HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESHEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESGR No. 179987April 29, 2009en bancFACTS:On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982. On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration.The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.ISSUES:1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?HELD:The Pertition is denied.(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 154953 June 26, 2008REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC., respondent.D E C I S I O NCARPIO, J.:The CaseBefore the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 21 August 2002 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the 16 December 1999 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 (trial court) in Land Registration Case No. T-635.The Antecedent FactsThis case originated from an Application for Original Registration of Title filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc. covering Lot 10705-B of the subdivision plan Csd-04-019741 which is a portion of the consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre. The land, with an area of 564,007 square meters, or 56.4007 hectares, is located at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas.On 31 August 1999, the trial court set the case for initial hearing at 9:30 a.m. on 11 November 1999. The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette, 20 September 1999 issue, Volume 95, No. 38, pages 6793 to 6794,4 and in the 18 October 1999 issue of Peoples Journal Taliba,5 a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The Notice of Initial Hearing was also posted in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the Municipal Building of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, as well as in a conspicuous place on the land.6 All adjoining owners and all government agencies and offices concerned were notified of the initial hearing.7On 11 November 1999, when the trial court called the case for initial hearing, there was no oppositor other than the Opposition dated 7 October 1999 of the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands (petitioner). On 15 November 1999, the trial court issued an Order8 of General Default against the whole world except as against petitioner.During the hearing on 19 November 1999, Ceferino Carandang (Carandang) appeared as oppositor. The trial court gave Carandang until 29 November 1999 within which to file his written opposition.9 Carandang failed to file his written opposition and to appear in the succeeding hearings. In an Order10 dated 13 December 1999, the trial court reinstated the Order of General Default.During the hearings conducted on 13 and 14 December 1999, respondent presented three witnesses: Anthony Dimayuga Torres (Torres), respondents Operations Manager and its authorized representative in the case; Primitivo Evangelista (Evangelista), a 72-year old resident of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas since birth; and Regalado Marquez, Records Officer II of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), Quezon City.The testimonies of respondents witnesses showed that Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy) had peaceful, adverse, open, and continuous possession of the land in the concept of an owner since 1942. Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio). On 27 September 1960, Antonio executed a Deed of Donation covering the land in favor of one of his children, Fortunato Dimayuga (Fortunato). Later, however, Antonio gave Fortunato another piece of land. Hence, on 26 April 1961, Antonio executed a Partial Revocation of Donation, and the land was adjudicated to one of Antonios children, Prospero Dimayuga (Porting).11 On 8 August 1997, Porting sold the land to respondent.The Ruling of the Trial CourtIn its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court adjudicated the land in favor of respondent.The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a corporation could apply for registration of land provided such entity and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed the land for 30 years or more. The trial court ruled that the facts showed that respondents predecessors-in-interest possessed the land in the concept of an owner prior to 12 June 1945, which possession converted the land to private property.The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the Order of General Default, the Court hereby adjudicates and decrees Lot 10705-B, identical to Lot 13637, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, on plan Csd-04-019741, situated in Barangay of San Bartolome, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas, with an area of 564,007 square meters, in favor of and in the name of T.A.N. Properties, Inc., a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws with principal office at 19th Floor, PDCP Bank Building, 8737 Paseo de Roxas, Makati City.Once this Decision shall have become final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued.SO ORDERED.12Petitioner appealed from the trial courts Decision. Petitioner alleged that the trial court erred in granting the application for registration absent clear evidence that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have complied with the period of possession and occupation as required by law. Petitioner alleged that the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres are general in nature. Considering the area involved, petitioner argued that additional witnesses should have been presented to corroborate Evangelistas testimony.The Ruling of the Court of AppealsIn its 21 August 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial courts Decision.The Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelistas knowledge of the possession and occupation of the land stemmed not only from the fact that he worked there for three years but also because he and Kabesang Puroy were practically neighbors. On Evangelistas failure to mention the name of his uncle who continuously worked on the land, the Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelista should not be faulted as he was not asked to name his uncle when he testified. The Court of Appeals also ruled that at the outset, Evangelista disclaimed knowledge of Fortunatos relation to Kabesang Puroy, but this did not affect Evangelistas statement that Fortunato took over the possession and cultivation of the land after Kabesang Puroys death. The Court of Appeals further ruled that the events regarding the acquisition and disposition of the land became public knowledge because San Bartolome was a small community. On the matter of additional witnesses, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to cite any law requiring the corroboration of the sole witness testimony.The Court of Appeals further ruled that Torres was a competent witness since he was only testifying on the fact that he had caused the filing of the application for registration and that respondent acquired the land from Porting.Petitioner comes to this Court assailing the Court of Appeals Decision. Petitioner raises the following grounds in its Memorandum:The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in allowing the grant of title to applicant corporation despite the following:1. Absence of showing that it or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in the concept of an owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier; and2. Disqualification of applicant corporation to acquire the subject tract of land.13The IssuesThe issues may be summarized as follows:1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable;2. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner since June 1945 or earlier; and3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land under the Public Land Act.The Ruling of this CourtThe petition has merit.Respondent Failed to Provethat the Land is Alienable and DisposablePetitioner argues that anyone who applies for registration has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land forms part of the public domain. Petitioner insists that respondent failed to prove that the land is no longer part of the public domain.The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the State.14 The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant.15In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO), Batangas City,16 certified that "lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre situated at Barangay San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with an area of 596,116 square meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31 December 1925." The second certification17 in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, which was issued by the Regional Technical Director, Forest Management Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated "that the subject area falls within an alienable and disposable land, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582."The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20,18 dated 30 May 1988, delineated the functions and authorities of the offices within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. DAO No. 38,19 dated 19 April 1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained the authority of the CENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares, as well as the authority of the PENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares.20 In this case, respondent applied for registration of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of land classification. Under DAO No. 20, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor products (OM) permits except rattan;2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;3. Approves renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public infrastructure projects; and4. Issues renewal of certificates of registration for logs, poles, piles, and lumber dealers.Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor [products] (OM) permits except rattan;2. Issues renewal of certificate of registration for logs, poles, and piles and lumber dealers;3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic meters within calamity declared areas for public infrastructure projects; and5. Approves original and renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public infrastructure projects.Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, has no probative value.Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by respondent. The government officials who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as follows:(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publication21 of the DENR Secretarys issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer," such as entries made by the Civil Registrar22 in the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ships logbook.23 The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not even records of public documents.24 The certifications are conclusions unsupported by adequate proof, and thus have no probative value.25 Certainly, the certifications cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein.26 Such government certifications may fall under the class of documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted as part of the testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated therein.27 Here, Torres, a private individual and respondents representative, identified the certifications but the government officials who issued the certifications did not testify on the contents of the certifications. As such, the certifications cannot be given probative value.28 The contents of the certifications are hearsay because Torres was incompetent to testify on the veracity of the contents of the certifications.29 Torres did not prepare the certifications, he was not an officer of CENRO or FMS-DENR, and he did not conduct any verification survey whether the land falls within the area classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable.Petitioner also points out the discrepancy as to when the land allegedly became alienable and disposable. The DENR Secretary certified that based on Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925. However, the certificate on the blue print plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985.We agree with petitioner that while the certifications submitted by respondent show that under the Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925, the blue print plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985. Respondent alleged that "the blue print plan merely serves to prove the precise location and the metes and bounds of the land described therein x x x and does not in any way certify the nature and classification of the land involved."30 It is true that the notation by a surveyor-geodetic engineer on the survey plan that the land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain is not sufficient proof of the lands classification.31 However, respondent should have at least presented proof that would explain the discrepancy in the dates of classification. Marquez, LRA Records Officer II, testified that the documents submitted to the court consisting of the tracing cloth plan, the technical description of Lot 10705-B, the approved subdivision plan, and the Geodetic Engineers certification were faithful reproductions of the original documents in the LRA office. He did not explain the discrepancy in the dates. Neither was the Geodetic Engineer presented to explain why the date of classification on the blue print plan was different from the other certifications submitted by respondent.There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and NotoriousPossession and Occupation in the Concept of an OwnerPetitioner alleges that the trial courts reliance on the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres was misplaced. Petitioner alleges that Evangelistas statement that the possession of respondents predecessors-in-interest was open, public, continuous, peaceful, and adverse to the whole world was a general conclusion of law rather than factual evidence of possession of title. Petitioner alleges that respondent failed to establish that its predecessors-in-interest had held the land openly, continuously, and exclusively for at least 30 years after it was declared alienable and disposable.We agree with petitioner.Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in possession of the land before 1945. Yet, Evangelista only worked on the land for three years. Evangelista testified that his family owned a lot near Kabesang Puroys land. The Court of Appeals took note of this and ruled that Evangelistas knowledge of Kabesang Puroys possession of the land stemmed "not only from the fact that he had worked thereat but more so that they were practically neighbors."32 The Court of Appeals observed:In a small community such as that of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, it is not difficult to understand that people in the said community knows each and everyone. And, because of such familiarity with each other, news or events regarding the acquisition or disposition for that matter, of a vast tract of land spreads like wildfire, thus, the reason why such an event became of public knowledge to them.33Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by Fortunato. However, he admitted that he did not know the exact relationship between Kabesang Puroy and Fortunato, which is rather unusual for neighbors in a small community. He did not also know the relationship between Fortunato and Porting. In fact, Evangelistas testimony is contrary to the factual finding of the trial court that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio, not by Fortunato who was one of Antonios children. Antonio was not even mentioned in Evangelistas testimony.The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that requires that the testimony of a single witness needs corroboration. However, in this case, we find Evangelistas uncorroborated testimony insufficient to prove that respondents predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. We cannot consider the testimony of Torres as sufficient corroboration. Torres testified primarily on the fact of respondents acquisition of the land. While he claimed to be related to the Dimayugas, his knowledge of their possession of the land was hearsay. He did not even tell the trial court where he obtained his information.The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting 1955. While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership.34 Respondent did not present any credible explanation why the realty taxes were only paid starting 1955 considering the claim that the Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of the land before 1945. The payment of the realty taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption that the Dimayugas claimed ownership or possession of the land only in that year.Land Application by a CorporationPetitioner asserts that respondent, a private corporation, cannot apply for registration of the land of the public domain in this case.We agree with petitioner.Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,35 the Court traced the law on disposition of lands of the public domain. Under the 1935 Constitution, there was no prohibition against private corporations from acquiring agricultural land. The 1973 Constitution limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of the Philippines. Under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations, even if wholly owned by Filipino citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain. The present 1987 Constitution continues the prohibition against private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.36 The Court explained in Chavez:The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. x x x x[I]f the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution could have simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public domain that corporations could acquire. The Constitution could have followed the limitations on individuals, who could acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the 1973 Constitution, and not more than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution.If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the land in the name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation to the next.In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain. Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only a limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent is removed. The available alienable public lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an ever-growing population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence to this constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the public domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical benefit arising from the constitutional ban.37In Director of Lands v. IAC,38 the Court allowed the land registration proceeding filed by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. (Acme) for five parcels of land with an area of 481,390 square meters, or 48.139 hectares, which Acme acquired from members of the Dumagat tribe. The issue in that case was whether the title could be confirmed in favor of Acme when the proceeding was instituted after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which prohibited private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares. The Court ruled that the land was already private land when Acme acquired it from its owners in 1962, and thus Acme acquired a registrable title. Under the 1935 Constitution, private corporations could acquire public agricultural lands not exceeding 1,024 hectares while individuals could acquire not more than 144 hectares.39In Director of Lands, the Court further ruled that open, exclusive, and undisputed possession of alienable land for the period prescribed by law created the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction ceases to be public land and becomes private property. The Court ruled:Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself that the possessor(s) "x x x shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title x x x." No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already effected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete.x x x [A]lienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period of (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporations holding or owning private land. x x x.40 (Emphasis supplied)Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case. In Director of Lands, the "land x x x was already private property at the time it was acquired x x x by Acme." In this case, respondent acquired the land on 8 August 1997 from Porting, who, along with his predecessors-in-interest, has not shown to have been, as of that date, in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the land for 30 years since 12 June 1945. In short, when respondent acquired the land from Porting, the land was not yet private property.For Director of Lands to apply and enable a corporation to file for registration of alienable and disposable land, the corporation must have acquired the land when its transferor had already a vested right to a judicial confirmation of title to the land by virtue of his open, continuous and adverse possession of the land in the concept of an owner for at least 30 years since 12 June 1945. Thus, in Natividad v. Court of Appeals,41 the Court declared:Under the facts of this case and pursuant to the above rulings, the parcels of land in question had already been converted to private ownership through acquisitive prescription by the predecessors-in-interest of TCMC when the latter purchased them in 1979. All that was needed was the confirmation of the titles of the previous owners or predecessors-in-interest of TCMC.Being already private land when TCMC bought them in 1979, the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution against corporations acquiring alienable lands of the public domain except through lease (Article XIV, Section 11, 1973 Constitution) did not apply to them for they were no longer alienable lands of the public domain but private property.What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to apply is for the corporate applicant for land registration to establish that when it acquired the land, the same was already private land by operation of law because the statutory acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years had already lapsed. The length of possession of the land by the corporation cannot be tacked on to complete the statutory 30 years acquisitive prescriptive period. Only an individual can avail of such acquisitive prescription since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions prohibit corporations from acquiring lands of the public domain.Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for original registration of land under the doctrine in Director of Lands. Republic Act No. 917642 (RA 9176) further amended the Public Land Act43 and extended the period for the filing of applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain until 31 December 2020. Thus:Sec. 2. Section 47, Chapter VIII of the same Act, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with Section Forty-five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any of said persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President.Sec. 3. All pending applications filed before the effectivity of this amendatory Act shall be treated as having been filed in accordance with the provisions of this Act.Under RA 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is limited only to 12 hectares, consistent with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that a private individual may only acquire not more than 12 hectares of alienable and disposable land. Hence, respondent, as successor-in-interest of an individual owner of the land, cannot apply for registration of land in excess of 12 hectares. Since respondent applied for 56.4007 hectares, the application for the excess area of 44.4007 hectares is contrary to law, and thus void ab initio. In applying for land registration, a private corporation cannot have any right higher than its predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its right. This assumes, of course, that the corporation acquired the land, not exceeding 12 hectares, when the land had already become private land by operation of law. In the present case, respondent has failed to prove that any portion of the land was already private land when respondent acquired it from Porting in 1997.WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658 and the 16 December 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in Land Registration Case No. T-635. We DENY the application for registration filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc.SO ORDERED. FIRST DIVISION REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, - versus - CAYETANO L. SERRANO,[1] and HEIRS OF CATALINO M. ALAAN, represented by PAULITA P. ALAAN, Respondents.G.R. No. 183063 Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: February 24, 2010 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x D E C I S I O N CARPIO MORALES, J.:Respondent Cayetano L. Serrano (Cayetano) filed on September 21, 1988 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City an application for registration,[2] docketed as LRC Case No. 270, over a 533-square meter parcel of commercial land known as Lot 249 ([on Plan Psu-157485] the lot), located in Poblacion Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. Cayetano claimed to have acquired the lot by inheritance from his deceased parents, Simeon Serrano (Simeon) and Agustina Luz; by virtue of a Deed of Exchange[3] dated February 10, 1961; and by a private deed of partition and extrajudicial settlement forged by him and his co-heirs. Invoking the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree or, in the alternative, the provisions of Chapter VIII, Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,[4] Cayetano also claimed to have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot under a claim of ownership before 1917 by himself and through his deceased parentspredecessors-in-interest or for more than 70 years. The Heirs of Catalino Alaan, represented by Paulita Alaan (Paulita),[5] intervened and filed an application for registration,[6] their predecessor-in-interest Catalino Alaan (Catalino) having purchased[7] a 217.45-square meter undivided portion of the lot from Cayetano on February 27, 1989 during the pendency of Cayetanos application for registration. The intervenor-heirs of Catalino, also invoking the provisions of the Property Registration Decree or, alternatively, of Chapter VIII, Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, prayed that their application for confirmation of title be considered jointly with that of Cayetanos, and that, thereafter, original certificates of title be issued in both their names. Cayetano raised no objection or opposition to the intervenor-Heirs of Catalinos application for registration.[8] Cayetanos brother-attorney-in-fact Leonardo Serrano (Leonardo) represented him at the hearings of the application. During the pendency of the case, Cayetano passed away[9] and was substituted by his heirs. At the trial, the following pieces of documentary evidence, inter alia, were presented to support Cayetanos claim of ownership over the lot: original survey plan dated January 3, 1957 and certified by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and Bureau of Lands Director Zoilo Castrillo,[10] technical description of the lot (Psu-157485),[11] Tax Declarations for the years 1924 (in the name of Simeon) and 1948-1997 (in the name of either Simeon [deceased] or Cayetano),[12] official receipts showing real estate tax payments (from 1948-1997),[13] and Surveyors Certificate No. 157485 dated January 1957.[14] As Cayetanos sole witness Leonardo was already physically infirm (hard of hearing and due to old age) at the time trial commenced, his testimony was taken by deposition on written interrogatories.[15] In answer to the interrogatories,[16] Leonardo declared that his family had lived on the lot since pre-war time, his father Simeon having built a house on it following his acquisition from Julian Ydulzura in 1923[17] who had purchased it from Lazaro Raada in 1917;[18] that the construction of a family home in 1923 was reflected in Tax Declaration No. 18,587 in the name of Simeon for the year 1924[19]; that after his fathers death in 1931, his mother and his brother Cayetano continued to possess the lot in the concept of owners and Cayetano in fact built his own house and a bodega thereon; that Cayetano religiously paid real estate taxes from 1951 up to the current year 1997;[20] that the lot was assigned to him and Cayetano as their share of the inheritance by virtue of a private document, Kaligonan, dated June 16, 1951,[21] which was executed by all of the heirs, the contents of which document were subsequently confirmed in a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated August 24, 1988;[22] and that on February 10, 1961, Cayetano exchanged a titled lot in Butuan City for his (Leonardos) half-share in the lot, thereby making Cayetano the sole and exclusive owner thereof.[23] On the other hand, Paulita, wife of Catalino who represented the heirs of Catalino, declared that in February 1989, Cayetano sold to her husband a 217.45-sq. meter portion of the 533-sq. meter lot subject of the present case as embodied in a deed of absolute sale;[24] and that Catalino religiously paid real estate taxes therefor. And she presented an approved Subdivision Plan of Lot 249,[25] Cad-866 indicating therein the respective shares of Cayetano and Catalino based on a survey undertaken by Geodetic Engineer Armando Diola on May 9, 1997.[26] The above-said Subdivision Plan of the lot, duly approved by Celso V. Loriega, Jr., Regional Technical Director of the DENR, Lands Management Services, Region Office XIII for Butuan City, carries the following annotation: Surveyed in accordance with survey authority no. (X-2A) 77 issued by CENRO. This survey is inside the alienable and disposable area as per project no. 5 L.C Map No. 550 certified on July 18, 1925. Lot 249-A, Lot 9090, Lot 249-B, Lot 9091, CAD 866 Cabadbaran Cadastre. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by Butuan provincial prosecutor Ambrosio Gallarde, did not present any evidence to oppose the applications. By Decision of November 3, 2003,[27] the RTC granted respondents applications, disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, conformably with existing laws and jurisprudence, DECISION is hereby rendered: 1. Awarding a portion of Lot 249, Psu-15(5)7485 (now known as Lot 249-B, Csd-13-000443-D) containing an area of 316 sq. meters to applicant Cayetano L. Serrano, Sr., represented by his heirs; 2. Awarding a portion of Lot 249, Psu-157485 (now known as Lot 249-A, Csd-1-000443-D) containing an area of 217 sq. meters to applicant Catalina M. Alaan, represented by Paulita P. Alaan; IT IS SO ORDERED. The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of herein petitioner, appealed the RTC decision before the Court of Appeals on the grounds that respondents failed to present evidence that the property was alienable or that they possessed the same in the manner and duration required by the provisions of the Property Registration Decree.[28] By Decision of May 13, 2008,[29] the appellate court affirmed the decision of the RTC in this wise: x x x x . . . [F]rom the aforequoted annotation, the OSGs assertion that there was no competent evidence that would clearly show the subject land was released as alienable and disposable land is unavailing. On the contrary, We HOLD that the said annotation would suffice to comply with the requirement of certification as the same is competent enough to show that the disputed land or the parcels of land (now Lot Nos. 249-A, Cad-866 and 249-B Cad-866, respectively) applied for by the applicants (Cayetano and Alaan) were already reclassified as alienable and disposable as early as 18 July 1925, under Project No. 5, L.C. Map No. 550. x x x x Records show that the subject land was first owned and possessed by Lazaro Raada and the same was sold to Julian Ydulzura per untitled document executed on 15 May 1917. On 3 September 1923, Ydulzura sold the subject land for one hundred fifty pesos (Php150.00) to Simeon M. Serrano per untitled document, father of Cayetano. Simeon M. Serrano then had the subject land tax declared in his name in 1924 per Declaration of Real Property (Urban) No. 18,587. Upon the demise of Simeon Serrano on 9 January 1931, his heirs, including herein applicant Cayetano, partitioned by way of an Agreement on 16 June 1951 the properties of their deceased father. On 24 August 1988, the heirs of Simeon M. Serrano executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement confirming further the Agreement executed on 16 June 1954 (sic). It is worth noting that from 1955 up to the filing of the Application for Registration in 21 June 1988 and until 1997, Cayetano religiously paid the real estate taxes of the said subject property. As held in a long line of cases, tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner. Undoubtedly, applicant Cayetano, through his predecessors-in-interest, having been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation over the subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier had met the requirements set forth in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. In fine, We FIND and so HOLD that applicant Cayetano L. Serrano and intervenor-appellee heirs of Catalino M. Alaan, have registrable title to the aforesaid subject lands, Lot 249-B, Csd-13-000443-D and Lot 249-A, Csd-1-000443-D, respectively, as they were able to prove that they are qualified and had complied with the requirements set forth by the provisions of P.D. No. 1529 which amended Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended and Presidential Decree No. 1073, which to Our mind merited the allowance of the application for registration of the said property by the trial court.[30] (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied) Hence, the present petition which raises the same grounds as those raised by petitioner before the appellate court. The petition fails. The requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are: that the property is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof; and that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[31] The Court reiterates the doctrine which more accurately construes Section 14(1) in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Naguit,[32] viz: . . . the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property. This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of Appeals. Therein, the Court noted that to prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. In that case, the subject land had been certified by the DENR as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the alienable status of the land, compounded by the established fact that therein respondents had occupied the land even before 1927, sufficed to allow the application for registration of the said property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that the subject property was released and certified as within alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.[33] (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied) While Cayetano failed to submit any certification which would formally attest to the alienable and disposable character of the land applied for, the Certification by DENR Regional Technical Director Celso V. Loriega, Jr., as annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence by Paulita, constitutes substantial compliance with the legal requirement. It clearly indicates that Lot 249 had been verified as belonging to the alienable and disposable area as early as July 18, 1925. The DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the contrary. It bears noting that no opposition was filed or registered by the Land Registration Authority or the DENR to contest respondents applications on the ground that their respective shares of the lot are inalienable. There being no substantive rights which stand to be prejudiced, the benefit of the Certification may thus be equitably extended in favor of respondents. Petitioners contention that respondents failed to adduce sufficient proof of possession and occupation as required under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree does not lie. Undeniably, respondents and/or their predecessors-in-interest must be shown to have exercised acts of dominion over the lot under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. On what constitutes open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation as required by statute, Republic v. Alconaba[34] teaches: The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Leonardo clearly established the character of the possession of Cayetano and his predecessors-in-interest over the lot. Thus he declared that the lot was first owned by Lazaro Raada who sold the same to Julian Ydulzura in 1917 who in turn sold it to his and Cayetanos father Simeon in 1923; that Simeon built a house thereon after its acquisition, which fact is buttressed by entries in Tax Declaration No. 18,587 in the name of Simeon for the year 1924 indicating the existence of a 40-sq. meter residential structure made of nipa and mixed materials, and of coconut trees planted thereon; and that after Simeons demise in 1931, Cayetano built his own house beside the old nipa house before the war, and a bodega after the war, which claims find support in Tax Declarations made in 1948-1958.