Property Joint Summary, 2017-18Profs. Kirsten Anker, Yaëll Emerich, and Tina Piper

Dear 2Ls,

Can one truly own a baseball that was caught and dropped or perhaps stolen from another’s mit? If I’m hitting you with an old dirty sock that has four dimes in it, whose dimes are they? What on earth is an emphyteusis? Can you say “usufruct” ten times quickly without tripping over your words? If your answer to all these questions was “what the…”, then this summary is for you!

Thank you to the many contributors who made this study tool possible, and a special shout-out to Carolyn Booth for inputting her class notes for the year. As always, I hope this alleviates some stress, or at least gives you the time to eat something healthy, drink a glass of wine, call your mom, or sleep.

We’ve got this,Jessica Cytryn

~

Fall SemesterCLASS 2: Subjects & Objects

[Barrington Walker plenary notes missing]

DG Bell, “Slavery and the Judges of Loyalist New Brunswick” (1982) 31 UNBLJ 9.39] In 1800 and 1805-06, NB Supreme Court reaffirmed the legality of slavery, even though no statutory provisions asserted its legality and so it was a bit of an open (common law) question

- Trend at the time had been to abolition, which NB judges could easily have done- Instead, they broke with dominant British Empire trend to affirm slavery’s legality

40] Natural rights enlightenment theorising, general rise of liberalism, helped bolster arguments that slavery was bad—which was a kind of novel thing as slavery as a practice is really old and widespread - “The combined force of these currents in natural rights theorizing, in economic thought, and in religious outlook was such that by the last third of the eighteenth century the tide of public opinion was perceptibly running against slavery, and especially the slave trade.”43] Upper Canada phased it out through legislation, kind of gradually—in 1793, no new slaves could be created, but those already in it had to live it out43] “In Lower Canada there was also legislative attempt to phase out slavery in 1793, but the bill died on the Table. It was, rather, the firm judicial policy of James Monk, Chief Justice of the King’s Bench in Montreal, which effectively doomed the institution in that colony. In cases in 1798, and, especially, in 1800, Monk denounced slavery and showed that he was determined to free every Black brought before him, in not on a technicality, than on an outright misconstruction of the law.”Nova Scotia judges were more active than legislature in phasing out slavery“Nova Scotia was the only one of the major British North American colonies to give a form of statutory recognition to slavery.”44] In general, lack of statutory recognition of slavery made it a contentious issue at common law—the right to property (I guess) evolved as a common law right, so the exact types of things that count as property were not enumerated in statute but came out of common law

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- So, a person? Do they count…?45] “No statute even recognized or regulated the existence or continuance of slavery in New Brunswick after the province was erected in 1784. This was greatly to the slaves' advantage. It meant New Brunswick's slaves did not suffer some of the disabilities that had prevailed in the old colonies. They could, for example, (at least theoretically) give evidence in court; they could intermarry with whites; they were protected by the same criminal law against murder or bodily harm. More importantly, the lack of legislative recognition meant the slaves' status was ambiguous. If the Nova Scotian judiciary was prepared to overturn slavery in the face of a 1762 local enactment explicitly recognizing it -- if the Lower Canadian judges were prepared to turn their back on generations of local slave holding -- then surely the New Brunswick judges, faced with neither of these impediments, would be prepared to do the same.”Bulk of the article goes into details about the slave cases in NB…pretty interesting but only skimmed them…lots of legal chicanery by both abolitionists and slavers50] Eventually, case decided that supported slavery in NB, a bit win for pro-slave interests50] “There is evidence that slavery continued to exist in the province as late as 1816, when the last advertisement for a slave appeared in the Royal Gazette; and doubtless slaves were held for some time thereafter. It is true that in 1822 the New Brunswick government reported that there were no slaves in the province,55 but this cannot mean more than that there were no notorious instances where the Black's status as a slave was perfectly unambiguous. Indeed, it is difficult to believe there were not still some theoretical slaves in New Brunswick at the time of the Imperial emancipation in the 1830's, although none are known. The situation was probably the same in Nova Scotia and Lower Canada, notwithstanding judicial policy to the contrary.”Chief Justice Ludlow’s rationale to support rights of masters:55] “Our Chief Justice is very strenuous in support of the Masters [sic] right as being founded in immemorial usage and custom in all parts of America ever since its discovery. He contends that customs in all Countries are the foundations of laws and [that from it they] acquire their force…”Summary of arguments shows that a lot of it came down to this question—what was the source of the property right to own a person? Was it some ‘natural law’? customary usage? Ancient statutory law? If something is being done, and legislation regarding it is just absent, what is its legal status?

Patricia J Williams, “Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights” (1987) 22:2 Harvard CR - CLL Rev 401 at 420–22. Excerpt describing personal reaction to discovering possible contract of sale of author’s great-great-grandmother Sophie. Personalizes these issues.But author describes using legal arguments to try and ‘rescue her fate’:

- “Repeatedly since then, I have tried to analyze, rationalize and rescue her fate, employing the tools I learned in law school: adequacy of valuable consideration, defenses to formation, grounds for discharge and remedies (for whom?). That this was to be a deadend undertaking was all too obvious, but it was interesting to see how the other part of my heritage, Austin Miller [Sophie’s owner], the lawyer, and his confreres, had constructed their world so as to nip quests like mine in the bud.”

Moore v Regents, 51 Cal 3d 120 (1990)Facts: M treated for Leukemia. Agrees to get cells removed for treatment. Behind M’s back, Dr. Gold (U) uses the cells to create and patent a cell line and makes huge profits. M sues for conversion.Issue: Did M retain an ownership interest in the excised cells and matter such that he may prosecute U for conversion?Holding: No - action based on a theory of conversion may be prosecuted where the subject matter of the allegation are excised cells taken in the course of a medical treatment; however, an action may be based on theories of breach of fiduciary duty or lack of informed consent.

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Reasoning: M’s claim in conversion amounts to asking for property rights of his own body, since he had no intention of retaining possession of his spleen after surgery. Such a right does not exist under current case law or statutes. The cell lines are “factually and legally distinct from what was taken from M’s body.” Although rights are granted over human tissue, they are either non-property rights or via patents, and M cannot lay claim to the inventive step in the defendant’s patents.Ratio: People do not have property rights in the biological products of their bodies after removal.

Édith Deleury et Dominique Goubau, Le droit des personnes physiques , 5th ed (Cowansville, Qc: Yvon Blais, 2015) at paras 98–105, 143–45.Para 98] Special judicial category for the human body—principle is ‘don’t touch me’, or inviolability of the body• CCQ has a chapter on dead bodies• Thus distinguish between inviolability of the living body and of the corpse• 99] a person is ‘incarnate’ such that they become a ‘objet du droit’• 100] CCQ 10 – “toute personne est inviolable et a droit à son intégrité. Sauf dans les cas prévus par la

loi, nul ne peut lui porter atteinte sans son consentement libre et éclairé. »• link is between the person/personality and the body—that is a legal link…• the right to the body’s inviolability is positioned to protect individual autonomy• 101] this right is not inalienable, however—if public safety or public health are involved it might be

compromised• So like vaccines, e.g. would be contentious• Isolation or incarceration, if you’re a menace and just a really bad dude• 103] whole link between person and body came out of the 19th and 20th centuries, and these bright

philosophes didn’t predict all the organ transplantation and sperm donation and such that we’ve since gotten up to

John Locke, “Of Property” in CB Macpherson, ed, Property: Mainstream and Critical Positions (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978) 17 at paras 26–28.• 26] Earth is there for man’s use• 27] Man has property in his person—and thus his labour is his own as well“Whatsoever then he removes out of the State of Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property.”• Something becomes property when you transform it or remove it, or otherwise mix your labour with it

Margaret Jane Radin, “Property and Personhood” (1982) 34 Stan L Rev 957.Personality basis for property requires objective criteria to tell what is so closely tied to ‘the person’ that it becomes property

o i.e. you can’t just claim that rock is ‘a part of you’ and get property rights over it, you need to rely on objective criteria

Thing is, these objective criteria come from shared understanding—so like many shared subjectivities makes a general objectivity, type deal112] “We must construct sufficiently objective criteria to identify close object relations that should be excluded from recognition as personal property because the particular nature of the relationship works to hinder rather than to support healthy self-constitution.”

- Riiiiiiight…clear as mudThe ‘fetishist’ is someone who so closely identifies with an object that they feel it’s a part of them - We can deny that it’s part of their ‘person’-al property, but still hold that it’s just general property…

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Morris Cohen, “Property and Sovereignty” in CB Macpherson, ed, Property: Mainstream and Critical Positions (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), 155. Radical theories of property: Lots of different strands, all recognize ‘property is power’ in that if you control so much property you get power over other’s livesLike I own the factory, I take on power through my property rights over the workers, etc.

116] “The character of property as sovereign power compelling service and obedience may be obscured for us in a commercial economy by the fiction of the so-called labour contract as a free bargain and by the frequency with which service is rendered indirectly through a money payment. But not only is there actually little freedom to bargain on the part of the steel-worker or miner who needs a job, but in some cases the medieval subject had as much power to bargain when he accepted the sovereignty of his lord.”

JCM v ANA, 2012 BCSC 584Facts: A lesbian couple purchased 13 sperm straws from a US sperm bank. Using this sperm, they conceived two children. The couple later broke up and divided up the assets of their relationship, but inadvertently failed to come to an agreement about the remaining sperm. The applicant, J, later met a new partner and wanted to use the remaining frozen sperm to conceive a child who was biologically related to her previous children. A refused to allow the use and instead asked that the cryopreserved sperm be destroyed. J brought the application seeking a declaration that the sperm was her sole property.Reasoning: (1) the sperm has been treated as property by the parties; (2) the sperm has been purchased; and (3) the moral objections to the commercialization of reproduction or the commoditization of the body were made after significant time had passed.Ratio: A person shall be able to own property even if not entitled to sell it. Sperm straws can be property.

Optional:Neal Ferris, “Between Colonial and Indigenous Archaeologies: Legal and Extra-legal Ownership of the Archaeological Past in North America” (2003) 27 Canadian Journal of Archaeology 154.102 (coursepack)] Topic: who owns native artifacts and remains that are excavated? Who says what can and can’t be excavated?“While the term ‘ownership’ is used here, I don’t mean simply property possession, although that is how archaeological ownership tends to be defined in statute and in discussions about repatriation. Rather, the term is intended to convey privileged access to archaeological remains, privileged ability to interpret the record and write the stories of the past from those remains, and privileged right to speak on behalf of the record.”• Archaeologists kind of viewed themselves as champions of preservation, but ‘native communities’ generally saw them as complicit in the robbing of their sacred sites• 104] “An important revelation at the time was that the Smithsonian Institution held the remains of close to 18,500 Native individuals. Many of these had been collected in the 19th century under orders from the Surgeon General’s office, which had instructed soldiers to dig up Indian burial grounds to recover skulls for phrenological studies (citation omitted).”

CLASS 3: Atikamekw

Atikamekw plenary notesRelations avec le territoire. Très actuel, pas folklorique mais vit des défis dans le contexte contemporain.Brève présentation historique de la nation Atikamekw :César Néwashish – « Jamais céder territoire »STATS: § 96% parle encore la langue Atikamekw – une des langues les plus fortes.

§ 1,4 million d’Autochtones au Canada (4,3% de la pop)§ 100, 000 au QC (autour de 1%)

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§ 90 1ere nations (12 groupes linguistiques)o Au QC : 3 grandes familles linguistiques

§ Atikamekw – de la famille de la langue algonquienne§ Inuits

3 COMMUNAUTÉS ATIKAMEKW: Manawan, Wemotaci, Opitciwan1. Appelés de diff noms (Algonquins, Montagnais etc.)

= Cause prob dans le processus de négociation (institutions étatiques demandent qui sont-ils, existent-ils vraiment?)

2. Réalités diff dans les communautés : Âge médian dans communauté 26 ansCréation du Monde par Charles :Histoire de l’ère glacière8 milles ans, Eaux de mer étaient très élevées, Ont suivi colonie de tortus de mer pcq l’inquiétude était grande – migration de la grande tortue; Allait vers l’est; Peuple n’avait pas encore pris sa forme initiale actuelle; Vision de lumières au loin. L’eau ruisselant et scintillant sur les carapaces de tortues au soleil; Aperçoivent la Kokum : je suis ému lorsque j’en parle, les grand-mères qu’on vénère encore, c’est des relations. Elle fumait assise, et c’était transformé en pierre; Une femme a accouché sur une nouvelle terre léguée au peuple par la Tortue; Le Conseil de Kokum s’est réuni pour discuter de cette nouvelle terre – quelles seront les respo à cette nouvelle terre; Égalité des femmes, important, car en relation avec la terre.; Les kokums décident de remettre à la terre = agriculture = prenaient de l’engagement, une responsabilité à une nouvelle terre, supporter son dvlp. Ajd « on appel ça de l’éco-responsabilité ».; Responsabilité commune à la terre.; Équilibre permet de stabilité une relationHistoires sont importantes – faut réhabilitées, redonnées une place / redéfinir dans le contexte, leur identité, leur droit. « Je suis un homme qui parle et dit vrai. Même si on croque les gens, c’est comme ça qu’on réveille ».Diff langues : son grand-père parlait Abenaki, Atikamekw et une autre langue – bcq de partages, relations. Occupation par toponyme (continue d’avoir leurs noms pour les lieux ajd renommés).

– Maskoc (Mascouche – déformation); Wacreka (Mtl); Lac des Deux Montagnes – traduction de l’Atikamekw); Ka Nictanak; Montagne du Diable (en Atikamekw – Montagne des Esprits).

Organisation Sociale et Territoriale (A) NITASKINAN (l’entité / l’ensemble du territoire Atikamekw Nehirowisiw).§ 8 régions administratives (la Mauricie, Lanaudière, le Saguenay etc.)

§ Territoire permet de découvrir connaissance des grands-pères, savoir familiale, collective ou nationale. Ensemble de toponymie désigne lacs, rivières, sources de portage, sites présents et anciens de rassemblements). Démontre occupation et relations.§ Division en 3 CLANS

o Opitciwan (= courant du détroit, avant la construction du réservoir Gouin)o Wemotaci (= montagne, cite d’observation)o Manawan (bcq de marécage, grands-pères ramassaient des œufs de goélands)

§ 211 activités traditionnelles§ Territoires claniques (à l’intérieur) unités familiaux avec un chef de territoire

RELATIONS INTIMES AVEC LES TERRITOIRES FAMILIALES: – cérémonielles et traditionnelles· Encore actuel – le fait avec ses enfants

o Mais + diff de gérer – braconnage, exploitation forestière – vient chambarder gestion du territoire

§ Est-ce qu’eux-mêmes étiqueté comme braconniers (chasse illégale)? Oui. Mais parvient à revendiquer droits de chasses dans territoires ancestrales. Mais ces terres bcq plus limitée que ce qu’elles étaient.

§ Convention de la Baie James (seul traité de ce type au QC)§ « Négocier de bonne foi, avec respect » « nous on ne comprenait pas, voulait

que le projet arrête» pd la négociation les forestiers / gvn’t continue de dvlp au détriment du peuple.

