UDK No. 7671 June 23, 1988DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,registrant-appellant,vs.THE ACTING REGISTER DEEDS OF NUEVA ECIJA,respondent-appellee.This case, rather cut-and-dried as far as factual background is concerned, turns upon a determination of the true meaning and intendment of Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,1which in part reads:Sec. 56. Primary Entry Book; fees, certified copies. Each Register of Deeds shall keep a primary entry book in which, upon payment of the entry fee, he shall enter, in the order of their reception, all instruments including copies of writs and processes filed with him relating to registered land. He shall, as a preliminary process in registration, note in such book the date, hour and minute of reception of all instruments, in the order in which they were received. They shall be regarded as registered from the time so noted, and the memorandum of each instrument, when made on the certificate of title to which it refers, shall bear the same date: Provided, that the national government as well as the provincial and city governments shall be exempt from the payment of such fees in advance in order to be entitled to entry and registration.xxx xxx xxxThe facts are few and undisputed. On June 13, 1980, the Development Bank of the Philippines (hereafter, DBP) presented for registration to the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, Cabanatuan City, a sheriff's certificate of sale in its favor of two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. NT-149033 and NT-149034, both in the names of the spouses Andres Bautista and Marcelina Calison, which said institution had acquired as the highest bidder at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale. The transaction was entered as Entry No. 8191 in the Registry's Primary Entry Book and DBP paid the requisite registration fees on the same day. Annotation of the sale on the covering certificates of title could not, however be effected because the originals of those certificates were found to be missing from the files of the Registry, where they were supposed to be kept, and could not be located.2On the advice of the Register of Deeds, DBP instituted proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija to reconstitute said certificates, and reconstitution was ordered by that court in a decision rendered on June 15, 1982.3For reasons not apparent on the record, the certificates of title were reconstituted only on June 19,1984.4On June 25, 1984, DBP sought annotation on the reconstituted titles of the certificate of sale subject of Entry No. 8191 on the basis of that same four-year-old entry. The Acting Register of Deeds, being in doubt of the proper action to take on the solicitation, took the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration byconsultaraising two questions: (a) whether the certificate of sale could be registered using the old Entry No. 8191 made in 1980 notwithstanding the fact that the original copies of the reconstituted certificates of title were issued only on June 19, 1984; and (b) if the first query was answered affirmatively, whether he could sign the proposed annotation, having assumed his duties only in July 1982.5The resolution on theconsultaheld that Entry No. 8191 had been rendered "... ineffective due to the impossibility of accomplishing registration at the time the document was entered because of the non-availability of the certificate (sic) of title involved. For said certificate of sale to be admitted for registration, there is a need for it to be re-entered now that the titles have been reconstituted upon payment of new entry fees," and by-passed the second query as having been rendered moot and academic by the answer to the first.6Unwilling to accept that result, the DBP appealed the resolution to the Court of Appeals (then the Intermediate Appellate Court)7which, after reviewing the record, certified the appeal to this Court as involving a question purely of law.8The appealed resolution appears to be based upon a reading of the cited Section 56 of PD No. 1529, and particularly of the provision therein referring to the Register's act of making a primary entry as " ... a preliminary process in registration ...," as depriving of any effect a primary entry without a corresponding annotation thereof on the certificate of title to which the instrument subject of said entry refers.That view fails to find support from a consideration of entire context of said Section 56 which in another part also provides that the instrument subject of a primary entry "... shall be regarded as registered from the time so noted ...," and, at the very least, gives such entry from the moment of its making the effect of putting the whole world on notice of the existence the instrument on entered. Such effect (of registration) clearly attaches to the mere making of the entry without regard to the subsequent step of annotating a memorandum of the instrument subject of the entry on the certificate of title to which it refers. Indeed, said Section, in also providing that the annotation, "... when made ... shall bear the same date ..." as the entry, may be said to contemplate unspecified intervals of time occurring between the making of a primary entry and that of the corresponding annotation on the certificate of title without robbing the entry of the effect of being equivalent to registration. Neither, therefore, is the implication in the appealed resolution that annotation must annotation entry immediately or in short order justified by the language of Section 56.Furthermore, it is amply clear that the four-year hiatus between primary entry and proposed annotation in this case has not been of DBP's making. Though it was under no necessity to present the owner's duplicates of the certificates of title affected for purposes of primary entry, since the transaction sought to be recorded was an involuntary transaction,9and the record is silent as to whether it presented them or not, there is nonetheless every probability that it did so. It was the mortgagee of the lands covered by those titles and it is usual in mortgage transactions that the owner's duplicates of the encumbered titles are yielded into the custody of the mortgage until the mortgage is discharged. Moreover, the certificates of title were reconstituted from the owner's duplicates,10and again it is to be presumed that said duplicates were presented by DBP, the petitioner in the reconstitution proceedings.It is, furthermore, admitted that the requisite registration fees were fully paid and that the certificate of sale was registrable on its face.11DBP, therefore, complied with all that was required of it for purposes ofboth primary entry and annotationof the certificate of sale. It cannot be blamed that annotation could not be made contemporaneously with the entry because the originals of the subject certificates of title were missing and could not be found, since it had nothing to do with their safekeeping. If anyone was responsible for failure of annotation, it was the Register of Deeds who was chargeable with the keeping and custody of those documents.It does not, therefore, make sense to require DBP to repeat the process of primary entry, paying anew the entry fees as the appealed resolution disposes, in order to procure annotation which through no fault on its part, had to be deferred until the originals of the certificates of title were found or reconstituted. That it is hardly just or equitable to do so also seems to have occurred to the Solicitor General, who dilutes his argument in support of the appealed resolution with the suggestion that "... the making of a new entry ... would be the more orderly procedure," and that DBP should not be made to pay filing fees anew.12Jurisprudence on the subject, while it has not been entirely consistent, is not wanting. InGovernment vs. Aballe,13this Court ruled that " ... (a)lthough a notice of attachment has not been noted on the certificate of title, its notation in the book of entry of the register of deeds produces all the effects which the law gives to its registration or inscription." Seemingly, that ruling was abandoned in the wartime case ofBasa vs. De la Rama,14where it was held that the entry of an instrument in the primary entry book produces no legal effect unless a memorandum thereof is noted on the certificate of title.Villasor vs. Camon,15however, clarified thatAballewas never really abandoned or reversed insofar as it applied to involuntary transactions. Said the Court in that case, which involved a voluntary transactions a deed of assignment of rights in a parcel of land and its improvements:The appellant cannot invoke in support of her contention, the ruling laid down in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Aballe, 60 Phil., 986, which was followed in Director of Lands vs. Abad, 61 Phil. 479, to the effect that an attachment entered upon the entry book is duly registered although the duplicate certificate is not presented at the time of registration to the register of deeds. Appellant cannot invoked said ruling,not because it has been abandoned by the Supreme Court during the Japanese occupation in the case of Bass VS. De la Rama, et al., ... in which it was said that "we are constrained to abandon the ruling in said two cases,"- it was not abandoned for the decision was concurred by only two justices or less than a majority, and said statement was not necessary or an obiter dictum and against the law, as correctly stated by the two associate justices who dissented and only concurred in the result, but because said ruling, subsisting and in force, does not support appellant's contention, for it is only applicable to registration of involuntary instruments, such as attachment, or other liensand adverse claims of anydescription. This ruling is correct or in conformity with the provisions of section 72 of Act No. 496, which do not require the production by the registrant of the duplicate certificate of the land to be affected, ... (emphasis supplied)The decision inVillasoralso quoted with approval the following excerpt from an earlier case,Philippine National Bank vs. Fernandez.16Coming now to the second ground on which the appellant bases his claims, we find that when Simona Fausa executed the document, Exhibit 3, on October 17, 1928, conveying her interest in the land to the appellant, her interest therein had already been attached by the provincial sheriff and also by him at public auction to the Philippine National Bank, and the certificate of sale filed in the office of the register of deeds in accordance with the law (sections 429 and 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure). It was not necessary for the sheriff to present the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title when he filed notice of attachment with the register of