[35] When pressed during the request for written interrogatories if Leonardo had any other pre-war tax declarations aside from Tax Declaration No. 18,587, he explained that all available records may have been destroyed or lost during the last war but that after the war, the lot was reassessed in his fathers name.[36] The Court finds Leonardos explanation plausible and there is nothing in the records that detracts from its probative value. Finally, the official receipts of realty tax payments[37] religiously made by Cayetano from 1948 to 1997 further serve as credible indicia that Cayetano, after his fathers death in 1931, continued to exercise acts of dominion over the lot. The totality of the evidence thus points to the unbroken chain of acts exercised by Cayetano to demonstrate his occupation and possession of the land in the concept of owner, to the exclusion of all others. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Republic of the PhilippinesSupreme CourtManila THIRD DIVISION REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, - versus - CARLOS R. VEGA, MARCOS R. VEGA, ROGELIO R. VEGA, LUBIN R. VEGA, HEIRS OF GLORIA R. VEGA, NAMELY: FRACISCO L. YAP, MA. WINONA Y. RODRIGUEZ, MA. WENDELYN V. YAP and FRANCISCO V. YAP, JR., Respondents, ROMEA G. BUHAY-OCAMPO, FRANCISCO G. BUHAY, ARCELI G. BUHAY-RODRIGUEZ, ORLANDO G. BUHAY, SOLEDAD G. BUHAY-VASQUEZ, LOIDA G. BUHAY-SENADOSA, FLORENDO G. BUHAY, OSCAR G. BUHAY, ERLYN BUHAY-GINORGA, EVELYN BUHAY-GRANETA, and EMILIE BUHAY-DALLAS, Respondents-Intervenors. G. R. No. 177790 Present: CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,BRION,BERSAMIN,VILLARAMA, JR., andSERENO, JJ. Promulgated: January 17, 2011x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x D E C I S I O NSERENO, J.:This is a Rule 45 Petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), questioning the Decision of the Court of Appeals,[1] which affirmed a lower courts grant of an application for original registration of title covering a parcel of land located in Los Baos, Laguna. The facts of the case as culled from the records of the trial court and the appellate court are straightforward and without much contention from the parties. On 26 May 1995, respondents Carlos R. Vega, Marcos R. Vega, Rogelio R. Vega, Lubin R. Vega and Heirs of Gloria R. Vega namely, Francisco L. Yap, Ma. Winona Y. Rodriguez, Ma. Wendelyn V. Yap and Francisco V. Yap, Jr. (respondents Vegas) filed an application for registration of title. The application covered a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 6191, Cadastre 450 of Los Baos, Laguna, with a total area of six thousand nine hundred two (6,902) square meters (the subject land). The case was docketed as Land Registration Case No. 103-95-C and raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 92. Respondents Vegas alleged that they inherited the subject land from their mother, Maria Revilleza Vda. de Vega, who in turn inherited it from her father, Lorenzo Revilleza. Their mothers siblings (two brothers and a sister) died intestate, all without leaving any offspring. On 21 June 1995, petitioner Republic filed an opposition to respondents Vegas application for registration on the ground, inter alia, that the subject land or portions thereof were lands of the public domain and, as such, not subject to private appropriation. During the trial court hearing on the application for registration, respondents Vegas presented several exhibits in compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, as well as witnesses to prove respondents Vegas ownership, occupation and possession of the land subject of the registration. Significant was the testimony of Mr. Rodolfo Gonzales, a Special Investigator of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Los Baos, Laguna, under the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). He attested to having conducted an inspection of the subject land[2] and identified the corresponding Report dated 13 January 1997, which he had submitted to the Regional Executive Director, Region IV. The report stated that the area subject of the investigation was entirely within the alienable and disposable zone, and that there was no public land application filed for the same land by the applicant or by any other person.[3] During the trial, respondents-intervenors Romea G. Buhay-Ocampo, Francisco G. Buhay, Arceli G. Buhay-Rodriguez, Orlando G. Buhay, Soledad G. Buhay-Vasquez, Loida G. Buhay-Senadosa, Florendo G. Buhay, Oscar G. Buhay, Erlyn Buhay-Ginorga, Evelyn Buhay-Grantea and Emilie Buhay-Dallas (respondents-intervenors Buhays) entered their appearance and moved to intervene in respondents Vegas application for registration.[4] Respondents-intervenors Buhays claimed a portion of the subject land consisting of eight hundred twenty-six (826) square meters, purportedly sold by respondents Vegas mother (Maria Revilleza Vda. de Vega) to the formers predecessors-in-interest - the sisters Gabriela Gilvero and Isabel Gilverio - by virtue of a Bilihan ng Isang Bahagi ng Lupang Katihan dated 14 January 1951.[5] They likewise formally offered in evidence Subdivision Plan Csd-04-024336-D, which indicated the portion of the subject land, which they claimed was sold to their predecessors-in-interest.[6] In a Decision dated 18 November 2003, the trial court granted respondents Vegas application and directed the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of registration in the name of respondents Vegas and respondents-intervenors Buhays predecessors, in proportion to their claims over the subject land. Petitioner Republic appealed the Decision of the trial court, arguing that respondents Vegas failed to prove that the subject land was alienable and disposable, since the testimony of Mr. Gonzales did not contain the date when the land was declared as such. Unpersuaded by petitioner Republics arguments, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the earlier Decision of the trial court. Aggrieved by the ruling, petitioner filed the instant Rule 45 Petition with this Court.Respondents Vegas, who are joined by respondents-intervenors Buhays (collectively, respondents), raise procedural issues concerning the filing of the instant Petition, which the Court shall resolve first. Briefly, respondents found, in the instant Petition, procedural deficiencies that ought to warrant its outright dismissal. These deficiencies are as follows: (a) petitioner Republic failed to include the pertinent portions of the record that would support its arguments under Rule 45, Section 4 (d) of the Rules of Court, specifically the Appellees Brief of respondents Vegas in the appellate proceedings; and (b) it raised questions of fact, which are beyond the purview of a Rule 45 Petition.[7]The Court is not persuaded by respondents arguments concerning the purported defects of the Petition.First, petitioner Republics failure to attach a copy of respondents Vegas Appellees Brief to the instant Petition is not a fatal mistake, which merits the immediate dismissal of a Rule 45 Petition. The requirement that a petition for review on certiorari should be accompanied by such material portions of the record as would support the petition is left to the discretion of the party filing the petition.