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§ Idle No more§ Affirmer souveraineté du peuple : langue, culture, territoire non cédé

PLACENTA :· Selon la loi, ne peut pas récupérer le placenta· Femmes se sont fait refuser de rapporter et pouvoir faire cérémonie de l’enterrement

o (+) Lorsque naît avec placenta à la tête = ê spécialo Importance du placenta – comme lien entre les parents et l’enfant / Pour que l’enfant

sache d’où il vient.§ « Utiliser les avocats » / jurisprudence inexistante / mandat au Conseil des

Nations Atikamekw de faire reconnaître ce droit.§ Trouve moyen de lever respo de l’hôpital pour les problèmes potentiels de

ramener le placenta.§ Ajd : placenta reconnu, plus comme un déchet biomédical

ROLE DU CHEF DU TERRITOIRE :· H / F· Rôle de gestionnaire + (assure consultations, examine du terr, maintenir l’activité trad, dirige sa famille en prenant compte de l’état du terr, des ressources, s’assure qu’après chaque activité trad (en moyenne, d’une durée de 7/8 mois) évalue impact, identifie source, quantité et qualité. Doit faire respecter ses pratiques liées au principe du « plan d’occupation et de développement ».· 211 activités : assure mise en application, déroulement etc.

= Système organisationnel (de droit) se basant sur valeurs Atikamekw écologiques, communautaires …= Doit favoriser éducation populaire : des normes et droits autochtonesRESPONSABILITÉ ENVERS LE TERR DE L’ENSEMBLE DES MBMS DE LA FAMILLE

· Terr = lieu de vie· Grande connexion avec le milieu – pas seulement respo / O, mais amour pour le territoire

RELATIONS SPIRITUELLES et CÉRÉMONIES avec le territoire· Spirituel dans def ne répond pas au concept Atikamekw· Cérémonie = expression culturelle – rencontre entre peuple / gens pour discuter des valeurs du domaine sociale = c’est ça l’aspect cérémoniel

o Ex cérémonie du nouveau né, du petit aigle de lumière§ Profond§ Exprime Valeurs et les responsabilités du rôle parental de la mère§ Répond aux besoins du peuple et le rôle du peuple dans l’éducation des

nouveaux nés§ Femmes formulent valeur, def des mots pour la cérémonie, les hommes sont

participants§ L’aspect « lumière » : d’abord l’enfant prend forme, puis au 1er battement du

cœur à la 7e semaine – l’énergie l’anime, la lumière entre, et c’est là qu’il devient humain. La plante ne peut plus ê utilisé pour mettre fin à la vie (// droit sur l’avortement).

o Cérémonie des premiers pas§ Encourager son entrée dans la nature

o Passage de la femme / (le droit de la jeune fille d’être femme)§ Confiant de leur instinct et pulsion – et capable de tempérer ses ardeurs

o Passage à la vie d’homme : 1er gibier / nouveau chasseuro Cérémonie de l’Ours « Nous venons des étoiles »

= EXPRESSIONS CULTURELLES qui doivent être protégées / Q de souveraineté / de reconnaissance- Il y-a-t-il vrm une place pour les autochtones dans un système colonialiste?

RETOUR:● Parler du droit, un peu prisonnier de la langue – diff de traduit / s’exprimer

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● Chaque trad a ses mythes fondateurs● Présentation semblait orientée● Importance lien terre-personne

PENSÉE : Exagère impossibilité de communiquer – le positif de la mise en dialogue.

Ethier, “Pluralisme juridique chez les Atikamekw”Contexte : négociations

§ Diff de revendique des droits terr à l’int de paramètres définis par les institutions étatiques.§ Force Autochtones à traduire leurs rapports au territoire = risques

Démarche d’affirmation identitaire et culturelle inclus§ Souci de transmettre les savoirs reliés à la resposabilité et aux pratiques terr§ = Dvlp d’outils de négociation à partir de propres conceptions / valeurs

« Contemporanéité » (def de Sylvie Poirier [2000]) : « but de reconnaître les dynamismes des ordres juridiques autochtones dans leurs interactions et négociations avec la modernité et les institutions étatiques »Pluralisme juridique :

§ « Espaces de coexistence, de codétermination et aussi de résistance » entre divers ordres juridiques§ Ou encore : relations de « compétition, d’interaction, de négociation et d’isolationnisme »

o = Inclus un processus de négos et de reformulation.§ Se produisant souvent dans un rapport asymétrique

§ Simon Roberts : « il est difficilement concevable de définit le droit en dehors de la définition comprise par les institutions sociales et politiques l’ayant élaboré » / « la trad des univers normatifs non occidentaux vers des catégories occidentales comme le droit peut entraîner la réduction et altération des univers normatifs décrits »§ La MISE EN DIALOGUE (créer le « trait d’union)

o Méthodologie à adopter : 1) documenter ces conceptions locales / 2) définir leur sens à partir des discours / pratiques institutionnelles locaux 3) Ensuite ! on peut penser à les mettre en commun avec d’autres.

§ Incite « à décliner le concept et le domaine du droit, mais aussi ceux du pouvoir de l’autorité et la justice dans leur formation historique et dans leurs pratiques »

· Il y a-t-il des « équivalences fonctionnelles » ?Droits et responsabilités terr nehirowisiwok

§ Partie de famille linguistique algonquienne§ Activité en forêt :

o Règles de conduiteo Rapports sociaux

§ Texte se base sur savoir d'aînés et responsables territoriaux (ka nikaniwitcik)« Droit » / « propriété territoriale --- traduit par ---- concept tiperitamowin

§ = Relation au terr comprenant certains droits et respoo Mais def varie : ex chez chasseurs innus – utilisé pour parler de « l’influence, du

contrôle ou de la maîtrise » = lien directe entre l’influence / maîtrise d’une personne et ses pouvoirs, son autorité ses droits , et ses respo.

o Terme au singulier = « celui qui est à la tête, en avant »§ Ka Nikaniwitc : personne qui connaît le mieux le territoire

· Lancer / approuve invitations à d’autres chasseurs· Voit au partage de la viande chassée· Rôle transmis / transmet aussi son « o nehirowisiwin » (« une

manière d’être et de vivre, ou encore un chemin pour parvenir à la maturité et à l’autonomie »

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o Pouvoir / autorité / responsable se trouve aussi dans les esprits-animaux = sont des tiperitamokw – à la fois responsable, propriétaires, et des perso juridiques

Règles de vivre-ensemble au sein du notcimik :§ Notcimik : + que forêt / terr / aussi « univers de relations intimes et de cohabitations entre les humains et les autres qu’humains »§ Forme langue et identité Nehirowisiwok

o Sur-utilisation du verbe dans les phrases par rapport au français = emphase sur les modes d’existence et sur les relations entretenues entre les choses

o + Distinction grammaticale entre ê animé et inanimé§ Diff entre 2 dépend de relation que le locuteur entretient avec l’objet / ou la

personne§ « Matériaux » réagissent à ceux qui les travaillent / utilisent = font partie des relations sociales.§ Appréciation / reconnaissance envers esprit-maitre de l’animal, mais aussi respo et obligations

o Éthique de respect et de réciprocitéo Contre gaspillage / maltraitance du corps des animauxo Règles sur disposition des ossements des animaux

§ Rupture intergénérationnelle (la motivation des personnes à poursuivre pratiques diff – certains par respect, d’autres parce que les ancêtres le faisaient, d’autres ne les pratique plus).

S’interroge sur enjeux de la traduction :§ Constitutuon du Nitaskinan et du code de pratiques nehirowisiw§ Reconnaissance des droits autochtones dans certains accords d’autonomie gvn’t : Nisga’a et l’Accord inuit – formalisés à même le système juridique canadien = « reconnaissance véritable des ordres juridiques autochtones » limitée.§ Voit en ce moment : « pluralisme juridique intra-étatique » = l’État reconnaît l’existence de divers ordres juridiques en son sein, pourvu qu’ils ne remettent pas en question l’ordre juridique de l’État.

Constitutions étatiques occidentales – basées sur une vision moniste et objective de la nature. Qu’est-ce qui pourrait changer si réellement en dialogue avec droit autochtone ?

Vincent, “Chevauchement territoriaux”Idée de chevauchements = problématique.

o Repose sur l’idée que les territoires ne sont pas délimités avec précision, si bien qu’ils comportent des zones floues.

o Sous-entend que chacun possède des droits identiques aux siens propres sur des terr autres que le sien.

Étudie : Algonquiens au nord du St-Laurent (Innus, Cris, Naskapis, Atikamekw, Algonquins) du XVIIe – XXe siècle.Thèse : Les Algonquiens concevaient leurs territoires comme bien délimités et ne pouvant pas empiéter les uns sur le autres sans suivre certaines règles de droit coutumier.(1) Péages sur les voies commerciales :

o Pratique : exiger des droits de passageso Contrôle de la circulation (Français et autres nations [volonté de conserver rôle

d’intermédiaires])o Tentative de dissuasion (vs Français) – volonté de rester maitre du commerce

o = Capacité d’imposer leurs règles à l’entrée de leurs territoires(2) L’existence de limites territoriales :

o (A) XVIIe Siècle :o Ex Hurons : Bien obtenues (en échange, aux bornes de péage etc.) = réserve = comme

un taxe dont le produit servait au bien de la collectivité (ex pour éviter la guerre ou pour d’autres services du public).

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o Écrits montrent : avait pas le droit de circuler sans autorisation sur le terr d’autrui = fondement politique

o Chez les Montagnais : coutume de l’hospitalité et du partage :il y avait une transgression des limites du terr en cas de nécessité (ex affamés, inondations etc.).

o (B) XVII et XIXo Cris de la Baie James : transgressions terr soulève indignation et plutôt rare.

§ Le fait que l’intrusion est illégale suppose qu’il existait des droits exclusifs de chasser ou de faire du piégeage sur un territoire déterminé.

§ Chasse sur territoire voisin sans autorisation – considéré comme un vol.§ Entre nation, certaines circonstances permettaient aux membres de la nation de

voyager entre territoires familiauxo Innus : limites déterminées par rivière, lac, ligne de crêt d’une région montagneuse =

limites précises.§ + Connaissances géographiques considérables

· Capable de délimiter limites des bandes et des territoires familiaux· Système de transmission et d’attribution (héritage, obtention d’un

titre).· + Obligation d’échange d’info (ex où passerait l’hiver etc.).· Conventions entre familles sont actualisés : dépend de

l’appartenance territoriale et des circonstances écologiques (feux de forêt, végétation / faune insuffisante) = préoccupation importante pour éviter des chevauchements (mais peut accueillir autres familles en temps de nécessité).

· Cris se perdaient en territoire innu.§ Preuves que Innus connaissaient les limites de leurs territoires et des autres

bandes voisines.§ Transgression = délit

o = Nations se représentent leur territoire et possède des règles de partage = relations peuvent pas être expliquées par notion de « chevauchements »

(3) Des frontières de contact et qui comportent des règles :o Frontières prenant diff formes :

o Règle d’entraide / partage : frontières ouvertes en cas de nécessité (ex inondations).o Devoir de protéger la vie : obligation d’hospitalité : chef du terr ou maître doit

accorder possibilité de pêcher/ chasser à un groupe pour leur subsistance, mais permet pas d'installation à long terme sans autorisation.

o Droit d’exploiter le territoire si possède des liens familiaux ou d’amitié.o = Activités de « bon voisinage », pas « chevauchements » = frontières ni complètement ouvertes, ni complètement fermées.

(4) Les règles imposées par les gvn’to (A) « Chevauchements » entre terr Cri et Innu

o Convention de la Baie James et du Nord québécois (1975)o Cris avaient prévenu les gvn’t que l’entente incluait terr de d’autres nations et que

d’autres groupes avaient des droits aux territoires.o Revendication des Innuso = Gvn’t déclarent droits des tiers comme éteints en l’absence de ces derniers…

§ Crée idée de chevauchements, mais preuve montre qu’il n’y avait pas de zones de chevauchement entre Cris et Innus (ils possèdent certains droits (ex en tant qu’ invités ou visiteurs) dans le terr de l’autre – mais pas leur terr).

§ = Frustration des Innus qui se sentent dépossédés d’un partie de leur terr.o (B) « Chevauchements » entre les terr des communautés innues :

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o Pour demande de reconnaissance des droits ancestraux, nation doit fournir une carte indiquant l’étendue de leurs territoires :

o Diff : carte inclut parfois + que terr traditionnels et inclut ex régions parcourues et visitées

o Mais carte ne prenne pas compte de ce système de répartition des terres : ce sont des cartes politiques

§ Ex idée de terr traditionnel et de terr parcouru (tous deux donnant naissance à certains droits)

o Donnent naissance à « chevauchements » Conclusion: Pour Innus et d’autres nations algonquiennes : existe un droit minimal, prioritaire et temporaire d’accès et de prélèvement de certaines ressources à certaines conditions (ex en pour leur survie) et de d’autre par, la gestion spécialisée et presque exclusive d’autres ressources (droit limité, doit obtenir l'autorisation, souvent non-permanente).

CLASS 4: Animals

Leffers c Da Silva, 2001 QCCQFacts: L has a cat that gets really badly injured by D’s negligently unsupervised St Bernard dog. Takes the cat to a vet, spends $863 for its care, but eventually it dies.Issue: How much does D owe L? Should the calculation be done as though the cat was like any other piece of property?Holding: D only owes L the cat’s cost of purchase. Yes.Reasoning: Consider the cat like the loss of a commercial object, not as a human being.Cats can be purchased, owned by people, can be transferred like an object. Calculate the value as though it’s a commercial object, so the price paid for the cat counts in the computation of damages.The medical expenses were a voluntary expense. Different from human life, which is priceless. Price paid for the cat is the only real, evaluable expense.Ratio: For the purpose of calculating damages, animals are treated as commercial objects. Expenses undertaken for their care are not recoverable.

A c D, 2003 QCCSFacts: In his will, a man asks for several conditions, incl. the shared custody of a parrot.Reasoning: The court refused to address this claim in terms of the rules governing the custody of a child, as a parrot is not a person. However, a parrot is not like a piece of furniture, and therefore falls outside the scope of CCQ Art. 401.

Pettingale v Pettingale, 1842 11 LJ Ch 176Facts: An executor was paid 50 pounds a month for a mare’s upkeep via a will. Can he use the surplus (ie what’s not needed to care for the horse)? Reasoning: Yes (but...). A gift to an animal is valid/enforceable. The man can use the surplus, but must provide information as to the quality of the mare’s upkeep which if insufficient may require further spending on his part.

J… L… c Coopérative de l’Ébène et Régie du logement, 2004 Chicoutimi QCCQ

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Facts: J is living in a cooperative (C). One stipulation to live in the C is that no animals may live on the premises. A tenant’s child has behavioural problems and a psychologist recommends pet therapy. A small cat is declawed, vaccinated, and castrated, and helps the child in several ways. C moves to enforce the prohibition clause.Reasoning: The court found that the enforcement of the clause is unreasonable in the circumstances, as it would deprive the child of necessary care. Rouleau, J: “One must make a distinction between a cat that never goes out of his master’s apartment and a 35-kilo killer who would haunt the common spaces.” The court reduces the obligation by suspending the effect of the prohibition on animals during the duration of the treatment in pet therapy with the aid of the cat.

Sue Donaldson & Will Kymlicka, Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at ch 5.Domestic Animal Citizenship, Rethinking CitizenshipCan animals be citizens?