deeds, nor was it necessary for the Philippine National Bank to present the owner's duplicate when the bank filed its certificate of sale for registration (sections 71 and 72 of Act No. 496).Later cases appear to have applied theAballeruling that entry in the day book, even without the corresponding annotation on the certificate of title, is equivalent to, or produces the effect of, registration to voluntary transactions, provided the requisite fees are paid and the owner's duplicates of the certificates of title affected are presented. Thus, inLevin vs. Bass, et al.,17it was held:... Under the Torrens system the act of registration is the operative act to convey and affect the land. Do the entry in the day book of a deed of sale which was presented and filed together with owner's duplicate certificate of title which the office of the Registrar of Deeds and full payment of registration fees constitute a complete act of registration which operates to convey and affect the land? In voluntary registration, such as a sale, mortgage, lease and the like, if the owner's duplicate certificate be not surrendered and presented or if no payment of registration fees be made within 15 days, entry in the day book of the deed of sale does not operate to convey and affect the land sold. In involuntary registration, such as an attachment, levy upon execution,lis pendensand the like entry thereof in the day book is a sufficient notice to all persons of such adverse claim. ... The pronouncement of the court below is to the effect that an innocent purchaser for value has no right to the property because he is not a holder of a certificate of title to such property acquired by him for value and in good faith. It amounts to holding that for failure of the Registrar of Deeds to comply and perform his duty, an innocent purchaser for value loses that character-he is not an "innocent holder for value of a certificate of title." ...Neither violence to, nor stretching of the meaning of, the law would be done, if we should hold that an innocent purchaser for value of registered land becomes the registered owner and in contemplation of law the holder of a certificate thereof the moment he presents the owner's duplicate certificate of title to the property sold and pays the full amount of registration fees, because what remains to be done lies not within his power to perform. The Registrar of Deeds is in duty bound to perform it. We believe that is a reasonable and practical interpretation of the law under considerations-a construction which would lead to no inconsistency and injustice.(emphasis supplied)A similar ruling was made inPotenciano vs. Dineros, et al.,18concerning land a deed of sale of which was entered in the day book upon payment of the corresponding fees and presentation of the owner's duplicate of the covering certificate of title, on November 4, 1944. However, due to the confusion arising from the bombing of Manila (this having happened during the final months of the Japanese Occupation), the papers presented by the registrant were either lost or destroyed, no certificate of title was issued to him and as far as the records of the Register of Deeds showed, the property remained in the name of the vendor. Another party later sued the vendor, obtained judgment against him and purchased the property on execution sale. In affirming judgment annulling the execution sale in an action brought by the original purchaser, this Court held:The judgment creditor contends that entry of the deed in the day book is not sufficient registration. Both upon law and authority this contention must be rejected. Section 56 of the Land Registration Act says that deeds relating to registered land shall, upon payment of the filing fees, be entered in the entry book also called day book in the same section with notation of the year, month, day, hour, and minute of their reception and that "they shall be regarded as registered from the moment so noted."And applying this provision in the cases of Levin vs. Bass, etc., G.R. Nos. L-4340 to 4346, decided on May 28, 1952, this Court held that "an innocent purchaser for value of registered land becomes the registered owner and in contemplation of law the holder of a certificate thereof the moment he presents and files a duly notarized and lawful deed of sale and the same is entered on the day book and at the same time he surrenders or presents the owner's duplicate certificate of title to the property sold and pays the full amount of registration fees, because what remains to be done lies not within his power to perform."Current doctrine thus seems to be that entry alone produces the effect of registration, whether the transaction entered is a voluntary or an involuntary one, so long as the registrant has complied with all that is required of him for purposes of entry and annotation, and nothing more remains to be done but a duty incumbent solely on the register of deeds.Therefore, without necessarily holding that annotation of a primary entry on the original of the certificate of title may be deferred indefinitely without prejudice to the legal effect of said entry, the Court rules that in the particular situation here obtaining, annotation of the disputed entry on the reconstituted originals of the certificates of title to which it refers is entirely proper and justified. To hold said entry "ineffective," as does the appealed resolution, amounts to declaring that it did not, and does not, protect the registrant (DBP) from claims arising, or transactions made, thereafter which are adverse to or in derogation of the rights created or conveyed by the transaction thus entered. That, surely, is a result that is neither just nor can, by any reasonable interpretation of Section 56 of PD 1529, be asserted as warranted by its terms.The qualms implicit in the query of the respondent (and present appellee) register of deeds about making annotation of an entry effected before he assumed that office are more imagined than real. He would only be making a memorandum of an instrument and of its entry based on or reciting details which are already of indubitable record and, pursuant to the express command of the law, giving said memorandum the same date as the entry. No part of that function is exclusive to the incumbent of the office at the time entry was made or is forbidden to any of his successors.WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution of the Acting Commissioner of Land Registration is SET ASIDE. The respondent-appellee Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, or his successor, is ordered to annotate on the originals of the reconstituted Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. NT-149033 and NT-149034 of his Registry a memorandum of the certificate of sale in favor of appellant Development Bank of the Philippines as entered under Entry No. 8191 dated June 13, 1980 of the Primary Entry (Day) Book of said Registry. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.January 13, 2004 SHOPPERS PARADISE REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,petitioner, vs.EFREN P. ROQUE,respondent.On 23 December 1993, petitioner Shoppers Paradise Realty & Development Corporation, represented by its president, Veredigno Atienza, entered into a twenty-five year lease with Dr. Felipe C. Roque, now deceased, over a parcel of land, with an area of two thousand and thirty six (2,036) square meters, situated at Plaza Novaliches, Quezon City, covered by Transfer of Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 30591 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City in the name of Dr. Roque.Petitioner issued to Dr. Roque a check for P250,000.00 by way of reservation payment. Simultaneously, petitioner and Dr. Roque likewise entered into a memorandum of agreement for the construction, development and operation of a commercial building complex on the property.Conformably with the agreement, petitioner issued a check for another P250,000.00 downpayment to Dr. Roque.The contract of lease and the memorandum of agreement, both notarized, were to be annotated on TCT No. 30591 within sixty (60) days from 23 December 1993 or until 23 February 1994.The annotations, however, were never made because of the untimely demise of Dr. Felipe C. Roque.The death of Dr. Roque on 10 February 1994 constrained petitioner to deal with respondent Efren P. Roque, one of the surviving children of the late Dr. Roque, but the negotiations broke down due to some disagreements.In a letter, dated 3 November 1994, respondent advised petitioner to desist from any attempt to enforce the aforementioned contract of lease and memorandum of agreement.On 15 February 1995, respondent filed a case for annulment of the contract of lease and the memorandum of agreement, with a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, before Branch 222 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.Efren P. Roque alleged that he had long been the absolute owner of the subject property by virtue of a deed of donationinter vivosexecuted in his favor by his parents, Dr. Felipe Roque and Elisa Roque, on 26 December 1978, and that the late Dr. Felipe Roque had no authority to enter into the assailed agreements with petitioner.The donation was made in a public instrument duly acknowledged by the donor-spouses before a notary public and duly accepted on the same day by respondent before the notary public in the same instrument of donation.The title to the property, however, remained in the name of Dr. Felipe C. Roque, and it was only transferred to and in the name of respondent sixteen years later, or on 11 May 1994, under TCT No. 109754 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.Respondent, while he resided in the United States of America, delegated to his father the mere administration of the property.Respondent came to know of the assailed contracts with petitioner only after retiring to the Philippines upon the death of his father.On 9 August 1996, the trial court dismissed the complaint of respondent; it explained:Ordinarily, a deed of donation need not be registered in order to be valid between the parties.Registration, however, is important in binding third persons.Thus, when Felipe Roque entered into a leased contract with defendant corporation, plaintiff Efren Roque (could) no longer assert the unregistered deed of donation and say that his father, Felipe, was no longer the owner of the subject property at the time the lease on the subject property was agreed upon.The registration of the Deed of Donation after the execution of the lease contract did not affect the latter unless he had knowledge thereof at the time of the registration which plaintiff had not been able to establish.Plaintiff knew very well of the existence of the lease.He, in fact, met with the officers of the defendant corporation at least once before he caused the registration of the deed of donation in his favor and although the lease itself was not registered, it remains valid considering that no third person is involved.Plaintiff cannot be the third person because he is the successor-in-interest of his father, Felipe Roque, the lessor, and it is a rule that contracts take effect not only between the parties themselves but also between their assigns and heirs (Article 1311, Civil Code) and therefore, the lease contract together with the memorandum of agreement would be conclusive on plaintiff Efren Roque.He is bound by the contract even if he did not participate therein.Moreover, the agreements have been perfected and partially executed by the receipt of his father of the downpayment and deposit totaling to P500,000.00.