[8] Except for the duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment sought to be appealed from,[9] there are no other records from the court a quo that must perforce be attached before the Court can take cognizance of a Rule 45 petition.Respondents cannot fault petitioner Republic for excluding pleadings, documents or records in the lower court, which to their mind would assist this Court in deciding whether the Decision appealed from is sound. Petitioner Republic is left to its own estimation of the case in deciding which records would support its Petition and should thus be attached thereto. In any event, respondents are not prevented from attaching to their pleadings pertinent portions of the records that they deem necessary for the Courts evaluation of the case, as was done by respondents Vegas in this case when they attached their Appellees Brief to their Comment. In the end, it is the Court, in finally resolving the merits of the suit that will ultimately decide whether the material portions of the records attached are sufficient to support the Petition.Second, the Petition raises a question of law, and not a question of fact. Petitioner Republic simply takes issue against the conclusions made by the trial and the appellate courts regarding the nature and character of the subject parcel of land, based on the evidence presented. When petitioner asks for a review of the decisions made by a lower court based on the evidence presented, without delving into their probative value but simply on their sufficiency to support the legal conclusions made, then a question of law is raised.In New Rural Bank of Guimba (N.E.) Inc. v. Fermina S. Abad and Rafael Susan,[10] the Court reiterated the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact in this wise: We reiterate the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. (Emphasis supplied) Petitioner Republic is not calling for an examination of the probative value or truthfulness of the evidence presented, specifically the testimony of Mr. Gonzales. It, however, questions whether the evidence on record is sufficient to support the lower courts conclusion that the subject land is alienable and disposable. Otherwise stated, considering the evidence presented by respondents Vegas in the proceedings below, were the trial and the appellate courts justified under the law and jurisprudence in their findings on the nature and character of the subject land? Undoubtedly, this is a pure question of law, which calls for a resolution of what is the correct and applicable law to a given set of facts. Going now to the substantial merits, petitioner Republic places before the Court the question of whether, based on the evidence on record, respondents Vegas have sufficiently established that the subject land is alienable and disposable. Was it erroneous for the Court of Appeals to have affirmed the trial courts grant of registration applied for by respondents Vegas over the subject land? We find no reversible error on the part of either the trial court or the Court of Appeals. Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides for the instances when a person may file for an application for registration of title over a parcel of land: Section 14. Who May Apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. x x x. Thus, pursuant to the afore-quoted provision of law, applicants for registration of title must prove the following: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.[11] Section 14 (1) of the law requires that the property sought to be registered is already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration is filed.[12]Raising no issue with respect to respondents Vegas open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land in the present Petition, the Court will limit its focus on the first requisite: specifically, whether it has sufficiently been demonstrated that the subject land is alienable and disposable.Unless a land is reclassified and declared alienable and disposable, occupation of the same in the concept of an owner - no matter how long -cannot ripen into ownership and result in a title; public lands not shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable lands remain part of the inalienable domain and cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.[13]Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed; they call for proof.[14] To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as any of the following: a presidential proclamation or an executive order; other administrative actions; investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator; or a legislative act or statute.[15] The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable.[16]Previously, a certification from the DENR that a lot was alienable and disposable was sufficient to establish the true nature and character of the property and enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence.[17]However, in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,[18] the Supreme Court overturned the grant by the lower courts of an original application for registration over a parcel of land in Batangas and ruled that a CENRO certification is not enough to certify that a land is alienable and disposable: Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable. (Emphasis supplied) Thus, as it now stands, aside from a CENRO certification, an application for original registration of title over a parcel of land must be accompanied by a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records in order to establish that the land indeed is alienable and disposable.[19]To comply with the first requisite for an application for original registration of title under the Property Registration Decree, respondents Vegas should have submitted a CENRO certification and a certified true copy of the original classification by the DENR Secretary that the land is alienable and disposable, together with their application. However, as pointed out by the Court of Appeals, respondents Vegas failed to submit a CENRO certification -- much less an original classification by the DENR Secretary -- to prove that the land is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.[20] If the stringent rule imposed in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., is to be followed, the absence of these twin certifications justifies a denial of an application for registration. Significantly, however, the Courts pronouncement in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., was issued after the decisions of the trial court[21] and the appellate court[22] in this case.Recently, however, in Republic v. Serrano,[23] the Court affirmed the findings of the trial and the appellate courts that the parcel of land subject of registration was alienable and disposable. The Court held that a DENR Regional Technical Directors certification, which is annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence, constitutes substantial compliance with the legal requirement:While Cayetano failed to submit any certification which would formally attest to the alienable and disposable character of the land applied for, the Certification by DENR Regional Technical Director Celso V. Loriega, Jr., as annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence by Paulita, constitutes substantial compliance with the legal requirement. It clearly indicates that Lot 249 had been verified as belonging to the alienable and disposable area as early as July 18, 1925. The DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the contrary. It bears noting that no opposition was filed or registered by the Land Registration Authority or the DENR to contest respondents' applications on the ground that their respective shares of the lot are