PRAGUE CONFERENCE PAPERDr. Mark Hayes (Solent University)

Abstract: this paper deals primarily with the role of Sinn Fein and the Provisional IRA in the Irish peace process. The objective, moreover, is to challenge some of the conventional assumptions about the development of the peace process and its political consequences. The hypothesis expounded here centres on the contention that the key to the apparently spectacular success of the peace agreement was not so much constructive dialogue and dexterous diplomacy, but the willingness of the Republican movement to re-articulate, reform, and even reject hitherto essential political principles. In essence, the fact that Republicanism is an amorphous and ambiguous ideological construct facilitated a more pragmatic political approach by the Provisional Republican leadership, which was a pre-condition for subsequent political accommodation. This ideological slippage, in combination with a number of other pertinent contextual factors, enabled the peace process to gain traction in the first instance, and provided the dynamic for the Good Friday Agreement.

THE ROLE OF SINN FEIN AND THE PROVISIONAL IRA IN THE TRANSITION TO PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND: FROM CONFLICT TO CO-OPERATION.

Basically this paper focuses upon Sinn Fein and the Provisional IRA and

their role in the Peace Process, and in so doing I want to tease out and challenge

some of the widespread assumptions held about the nature of the peace process

and its political consequences.

The peace process in Ireland has been widely seen as a successful

compromise. A seemingly intractable and violent conflict has apparently been

resolved by a willingness to engage in constructive dialogue, and the utilisation of

dexterous diplomacy. The mechanics of this process, from the tortuous syntax

of the Downing Street Declaration to the constructive ambiguity of the Good

Friday Agreement, have been assessed and analysed in great detail by academics

and journalists alike. And accolades have been widely distributed to the likes of

Trimble, Hume, Blair, Reynolds, Ahern, Mowlam even Adams and Paisley!

This is what we might call the hand of history thesis all the players played a

blinder and it was a good result!

In many ways this thesis forms part of the conventional orthodoxy about

the Good Friday Agreement it is the dominant explanatory narrative. Indeed,

this perspective was powerfully re-enforced by the extraordinary scenes of

Martin McGuinness and Ian Paisley working together in a fully functioning

devolved administration the so-called chuckle-brothers were simply the most

stunning visual manifestation of the politics of compromise and the success of

skilful diplomacy. The conflict, which had hitherto been managed, was now

resolved, precipitating ubiquitous talk of the end game in Ireland.

As Secretary of State Shaun Woodward has recently argued (2008) the

process was a spectacular transformation and he reflected upon the historic

acts of leadership that have been taken by unionists, nationalists and

republicansin establishing a NI that is about a genuinely shared future

In many ways this perspective on how the conflict was resolved suits

the British government. The bi-partisan consensus on Northern Ireland, and the

stress placed on the virtues of constitutionalism and conventional politics,

seemed to vindicate successive British administrations as the impartial arbiters

in the management of enmity. Of course there is a patronising and self-

congratulatory tone in some of this (see Jonathan Powell for instance who

claimed that seeing Adams and McGuinness signing an agreement was like

seeing his children graduate! Michael Ancram said the British had danced

with wolves). Nevertheless few would challenge its underlying assumptions of

this perspective the GFA reflected the success of critical engagement, dialogue

and diplomacy in turning insurgent terrorists into conventional politicians

bound by peaceful, constitutional practices and processes.

There has even been a suggestion that the Northern Ireland model

should be deployed to resolve other conflicts in far more sensitive parts of the

world. As Bew and Frampton have said, it has become fashionable to look to

the lessons of the peace process in NI as holding insights for other areas of

conflict in the world. Indeed Peter Hain (June 2007) argued that the process

should stand as an inspiration and perhaps guidance to others as they go

about the business of conflict resolution. In a world littered with serious ethnic

and religious conflict it is understandable that well meaning people would want

to develop a template or model that might be utilised productively elsewhere.

(McGuinness visited Iraq to attend a national reconciliation conference).

Interestingly Sinn Fein also has a vested interest in perpetuating this

orthodoxy. Sinn Fein has developed very rapidly as a political party. (SF has 5

abstentionist MPs, one MEP, over 120 local councillors in NI, 27 MLAs and 5

Ministers in the devolved administration at Stormont; just got Tom Hartley

elected as Mayor of Belfast). As Feeney (memorably) stated in 2002, the most

remarkable phenomenon in electoral politics in Ireland was the apparently

irresistible rise of SFit has proven to have had a more profound effect on Irish

politics than the most sustained IRA campaignSF now exercises greater

political influence than it has done at any time since 1921.