[1]The Trial court ordered respondent to surrender TCT No. 109754 to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City for the annotation of the questioned Contract of Lease and Memorandum of Agreement.On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and held to be invalid the Contract of Lease and Memorandum of Agreement.While it shared the view expressed by the trial court that a deed of donation would have to be registered in order to bind third persons, the appellate court, however, concluded that petitioner was not a lessee in good faith having had prior knowledge of the donation in favor of respondent, and that such actual knowledge had the effect of registration insofar as petitioner was concerned.The appellate court based its findings largely on the testimony of Veredigno Atienza during cross-examination,viz;Q.Aside from these two lots, the first in the name of Ruben Roque and the second, the subject of the construction involved in this case, you said there is another lot which was part of development project?A.Yes, this was the main concept of Dr. Roque so that the adjoining properties of his two sons, Ruben and Cesar, will comprise one whole.The other whole property belongs to Cesar.Q.You were informed by Dr. Roque that this property was given to his three (3) sons; one to Ruben Roque, the other to Efren, and the other to Cesar Roque?A.Yes.Q.You did the inquiry from him, how was this property given to them?A.By inheritance.Q.Inheritance in the form of donation?A.I mean inheritance.Q.What I am only asking you is, were you told by Dr. Felipe C. Roque at the time of your transaction with him that all these three properties were given to his children by way of donation?A.What Architect Biglang-awa told us in his exact word: Yang mga yan pupunta sa mga anak.Yong kay Ruben pupunta kay Ruben.Yong kay Efren palibhasa nasa America sya, nasa pangalan pa ni Dr. Felipe C. Roque.x x xx x xx x xQ.When was the information supplied to you by Biglang-awa? Before the execution of the Contract of Lease and Memorandum of Agreement?A.Yes.Q.That being the case, at the time of the execution of the agreement or soon before, did you have such information confirmed by Dr. Felipe C. Roque himself?A.Biglang-awa did it for us.Q.But you yourself did not?A.No, because I was doing certain things.We were a team and so Biglang-awa did it for us.Q.So in effect, any information gathered by Biglang-awa was of the same effect as if received by you because you were members of the same team?A.Yes.[2]In the instant petition for review, petitioner seeks a reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals and the reinstatement of the ruling of the Regional Trial Court; it argues that the presumption of good faith it so enjoys as a party dealing in registered land has not been overturned by the aforequoted testimonial evidence, and that, in any event, respondent is barred by laches and estoppel from denying the contracts.The existence,albeitunregistered, of the donation in favor of respondent is undisputed.The trial court and the appellate court have not erred in holding that the non-registration of a deed of donation does not affect its validity.As being itself a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee.[3]In donations of immovable property, the law requires for its validity that it should be contained in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.[4]The Civil Code provides, however, that titles of ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property (now Registry of Land Titles and Deeds) shall not prejudice third persons.[5]It is enough, between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, that the donation be made in a public document but, in order to bind third persons, the donation must be registered in the registry of Property (Registry of Land Titles and Deeds).[6]Consistently, Section 50 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act), as so amended by Section 51 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), states:SECTION 51.Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner.- An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws.He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law.But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration.The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned,and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies. (emphasis supplied)A person dealing with registered land may thus safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefore, and he is not required to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property[7]but, where such party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at the time he acquired a right thereto, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest would have the effect of registration as regards to him.[8]The appellate court was not without substantial basis when it found petitioner to have had knowledge of the donation at the time it entered into the two agreements with Dr. Roque.During their negotiation, petitioner, through its representatives, was apprised of the fact that the subject property actually belonged to respondent.It was not shown that Dr. Felipe C. Roque had been an authorized agent of respondent.In a contract of agency, the agent acts in representation or in behalf of another with the consent of the latter.[9]Article 1878 of the Civil Code expresses that a special power of attorney is necessary to lease any real property to another person for more than one year.The lease of real property for more than one year is considered not merely an act of administration but an act of strict dominion or of ownership.A special power of attorney is thus necessary for its execution through an agent.The Court cannot accept petitioners argument that respondent is guilty of laches.Laches, in its real sense, is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declinedto assert it.[10]Respondent learned of the contracts only in February 1994 after the death of his father, and in the same year, during November, he assailed the validity of the agreements.Hardly, could respondent then be said to have neglected to assert his case for unreasonable length of time.Neither is respondent estopped from repudiating the contracts.The essential elements of estoppelinpais,in relation to the party sought to be estopped, are: 1) a clear conduct amounting to false representation or concealment of material facts or, at least, calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; 2) an intent or, at least, an expectation, that this conduct shall influence, or be acted upon by, the other party; and 3) the knowledge, actual or constructive, by him of the real facts.[11]With respect to the party claiming the estoppel, the conditions he must satisfy are: 1) lack of knowledge or of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question; 2) reliance, in good faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; and 3) action or inaction based thereon of such character as to change his position or status calculated to cause him injury or prejudice.[12]It has not been shown that respondent intended to conceal the actual facts concerning the property; more importantly, petitioner has been shown not to be totally unaware of the real ownership of the subject property.Altogether, there is no cogent reason to reverse the Court of Appeals in its assailed decision.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals declaring the contract of lease and memorandum of agreement entered into between Dr. Felipe C. Roque and Shoppers Paradise Realty & Development Corporation not to be binding on respondent is AFFIRMED.No costs.ARLYN*PINEDA VS JULIE C. ARCALAS, NOV 2007

This is a Special Civil Action forCertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Resolution[1]dated25 January 2005, rendered by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 82872, dismissing the appeal filed by petitionerArlynPineda (Pineda) for failure to file her appellants brief.Under the assailed Resolution, the Order[2]promulgated by Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna (Laguna RTC), on 2 February 2004, granting the petition of respondent JulieArcalas(Arcalas) for the cancellation of the Affidavit of Adverse Claim annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-52319 under Entry No.324094,became final.The subject property consists of three parcels of land, which are described as Lot No. 3762-D with an area of 42,958 square meters, Lot No. 3762-E with an area of 4,436 square meters, and Lot No. 3762-F with an area of 2,606 square meters, the total area of which consists of 50,000 square meters.These three lots are portions of Lot No. 3762, registered in the name of Spouses MauroLateo andEncarnacionEvangelista (spousesLateo) under TCT No. T-52319, with a total area of 74,708 square meters, located at Barrios DuhatandLabuin,Santa Cruz, Laguna.A certain VictoriaTolentinobought the said property from the SpousesLateo.Sometime later, Civil Case No.Q-96-27884, for Sum of Money, was instituted byArcalasagainst VictoriaTolentino.This case stemmed from an indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note and four post-dated checks later dishonored, which VictoriaTolentinoowedArcalas.[3]On9 September 1997, Branch 93 of theQuezonCity RTC, rendered judgment in favor ofArcalasand against VictoriaTolentino.[4]On15 December 1997, Pineda bought the subject property from Victoria L.Tolentino.[5]Pineda alleged that upon payment of the purchase price, she took possession of the subject property by allowing a tenant, Rodrigo Bautista to cultivate the same.However, Pineda failed to register the subject property under her name.[6]To execute the judgment, theQuezonCity RTC levied upon the subject property and the Notice of Levy on Alias Writ of Execution dated12 January 1999was annotated as Entry No. 315074, in relation to Entry No. 319362, at the back of TCT No.T-52319.