage,

Spillage, fire,

explosion,

Toxic release





49

M/s. SRF Limited


of SCBA sets.


First Aid Kit will be kept with TL.

Fire extinguishers will be kept with

TL.

Spark arrestor will be provided to TL

exhaust.






CODE.


TL.

2 Drums unloading at

site.

Leakage,

Spillage, fire,

explosion, toxic

release

Priority will be given to truck to




road.

Security person will check Licence,


condition, First Aid Kit condition,

Antidote Kit, required PPEs as per

SOP laid down.

QA/QC Chemist will take sample as

per sampling SOP from sampling

point.

After approval ofQA/QC department


be started.


during unloading



Only day time unloading will be

permitted.

3 Godown/warehouse

safety

Leakage,

Spillage, Fire,

Explosion,

Toxic release.

FLP type light fittings will be

provided.

Proper ventilation will be provided in

godown.

Proper label and identification board

/stickers will be provided in the

storage area.

Conductive drum pallets will be

provided.

Drum handling trolley /

stackers/fork lift will be used for

drum handling.

Separate dispensing room with local

exhaust and static earthing provision

will be made.

50

M/s. SRF Limited


Materials will be stored as per its

compatibility study and separate

area will be made for flammable,

corrosive and toxic chemical drums

storage.

Smoking and other spark, flame

generating item will be banned from

the Gate.

4 Solvents transfer

from drum to Day

tank/ reactor

Leakage,

Spillage due to

Line rupture,

Flange Gasket

failure, Fire,

Explosion,

Toxic release.

Solvent transfer by vacuum or by

pump only.

Static earthing will be provided.

SS flexible hose / conductive hose

will be used.

5 Solvent transfer from

Day tank to reactor.

Leakage,

Spillage due to

Line rupture,

Flange Gasket

failure, Fire,

Explosion,

Toxic release.

Transfered solvent from drums to storage tank/reactor in closed loop by

pump.


will be charged in to reactor at a

time.


outlet line.


storage tank.

Jumpers will be provided to pipeline

flanges.

51

M/s. SRF Limited


3.10 HAZARDOUS PROPERTIES OF THE CHEMICALS, COMPATIBILITIES AND SPECIAL HAZARD

Table-3.10

Sr. No NAME OF

CHEMICAL

HA

ZA

RD

FL

AS

H P

OIN

T 0

C

BP 0C

LEL

%

UEL

%

SP.GR 20 0C

VD

SO

LU

BIL

ITY

WIT

H W

AT

ER

at

20

0C

NFPA

H F R

HAZARDOUS

COMBUSTION

PRODUCT

TLV

PPM

IDLH

PPM

LC50

mg/m3

TARGET

ORGANS

CA

RC

INO

G-

EN

ICIT

Y

ANTIDOT

1. Trifluoro Acetic Acid

CAS# 76-05-1

T -3 72.4 NF NF 1.535 3.9 Soluble 3 0 0 CO, CO2, HF gas NL NL 10 gm/m3

Rat

Respiratory system,

eyes, skin, mucous

membranes

No Not available

2. Parabromofluorobe

nzene

CAS# 460-00-4

F/T 53 150 NA NA 1.6030 to

1.6060

6.03 Insoluble 1 2 0 Fire may produce

irritating, corrosive

and/or toxic gases.

NL NL Inhalation - Rat - 4 h

- 18.000 mg/m3

No data

available

Inhalation - May

cause respiratory

irritation.

No No specific antidote.

3. Ethyldifluoroacetate

CAS# 454-31-9

F/C 25 97 NA NA 1.1760 to

1.1810

NA slight soluble

in water

3 2 0 CO, CO2 Gaseous

HF

NL NL NA NA NA No specific antidote

4. Ethyltrifluroacetate

CAS# 383-63-1

F/C

/T

-1 60 - 62 NA NA 1.1900 to

1.1950

4.9 hydrolysis 2 3 0 CO, CO2 Gaseous

HF

NL NL NA Liver Not observed No specific antidote

5. Ethyltrifluoroacetoacetate

CAS# 372-31-6

F/H 28 131 NA NA 1.2490 to 1.2670

NA slight soluble in water

2 3 0 CO, CO2 Gaseous HF

NL NL NA Respiratory system, eyes, skin

NA No specific antidote

6. Amino crotonate

CAS# 7318-00-5

C 97 210-

215

NA NA 1.28-1.32 NA soluble 3 1 0 CO, CO2 & NOx NL NL NA Respiratory system NA No specific antidote

7. Trifluoroacetic anhydride

CAS#: 407-25-0

C/T NA 40 NA NA 1.487 NA Insoluble 3 2 0 CO, CO2, Gaseous HF

NL NL NA Respiratory system NA No specific antidote

8. 1,1,2,2-

Tetrafluoroethyl

Methyl Ether

CAS# 425-88-7

F -20 37.2 11.7 23.5 1.2940 4.55 Soluble 0 4 1 HF NL NL Oral: LC50, rat, >

10,000 ppm

NA NA No specific antidote

9. Triflic Acid

CAS# 1493-13-6

C NA 161-

162

NA NA 1.696 5.2 Very Soluble 3 0 1 CO, SOx, CO2, HF NL NL NA Respiratory system,

eyes, skin


10. Trimethylsilyl

trifluoromethanesul

fonate CAS# 27607-77-8

F/T 25 140 NA NA 1.150 7.7 3 3 2 irritating and

highly toxic

gases may be generated by

NL NL NA Respiratory system,

eyes, skin.


52

M/s. SRF Limited


thermal

decomposition

11. Trifluoroacetyl

chloride

CAS# 354-32-5

T NA -19.3 NA NA 1.38 5.7 Reacts with

water

4 1 0

- -w-

HCL gas, HF, CO NL NL 4 h, rat, 40 - 90

ppm

Lungs, Liver

irritant effects


12. Sulphur

Tetrafluoride

CAS# 7783-60-0

H

react on

contact

with

air,

heat,

light or

water

NA -38 NA NA 1.95 3.78 Reacts with

water

3 0 2 Contact with water

or moist air may

generate flammable and/or

toxic gases.

0.1 NL 1 h : 40 ppm respiratory tract NA No specific antidote

13. Monomethylhydrazi

ne

CAS# 60-34-4

F/C -8.3 87.5 2.5 92 0.874 1.03 soluble 4 3 2 toxic oxides of

nitrogen during

combustion

0.2 20 Rat inhalation 74-78

ppm/4 hr

Skin, Eye, and

Respiratory

tract

Yes

20 ppm;

NIOSH

considers

methyl

hydrazine to

be a potential

occupational carcinogen.

1) Give the victims

water or milk.

adults, 250 mL (8

oz or 1 cup).

Water or milk

should be given

only if victims are

conscious and

alert.

2) Activated charcoal

may be

administered if

victims are

conscious and

alert. 50 to 100 g

(1-3/4 to 3-1/2

oz) for adults,

with 125 to 250 mL (1/2 to 1 cup)

of water.

3) Promote excretion

by administering a

saline cathartic or

sorbitol to

conscious and

alert victims.

http://pubchem.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/compound/water

http://pubchem.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/compound/Water


http://pubchem.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/compound/sorbitol

53

M/s. SRF Limited


14. Tri Fluoro acetone

CAS# 421-50-1

F/H -30 22 NA NA 1.25 >1 Soluble

with

high heat of

reaction

when

dissolving.

2 4 1 CO, CO2, Gaseous

HF

NL NL NA Respiratory system. No No specific antidote

15. Methyl tri fluoro

acetate

CAS# 431-47-0

F/C -7 43-44 NA NA 1.273 4.41 NA 3 3 0

CO, CO2, Gaseous

HF

NL NL NA Respiratory system. No No specific antidote

16. Chlorodifluoroacetic

Anhydride

CAS# 2834-23-3

T/C NA 96-97 NA NA 1.395 3.5 NA 3 0 0 Highly toxic HCl gas

is produced during

combustion.

NL NL NA NA No specific antidote

17. 4-

Chlorobenzotrichloride

CAS# 5216-25-1

H/C > 112 245 NA NA 1.495 7.9 decomposes 3 0 1 CO, CO2, Gaseous

HCL

NL NL Inhalation, mouse:

LC50 = 125 mg/m3;

Inhalation, rat:

LC50 = 125 mg/m3

Central nervous

system, cardiovascular

system.

No No specific antidote

18. 3-

Aminobenzotrifluori

de

CAS# 455-14-1

C/T

/F

86 83

(12

mmHg)

NA NA 1.296 5.6 insoluble 3 2 1 CO,CO2, HF, NOx NL NL NA Respiratory system

19. Ethyl-

Trifluoropyruvate

CAS# 13081-18-0

F/H 31 95-98 NA NA 1.283 NA NA 2 3 0 CO, CO2, HF gas NL NL NA eyes, respiratory

system and

skin.


20. Trichloroacetyl

chloride

C/T

100 114-

116

Na NA 1.620 6.3 Incompatible

with water

4 0 0

w

HCL gas, CO, CO2,

Phosgene gas

NL NL 475 mg/m3 ( Rat ) 4

h

Respiratory system No No specific antidote

21. Anhydrous

Hydrofluoric acid

CAS# 7664-39-3

H/T NA 19.5 NA NA 0.97 1.3-1.9 Very soluble

(violent

reaction)

4 0 1 Hydrogen over

an extended

period of time in

steel cylinders and

systems

3 30 1276 ppm (rat, 1

hour)

Eyes, skin, airway,

lungs, liver, kidney,

heart and bone.


22. Difluoromethane

(HFC - 32 )

CAS# 75-10-5

-52 12.7 33.4 1.8 2.163 NA 1 4 1 Halogen, Halogen

acid, & possibly

carbonyl halide

such as phosgene.

NL NL 1 h, rat =100,000

ppm

Central nervous

system,

cardiovascular

system.


23. R600a (ISO Butane)

CAS# 75-28-5

F -82.2 -12.2 1.6 8.4 2.51 2.05 insoluble 1 4 0 CO 800 NL rat, 4 hours =

277000 ppm (27.7%)

Central nervous

system


24. Dicyclopentadyene &

Chlorobenzene

CAS# 77-73-6

F 32 150-

190

0.8 6.3 0.977 4.5 insoluble 1 3 1 Toxic and irritating

gases

5 NL 500 Eyes, skin,

respiratory system,

central nervous

system, kidneys


54

M/s. SRF Limited


25. Diethylether &

Toluene

CAS# 60-29-7

F -40 34.6 1.8 48 0.714 2.55 soluble 1 4 1 CO, CO2, Peroxides 400 1900 Inhalation - mouse -

30 min - 31000 ppm

Eyes, skin,

respiratory system,

central nervous system


26. Dimethylformamide

CAS# 68-12-2

T/F 57 153 2.2 15.2 0.949 2.51 Easily

soluble

2 2 0 carbon oxides,

nitrogen oxides

10 500 Inhalation, rat: LC50

= 3421 ppm/1H;

Eyes, skin,

respiratory system,

liver, kidneys,

cardiovascular

system

Yes

No specific antidote

27. Ethane

CAS# 74-84-0

F -135 -88.6 3 12.5 0.362 1.04 insoluble 1 4 0 Carbon oxides NL NL NA None NA No specific antidote

28. Ethanol

CAS# 64-17-5

F 14 78 3.3 19 0.790 1.59 soluble 2 3 0 CO, CO2, irritating

and toxic fumes

and gases

1000 3300 Inhalation - rat - 10 h

- 20000 ppm

Eyes, skin,

respiratory system,

central nervous

system, liver,

blood, reproductive

system

Ethanol has

been shown

to produce

fetotoxicity in

the embry o

or fetus of laboratory

animals

Teratogen

Reproductive

effect

Mutagen

2 gm sodium bi

carbonate in 250

ml water,

Diazepam 10 mg

through injection

29. Ethyl Acetate CAS # 141-78-6

F -4.0 77.0 2.0 11.5 0.902 3.0 1 ml/10ml water

1 3 0 Irritating Vapour 400 2000 200 gm/m3 Eyes, skin, respiratory

system


30. Ethyldifluoroacetate

&

Polyldifluoroacetate

CAS# 454-31-9

F/C 23.9 99 NA NA 1.18 NA slight soluble 3 2 0 COx, HF NL NL NA Respiratory system,

gastrointestinal

system, eyes, skin


31. HCl Anhydrous

CAS #7647-01-0

T/C NA -84.9 NA NA 1.27 1.52 Soluble 3 0 1 HCL gas 5 50 1300 ppm /30

mins for hum

Eyes, skin,

respiratory

system

No No specific

Antidote

32. Hydrochloric acid

(15 - 33%)

CAS #7647-01-0

T/C NA -84.9 NA NA 1.27 1.52 Soluble 3 0 1 HCL gas 5 50 1300 ppm /30 mins

for hum

Eyes, skin,

respiratory

system

No No specific Antidote

33. Hydrofluoric acid (20

- 60%)

CAS# 7664-39-3

H/T NA 19.5 NA NA 0.97 1.3-1.9 Very

soluble

(violent

reaction)

4 0 1 Hydrogen over an

extended period

of time in

steel cylinders and

systems

3 30 1276 ppm (rat, 1

hour)

Eyes, skin, airway,

lungs, liver,

kidney, heart and

bone.


34. Hydrogen bromide

CAS# 10035-10-6

T/C -66.7 NA NA NA 2.812 3.684 Insoluble 3 0 1 NA 2 30 Inhalation - rat - 1 h

- 2860 ppm

respiratory system No No specific antidote

55

M/s. SRF Limited


35. Methylene chloride

CAS# 75-09-2

H/T NA 39.75 12 19 1.3266 2.93 Partially

soluble

2 1 0 CO, CO2,

halogenated

compounds.

50 52000 1 hours [Rat]. lungs, the

nervous system,

liver, mucous

membranes,


Yes

Classified

2B

(Possible

for human.) by IARC


36. o-Xylene

CAS # 1330-20-7

F 31 143-

145

1.7 7.6 0.878 3.7 0.2 g/l 3 2 0 CO, CO2 100 900 4550 ppm 4

hour(s) [Rat].

Eyes, skin,

respiratory

system, central

nervous system,

gastrointestinal

tract, blood, liver,

kidney

No Diazem – 1

mg/Kg.(Intraveno

us), Epinephina,

Efidrine

37. n-Butane

CAS# 106-97-8

F -60 -0.5 1.8 8.4 2.08 2.11 Insoluble 1 4 0 CO, CO2 1000 NL (Rat, inhalation) =

658g/m3/4 hours

central nervous

system


38. Toluene

CAS # 108-88-3

F 4.0 111 1.1 7.1 0.87 3.2 Insoluble 2 3 0 Irritating Vapour

generated

50 2000 400 ppm for 24Hr

Rat

Eyes, skin,

respiratory system, central

nervous system,

liver, kidneys

No Diazem – 1

mg/Kg.(Intravenous), Epinephina,

Efidrine

39. Hexane

CAS #110-54-3

F -7 68.7 1.2 7.7 0.659 3.0 - 1 3 0 CO & CO2 50

ppm

5000

ppm

- No No specific Antidot

40. R 600a (Isobutane)

CAS# 75-28-5

F -82.8 -12.22 1.8 8.4 0.564 2.006 Insoluble 1 4 0 Carbon

monoxide.

Unidentified

organic and

inorganic

compounds

800 NL Rat inhalation LC50

(4 hr.): 658,000ppm

CNS No No specific Antidot

41. Sodium methoxide CAS #124-41-4

F 60.55 300 7.3 36 0.996 1.3 Reacts with water

3 4 3 CO, CO2, sodium oxide

200 6000 NA Respiratory system,

gastrointestinal

system, eyes,

skin


42. 1,4-Dioxane (C4H8O2)

CAS# 123-91-1

H/F 12 101 2 22 1.034 NA Soluble 2 3 1 CO, CO2, Peroxide

NIOSH

REL: 1 ppm

OSHA

PEL: 100

ppm

500 48.5 mg/L ( Rat ) 4 h

Eyes, skin, respiratory

system, liver, kidneys

Yes Group 2B -

Possibly Carcinogenic to Humans – carcinogen

by IARC

No specific antidote.

56

M/s. SRF Limited


43. Acetic Acid CAS No. 64-19-7

T / F

44.4

117.9

5.4 16.0

1.015

2.1 Soluble 2 2 1 Irritating Vapour

generated

10 ppm

50 ppm

5620 ppm/1H Teeth, eyes, skin, mucous membranes

No Milk of magnesia.

44. Acetic anhydride CAS No.108-24-7

F/T 49 140 2.7 10.3

1.05 3.5 Slightly 3 2 1 Emits toxic fumes

5ppm

200 ppm

1780 mg/m3 eyes, skin, respiratory

system, lungs

No milk butter and milk of magnesia.