And Sinn Fein wants to be seen as part of a substantive historic

compromise, and to have negotiated a number of critical concessions from the

Unionists and British administration. The release of prisoners, the reform of the

RUC, the reduction in the number of troops and military bases, the cultural

equality agenda, were all to varying degrees difficult for Unionists and British

administration to swallow and apparently indicative of a genuine

accommodation between political opponents.

However, my contention is or the essence of my interpretation is that

the key component or critical dynamic that has driven the peace process, and

which underpins the GFA is the dramatic scaling-down or down-sizing of

Republican aspirations. The fact is that on the critical issue the issue that

counted in terms of Republican history and discourse the Provisional

movement effectively capitulated.

The emotional core and the political nucleus of Republican praxis has

always been the notion that Ireland has been denied the right to national self-

determination. The reality is that the GFA copper-fastens the consent principle

and Northern Ireland will remain British for as long as majority in the north

(i.e. the Protestants) wish it. This was the non-negotiable bottom-line for all the

other parties before SF were involved. Article 1 Annex A of the GFA states

unequivocally NI in its entirety remains part of the UK. As Blair put it, the

GFA offered them (the Unionists) every key demand they have made since

partitionthe principle of consent is enshrined. And Ian Paisley was,

characteristically, blunt, they cant be true Republicans when they now accept

the right of Britain to govern this country and take part in that governmentI

took away their main plank, for their main plank was they wouldnt recognize

the British government now they are part of the British government. SF have

become an integral part of a state they had once pledged to destroy!

Of course, SF emphasised the transformative potential of the GFA.

Adams talked of a new phase of struggle, building a bridge to the future and

the GFA as a powerful instrument for change; whilst McGuinness said that it

was like both partners in a relationship agreeing that it was over but staying

together for the kids. An interesting editorial in An Phoblacht/Republican News

(2nd December 1999) put it this way to fellow Shinners: Admit it these last 5

years have been confusing. But thats winning for youfor the foreseeable

future there will be two jurisdictionswe are not to blame for thatbottom line

its going our waythe revolutionary is an improviser you work with what

youve got!

Unfortunately for SF the transitional arrangements that were emphasised

as the engine of unification have yet to materialise. There is greater cross-border

co-operation on issues like teachers qualifications, waste management, rural

development and aqua culture. But this hardly constitutes an all-Ireland

dynamic or the architecture for national liberation (and probably wasnt what

Bobby Sands had in mind). No amount of sophistry or self-delusion can obscure

this fundamental fact - the GFA has stabilised the NI state. The reality is that, for

Irish Republicans, the GFA represents not so much the treaty of Versailles for

the victorious Allies, but the debacle of Brest Litovsk for the Bolsheviks! Of

course Provisional Republicans are far too clever to acknowledge slaughtering

sacred cows or to admit to surrendering in stages and theyll keep whistling to

keep their spirits up! They are all Sticks now!

In this sense ex-Provo Dr. Anthony McIntyre is absolutely correct the

British stewardship of the Peace Process has incorporated Republicans and

excluded Republicanism. As Brendan Hughes put it to the author -

Republicanism has been effectively de-commissioned. It is this fact more than

anything that has facilitated the GFA.

In many ways for someone like myself (political activist/academic) the

more interesting question to ask is not whether this has been an abandonment of

Republicanism, but why this has happened.

Briefly, there are a number of inter-related reasons for this situation some

are more specific and indigenous to the movement, others are much broader

exogenous variables that came into play. All of them placed uni-dimensional

pressure on the Provos to reach agreement well short of their stated aspirations.

These are all inter-related and are listed in no particular order of importance.

* The prominence and politicisation of Sinn Fein and the down-grading of

the IRA as the cutting edge of resistance to the state. The journey toward

electoralism, via the Hunger Strikes, dialogue with the SDLP, Pan-Nationalist

diplomacy, the TUAS document etc have all been well documented. All of these

moments facilitated and pre-figured a purely political strategy with the

emphasis on electoral politics. Indeed Adams has recently claimed that, our

struggle was about bringing to an end physical force Republicanism, by creating

an alternative way to achieve democratic and Republican objectives

* There was a military stalemate and a (realistic) recognition that armed

struggle could not secure victory. (IRA Volunteers from Derry in Long Kesh

1989 commented to author that McGuinness was saying the guns were

banjaxed). This realisation was probably evident much earlier, but certainly

after the spectacular failure of the border campaign in the mid-1980s and the

disaster at Loughall (the PIRA Tet Offensive). So Provo strategists would have

been well aware of the relative weakness of its military capability. (It might also

be added that the tragedy at Omagh effectively destroyed what little support

there was for the military option).

* There was extensive Security Service infiltration of the upper echelons of

the IRA. The recent controversy over Stakeknife and the activities of Freddy

Scappatticci in the Security Dept are most recent manifestations of a

sophisticated and well resourced spy network and the dirty war. With so

many activists compromised it is difficult, if not impossible to sustain armed

resistance.