[7]Asserting ownership of the subject property, Pineda filed with the Deputy Sheriff of theQuezonCity RTC an Affidavit of Title and Third Party Claim.Arcalasfiled a motion to set aside Pinedas Affidavit of Title and Third Party Claim, which on3 November 1999, theQuezonCity RTC granted, to wit:[Arcalas] showed that her levies on the properties were duly registered while the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale between the defendant Victoria L.TolentinoandAnalynG. Pineda was not.The levies being superior to the sale claimed by Ms. Pineda, the court rules to quash and set aside her Affidavit of Title and Third Party Claim.ACCORDINGLY, the motion is granted.The Affidavit of Title and Third-Party Claim is set aside to allow completion of execution proceedings.[8]On2 February 2000, after the finality[9]of the Order of theQuezonCity RTC quashing Pinedas third-party claim, Pineda filed with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna another Affidavit of Third Party Claim and caused the inscription of a notice of adverse claim at the back of TCT No.T-52319 under Entry No. 324094.[10]On3 February 2000,Arcalasand Leonardo Byron P. Perez, Jr. purchased Lot No. 3762 at an auction sale conducted by the Deputy Sheriff ofQuezonCity.The sale was evidenced by a Sheriffs Certificate of Sale issued on the same day and registered as Entry No. 324225 at the back of TCT No.T-52319.[11]Arcalasthen filed an action for the cancellation of the entry of Pinedas adverse claim before the Laguna RTC.The Laguna RTC ordered the cancellation of the Notice of Adverse Claim annotated as Entry No. 324094 at the back of TCT No. 52319 on the ground of resjudicata:The court order emanating from Branch 91 of the Regional Trial Court ofQuezonCity having become final andexecutoryand no relief therefromhaving been filed by [Pineda], the said order granting the [Arcalass] Motion to Set Aside Affidavit of Title and 3rdParty Claim should be given due course and the corresponding annotation at the back of TCT No. T-52319 as Entry No. 324094 datedFebruary 2, 2000should be expunged accordingly.[12]Pineda appealed the Order of the Laguna RTC before the Court of Appeals under Rule 44 of the Rules of Court.In a Resolution dated25 January 2005,[13]the appellate court dismissed the appeal and considered it abandoned when Pineda failed to file her appellants brief.Pineda filed a Motion for Reconsideration, wherein it was plainly stated that Pinedas counsel overlooked the period within which he should file the appellants brief.[14]The said motion was denied in a Resolution dated26 May 2005.Pineda filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied on7 October 2005.[15]No appellants brief was attached to either motion for reconsideration.Hence, the present Petition raising the following issues:[16]I.WHETHER THE LEVY ON ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OFQUEZON CITYIN CIVIL CASE NO.Q-96-27884 MAY EXEMPT THE PORTION BOUGHT BY [PINEDA] FROM VICTORIA TOLENTINO; [and]II.WHETHER THE POSSESSION OF [PINEDA] OF THE 5 HECTARES PORTION OFLOT3762 IS ALREADY EQUIVALENT TO A TITLE DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF REGISTRATION.This petition must be dismissed.The Court of Appeals properly dismissed the case for Pinedas failure to file an appellants brief.This is in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, which imposes upon the appellant the duty to file an appellants brief in ordinary appealed cases before the Court of Appeals, thus:Section 7.Appellants brief.It shall be the duty of the appellant to file with the court, within forty-five (45) days from receipt of the notice of the clerk that all the evidence, oral and documentary, are attached to the record, seven (7) copies of his legibly typewritten, mimeographed or printed brief, with proof of service of two (2) copies thereof upon theappellee.In special cases appealed to the Court of Appeals, such ascertiorari, prohibition,mandamus,quowarrantoandhabeas corpuscases, a memorandum of appeal must be filed in place of an appellants brief as provided in Section 10 of Rule 44 of the Rules of CourtSection 10.Time of filing memoranda in special cases.In certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quowarrantoand habeas corpus cases, the parties shall file, in lieu of briefs, their respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice issued by the clerk that all the evidence, oral and documentary, is already attached to the record.The failure of the appellant to file his memorandum within the periodthereformay be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.Non-filing of an appellants brief or a memorandum of appeal is one of the explicitly recognized grounds of dismissal of the appeal in Section 1 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court:Section 1.Grounds for dismissal of appeal.- An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of theappellee, on the following grounds:xxxx(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules;This Court provided the rationale for requiring an appellants brief inEnriquez v. Court of Appeals[17]:[T]he appellants brief is mandatory for the assignment of errors is vital to the decision of the appeal on the merits.This is because on appeal only errors specifically assigned and properly argued in the brief or memorandum will be considered, except those affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter as well as plain and clerical errors.Otherwise stated, an appellate court has no power to resolve an unassigned error, which does not affect the courts jurisdiction over the subject matter, save for a plain or clerical error.Thus, inCasimv.Flordeliza,[18]this Court affirmed the dismissal of an appeal, even when the filing of an appellants brief was merely attended by delay and fell short of some of the requirements of the Rules of Court.The Court, inGonzales v. Gonzales,[19]reiterated that it is obligatory on the part of the appellant to submit or file a memorandum of appeal, and that failing such duty, the Rules of Court unmistakably command the dismissal of the appeal.In this case, Pineda did not even provide a proper justification for her failure to file her appellants brief.It was merely alleged in her Motion for Reconsideration that her counsel overlooked the period within which to file the appellants brief.Although Pineda filed no less than two motions for reconsideration, Pineda had not, at any time, made any attempt to file her appellants brief.Nor did she supply any convincing argument to establish her right to the subject property for which she seeks vindication.Thus, this Court cannot reverse or fault the appellate court for duly acting in faithful compliance with the rules of procedure and established jurisprudence that it has been mandated to observe, nor turn a blind eye and tolerate the transgressions of these rules and doctrines.[20]An appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court since the right to appeal is a purely statutory right.[21]Even when this Court recognized the importance of deciding cases on the merits to better serve the ends of justice, it has stressed that the liberality in the application of rules of procedure may not be invoked if it will result in the wanton disregard of the rules or cause needless delay in the administration of justice.[22]The Court eyes with disfavor the unjustified delay in the termination of cases; once a judgment has become final, the winning party must not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict, through a mere subterfuge.Thetime spent by the judiciary, more so of this Court, in taking cognizance and resolving cases is not limitless and cannot be wasted on cases devoid of any right calling for vindication and aremerely reprehensible efforts to evade the operation of a decision that is final andexecutory.[23]In the present case, there is a clear intent on the part of Pineda to delay the termination of the case, thereby deprivingArcalasof the fruits of a just verdict.TheQuezonCity RTC already quashed Pinedas third party claim over the subject property, yet she filed another adverse claim before the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna based on the same allegations and arguments previously settled by theQuezonCity RTC.Arcalas, thus, had to file another case to cause the cancellation of Pinedas notice of adverse claim on TCT No.T-52319 before the Laguna RTC.After the Laguna RTC gave due course toArcalasspetition, Pineda filed a dilatory appeal before the Court of Appeals, where she merely let the period for the filing of the appellants brief lapse without exerting any effort to file one.The two motions for reconsideration and even the petition before this Court fail to present new issues.They raised the very same issues which had been consistently resolved by both theQuezonCity RTC and the Laguna RTC in favor ofArcalas, upholding the superiority of her lien over that of Pinedas unregistered sale.Considering all these circumstances, there is no basis for the lenient application of procedural rules in this case; otherwise, it would result in a manifest injustice and the abuse of court processes.As a rule, the negligence or mistake of counsel binds the client.[24]The only exception to this rule is when the counsels negligence is so gross that a party is deprived of due process and, thus, loses life, honor or property on mere technicalities.[25]The exception cannot apply to the present case, where Pineda is merely repeating arguments that were already heard and decided upon by courts of proper jurisdiction, and the absolute lack of merit of the petition is at once obvious.Pineda avers thatshe is not a party to Civil Case No. Q-96-27884, heard before theQuezonCity RTC, and that the levy on the alias writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. Q-96-27884 cannot affect her purchase of subject property.Such position runs contrary to law and jurisprudence.Sections 51 and 52 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provide that:Section 51.Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner.Anowner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws.He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law.But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration.The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or the city where the land lies. (Emphasis provided.)Section 52.Constructive notice upon registration.Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, beconstructive notice to all personsfrom the time of such registering, filing or entering. (Emphasis provided.)It is clear from these provisions that before a purchaser of land causes the registration of the transfer of the subject property in her favor, third persons, such asArcalas, cannot be bound thereby. Insofar as third persons are concerned, what validly transfers or conveys a persons interest in real property is the registration of the deed.As the deed of sale was unrecorded, it operates merely as a contract between the parties, namely VictoriaTolentinoas seller and Pineda as buyer, which may be enforceable against VictoriaTolentinothrough a separate and independent action.On the other hand,Arcalasslien was registered and annotated at the back of the title of the subject property and accordingly amounted to a constructive notice thereof to all persons, whether or not party to the original case filed before theQuezonCity RTC.The doctrine is well settled that a levy on execution duly registered takes preference over a prior unregistered sale.