➢ Citizenship involves not just a list of rights or entitlements, but also an ongoing role as a co-creator of the community. Such an active role clearly requires certain capacities :

■ (i) the capacity to have a subjective good, and to communicate it; ■ (ii) the capacity to comply with social norms/cooperation; ■ (iii) the capacity to participate in the co-authoring of laws.

The authors dispute the facts that these capacities are often interpreted in highly intellectualist or rationalist ways, which results in the fact that animals seem incapable of being citizens ; in these conditions, a large numbers of human beings would also be excluded: children, the mentally disabled, people with dementia, and those who are temporarily incompetent due to illness or injury.The disability movement has reconceived how these capacities can sustain the recognition and exercise of citizenship (e.g., how those with mental disabilities can enact their citizenship, at least under appropriate conditions). This impacts on animal case.

■ The idea of trust-based ‘dependent agency’: even the severely cognitively disabled have the capacity for agency, but it is agency that is exercised in and through relations with particular others in whom they trust, and who have the skills and knowledge needed to recognize and assist the expression of agency.

■ Domesticated animals are capable of forming relations with humans that allow them to manifest a subjective good, to cooperate, and to participate-in short, to be citizens = for domesticated animals, citizenship is possible and morally required.

○ the animal species that were historically selected for domestication were picked precisely because they possessed these competences.

■ For non-domesticated animals, whether living in the wild or amongst us in the liminal zone, we need to find alternative ways of recognizing their rights and interests other than by according them citizenship.

Having and Expressing a Subjective Good● Anyone who has lived with a domesticated animal knows that they have preferences, interests,

and desires, and that they communicate these in a variety of intentional ways.● Capacity of agency : ● Dogs have individual preferences about food and (to varying degrees) the competence to make

choices based on their preferences.● Farm animals are also capable of expressing their subjective good.

○ For many years we have noticed that if you give cows the opportunity and the time to choose between several alternatives-for instance between staying outside or coming in for shelter, or walking on grass or on straw or concrete, or a choice of diet-then they will choose what is best for them and they will not all choose the same thing . . .

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○ Domesticated animals are dependent on humans to establish a basic framework of security and comfort for them. With this framework in place, they are capable of exercising agency in many areas of their lives, either directly (as when the cows choose which plants they need to eat), or through supported agency.

Political Participation● For the disabled :assent is reconceived in terms of the continuation of an ongoing relationship of

trust, rather than a fixed-in-time agreement.○ Disabled people: ont été réintégré dans la société après avoir été cachés dans des

institutions. Leurs droits se développent depuis. ● La réintégration des animaux dans les espaces urbains (parc à chiens, poules urbaines, chiens

Mira, etc.) assure une présence and “sheer presence in society constitutes a form of participation”● Protest and dissent :

○ Chevaux de labeur et animaux de zoo (primates, dauphins, etc.)...■ Authorities are well aware that public support for their institutions would be

undermined by revelations that animals are desperate to escape their situation, and engaged in active resistance (Hribal 2010).

Cooperation, Self-Regulation, and Reciprocity- In much of the animal advocacy literature, it is assumed that animals are moral patients (the

objects of moral action by humans), and never moral agents themselves. So we tend to dismiss a lot of their behaviour as blind instinct (a drive to dominate, or to reproduce), when in fact it reflects a process of conscious learning, negotiating, and developing social norms.

- Recent findings in the science of animal behaviour show that animals experience a wide range of emotions, and exhibit a range of moral behaviours such as empathy, trust, altruism, reciprocity, and a sense of fair play + The existence of cooperative and altruistic behaviour amongst animals.

- + Reciprocal altruism and aversion to inequity among primates- It is not just dogs and cats who recognize that they are part of a cooperative community with

humans (and each other). Most domesticated animals know to seek out humans for help, either for themselves or for others.

- Young describes several instances in which cows, anticipating a difficult birth, or concerned for the welfare of another cow, sought human assistance (Young 2003).

- It’s not simply that these animals have special innate capacities (though that is no doubt part of the equation), but that their human companions are prepared to enable the development of these capacities.

- How many animals are capable of this kind of self-regulation and negotiation of cooperative life? We can’t answer that question, since we’ve only just begun to ask it. There is enormous uncharted territory here once we recognize domesticated animals as our fellow citizens, rather than chattels, slaves, or alien intruders.

As Smuts says, subjectivity/ personhood is not a capacity we can either ‘discover’ or ‘fail to find’ in another, but rather, a way of ‘being in relation’ with others. So we must keep an open mind about the potential scope of animal agency, recognizing that it will always be highly variable, and dependent on individual, contextual, and structural factors.

R v Krajnc, 2017 ONCJ 281Facts: Krajinc charged with mischief to property under the criminal code meaning she : obstructed, interrupted or interferes with the lawful use, enjoyment or operation of property. Krajinc had been offering water to pigs in a slaughterhouse truck while it was stopped. She tried to defend herself by arguing that pigs are not property.Reasoning: The court rejects an “expert’s” argument about pig personhood, but does not define personhood (ie I don’t think this case shuts the door on a future argument). The judge simply notes pigs,

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like pets, are considered property. Note Krajinc ws ultimately acquitted, because her action was not seen as mischief against property (offering the pigs water did not meaningfully effect the owner’s enjoyment of property).

Paul Nadasdy, “The Gift in the Animal: The Ontology of Hunting and Human-Animal Sociality” (2007) 34:1 American Ethnologist 25.1.The gift in the animal(1) A positive principle of reciprocity● By accepting the gifts animals make of their own bodies, hunters incur a spiritual debt that they must

repay through the observance of a whole series of different ritual attitudes and practices. These ideas continue to structure Kluane people’s lives in important ways

(2) A negative principle of domination● Kluane people regularly talk about animals as creatures who have to be overcome and/or outsmarted,

and they revel in stories that recount a battle of wits between hunter and animal2. Animal gifts: real or metaphor?● Anthropologists tended to take either a functionalist ecological or a symbolic approach to the study of

human–animal relations.➢ Those taking the former approach tended to view animals as purely biological organisms whose

relationship to humans was composed entirely of their ability to help humans meet their subsistence needs, whereas those subscribing to the latter approach viewed animals primarily as symbols whose value lies in their usefulness to people as metaphors for thinking about human society.

● Anthropologists are reluctant to accept the notion that humans and animals might actually engage in social relations with one another.

3. Human-animal society● Scott argues that Cree concepts of animals as sentient persons is not only of practical value to them in

the hunt, but that this view has “oriented [them] to aspects of animal behavior that Western science, inured by Cartesian metaphors of mechanical nature, has admitted rather belatedly”

[Movie: Up for Grabs notes missing]

CLASS 5: Possession and its Consequences

Articles 911, 921–933 du Code civil du Québec . CHAPTER III PROPERTY IN RELATION TO PERSONS HAVING RIGHTS IN IT OR POSSESSION OF IT 911. A person, alone or with others, may hold a right of ownership or other real right in property, or have possession of the property. A person also may hold or administer the property of others or be trustee of property appropriated to a particular purpose. CHAPTER IV: CERTAIN DE FACTO RELATIONSHIPS CONCERNING PROPERTY DIVISION I: POSSESSION § 1.  —  The nature of possession 921. Possession is the exercise in fact, by a person himself or by another person having detention of the property, of a real right, with the intention of acting as the holder of that right. The intention is presumed. Where it is lacking, there is merely detention. 922. Only peaceful, continuous, public and unequivocal possession produces effects in law. 923. A person having begun to detain property on behalf of another or with acknowledgement of superior domain is presumed to continue to detain it in that quality unless interversion of title is proved on the basis of unequivocal facts.

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924. Merely facultative acts or acts of sufferance do not found possession. 925. The present possessor is presumed to have been in continuous possession from the time he came into possession; he may join his possession to that of his predecessors in title. Possession is continuous even if its exercise is temporarily prevented or interrupted. 926. Defective possession begins to produce effects only from the time the defect ceases. Successors by whatever title do not suffer from defects in the possession of their predecessor. 927. No thief, receiver of stolen goods or defrauder may invoke the effects of possession, but his successors by whatever title may do so if they were unaware of the defect. § 2.  —  Effects of possession 928. A possessor is presumed to hold the real right he is exercising. A person contesting that presumption has the burden of proving his own right and, as the case may be, that the possessor has no title, a defective title, or defective possession. 929. A possessor in continuous possession for more than a year has a right of action against any person who disturbs his possession or dispossesses him, in order to put an end to the disturbance or be put back into possession. 930. Possession vests the possessor with the real right he is exercising if he complies with the rules on prescription. 931. A possessor in good faith need not render account of the fruits and revenues of the property, and he bears the costs he incurred to produce them. A possessor in bad faith shall, after compensating for the costs, remit the fruits and revenues from the day he began to be in bad faith. 932. A possessor is in good faith if, when his possession begins, he is justified in believing he holds the real right he is exercising. His good faith ceases from the time his lack of title or the defects of his possession or title are notified to him by a civil proceeding. 933. A possessor may be reimbursed or indemnified, in accordance with the rules in the chapter on accession, for the constructions, plantations and works he has made.

Jean Carbonnier, Droit civil: Les biens , t 3 (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2000) at para 118. Possession and property are not legal synonyms● Property is the right, possession is the fact (possession is also called “the shadow of property”)Possession is the physical power exercised over a thing, whether or not that physical power (of fact) coincides with the legal power (of right) known as propertyIt is significantly easier to demonstrate possession than ownershipCases of possession without ownership include:● Thieves after stealing an object● A farmer who uses their neighbor’s yard for many yearsSomeone who buys an item from another who isn’t the owner

Carol M Rose, “Possession as the Origin of Property” (1985) 52:1 U Chicago L Rev 73.Any chain of ownership or title must have a first link. Someone had to do something to anchor that link. The law tells us what steps we must follow to obtain ownership of things, but we need a theory that tells us why these steps should do the job.1. John Locke's view = "the standard bourgeois theory" or the labor theory : an original owner is

one who mixes his or her labor with a thing and, by commingling that labor with the thing, establishes ownership of it.

○ Problème avec cette théorie : ○ not self-evident that one owns even the labor that is mixed with something else. ○ even if one does own the labor that one performs, the labor theory provides no guidance in

determining the scope of the right that one establishes by mixing one's labor with something else.

2. A number of thinkers more or less contemporary to Locke : “consent” theory

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○ the original owner got title through the consent of the rest of humanity ○ Problème : "administrative costs." How does everyone get together to consent to the division

of things among individuals?3. The common law approach :

○ possession or "occupancy" is the origin of property : ○ Maxim of the common law: first possession is the root of title○ Beaucoup de cours ont statué sur la possession (animaux sauvages capturés, trésors enfouis,

pétrole, ressources naturelles, etc.)○ Pierson v. Post : cas du Moyen-âge : deux chasseurs se chicanent la propriété d’un renard

tué : qui le possède ? celui qui le chassait ou l’autre qui l’a tué alors que l’autre le chassait? La cour a statué que c’était celui qui l’a tué. Dissidence : cela devrait être tranché par des pairs chasseurs.

■ Pierson thus presents two great principles, seemingly at odds, for defining possession: (1) notice to the world through a clear act (la mort du renard), and (2) reward to useful labor.

Suite de l’approche de la CMLThe clear-act principle suggests that the common law defines acts of possession as some kind of statement the acts must be a declaration of one's intent to appropriate.

● Brumagim v. Bradshaw : chicane sur qui possède une terre. L’un d’eux a fait des travaux sur la propriété (clôture, etc.). The court ruled that the jury should decide whether Treat's acts gave sufficient notice to the public that he had appropriated the property.n27 If so, he had "possessed" it and could pass it on as an owner.

○ This instruction would seem to come down clearly on the side of the "clear act" theory of possession.

○ Suitable use is also a form of noticeCML : Possession now begins to look even more like something that requires a kind of communication, and the original claim to the property looks like a kind of speech, with the audience composed of all others who might be interested in claiming the object in question. Adverse possession is a common law interpretation of statutes of limitation for actions to recover real property● The doctrine of adverse possession operates to transfer property to one who is initially a

trespasser if the trespasser's presence is open to everyone, lasts continuously for a given period of time, and if the title owner takes no action to get rid of him during that time.

○ No matter how much the doctrine of adverse possession seems to reward the one who performs useful labor on land at the expense of the lazy owner who does nothing, the crucial element in all these situations is, once again, communication. "Possession" means acts that "'apprise the community[,] ... arrest attention, and put others claiming title upon inquiry.

○ The possibility of transferring titles through adverse possession once again serves to ensure that members of the public can rely upon their own reasonable perceptions, and an owner who fails to correct misleading appearances (par exemple s’il ne fait payer ses taxes de proprio par un tiers) may find his title lost to one who speaks loudly and clearly, though erroneously.

Why is it so important that property owners make and keep their communications clear? Economists: clear titles facilitate trade and minimize resource-wasting conflict

● "acts of possession" are, in the now fashionable term, a "text," and that the common law rewards the author of that text. But, as students of hermeneutics know, the clearest text may have ambiguous subtexts.

● Some objects of property claims do seem inherently incapable of clear demarcation—ideas, for example

○ In order to establish ownership of such disembodied items we find it necessary to translate the property claims into sets of secondary symbols that our culture understands.

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In patent and copyright law, for example, one establishes an entitlement to the expression of an idea by translating it into a written document and going through a registration process.

In defining the acts of possession that make up a claim to property, the law not only rewards the author of the "text"; it also puts an imprimatur on a particular symbolic system and on the audience that uses this system. Audiences that do not understand or accept the symbols out of luck.

● even under the majority's rule, the definition of first possession depended on a particular audience and its chosen symbolic context; some audiences win, others lose.

Exemple historique notoire : Johnson v. McIntosh :a John Marshall opinion concerning the validity of opposing claims to land in what is now a large part of Illinois and Indiana. The plaintiffs in this case claimed through Indian tribes, on the basis of deeds made out in the 1770’s; the defendants claimed under titles that came from the United States.n50 The Court found for the defendants, holding that the claims through the Indians were invalid, for reasons derived largely from international law rather than from the law of first possession. The Indians, according to an argument of the claimants from the United States, could not have passed title to the opposing side's predecessors because, "[b]y the law of nature," the Indians themselves had never done acts on the land sufficient to establish property in it. That is to say, the Indians had never really undertaken those acts of possession that give rise to a property right.Core principles in CMLPossession as the basis of property ownership, then, seems to amount to something like yelling loudly enough to all who may be interested. The first to say, "This is mine," in a way that the public understands, gets the prize, and the law will help him keep it against someone else who says, "No, it is mine." But if the original communicator dallies too long and allows the public to believe the interloper, he will find that the interloper has stepped into his shoes and has become the owner.Common law of first possession, in rewarding the one who communicates a claim, does reward useful labor; useful labor is the very act of speaking clearly and distinctly about one's claims to property. Perhaps the deepest aspect of the common law text of possession lies in the attitude that this text strikes with respect to the relationship between human beings and nature. At least some Indians professed bewilderment at the concept of owning the land. Indeed they prided themselves on not marking the land but rather on moving lightly through it, living with the land and with its creatures as members of the same family rather than as strangers who visited only to conquer the objects of nature. n59

The doctrine of first possession, quite to the contrary, reflects the attitude that human beings are outsiders to nature. It gives the earth and its creatures over to those who mark them so clearly as to transform them, so that no one else will mistake them for unsubdued nature.