45. Acetone CAS# 67-64-1

F - 20 56 2.15 13.0 0.791 2.00 Soluble 1 3 0 Irritating vapour

1000 2500 Inhalation, mouse: LC50 = 44 gm/m3/4H; Inhalation, rat: LC50 = 50100

mg/m3/8H


system, central nervous system

No 10 mg diazepam through injection

46. Ammonia (Anhydrous) CAS # 7664-41-7

C NF - 33.3

15.50

27 0.6819

at -30 C

(Water)

0.5970 at

00C 1 atm (Air 1)

Liq. 608.7 kg/m

3 210C Gas

0.771 kg/m

3 00C

Insoluble 3 1 0 N A 25 ppm

300 ppm

7040 mg/m3 Eyes, skin, respiratory

system

No Smelling Ethanol or Ether

47. Bromine CAS #7726-95-6

C/T -- 58.78

-- -- 3.11 7.1 Soluble in water

3 0 0 Non combustible

0.2 ppm

3.0 ppm

2600 mg/kg [Rat

respiratory system, eyes,

central nervous

system, skin

No Put two or three drops of Pontocane (0.5 solution) or Benoxinate (Novesine) 0.4 %. If problem in respiration, give milk, butter-milk or lemon juice or make a small cotton ball and drench with ethanol or ether solution drops

57

M/s. SRF Limited


and put it near victim’s nose for smell. Apply pure oxygen.

48. Butyl Acetate CAS#: 123-86-4

H/F 27 °C

125 °C

NA NA 0.8812

4 5.3 g/l 2 3 0 Carbon Dioxide, Carbon

Monoxide.

150 1700 4 h LC50 for rats is over 2230

mg/m3


system, central nervous system

NO No specific antidote.

49. Dichloro Methane (MDC, DCM ) CAS#: 75-09-2

T N.F 39.8 14.0 22.0 1.325 2.9 20 g/ lit. 2 0 1 CO, CO2, Cocl2, HCL (g)

generated

25 2300 52 gm/m3 inhalation

- rat

blood, central nervous system

Yes Cancer Site

[in animals:

lung, liver, salivary & mammary

gland tumors]

No specific antidote.

50. Carbon monoxide CAS# 630-08-0

F/H NA -191.5 10.9 74.2 1.250 0.97 Partially soluble

3 4 0 CO will decompose

above 752°F (400°C) to form carbon dioxide

and carbon.

50 1200 inhalation rat – 1880 ppm/4h

cardiovascular system, lungs, blood, central

nervous system

No 100% Oxygen,

51. Chlorine CAS #7782-50-5

T - The lowest known value

is 100°C

NA NA 1.424 0.62 Boils 3 0 0 Toxic and irritating gases

1 10 1017 ppm For human

Eyes, skin, respiratory system

No Milk butter and milk of magnesia.

52. Chloro Benzene CAS # 108-90-7

T/F 28 132 1.3 9.6 1.11 3.9 Insoluble 2 3 0 Phosgene & Hydrochloric

gases generated

75 1000 22,000 ppm Rat Eyes, skin, respiratory

system, central nervous

system, liver

No Diazem – 1 mg/Kg.(Intraven

ous) Epinephina,

Efidrine 53. Chlorodifluorom

ethane (R 22) CAS# 75-45-6

H -78.3 -40.7 NA NA 1.21 3.0 Partially soluble

1 0 1 Toxic and/or corrosive fumes

may be produced by thermal

NIOSH-REL: 1000

NL NA respiratory system,

cardiovascular system, central


58

M/s. SRF Limited


decomposition: Chlorides. Fluorides.

nervous system, liver, kidneys,

spleen 54. Cyclohexanone

CAS# 108-94-1 C/F 44 155 1.1 9.4 0.94 3.4 Soluble 1 2 0 CO 50 700 Inhalation rat:

8000 ppm/4-hour Eyes, skin, respiratory

system, central nervous system,

liver, kidneys


55. Difluoromethane (R

- 32 )

CAS# 75-10-5

-52 12.7 33.4 1.8 2.163 NA 1 4 1 Halogen, Halogen

acid, & possibly

carbonyl halide

such as phosgene.

NL NL 1 h, rat =100,000

ppm

Central nervous

system,

cardiovascular

system.


56. Dimethylformamide

CAS# 68-12-2

T/F 57 153 2.2 15.2 0.949 2.51 Easily

soluble

2 2 0 carbon oxides,

nitrogen oxides

10 500 Inhalation, rat: LC50

= 3421 ppm/1H;

Eyes, skin,

respiratory system, liver, kidneys,

cardiovascular

system

Yes

May affect

genetic

material. May

cause adverse

reproductive

effects(patern

al and

maternal) and

birth defects. Embryotoxic

and/or

foetotoxic in

animal. Passes

through the

placental

barrier in

animal. May

cause cancer


57. Ethyl Acetate

CAS # 141-78-6

F -4.0 77.0 2.0 11.5 0.902 3.0 1 ml/10ml

water

1 3 0 Irritating Vapour 400 2000 200 gm/m3 Eyes, skin,

respiratory

system


58. Ethyldifluoroacetoacetate CAS# 454-31-9

F/C 23.9 99 NA NA 1.18 NA slight soluble

3 2 0 COx, HF NL NL NA Respiratory system,

gastrointestinal system, eyes,

skin


59. Ethyledichloride CAS# 107-06-2

F/T 13 83 6.2 15.9

1.253

3.4 0.87 % 2 3 1 Hcl, Phosgene NIOSH-

50 N.L Eyes, skin, kidneys, liver,

Yes Cancer Site


59

M/s. SRF Limited


REL: 1

ppm

central nervous system,

cardiovascular system

[in animals: forestomach, mammary gland & circulatory sys cancer]

60. Ethylene CAS# 74-85-1

F NA -104 2.7 36 NA 1.0 Partially soluble

1 4 2 COx NL NL NA central nervous system

depression, difficulty breathing


61. Ethyltrifluroacetate

CAS# 383-63-1

F/C

/T

-1 60 - 62 NA NA 1.1900 to

1.1950

4.9 hydrolysis 2 3 0 CO, CO2 Gaseous

HF

NL NL NA Liver No No specific antidote

62. Ethyltrifluoroacetoa

cetate

CAS# 372-31-6

F/H 28 131 NA NA 1.2490 to

1.2670

NA slight soluble

in water

2 3 0 CO, CO2 Gaseous

HF

NL NL NA Respiratory system,

eyes, skin


63. Fluorine CAS# 7782-41-4

T/C

Oxidize

r

NA -188.1 NA NA 1.5 1.3 Reacts with water

4 0 4 -W-

None that are more toxic than

the product itself

0.1 25 Rat – 1 hr – 185 ppm;

Rat – 4 hr – 92.5

ppm



No IV calcium should be administered to

patients with cardiac

dysrhythmias.

Electrolytes may be used to correct

imbalances resulting from

fluoride toxicity. 64. Hexafluoroaceto

ne CAS# 684-16-2

T/C NA -26 NA NA 1.320 5.73 NA 4 0 2 NA 0.1 NL Inhalation - rat - 3 h - 275 ppm


system, kidneys, reproductive

system


65. Hexane CAS #110-54-3

F -7 68.7 1.2 7.7 0.659 3.0 Insoluble 1 3 0 CO & CO2 500 1100 48000 ppm ( Rat ) 4 h



peripheral nervous system

No No specific Antidot

60

M/s. SRF Limited


66. Hydrazine hydrate F/T 75 113.5

3.5 99.99

1 1.1 Soluble in water

3 2 2 Irritating & toxic Gas

NL NL Acute: 570 ppm 4 hour(s) [Rat].

lungs, liver, mucous

membranes.


67. Hydrochloric acid

(15 - 33%)

CAS #7647-01-0

T/C NA -84.9 NA NA 1.27 1.52 Soluble 3 0 1 HCL gas 5 50 1300 ppm /30 mins

for hum

Eyes, skin,

respiratory

system


68. Hydrofluoric acid (20

- 60%)

CAS# 7664-39-3

H/T NA 19.5 NA NA 0.97 1.3-1.9 Very

soluble

(violent

reaction)

4 0 1 Hydrogen over an

extended period

of time in

steel cylinders and

systems

3 30 1276 ppm (rat, 1

hour)

Eyes, skin, airway,

lungs, liver,

kidney, heart and

bone.


69. Hydrogen Gas CAS # 1333-74-0

F/E N.A. -252.8°C

3.0 74 0.0696

- Soluble in water

1 4 0 Explosive gas 250 ppm

LC50 >800000 ppm rat

lungs, heart, upper respiratory tract, central nervous system (CNS)


70. Hydrogen bromide

CAS# 10035-10-6

T/C -66.7 NA NA NA 2.812 3.684 Insoluble 3 0 1 NA 2 30 Inhalation - rat - 1 h

- 2860 ppm

respiratory system No No specific antidote

71. Liquified Petroleum Gas CAS# 74-98-6

F/H -104 -42.04

2.1 9.5 0.58 1.5 Very lightly soluble

2 4 0 CO, CO2, H2 gas 1000 2100 inhalation rat 658 mg/l/4h


No Oxygen is the antidote for asphyxiant poisoning.

72. Methanesulfonyl

chloride (MSCl) CAS# 124-63-0

T/C 110 161 NA NA 1.481 3 NA 3 1 1 CO, CO2, halogenated compounds

Nl NL NL Eyes, skin, airway, lungs


73. Methanol CAS# 67-56-1

F/T 10 54 5.4 44 0.792 1.1 Soluble 1 3 0 Irritating vapour

200 6000 LEL

64000 ppm for 4H rat

Kidneys, heart, central

nervous system, liver,

eyes

No 10 mg diazepam through injection Activated Charcoal

74. Methylene chloride

CAS# 75-09-2

H/T NA 39.75 12 19 1.3266 2.93 Partially

soluble

2 1 0 CO, CO2,

halogenated

compounds.

50 NL 52000 1 hours [Rat]. lungs, the

nervous system,

liver, mucous membranes,

central

nervous system

Yes

Classified 2B

(Possible

for human.)


61

M/s. SRF Limited


by IARC

75. MonoChloro Benzene CAS # 108-90-7

T/F 28 132 1.3 9.6 1.11 3.9 Insoluble 2 3 0 Phosgene & Hydrochloric

gases generated

10 ppm

10 ppm

22,000 ppm Rat Eyes, skin, respiratory


system, liver


ous) Epinephina,

Efidrine 76. Monomethylhydrazi

ne

CAS# 60-34-4

F/C -8.3 87.5 2.5 92 0.874 1.03 soluble 4 3 2 toxic oxides of nitrogen during

combustion

0.2 20 Rat inhalation 74-78 ppm/4 hr

Skin, Eye, and Respiratory

tract

Yes

20 ppm;

NIOSH

considers

methyl

hydrazine to

be a potential

occupational

carcinogen.

4) Give the victims water or milk.

adults, 250 mL (8

oz or 1 cup).

Water or milk

should be given

only if victims are

conscious and

alert.

5) Activated charcoal

may be

administered if

victims are

conscious and

alert. 50 to 100 g

(1-3/4 to 3-1/2

oz) for adults,

with 125 to 250

mL (1/2 to 1 cup) of water.

6) Promote excretion

by administering a

saline cathartic or

sorbitol to

conscious and

alert victims.

77. Oleum Component: SULFURIC ACID-CAS# 7664-93-9: SULFUR TRIOXIDE-CAS#

T/C

Strong

oxedizer

NA 65 NA NA 1.992 at 4 C

NA miscible 3 0 2 Toxic and irritating

vapors

1 mg/m

3

15 mg/m

3

510 mg/m3 for 2 hrs RAT

Teeth, Lungs, Heart,

Respiratory system,

Cardiovascular system

No Sodium Hydro-Carbonate (4%

Conc.), Milk, Lime Juice, Milk

of Magnesia


http://pubchem.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/compound/Water


http://pubchem.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/compound/sorbitol

62

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7446-11-09

78. o-Xylene

CAS # 1330-20-7

F 31 143-

145

1.7 7.6 0.878 3.7 0.2 g/l 3 2 0 CO, CO2 100 900 4550 ppm 4

hour(s) [Rat].

Eyes, skin,

respiratory

system, central

nervous system,

gastrointestinal tract, blood, liver,

kidney

No Diazem – 1

mg/Kg.(Intraveno

us), Epinephina,

Efidrine

79. P-Chloro toluene CAS# 106-43-4

F/H 49 162 0.7 12.2 1.07 4.4 Insoluble 1 2 0 CO , HCL gas, possibly

phosgene . Reacts with

strong oxidants.

NL NL Inhalation (rat): >26700

ppm/1h


system


80. R 134a (1112 - Tetrafluoroethane)

H NA -26.3

NA NA NA 3.5 Insoluble 1 0 1 CO, CO2, halogenated compounds

NL NL Inhalation Vapor- Rat-4h- 1500 g/m³

NA No No specific antidote

81. R 152 a (Difluoroethane) CAS #75-37-6

H/F < 50 -25 3.7 18 NA 2.79 Slight soluble

2 4 1 CO, CO2, HF gas

NL NL Inhalation-Rat LCLo: 64,000 ppm/4 hours; Inhalation-Mouse LC50: 977 g/m3/2 hours

Respiratory system, central

nervous system,

circulatory system and

heart, kidneys.


82. R-125 (Pentafluoroethane) CAS# 354-33-6

H NA -48.5

NA NA 1.2 4.1 Slight soluble

1 0 1 toxic products which can be corrosive in the presence of moisture.

1000 NL Inhalation Vapor- Rat-4h- 2910 g/m³

NA NA No specific antidote

83. R-143a (1,1,1-TRIFLUOROETHANE) CAS# 420-46-2

F -47.2

-90 7.7 17.4 0.93 2.9 Slight soluble

1 4 1 HF gas 1000 NL Inhalation 4 hour LC50: > 540,000 ppm in rats

NA No No specific antidote

84. Raney nickel

T/F NA NA NA NA NA NA In contact with water

releases flammable

gas

3 2 0 W

obnoxious and toxic fumes

1 5 NA ATE > 20 mg/l.

Skin. Yes

Nickel is Group 2B carcinoge


63

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n- IARC

85. Sodium Methoxide (30%) CAS# 124-41-4

F/H 33 NA 7.3 36 1.1 1.1 Decomposes/reacts in water

3 2 2 CO, CO2 3 Mg/m3

NL NA Respiratory system


86. Sulfuric Acid CAS # 7664-93-9

C -- 340 -- -- 1.84 -- Water reactive

3 0 2 Non combustible

1 mg/m3

15 mg/m

3

510 Rat Skin, eyes, Lung,

No Sodium Hydro-Carbonate (4%

Conc.), Milk, Lime Juice, Milk

of Megnesia 87. Tetrafluoroethyl

ene CAS# 116-14-3

T/F/R

NA -76 10 50 1.5 3.9 insoluble 2 4 3 halogenated compounds, acid

halides

2 NL 40000 ppm/4 hour(s) inhalation-rat

NA Yes

NTP: Anticipated Human

Carcinogen; IARC: Animal

Sufficient Evidence, Group 2B; ACGIH: A3 -Confirmed

Animal Carcinogen


88. Tetrahydrofuran CAS # 109-99-9

F/E -21 66 1.5 12 0.88 2.5 miscible 2 3 0 Toxic vapour 200 ppm

2000 ppm

21000 mg/m 3 hours [Rat

Skin, eyes, Lung,


89. Toluene

CAS # 108-88-3 F 4.0 111 1.1 7.1 0.87 3.2 Insoluble 2 3 0 Irritating

Vapour generated

50 2000 400 ppm for 24Hr Rat





ous), Epinephina,

Efidrine

90. TRICHLOROETHYLENE CAS# 79-01-6

H NA 87 8 10.5 1.464 4.53 Insoluble 2 1 0 phosgene, halogenated compounds,

oxides of carbon

100 1000 140700 mg/m3/1 hour(s) inhalation-rat


system, heart, liver, kidneys,

Yes Cancer Site [in animals:

No specific Antidote

64

M/s. SRF Limited


LC50 central nervous system

liver & kidney cancer]

91. Trichlorofluoromethane CAS# 75-69-4

H NA 23.7 NA NA 1.49 4.7 Partially soluble

1 0 0 CO, CO2, halogenated compounds,

carbonyl halides

1000 2000 Inhalation Gas-rat-1 hr-104800 ppm

Skin, respiratory

system, cardiovascular

system

NA No specific Antidote

92. Xylene CAS # 1330-20-7

F 31 143-145

1.7 7.6 0.878 3.7 0.2 g/l 3 2 0 100 ppm

150 ppm

4550 ppm 4 hour(s) [Rat].



gastrointestinal tract, blood, liver, kidneys


ous), Epinephina,

Efidrine

F = FIRE T = TOXIC C = CORROSIVE E = EXPLOSIVE R = REACTIVE STEL = SHORT TERM EXPOSURE LIMIT

BP = BOILING POINT LEL = LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT PPM = PARTS PER MILLION

UEL = UPPER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT SP.GR = SPECIFIC GRAVITY VD = VAPOUR DENSITY

ER = EVAPORATION RATE H = HEALTH HAZARD CLASS F = FIRE HAZARD CLASS

R = REACTIVE HAZARD BR = BURNING RATE TLV = THRESHOLD LIMIT VALUE

NFPA =NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION-usa N.A = NOT AVAILABLE N.L =NOT LISTED

http://www.commonchemistry.org/ChemicalDetail.aspx?ref=75-69-4

65

M/s. SRF Limited


3.11 Occupational health impact on employees, control measures, action plan if accident occur

Table-3.11

Sr.No. Chemical Occupational health impact on

employees

Control measures provided Action plan if accident occure

1. Acetic Acid

CAS No. 64-19-7

Chronic respiratory disease due to

long term exposure inhalation

Skin disease due to skin contact

Process enclosure,

Local exhaust, General

dilution ventilation,

Personal protective

equipments

Remove victim from the spillage location

into fresh air area.

Small spillage control absorb on paper

towel.