[26]A registered lien is entitled to preferential consideration.[27]InValdeviesov.Damalerio,[28]the Court held that a registered writ of attachment was a superior lien over that on an unregistered deed of sale and explained the reasontherefor:This is so because an attachment is a proceeding inrem.It is against the particular property, enforceable against the whole world.The attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached property which nothing can subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment or levy itself.Such a proceeding, in effect, means that the property attached is an indebted thing and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the owners debt.The lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued on the judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law.Thus, in the registry, the attachment in favor of respondent appeared in the nature of a real lien when petitioner had his purchase recorded.The effect of the notation of said lien was to subject and subordinate the right of petitioner, as purchaser, to the lien. Petitioner acquired ownership of the land only from the date of the recording of his title in the register, and the right of ownership which he inscribed was not absolute but a limited right, subject to a prior registered lien of respondent, a right which is preferred and superior to that of petitioner.Pineda also contends that her possession of the subject property cures the defect caused by her failure to register the subject property in her name.This contention is inaccurate as well as inapplicable.True, that notwithstanding the preference given to a registered lien, this Court has made an exception in a case where a party has actual knowledge of the claimants actual, open, and notorious possession of the disputed propertyat the time the levy or attachment was registered.In such situations, the actual notice and knowledge of a prior unregistered interest, not the mere possession of the disputed property, was held to be equivalent to registration.[29]Lamentably, in this case, Pineda did not even allege, much less prove, thatArcalashad actual knowledge of her claim of ownership and possession of the property at the time the levy was registered.The records fail to show thatArcalasknew of Pinedas claim of ownership and possession prior to Pinedas filing of her third party claim before theQuezonCity RTC.Hence, the mere possession of the subject property by Pineda, absent any proof thatArcalashad knowledge of her possession and adverse claim of ownership of the subject property, cannot be considered as equivalent to registration.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition isDISMISSEDand the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals inC.A. G.R. CV No. 82872, promulgated on25 January 2005, isAFFIRMED.The Order of Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, directing the Register of Deeds of Laguna to cancel the Notice of Adverse Claim inscribed at the back of TCT No. T-52319 as Entry No. 324094 isSUSTAINED. No costs.Fudot vs. Cattleya Land Inc. (533 SCRA 351)

Knowledge gained by first buyer of second sale cannot defeat first buyers rights, except where the second buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first. It is essential to merit the protection of Art. 1544 of the New Civil Code, that the second realty buyer must act in good faith in registering his deed of sale.

CARMELITA FUDOT VS CATTLEYA LAND, INC.,For resolution is a petition that seeks to nullify the Decision[1]and Resolution[2]of the Court of Appeals dated 28 April 2005 and 11 January 2006, respectively, in C.A.G.R. CV No. 73025 which declared respondent as having a better right over a parcel of land located in Doljo, Panglao, Bohol.The facts, as culled from the records, follow.Sometime in July 1992, Cattleya Land, Inc. (hereinafter referred toas respondent) asked someone to check, on its behalf, the titles of nine (9) lots, the subject land included, which it intended to buy from the spouses Troadio and Asuncion Tecson.Finding no defect on the titles, respondent purchased the nine lots through a Deed of Conditional Sale on6 November 1992.Subsequently, on30 August 1993, respondent and the Tecsons executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the same properties. The Deed of Conditional Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale were registered with the Register of Deeds on06 November 1992and04 October 1993, respectively.[3]The Register of Deeds, Atty. Narciso dela Serna, refused to actually annotate the deedof sale on the titles because of the existingnotice of attachment in connection with Civil Case No. 3399 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.[4]The attachment was eventually cancelled by virtue of a compromise agreement between the Tecsons and their attaching creditor which wasbrokered by respondent.Titles to six (6) of the nine (9) lots were issued, but the Register of Deeds refused to issue titles to the remaining three (3) lots , because the titles covering the same were stillunaccounted for.On23 January 1995, petitioner presented for registration before the Register of Deeds the owners copy of the title of the subject property, together with the deed of sale purportedly executed by theTecsons in favor of petitioner on19 December 1986.On thefollowing day, respondent sent a letter of protest/opposition to petitioners application.Much to its surprise, respondent learned that theRegister of Deedshad already registered the deed of sale in favor of petitioner and issued a new title in her name.[5]On5 May 1995, respondent filed its Complaint[6]for Quieting Of Title &/Or Recovery Of Ownership, Cancellation Of Title With Damages before theRegionalTrialCourtofTagbilaranCity.[7]On26 June 1995,Asuncionfiled a complaint-in-intervention, claiming that she never signed any deed of sale covering any part of their conjugal property in favor of petitioner.She averred that her signature in petitioners deed of sale was forged thus, said deed should be declared null and void.[8]She also claimed that she has discovered only recently that there was an amorous relationship between her husband and petitioner.[9]Petitioner, for her part, alleged in her answer[10]thatthe spouses Tecson had sold to her the subject property forP20,000.00 and delivered to her the owners copy of the titleon26 December 1986. She claims that she subsequentlypresented the said title to the Register of Deeds but the latter refused to register the same because the property was still under attachment.On 31 October 2001, the trial court rendered its decision:[11](i) quieting the title or ownership of the subject land in favor of respondent; (ii) declaring the deed of sale between petitioner and spouses Tecson invalid; (iii) ordering the registration of the subject land in favor of respondent; (iv) dismissing respondents claim for damages against the Register of Deeds for insufficiency of evidence; (v) dismissing Asuncions claim for damages against petitioner for lack of factual basis; and (vi) dismissing petitioners counterclaimfor lack of the required preponderance of evidence.[12]According to the trial court, respondent had recorded in good faith the deed of sale in its favor ahead of petitioner. Moreover, based onAsuncions convincing and unrebutted testimony, the trial courtconcluded that the purported signature ofAsuncionin thedeed of sale in favor of petitioner was forged, therebyrendering the sale void.[13]Petitioner sought recourse to the Court of Appeals, arguing in the main that the rule on double sale was applicable to the case.The appellate court, however, dismissed her appeal, holding that therewas no double sale because the allegedsale to petitioner was null and void in view of the forgery ofAsuncions purported signaturein the deed. The appellate court noted that petitioner failed to rebutAsuncions testimony despite opportunities to do so.[14]Moreover, even if there was double sale, according to the appellate court, respondents claim would still prevail since it was able to register the second sale in its favor in good faith, had made inquiries before it purchased the lots, and was informed that the titles were free from encumbrance except the attachment on the property due to Civil Case No. 3399.[15]Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the Court of Appeals denied her motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.[16]Petitioner thus presents before this Court the following issues for resolution:I.BETWEEN 2 BUYERS OF REGISTERED LAND, WHO HAS THE BETTER RIGHT-IS IT THE FIRST BUYER WHO WAS GIVEN THE OWNERS DUPLICATE TCT TOGETHER WITH A DEED OFSALEIN1986, OR THE SECOND BUYER IN 1992 WITH ONLY A DEED OFSALE.II.IS A BUYER OF REGISTERED LAND WHO DID NOT DEMAND OR REQUIRE THE DELIVERY OF THE OWNERS DUPLICATE TCT A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH.III.II.IN SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION OF REGISTERED LANDS, AS BYSALE, WHICH LAW SHALL GOVERN, ARTICLE 1455 OF CIVIL CODE OR P.D. 1529 ORTORRENSSYSTEM.[17]Petitioner avers that she was the first buyer in good faith and even had in her possession the owners copy of the title so much so that she was able to register the deed of sale in her favor and caused the issuance of a new title in her name.She argues that the presentation and surrender of the deed of sale and the owners copy carried with it the conclusive authority of Asuncion Tecson which cannot be overturned by the latters oral deposition.[18]Petitioner claims that respondent did not demand nor require delivery of the owners duplicate title from the spouses Tecson, neither did it investigate the circumstances surrounding the absence of the title. These indicate respondents knowledge of a defect in the title of the spouses and,thus, petitioner concludes that respondent was not a buyer in good faith.[19]Finally, petitioner insists that the applicable law in this case is P.D. No. 1529, a special law dealing precisely with the registration of registered lands or any subsequent sale thereof, and not Article 1544 of the Civil Code which deals with immovable property not covered by the Torrens System.[20]Respondent points out, on one hand, that petitioners first two issues which present an inquiry on who has a better right or which one is a buyer in good faith, are questions of fact not proper in a petition for review. The third issue, on the other hand, is ostensibly a question of law which had been unsuccessfully raised below.