Use: fondements de la conception de la propriété en CML!

Pierson v Post, Caines Reports 175 (N.Y. Supreme Court, 1805)Facts: Post was pursuing a fox. Pierson intervened, killed the fox, and retained possession of it.Issue: Whether Post, by the pursuit of the fox, acquired such a right to, or property in, the fox, and if such right is sufficient to sustain an action against Pierson for killing and taking him away. Has Post established by his chase the right to or property in the wild fox?Holding: No.Reasoning: It is agreed that wild beasts are not the property of anyone and are claimed by occupancy. Thus, we ask what acts amount to occupancy. Ancient writers were unanimous pursuit alone gives no rights, and only actual possession of the carcass counts. To ensure certainty of rights, & avoid useless quarrels, this approach should be used. Pierson gets the fox.Dissent: This dispute should never have been submitted to trial, but rather settled according to the custom and usage of huntsmen. Policy reasons suggest that fox hunts should be encouraged. Thus, a broader

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definition of occupation is appropriate – Livingston chooses “reasonable chance of capture” as his standard for possession. Post had such a chance here. Fox to Post.Ratio: (1) Occupancy occurs when a hunter has “so wounded, circumvented or ensnared” the animal that it has been deprived of its natural liberty. (2) Mere pursuit is not enough to found possession. Note that the judges look at various authorities’ definition of hunting possession (with the exception of Blackstone, all are drawn from the Civilian tradition!). The general common law approach is to look at how a reasonable person in that field would interpret possession

Clift v Kane (1870), 5 Nfld. L.R. 327Facts: P killed and marked 1000 seals worked to bring them on boat. Weather pushed them towards D. P brought some more on boat, but stopped after while assuming D had already gotten them all.Issue: (1) Is killing and marking a wild animal sufficient to give you a property right in it? (2) If so, can an accident beyond your control deprive you of this right?Holding: P wonReasoning: (1) Killing and marking is indisputable evidence of absolute property. Like all Chattel: Seals are like any other chattel. Killing and seizure sufficient: There is no need for "the power of ongoing possession". (2) Right of Recovery: One of the rights of property is the right of recovery against third parties if they obtain that property without owner's consent. Lose thing not right: There is no authority that says if you lose a thing you lose a right to it too. Ownership Until Abandonment: One owns something until such time as he does an act which shows an intention to abandon it (2 BL p.9 & 1 St. Co. P.149).Basic Principles: Unlike past cases, this case does not turn on whether P would have been able to recover without interference of D.Public Policy Concerns: To rule that D acquired a right would promote seal-fisherman taking from each other.Ratio: (1) Killing and marking manifest control and therefore vest an absolute property right.(2) This entitles owners to maintain right short of an act to abandon.Rights in abandoned property; killing AND seizing =possessionNote: The dissent:This ruling contradicts precedent in this area showing that a reasonable prospect of capture is required. It relies on a number of erroneous equivocations between wild and domestic chattel, land and sea environments. If these differences are respected what emerges is a qualified right that the circumstances of nature can overturn.

Tremblay c Boivin, [1960] CS 235Facts: T shot and killed a moose on land owned by B. B arrived and claimed the moose carcass on two grounds: firstly, because it was killed on his territory, and secondly since he claimed to have inflicted a mortal wound on it earlier, so T’s shots did not really kill the animal. Ballistics evidence indicated that the moose had been shot by B a mile and a half away from the site at which T killed it.Issue: Who does the moose belong to?Holding: Tremblay.The plaintiff hunters are deemed to have taken possession of the moose and are awarded $325 together. Note that this is much less than they requested and that the Court refused granting damages for the claimed items related to moral losses (ie loss of pleasure while hunting).Reasoning: All wild animals are “biens sans maître” that can be claimed via occupation. The land on which they happen to be found is irrelevant, since ownership of the land does not grant ownership of the

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animals on the land. “… le gibier, tant qu’il est en liberté, n’est pas la propriété de personne.” Thus, B’s claim on the basis of territoriality must fail. Wild animals are occupied by the first person to exercise clear physical control over them. In this case it was T, because even if B shot the moose first, the wound was clearly not fatal, since the moose walked for a mile and a half before being killed by T. T was also the first party to exercise physical control over the carcass, since he and his friends were busy butchering the moose when B found them. Thus, T is the owner of the moose carcass by occupation.Ratio: Occupation concerns the factual issue of physical control over the bien/chose; other factors are not important.Comments: Owning land, or the rights to hunt on land, does not confer ownership over wild animals thereon. Occupation confers ownership as reward for work; it’s for the common good that someone possess res nullius and derive benefit. Can be compared to claims of New France regarding “occupation of Canada from Natives.” Implies that land was vacant, res nullius because Natives not considered political actors. Rewarding colonizers for their ‘work’.

The Tubantia [1924] All ER 615 (Pr & Ad Div)Facts: A ship sunk in the North Sea. It was thought to have treasure in its hull. The plaintiffs (first salvage company, moderately equipped to perform to the salvage) were undertaking a salvage operation and had performed some limited work due to inclement weather. They did however, mark out the area, moored crafts, set up devices for divers to work, etc. when the defendants (second salvage company, better equipped) came along, interfered with the devices of the 1 st ship and started their own salvage operation. Plaintiffs assert possessory rights over the wreck and complain of trespass and wrongful interference by defendants.Issue: (1) Do the plaintiffs have a valid legal possession of the Tubantia? (2) How do you possess something that is so unpossessable? Holding: (1) Yes. (2) 4 Requirements.Reasoning: Since the plaintiffs did everything a reasonable person could do and it was obvious they had the intention of working on the ship as a whole, they have a valid possessory claim over it. Also, the defendants intentionally hampered with P’s moorings and work.Maj (Sir Henry Duke): Does the Plaintiff exhibited the elements of possession (what a reasonable and prudent owner would do)? Physical control of the wreck (use and occupation) [YES]; Occupation sufficient for exclusion (power to exclude) [YES] (Merrill); Animus possidendi (where the person in custody of the property knows and intends that he is holding the property for his own benefit) [YES]; Treated the wreck as owners would [YES]; Finding the wreck incapable of possession would be unfortunate and discourage salvage efforts of great public importance.Ratio: (1) Possession is defined contextually and has many elements. (2) Evidence of what constitutes possession can be derived from customary/expert norms.Comments: Other party at dive site demonstrates Bad faith. This case is about Elements of Possession – how to possess something that is hard to possess.

Giroux c Sivret, [1997] RDI 163 (CA)Facts: G bought land and S built a cottage. They occupied it together. Stopped living together. G continued to live in cottage, changed locks. S asking for access to land so that he may continue to exercise his possession on the cottage (he had built it).Issue: S trying to recover his property, having been denied access to the cottage by G.Reasoning: Doctrine and jurisprudence require peaceful, continuous, public, and unequivocal for a year and a day (929) prior to the troubles re: possession. Joint possession didn’t count because needed to be

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unequivocal (i.e. exclusive). Can’t show actual useful possession of the cottage on part of S. So, request should be rejected.Ratio: Possession for a year gives you rights against people who disturb your possession (929). Possession must be peaceful, continuous, public, and unequivocal to produce legal effects (921).

Popov v Hayashi (unreported) California Supreme Court 18 December 2002Facts: Popov caught Barry Bonds' 73 HR ball. Others piled on him. Hayashi recovered the ball. Reasoning: Popov never unambiguously possessed the ball, however, it seems but for violence against him he would have. Hayashi unambiguously possessed the ball. Therefore for policy reasons (not encouraging violence) a fifty-fifty split was ordered.

Herman Melville, Moby Dick (Boston: Simonds, 1922) at 372–75, ch 89. A “fast fish” (whale: FYI, there’s a fascinating excerpt in Moby Dick in which Ishmael tries to argue that whales are fishes) is a whale fastened to a boat. That whale belongs to the owner of the boat. A “loose fish” is not tied to a boat and is anyone’s game

CLASS 6: Possession - Finders, Prescription Acquisitive

Articles 916, 2875, 2876, 2910–2920 du Code civil du Québec . 916. Property is acquired by contract, succession, occupation, prescription, accession or any other mode provided by law. No one may appropriate property of the State for himself by occupation, prescription or accession except property the State has acquired by succession, vacancy or confiscation, so long as it has not been mingled with its other property. Nor may anyone acquire for himself property of legal persons established in the public interest that is appropriated to public utility. 2875. Prescription is a means of acquiring or of being released by the lapse of time and according to the conditions determined by law: prescription is called acquisitive in the first case and extinctive in the second. 2876. That which is not an object of commerce, is non-transferable or is inappropriable, by reason of its nature or the purpose to which it has been appropriated, cannot be prescribed.

Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 154.Europeans established their rights over a territory through symbolic gestures, which differed from one nation to another.The English did not have ceremonies or statements (like erecting a cross). Instead, they used mundane activities to communicate and establish their rights over land. They built homes and other permanent items on the land (hedges, fences), which acted as symbols of permanence and stability. Such acts also served to confer individuals legal rights of ownership over the land, which were confirmed through government surveys. Practice of deploying physical objects to establish title was unique to English law.They could also establish rights over the property by simply using it (agriculture or raising animals). One of the most common practices was planting a garden and enclosing it as a means of establishing “actual possession" by separating the “wild” from the “cultivated.”Native American traditions did not enclose their land, did not have any tame cattle on their land, did not have permanent habitations. Therefore, English settled deemed that they never had possession, thus describing the land as “vacant” and justifying settlement. They considered that the Native Americans never had full dominion of the territory.

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The difference in how English and the Native American people see the “clear act” of establishing possession shows how the nature of this “clear act” necessarily requires compatible languages and understandings: “clarity depends not on the action, but on the community of interpreters.”

Boivin c Québec (PG), [2000] RJQ 687 (CA)Facts: B went on a diving expedition with friends and five bars of gold. They handed them to the police, who were unable to find the owners, and returned them to B et al. QC claims the gold is a treasure and given that they owned the lake in which it was found, they are entitled to half of the value. B claims the gold bars were abandoned and that he and his friends are entitled to the full value. The trial judge considered the gold to be treasure and split its value between the finders and QC. B appealed.Issue: Is B entitled to the entire value of the gold?Holding: Yes. Evidence suggests they were abandoned and not put there as treasure.Reasoning: Appeal Courts can only pronounce themselves on errors of law (manifest, unreasonable and determinative), not of fact. This case is a question of law, because the question based on the legal conclusions made based on presumptions made regarding the initial facts, not about the facts.The lower court judge based his conclusion that this was treasure on the assumption that no reasonable person would simply abandon gold. The QCCA disagrees. It is more plausible that these were forgotten or abandoned goods.¶938 outlines that a treasure belongs to the person who discovers it unless it is found on the property of another, in which case they must split the revenue with the owner of the land where it was found. However, the definition of “treasure” is not established.¶941 and ¶942 establish that movable property that has been lost or forgotten on public land continues to belong to the owner, but can be prescribed to the new holder.Whether something is treasure or abandoned goods depends on the intention of the possessor (i.e. whether they intended on retrieving it later or not). Abandonment of goods involves an intention to give them up, while treasure involves the intention to retrieve them later (whether it was caché ou enfoui).The trial judge rejected the hypothesis that the gold was abandoned based on its value (over 80,000$) and assumed that no reasonable person would imply abandon this; rather, they would come back and look for the goods later to retrieve them. He did not consider that the dimensions of these goods (very small) suggest that they were intentionally thrown away, which is a theory supported by the fact that each bar was found about 1.5 km away from the other (“4 separate treasures”).Moreover, the case had been heavily addressed by the media, and no one came forward to claim the goods. They were identifiable goods and someone would have recognized them if they were theirs and they wanted to retrieve them. They were clearly put there by someone and evidence suggests they were not intended to be retrieved.Ratio: The rights to abandoned property (i.e. goods that one can reasonably conclude based on the facts were left with no intention of being retrieved) are prescribed solely to those who find it, even when it is found on the land of another.

Malette c Sureté du Québec, [1994] RJQ 2963 (CS)Facts: M found around 20,000$. He called the police to try to find the real owner, but it was never reclaimed.Issue: Is M entitled to the 20 000$?Holding: Yes.Reasoning: The Code establishes two types of “vacant goods” (biens vacants): those without an owner (biens sans propriétaires, ¶934) and those forgotten or lost (biens perdus ou oubliés – defined through doctrine, not the CcQ). Goods without owners include wild animals and abandoned goods (i.e. movables

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of slight value or in a very deteriorated condition left in a public place). Pursuant to ¶935, they can be immediately acquired by occupation. Lost/forgotten goods belong to the municipality in which it is found or to the state (¶935). They can only be acquired by another by prescription (¶939) pursuant to the conditions outlined in ¶940 (attempt to find the owner) and ¶941 (must bring item to a peace officer/municipality/person who owns the land where it was found).Application: To determine the appropriate mode of acquisition, we must determine the nature of the sum (abandoned or lost/forgotten).The sum may neither be qualified as a bien sans maître (¶934) nor as an abandoned good (¶934 al.2). The plaintiff did not prove abandonment, and the presumption of abandonment (¶934 al.2) does not apply (was not of little value or in bad condition).It is therefore a lost/forgotten good which can be acquired by the holder only by prescriptive acquisition. This is not a case of “good faith” detention (i.e where the person was unaware that the object belonged to someone else; gives rise to a 3-year prescription under ¶2919). The time for prescriptive acquisition is 10 years (¶2917). It continues to be the possession of the rightful owner but can be detained by M.Ratio: (1) To determine ownership of a found good, one must determine whether it was lost/forgotten or abandoned. Abandoned goods can be immediately prescribed through occupation, whereas lost/forgotten goods must be acquired through prescriptive acquisition (10 years, and 3 years when it is in good faith) and only if the finder has respected the necessary conditions (attempted to find the owner and brought it forward to authorities) before detaining it. (2) Until lost or forgotten property is prescribed by acquisition, it continues to belong to the owner, but can be detained by the finder.

Armory v Delamirie, [1722] 93 E.R. 664Facts: Armory, a chimney sweeper’s boy, finds a jewel and brings it to Delamirie’s shop (goldsmith) to inquire about the value. While weighing the jewel, Delamirie’s apprentice took out the stones, and claimed that the jewel was worth three halfpence. Armory asked for the jewel, and Delamirie’s apprentice returned it without the stones. Armory sues for trover [action to recover the value of personal property that was wrongfully disposed of by another person].Issue: (1) Does A have an interest to justify an action of trover? Yes. (2) How is the value of the jewel determined?Reasoning: (1) The finder, Armory, does not acquire an absolute property or ownership. He has “such a property as will enable him to keep it against all but the owner”. Thus, he has a basis for his action in trover. Here, Delamirie is the master of the apprentice, so he is held liable. (2) Unless Delamirie produces the jewel, the jury should presume the strongest against him (i.e. the measure of their damages is the value of the best jewels).Ratio: A finder does not acquire absolute property or ownership of the thing, but has such property as will enable him to keep it against all but the rightful owner.