Large spillage – Evacuate area and stop

source of ignition.

Dilute with water and collect washed

out water in tank and neutralize it in

safe manner.

2. Acetic anhydride

CAS No.108-24-7




Process enclosure,



Personal protective

equipments

Remove victim from the spillage location

into fresh air area.

Small spillage control absorb on paper

towel.

Large spillage – Evacuate area and stop

source of ignition.

Dilute with water and collect washed

out water in tank and neutralize it in

safe manner.

3. Acetone

CAS# 67-64-1 99




Process enclosure,



Personal protective

equipments

Prevent ignition, stop leak and ventilate

the area. Contain spilled liquid with sand

or earth. DO NOT use combustible

materials such as sawdust. Use

appropriate personal protective

equipment

66

M/s. SRF Limited


4. Acetonitrile

CAS #75-05-8

Potential Acute Health Effects:

skin contact (irritant), of eye

contact (irritant),

Potential Chronic Health Effects:

The substance is toxic to blood,

kidneys, lungs, liver, mucous

membranes, gastrointestinal tract,

upper respiratory tract,

skin, eyes, central nervous system

(CNS). The substance may be toxic

to the reproductive system.

Closed system, ventilation,

explosion-proof electrical

equipment and lighting. Do

NOT use compressed air for

filling, discharging, or

handling.

Ventilation. Remove all ignition sources.

Collect leaking liquid in sealable

containers. Absorb remaining liquid in

dry sand or inert absorbent and remove

to safe place. Do NOT wash away into

sewer. Personal protection: complete

protective clothing including self-

contained breathing apparatus

5. Liq. Ammonia (25 %

Solution)

Very hazardous in case of skin

contact (corrosive, irritant,

permeator), Inhalation of the

spray mist may produce severe

irritation of respiratory tract,

characterized by coughing,

choking, or shortness of breath.

Severe over-exposure can result in

death. The substance is toxic

to upper respiratory tract

Provide exhaust ventilation or

other engineering controls to

keep the airborne

concentrations of vapors

below their respective

threshold limit value. Ensure

that eyewash stations and

safety showers are proximal

to the work-station location.

Dilute with water and mop up, or absorb

with an inert dry material and place in

an appropriate waste disposal container.

If necessary: Neutralize the residue with

a dilute solution of acetic acid.

Corrosive liquid. Poisonous liquid. Stop

leak if without risk. Absorb with DRY

earth, sand or other non-combustible

material.

Do not get water inside container. Do

not touch spilled material. Use water

spray curtain to divert vapor drift. Use

water spray to reduce vapors. Prevent

entry into sewers, basements or

confined areas; dike if needed. Call for

assistance on disposal. Neutralize the

residue with a dilute solution of acetic

acid.

6. Benzaldehyde Prolonged or repeated contact Closed system, ventilation, Remove sources of ignition, stop release,

67

M/s. SRF Limited


CAS No. 100-52-7 with the skin may cause contact

dermatitis. No other chronic health

hazard information is available

explosion-proof electrical

equipment and lighting. Do

NOT use compressed air for

filling, discharging, or

handling.

and provide adequate ventilation.

Prevent flow to sewer and public waters.

Recover free product, if possible. Cover

spill with inert, non-combustible

absorbent material and remove to

disposal container. Consider sealed

metal containers for disposal. Report

spill as per regulatory requirements.

Leaking drum should be emptied or

placed into an oversized (recovery)

drum.

7. Benzyl chloride

CAS#: 100-44-7

The substance is toxic

to kidneys, lungs, the nervous

system, liver, mucous membranes.

Repeated or prolonged exposure

to the substance can

produce target organs damage.

Repeated or prolonged contact

with spray mist may produce

chronic eye irritation and severe

skin irritation. Repeated or

prolonged exposure to spray mist

may produce respiratory tract

irritation leading to frequent

p. 2

attacks of bronchial infection.

Repeated exposure to a highly

toxic material may produce

general deterioration of health by

an accumulation in one or many



keep the airborne







Combustible material. Corrosive liquid.

Keep away from heat. Keep away from

sources of ignition. Stop leak if without

risk.

Absorb with DRY earth, sand or other

non-combustible material. Do not get

water inside container. Do not touch

spilled material. Use water spray curtain

to divert vapor drift. Prevent entry into

sewers, basements or confined areas;

dike if needed.

Call for assistance on disposal. Be careful

that the product is not present at a

concentration level above TLV.

68

M/s. SRF Limited


human organs. Repeated or

prolonged inhalation of vapors

may lead to chronic respiratory

irritation.

8. Chlorine

CAS #7782-50-5

Toxic by inhalation. Irritating to

eyes, respiratory system and skin.

Very toxic to

aquatic organisms.

Use only with adequate

ventilation. Use process

enclosures, local exhaust

ventilation or other

engineering controls to keep

worker exposure to airborne

contaminants below any

recommended or statutory

limits.

Immediately contact emergency

personnel. Keep unnecessary personnel

away. Use suitable protective

equipment. Eliminate all ignition

sources if safe to do so.

Do not touch or walk through spilled

material. Shut off gas supply if this can

be done safely. Isolate area until gas has

dispersed.

9. Chloroform

CAS # 7-66-3

Potential Chronic Health Effects:

CARCINOGENIC EFFECTS:

Classified + (Proven.) by NIOSH.

Classified A3 (Proven

for animal.) by ACGIH, 2B

(Possible for human.) by IARC.

Classified 2 (Some evidence.) by

NTP. MUTAGENIC EFFECTS:

Mutagenic for mammalian somatic

cells. Mutagenic for bacteria

and/or yeast. TERATOGENIC

Engineering Controls: Provide

exhaust ventilation or other


the airborne concentrations

of vapors below their

respective threshold limit

value. Ensure that eyewash

stations and safety showers

are proximal to the

workstation location.

Personal Protection: Splash

goggles. Lab coat. Vapor

respirator. Be sure to use an

approved/certified respirator

or equivalent. Gloves.

Absorb with an inert material and put

the spilled material in an appropriate

waste disposal. Be careful that the

product is not present at a concentration

level above TLV. Check TLV on the MSDS

and with local authorities.

10. Cuprous chloride

CAS#: 7758-89-6

The substance is toxic to kidneys,

lungs, liver,

Use process enclosures, local

exhaust ventilation, or other

Corrosive solid. Stop leak if without risk.


69

M/s. SRF Limited


mucous membranes. Repeated or

prolonged exposure to the

substance can produce target

organs damage. Repeated

exposure of the eyes to a low level

of dust can produce eye irritation.

Repeated skin exposure can

produce local skin destruction, or

dermatitis. Repeated inhalation of

dust can produce varying degree

of respiratory irritation or lung

damage.

Repeated exposure to an highly




human organs.


airborne levels below

recommended exposure

limits. If user operations

generate dust, fume or mist,

use ventilation to keep

exposure to airborne

contaminants below the

exposure limit


spray to reduce vapors. Prevent entry

into sewers, basements or confined

areas; dike if needed. Call for assistance

on disposal. Be careful that the product

is not present at a concentration level

above TLV.

11. Diethyl ether

CAS#: 60-29-7

The substance may be toxic to

skin, central nervous system

(CNS). Repeated or prolonged

exposure to the substance can




keep the airborne



Threshold limit value. Ensure




Flammable liquid. Keep away from heat.

Keep away from sources of ignition. Stop



material. Do not touch spilled material.

Prevent entry into sewers, basements or

confined areas; dike if needed. Be careful



12. Dimethyl

formamide(DM F)CAS

#68-12-2

The substance is toxic to kidneys,

liver, central nervous system

(CNS). The substance may be toxic

to blood, the nervous



keep the airborne


Flammable liquid. Keep away from heat.



earth,

70

M/s. SRF Limited


system. Repeated or prolonged

exposure to the substance can







sand or other non-combustible material.

Do not touch spilled material. Prevent


confined areas; dike if needed.

13. Ethyl Alcohol

CAS # 64–17-5


the reproductive system, liver,

upper respiratory tract, skin,

central nervous

Provide close process Flammable liquid. Keep away from heat.







14. Ethyl Acetate

CAS # 141-78-6




central nervous








15. Ferric chloride

CAS#: 7705-08-0

The substance is toxic to lungs,

mucous membranes. Repeated or







produce local skin destruction, or

dermatitis. Repeated inhalation of

dust





recommended

exposure limits. If user

operations generate dust,

fume or mist, use ventilation

to keep exposure to airborne

contaminants

below the exposure limit.




spray to reduce vapors. Prevent entry

into sewers, basements or confined

areas; dike if needed. Call for assistance

on disposal.

p. 3 Neutralize the residue with a dilute

solution of sodium carbonate. Be careful


concentration

71

M/s. SRF Limited


can produce varying degree of

respiratory irritation or lung

damage.

level above TLV.

16. Formic acid

64-18-6


kidneys, liver, upper

p. 2 respiratory tract, skin, eyes,

central nervous system (CNS).


to the substance can produce

target organs damage. Repeated or

prolonged contact with spray mist

may produce chronic eye irritation

and severe skin irritation.


to spray mist may produce

respiratory tract irritation leading

to frequent attacks of bronchial inf



keep the airborne







Combustible material. Corrosive liquid.

Keep away from heat. Keep away from

sources of ignition. Stop leak if without

risk.

Absorb with DRY earth, sand or other

non-combustible material. Do not get

water inside container. Do not touch

spilled material. Use water spray curtain

to divert vapor drift. Prevent entry into


dike if needed.

Call for assistance on disposal.

Neutralize the residue with a dilute

solution of sodium carbonate. Be careful


concentration level above TLV

17. N - HEPTANE The substance is toxic to blood,



central nervous








18. Hexane

CAS #110-54-3




central nervous




earth,

72

M/s. SRF Limited


sand or other non-combustible material.




19. Hydrochloric Acid



permeator), of eye contact

(irritant, corrosive), of ingestion, .

Slightly hazardous in case of

inhalation (lung sensitizer). Non-

corrosive for lungs. Liquid or spray

mist may produce tissue damage

particularly on mucous

membranes of eyes, mouth and

respiratory tract. Skin contact may

produce burns. Inhalation of the

spray mist may produce severe

irritation of respiratory tract,

characterized by coughing,

choking, or shortness of breath.

Severe over-exposure can result in

death.

Provide close process and

scrubber on process vent and

storage vent




material.



spray curtain to divert vapor drift.

20. Hydrogen peroxide Very hazardous in case of skin

contact (irritant), of eye contact

(irritant). Hazardous in case of

skin contact (corrosive), of eye

contact (corrosive), of ingestion, .

Slightly hazardous in case of

inhalation (lung sensitizer).

The substance is toxic to lungs,



keep the airborne






EXPLOSION

HAZARD: SEVERE, WHEN HIGHLY

CONCENTRATED OR PURE H2O2 IS

EXPOSED TO HEAT, MECHANICAL

IMPACT, OR CAUSED TO DECOMPOSE

CATALYTICALLY BY METALS & THEIR

SALTS, DUSTS & ALKALIES. ANOTHER

SOURCE OF HYDROGEN PEROXIDE

73

M/s. SRF Limited


mucous membranes to the work-station location.

Use PPEs.

EXPLOSIONS IS FROM SEALING THE

MATERIAL IN STRONG CONTAINERS.

UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS EVEN

GRADUAL DECOMPOSITION OF

HYDROGEN PEROXIDE TO WATER +

1/2 OXYGEN

CAN CAUSE LARGE PRESSURES TO

BUILD UP IN THE CONTAINERS WHICH

MAY BURST EXPLOSIVELY.

Corrosive liquid. Oxidizing material.

Stop leak if without risk. Absorb with

DRY earth, sand or other non-

combustible material.

Do not get water inside container. Avoid

contact with a combustible material

(wood, paper, oil, clothing...). Keep

substance damp using water spray. Do


spray curtain to divert vapor drift.



21. N - PROPANOL The substance is toxic to blood,



central nervous








22. Methanol

CAS# 67-56-1





74

M/s. SRF Limited



central nervous






23. Methylene Chloride

CAS #75-09-2

CARCINOGENIC EFFECTS:

Classified + (Proven.) by OSHA.

The substance is toxic to lungs, the

nervous system, liver, mucous

membranes, central nervous

system (CNS).



keep the airborne






to the workstation

location.

Personal Protection:

Absorb with an inert material and put

the spilled material in an appropriate

waste disposal. Be careful that the

product is not present at a concentration

level above TLV

24. p-Xylene

CAS#: 106-42-3


kidneys, the nervous

system, liver. Repeated or



organs damage.



keep the airborne







Toxic flammable liquid, insoluble or very

slightly soluble in water. Keep away

from heat. Keep away from sources of

ignition.

Stop leak if without risk. Absorb with

DRY earth, sand or other non-

combustible material. Do not get water

inside container.



confined areas; dike if needed. Eliminate

all ignition sources. Call for assistance

on disposal. Be careful that the product

is not present at a concentration level

75

M/s. SRF Limited


above TLV.

25. Liq. Ammonia (25 %

Solution)



permeator),

Inhalation of the spray mist may

produce severe irritation

of respiratory tract, characterized

by coughing, choking, or shortness

of breath. Severe over-exposure

can result in death.

The substance is toxic

to upper respiratory tract



keep the airborne







Dilute with water and mop up, or absorb

with an inert dry material and place in

an appropriate waste disposal container.

If necessary: Neutralize the residue with

a dilute solution of acetic acid.




material.







assistance on disposal.


solution of acetic acid.

26. Nitric acid

CAS#7697-37-2


lungs, mucous membranes, upper

respiratory

p. 2

tract, skin, eyes, teeth. Repeated or




or prolonged contact with spray

mist may produce chronic eye



keep the airborne







Corrosive liquid. Oxidizing material.

Poisonous liquid. Stop leak if without

risk. Absorb with DRY earth, sand or

other noncombustible material. Do not

get water inside container. Avoid

contact with a combustible material

(wood, paper, oil, clothing...). Keep

substance damp using water spray. Do



76

M/s. SRF Limited


irritation and severe skin

irritation. Repeated or prolonged

exposure to spray mist may

produce respiratory tract

irritation leading to frequent

attacks of bronchial infection.




assistance on disposal. Neutralize the

residue with a dilute solution of sodium

carbonate. Be careful that the product is

not present at a concentration level

above TLV.

27. OLEUM

CAS#8014-95-7

MAY BE FATAL IF ABSORBED

THROUGH SKIN, SWALLOWED OR

INHALED.

CAUSES SEVERE RESPIRATORY

TRACT BURNS. CAUSES EYE AND

SKIN

BURNS. HARMFUL IF ABSORBED

THROUGH SKIN OR IF

SWALLOWED.

CONTAINS MATERIAL THAT CAN

CAUSE TARGET ORGAN DAMAGE.



keep the airborne



occupational exposure limits.

Use only

with adequate ventilation.

Prevent liquid from entering sewers or

waterways. Dike with inert material

(sand, earth, etc.). Collect into

containers for reclamation or disposal

only if container is suitable to withstand

the material. Consider insitu

neutralization and disposal. Anhydrous

sodium sulfate is useful to treat spills of

oleum. It reacts with the liquid to

contain and solidify the spill and

suppress the fume. Tools and equipment

must be properly decontaminated after

clean up. Comply with Federal,

Provincial/State and local regulations on

reporting releases.

28. Paraformaldehyde

CAS#: 30525-89-4

The substance

p. 2 is toxic to mucous membranes.


to the substance can produce

target organs damage.

Repeated exposure of the eyes to a

low level of dust can produce eye





recommended



Flammable solid. Corrosive solid. Stop

leak if without risk. Do not get water

inside container. Do not touch spilled

material. Use water spray curtain to

divert vapor drift. Use water spray to

reduce vapors. Prevent entry into

sewers, basements or confined

77

M/s. SRF Limited


irritation. Repeated skin exposure

can produce local skin destruction,

or dermatitis. Repeated inhalation

of dust can produce varying

degree of respiratory irritation or

lung damage.





human organs



contaminants


areas; dike if needed. Eliminate all

ignition sources. Call for assistance on

disposal.

29. Phenol

CAS#: 108-95-2


kidneys, liver, central

nervous system (CNS). Repeated

or prolonged exposure to the



p. 2




produce local skin

destruction, or dermatitis.

Repeated inhalation of dust can

produce varying degree of

respiratory irritation or lung

damage.








recommended





contaminants





spray to

reduce vapors. Prevent entry into


dike if needed. Eliminate all ignition

sources. Call

for assistance on disposal. Be careful



78

M/s. SRF Limited



human organs.

30. Phosphoric acid (85 % ) Very hazardous in case of skin

contact (irritant), of eye contact

(irritant), of ingestion, . Hazardous

in case of skin contact

(corrosive, permeator), of eye

contact (corrosive). Slightly

hazardous in case of inhalation

(lung sensitizer)



keep the airborne










material.




water spray

to reduce vapors. Prevent entry into


dike if needed.

31. Pyridine

CAS # 110 – 86 - 1

Target organs: Liver, kidneys,

nerves, Bone Marrow. Persons

with pre-existing disorders may be

more susceptible. This Product has

beeen reported to be a possible

carcinogen.

Long-term exposure may cause

liver, kidney or CNS damage.

Typical STEL 10 ppm. Typical PEL

15 ppm.

Use process enclosure, local


engineering controls to

control airborne levels below


limits. Facilities storing or

utilizing this material should

be equipped with an eyewash

facility and a safety shower.