[21]Respondent maintains that there is no room to speak of petitioner as a buyer in good faith since she was never a buyer in the first place, as her claim is based on a null and void deed of sale, so the courta quofound.Respondent also asserts that its status as a buyer in good faith was establishedand confirmed inthe proceedings before the two courts below.[22]Lastly, respondent argues that P.D. No. 1529 finds no application in the instant case.The production of the owners duplicate certificate x x x being conclusive authority from the registered owner is only true as between the registration applicant and the register of deeds concerned, but never to third parties. Such conclusive authority, respondent adds, is only for the Register of Deeds to enter a new certificate or to make a memorandum of registration in accordance with such instrument. It cannot cure the fatal defect that the instrument from which such registration was effected is null and voidab initio, respondent concludes.[23]The petition is bereft of merit.Petitioners arguments, which rest on the assumption that there was a double sale, must fail.In the first place, there is no double sale to speak of.Art. 1544 of the Civil Code,[24]which provides the rule on double sale, applies only to a situation where the same property is validlysold to different vendees.In this case, there is only one sale to advert to, that between the spouses Tecson and respondent.InRemalante v. Tibe,[25]this Court ruled that the Civil Law provision on double sale is not applicable where there is only one validsale, the previous sale having been found to be fraudulent. Likewise, inEspiritu and Apostol v. Valerio,[26]where the same parcel of land was purportedly sold to two different parties, the Court held that despite the fact that one deed of sale was registered ahead of the other, Art. 1544 of the Civil Code will not apply where said deed is found to be a forgery, the result of this being that the right of the other vendee should prevail.The trial court declared that the sale between the spouses Tecson and petitioner is invalid, as it bearsthe forged signature ofAsuncion.Said finding is based on the unrebutted testimony ofAsuncionand the trial courts visual analysis and comparison of the signaturesin her Complaint-in-Intervention and the purported deed of sale.This finding was upheld by the Court of Appeals, as it ruled that the purported sale in petitionersfavor is null and void, taking into accountAsuncions unrefuted deposition.In particular, the Court of Appeals noted petitioners failure to attend the taking of the oral deposition and to give written interrogatories.In short, she did not take the necessary steps to rebutAsuncions definitive assertion.The congruence of the wills of the spouses is essential for the valid disposition of conjugal property.[27]Thus, under Article 166 of the Civil Code[28]which was still in effect on19 December 1986when the deed of sale was purportedly executed, the husband cannot generally alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent.In this case, following Article 173[29]of the Civil Code, on 26 June 1995, or eight and a half years (8 ) after the purported sale to petitioner,Asuncionfiled her Complaint-in-Intervention seeking the nullification thereof, and while her marriage with Troadio was still subsisting. Both the Court of Appeals and the trial court foundAsuncions signaturein the deed of sale to have been forged, and consequently, the deed of sale void for lack of marital consent. We find no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.Findings of fact of lower courts are deemed conclusive and binding upon the Supreme Court subject to certain exceptions,[30]none of which are present in this case. Besides, it has long been recognized in our jurisprudence that a forged deed is a nullity and conveys no title.[31]Petitioner argues she has a better right over the property in question, as the holder of and the first one to present, the owners copy of the title for the issuance of a new TCT. The Court is not persuaded.The act of registration does not validate petitioners otherwise void contract. Registration is a mere ministerial act by which a deed, contract, or instrument is sought to be inscribed in the records of the Office of the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of the certificate of title covering the land subject of the deed, contract, or instrument.While it operates as a notice of the deed, contract, or instrument to others, it does not add to its validity nor converts an invalid instrument into a valid one as between the parties,[32]nor amounts to a declaration by the state that the instrument is a valid and subsisting interest in the land.[33]The registration of petitionersvoid deed is not an impediment to a declaration by the courts of its invalidity.Even assuming that there was double sale in this case,petitioner would still not prevail. The pertinent portion of Art. 1544 provides:Art. 1544.x x x.Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.x x x x.In interpreting this provision, the Court declared that the governing principle isprimus tempore, potior jure(first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyers rights, except where the second buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first as provided by the aforequoted provision of the Civil Code. Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar him from availing of his rights under the law, among them to register first his purchase as against the second buyer. However, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith.[34]It is thusessential, to merit the protection of Art. 1544, second paragraph, that the second realty buyer must act in good faith in registering his deed of sale.[35]We agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that respondent was a buyer in good faith, having purchased the nine (9) lots, including the subject lot, without any notice of a previous sale, but only a notice of attachment relative to a pending civil case.In fact, in its desire to finally have the title to the properties transferred in its name, it persuaded the parties in the said case to settle the same so that the notice of attachment could be cancelled.Relevantto the discussion are the following provisions of P.D. No. 1529:Sec. 51.Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, lease or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make Registration.The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies. (Emphasis supplied)Sec. 52.Constructive notice upon registration.Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering.It has been held that between two transactions concerning the same parcel of land, the registered transaction prevails over the earlier unregistered right. The act of registration operates to convey and affect the registered land so that a bona fide purchaser of such land acquires good title as against a prior transferee, if such prior transfer was unrecorded.[36]As found by the courtsa quo, respondent was able to register its purchase ahead of petitioner.It will be recalled that respondent was able to register its Deed of Conditional Sale with the Register of Deeds as early as6 November 1992, and its Deed of Absolute Sale on14 October 1993. On the other hand, petitioner was able to present for registration her deed of sale and owners copy of the title only on23 January 1995, or almost nine years after the purported sale.Why it took petitioner nine (9) years to present the deed and the owners copy, she had no credible explanation; but it is clear that when she finally did, she already had constructive notice ofthe deed of sale in respondents favor.Without a doubt, respondent had acquired a better title to the property.Finally, anent petitioners claim that P.D. No. 1529 applies to registered lands or any subsequent sale thereof, while Art. 1544 of the Civil Code applies only to immovable property not covered by the Torrens System, suffice it to say that this quandary has already been answered by an eminent former member of this Court,Justice Jose Vitug, who explained thatthe registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has been held to refer to registration under P.D. No. 1529, thus:The registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has been held to refer to registration under Act 496 Land Registration Act (now PD 1529)which considers the act of registration as the operative act that binds the land (seeMediante v. Rosabal, 1 O.G. [12] 900,Garcia v. Rosabal,73 Phil 694). On lands covered by the Torrens System, the purchaser acquires such rights and interest as they appear in the certificate of title, unaffected by any prior lien or encumbrance not noted therein. The purchaser is not required to explore farther than what theTorrenstitle, upon its face, indicates. The only exception is where the purchaser has actual knowledge of a flaw or defect in the title of the seller or of such liens or encumbrances which, as to him, is equivalent to registration (see Sec. 39, Act 496;Bernales v. IAC, G.R. 75336, 18 October 1988; Hernandez vs. Sales, 69 Phil 744;Tajonera s. Court of Appeals, L-26677, 27 March 1981) (Emphasis supplied)[37]WHEREFORE,the petition is DENIED. The assailed decisionand resolution of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.Costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. 165853 June 22, 2006ROSANA EREA,Petitioner,vs. VIDA DANA QUERRER-KAUFFMAN,Respondent.Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67899. The assailed decision reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City in Civil Case No. LP-98-0056.2Vida Dana Querrer-Kauffman is the owner of a residential lot with a house constructed thereon located at Block 3, Lot 13, Marcillo corner Planza Streets, BF Resort Village, Talon, Las Pias City. The property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-48521. The owners duplicate copy of the title as well as the tax declaration3covering the property, were kept in a safety deposit box in the house.Sometime in February 1997, as she was going to the United States, Kauffman entrusted her minor daughter, Vida Rose, to her live-in partner, Eduardo Victor. She also entrusted the key to her house to Victor. She went back to the Philippines to get her daughter on May 13, 1997, and again left for the U.S. on the same day. Later on, Victor also left for the U.S. and entrusted the house and the key thereto to his sister, Mira Bernal.4On October 25, 1997, Kauffman asked her sister, Evelyn Pares, to get the house from Bernal so that the property could be sold. Pares did as she was told.5Kauffman then sent the key to the safety deposit box to Pares, but Pares did not receive it. Kauffman then asked Pares to hire a professional locksmith who could open the safe.6When the safe was broken open, however, Pares discovered that the owners duplicate title and the tax declarations, including pieces of jewelry were missing.7Kauffman learned about this on October 29, 1997 and returned to the Philippines on November 9, 1997. She and Pares went to the Register of Deeds of Las Pias City and found out that the lot had been mortgaged to Rosana Erea on August 1, 1997.8It appeared that a "Vida Dana F. Querrer" had signed the Real Estate Mortgage as owner-mortgagor,9together with Jennifer V. Ramirez, Victors daughter, as attorney-in-fact.10Kauffman and Pares were able to locate Bernal who, when asked, confirmed that Ramirez had taken the contents of the safety deposit box. When Kauffman told Bernal that she would file a case against them, Bernal cried and asked for forgiveness. Bernal admitted that Jennifer Ramirez had been in a tight financial fix and pleaded for time to return the title and the jewelry.11On March 12, 1998, Kauffman filed a complaint against Erea, Bernal and Jennifer Ramirez for Nullification of Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and Damages with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction12in the RTC of Las Pias City. The complaint contained the following allegations:2. The plaintiff is the owner of a property consisting of a lot with an area of One Hundred Ten (110) square meters located at Blk. 3, Lot 13, Marcillo cor. Pianza Sts., BF Resort Village, Talon, Las Pias City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-48521 of the Register of Deeds of Las Pias City, together with a residential house thereon, with a combined assessed value ofP40,500.00, and copies of said TCT, and tax declarations of the lot and house x x x;3. Sometime in February 1997, when the plaintiff left for the United States, she entrusted the key of her said house to one Eduardo Victor who, in turn, when he himself went to the United States, entrusted said key to his sister, the defendant Mira V. Bernal;4. Sometime between May and July 1997, said defendant Mira V. Bernal, in conspiracy with her niece, the defendant Jennifer V. Ramirez, who is the daughter of Eduardo Victor, using the key in their possession, opened the locked and the unoccupied house of the plaintiff, forced open the vault of the plaintiff and stole the owners copy of TCT No. T-48521 and other articles contained therein valued at more thanP60,000.00, all belonging to the plaintiff;5. Having in their possession the stolen TCT No. T-48521, defendants Mira V. Bernal and Jennifer V. Ramirez, with the latter falsely representing herself to be the attorney-in-fact of the plaintiff, mortgaged the property in question to the defendant Rosana L. Erea for the amount ofP250,000.00, in Pasay City, for forging the signature of the plaintiff on the corresponding Real Estate Mortgage, which appears to have been notarized by Notary Public Alfredo M. Mendoza and registered as Doc. No. 43, Page No. 1, Book No. VII, Series of 1997, x x x;6. After the execution of the falsified Real Estate Mortgage, the defendants registered the same with the Registry of Deeds of Las Pias City and had it annotated on the TCT No. T-48521 as Entry No. 7185-15;7. When the defendant Rosana L. Erea as mortgagee accepted the property in mortgage, she knew fully well that the plaintiff-owner was in the United States at that time and the defendants Mira V. Bernal and Jennifer V. Ramirez were not authorized to mortgage the property as they claimed themselves to be, and this notwithstanding, the defendants who were in bad faith conspired and confederated between and among themselves and fraudulently executed the said document of mortgage for purposes of personal gain;8. The plaintiff has been a victim of fraud as above narrated and the defendant Rosana L. Erea now being in unlawful possession of her torrens title, the plaintiff is not only in constant apprehension as to what other fraudulent transactions the defendant might enter into involving her title, but is also prevented from pursuing her intention to sell her property, and by reason of which the plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of said title and the cancellation of Entry No. 7185-15 thereon;9. In view thereof, plaintiff is entitled to actual damages in the amount ofP200,000.00;10. Likewise, plaintiff suffered moral damages in the form of mental anguish, wounded feelings, serious anxiety and similar injuries in the amount ofP200,000.00;11. The plaintiff is also entitled to exemplary damages in the amount ofP100,000.00 which plaintiff seeks to impose upon the defendants as a correction or example for the public good, as a deterrent to people from committing fraudulent acts against their fellowmen;12. On account of defendants unwarranted acts aforecited, the plaintiff is furthermore entitled to attorneys fees in the amount ofP50,000.00 as acceptance fee, plusP1,500.00 appearance fee every hearing, for which the defendants should be liable;13The complaint also contained the following prayer:(a) That upon the filing of this complaint and compliance with the pertinent rule, a temporary mandatory order be issued requiring the defendant Rosana L. Erea to turn over to the plaintiff the possession of TCT No. T-48521;(b) That after due hearing, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued making permanent the temporary mandatory order;(c) In case a temporary mandatory order or preliminary injunction be not issued, that the defendant Rosana L. Erea or whoever be in possession of TCT No. T-48521, be ordered, after due hearing, to turn the same over to the plaintiff, that the Real Estate Mortgage (Annex "D") of this complaint be declared null and void, and Entry No. 7185-15 on said title be cancelled;(d) That after hearing, the defendants be ordered to pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally, the following amounts:1.P200,000.00 as moral damages;2.P200,000.00 as actual damages;3.P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;4.P50,000.00 as acceptance fee, plusP1,500.00 appearance fee every hearing, as attorneys fees, aside from costs.Plaintiff further prays for such other relief that this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the premises.14Erea interposed the defense of being a mortgagee in good faith. She likewise interposed a cross-claim against Bernal and Jennifer Ramirez for the refund of theP250,000.00 she loaned to "Vida Dana Querrer."15Jennifer Ramirez and Bernal interposed the common defense that, on November 13, 1998, the City Prosecutor approved a Resolution absolving them of the robbery and estafa cases through falsification of a public document.16During pre-trial, defendants Ramirez and Bernal failed to appear. On motion of the plaintiff, they were thus declared in default.17During trial, Socorro Ramos, Ereas aunt, testified that, Richmond Ramirez, Jennifers husband, and Angel Jose, her grandson and Ereas nephew, had been classmates and were compadres.18The Ramirez spouses used to go to her house. In one occasion, the Ramirez spouses arrived in her house with one "Vida Dana Querrer" whom Richmond introduced as his half-sister.19He also told Ramos that Querrer wanted to mortgage her house and lot as she was going to the U.S.20Richmond showed her a copy of TCT No. T-48521, Querrers identification (I.D.) card, and pictures of the house and lot.21Ramos then informed her niece, Rosana Erea, and asked if she would agree to mortgage the property. Ramos later brought the spousesRamirez and "Vida Dana Querrer" to Erea who showed a copy of the title, tax declaration, a tax clearance, all in the name of "Vida Dana Querrer." The spouses also showed an I.D. card of "Vida Dana Querrer" as a worker in Japan, a police clearance, and the location plan of the property.22Jennifer Ramirez informed Erea that Vida Dana was applying for a passport as she was going to Japan and the U.S.23"Vida Dana Querrer" likewise introduced herself as Richmonds sister.24Erea was able to verify from the Office of the Register of Deeds that the property was in the name of Vida Dana Querrer and that it was free of any lien or encumbrance. Erea and her husband, Ramos, Richmond Ramirez, Angel Jose, and "Vida Dana Querrer" later inspected the house and lot two times.25Erea finally agreed to aP250,000.00 mortgage loan, with the house and lot as security therefor.On August 1, 1997, Jennifer Ramirez, Rosana Erea and a woman who identified herself as "Vida Dana Querrer" arrived in the office Notary Public Alfredo M. Mendoza and asked him to prepare a Special Power of Attorney to be executed by "Vida Dana Querrer," as principal, in favor of Jennifer Ramirez, as attorney-in-fact; and a Real Estate Mortgage contract over the lot covered by TCT No. 48521 to be executed by "Vida Dana Querrer" and Jennifer Ramirez as mortgagors. Erea and "Vida Dana Querrer" showed to him their respective residence certificates. Mendoza prepared the documents after which the parties affixed their respective signatures above their respective names26and their submarkings on the deeds. The Real Estate Mortgage was filed with the Office of the Register of Deeds and annotated at the dorsal portion of TCT No. 48521 on November 7, 1997.27On April 4, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the defendants and ordered the dismissal of the complaint. The court ruled that, although the plaintiff adduced proof that she owned the property and that her signatures on the Special Power of Attorney and in the Real Estate Mortgage were forged, nevertheless, defendant Erea adduced evidence that she was a mortgagee in good faith. The court declared that the woman who pretended to be the plaintiff and lawful owner of the property had in her possession the original copy of the owners duplicate of title. The defendant thus relied in good faith on the title after ascertaining with the Register of Deeds the identity of Vida Dana Querrer as the registered owner of the property, who turned out to be an impostor. In fact, the defendant still had possession of the owners duplicate of the title when she received the complaint and summons.The court cited the ruling of this Court in Cebu International Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals28and Duran v. Intermediate Appellate Court.29The fallo of the decision reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint filed by plaintiff VIDA DANA QUERRER-KAUFFMAN is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the questioned Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated 1 August 1997 is hereby declared VALID.No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.30Kauffman filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, alleging that the Cebu International Finance Corporation case is not applicable as the facts therein are different. She insisted that Solivel v. Francisco31is the case in point.The RTC denied the motion, prompting Kauffman