Bird v Fort Frances, [1949] 2 DLR 791 (Ont HC)Facts: B (a young boy) found $1400 in a tin can while he was playing beneath a building whose owner was recently deceased. He brought it home to his mother. Eventually, the police questioned him and seized the money. The true owner could not be found, and so B sues the city to return the money.Issue: (1) What rights does B have over the money? (2) Was taking the money theft and how does this affect B’s rights? (3) Was B’s possession so disrupted at the time that the police took the money that he cannot maintain this action? (4) Does B get the money?Holding: (1) He is a wrongful taker, (2) Unclear but doesn’t matter, (3) No, (4) Yes.Reasoning: Since the money was not found in a public place, but was deliberately hidden underneath the house, B is not a true finder, he is a wrongful taker. The rights of a wrongful taker are still stronger than

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everyone else’s except the true owner or the owner of the land on which the object was found. B’s claim outranks everyone else’s.Ratio: The rights of a wrongful finder are good against the world, except as against the true owner and, in some cases, the owner of the land on which the thing was found.

Keron v Cashman et al, 33 A 1055, Court of Chancery of New Jersey, 1896Facts: A group of boys were playing by a railroad track when one of them finds a sock. They all start playing with it, until eventually the sock break opens and money falls out of it. No one had intended to take possession of the sock until the money was revealed.Issue: Who found the money?Holding: They all did, and should divide the money equally.Reasoning: None of the boys had the intention to possess and physically control the sock at the same time until it broke open. Since they all formed the idea of keeping the money at the same time, it should be divided equally.Ratio: In order to establish possession, it is necessary for intention and physical control to be concurrent.

Parker v British Airways Board, [1982] 1 QB 1004 (CA)Facts: P found a gold bracelet in an airport lobby. He gave it to BA with a note stating his name and address, asking that the bracelet be returned if BA could not find the true owner. BA failed to find the owner, sold the bracelet, and kept the profits.Issue: Who owns the bracelet?Holding: P does.Reasoning: A few things are clear: finders get opposable rights if the thing is found in a public area, trespassers’ rights are inferior to the owner of the land they are trespassing on, and things attached to buildings belong to the building-owner. The rest is unsettled in jurisprudence, and so this court must develop an appropriate test.Applying this test to the facts, we see that BA had no pre-existing policy of controlling objects in its lounge, entry was free, no signs posted to this effect, and no custom that suggests otherwise. The bracelet belongs to P.Ratio: Creation of finders’ test. [See below]

Rights and obligations of the finder: (from Parker)1. Finder acquires rights only if (a) the thing is lost or abandoned, and (2) he takes it in to his care/control.2. Finder acquires very limited rights if acquired dishonestly or while trespassing.3. Subject to 1, 2, and 4, the finder’s rights prevail against all but the true owner’s.4. Unless otherwise agreed, if the finder is working and the finding is not ‘wholly incidental or collateral’ to his work, the employer gets the finder’s rights over the object.5. Finders must make reasonable efforts to find the true owner.Rights and obligations of the occupier:1. The rights of the occupier of land/buildings are superior than the finder’s rights for things in or attached to the land, regardless of whether the occupier is aware of the things.2. The rights of a building’s occupier are superior to those of the finder if, before the thing has been found, the occupier “manifested an intention to exercise control over the building and the things which may be upon it or in it.” (ex: in a bank vault).3. An occupier who uses the rights in 2 has a duty to take all reasonable measures to find original owner.4. Occupiers of things (such as a ship, car) are treated like the occupiers of a building.

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CLASS 7: Prescription Acquisitive - Adverse Possession (cont’d)

Excerpts from the Real Property Limitations Act , RSO 1990, c L-15. 4) No person shall make an entry or distress, or bring an action to recover any land or rent, but within ten years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or distress, or to bring such action, first accrued to some person through whom the person making or bringing it claims, or if the right did not accrue to any person through whom that person claims, then within ten years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or distress, or to bring such action, first accrued to the person making or bringing it. 5) (1) Where the person claiming such land or rent, or some person through whom that person claims, has, in respect of the estate or interest claimed, been in possession or in receipt of the profits of the land, or in receipt of the rent, and has, while entitled thereto, been dispossessed, or has discontinued such possession or receipt, the right to make an entry or distress or bring an action to recover the land or rent shall be deemed to have first accrued at the time of the dispossession or discontinuance of possession or at the last time at which any such profits or rent were so received.5) (9) Where the person claiming such land or rent, or the person through whom that person claims, has become entitled by reason of any forfeiture or breach of condition, such right shall be deemed to have first accrued when the forfeiture was incurred or the condition broken.13) Where any acknowledgement in writing of the title of the person entitled to any land or rent has been given to him or to his agent, signed by the person in possession or in receipt of the profits of the land, or in the receipt of the rent, such possession or receipt of or by the person by whom the acknowledgment was given shall be deemed, according to the meaning of this Act, to have been the possession or receipt of or by the person to whom or to whose agent the acknowledgment was given at the time of giving it, and the right of the last-mentioned person, or of any person claiming through him, to make an entry or distress or bring an action to recover the land or rent, shall be deemed to have first accrued at and not before the time at which the acknowledgment, or the last of the acknowledgments, if more than one, was given. 15) At the determination of the period limited by this Act to any person for making an entry or distress or bringing any action the right and title of such person to the land or rent, for the recovery whereof such entry distress or action, respectively, might have been made or brought within such period, is extinguished. 16) Nothing in sections 1 to 15 applies to any waste or vacant land of the Crown whether surveyed or not, nor to lands included in any road allowance heretofore or hereafter surveyed and laid out or to any lands reserved or set apart or laid out as a public highway where the freehold in any such road allowance or highway is vested in the Crown or in a municipal corporation, commission or other public body, but nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect or prejudice any right, title or interest acquired by any person before the 13th day of June, 1922. 36) If at the time at which the right of a person to make an entry or distress, or to bring an action to recover any land or rent, first accrues, as herein mentioned, such person is under the disability of minority, mental deficiency, mental incompetency or unsoundness of mind, such person, or the person claiming through him or her, even if the period of ten years or five years, as the case may be, hereinbefore limited has expired, may make an entry or distress, or bring an action, to recover the land or rent at any time within five years next after the time at which the person to whom the right first accrued ceased to be under any such disability, or died, whichever of those two events first happened.

TW Merrill, “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession” (1985) 79 Northwestern UL Rev.Justifications for adverse possession - purpose of statute of limitations is to prevent stale claims when everything is forgotten – Adverse possession seen as a policy to favour active owners who develop the land – but they may be saving it for future generations and this runs counter to the concept they can do whatever they want with their land – posesser (squatter) may have also developed reliance on the property

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In sum, there are four traditional justifications or clusters of justifications which support transferring the entitlement to the AP after the statute of limitations runs: the problem of lost evidence, the desirability of quieting titles, the interest in discouraging sleeping owners, and the reliance interests of AP's and interested third persons.

Re St. Clair Beach Estates v Macdonald (1974), 50 DLR (3d) 650 (Ont Div Ct)Facts: M bought a house on land that was bordering G’s farm in 1961. Over time, M made use of that part of G’s land, cutting down trees, erecting a dog house, maintenance, etc. M never had G’s permission or consent. G picked cherries in the disputed area from time to time. On two occasions, M attempted to buy the land from G, but G eventually sold to farm to StC. M objects on the basis of his adverse possession of the disputed land.Issue: Has M established adverse possession of the land?Holding: No.Reasoning: Adverse possession requires three elements: (1) actual possession, (2) intent to exclude the owner and all other persons entitled to possession, and (3) the discontinuance of possession by the owner and all others. All of these factors must be true for the entire statutory period. Here, M failed on the discontinuance of possession, since G made use of the disputed parcel of land in a manner consistent with his ownership of it (picking cherries). There was no reason for G to go more frequently. Furthermore, M’s offers to buy the land from G show his acknowledgement that G is the owner, and that he therefore did not intend to exclude G from the land. M did not have an animus possidendi in this case (an intention to possess).Ratio: Three necessary criteria for adverse possession. // To claim possession of something, one must establish animus possidendi to the exclusion of other parties.

Masidon Investments v Ham (1984), 45 OR (2d) 563 (CA)

Facts: H has owned the western part of a large parcel of rural land since 1956. The eastern part was owned by MI, which was holding onto it for development purposes, but never visited it past 1968. Over the course of several decades, H built and operated an airport on the disputed eastern parcel. The airport consisted of two grass runways, the second of which required significant landscaping. A windstock was visible from the highway and the airport appears on government charts. The airport was used by 10-12 planes year-round. He also built a dam, a pasture, and a road.Issue: Did H fulfill the requirements for adverse possession?Held: No, because it fails the (newly created) inconsistent use test.Reasoning: Restatement of the trinity of elements required for AP: (1) actual possession, (2) intent to exclude, and (3) the discontinuance of possession by the owner and all others. // Then, the court launches into an overview of jurisprudence, which states the broad principle of “inconsistent use” as a requirement for dispossession of the owner. When nothing is done with the property, we must look to its intended purpose (subjective test). If the intended purpose is speculation, H’s actions did not interfere with MI’s plans. Finally, the judge ducks the policy issues of “impossibility of infringement” by saying that it would be imprudent to speculate on what could constitute infringement of land speculation. He does say that there are no policy reasons to care about the rights of adverse possessors who are trespassers.Ratio: Creation of the inconsistent use test. [see below]

The Inconsistent Use Test (Masidon)Test requires that to exclude the true owner (third criteria for AP), the adverse possessor must make such use of the property as is inconsistent with the owner’s current use. Thus, where there is no

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current use, dispossession is virtually impossible. (Scope of application for the test is unclear, but Masidon shows application to intentional trespassers.)The traditional position on adverse possession can be summarized as: Exclusive possession as an ordinary owner would possess for the statutory period of time.The new development is that the squatter’s use be “inconsistent” with that of the title holder. Some criticisms of the Inconsistent Use Test:

- Reversal of the regular process of AP- H had built an airport on the land!- Makes it virtually impossible to adversely possess against land speculators, which de facto creates a stronger legal protection for them than other land owner have.- It is a subjective test, and cml doesn’t like subjective tests

Sylvio Normand, Introduction au droit des biens , 2nd ed (Montréal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2014) at 349–362. La prescription acquisitive - La loi reconnaît 2 types de prescriptions (2875) :

1. La prescription extinctive – un moyen d’éteindre un droit au motif de son non-usage ou d’opposer une fin de non-recevoir à une action (2921)

2. La prescription acquisitive (usucapion) – un moyen d’acquérir le droit de propriété [ou l’un de ses démembrements] par le simple effet de la possession durant un certain temps (916+2910)

[[What does prescription do?]]La prescription…

Permet de légaliser des situations où le fait n’est pas conforme au droit [à défaut pour le régime de la publicité foncière de pouvoir jouer un rôle correcteur]

Couvre les occupations sans titre (squatters) Corrige les vices ou les imprécisions d’un titre

« En permettant de corriger des anomalies et des contradictions nées de situations de faits ou d’erreurs d’écriture, la prescription accroit la stabilité du droit en restreignant la contestation des titres » (p. 275).[[But isn’t this hard to reconcile with modern society?]]

Information technology Our system of registering titles actually still isn’t good enough to render acquisitive prescription obselete (See : initial suspension and subsequent re-introduction of 2944 )

Once the technology of registration advances, the legislators will probably restrain the champ d’application of acquisitive prescription.

Domaine d’application   : La prescription acquisitive exige la possession d’un bien [ou d’un droit] durant un délai déterminé – Étant donné l’effet draconien de la prescription, sa mise en œuvre impose le respect de règles à caractère technique.

En principe, tous les biens (meubles/immeubles) et les droits réels peuvent être objet de la prescription

Cas d’exclusion :o La servitude ne peut être créée sans titre (même à la suite d’une possession immémoriale)

(1181 al. 2) o Biens hors commerce, incessibles ou non susceptibles d’appropriation, [par nature] ou

[par affectation] = imprescriptibles [Par nature] = les choses communes (air, eau) (913 al. 2) + les biens de l’État

(916 al 2) [Par affectation] = les biens des personnes morales de droit public affectés à

l’utilité publique (916 al 2) Délais requis   : Deux délais de prescription sont reconnues par le Code [=ordre public – ne peuvent être modifiés par convention!! (2884)]1. Dix ans   : La prescription en droit commun – tous les cas où ne s’applique pas un autre délai de

prescription (2917) Conditions  :

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Possession utile et non viciée (paisible, continue, publique, non équivoque) (2911 + 922) 10 ans doivent s’écouler entre l’entrée en possession jusqu’à l’acquisition de la prescription Pas nécessaire que le possesseur détienne un titre (contrairement à l’ancien code) (2918) Pas nécessaire la bonne foi (!!!)

o « En somme, en matière immobilière, la possesseur peut être de mauvaise foi. Ceci découle de la portée de l’actuelle prescription décennale qui est désormais d’application générale, alors que cette même prescription, sous le code précédent, présentait un caractère exceptionnel. Il faut, par ailleurs, se garder de donner une interprétation large à l’article 2920 du CCQ – qui aurait pour effet d’exiger la bonne foi du possesseur – et considérer que son champ d’application déborde au-delà de la prescription mobilière »

Porte tant sur la propriété et ses modalités que sur les démembrements de la propriété Même si la prescription acquisitive peut être invoquée par le possesseur d’un bien meuble qui est

de mauvaise foi, le voleur/le receleur ne peuvent pas l’invoquer (927) Jonction et continuation de la possession   : L’ayant cause à titre particulier (« successor by particular title ») a la possibilité de joindre à sa

possession celle de son auteur (=seller, assigner, eg) ET, ce faisant, d’abréger sa propre prescription [=fondé sur le lien juridique entre auteur + ayant cause] (925+2912)

Jonction de possession = seul effet de la loi, N’A PAS à être prévue à un acte juridique Sans lien de droit, la possession ne peut être transmise (ie, un possesseur qui occupe un immeuble

sans titre ne peut prétendre de joindre sa possession à celle d’un possesseur antérieur) Jonction de possession joue même quand l’auteur a prescrit au-delà de son propre titre L’acquéreur a l’option de joindre sa possession à celle de son vendeur sur la partie de terrain qui

excède la surface que le titre lui attribue Continuation de la possession déjà commencée par l’auteur de l’ayant cause universel ou à titre

universel (2912 al 2) Rend impossible la prescription triennale par un ayant cause universel ou à titre universel dont l’auteur était de mauvaise foi.