inalienable. There being no substantive rights which stand to be prejudiced, the benefit of the Certification may thus be equitably extended in favor of respondents. (Emphasis supplied) Indeed, the best proofs in registration proceedings that a land is alienable and disposable are a certification from the CENRO or Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) and a certified true copy of the DENRs original classification of the land. The Court, however, has nonetheless recognized and affirmed applications for land registration on other substantial and convincing evidence duly presented without any opposition from the LRA or the DENR on the ground of substantial compliance.Applying these precedents, the Court finds that despite the absence of a certification by the CENRO and a certified true copy of the original classification by the DENR Secretary, there has been substantial compliance with the requirement to show that the subject land is indeed alienable and disposable based on the evidence on record.First, respondents Vegas were able to present Mr. Gonzales of the CENRO who testified that the subject land is alienable and disposable, and who identified his written report on his inspection of the subject land.In the Report,[24] Mr. Gonzales attested under oath that (1) the area is entirely within the alienable and disposable zone as classified under Project No. 15, L.C. Map No. 582, certified on 31 December 1925;[25] (2) the land has never been forfeited in favor of the government for non-payment of taxes; (3) the land is not within a previously patented/decreed/titled property;[26] (4) there are no public land application/s filed by the applicant for the same land;[27] and (5) the land is residential/commercial.[28] That Mr. Gonzales appeared and testified before an open court only added to the reliability of the Report, which classified the subject land as alienable and disposable public land. The Court affirms the Court of Appeals conclusion that Mr. Gonzales testimony and written report under oath constituted substantial evidence to support their claim as to the nature of the subject land.Second, Subdivision Plan Csd-04-02433-6, formally offered as evidence by respondents-intervenors Buhays,[29] expressly indicates that the land is alienable and disposable. Similar to Republic v. Serrano, Mr. Samson G. de Leon, the officer-in-charge of the Office of the Assistant Regional Executive Director for Operations of the DENR, approved the said subdivision plan, which was annotated with the following proviso: [T]his survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 15, L.C. Map No. 582, certified on Dec. 31, 1925. Notably, Mr. De Leons annotation pertaining to the identification of the land as alienable and disposable coincides with the investigation report of Mr. Gonzales.Finally, upon being informed of respondents Vegas application for original registration, the LRA never raised the issue that the land subject of registration was not alienable and disposable. In the Supplementary Report submitted during the trial court proceedings,[30] the LRA did not interpose any objection to the application on the basis of the nature of the land. It simply noted that the subject subdivision plan (Psu-51460) had also been applied for in Case No. 1469, GLRO Record No. 32505, but that there was no decree of registration issued therefor. Thus, the LRA recommended that should the instant case be given due course, the application in Case No. 1469, GLRO Record No. 32505 with respect to plan Psu-51460 be dismissed. In addition, not only did the government fail to cross-examine Mr. Gonzales, it likewise chose not to present any countervailing evidence to support its opposition. In contrast to the other cases brought before this Court,[31] no opposition was raised by any interested government body, aside from the pro forma opposition filed by the OSG.The onus in proving that the land is alienable and disposable still remains with the applicant in an original registration proceeding; and the government, in opposing the purported nature of the land, need not adduce evidence to prove otherwise.[32] In this case though, there was no effective opposition, except the pro forma opposition of the OSG, to contradict the applicants claim as to the character of the public land as alienable and disposable. The absence of any effective opposition from the government, when coupled with respondents other pieces of evidence on record persuades this Court to rule in favor of respondents.In the instant Petition, petitioner Republic also assails the failure of Mr. Gonzales to testify as to when the land was declared as alienable and disposable. Indeed, his testimony in open court is bereft of any detail as to when the land was classified as alienable and disposable public land, as well as the date when he conducted the investigation. However, these matters could have been dealt with extensively during cross-examination, which petitioner Republic waived because of its repeated absences and failure to present counter evidence.[33] In any event, the Report, as well as the Subdivision Plan, readily reveals that the subject land was certified as alienable and disposable as early as 31 December 1925 and was even classified as residential and commercial in nature.Thus, the Court finds that the evidence presented by respondents Vegas, coupled with the absence of any countervailing evidence by petitioner Republic, substantially establishes that the land applied for is alienable and disposable and is the subject of original registration proceedings under the Property Registration Decree. There was no reversible error on the part of either the trial court or the appellate court in granting the registration.Respondents-intervenors Buhays title to that portion of the subject land is likewise affirmed, considering that the joint claim of respondents-intervenors Buhays over the land draws its life from the same title of respondents Vegas, who in turn failed to effectively oppose the claimed sale of that portion of the land to the formers predecessors-in-interest.It must be emphasized that the present ruling on substantial compliance applies pro hac vice. It does not in any way detract from our rulings in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., and similar cases which impose a strict requirement to prove that the public land is alienable and disposable, especially in this case when the Decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals were rendered prior to these rulings.[34] To establish that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable public land, the general rule remains: all applications for original registration under the Property Registration Decree must include both (1) a CENRO or PENRO certification and (2) a certified true copy of the original classification made by the DENR Secretary.As an exception, however, the courts - in their sound discretion and based solely on the evidence presented on record - may approve the application, pro hac vice, on the ground of substantial compliance showing that there has been a positive act of government to show the nature and character of the land and an absence of effective opposition from the government. This exception shall only apply to applications for registration currently pending before the trial court prior to this Decision and shall be inapplicable to all future applications.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 30 April 2007 and the trial courts Decision dated 18 November 2003 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.