Ventilation fans and other

electrical service must be

non-sparking and have an

explosion-proof design.

Absorb spill with inert material (e.g.

vermiculite, sand or earth), then place in

suitable container. Clean up spills

immediately, observing precautions in

the Protective Equipment section.

Remove all sources of ignition. Use a

spark-proof tool. Provide ventilation.

Prevent spreading of vapors through

sewers, ventilation systems and

confined areas. Evacuate unnecessary

personnel. Approach spill from upwind.

Use water spray to cool and disperse

vapors, protect personnel, and dilute

spills to form nonflammable mixtures.

Control runoff and isolate discharged

material for proper disposal.

79

M/s. SRF Limited


32. Sodium Acetate

127-09-3

Repeated or prolonged exposure is

not known to aggravate medical

condition.






limits. If user operations

generate dust, fume or mist,

use ventilation to keep

exposure to airborne

contaminants below the

exposure limit.

Use a shovel to put the material into a

convenient waste disposal container.


solution of acetic acid. Finish cleaning by

spreading water on the contaminated

surface and allow to evacuate through

the sanitary

system.

33. Sulfur powder

CAS # 7704-34-9

Prolonged or repeated skin contact

may cause dermatitis. Chronic

inhalation may cause effects

similar to those of acute

inhalation.

Facilities storing or utilizing

this material should be

equipped with an eyewash


Use adequate general or local

explosion-proof ventilation to

keep airborne levels to

acceptable levels.

Vacuum or sweep up material and place

into a suitable disposal container. Clean

up spills immediately, observing

precautions in the Protective Equipment

section. Scoop up with a nonsparking

tool, then place into a suitable container

for disposal. Avoid generating dusty

conditions. Remove all sources of

ignition. Provide ventilation.

34. Sulfuric Acid

Prolonged or repeated skin contact

may cause dermatitis. Prolonged

or repeated inhalation may cause

nosebleeds, nasal congestion,

erosion of the teeth, perforation of

the nasal septum, chest pain and

bronchitis. Prolonged or repeated

eye contact may cause

conjunctivitis. Effects may be

Facilities storing or utilizing

this material should be

equipped with an eyewash


Use adequate general or local

exhaust ventilation to keep

airborne concentrations

below the permissible

exposure limits. Use a

Clean up spills immediately, observing

precautions in the Protective Equipment

section. Carefully scoop up and place

into appropriate disposal container.

Provide ventilation. Do not get water

inside containers. Cover with dry earth,

dry sand, or other non-combustible

material followed with plastic sheet to

minimize spreading and contact with

80

M/s. SRF Limited


delayed. Workers chronically

exposed to sulfuric acid mists may

show various lesions of the skin,

tracheobronchitis, stomatitis,

conjunctivitis, or gastritis.

Occupational exposure to strong

inorganic acid mists containing

sulfuric acid is carcinogenic to

humans.

corrosion-resistant

ventilation system.

water.

35. Toluene

CAS # 108-88-3




central nervous








3.12 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF PROCESS.

Process details are provided in EIA report.

81

M/s. SRF Limited


3.13 Existing Fire Prevention & Protection System

3.13.1 Fire Fighting System (Fire hydrant System )

Fire hydrant system is operational with working pressure of 8.0 kg/cm2 g. Jockey

Pump maintains pressure of the fire hydrant network. The fire hydrant is forming main ring

in which water is available from two sides.

Working of Fire hydrant System

1 In case pressure drops below 7.5 kg/Cm2 Jockey pump no.-01 starts & stops at maintaining 8.0

Kg/cm2. If further pressure drops below 7.5 kg/cm2 & reduce up to 7.0 kg/cm2 Jockey pump

no.-02 will also start and keep running till hydrant line pressure maintained 8.0 kg/cm2. 2 In case of any emergency when hydrant line pressure drops below 7 kg/ cm2 g and Jockey

pump is not able to maintain the pressure in line, Diesel (engine) pump no.1 starts at 7 kg/

cm2 g and it provide the required water for fire fighting. 3 If Diesel (engine) pump no.1 is not able to start & pressure drops below 6.5 kg/ cm2 g,

Diesel (engine) pump no.2 starts at 6.0 kg/ cm2 g automatically. 4 Pumps can only be stopped from the Pump house.

Details of Fire hydrant system

S.

No.

Item Description Nos. Installed/ Capacity

1 Diesel driven Fire Hydrant Main Pump 3

2 Capacity of Diesel driven Pumps 410 m3/ hr.

3 Hydrant Pressure 8.0 kg/ cm2 g

4 No. of Jockey Pump 2

5 Capacity Jockey Pumps 40 m3/ hr.

6 Capacity of Water reservoir 2010 m3

7 Source of water GIDC supply

8 Hydrant Points (Single headed) 276

9 Water Monitors (Manual) 27

10 Foam Monitor ( Manual ) 3

11 Ozzie Oscillator 552

12 Hose Pipe of 15 meter length 276

13 Hose Box 276

14 Nozzles 276

15 Hose Reel 86

Fire Fighting System.

Fire Extinguishers have been provided all across the Plants & departments. Fire extinguishers

selection has been made according to class of fire in the area. Capacity and Quantity of Fire

extinguishers have been decided according to floor area.

82

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Type of Extinguisher Nos. available

Actual

Nos

ABC 02 Kg 4

ABC 05Kg 35

ABC 06 Kg 253

ABC 04 Kg 21

DCP 04 Kg 30

DCP 05 Kg 87

Mechanical Foam 09 Ltr 58

Mechanical Foam 50 Ltr 3

CO2 4.5 Kg 150

CO2 6.5 Kg 30

Smoke Detectors:-

There are 67 numbers of smoke detectors are installed. The main indicator panel is

installed at Control Room and Security gate. If smoke or fumes are sensed by these

sensor, it will generate alarm and the panel operator at control room and security gate

will get the location of affected area. Security officer will work as per the instruction of

panel Operator. Mean time they will inform to OHC and keep Ambulance ready.

Manual Call Points:

There are 31 number of manual call points installed in process plant, critical area and

storage tank farm. The hooters are installed along with the call points which alarm all

the person present in the affected area. These hooters and manual call points are

addressable , so in case of any emergency, both control room and security gate will able

to identify the affected area with the help of active raptor panel & control room.

Sr. No. Location of smoke Detectors Nos. Available

1. Module -2 office (Det 34 to 36) 3

2. Control room (FMP and P-14) (Det 67 to 71) 5

3. DCS Panel (P-14 & FMP) (Det 62 to 66) 5

4. Utility / Process MCC Rooms. (Det 54 to 61) &

(Det 11 to 19)

17

5. Cable cellar of both MCC rooms (Det 20 to 33) &

(Det 40 to 53)

28

6. QA -M-2 (Det 1 to 10) 10

7. P-18 Mcc Room (Det 37 to 39) 3

8. DCS Panel (P-2 & FMP-2) (Det 4 to 7) 4

9. P-2 Control Room & ( P-2&FMP-2 Office Area)

(Det 1 to 3)

3

10. FMP-2 Mcc Room (Det 8 to 22) 15

11. FMP-2 Cable Cellar (Det 23 to 32) 10

Total 103

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M/s. SRF Limited


SECTION IV

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Risk assessment process rests on identification of specific hazards, hazardous areas and

areas vulnerable to effects of hazardous situations in facilities involved in processing and

storage of chemicals.

In fact the very starting point of any such assessment is a detailed study of materials

handled & their physical / chemical / thermodynamic properties within the complex at

various stages of manufacturing activity. Such a detailed account of hazardous materials

provides valuable database for identifying most hazardous materials, their behaviour under

process conditions, and their inventory in process as well as storage and hence helps in

identifying vulnerable areas within the complex.

Hazardous posed by particular installation or a particular activity can be broadly classified

as fire and explosive hazards and toxicity hazards. Whether a particular activity is fire and

explosive hazardous or toxicity hazardous primarily depends on the materials handled and

their properties.

It will be from the above discussion that study of various materials handled is a prerequisite

from any hazard identification process to be accurate. Based on this study the hazard

indices are calculated for subsequent categorization of units depending upon the degree of

hazard they pose.

In a Fluorochemicals, Specialty Chemicals Products Manufacturing Unit main hazard

handling of hazardous chemicals like, solvents, corrosive and toxic chemicals, the primary

concern has always been, fire and explosion prevention and control as these are the main

hazard posed by such unit. This concern has grown through the loss of life, property and

materials experienced after experienced after major disasters, which have occurred over

the years.

Identification of hazards is the most important step to improve the safety of any plant. The

hazard study is designed to identify the hazards in terms of chemicals, inventories and

vulnerable practices /operations.

The hazard evaluation procedures use as a first step by checklists and safety reviews. Dow

and Mond fire and explosion indices, which make use of past experience to develop relative

ranking of hazards, is also extensively used. For predictive hazard analysis, Hazard and

Operability studies (HAZOP), Fault tree analysis, Event tree analysis, Maximum credible

accident and consequence analysis etc are employed.

91

M/s. SRF Limited


4.2 Dow’s fire and Explosion Index F & EI

TABLE- 4.1

Sr

No

Material

stored

N

h

N

f

N

r

MF GPH SPH FEI Degree of

Hazard

Radius of

Exp. (ft.)

Th Ts TI Degree

of

Hazard

1. Hydrogen 0 4 0 21 3.0 2.29 144 Heavy 120 - - - -

2. Class A

flammable

chemicals

and

solvents

0 3 0 16 2.55 3 122.4 Intermediate 106 125 50 11.4 Severe

3. n-Butane 2 3 0 24 3.1 3.41 168 Severe 43.0 125 75 15 Severe

4. Acetic

anhydride

2 2 1 14 2.2 3.08 95 Intermediate 27.84 125 125 15.7 Severe

5. Bromine 3 0 0 1 2.05 2.82 5.8 Light 4.9 325 125 26.4 Severe

6. AHCL 3 0 0 1 2.05 2.82 5.8 Light 4.9 250 125 22.0 Severe

7. Ammonia

cylinder

3 1 0 4 3.75 2.91 10.9 Light 8 250 75 10.9 Heavy

Nh = NFPA Health rating GPH = General Process Hazard

Nf = NFPA Fire rating SPH = Special Process Hazard

Nr = NFPA Reactive rating MF = Material Fctor Th = Penalty Factor

Ts = Penalty for Toxicity

4.3 Identification of Hazardous Areas:

A study of process for manufacturing as given in chapter 3 of the report indicates the

following:

Various raw materials used in the manufacturing processes are listed in Table-3.4 in

Section-3 along with mode / type of storage & storage conditions. It can be readily seen

that raw materials even though hazardous in nature, are used in continuous process &

inventory are low at process plant. However some chemicals list is provided in Table- 3.5

Most of hazardous chemicals are stored in dedicated Explosive licence premises and above

ground storage tank farm area. List of chemicals stored in larger quantities is provided in

Table-3.5 and all such chemical properties provided in Table-3.10

4.3.1 Major hazardous area:

Following areas considered as a Hazardous area of the plant.

(a) Petroleum product PESO licence premises.

(b) Liqufied petroleum storage (SMPV) PESO area.

(c) Non petroleum product but highly flammable class A chemical storage tank farm area.

(d) Hydrogen gas cylinder storage area.

(e) Ammonia gas cylinder storage area.

(f) Bromine storage tank area

(g) AHF tank farm area

(h) AHCL cylinder storage

(e) Oleum and Sulfuric acid storage tank farm area.

(f) Drums storage area ( Warehouse)

92

M/s. SRF Limited


The materials were studied with respect to their flammability, reactivity and toxicity based

on the criteria given by the NFPA (NFPA ratings). Material factor values were determined

using these ratings. General process hazards and Special process hazards for all the

materials stored were determined as per the guidelines given by DOW Chemicals Company in

DOW Index. FEI values for all these materials were calculated form the above data.

Value of material factor, General Process Hazard & Special Process Hazard as also FEI / TI

values & degree of hazard are given in Table 4.1 It can be seen storage in tank farms is mostly

in the Severe category due to pressure storage and highly flammable and toxic nature of

chemicals. The radius of exposure for various tanks considering FEI Values is also calculated

and presented in the Table.

4.3.2 Evaluation of Process Areas :

Existing and proposed plants are DCS operation and continuous process plant.

Even storage tank farm area are DCS operation.

Produce units will do not warrant any detailed calculations as consequences due to any

worst case scenario due to very quantity of material & damage is such a case is expected

to be limited to within the factory premises.

Considering this, the risk analysis and consequences studies are concentrated on storage

in bulk as per Table -3.5.

4.4 Failure Frequencies

4.4.1 Hazardous material release scenarios can be broadly divided into 2 categories

I) catastrophic failures which are of low frequency and

II) ruptures and leaks which are of relatively high frequency.

Releases from failure of gaskets, seal, rupture in pipelines and vessels fall in the second

category whereas catastrophic failure of vessels and full bore rupture of pipelines etc fall into

the first category.

4.4.2 Typical failure frequencies are given below:-

TABLE-4.2

Item Mode of failure Failure frequencies

Atmospheric

storage

Catastrophic failure

Significant leak

10-9 /yr

10-5 /yr

Process Pipelines

< = 50 mm dia Full bore rupture

Significant leak

8.8 x 10-7 /m.yr

8.8 x 10-6 /m.yr

> 50 mm <=150mm dia Full bore rupture

Significant leak

2.6 x 10-7 /m.yr

5.3 x 10-6 /m.yr

< 150 mm dia Full bore rupture

Significant leak

8.8 x 10-8 /m.yr

2.6 x 10-6 /m.yr

Hoses Rupture 3.5 x 10-2 /m.yr

93

M/s. SRF Limited


TABLE-4.3

TABLE-4.4

94

M/s. SRF Limited


SECTION V

RISK ASSESSMENT

5.1 Effects Of Releases Of Hazardous Substances

Hazardous substances may be released as a result of failures / catastrophes,

causing possible damage to the surrounding area. In the following

discussion, an account is taken of various effects of release of hazardous

substances and the parameters to be de termined for quantif ication of such

damages.

In case of release of hazardous substances the damages will depend largely

on source strength. The strength of the source means the volume of the

substance released. The release may be instantaneous or semi -continuous. In

the case of instantaneous release, the strength of the source is g iven in kg

and in semi-continuous release the strength of the source depends on the

outf low time (kg/s.) .

In order to f ire the source strength, it is f irst necessary to determi ne the

state of a substance in a vessel . The physical properties , viz. Pressure and

temperature of the substance determine the phase of release. This may be

gas, gas condensed to l iquid and liquid in equil ibrium with its vapour or

solids .

Instantaneous release will occur, for example, if a storage tank fails .

Depending on the storage conditions the following situations may occur.

The source strength is equal to the contents of the capacity of the storage

system.

In the event of the instantaneous release of a l iquid a pool of l iquid will

form. The evaporation can be calculated on the basis of this pool .

5.2 Tank On Fire/ Pool Fire

In the event of the instantaneous release of a l iquid a pool of l iquid will

form. The evaporation can be calculated on the basis of this pool .

The heat load on object outside a burning pool of l iquid can be calculated

with the heat radiation model . This model uses average radiation intensity,

which is dependent on the l iquid. Account is also taken of the diameter -to-

height ratio of the f ire, which depends on the burning l iquid. In addit ion,

the heat load is also inf luenced by the following factors:

Distance from the f ire

The relative humidity of the air (water vapour has a relatively high heat -

absorbing capacity)

The orientation i .e . horizontal/vertical of the objective irradiated with

respect to the f ire.

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M/s. SRF Limited


5.3 Fire Ball/ BLEVE

This happens during the burning of liquid, the bulk of which is initially over rich (i.e.

abovethe upper flammable limit.). The whole cloud appears to be on fire as combustion is

takingplace at eddy boundaries where air is entrained (i.e. a propagating diffusion flame).

The buoyancy of the hot combustion products may lift the cloud form the ground,

subsequently forming a mushroom shaped cloud. Combustion rates are high and the hazard

is primarily thermal.

5.4 UVCE

UVCE stands for unconfined vapour cloud explosion. The clouds of solvent vapour mix with

air (within flammability limit 3.0 % to 11 %) may cause propagating flames when ignited. In

certain cases flame may take place within seconds. The thermal radiation intensity is severe

depending on the total mass of vapour in cloud and may cause secondary fire. When the

flame travels very fast, it explodes causing high over pressure or blast effect, resulting in

heavy damage at considerable distance from the release point. Such explosion is called UVCE

(Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion) and is most common cause of such industrial accident.

5.5 DISPERSION CASES :

5.5.1 PLUMES :

Plumes are continuous release of hazardous gases and vapours. Smoke from

a chimney is an example. Plumes can cause FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS as

secondary scenarios.

5.5.2 PUFFS :

Puffs are instantaneous release of hazardous gases and vapours. Puffs can

give rise to FIRE BALLS and vapour cloud explosions (VCE). A special case of

vapour cloud explosion is the Boil ing Liquid Evaporating Vapour Explosion

(BLEVE).

5.5.3 SPILLS POOL:

Spil ls are l iquid pools created by leaking l iquid chemicals . Spil ls cause

evaporation and dispersal of toxic gases and if the spil led l iquid is

f lammable, then it can catch f ire creating a pool f ire also the vapours can

cause explosion.