L’ayant cause (peu importe à quel titre) [si de bonne foi] commence sa possession sans souffrir des vices qui marquaient la possession de son auteur (926 al 2 + 2912) Avantageuse pour l’ayant cause universel/à titre universel

o Permet à un héritier de prescrire en son propre nom Acquisition judiciaire du droit de propriété   : La prescription d’un droit de propriété portant sur

un immeuble n’opère pas de plein droit Pour acquérir un propriété [qu’on a possédé à titre de propriétaire pendant 10 ans] il faut présenter une requête en acquisition du droit propriétaire au tribunal (2918)

La requête est accompagnée de : (1) un état récent des droits inscrits au registre foncier de cet immeuble, (2) une copie/un extrait du plan cadastral de l’immeuble, (3) un certificat de localisation [si un construction se trouve sur l’immeuble]

Habituellement, [lorsque la procédure vise à régulariser un titre défectueux] le requérant demande aux propriétaires voisins d’acquiescer à sa présentation [plutôt que de faire signifier la requête] (806, 1 CPC)

Demande en acquisition du droit de propriété = prononcé par un juge de la Cour supérieur plutôt que par un greffier (808, 31/34 CPC)

Si demande en acquisition du droit de propriété n’est pas contestée soumise soit par avocat, soit par notaire

Acquisition par prescription d’un droit de propriété sur un immeuble exige le prononcé d’un jugement (2918 al 1)

Pas rétroactif Les droits que tiers pourraient avoir acquis du fait du possesseur ne seraient pas confirmés par le

jugement2. Trois ans   : Possède un champ d’application restreint ; elle vaut à l’égard des meubles seulement

(2919)

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Conditions   : Possession non viciée; paisible, continue, publique, non équivoque (922) Le voleur, le receleur, le fraudeur ne peuvent invoquer les effets de la possession (927)

o Toutefois, les ayants cause de ces personnes peuvent l’invoque s’ils étaient dans l’ignorance du vice

Exige la bonne foi du possesseur lors de l’acquisition du bien (2919-2920) o Le fardeau d’établir la preuve de la mauvaise foi du possesseur = celui qui conteste la

possession Le possesseur de bonne foi doit se croire propriétaire du bien dont il a la possession En cas de doute sur le droit, le possesseur est tenu de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour se

renseigner sur la provenance du bieno La simple connaissance, à la suite du l’acquisition, de l’existence du droit d’autrui sur le

bien ne suffit pas à interrompre la prescription commencée o Pour produire une interruption les vices du titre du possesseur doivent lui être

dénoncés par une procédure civile (932) o La loi présume l’existence de bonne foi (2805)

Délai de 3 ans doit s’être découlé depuis la dépossession du propriétaire Le non-respect des conditions requises entraine un allongement du délai de prescription qui passe alors à 10 ans (délai de la prescription de droit commun)

Droits du propriétaire avant la prescription   : Avant l’acquisition de la propriété par la prescription, la propriétaire du bien meuble conserve, en

principe, son droit de propriété – donc il peut revendiquer son bien (946, 953, 2919 al 2) Cas où le propriétaire a été victime d’un vol de son meuble

o Le propriétaire peut revendiquer son bien ou demander la nullité de la vente La revendication n’emporte pas nécessairement l’annulation de la vente

o Vente doit être conclue par une personne qui n’en était pas propriétaire/pas chargée ou autorisée à la vendre (1713)

o Bien ne doit pas avoir été vendu sous l’autorité de la justice et la prescription de 3 ans ne doit pas être acquise (1714 al 1)

o Lorsque le propriétaire revendique le bien qui se trouve entre les mains de l’acheteur : Acheteur est tenu [en principe] de remettre le bien une fois établie la preuve de

son droit par celui qui le revendique Si bien revendiqué a été dans le cours des activités d’une entreprise

propriétaire est tenu de rembourser à l’acheteur, s’il était de bonne foi, le prix payé (1714 al 2)

L’acheteur de bonne foi peut conserver le bien tant que le propriétaire ne lui aura pas versé le prix [Il bénéficie, donc, d’un droit de rétention]

Si bien revendiqué a été acquis d’un particulier (non commerçant) le propriétaire n’a pas à rembourser l’acheteur

L’acheteur demande la nullité de la vente, en poursuivant son vendeur o Propriétaire peut aussi demander la nullité de la vente

Permet au propriétaire de récupérer son bien Vendeur obligé de restituer à l’acheteur le prix de la vente Propriétaire pas obligé de verser à l’acheteur le prix qu’il a payé

Modalités   : Calcul du délai   : Super precise rules about counting days that we’ll never have to know Renonciation   :

o Il est impossible de renoncer à l’avance à la prescription ou de convenir de délais de prescription autres que ceux prévus par la loi (2883, 2884)

Cette règle = ordre public (!!!)

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o Le possesseur a toutefois l’option de renoncer au bénéfice du temps écoulé ou à une prescription déjà acquise

Par cette renonciation, le possesseur abandonne le droit de bénécier des effets de la possession

Exige une manifestation volontaire, déterminante et sans équivoque À la suite d’une renonciation, la prescription peut toujours recommencer à courir

(2888) o Si portée sur un droit réel immobilier la renonciation doit être publiée au Bureau de la

publicité foncière (2885) o Faculté de renonciation limitée aux personnes majeures avec capacitéo Une personne lésée par une renonciation à la prescription acquise peut s’y opposer (2887)

Interruption   : L’interruption de la prescription = perte du bénéfice du temps déjà écoulé à celui qui prescrivait – Une fois l’interruption constatée, la prescription recommence à courir à son début (2903)

o L’interruption est soit naturelle, soit civile (2889) Interruption naturelle : lorsque le possesseur est privé de la jouissance du bien

[par le propriétaire lui-même] ou [par un tiers]. Pas un simple incident; la perte de la possession = caractère notoire = dépossession doit durer plus d’un an (2890). Durant cette période, le possesseur [conserve une possession utile] et [a droit d’intenter une action possessoire et d’être remis en possession du bien] (2923 al 2, 929).

Interruption civile : Prend sa source dans un acte juridique (dépôt d’une demande en justice (2892), par exemple – full list at 2892 al 2).

Doit être communiqué à celui qu’on veut empêcher au plus tard dans les 60 jours qui suivent l’expiration du délai de prescription

See also : 2892 al 2, 2894 Suspension   : Plutôt pour les personnes vulnérables à l’effet draconien de la prescription

acquisitive, qui se trouve dans l’impossibilité de poser les gestes requis pour interrompre la prescription. Ainsi, le processus de la prescription peut s’arrêter momentanément. La prescription recommence à courir lorsque la cause qui a provoqué la suspension prend fin.

o Règle générale = coure; les personnes pour qui la prescription est suspendue sont en nombre limité (2877)

o La personne dans l’impossibilité d’agir [soit par elle-même], [soit en se faisant représenter par d’autres] est protegée (2904)

Une personne semi-consciente suite à un accident, l’enfant à naitre (2905), et les époux pendant la vie commune (2906).

Bolduc c Fortier, 2008 QCCS 3799Facts: B asking for legal recognition of land which she has possessed. Relying on possession and prescriptive acquisition as an argument. Argues they occupied it for over 10 years, paid taxes on it, maintained it, used it for camping, and had installed a fence.Reasoning: B failed to prove that she had possession that permitted her to acquire this piece of land by prescription.Clearing plants to put up tents 2-3 times a year does not constitute regular maintenance. Putting up a sign prohibiting the dumping of waste doesn’t constitute possession either. Same thing re: the fence – wasn’t a permanent fixture. This camping business with parents and friends doesn’t denote possession either because it is not unequivocal – it’s temporary.Ratio: Possession must be peaceful, continuous, public, and unequivocal to produce legal effects (921).

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Henri et Léon Mazeaud, Jean Mazeaud et François Chabas, Leçons de droit civil , t 2, vol 2 Biens: Droit de propriété et ses démembrements (Paris, Montchrestien, 1994) at 186–200. Possession of non-ownership real rights is quasi-possession. Universalities and outside commerce things aren’t susceptible to possession.Corpus is the physical mastery over the thing; it is behaving materially like the owner. It can be exercised by a third party for the possessor.Animus is the intent of acting as the owner. Detention lacks animus domini, and instead has animus tenendi.

1. Animus domini is presumed to exist unless proof to the contrary.2. It is appreciated in abstracto, by reference to a normal person in the same situation.3. Animus is presumed to be conserved during the whole of occupation.4. The presumption of animus falls if there is inversion of title by a third party, or acts

contradicting the person’s acting as an owner.· Savigny: What matters is the intent to act as owner. The theory is a subjective one.

However, we can only appreciate it in abstracto, making it a reasonable observer-type standard.

· Ihering: Both possessor and detentor have the same intent to retain the thing. We must appreciate animus domini objectively by reference to an objective standard. As such, we shall give the protection of possession to everyone unless there is a reason to think there is mere detention, i.e. by a contract for lease.

· French law adopted Savigny’s approach which denies detentors the protections given to possession.

Proving ownership is quite hard, whereas proving possession isn’t.Protection of possession is justified to maintain public order. It avoids violent repossession by the owner. Acquisitive prescription is justified by economic efficiency and by the wish to protect third parties.

CLASS 8: Aboriginal Title, Occupation

[missing] Anker plenary notes

[missing] James Tully, “Rediscovering America: The Two treatises and aboriginal rights” in An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 137.

Delgamuukw v Queen in Right of British Columbia (1997), 153 DLR (4th) 193 SCCFacts: The appellants claimed title to a plot of land of more than 58,000 square kilometers on the basis of aboriginal title that was never extinguished. There were 71 individual plaintiffs claiming title. In the original trial the plaintiffs tried to obtain "ownership", however upon appeal this was changed to "aboriginal title and self government". The case was dismissed at trial and on appeal the claims of all of the houses were grouped together into one and their claims dismissed.Issue: (1) What is the nature of the protection given to aboriginal title under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982? (2) Did the province have the authority to extinguish the title after confederation?Holding: Appeal allowed in part, new trial ordered.Reasoning: The final ruling is for a new trial as the grouping of the plaintiffs together was seen as unfair to the defendants. The court reaffirms that it definitely does exist and further that provincial governments never had the jurisdiction to extinguish it because it falls under federal jurisdiction under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.The Court states clearly that aboriginal title is special for a few reasons. It is inalienable – it cannot be transferred to anyone other than the Crown. Its source is unique as it arises from occupancy before

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sovereignty. Finally, the aboriginals hold the title communally. The court states that aboriginal title is given full protection under s. 35(1).They also establish the test for determining if aboriginal title exists. For it to be present it must satisfy the following criteria: (1) the land must have been occupied before sovereignty, (2) there must be a continuity between pre-sovereignty and modern times (but not an unbroken chain), (3) at the time of sovereignty, the occupancy must have been exclusive (but it could have been jointly exclusive by more than one party or tribe). If these are established, then aboriginal title exists. If it partially fails, it is possible to establish a claim less than title.They go on to say that this is not an absolutely protected title. It can be infringed upon if the infringement passes a two-part test: (1) The infringement must be in furtherance of a legislative objective that is compelling and substantial, (2) The infringement must be consistent with the special relationship between aboriginals and the Crown.Ratio: (1) Only the federal government can extinguish aboriginal title. (2) Aboriginal title is inalienable to anyone but the Crown, it arises before sovereignty, and it is held communally.

James (Sákéj) Youngblood Henderson, “First Nations Legal Inheritances in Canada: The Míkmaq Model” (1996) 23 Man LJ 1.The Mawíomi developed a defined concept of space where families annually allocated their livelihoods among themselves.

● One family also often managed the resources for allied families and their friends. Their image of territory was one of a dedicated, sacred space. They not only used what was physically available to them, but the Mawíomi made choices about the rate of resource, use, within sustainable limits, and modified natural resources in selective and sustainable ways, to increase availability and distribution. To do so, they created an international customary trading code as part of Nikmanen law.

“Mímáki” was the word-concept for recognition of national territories. It translated as the “land of friendship,” the term has traditionally expressed a sacred space with an implicate, or entwined, order.

● Instead they viewed Mímáki as created by interactions between their ancestors and the ancestors of other species.

● the Míkmaq conceptualized every plant or animal as having a specific animate power; with a spirit that made each. They considered each species to be a “separate nation.” In this sense, “nation” meant one’s birth-identity, as the original Latin term natio denoted.

● The Míkmaq cultivated an awareness of these life-forces (mntúk) and of a covenant with the keepers of these forces. This was the foundation of their idea of property. One had to respect and live in harmony with these intelligible essences. A sacred relationship of respect existed among all mntu within the national territory. A crude statement of the worldview of Míkmáki was that it had an order of spirits that a respectful human could participate in, but not possess or own.

● In fact, the sacred space itself was not individualized.“netukulimk” referred to the responsibility of a Míkmaq user to be mindful of the life-givers, the content of the resources to be used, and the need for sharing within the human community.

● Certain families had responsibilities to use certain animals, plants, materials and access sites, eg hunting and fishing traps, because of their particular relationships. This was illustrated by the totemic clan system, their songs and stories, and the ceremonies that linked the present and the past.

● The netukulimk responsibilities within the First Nations were distinct from the equally unique English legal notion of a “possessory estate” under the crown’s original title. The Míkmaq sui generis tenures were different in defining which rights could be acquired, the extent to which other persons could be excluded, and the nature of the resource-occupying entity.

● Míkmaq netukulimk responsibilities, in the form of “property rights,” were acquired through kinship rather than use or purchase.

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The most difficult point about Míkmaq tenure for the English mind was that each family or personal claim to a resource or space was valid only insofar as it was based on permission by local or regional consensus. And also reminiscent of classical Roman law, the Míkmaq did not distinguish between personal and real property. Their tenure treated all things as property, equally.

R v Marshall; R v Bernard, 2005 SCC 43Facts: 35 Mi’kmaq were charged with cutting timber on Crown lands in Nova Scotia without authorization. The accused argued that as Mi’kmaq, they were not required to obtain provincial authorization to log because they have a right to log on Crown lands for commercial purposes pursuant to treaty or aboriginal title. The trial court entered convictions which were overturned by the Court of Appeal.Issue: (1) Do the Peace and Friendship Treaties give aboriginals a treaty right to log on Crown lands without permission, contrary to provincial regulations? (2) What is the correct test for occupancy that is needed when determining if aboriginal title exists?Holding: Appeal allowed, convictions restored.Reasoning: Treaty rights: The majority finds that the Treaties do not grant this right, and therefore the appeal must be allowed and the convictions restored. The Mi'kmaq tried to argue that these rights progressed from the "truckhouse" clause of the treaties similarly to the right to fish in Marshall. To address this, the Court states that there must be evidence that a similar practice to logging for trade was done at the time the treaties were created. They find no evidence that this was the case, and therefore the treaty did not protect the right. The treaty gave the Mi'kmaq the right to continue their trading activities as they were established in 1760. Obviously, the rights protected were not frozen in time, thus if the Aboriginals traded logs in 1760 then this practice would likely be allowed today as a modern evolution of the practice. However, because there was no logging trade in 1760, the practices of the accused were not modern development of a treaty right, and were not protected at all. The proper test to employ when considering if a treaty trade right exists is to ask if the aboriginal people participated in a trade that can be said to be the precursor to the modern practice at the time the treaty was signed. // Aboriginal title: In the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, Cromwell held that the trial judge's test for occupancy was too strict, as it did not allow for the nomadic lifestyle of the Mi'kmaq's to be considered. The trial judge's test was that they must have established a "regular use of a defined piece of land". Therefore, such things as a settlement would satisfy the test. However, the respondents did not regularly occupy the land, and therefore they failed this test. Cromwell's test took the nomadic lifestyle into effect, and set a lower threshold of "occasional entry on the land and acts from which an intent to occupy can be inferred". He found that the respondents met this standard, and therefore should be given good title. McLachlin, writing for the majority, does not agree with Cromwell's lower threshold. She applies the test laid out in Delgamuukw, but in the end they rely on the trial judge's stricter threshold for occupancy. The defendants did not possess a treaty or permit to the lands concerned, and had not occupied them to the extent necessary to establish aboriginal title. They also discuss that in some cases where aboriginal title is not found, permission to use the land for agricultural or traditional reasons may be permitted, but this is not the case here. They put lots of emphasis on trying to balance the CML & aboriginal law, however it seems that the common law wins out in this case.Ratio: (1) When asking if a treaty that guaranteed trade rights protects a particular trade, you must ask if the aboriginal people participated in a trade that can be said to be the precursor to the modern practice at the time the treaty was signed; if they did not, then there is no treaty protection of the trade because neither party considered it when the treaty was signed. (2) In order to be deemed to "occupy" lands to a satisfactory extent of being able to claim aboriginal title to them, must establish that they regularly use a defined piece of land for a certain purpose.