to file an appeal with the CA where she made the following allegations:ICONSIDERING THAT THE MORTGAGE CONTRACT IN QUESTION WAS EXECUTED AND MADE POSSIBLE THROUGH THE FRAUDULENT MANIPULATION OF AN IMPOSTOR, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT ROSANA EREA WHO ACCEPTED THE MORTGAGE OFFERED BY SAID IMPOSTOR IS A MORTGAGEE IN GOOD FAITH;IITHE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DEED OF MORTGAGE IN QUESTION IS VALID DESPITE ITS OWN FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS OWNED BY THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WHOSE SIGNATURE ON THE DEED WAS FORGED;IIITHE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE JURISPRUDENCE CITED IN ITS APPEALED DECISION AND IN APPLYING THE SAME TO THE CASE AT BAR;IVTHE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE RIGHT OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT ROSANA EREA DERIVED FROM A FORGED MORTGAGE CONTRACT AS AGAINST THE RIGHT OF THE PLAINTIFF, THE PROVEN TRUE OWNER OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, WHO DID NOT IN ANY WAY CONTRIBUTE TO THE COMMISSION OF THE FRAUD.32On June 10, 2004, the CA rendered judgment in favor of Kauffman. It held that in ruling as it did, the RTC disregarded the clear provisions of the Civil Code, particularly Articles 2085 (2)33and 1409 (2)34The appellate court relied on the Courts ruling in Insurance Services & Commercial Traders, Inc. v. Court of Appeals35and ratiocinated, thus:Thus, it has been uniformly held that (I)n a real estate mortgage contract, it is essential that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the property to be mortgaged; otherwise, the mortgage is void. (Robles vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 12309, Mar. 14, 2000). This was simply in line with the basic requirement in our laws that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the property sought to be mortgaged (Lorbes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R No. 139884, Feb. 15, 2001). This is in anticipation of a possible foreclosure sale should the mortgagor default in the payment of the loan, and a foreclosure sale, though essentially a "forced sale," is still a sale in accordance with Art. 1458 of the Civil Code. Being a sale, the rule that the seller must be the owner of the thing sold also applies in a foreclosure sale (Cavite Development Bank vs. Cyrus Lim, G.R. No. 131679, Feb. 1, 2000).36Erea thus filed the instant petition contending that the following legal issues should be resolved:ITHE COURT OF APPEALS HAS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT QUERRER-KAUFFMAN IS THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY MORTGAGED TO PETITIONER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SUCH A CONCLUSION OF FACT.IITHE COURT OF APPEALS HAS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CONTRACT OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE EXECUTED ON 01 AUGUST 1997 BETWEEN ROSANA EREA AND VIDA DANA QUERRER IS A FORGED DEED OF MORTGAGE WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH SUCH FACT.IIITHE COURT OF APPEALS HAS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF A "MORTGAGE IN GOOD FAITH" DOES NOT APPLY TO PETITIONER DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL AND UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE PROVING HER A MORTGAGEE IN GOOD FAITH.37Petitioner avers that respondent failed to prove that she is the owner of the property, and points out that the documentary evidence shows that the negotiator over the property is Vida Dana Querrer and not Vida Dana Querrer-Kaufffman. There is thus no factual basis for the CAs finding that the Real Estate Mortgage was a forged deed. Considering that respondent, as the plaintiff below, failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence that the signature on the Real Estate Mortgage is a forgery, the signature over the printed name in the said document must be the genuine signature of Vida Dana Querrer, the registered owner of the property. Even assuming that respondent was the lawful owner of the property and the signature in the Real Estate Mortgage is a forgery, petitioner insists that she is a mortgagee in good faith as shown by the following facts and circumstances:1. Before the offer of mortgage was accepted by petitioner Rosana Erea, she required the production of the owners copy of TCT No. T-48521. The mortgagee took such step to enable her to know the rights of the mortgagor over the property to be mortgaged. The presentation of the desired certificate was complied with.2. The identity of the mortgagor was ascertained from the personal interview of the relatives of the mortgagor who were the spouses Jennifer and Richmond Ramirez, a known compadre of Angel Jose, the grandson of Socorro Ramos, the aunt of the petitioner. Richmond Ramirez with his wife introduced the mortgagor Vida Dana Querrer as his half-sister who wanted to mortgage the property described in the certificate of title which was registered in her name. The spouses of the mortgagor were accompanied to the house of Rosana Erena by Socorro Ramos, her aunt who acknowledged to know Richmond and Jennifer Ramirez for a period of five years, more or less. Aside from the confirmation of her filial relation to the Ramirez couple by Richmond Ramirez, her personal Identification Card showed the mortgagors name and proved her identity to be Vida Dana Querrer. The Tax Declarations, tax clearance, the owners copy of TCT No. T-48521, police clearance, survey plan attested to the fact that the owner of the property subject of the mortgage was the mortgagor.3. Further examination of the certificate of title in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Las Pias City proved the authenticity of the owners copy of the certificate.4. The actual physical inspection of the house and lot covered by the certificate in the given address for two (2) times, at least by the mortgagor and mortgagee together with Soccoro Ramos, and the Ramirez couple strengthened herreasonable belief in good faiththat the mortgagor is the owner of the property covered by the certificate of title.5. The aforesaid interviews/examination of records, and inspection of the premises showed that earnest and diligent efforts were exerted by the petitioner to ascertain the identity of the mortgagor and her ownership of the subject property. The aforestated steps taken by her are visible proofs of the due diligence exercised by Rosana Erena to ascertain the identity of the mortgagor and respondents capacity to convey the property to her in a contract of mortgage with her.6. Without admitting on the allegation of a forged signature, the established facts showing the exercise of due diligence and reasonable caution observed by petitioner preparatory to the acceptance and execution of the mortgage contract BELIE the accusation of bad faith to her. In truth, petitioner had been reasonably diligent to meet the justification of a mortgagee in good faith.38For her part, respondent avers that, contrary to petitioners claim, the issues raised in the instant petition are factual in nature. Moreover, based on the evidence on record, both the trial and appellate courts are one in declaring that she is the lawful registered owner of the property, and that such findings are conclusive on this Court. Besides, the petitioner is proscribed from assailing the findings of the trial and appellate courts since under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in this Court. She insists that petitioner failed to establish special and important reasons for the Court to exercise its discretion to review the appellate courts decision.The petition has no merit.Indeed, the trial and appellate courts found that respondent, as plaintiff below, adduced clear and convincing evidence that she is the owner of the property and that the signature on the Special Power of Attorney and Real Estate Mortgage are not her genuine signatures. She purchased the property from Edgardo C. Espiritu on June 21, 1997 via a Deed of Absolute Sale,39on the basis of which TCT No. 48521 under her name was issued by the Register of Deeds on June 25, 1997.40Indeed, when respondent and her sister, Evelyn Pares, confronted Mira Bernal (Jennifer Ramirezs aunt), Bernal pleaded for mercy, on bended knees, after admitting that she and Jennifer Ramirez stole the owners duplicate copy of the title and the tax declarations covering the property, the air-conditioning unit, television, and the pieces of jewelry owned by respondent, and, thus, impliedly admitted that they forged the respondents signature on the Real Estate Mortgage:Q Were you able to see Mira in Pasay, in her house?A Yes, Sir. We saw her in Pasay, but in Bian, she suddenly disappeared when we arrived.Q What time did you see Mira in her house in Pasay?A Between 11:00 to 12:00 P.M., Sir.Q But you said you arrived there at 6:00 p.m.?A Yes, Sir.Q You mean you waited?A We waited for her. Dana said, "Mabuti pang ilabas ninyo and mother niyo."ATTY. CABARON:The witness is narrating, Your Honor.ATTY. MASANGKAY:Q So, finally, you were able to talk to Mira in that house?A Yes, Sir.Q How about Jennifer?A No, Sir.Q Alright, what did you ask Mira?A My sister asked Mira who destroyed my vault?Q What was the answer of Mira?A Mira answered, "Why did you not inform that you will be coming?"ATTY. MASANGKAY:Q And then?A Dana said, what I am asking, you better answer.Q What was the answer?A According to her, it was Jennifer.Q It was Jennifer who, what?A She just said Jennifer.Q What about the title?A My sister was asking who destroyed the vault, then Mira answered, it was Jennifer. We did not ask anymore because she continued on talking and she said Jennifer was short of funds.She said, "Nagipit kasi ang bata, naawa ako kaya binigay ko ang titulo.Q And, who is Jennifer? Is this Jennifer the same Jennifer Ramirez who is one of the defendants here?A Yes, Sir.Q Who is she?A According to my sister, she is the daughter of Eduardo Victor.Q What else did she say?WITNESS:AWhen she said that Jennifer took it, Dana looked for jewelries. Then the daughter of Beth said, "Tita Dana, sabi ni Tita Ellen, papalitan niya ang mga alahas na iyon."ATTY. MASANGKAY:Q And finally, what was the statement of Mira with respect to the transaction?A When Dana learned about that, she said, we will file a case against them.Q And so?AMira knelt down and began to cry and was begging.Q What did she say?A She said, "Parang awa mo na sa akin, Dana. Luluhod ako sa harapan niyo, patawarin mo lang kami." She was crying and saying, "Gipit na gipit lang talaga kami. Bigyan mo kami ng konting panahon at ibabalik naming iyon."41The trial courts findings of fact as affirmed by the CA are conclusive on this Court absent evidence that the trial court ignored, misapplied or misconstrued facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the ca