5.6 Identi fication of High Risk Areas :

1. Under ground Storage tank farm area, road truck unloading area

2. Drum storage area.

3. Hydrogen cylinder skid and hydrogenation reaction shed.

5.7 Modes of Failure:

Liquid release due to catastrophic failure of storage vessel or road tanker.

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Liquid release through a hole/crack developed at welded joints/flanges / nozzles /

valves etc.

Vapour release due to exposure of liquid to atmosphere in the above scenarios.

Gas release due to catastrophic failure of Ammonia cylinder or outlet valve/line failure.

Event Causes

Tank on Fire/ - Catastrophic failure of tank + Ignition availability

Pool fire - Failure of liquid outlet line + Ignition availability

Fire Ball/ - Catastrophic failure of road tanker/ storage tank

Flash Fire Vapour generation due to substrate and wind

UVCE Vapour cloud generation and about 15 % of

total vapour mass Above the UEL-LEL % Ignition availability

Toxic gas dispersion - Toxic Gas release due to catastrophic failure of tonner/bullet/

Tanks and ignition not available within LEL- UEL range.

Considering the quantity of storages & nature of Toxic nature and Flammable storage,

following scenarios were taken up for detailed analysis & safe distances computed :

Catastrophic failure of road tanker of Ethyl Alcohol, Methanol and presence of ignition source

poses heat radiation hazards to nearby areas.

Failure cases considered for consequence analysis are representative of worst-case

scenarios. Probability of occurrence of such cases is negligible (less than 1 x 10-6 per year)

because of strict adherence to preventive maintenance procedures within the complex.

General probabilities for various failure is provided in Table-4.2, 4.3 and 4.4, but

consequences of such cases can be grave & far reaching in case such systems fail during life

history of the company. Hence such scenarios are considered for detailed analysis. It is to be

noted however that such situations are not foreseeable or credible as long as sufficient

measures are taken. Also, consequence analysis studies help us evaluate emergency planning

measures of the Company.

5.8 Damage Criteria For Heat Radiation:

Damage effects vary with dif ferent scenarios. Calculations for various

scenarios are made for the above failure cases to quantify the result ing

damages.

The results are translated in term of injuries and damages to exposed

personnel , equipment, building etc.

Tank on f ire /Pool f ire due to direct ignit ion source on tank or road tanker

or catastrophic failure or leakage or damage from pipeline of storage

facil it ies or road tanker unloading arm, can result in heat radiation causing

burns to people depending on thermal load and period of exposure.

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All such damages have to be specif ied criteria for each such resultant effect ,

to relate the quantif ier damages in this manner, damage criteria are used for

Heat Radiation.

TABLE 5.3

DAMAGE CRITERIA – HEAT RADIATION

Heat Radiation

Incident Flux KW/m2 Damage

38 100% lethality, heavy damage to tanks

37.5 100% lethality, heavy damage to equipment.

25 50% lethality, nonpiloted ignition

14 Damage to normal buildings

12.5 1% lethality, piloted ignition

12 Damage to vegetation

6 Burns (escape routes)

4.5 Not lethal, 1st degree burns

3 1st degree burns possible

(personnel only in emergency allowed)

2 Feeling of discomfort

1.5 No discomfort even after long exposure

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SECTION VI

CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

6.1 Consequence analysis.

In the risk analysis study, probable damages due to worst case scenarios

were quantif ied and consequences were analyzed with object of emergency

planning. Various measures taken by the company and f indings of the study

were considered for deciding acceptabil ity o f risks.

6.1.1 Maximum Credible loss scenarios ( MCLS)

MCLS assume maximum inventory of hazardous chemicals and worst weather

condition prevail ing at the t ime of failure. Further, no credit is given for the

safety features provided in the facil ity to determine maximum possible

damage from the scenario selected. In reality , leakage of hazardous chemical

wil l be smaller in magnitude. Also the leakage will be detected immediately

by plant operating staff then init iate various mitigation measures to prevent

any disastrous situation.

The maximum credible loss Scenarios (MCLS) identified for plant base on above criteria are

listed below:

Table-6.1

Scenario

No.

Failure Type Failure Mode Consequence

1. Loss of containment in 20 KL

Road Tanker of solvents.

Unloading arm 100 %

failure and immediate

Ignition.

Unconfined Pool fire.


Methanol tank

Over flow, tank bottom

line/valve failure,

Pool fire


Toluene tank


line/valve failure,

Pool fire


Acetone tank


line/valve failure,

Pool fire


IPA tank


line/valve failure,

Pool fire


Ethanol tank


line/valve failure,

Pool fire


Ethyl Acetate tank


line/valve failure,

Pool fire


Diethyl Ether tank


line/valve failure,

Pool fire


Hexan tank


line/valve failure,

Pool fire


O-xylene tank


line/valve failure,

Pool fire


Acitic Acid tank


line/valve failure,

Pool fire

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Monomethyl Hydrazinel

tank


line/valve failure,

Pool fire


EDC tank


line/valve failure,

Pool fire


Acetonitrile tank


line/valve failure,

Pool fire


MIBK tank


line/valve failure,

Pool fire


Butyl Acetate tank


line/valve failure,

Pool fire


Acetic Anhydride tank


line/valve failure,

Pool fire


DCPD tank


line/valve failure,

Pool fire


n-Butane tank


line/valve failure,

Pool fire

20. n-Butane 60 KL storage Tank Over heating due to

other tank in fire

BLEVE

21. n-Butane 60 KL storage Tank Evaporation and delay UVCE/over pressure


Ethan tank


line/valve failure,

Pool fire


Ethan tank

Over heating due to

other tank in fire

BLEVE


Ethan tank

Evaporation and delay UVCE/over pressure


Ethylene tank


line/valve failure,

Pool fire


Ethylene tank

Over heating due to

other tank in fire

BLEVE


Ethylene tank

Evaporation and delay UVCE/over pressure

28. Catastrophic failure of

Hydrogen pipe line rupture.

Random failure Jet fire.

29. Catastrophic failure of

Hydrogen pipe line rupture.

Random failure Flash Fire

(Explosion).

30. Fire in drum storage area. Drum spillage Unconfined Pool fire.

31. Fire in drum storage area. Due to fire domino

effect

BLEVE in drum

32. Loss of containment in

Ammonia Cylinder

Catastrophic Failure Puff release up to

LC50, IDLH and TLV

distances.

33. Loss of containment in

Ammonia Cylinder

Valve / connecting tube

failure

Point source release

up to LC50, IDLH and

TLV distances.

34. Loss containment in

Bromine tank


line/valve failure,

Spill pool

evaporation up to

LC50, IDLH and TLV

distances.

35. Loss containment in AHF catastrophic failure Puff release up to

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M/s. SRF Limited


bullet.

LC50, IDLH and TLV

distances.

36. Loss containment in AHF

bullet.


line/valve failure,

Spill pool

evaporation up to

LC50, IDLH and TLV

distances.

37. Loss of containment in AHCL

Cylinder

Catastrophic Failure Puff release up to

LC50, IDLH and TLV

distances.

38. Loss of containment in AHCL

Cylinder

Valve / connecting tube

failure

Point source release

up to LC50, IDLH and

TLV distances.

39. Loss containment in Oleum

Tank.


line/valve failure,

Spill pool

evaporation up to

LC50, IDLH and TLV

distances.

MCA Scenario –1 Unconfined pool fire due to Loss of containment in Road Tanker.

TABLE – 1

For 20 KL Road tanker.

Scenario : UNCONFINED POOL FIRE

In put Data

Stored quantity 20 KL

Pool diameter 50.0(m)

Pool liquid depth 0.1 (m)

Wind speed 3 m/s

Liquid Density 791.7 kg/m3

Incident Intensity of

Heat Radiation ( IHR)

at ground level KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )

Effect if IHR at Height of Simulation

37.5 26.0 Damage to process equipment. 100 % Fatal in 1 Min. 1 %

fatal in 10 sec.

25.0 29.1 Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ). 100 % fatal in 1

Min. Significant injury in 10 sec.

12.5 41.1 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 % fatal in 1 min. 1

st deg. burn in 10 sec.

4.0 72.6 Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely.

1.6 114.7 No discomfort even on long exposure.

Results

In the 26.0 meter radius area is considered as 100% fatality in 1 min.

In the 41.1 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec.

In the 72.6 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely.

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6.1.2 Measures to control and mitigate Emergency of road tanker accident:

Measures to be taken to prevent such accident:

1. Training will be provided to driver and cleaner regarding the safe driving, hazard of

Flammable chemicals, emergency handling, use of SCBA sets.

2. TREM card will kept with TL.

3. SCBA set will be kept with TL.

4. Fire extinguishers will be kept with TL.

5. Flame arrestor will be provided to TL exhaust.

6. Instructions will be given not to stop road tanker in populated area.

7. Clear Hazard Identification symbol and emergency telephone number will be

displayed as per HAZCHEM CODE.

8. Appropriate PPEs will be kept with TL.

Mitigation measures :

1. Off site emergency agency telephone provided in TRM CARD.

2. Fire extinguishers are provided in TL.

3. Training provided to control such emergency to driver and cleaner.

4. Evacuate the area up to 200 meters in all direction.

5. In case of leakage from valve road tanker should be deriver away from the populated

area.

6. Call to police, fire brigade, Users company and supplier company.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Fire

CAUTION: All these products have a very low flash point: Use of water spray when fighting

fire may be inefficient.

CAUTION: For mixtures containing alcohol or polar solvent, alcohol-resistant foam may be

more effective.

Small Fire

Dry chemical, CO2, water spray or regular foam.

Large Fire

Water spray, fog or regular foam.

Use water spray or fog; do not use straight streams.

Move containers from fire area if you can do it without risk.

Fire involving Tanks or Car/Trailer Loads

Fight fire from maximum distance or use unmanned hose holders or monitor nozzles.

Cool containers with flooding quantities of water until well after fire is out.

Withdraw immediately in case of rising sound from venting safety devices or

discoloration of tank.

ALWAYS stay away from tanks engulfed in fire.

For massive fire, use unmanned hose holders or monitor nozzles; if this is impossible,

withdraw from area and let fire burn.

103

M/s. SRF Limited


SPILL OR LEAK

ELIMINATE all ignition sources (no smoking, flares, sparks or flames in immediate

area).

All equipment used when handling the product must be grounded.

Do not touch or walk through spilled material.

Stop leak if you can do it without risk.

Prevent entry into waterways, sewers, basements or confined areas.

A vapor suppressing foam may be used to reduce vapors.

Absorb or cover with dry earth, sand or other non-combustible material and transfer

to containers.

Use clean non-sparking tools to collect absorbed material.

Large Spill

dyke far ahead of liquid spill for later disposal.

Water spray may reduce vapor; but may not prevent ignition in closed spaces.

MCA Scenario -2 Pool fire due to Loss of containment in Methanol tank.

TABLE – 2

Pool Fire for Methanol Tank 35 KL.

Scenario : POOL FIRE

In put Data Results of Computations

Stored quantity 35 KL Max. IHR at flame centre height 180.27 Kw/m2

Pool diameter 25(m) Flame centre height 10.59 meter

Pool liquid depth 1 (m) Maximum Flame width 9.596 meter

Wind speed 3 m/s Mass burning rate liquid 1.345 kg/ m2/min.

Liquid Density 791.7 kg/m3 Flame burnout time 38.11 Hrs.


Heat Radiation (

IHR) at ground level

KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )


37.5 13.5 Damage to process equipment. 100 % Fatal in 1 Min. 1

% fatal in 10 sec.

25.0 15.6 Min. to ignite wood (without flame contact). 100 % fatal

in 1 Min. Significant injury in 10 sec.

12.5 22.1 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 % fatal in 1

min. 1 st deg. burn in 10 sec.



Results

In the 13.5 meter radius area is considered as 100 % fatality in 1 min. and first degree burn in 10

sec.

In the 15.6 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec.


In the 39.0 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfiture even on long

exposure.

105

M/s. SRF Limited


MCA Scenario – 3 pool fire simulation due to Loss of containment in Toluene tank.

TABLE – 3

Pool Fire for Toluene Tank 35 KL.







Liquid Density 867 kg/m3 Flame burnout time 2.77 Hrs.


Heat Radiation (


KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )



% fatal in 10 sec.







Results


In 28.3 meter radius area is considered as 1st deg. Burn in 10 sec. and 1 % fatal in 1 minute.



exposure.

107

M/s. SRF Limited


MCA Scenario – 4 pool fire simulation due to Loss of containment in Acetone tank 35 KL.

TABLE – 4

Pool Fire for Acetone Tank 35 KL.




Pool diameter 25(m) Flame centre height 10.59meter


Wind speed 3 m/s Mass burning rate liquid 1.345kg/ m2/min.



Heat Radiation (


KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )



% fatal in 10 sec.







Results





exposure.

109

M/s. SRF Limited


MCA Scenario – 5 pool fire simulation due to Loss of containment in IPA tank 35 KL.

TABLE – 5

Pool Fire for IPA Tank 35 KL.









Heat Radiation (


KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )



fatal in 10 sec.







Results





exposure.

111

M/s. SRF Limited


MCA Scenario – 6 pool fire simulation due to Loss of containment in Ethanol tank 35 KL.

TABLE – 6

Pool Fire for ETHANOL Tank 35 KL.









Heat Radiation (


KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )



fatal in 10 sec.







Results





exposure.

113

M/s. SRF Limited


MCA Scenario – 7 pool fire simulation due to Loss of containment in Ethyl Acetate tank 35 KL.

TABLE – 7

Pool Fire for EA Tank 35 KL.









Heat Radiation (


KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )



fatal in 10 sec.







Results





exposure.

115

M/s. SRF Limited


MCA Scenario – 8 pool fire simulation due to Loss of containment in Diethyl Ether tank 35 KL.

TABLE – 8

Pool Fire for Diethyl Ether Tank 35 KL.









Heat Radiation (


KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )



fatal in 10 sec.







Results





exposure.

117

M/s. SRF Limited


MCA Scenario – 9 pool fire simulation due to Loss of containment in Hexane tank 35 KL.

TABLE – 9

Pool Fire for Hexane Tank 35 KL.









Heat Radiation (


KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )



fatal in 10 sec.







Results





exposure.

119

M/s. SRF Limited


MCA Scenario – 10 pool fire simulation due to Loss of containment in O-xylene tank 35 KL.

TABLE – 10

Pool Fire forO-xylene Tank 35 KL.









Heat Radiation (


KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )



fatal in 10 sec.







Results





exposure.

121

M/s. SRF Limited


MCA Scenario – 11 pool fire simulation due to Loss of containment in Acetic Acid tank 35 KL.

TABLE – 11

Pool Fire for Acetic Acid Tank 35 KL.









Heat Radiation (


KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )



fatal in 10 sec.







Results





exposure.

122

M/s. SRF Limited


123

M/s. SRF Limited


MCA Scenario – 12 pool fire simulation due to Loss of containment in Monomethyl Hydrazinel tank 35

KL.

TABLE – 12

Pool Fire for Monomethyl Hydrazinel Tank 35 KL.









Heat Radiation (


KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )



fatal in 10 sec.







Results





exposure.

124

M/s. SRF Limited


125

M/s. SRF Limited


MCA Scenario – 13 pool fire simulation due to Loss of containment in EDC tank 35 KL.

TABLE – 13

Pool Fire for EDC Tank 35 KL.









Heat Radiation (


KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )



fatal in 10 sec.







Results





exposure.

127

M/s. SRF Limited


MCA Scenario – 14 pool fire simulation due to Loss of containment in Acetonitrile tank 10 KL.

TABLE – 14

Pool Fire for Acetonitrile Tank 10 KL.









Heat Radiation (


KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )



fatal in 10 sec.







Results





exposure.

129

M/s. SRF Limited


MCA Scenario – 15 pool fire simulation due to Loss of containment in MIBK tank 10 KL.

TABLE – 15

Pool Fire for MIBK Tank 10 KL.









Heat Radiation (


KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )



fatal in 10 sec.







Results





exposure.

131

M/s. SRF Limited


MCA Scenario – 16 pool fire simulation due to Loss of containment in Butyl Acetate tank 50 KL.

TABLE – 16

Pool Fire for Acetonitrile Tank 50 KL.









Heat Radiation (


KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )



fatal in 10 sec.







Results





exposure.

133

M/s. SRF Limited


MCA Scenario – 17 pool fire simulation due to Loss of containment in Acetic Anhydride tank 50 KL.

TABLE – 17

Pool Fire for Acetic Anhydride Tank 50 KL.









Heat Radiation (


KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )



fatal in 10 sec.







Results





exposure.

135

M/s. SRF Limited


MCA Scenario – 18 pool fire simulation due to Loss of containment in DCPD tank 50 KL.

TABLE – 18

Pool Fire for DCPD Tank 50 KL.









Heat Radiation (


KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )



fatal in 10 sec.







Results





exposure.

137

M/s. SRF Limited


MCA Scenario – 19 pool fire simulation due to Loss of containment in n-Butane tank 60 KL.

TABLE – 19

Pool Fire for n-Butane Tank 60 KL.





Pool liquid depth 0.3 (m) Maximum Flame width 25.865 meter




Heat Radiation (


KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )



fatal in 10 sec.







Results





exposure.