William v British Columbia, 2012 BCCA 285

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Facts: On behalf of the Tsilhqot’in people, Chief Roger William sought declarations of Aboriginal title over 440,000 hectares of land lying in the Cariboo-Chilcotin region of British Columbia (the “Claim Area”). The Tsilhqot’in also sought declarations of Aboriginal rights to hunt, trap, trade in animal skins and pelts, and to capture and use wild horses. The trial lasted 339 days spanning almost five years and produced lengthy reasons for judgment, albeit much of the decision was non-binding. In the end, the trial judge dismissed the claim for Aboriginal title without prejudice to the Tsilhqot’in’s right to claim title for a portion of the Claim Area (and damages) in the future, but granted the declaration of Aboriginal rights, and found those rights had been infringed by forestry activities in the Claim Area. No damages were awarded for the infringement. Canada, British Columbia and the Plaintiff each filed appeals, which were heard almost exactly eight years after the start of the trial. In the end, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial decision in all respects although significantly differed in its reasoning, particularly with respect to the title claim.Issue: The issues considered by the BCSC at trial included whether: (1) the Tsilhqot’in held Aboriginal title to all or part of the Claim Area; (2) the Tsilhqoti’in held Aboriginal rights to hunt, trap and trade in furs and pelts throughout all or part of the Claim Area; (3) the Forest Act applied to Aboriginal title lands; and (4) the issuing of forest licences and other forest development authorizations unjustifiably infringed Aboriginal rights in the Claim Area.Holding: Appeals dismissed.Reasoning: The “All or Nothing” Title Claim: Having rejected the Plaintiff’s claim for Aboriginal title over the entire Claim Area, the trial judge considered himself bound to reject the title claim to part of the area on a technical point: the Statement of Claim did not seek declarations of title over portions of the Claim Area, and therefore, it would be prejudicial to the Defendants to make such a declaration. In other words, the Plaintiff’s claim was “all or nothing”. While dismissing the claim, the trial judge nonetheless observed the evidence warranted a finding of Aboriginal title over certain tracts of land. The Court of Appeal refused to take the same narrow view of the Plaintiff’s claim, noting BC courts take a “functional” approach to pleadings that overlook minor flaws unless prejudice arises. Finding no prejudice, the Court of Appeal concluded that the Plantiff’s claim was not “all or nothing” and therefore went on to consider the Plaintiff’s claim for title over part of the Claim Area. // Test for Aboriginal Title: Although the Court of Appeal rejected the “all or nothing” conclusion of the trial judge, it noted that at trial, the Plaintiff had argued its title claim based on a “territorial theory” – asserting that title could be established by showing the movement of the Tsilhqot’in through the territory in various patterns (while attempting to repel others who sought to use the land) at the time of sovereignty. The Court of Appeal ultimately rejected the Plaintiff’s “territorial” claim since it was premised on the wrong legal test for proof of Aboriginal title. Instead, the Court concluded “Aboriginal title must be proven on a site-specific basis” (para. 230). Therefore, on different grounds, the Court upheld the trial judge’s dismissal of the Tsilhqot’in’s title claim without prejudice to their right to bring a new (site-specific) claim. // Site Specific Approach to Title: The Court of Appeal observed that the Plaintiff’s claim was clearly territorial, relying on the following evidence: the Tsilhqot’in lived in various encampments in the Claim Area at different times; the Tshilhqot’in hunted, fished and trapped at various places, some of which are in the Claim Area; and on a seasonal basis, the Tsilhqot’in would travel along trails throughout the Claim Area. With a few exceptions, the Court noted there were no definite tracts of land habitually occupied by the Tshilhqot’in at sovereignty in 1846. The Court of Appeal acknowledged that Delgamuukw did not fully address the quality of “occupancy” required (except that it required exclusivity), but the Court found, relying extensively on recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions. Using this approach, the Tsilhqot’in’s claim for Aboriginal title was not sustainable. However, instead of dismissing the claim in its entirety, the Court was of the view the Plaintiff should not be prejudiced for structuring the claim as it was, and declared its dismissal to be without prejudice to the First Nation’s right to pursue future title claims to specific sites. // Proper Rights Holders: While it is common ground that Aboriginal rights are communally held, identifying the proper rights-holding collective may not be obvious. As the trial judge noted, an individual may simultaneously be a member of “a family, a clan or descent group, a hunting party, a band and a

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nation”. The Plaintiff had originally brought the claim for Aboriginal title on behalf of the Tsilhqot’in Nation and the claim for Aboriginal rights on behalf of Xeni Gwet’in First Nations Government (a band and subgroup of the Tsilhqot’in), but in closing arguments asserted both rights and title belonged to the Nation. The Province disagreed, arguing the band held the collective rights as decision-making typically took place at the band level, and not at the Nation level where there was no governing body. In the Province’s view, the lack of political structure at the Nation level provides practical problems in implementing consultation and negotiation should the Nation be declared the rights-bearing community. Observing that the proper rights holder should primarily be determined by the Aboriginal collective itself, the Court concluded the evidence in this case supported the trial judge’s finding that the Tsilhqot’in Nation is the proper rights-holder. // Claim for Aboriginal Rights: The trial judge found the Tsilhqot’in held Aboriginal rights in the Claim Area and that those rights had been infringed by forestry activities permitted by the Province. Although horses were introduced to North America by Europeans, the trial judge nonetheless found the evidence established the Tsilhqot’in practice of capturing and using horses for work and transportation pre-dated the Tsilqot’in’s contact with Europeans and qualified as an Aboriginal right. Giving deference to the trial judge on the factual findings, the Court of Appeal found no reason to interfere with this conclusion. Similarly, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s assessment of the Tsilhqot’in’s practice of trading in skins and pelts, finding there was evidence to support the Tsilhquot’in traded to earn a “moderate livelihood” – that is, a low level of commercial activity. The question of whether these rights were infringed was complex: the Tsilhqot’in were found to hold Aboriginal rights over a large area that had been affected by a complex array of forestry legislation, regulation, licences and grants of tenure. As the trial judge found on the facts that forestry activities had an overall negative effect on hunting and wildlife habitat, the low threshold required to establish a prima facie infringement of the proven Aboriginal rights (more than trivial interference) was met in this case. In deciding the final question of whether the infringement was justified, the Court of Appeal supported the trial judge’s case-specific approach, observing that although forestry fell within the range of activities that may justify infringement of Aboriginal rights and title, the analysis must be specific to the Aboriginal rights and forestry practices at issue. The Court of Appeal found no reason to interfere with the trial judge’s conclusion that the government objective in this case was not made out on the evidence in relation to the Claim Area.

Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44Facts: BC issued a license to harvest trees in Appellant’s territory. The Appellant objected which led to negotiations with BC. Negotiations came to an impasse. The Appellant sued BC and claimed for Aboriginal Title (AT). Trial Judge found Appellants were entitled to declaration of AT, but for procedural reasons the TJ refused to make the declaration. BC appealed. BCCA held AT had not been established, but that it might exist to specific sites. Appellants appealed to SCC.Issue: Is Aboriginal title established? What rights does title confer? Did BC breach its Duty to Consult?Holding: Appeal allowed. Declaration of Aboriginal title granted. BC breached its duty to consult.Reasoning: Per McLachlin CJ (for the court): The test for AT should not be considered independently but rather as related aspects of a single concept. The sights must remain on the ultimate task, which is to identify how rights and interests possessed under traditional law and custom can find expression in common law (CL) terms. This requires considering the Aboriginal perspective, which must not be distorted by forcing ancestral practices into CL concepts. The goal is to translate pre-sovereignty Aboriginal interests into equivalent modern legal rights. When AT is established, it confers numerous rights which includes the right to control how the land is used. Gov’t incursions onto AT lands that are not consented to must be undertaken in accordance with the Crown’s procedural duty to consult, it must be justified, and must be consistent with the Crown’s fiduciary duty to the Aboriginal group.Ratio: The Test for AT: AT is based on “occupation” prior to the assertion of sovereignty. Delgamuukw affirms a “territorial use-based approach” to establishing AT, where the claimant group must show its

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occupation possesses the following three characteristics: (i) sufficient occupation of the land claimed to establish title at the time of assertion of sovereignty, (ii) continuity of occupation (where present occupation is relief on), and (iii) exclusive historic occupation.What rights does AT confer?: AT confers the right to the benefits associated with the land: to use it, enjoy it and profit from its economic development. As well, it includes ownership rights similar to those with fee simple, including the right to decide how the land will be used; the right of enjoyment and occupancy of the land; the right to possess the land; the right to the economic benefits of the land; the right to proactively use and manage the land; and, the right to control the land.Breach of the Duty to Consult: Before AT is declared, the honour of the Crown requires the Crown to consult and accommodate the interests of the potential AT holders.Provincial Laws of General Application: Provincial laws that regulate AT lands are constitutionally limited by s. 35 which acts as a limit on provincial jurisdiction.

Alan Hanna, “Making the Round: Aboriginal Title in the Common Law from a Tsilhqot’in Legal Perspective” (2013) 45:3 Ottawa L Rev 365.Le concept de «nomadisme» adopté par les tribunaux canadiens est un exemple d'un concept cloisonné qui simplifie inexactement de nombreuses Premières Nations.

● Nomadic ways of life derive from the annals of anthropological discourse to describe when an “entire group-women, men, and children-moves with the animals throughout the year.” The problem with this description is that it produces an image of people being passive subjects who only respond to their environment.

La vision simpliste d'une société dite nomade crée des obstacles potentiellement insurmontables pour les Premières Nations lorsqu'elles essaient de prouver les éléments du test de Delgamuukw .

● Test (rappel) = Pour fonder le titre ancestral, l’occupation doit posséder trois caractéristiques : elle doit être suffisante, elle doit être continue (si l’occupation actuelle est invoquée) et elle doit être exclusive.

● (source : Nation Tsilhqot’in. C. Colombie-Britanniquehttps://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/fr/item/14246/index.do

● The seasonal round (“the round”) immediately contradicts the concept of opportunistic nomadic wandering with the idea that the round is comprised of a pre-determined pattern of managed resource extraction. Testimony from Tsilhqot’in Elders at the trial reveal the round as being a calculated system developed with the peoples’ extensive and intimate knowledge of the territory’s resources

○ The seasonal round is a practice that was carried out by the “?Esggidam” (ancestors) from “sadanx” (long ago), and continues to the present.

○ The practical benefits of the round, going beyond gathering resources, as a means for exercising legal jurisdiction over a vast territory arises in the Tsilhqot’in origin story, “Lendix’tcux.

○ Making the round takes us beyond the simplistic Western concept of nomadism and provides the evidentiary basis for proving occupation to the exclusion of others on a territorial basis through the application of Indigenous laws.

● The laws establish jurisdiction and authority to manage land use governed by principles of environmental protection.

● The territorial rounds are deliberate and serve multiple functions. They are a means of protecting the country through observation and communication, while simultaneously managing the subsistence economy and maintaining healthy relationships with the land, animals and other resources.

● A. “Lendix’ tcux” 1. Case Brief - histoire allégorique autochtone sur la création d’animaux et les relations avec eux.

○ The story reveals a process of negotiating with people, overcoming obstacles and creating

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animals and fish. Through these processes, the acquisition of jurisdiction over the Tsilhqot’in country is achieved in two ways: First, through the creation of reciprocal obligations in relationships; and second, through the acquisition of power over the other inhabitants. The initial reaction to the idea of Lendix’tcux creating animals from the various parts of the moose, and fish from the beaver, may be disbelief; however, the world that results from such creations is what begins to establish the acquisition of jurisdictional authority. Creating something produces a concept of ownership embraced in the law of property in the common law. The creation of life itself produces legal rights and obligations and may also produce property law rights.

○ The lives Lendix’tcux creates are gifts to the recipient life-bearers themselves, to the land and the water, to the other inhabitants. The initial gift launches a perpetual cycle that binds Lendix’tcux and his Tsilhqot’in descendents for all time.

■ In order to reciprocate, the original giver must protect and maintain the habitat (environment) required to produce and reproduce the new life. This is the cycle. If the original giver or his or her descendants fail to renew the other life, the relationship breaks down and eventually the giver will suffer the loss in the form of collapse of the entire system. This gift cycle definition begins to describe the relationship Indigenous peoples have with the land and environment.

■ Notions of power invoke more than mere control over others. They can also invoke spirit power. Spirit power includes the sacred power contained in the spirits of the ancestors, the Creator, natural forces and the unique powers in individual wildlife.

B. “The Young Man and Dt’an (Famine)” - histoire sur la famine et la responsabilité d’être prudent avec la nourritureThe story of Dt’an includes an example of all five of Borrows’ sources of Indigenous law.”

● The sharing of information represents deliberative law. ● The spiritual source arises in Dt’an, an entity who represents death through starvation, and

travels in fog and billowing snow.● The natural source is within the lake and fish as providers of food and life, to which the young

man (and people) must respect by avoiding waste● The positivistic aspect of the law is that explicit statements are made.● Continued observance of the prohibition through time, up to and including the present continued

efforts to protect their lakes from destructive mining operations, is an example of customary law. The story represents a prohibition against wasting food resources, and by natural extension, the habitats and other sources of those resources. Prohibition against waste is a limited category of the common law applied to life estates, where legal and equitable waste guide appropriate uses of land depending on the legal status of ownership. The purpose of mentioning this is to identify that the category of waste is recognized in common law regarding the life estate of an individual, and should not be confused with the status of Aboriginal title, which is a “collective right to land held by all members of an aboriginal nation.” Bearing Aboriginal title in mind, the story’s prohibition of waste is consistent with the definition provided by Chief Justice Lamer (AP : in Delgamuukw) regarding the title’s inherent limit that prevents uses of land that are inconsistent with the Nation’s “special bond” with the land. By way of example, Chief Justice Lamer indicated that land used for hunting could not then later be used for “strip mining.” Ironically, the Tsilhqot’in government is fighting to uphold its law to preserve lakes used for fishing against the threat of destruction by a proposed mine. (Taseko) http://vancouversun.com/business/local-business/first-nation-angry-over-timing-of-permits-issued-for-controversial-new-prosperity-mineIV. TSILHQOT’IN LAW IN PRACTICE: DESCRIPTION OF INDIGENOUS TITLEThe seasonal round is rich in complexity. The process involves resource gathering such as hunting,

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gathering and fishing in small units. However, it also serves other functions such as providing a means of monitoring the boundary for incursions by outsiders without permission or escort.This specific purpose is inferred by the concern neighbouring Indigenous peoples had when approaching Tsilhqot’in territory, and would refuse to enter without permission. The recognition of Tsilhqot’in territory was not limited to other Indigenous people, as colonial officials also knew they required permission to enter.’ Stripped of context, “roaming” is portrayed purely as a physical act of movement that animals do. Applying this particular description to humans removes the practical agency involved insofar as these movements through the territory are unreasoned and devoid of contemplation or purpose. Certainly, the Tsilhqot’in quickly knew when Royal Engineers entered the territory without permission in 1864, and the information spread rapidly, revealing another purpose for the round.Communicating information to other people was an important aspect in order to respond to potential trouble. The activity of communication supports the assertion of jurisdiction over the territory. The process of traveling through the land is deliberate. Based upon the stories, the act establishes the relationships required to secure the power that bestows jurisdiction. Along with authority, the need for mobility is also conferred to the Tsilhqot’in descendants. Maintaining jurisdiction necessarily requires knowing who is entering the territory, communicating information, maintaining the subsistence economy and fulfilling the continuous obligation established in “Lendix’tcux” to renew all relationships. Justice Lamer in Van der Peet held that the Court must accept that traditional practices are not frozen in time and are exercised in modern forms. These continued practices constitute the contemporary round, allowing the Tsilhqot’in to fulfill ancestral obligations to the land and its inhabitants. Based upon this understanding, the round is not a nomadic wandering, but the deliberate act of governing.The act of ancestors turning to stone anchors the stories to the land in both time and space. The cyclical motion of time renews the annual obligation to set out and make the round to renew the relationships. Conceptually, the stones mark the spot where the round begins and ends, and reifies the obligations the ancestor Lendix’tcux created.Core principles:This paper proposes to hold the Supreme Court to task by giving Indigenous legal traditions equal weight to the common law. At the nexus of this equality at law, Aboriginal title (the common law perspective) and Indigenous title (the Indigenous legal perspective) merge to produce a concept of title borne of both from which the kernel of” true reconciliation” manifests.Use: Intéressant papier qui ressasse les grands principes issus des arrêts de la CS au regard de territoire ancestral, tout en faisant voir l’aspect territorial derrière le nomadisme de la nation Tsilhqot’in.