* Another factor (downplayed by Republicans) was the increased success of

Loyalist paramilitaries in targeting Provisional Republicans and SF members.

Aided by British Army intelligence (e.g. Brian Nelson) this campaign became

more effective in targeting its political opponents.

* The general war-weariness of the Republican support base was

undoubtedly important in placing pressure Republicans to reach an

accommodation. For 25 years the Nationalist community, principally in the

poorest areas of Belfast and Derry, had born the brunt of harassment,

interrogation, imprisonment, injury and death.

* The international geo-political situation seemed to suggest that the time was

right to reach an agreement. In the context of new post-Cold War realities, in

places like Palestine and South Africa, the emphasis was on reaching agreement

with enemies. The 1990s saw the release of Mandela and the collapse of

Apartheid, the Oslo Peace Accords regarding the Middle East. The evolving

political zeitgeist seemed to be at odds with armed insurrection and politically

motivated violence.

* Accompanying this was the apparent demise of socialism as a political

creed. Without endorsing Fukayamas facile end of history thesis, it was clear

to most that efforts at socialist transformation had endured serious setbacks.

This placed added pressure on a Republican movement that was aligning itself

with Third World liberation struggle and espousing an explicitly socialist

perspective (Jimmy Drumm 1977 speech about Southern Fascist state and its

capitalist sycophants).

As Eoin OBroin (SF) has said the general retreat of the left had an impact

on Republicanism when Republicanism was becoming increasingly isolated

anywaya whole array of ideological positions no longer seemed applicableit

was a period of flux and change when there was a sense of crisis and a lack of

ideological certainty. Of course this uncertainty and sense of isolation was re-

enforced by state initiatives such as the Broadcasting Ban on Sinn Fein (1988).

* The dynamic of discourse drew Republicans into accepting the agreement.

Once meetings were held and position papers exchanged, expectations were

raised exponentially - so there was an inexorable logic to the GFA. The outcome

of this diplomatic process was never likely to be determined, or even seriously

influenced, by Republicans because they were effectively engaged with

constitutional parties and governments who did not share their perspective.

Essentially SF was passive because, as Chou En Lai once observed - you can

never win at the negotiating table what you have not secured in the field. So SF

was negotiating from a position of weakness.

* The state had very artfully drawn Sinn Fein into a web of community

activism, which relied on public funding (KB). Over the years there evolved a

kind of containment Keynesianism, which was operational even during the years

of Thatcherism. This acted, as Terry Robson has argued, as the extra-

bureaucratic arm of the state thereby reinforcing the hegemony of pro-state

values.

* Finally, the weakness and fragmented nature of Republican ideology

allowed scope to portray Sinn Feins strategy as viable, and the outcome as a

success. Republicanism is an incredibly inchoate and ambiguous ideology. At

different junctures it has been democratic/socialist and romantic/ethno-

nationalist, and has drawn on the ideas of figures as disparate as Mao and

Acquinas. The pantheon of Republican heroes includes Pearce and Connolly a

contradiction that has never been satisfactorily resolved.

Indeed if we focus on contemporary Republicanism, it is broad enough to

accommodate the ethnic volksgemeinschaft Hibernianism of Gerry McGeogh

and the scientific Marxism of Tommy McKearney. So Republican nationalism is

in many ways too amorphous a creed, and can be suffused by a whole range of,

(sometimes) contradictory principles and practices (pace Michael Freedens

excellent analysis of Nationalism).

Consequently, the ideological imprecision of Republicanism has always

allowed political pragmatism to take root.

What the Provos have emphasised is a kind of ethnic particularism,

promoting themselves as primary representatives of the Nationalist community.

Sinn Fein aims to win concessions and to be foremost advocate for their

community. When Adams talks about equality it is, for the most part, not

about socialism (Maillot/McGovern) but ethnic special pleading and a level

playing field for cultural pluralism (which is perfectly compatible with a neo-

liberal economic agenda). In many respects this type of cultural-identity politics

has been reinforced by the GFA, which in some ways institutionalises

sectarianism.

Interestingly there is a kind of multiple paradox here in that SFs electoral

success has been accompanied by ideological failure, and for the SDLP the

reverse is true - GFA is very much Stoop territory.

To conclude: if there is a lesson to be learned in terms of conflict resolution -

try to get your political enemy to abandon its core principles and accept a

compromise on your terms. The reality is that political conflicts quite often

produce winners and losers and Northern Ireland is no different (despite the

rhetoric and the media spin) - and for the British state (to paraphrase Sir David

Goodall) it has all gone, more or less, exactly according to plan!