138

M/s. SRF Limited


139

M/s. SRF Limited


MCA Scenario – 20 BLEVE simulation for n-Butane 60 KL storage Tank

TABLE –20

BLEVE simulation for n-Butane 60KL

Scenario : BLEVE


Stored quantity 60 KL Fire Ball radius 44.99 meter

Mass of vapour 5670 Kgs. Fire ball Intensity of Heat

radiation

601.13 Kw /m 2

Heat of combustion 49527.1 Kj/Kg Fire Ball rate of energy

release

1.52903e+007Kj/ sec.

Wind speed 3 m/s Fire- Ball total energy

release

2.80819e + 008 Kj

Liquid Density 600.6 kg/m3 Fire ball duration 18.3658 sec.


Heat Radiation (


KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )

Damage effects

37.5 176 100 % Fatal . Min. to ignite wood (without flame contact)

25.0 216 Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ). Significant

injury.

12.5 306 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 st deg. burn .

4.0 546 Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely.

1.6 866 No discomfort even on long exposure.

Results

In the 176 meter radius area is considered as 100% fatality in 1 min.

In 306 meter radius area is considered as 1st deg. Burn in 10 sec. and 1 % fatal in 1 minute.

In the 546 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely.

In the 866 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfiture even on long

exposure.

140

M/s. SRF Limited


141

M/s. SRF Limited


SCENARIO-21 Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion / Over Pressure For Loss Of

Containment and delay ingnition for N- Butane 60 Kl Storage Tank.

MODEL-21

UVCE / over pressure For delay ingnition for N- Butane 60 Kl Storage Tank

Scenario : UVCE / Over pressure

Input Data

Stored/Spillage quantity 60 KL

Mass of vapour between LEL – UEL % 12618 lbm.

TNT equivalent 14.58

Explosion efficiency 0.05

Wind speed 3.0 m/s

Radial

Distance in

meter

Over

pressure

( psi )

% Fatality lung

Rupture

% Eardrum

rupture

% Structural

damage

% Glass

rupture

27.1 38.3 100 100 100 100

32.2 29.4 96.7 100 100 100

34.2 23.1 73.2 97.8 100 100

153.2 1.8 0.0 2.7 11.8 100

Results

In case of UVCE up to 27.1 meter distance is considered as 100 % fatality and 100 % ear

drum rupture radius.

Up to 34.2 meter distance is considered as 100 % structural Damage and up to 153.2 meter

distance for 100 % glass damage area.

142

M/s. SRF Limited


143

M/s. SRF Limited


MCA Scenario – 22 pool fire simulation due to Loss of containment in Ethane tank 10 KL.

TABLE – 22

Pool Fire for ethane Tank 10 KL.









Heat Radiation (


KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )



fatal in 10 sec.







Results





exposure.

145

M/s. SRF Limited


MCA Scenario – 23 BLEVE simulation for Ethane 10 KL storage Tank

TABLE –23

BLEVE simulation for Ethane 10KL

Scenario : BLEVE




radiation

552.23 Kw /m 2

Heat of combustion 47202 Kj/Kg Fire Ball rate of energy

release

3.96289e+006Kj/ sec.


release

3.86584e + 007 Kj



Heat Radiation (


KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )

Damage effects

37.5 95.0 100 % Fatal . Min. to ignite wood (without flame contact)

25.0 115.0 Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ). Significant

injury.

12.5 155.0 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 st deg. burn .



Results





exposure.

147

M/s. SRF Limited



Containment In ethane 10 KL Storage Tank.

MODEL-24

UVCE / O.P. For Loss Of Containment In ethane


Input Data





Wind speed 3.0 m/s

Radial

Distance in

meter

Over

pressure

( psi )

% Fatality lung

Rupture

% Eardrum

rupture

% Structural

damage

% Glass

rupture

16.6 40.4 100 100 100 100

21.6 27.1 93.4 100 100 100

33.2 8.6 0.0 100 100 100

102.32 2.0 0.0 3.4 16.7 100

Results

In case of UVCE up to 16.6 meter distance is considered as 100 % fatality and 100 % ear

drum rupture radius.

Up to 33.2 meter distance is considered as 100 % structural Damage and up to 102.3 meter

distance for 100 % glass damage area.

148

M/s. SRF Limited


149

M/s. SRF Limited


MCA Scenario – 25 pool fire simulation due to Loss of containment in ethylene tank 20 KL.

TABLE – 25

Pool Fire for ethylene Tank 20 KL.









Heat Radiation (


KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )



fatal in 10 sec.







Results





exposure.

151

M/s. SRF Limited


MCA Scenario – 26 BLEVE simulation for Ethylene 20 KL storage Tank

TABLE –26

BLEVE simulation for Ethylene 20KL

Scenario : BLEVE




radiation

559.89 Kw /m 2


release

6.49518e+006Kj/ sec.


release

8.05602e + 007 Kj



Heat Radiation (


KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )

Damage effects



injury.




Results

In the 121 meter radius area is considered as 100% fatality in 1 min.

In 201meter radius area is considered as 1st deg. Burn in 10 sec. and 1 % fatal in 1 minute.

In the 341 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely.

In the 561 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfiture even on long

exposure.

153

M/s. SRF Limited



Containment In ethylene 20 KL Storage Tank.

MODEL-27

UVCE / O.P. For Loss Of Containment In ethylene


Input Data





Wind speed 3.0 m/s

Radial

Distance in

meter

Over

pressure

( psi )

% Fatality lung

Rupture

% Eardrum

rupture

% Structural

damage

% Glass

rupture

20.3 46.5 100 100 100 100

24.2 33.0 98.8 100 100 100

33.2 14.8 2.2 93.40 100 100

133.32 1.9 0.0 2.9 13.4 100

Results

In case of UVCE up to 20.3 meter distance is considered as 100 % fatality

Upto 24.2 mtrs. Distances 100 % ear drum rupture radius.

Up to 33.2 meter distance is considered as 100 % structural Damage

up to 133.3 meter distance for 100 % glass damage area.

155

M/s. SRF Limited


MCA Scenario –28 Diffusion Jet Fire Simulation for rupture of 1.0 cm copper connecting pipe.

TABLE – 28

For Hydrogen Cylinder skid to PRV Station.

Scenario : JET FIRE


Stored quantity 515 M3 Max. IHR at flame centre

height

52.49 Kw/m2

Gas Jet Diameter 1 cm Flame centre height 63 meter

Gas velocity in the

leakage hole/ pipe

143463 m/s Maximum Flame width 12 meter

Wind speed 3 m/s. Heat flux 8.5 Kw/ m2

Gas Density 0.067kg/m3 Flame surface area 3778 m2

Incident Intensity

of Heat Radiation

( IHR) at ground

level

KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )



fatal in 10 sec.

25.0 10.2 Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ). 100 % fatal in

1 Min. Significant injury in 10 sec.

12.5 14.4 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 % fatal in 1 min.

1 st deg. burn in 10 sec.



157

M/s. SRF Limited


MCA Scenario –29 Over pressure / explosion for rupture of 1.0 cm copper pipe line of Hydrogen

cylinder to PRV station.

TABLE – 29

For Hydrogen Gas Copper Tube Failure

Scenario : FLASH FIRE


Stored quantity 7 m3 Visible Flash Fire Height 0.52meter

Mass of Gas 1 kgs Visible Flash Fire Width 0.26 meter

Heat of combustion 42267 Kj/kg Duration of Flash-Fire in Sec. 2 sec.

Fuel-Air volume ratio in

Flash fire cloud

0.600 Radius of fuel-air cloud mixture 4.19 meter

Stochiometric Fuel-Air

Mixture

0029 Total energy release 283720 Kj

Wind speed 6.0 m/s Max. Heat Radiation from 1 m from

Flash Fire

750 Kw/ m2

Gas Density 0.067 kg/m3 Combustion efficiency 0.5


Heat Radiation (IHR)

at ground level KW

/m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )

Damage effects

37.5 19 100 % Fatal . Min. to ignite wood (without flame

contact)

25.0 24 Significant injury. Min. to ignite wood ( without flame

contact ).

12.5 32 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1st deg. burn .



159

M/s. SRF Limited


MCA Scenario -30 Unconfined Pool Fire Simulation for Drum Storage Area.

TABLE – 30 Unconfined Pool Fire for Drum Storage Area

Scenario : UNCONFINED POOL FIRE








Heat Radiation (


KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )



% fatal in 10 sec.







161

M/s. SRF Limited


MCA Scenario – 31 BLEVE simulation for Drums Storage

TABLE – 31

BLEVE simulation for Drums Storage

Scenario : FIRE BALL/ BLEVE




radiation

186.59 Kw /m 2


release

292486 Kj/ sec.


release

1.333e + 006 Kj

Liquid Density 867 kg/m3 Fire ball duration 4.56 sec.


Heat Radiation (


KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )

Damage effects



injury.

12.5 42.5 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 st deg. burn .



163

M/s. SRF Limited


Scenario-32 Puff Isopleth Simulation For Ammonia Cylinder Catastrophic Failure.

TABLE –32 FOR AMMONIA

Scenario : PUFF DISPERSION

In put Data

Stored quantity 50 kg.

Instantaneous Puff Release quantity 50000 gms.

Molecular weight 17

Density ( Air) 0.6kg/m3

Maximum ground level conc. 258295 ppm

Distance of max. ground level conc. 23m.

Hazard Level Concentration (PPM) Ground level distance (Meter)

Lc50 human 6164 179.37

IDLH 300 578.08

STEL 35 1358

TWA 25 1554

165

M/s. SRF Limited


Scenario-33 Point source release from valve for Ammonia Cylinder.

TABLE –33 FOR AMMONIA

Scenario : POINT SOURCE RELEASE

In put Data

Stored quantity 50 Kgs

Rate of release 346 g/s

Molecular weight 17

Density ( Air) 0.6 kg/m3


Lc50 6164 18.77

IDLH 300 187.56

STEL 35 675.54

TWA 25 831.17

Results:-

LC50 HUMAN (6164 ppm) area up to 18.77 meter, IDLH (300 ppm Immediate danger to life and

health) concentration area up to 187.56 meter and TWA (25 PPM ) area up to 831.17 meter.

167

M/s. SRF Limited


Scenario-34 Spill pool evaporation due to loss containtment in Bromine tank

TABLE –34 FOR Bromine

Scenario : SPILL POOL EVAPORATION

In put Data



Molecular weight 159.8

Density ( Air) 5.5 kg/m3


Lc50 1075 67.26

IDLH 3.00 890.52

STEL 0.20 2307.23

TLV 0.10 2921.14

Results:-

LC50 HUMAN (1075 ppm) area up to 67.26 meter, IDLH (3.0 ppm Immediate danger to life and

health) concentration area up to 890.52 meter and STEL (0.2 PPM ) area up to 2307.23 meter.

TLV(0.10 PPM) area up to 2921.14 mtrs.

169

M/s. SRF Limited


Scenario-35 Puff Isopleth Simulation due to catastrophic failure of AHF bullet.

TABLE –35 FOR AHF


In put Data


Instantaneous Puff Release quantity 8.8e+007 gms.

Molecular weight 20

Density ( Air) 1.258kg/m3

Maximum ground level conc. 1e+006 ppm



Lc50 human 802 1277.40

IDLH 30.0 3107.39

TLV 3.0 5683.39

Results

LC50 HUMAN (802 ppm) area up to 1277.40 meter, IDLH (3.0 ppm Immediate danger to life and

health) concentration area up to 3107 meter and TLV (3 PPM ) area up to 5683 meter.

171

M/s. SRF Limited


Scenario-36 Spill pool Evaporation due to loss containment in AHF bullet.

TABLE –36 FOR AHF

Scenario : Spill pool Evaporation


Stored quantity 88 KL Max. ground level conc. 53395.3

Rate of release 6674 g/s Dist. Of maxi. Ground level

conc.

21 meter

Molecular weight 20

Wind speed 3.0 m/s

Density ( Air) 1.258

Hazard Level Concentration

(PPM)

Ground level distance (Meter)

LC50 802 241.09

IDLH 30 867.46

TLV 3 1957.31

173

M/s. SRF Limited


Scenario-37 Puff Isopleth Simulation For AHCL Cylinder Catastrophic Failure.

TABLE –37 FOR AHCL


In put Data

Stored quantity 40 Kg

Instantaneous Puff Release quantity 40000 gms.


Density ( Air) 1.189

Maximum ground level conc. 49672 ppm



Lc50 human 3940 150.82

IDLH 50.0 825.10

TWA 5.0 2053

175

M/s. SRF Limited


Scenario-38 Point source release for AHCL Cylinder.

TABLE –38 FOR AHCL

Scenario : POINT SOURCE RELEASE

In put Data

Stored quantity 40 Kgs



Density ( Air) 1.3


Lc50 3940 99.69

IDLH 50.0 701.02

TWA/TLV 5.0 1596.90

177

M/s. SRF Limited


Scenario-39 Spill pool Evaporation due to loss containment in Oleum storage tank

TABLE –39 FOR Oleum

Scenario : Spill pool Evaporation


Stored quantity 250 KL Max. ground level conc. 1822.38

Rate of release 2405 g/s Dist. Of maxi. Ground level

conc.

26 meter

Molecular weight 178

Wind speed 3.0 m/s

Density ( Air) 3

Hazard Level Concentration

(PPM)

Ground level distance

(Meter)

LC50 368 69.84

IDLH 10 397.79

STEL 1 930.53

TLV 0.10 2093.13

179

M/s. SRF Limited


Additional Risk assessment for Natural Gas pipeline passing through SRF

premises As discussed in SEAC Meeting Held on 28/10/2015.

Pipeline Data :

1 Pipeline size 24 inch

2 Pipeline MOC As per API 5L Gr X60

3 Average Soil Cover 1.3Mtr

4 Average pipeline operating pressure

80 Bars

5 Average Natural Gas Flow in the pipeline: - 4 lac m 3 per hour .

6 Sectional isolation valve outside of the SRF

premises;

1. At Atali Vil lage on

Down Stream side-

P/L Ch.- 32.950Km

2. At Dahej-GACL on up

Stream side- P/L Ch. -

44.191Km

7 Pipeline protection on f iled:

CP protection & Regular

pipeline patroll ing

8 The Sectional Valve is fully automatic &

controlled by GSPL's MCR - Gandhinagar through

SCADA system.

In put data for MCA scenarios :

Assumption Natural Gas pipeline passing through SRF premises :

NG pipeline rupture due to over pressurized or earth quake or othe r man made reason.

Scenarios considered :

Sr. No.

Failure Type Failure Mode Consequence

1. NG line rupture

Random failure Jet Fire, Flash fire

180

M/s. SRF Limited


SCENARIO : 40 DIFFUSION JET FIRE SIMULATION FOR NATURAL GAS PIPE LINE 100 % RELEASE.

MODEL-40

For Natural gas Pipe line rupture

Scenario : JET FIRE In put Data

Release quantity 4466 kgs (flash fire follows jet fire) Liquid Jet Diameter 24 inch Liquid velocity in the leakage hole/ pipe 32 m/s Wind speed 2 m/s Vapour Density 0.67 kg/m3 Frequence of the rupture of NG pipeline as per Historical failure frequency

1 X 10-6 incedent per year

Incident Intensity

of Heat Radiation

( IHR) at ground

level

KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth

Distance

( Meters )


37.5 14.0 Damage to process equipment. 100 % Fatal in 1 Min. 1 % fatal in 10 sec.

25.0 17.2 Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ). 100 % fatal in 1 Min. Significant injury in 10 sec.

12.5 24.1 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 % fatal in 1 min. 1 st deg. burn in 10 sec.

4.0 42.6 Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely. 1.6 67.4 No discomfort even on long exposure.

Results In the 14.0 meter radius area is considered as 100% fatality in 1 min. In the 24.1 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec. In the 42.6 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely. In the 67.4 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfort even on long

exposure.

181

M/s. SRF Limited


182

M/s. SRF Limited


SCENARIO : 41 FLASH FIRE SIMULATION FOR NATURAL GAS PIPE LINE RUPTURE

MODEL-41

Flash fire For Natural gas Pipe line rupture

Scenario : FLASH FIRE In put Data

Release Gas mass 4466 kgs Heat of combustion 55664 Kj/Kg Fuel-Air volume ratio in Flash fire cloud 0.600 Stochiometric Fuel-Air Mixture 0.50 Wind speed 2 m/s Gas Density 0.67 kg/m3 Combustion efficiency 0.6 Incident Intensity of

Heat Radiation ( IHR) at ground level

KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth Distance ( Meters )

Damage effects

37.5 103 100 % Fatal. Min. to ignite wood (without flame contact)

25.0 123 Significant injury. Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ).



1.6 503 No discomfiture even on long exposure.

Results In case of Flash Fire, up to 103 meter distance it is found to be 100 % fatality area and in this

area wood could be ignited without flame being in contact. From 123 meter distance it is found to be significant injury area. From 183 meter distance it is found to be first degree burn injury area. Above 322 meter area it is found to be a safe area.

183

M/s. SRF Limited


184

M/s. SRF Limited


6.2 Detail regarding consequences analysis table

TABLE - 6.3 For Fire simulations Results

Type of failure considered Spill quantity

consideration Max.

Credible loss scenario

in KL.

Heat Intensity KW/ M2

37.5 12.5 4.0

MCA Scenario –1 Unconfined pool fire

due to Loss of containment in road

tanker

20 26 41.1 72.6

MCA Scenario -2 Unconfined Pool Fire

Simulation for METHANOL tank 35 kl.

35 13.5 22.1 39.0

MCA Scenario – 3 pool fire simulation

due to Loss of containment in Toluene

tank 35 KL

35 23.1 40.0 70.7

MCA Scenario –4 pool fire simulation

due to Loss of containment in Acetone

tank 35 KL

35 14.8 28.6 45.2


due to Loss of containment in IPA tank

35 KL.

35 21.8 37.7 66.6


due to Loss of containment in Ethanol

tank 35 KL.

35 14.0 24.2 42.7


due to Loss of containment in Ethyl

Acetate tank 35 KL.

35 16.9 29.3 51.7


due to Loss of containment in Diethyl

Ether tank 35 KL.

35 15.4 26.6 47.0


due to Loss of containment in Hexane

tank 35 KL.

35 15.7 27.1 47.9


due to Loss of containment in O-xylene

tank 35 KL.

35 17.4 30.0 53.1


due to Loss of containment in Acitic Acid

tank 35 KL.

35 5.9 10.1 17.9


due to Loss of containment in

Monomethyl Hydrazinel tank 35 KL.

35 8.9 15.3 27.1


due to Loss of containment in EDC tank

35 KL.

35 25.4 44.0 77.7

185

M/s. SRF Limited



due to Loss of containment in

Acetonitrile tank 10 KL.

10 5.0 7.6 13.3


due to Loss of containment in MIBK tank

10 KL.

10 5.5 9.5 16.7


due to Loss of containment in Butyl

Acetate tank 50 KL.

50 13.3 23.0 40.6


due to Loss of containment in Acetic

Anhydride tank 50 KL.

50 32.9 57.0 100.7


due to Loss of containment in DCPD tank

50 KL.

50 16.1 27.9 49.3


due to Loss of containment in n-Butane

tank 60 KL.

60 27.1 46.9 82.8

MCA Scenario – 20 BLEVE simulation for

n-Butane 60 KL storage Tank

60 176 306 546

SCENARIO-21 Unconfined Vapor Cloud

Explosion / Over Pressure For Loss Of

Containment In N- Butane 60 Kl Storage

Tank.

60 27.1 32.2 34.2


due to Loss of containment in Ethane

tank 10 KL.

10 16.7 28.8 50.9


Ethane 10 KL storage Tank

10 95.0 155.0 256.0



Containment In ethane 10 KL Storage

Tank.

10 16.6 21.6 33.2


due to Loss of containment in ethylene

tank 20 KL.

20 16.6 28.6 50.6


Ethylene 20 KL storage Tank

20 121 201 341



Containment In ethylene 20 KL Storage

Tank.

20 20.3 24.2 33.2

MCA Scenario –28 Diffusion Jet Fire

Simulation for 1.0 cm copper connecting

pipe to PRV station.

515 M3 8.3 14.4 25.4

MCA Scenario –29 Over pressure /

explosion for rupture of 1.0 cm copper

pipe line of Hydrogen

cylinder to PRV station.

7 M3 19 32 57

MCA Scenario -30 Unconfined Pool Fire

Simulation for Drum Storage Area.

50 6.7 11.5 20.1

186

M/s. SRF Limited



Drums Storage.

20 25 42.5 76

MCA Scenario – 40:-Diffusion Jet Fire

Simulation For Natural Gas Pipe Line

100 % Release.

4466 Kgs 14 24.1 42.6

MCA Scenario – 41:-Flash Fire

Simulation for Natural Gas Pipeline

Rupture.

4446 Kgs. 103 183 322

TABLE - 6.4 For Toxic gas dispersion simulations

Type of failure considered Spill quantity

consideration Max.

Credible loss

scenario in

KL

Evapora

tion

Rate

Grm. /

Sec.

LC50

Distanc

e in

meter

IDLH

Distanc

e in

meter

TLV

Distance

in meter

Scenario-32 Puff Isopleth

Simulation For Ammonia Cylinder

Catastrophic Failure.

50 kg - 179.37 578.08 1554

Scenario-33 Point source release

from valve for Ammonia Cylinder.

50 346 18.77 187.56 831.17

Scenario-34 Spill pool

evaporation due to loss

containment in Bromine tank

16 5734 67.26 890.52 2921.14


Simulation due to catastrophic

failure of AHF bullet.

88 - 1277 3107 5683


Evaporation due to loss

containment in AHF bullet.

88 6674 241.09 867.46 1957.31


Simulation For AHCL Cylinder

Catastrophic Failure.

40 - 150.82 825.10 2053

Scenario-38 Point source release

for AHCL Cylinder.

40 11290 99 701 1596


Evaporation due to loss

containment in Oleum storage

tank

250 2405 69.84 397.79 2093.13

187

M/s. SRF Limited


6.3 Conclusions

The appended table 6.3 and 6.4 summarizes the consequences of the various Scenarios

analyzed under this study.

As can be seen from the results of the summary of the Quantitative Risk Analysis study, the

Total damage and Fatality zone due to Fire & Explosion up to 121 meters in worst case

scenario. First degree burn zone up to 201 meter.

Maximum effect due to fire and explosion the maximum quacequances limited to factory

premises.

As can be seen from the results of the summary of the Quantitative Risk Analysis study, the

Fatality distance due to toxic release dispersion is up to 1277 meter in worst case scenario.

IDLH distance ( Evacuation area) is up to 3107 meter i.e company has to plan off site

emergency plan up to 3.2 kms from the site in down wind direction.

On site emergency preparedness plan to be prepared as per risk assessment findings.

Emergency control facilities and resources to be plan and rehearsal / Mock- Drill to be

conducted regularly to combat emergency in minimum time.

188

M/s. SRF Limited


SECTION VII

RISK REDUCTION MEASURES

7.1 Recommendations

7.1.1 From the Risk Analysis studies conducted, it would be observed that by and large, the risks

are confined within the factory boundary walls in case of fire, explosion and spillage of

chemicals. On site emergency plan & preparedness plan to be prepared and implemented to

combat such situations. To minimize the consequential effects of the risk scenarios, following

steps are recommended.

Plant should meet provisions of the Manufacture, storage & Import of Hazardous

Chemicals Rules, 1986 & the factories Act, 1948.

Fire hydrant system needs to be installed as per NFPA / GFR 66 A Norms in plant and

buildings.

Process hazard analysis and HAZOP study to be conducted for each process and

recommendation to be implemented.

HSE management system to be implemented.

Induction course for HSE to be implemented at very initial stage of the plant employees

recruitment.

Periodic On Site Emergency Mock Drills and occasional Off Site Emergency Mock Drills to

be conducted, so those staffs are trained and are in a state of preparedness to tackle any

emergency.

Emergency handling facilities to be maintained in tip top condition at all time.

Safe operating procedure to be prepared for hazardous process and material handling

process.

Smoke detectors and srinklersytem to be provided in godown/ware house, drum storage

area etc.

Safety devices and control instruments to be calibrated once in a year.

Proper colour work as per IS 2379 to plant pipeline and tank, equipments to be done

once in a six month to protect from corrosion.

Preventive maintenance schedule to be prepared for all equipments.

Permit to work system to be implemented 100 % for hazardous work in the plant.

Safety manual as per Gujarat Factories Rule-68 K & P and Public awareness manual as

per Gujarat Factories Rule 41 B & C needs to be prepared and distributed to all

employees and nearby public.

Fire & Safety organization setup to be extended to implement batter plant process safety.

Plant process safety recommendations provided in relavent section of the report should

be complied at plant comissining stage.

SRF P11 PLANT DAHEJ,

GUJARAT.

CO

NSE

QU

EN

CE

AN

AL

YSI

S R

EPO

RT

OF

SR

F P

11 P

LA

NT

- DA

HE

J, G

UJA

RA

T.

Report Prepared By: Asia Pacific Risk Management Services Pvt. Ltd., 6th Floor Mookambika Complex, No. 4 Lady Desika Road, Mylapore, Chennai – 600 004, Ph no. 044-45518182 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.aprms.in

Report No. RPT – 216/ SRF P 11 Plant-DAHEJ/APRMS/12/CL/R0

DATE: 03rd JAN 2012

CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS REPORT FOR SRF P-11 PLANT, DAHEJ

2

Disclaimer

This report does not guarantee, assure or warrant in any way that the client is in compliance with any laws,

status, regulations or directives or that compliance with the recommendations of this report will eliminate all

hazards or accidents.

The report is based upon an analysis of information provided by Naik Associates. Asia Pacific Risk Management Services Pvt. Ltd. (APRMS) therefore makes no warranty, expressed or implied, as to the accuracy of this data or to the calculations or opinion, based upon this data, given herein and it is a condition of any contractual agreement between APRMS and its client that APRMS shall not be liable for any loss or damage arising out of or in connection with such data, calculation or opinions.


3

Table of Contents

S.NO DESCRIPTION PAGE NO

1 Summary 1

2 Introduction 5

3 Process Description 6

4 Chlorine and its hazards 7

5 Methodology 9

6 Consequence Analysis 10

7 Summary of Consequence Analysis results 30


1

1. Summary

Material Scenario Damage effects for 1.5/F

Chlorine

Tonner Leak

Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further. Effect zone 1 (100% lethality) covers chlorine tonner shed; Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) covers nearly 50% of the plant area which includes petroleum product tank farm(35), Workshop(25), training centre(05), Process pad area(13), 9m wide road and 4MW captive plant; Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) covers almost entire plant area excluding security cabin & medical centre(10) and Raw & fire water storage & pump house(08).

Catastrophic rupture of header – tonner to bullet

Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further. Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) covers nearly 50% of the plant area which includes petroleum product tank farm(35), Workshop(25), training centre(05), Process pad area(13), 9m wide road and 4MW captive plant; Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) covers entire plant area and goes out of the plant boundary.

Bullet transfer line to relay tank

Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further. Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) covers CMS filling station (46), organic & hazardous tank farm (20), cooling tower (101) and MCC & control room for plant & utility (16); Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) extends out of the plant in all directions except north where it covers a part of acid tank farm(34).

Catastrophic rupture of pump discharge line – relay tank to vaporizer

Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further. Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) covers CMS filling station (46), organic & hazardous tank farm (20), cooling tower (101) and MCC & control room for plant & utility (16); Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) extends out of the plant in all directions except north where it covers HOG area(31), Cooling tower(29) and part of solvent tank farm(33).

Catastrophic rupture of pump discharge line – relay tank to

Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further. Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) covers Chlorine storage area (17), Chlorine


2

vaporizer in main plant area tonner shed (18), MCC & control room for plant & utility (16), R22 chiller room (19), Liquid nitrogen area(22), ESP(108) and RCC chimney(109); Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) extends out of the plant in all directions except north where it covers a part of Acid tank farm (34).

Catastrophic rupture of vaporizer outlet pipeline

Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further. Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) extends out of the plant in all directions except north where it covers Petroleum product tank farm (35) and ETP area (37); Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) extends out of the plant in all directions except north where it covers up to FMP plant (27).

Catastrophic rupture of vaporizer

Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further. Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) covers Liquid nitrogen area (22), ESP (108), RCC Chimney (109), P11 main plant (11), cracker section (12), process pad area (13) and UG tank farm (14); Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) covers nearly 40% of the plant area which includes ETP (26), P11 plant, 9m wide road, cooling tower (101) and part of organic & hazardous tank farm (20).

Catastrophic failure of bullet Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further. Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) covers entire plant area; Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) covers entire plant area and extends out of the plant boundary.


3

Material Scenario Damage effects for 5/D

Chlorine

Tonner Leak

Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further. Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) covers CMS filling station (46), organic & hazardous tank farm (20), cooling tower (101) and MCC & control room for plant & utility (16); Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) covers nearly 50% of the plant area which includes petroleum product tank farm (35), Workshop (25), training centre (05), Process pad area (13), 9m wide road and 4MW captive plant.


Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further. Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) covers organic & hazardous tank farm (20), cooling tower (101) and MCC & control room for plant & utility (16); Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) covers nearly 40% of the plant area which includes ETP (26), Process pad area(13), 9m wide road and 4MW captive plant.


Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further in south direction. Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) covers chlorine storage area and a part of chlorine tonner shed; Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) covers MCC & control room for plant & utility (16), Chlorine storage area(17), Chlorine tonner shed(18) and R22 chiller room(19).


Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further in south direction. Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) covers MCC & control room for plant & utility (16), Chlorine storage area (17), Chlorine tonner shed (18) and R22 chiller room (19); Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) covers Liquid nitrogen area(22), part of organic & hazardous tank farm(20), ESP, RCC Chimney, P11 main plant(11), cracker section(12), process pad area(13) and UG tank farm(14).

Catastrophic rupture of pump discharge line – relay tank to vaporizer in main plant area

Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further in south direction. Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) covers MCC & control room for plant & utility (16), part of cooling tower (23), Chiller shed (15), P11 main plant (11), cracker section (12), Process pad area (13), and UG tank farm (14); Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) covers MCC & control room for plant & utility (16), cooling tower (23), Chiller shed (15), P11 main plant (11), cracker section (12), Process pad


4

area (13), and UG tank farm (14), part of liquid nitrogen area and chlorine storage area.


Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further. Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) extends out of the plant in all directions except north where it covers up to ETP area (37); Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) extends out of the plant in all directions except north where it covers up to Acid tank farm (34).



Catastrophic failure of bullet

Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further. Effect zone 1 (100% lethality) is confined to chlorine storage area; Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) covers P11 plant, 4 MW captive plant and ETP area (37); Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) extends out of the plant in all directions except north where it extends nearly up to FMP plant (27).


5

2. Introduction About the Company

SRF is a multi-business entity engaged in the manufacture of chemical based industrial intermediates. Today,

its business portfolio covers Technical Textiles, Chemicals, Packaging Films and Engineering Plastics. The

company also enjoys a significant presence among the key domestic manufacturers of Polyester Films and

Fluorospecialities.

Building on its in-house R&D Facilities for technical textiles business and chemicals business, the company

strives to stay ahead in business through innovations in operations and product development. A winner of the

prestigious Deming Application prize for its tyre cord business, SRF continues to redefine its work and

corporate culture with the TQM as its management way.

Over the years, SRF has not only upgraded its refrigerant portfolio by adding new generation ozone-friendly

refrigerant, but also enriched its product mix. Today, SRF also manufactures and markets chloromethanes and

a variety of Fluorospecialities, the fluorine based high value speciality chemicals. These are used as

intermediates in the manufacturing of agro and pharma chemicals. As part of its long term strategy, SRF is

now developing a multipurpose chemical complex at Dahej (Gujarat) with the purpose of expanding its

fluorospeciality business.

Study objective

The main objective of this consequence analysis was to study the risk to safety of plant personnel and the

plant layout. It was required to give a clear concise picture of the identified failure scenarios and their

consequences.

Scope of study Consequence analysis

Superimposition of consequence contours on the plot plan provided.

Summary of all consequence results


6

3. Process Description

Chlorine is one of the major raw materials for P11/P12 and the requirement is about 120MT/day. The liquid

chlorine is received in tonners and is unloaded into chlorine bullets. The tonner unloading facility consists of 4

unloading bays with 21 unloading points in each bay. The liquid chlorine is transferred from tonners to bullets

using nitrogen pressure in the tonners.

The liquid chlorine storage consists of 3 bullets (V-1011 A/B/C) of each 132KL capacity. Out of three bullets,

one (V-11011C) will be kept as emergency spare.

The liquid chlorine from bullets is continuously pumped to chlorine vaporizer (E-11033) using a relay tank V-

11017 and liquid chlorine transfer pumps P – 11017 A/B. The relay tank is jacketed with continuous

circulation of chilled P11 so that the chlorine is chilled before going to pump suction.

The vapour chlorine from vaporizer is continuously fed to chlorination reactor in the plant at the rate of 5000

kg/hr.


7

4. Chlorine and its Hazards

Pure Chlorine comes in two forms; gas and liquid. Chlorine gas is easily liquefied under pressure.

Typically, a commercial cylinder contains liquefied gas under pressure. Chlorine gas has a disagreeable,

sharp, pungent, penetrating odour. In air-borne concentration above 1000ppm, it has a greenish-yellow

colour. In smaller concentrations, it is colourless. Chlorine gas is 2.5 times heavier than air and tends to

flow downhill and pool in lower areas. Wind & weather, however will cause a chlorine gas cloud to

disperse, spreading it all directions, even uphill.

Liquid chlorine is a transparent, amber-coloured, oily fluid that is 1.5times heavier than water. Liquid

chlorine has a high compression ratio. The ratio of liquid to gas is 1 to 460, which means that 1 litre of

liquid chlorine expands to form 460 litres of pure chlorine gas.

Hazards of Chlorine

Chlorine is corrosive. It can burn moist body surfaces such as the eyes, nose, throat, lungs and wet skin

because it forms harmful acids when reacts with moisture. Long-term exposure to low concentration of

chlorine may cause a gradual decrease in lung efficiency. A single exposure to a high concentration can

cause the same effect.

Toxic effects of Chlorine

Chlorine

Concentration (ppm) Effect

0.03 – 0.1 Range of Odour threshold

1 – 3 May cause mild irritation of eyes, nose and throat

3 – 5 Stinging or burning in eyes, nose and throat; may cause headache, watering eyes,

sneezing, coughing, breathing difficulty, bloody nose and blood tinged sputum.

5 – 15 Severe irritation of the eyes, nose and respiratory tract.

30 - 60 Immediate breathing difficulty resulting in pulmonary edema (fluid build-up in

lungs), possible causing suffocation and death.


8

430 Lethal after 30 minutes

1000 or more Fatal after a few breaths

Source: Chlorine Safe work Practices, 2002 edition

Exposure limits of Chlorine

Exposure level (ppm) Exposure limit

0.5 Maximum allowable concentration averaged over an eight-hour period.

1 Maximum allowable short-term exposure (15 mins)

10 or more Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health

Note: The IDLH exposure level is the point at which a person without appropriate respiratory protection

could be fatally injured or could suffer irreversible or in capacitating health effects.

Fire: Chlorine will not burn by itself, but will support combustion.

Chemical Action: Chlorine, in both gas and liquid forms, reacts with almost all chemicals usually with a

release of heat. At high temperature, chlorine reacts vigorously with most metals. For instance, a chlorine

reaction can cause stainless steel to catch fire or melt.

Corrosive Action: Chlorine reacts with water or moisture in the air to form highly corrosive acids. Every

precaution must be taken to keep chlorine and chlorine equipment moisture free. Never use water on a

chlorine leak.


9

5. Methodology Study workflow

The steps involved in the study were:

Data collection

Identification of possible scenarios

Modelling of the scenarios

Results & Summary

1. Meteorological Data

Weather conditions considered for the analysis are

Stability class F and Wind speed 1.5m/s

Stability class D and Wind speed 5 m/s

Ambient temperature of 320C

Relative humidity of 70%

Surface roughness length: 1m

2. Toxic

Maximum Concentration Cloud Footprint for IDLH (Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health) and

Toxic lethality contours were plotted to estimate the extent to which it can cause harm to personnel in

the facility and surrounding.

Software tool

DNV’s PHAST version 6.7 was used to model various physical effects. PHAST is extensively used in

the hydrocarbon industry and is also validated for a number of substances. As for any software, the

accuracy of results depends on the accuracy of data input.


10

6. Consequence Analysis

Chlorine Scenarios:

Material: Chlorine

S.No Failure Scenario Hole size / Line size Consequence modelled

1 Tonner leak 15 mm Maximum Concentration cloud footprint, TL

Maximum Concentration cloud footprint, TL

2 Catastrophic rupture of header – tonner to bullet

- Maximum Concentration cloud footprint, TL


3 Bullet transfer line to relay tank – 10 mins release



4 Catastrophic rupture of pump discharge line – relay tank to vaporizer



5 Catastrophic rupture of pump discharge line – relay tank to vaporizer in main plant area



6 Catastrophic rupture of vaporizer outlet pipeline



7 Catastrophic rupture of vaporizer



8 Catastrophic rupture of bullet - Maximum Concentration cloud footprint, TL


TL – Toxic Lethality


12

Toxic Lethality


13

Scenario: Catastrophic rupture of header – tonner to bullet

Toxic Maximum Concentration Cloud Footprint


15

Toxic Lethality


18

Toxic Lethality


20

Toxic Lethality


21

Scenario: Catastrophic rupture of pump discharge line – relay tank to vaporizer in main plant area



22

Toxic Lethality


24

Toxic Lethality


25

Scenario: Catastrophic rupture of vaporizer



26


28

Scenario: Catastrophic rupture of bullet



29

Annexure 11

SRF P11 PLANT DAHEJ,

GUJARAT.

CO

NSE

QU

EN

CE

AN

AL

YSI

S R

EPO

RT

OF

SR

F P

11 P

LA

NT

- DA

HE

J, G

UJA

RA

T.

Report Prepared By: Asia Pacific Risk Management Services Pvt. Ltd., 6th Floor Mookambika Complex, No. 4 Lady Desika Road, Mylapore, Chennai – 600 004, Ph no. 044-45518182 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.aprms.in

Report No. RPT – 216/ SRF P 11 Plant-DAHEJ/APRMS/12/CL/R0

DATE: 03rd JAN 2012


2

Disclaimer

This report does not guarantee, assure or warrant in any way that the client is in compliance with any laws,

status, regulations or directives or that compliance with the recommendations of this report will eliminate all

hazards or accidents.

The report is based upon an analysis of information provided by Naik Associates. Asia Pacific Risk Management Services Pvt. Ltd. (APRMS) therefore makes no warranty, expressed or implied, as to the accuracy of this data or to the calculations or opinion, based upon this data, given herein and it is a condition of any contractual agreement between APRMS and its client that APRMS shall not be liable for any loss or damage arising out of or in connection with such data, calculation or opinions.


3

Table of Contents

S.NO DESCRIPTION PAGE NO

1 Summary 1

2 Introduction 5

3 Process Description 6

4 Chlorine and its hazards 7

5 Methodology 9

6 Consequence Analysis 10

7 Summary of Consequence Analysis results 30


1

1. Summary

Material Scenario Damage effects for 1.5/F

Chlorine

Tonner Leak

Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further. Effect zone 1 (100% lethality) covers chlorine tonner shed; Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) covers nearly 50% of the plant area which includes petroleum product tank farm(35), Workshop(25), training centre(05), Process pad area(13), 9m wide road and 4MW captive plant; Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) covers almost entire plant area excluding security cabin & medical centre(10) and Raw & fire water storage & pump house(08).


Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further. Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) covers nearly 50% of the plant area which includes petroleum product tank farm(35), Workshop(25), training centre(05), Process pad area(13), 9m wide road and 4MW captive plant; Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) covers entire plant area and goes out of the plant boundary.


Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further. Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) covers CMS filling station (46), organic & hazardous tank farm (20), cooling tower (101) and MCC & control room for plant & utility (16); Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) extends out of the plant in all directions except north where it covers a part of acid tank farm(34).


Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further. Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) covers CMS filling station (46), organic & hazardous tank farm (20), cooling tower (101) and MCC & control room for plant & utility (16); Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) extends out of the plant in all directions except north where it covers HOG area(31), Cooling tower(29) and part of solvent tank farm(33).

Catastrophic rupture of pump discharge line – relay tank to

Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further. Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) covers Chlorine storage area (17), Chlorine


2

vaporizer in main plant area tonner shed (18), MCC & control room for plant & utility (16), R22 chiller room (19), Liquid nitrogen area(22), ESP(108) and RCC chimney(109); Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) extends out of the plant in all directions except north where it covers a part of Acid tank farm (34).


Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further. Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) extends out of the plant in all directions except north where it covers Petroleum product tank farm (35) and ETP area (37); Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) extends out of the plant in all directions except north where it covers up to FMP plant (27).



Catastrophic failure of bullet Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further. Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) covers entire plant area; Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) covers entire plant area and extends out of the plant boundary.


3

Material Scenario Damage effects for 5/D

Chlorine

Tonner Leak

Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further. Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) covers CMS filling station (46), organic & hazardous tank farm (20), cooling tower (101) and MCC & control room for plant & utility (16); Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) covers nearly 50% of the plant area which includes petroleum product tank farm (35), Workshop (25), training centre (05), Process pad area (13), 9m wide road and 4MW captive plant.


Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further. Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) covers organic & hazardous tank farm (20), cooling tower (101) and MCC & control room for plant & utility (16); Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) covers nearly 40% of the plant area which includes ETP (26), Process pad area(13), 9m wide road and 4MW captive plant.


Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further in south direction. Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) covers chlorine storage area and a part of chlorine tonner shed; Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) covers MCC & control room for plant & utility (16), Chlorine storage area(17), Chlorine tonner shed(18) and R22 chiller room(19).


Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further in south direction. Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) covers MCC & control room for plant & utility (16), Chlorine storage area (17), Chlorine tonner shed (18) and R22 chiller room (19); Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) covers Liquid nitrogen area(22), part of organic & hazardous tank farm(20), ESP, RCC Chimney, P11 main plant(11), cracker section(12), process pad area(13) and UG tank farm(14).


Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further in south direction. Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) covers MCC & control room for plant & utility (16), part of cooling tower (23), Chiller shed (15), P11 main plant (11), cracker section (12), Process pad area (13), and UG tank farm (14); Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) covers MCC & control room for plant & utility (16), cooling tower (23), Chiller shed (15), P11 main plant (11), cracker section (12), Process pad


4

area (13), and UG tank farm (14), part of liquid nitrogen area and chlorine storage area.


Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further. Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) extends out of the plant in all directions except north where it covers up to ETP area (37); Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) extends out of the plant in all directions except north where it covers up to Acid tank farm (34).



Catastrophic failure of bullet

Maximum Concentration cloud footprint covers the entire plant area and extends further. Effect zone 1 (100% lethality) is confined to chlorine storage area; Effect zone 0.5 (50% lethality) covers P11 plant, 4 MW captive plant and ETP area (37); Effect zone 0.1 (10% lethality) extends out of the plant in all directions except north where it extends nearly up to FMP plant (27).


5

2. Introduction About the Company

SRF is a multi-business entity engaged in the manufacture of chemical based industrial intermediates. Today,

its business portfolio covers Technical Textiles, Chemicals, Packaging Films and Engineering Plastics. The

company also enjoys a significant presence among the key domestic manufacturers of Polyester Films and

Fluorospecialities.

Building on its in-house R&D Facilities for technical textiles business and chemicals business, the company

strives to stay ahead in business through innovations in operations and product development. A winner of the

prestigious Deming Application prize for its tyre cord business, SRF continues to redefine its work and

corporate culture with the TQM as its management way.

Over the years, SRF has not only upgraded its refrigerant portfolio by adding new generation ozone-friendly

refrigerant, but also enriched its product mix. Today, SRF also manufactures and markets chloromethanes and

a variety of Fluorospecialities, the fluorine based high value speciality chemicals. These are used as

intermediates in the manufacturing of agro and pharma chemicals. As part of its long term strategy, SRF is

now developing a multipurpose chemical complex at Dahej (Gujarat) with the purpose of expanding its

fluorospeciality business.

Study objective

The main objective of this consequence analysis was to study the risk to safety of plant personnel and the

plant layout. It was required to give a clear concise picture of the identified failure scenarios and their

consequences.

Scope of study Consequence analysis

Superimposition of consequence contours on the plot plan provided.

Summary of all consequence results


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3. Process Description

Chlorine is one of the major raw materials for P11/P12 and the requirement is about 120MT/day. The liquid

chlorine is received in tonners and is unloaded into chlorine bullets. The tonner unloading facility consists of 4

unloading bays with 21 unloading points in each bay. The liquid chlorine is transferred from tonners to bullets

using nitrogen pressure in the tonners.

The liquid chlorine storage consists of 3 bullets (V-1011 A/B/C) of each 132KL capacity. Out of three bullets,

one (V-11011C) will be kept as emergency spare.

The liquid chlorine from bullets is continuously pumped to chlorine vaporizer (E-11033) using a relay tank V-

11017 and liquid chlorine transfer pumps P – 11017 A/B. The relay tank is jacketed with continuous

circulation of chilled P11 so that the chlorine is chilled before going to pump suction.

The vapour chlorine from vaporizer is continuously fed to chlorination reactor in the plant at the rate of 5000

kg/hr.


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4. Chlorine and its Hazards

Pure Chlorine comes in two forms; gas and liquid. Chlorine gas is easily liquefied under pressure.

Typically, a commercial cylinder contains liquefied gas under pressure. Chlorine gas has a disagreeable,

sharp, pungent, penetrating odour. In air-borne concentration above 1000ppm, it has a greenish-yellow

colour. In smaller concentrations, it is colourless. Chlorine gas is 2.5 times heavier than air and tends to

flow downhill and pool in lower areas. Wind & weather, however will cause a chlorine gas cloud to

disperse, spreading it all directions, even uphill.

Liquid chlorine is a transparent, amber-coloured, oily fluid that is 1.5times heavier than water. Liquid

chlorine has a high compression ratio. The ratio of liquid to gas is 1 to 460, which means that 1 litre of

liquid chlorine expands to form 460 litres of pure chlorine gas.

Hazards of Chlorine

Chlorine is corrosive. It can burn moist body surfaces such as the eyes, nose, throat, lungs and wet skin

because it forms harmful acids when reacts with moisture. Long-term exposure to low concentration of

chlorine may cause a gradual decrease in lung efficiency. A single exposure to a high concentration can

cause the same effect.

Toxic effects of Chlorine

Chlorine

Concentration (ppm) Effect

0.03 – 0.1 Range of Odour threshold

1 – 3 May cause mild irritation of eyes, nose and throat

3 – 5 Stinging or burning in eyes, nose and throat; may cause headache, watering eyes,

sneezing, coughing, breathing difficulty, bloody nose and blood tinged sputum.

5 – 15 Severe irritation of the eyes, nose and respiratory tract.

30 - 60 Immediate breathing difficulty resulting in pulmonary edema (fluid build-up in

lungs), possible causing suffocation and death.


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430 Lethal after 30 minutes

1000 or more Fatal after a few breaths

Source: Chlorine Safe work Practices, 2002 edition

Exposure limits of Chlorine

Exposure level (ppm) Exposure limit

0.5 Maximum allowable concentration averaged over an eight-hour period.

1 Maximum allowable short-term exposure (15 mins)

10 or more Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health

Note: The IDLH exposure level is the point at which a person without appropriate respiratory protection

could be fatally injured or could suffer irreversible or in capacitating health effects.

Fire: Chlorine will not burn by itself, but will support combustion.

Chemical Action: Chlorine, in both gas and liquid forms, reacts with almost all chemicals usually with a

release of heat. At high temperature, chlorine reacts vigorously with most metals. For instance, a chlorine

reaction can cause stainless steel to catch fire or melt.

Corrosive Action: Chlorine reacts with water or moisture in the air to form highly corrosive acids. Every

precaution must be taken to keep chlorine and chlorine equipment moisture free. Never use water on a

chlorine leak.


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5. Methodology Study workflow

The steps involved in the study were:

Data collection

Identification of possible scenarios

Modelling of the scenarios

Results & Summary

1. Meteorological Data

Weather conditions considered for the analysis are

Stability class F and Wind speed 1.5m/s

Stability class D and Wind speed 5 m/s

Ambient temperature of 320C

Relative humidity of 70%

Surface roughness length: 1m

2. Toxic

Maximum Concentration Cloud Footprint for IDLH (Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health) and

Toxic lethality contours were plotted to estimate the extent to which it can cause harm to personnel in

the facility and surrounding.

Software tool

DNV’s PHAST version 6.7 was used to model various physical effects. PHAST is extensively used in

the hydrocarbon industry and is also validated for a number of substances. As for any software, the

accuracy of results depends on the accuracy of data input.


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6. Consequence Analysis

Chlorine Scenarios:

Material: Chlorine

S.No Failure Scenario Hole size / Line size Consequence modelled

1 Tonner leak 15 mm Maximum Concentration cloud footprint, TL


2 Catastrophic rupture of header – tonner to bullet



3 Bullet transfer line to relay tank – 10 mins release



4 Catastrophic rupture of pump discharge line – relay tank to vaporizer



5 Catastrophic rupture of pump discharge line – relay tank to vaporizer in main plant area



6 Catastrophic rupture of vaporizer outlet pipeline



7 Catastrophic rupture of vaporizer



8 Catastrophic rupture of bullet - Maximum Concentration cloud footprint, TL


TL – Toxic Lethality


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Scenario: Tonner Leak Toxic Maximum Concentration Cloud Footprint


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Toxic Lethality


13

Scenario: Catastrophic rupture of header – tonner to bullet



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15

Toxic Lethality


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17

Scenario: Bullet transfer line to relay tank – 10 mins release



18

Toxic Lethality


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Scenario: Catastrophic rupture of pump discharge line – relay tank to vaporizer



20

Toxic Lethality


21

Scenario: Catastrophic rupture of pump discharge line – relay tank to vaporizer in main plant area



22

Toxic Lethality


23

Scenario: Catastrophic rupture of vaporizer outlet pipeline



24

Toxic Lethality


25

Scenario: Catastrophic rupture of vaporizer



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27

Toxic Lethality


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Scenario: Catastrophic rupture of bullet



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30

Toxic Lethality


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7. Summary of Consequence Analysis Results

CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR 1.5/F

MATERIAL: CHLORINE

Scenario

Toxic Distances (m)

Max Conc (IDLH)

Effect zone 1 (100%

lethality)

Effect zone 0.5

(50% lethality)

Effect zone 0.1

(10% lethality)

Tonner leak 10835.8 17.5 229.7 448.6 Catastrophic rupture of header – tonner to bullet 8338.1 - 241.5 615.8

Bullet transfer line to relay tank – 10 mins release 4544.8 - 146 307.1

Catastrophic rupture of pump discharge line – relay tank to vaporizer 4835.0 - 154.3 397.5


4835.0 - 154.3 397.5

Catastrophic rupture of vaporizer outlet pipeline 10897.1 - 343.2 553.1

Catastrophic rupture of vaporizer 5019.3 - 160.0 243.5 Catastrophic rupture of bullet 14888.1 - 561.2 1355.8

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CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR 5/D

MATERIAL: CHLORINE

Scenario

Toxic Distances (m)

Max Conc (IDLH)

Effect zone 1 (100%

lethality)

Effect zone 0.5

(50% lethality)

Effect zone 0.1

(10% lethality)

Tonner leak 1724.7 - 125.0 202.8 Catastrophic rupture of header – tonner to bullet 1290.3 - 114.2 193.7

Bullet transfer line to relay tank – 10 mins release 699.0 - 39.9 77.3

Catastrophic rupture of pump discharge line – relay tank to vaporizer 791.7 - 76.0 122.8


791.7 - 76.0 122.8

Catastrophic rupture of vaporizer outlet pipeline 4221.2 - 329.7 452.0

Catastrophic rupture of vaporizer 2130.1 - 166.6 229.6 Catastrophic rupture of bullet 2248.5 21.8 253.7 446.6

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