CLASS 9: John Borrows[missing] Borrows plenary notes

Chilkat Indian Village Tribal Court: Chilkat Indian Village, IRA v. Johnson, et al., No. 90-01 (Chilkat Tr. Ct., Nov. 3, 1993)Background:

➢ Non-native art dealer took artifacts from the village➢ Village seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, + monetary damages➢ Can the village use tribal law in their own court against a non-indigenous person?

(jurisdiction question)➢ Applicable law is tribal law comprised of written and unwritten customary law ➢ Written: nobody can enter and take artifacts without permission from the village➢ Seven member village council has power to decide➢ tribe has authority to adjudicate matters of a civil and criminal nature, arising within the

geographic limits of the real property owned by the VillageIssues:

● (1) whether the Whale House rain screen and four house posts constitute "artifacts, clan crests, or

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other Indian art works" within the meaning of the relevant tribal ordinance; ● (2) whether the tribe has the power to enforce the ordinance against the defendants, including the

non-Indian art dealer, Michael Johnson (“MJ”) and his corporation; ● (3) whether any or all of the defendants violated the ordinance; ● (4) whether defendants have presented any defenses which preclude judgment against any or all

of them; and ● (5) whether defendants can pursue counterclaims against the tribe, and if so, whether such

counterclaims have been established. ● Also → appropriate relief and other remedial orders?

Discussion:➢ MJ had been soliciting the members of the tribe for many years, offering large sums for their

artifacts. ➢ Most witnesses agreed that the artifacts belong to the entire tribe. ➢ On the subject of ownership and sale of crest objects: “such objects, which can include songs and

stories, cannot be "owned;" there is no way to put a price on spirits, and certainly no hitsati, i.e., caretaker of a tribal house, has the right to unilaterally dispose of clan crest objects...the artifacts should remain in the village, and that the spirits will feel better upon the return of the artifacts...”

➢ significance is to provide a sense of history and identity. Not a commodity➢ Some members of the Tlingit tribe caved to the pressure from MJ, and drew up contracts to

sell the artifacts. Others were very opposed to this and maintain they had no right to sell them, especially without consultation.

➢ Two previous attempts to remove the artifacts in the 70s were thwarted by direct action of the community

Conclusion: I. The Whale House Rain Screen and House Posts as Artifacts, Clan Crests, and Indian Art Within the Meaning of the Ordinance

● Artifacts created around 1830 to unite several houses● If sold on open market would fetch several million dollars● Lots of historic resistance to any sale of these items ● Those who finally did sell them regret their decision and want them returned. ● The court decides they are artifacts within the meaning of the ordinance

II. Power of the Village to Enact the Ordinance and Enforce it Against the Defendants● Chilkat Tribe had authority to enact the 1976 Ordinance based on federal common law, the

village's IRA constitution, + its retained, inherent authority● No debate that MJ and the defendants entered into contractual relations● the tribe has the authority to regulate these consensual relations, and that it has jurisdiction

in this respect over non-Indian defendants MJ and his corporation.● The trial evidence convincingly demonstrated the continuing importance of the artifacts to the

tribe. ○ removal of the artifacts had a direct effect on and posed a distinct threat to the political

integrity, health, and welfare of the tribe. III. Violation of the Ordinance by Defendants

● abundant evidence that all of the defendants, including MJ, violated the 1976 Ordinance. He orchestrated the removal, and didn’t bother to come to the trial

● When some members refused him, he went to others. He financed a lawsuit and other efforts to remove the artifacts

● MJ knew of the 1976 ordinance, but persisted despite it. Never requested permission of the council before removal.

● The fact that MJ was 22 miles away in the town of Haines during the physical removal of the artifacts does not absolve him from culpability for violating the ordinance.

● Court concludes that he and his corporation violated the ordinance

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IV. Defendants' Defenses● the defendants intend to rely primarily on two defenses: (1) that under Tlingit custom, they

had no choice but to obey their uncle, Clarence Hotch, and (2) that traditional Tlingit culture is dead, and thus tribal law is not valid. The incompatibility of these mutually exclusive assertions has not escaped notice by the court.

● As adult members of their clan, they did have the right to question their uncle● in order to obey their uncle, the defendants had to disobey a contrary directive by their uncle

Victor Hotch who didn’t want them to sell the artifacts● The argument that Tlingit culture is essentially dead unsupported by evidence. The village

maintains and nourishes its culture-even though, like any culture, it’s dynamic and ever-changing ● court concludes that no legal defense has been established by defendants.

Relief and Order● As a matter of tribal law the artifacts must be returned. Placing them in the Whale House will

return the parties to the status before the illegal 1984 removal. ● Plaintiff seeks damages from (a) defendants and (b) MJ (due to his pernicious role)● The defendants were being greedy, but they had also been misled by the bad faith actions of MJ,

who convinced them they had the right to sell artifacts. They regret their actions and want them returned. MJ on the other hand, acted in bad faith all along, and refused to participate in the trial.

● Order: Artifacts to be returned at MJ’s expense + MJ pays court costs for the plaintiffs. No punitive damages.

CLASS 10: Tenure, Estates

[missing] Piper plenary notes

Barbara Pierre, “Classification of Property and Conceptions of Ownership in Civil and Common Law” (1997) 28:2 RGD 235.

● Classifications between common law and civil law cannot be homologized.● “Ownership is the institution employed in civil law to describe man’s interaction with all things,

whether land of objects… It denotes the totality of powers that can be exercised over… The right is therefore described as absolute, and ipso facto, unitary.”

● Civil law doesn’t distinguish between ownership of immovable and movable like the common law does.

● The notion of ownership in civil law is confounded with the object itself; it is a real right in the thing, rather than a right against others, as it is in common law.

● The ownership bundle can be split, but there is always only one right of ownership for a parcel of land.

● Matamajaw was wrongly decide because the JCPC thought personal servitudes were not real rights.

F.W. Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law (1909). a "form of action" has implied a particular original process, a particular mesne process, a particular final process, a particular mode of pleading, of trial, of judgment.

● The modern writ is in form a command by the king addressed to the defendant telling him no more than that within eight days he is to appear in an action at the suit of the plaintiff, and telling him that in default of his so doing the plaintiff may proceed in his action and obtain a judgment.

● a well-known classification of the forms [according to Blackstone]: they were (1) real, (2) personal, (3) mixed. Real actions, which concern real property only, are such whereby the plaintiff claims title to have any lands, or tenements, rents, commons, or other hereditaments in fee simple, fee tail or for term of life.

● Write of right

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○ Everyone therefore who demands freehold land must obtain a writ○ The [writ of right] is the beginning of a proprietary action, one in which the demandant

relies on right, not merely on seisin.● Possessory assizes

○ it is an action competent to a person who has been turned out of possession, and competent against the person who turned him out

● Write of debt○ The writ of Debt … is almost an exact copy of the Writ of Right, a certain sum of money

being substituted for a certain piece of land. … The non-payment of a debt seems regarded as a "deforcement", an unjust and forcible detention of money that belongs to the creditor.

● Detinue○ The defendant is charged with an unjust detainer○ the defendant when worsted is always allowed the option of surrendering the goods or

paying assessed damages.○ Goods and chattels are personal not real property

● Trespass○ Trespass appears circa 1250 as a means of charging a defendant with violence but no

felony.○ The opinion comes to prevail that the action is real if a favourable judgment gives

possession of lands, tenements and hereditaments, personal if damages are awarded and mixed if both lands and damages are recovered.

[missing] William de Montmollin Marler & Georges C Marler, The Law of Real Property (Toronto: Burroughs, 1932) at 13-18

B Ziff, “Warm Reception in a Cold Climate: English Property Law and the Suppression of the Canadian Legal Identity” in John McLaren, AR Buck & Nancy E Wright, eds, Despotic Dominion: Property Rights in British Settler Societies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005) 103.Reception of most English Property laws were accepted as suitable to the circumstances, physical, economic and social Canadian experience.Two Reasons English Property law was accepted in Canada:1. Convenient, pointless to recreate the wheel, and absence of adoption would create uncertainty.

a. There was nothing in the English law that couldn’t be adopted to Canadab. Tenure was already irrelevant, so didn’t matter that it was received.

2. Normative – there was resolute confidence in the superiority of English lawa. English law was seen as a repository of centuries of collected wisdom.

Discarding the collected wisdom risked taking a step backwards rather than moving forward.

[missing] Mabo v Queensland [No 2] , (1992) 175 CLR 1 (High Court of Australia).

Jeanne L Schroeder “Chix nix bundle-o-stix” (1994) 93 Michigan L Rev 239 at 266-268.The concept of realty as a specific plot of land occupied and exploited by a single owner is a relatively modern development in Angloamerican cultureHistorically, real property consisted of the system of estates• Numerous persons held different property rights with respect to a given piece of realty• Indeed, the traditional dichotomy between real and personal property may originally have been in large part jurisdictional rather than substantiveo Real property rights referred not to property interests relating to land per se but to those causes of action for specific relief that could be brought in the king's courtAlthough many of these medieval estates exist only as vestigial organs in late-20th century

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America, other partial estates have taken their place

R. Scane, “Notes on Life Estates and Estates in Fee Tail”.➢ Life Estate

○ Definition:Estates whose duration is measured by the lifetime of a person, or of persons - a definite period of uncertain duration are estates of freehold.

■ NOT estates of inheritance!○ Two classes:

■ (1) Conventional life estates arose as a result of the intention of the grantor of the estate to create an estate of this nature

● Life estate pur sa vie○ the measuring life is that of the tenant of the estate

● To A for life○ "to A during the period of A's own life".

● Life estate pur autre vie○ the measuring life might be a person other than the tenant,

i.e: in the conveyance "to Joan, for the life of Susan".➢ Nemo dat quod non habet

○ you cannot give what you do not have. The original owner here has an estate measured by his or her own life and can only grant that, or something less than that, to another.

○ As mentioned, life estates pur sa vie are not estates of inheritance and therefore cannot descend to the life tenant's heir on death

➢ General occupant○ on Joan's death before that of Susan, the first person to enter upon the land after Joan's

death, and take possession of it, was entitled to enjoy the balance of the estate (that is, until Susan's death) as "General Occupant".

➢ Special occupant○ If the land was originally granted "to Joan and her heirs for the life of Susan", then the

person who was Joan's heir was entitled to occupy the land until Susan's death, as a "Special Occupant"

➢ In Ontario today a life estate pur autre vie may be disposed of by will: Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S-26, s. 2 (a). If the holder fails to dispose of it by will, it will descend to the next-of-kin: Estates Administration Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E-22, s. 2.

● (2)Life estates arose by implication of law○ No longer exist in ON

Estate in Fee Tail● Definition:A fee tail is a "cut down" fee simple. It is an estate which descends by inheritance

only to a person in the direct line of issue from the original grantee in fee tail.○ The form of limitation to create a fee tail was to add to the traditional words of limitation

to create a fee simple so-called "words of procreation": "to Joan and the heirs of her body".

● Various types of fee tail○ the Fee Tail Male: "To John and the heirs male of his body" . Here only male

descendants who could trace their descent from John through an unbroken male line could inherit.

○ the Fee Tail General: "To John and the heirs of his body". Here any direct lineal descendant of John was eligible to inherit.

● Inconveniences○ the fee tail ran counter to the more general thrust of the common law towards making

land freely alienable.

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➢ Remember that the amendment to the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act noted above only prevented the creation of fee tails; it did not abolish existing ones.

Sir Robert Edgar Megarry & William Wade, The Law of Real Property , 6th ed by Charles Harpum, Stuart Bridge & Martin Dixon (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000) at para 3-056.Complete text of reading: “The difference between a determinable fee and a fee simple defeasible by condition subsequent is not always easy to discern. The essential distinction is that the determining event in a determinable fee itself sets the limit for the estate first granted. A condition subsequent, on the other hand, is an independent clause added to a limitation of a complete fee simple absolute which operates so as to defeat it. Thus a devise to a school in fee simple "until it ceases to publish its accounts" creates a determinable fee, whereas a devise to the school in fee simple "on condition that the accounts are published annually" creates a fee simple defeasible by condition subsequent. Words such as "while," "during," "as long as," "until" and so on are apt for the creation of a determinable fee, whereas words which form a separate clause of defeasance, such as "provided that," "on condition that," "but if," or "if it happen that," operate as a condition subsequent.”

Re McColgan, [1969] 2 OR 152 (HCJ)Facts: M died 1967, bequeathing “all property … unto my Trustee upon the following trusts: … to hold my property … as a home for Mary Kovalchick … until her death or until she is not residing therein personally”, with taxes and upkeep to be paid from a fund. Kovalchick was residing with M at the time of his death, but had to return to her native USA a few months later to receive care for an illness; before leaving she wrote to solicitors informing them of her absence and stating that she retained her rights. Trustees kept legal fee simple in this property. Questions then arose about responsibility for various expenses in connection with upkeep à this application brought.Issue: what interest passed to Kovalchick on M’s death?Holding: Absolute life estate.Reasoning: Question is not what testator meant to do, but what the written words he used mean (“expressed intentions”). Bound by decided cases, but when the decision revolves around the meaning of words and not a rule or principle of law, must attend to peculiar circumstances of each case . Language of the will goes beyond what would create a mere license – intended to create an interest in land (here, a life estate that is qualified in some way). Must consider (1) whether life estate is determinable or defeasible, and then (2) whether qualification is valid or void, and (3) if valid whether determining event or condition subsequent has or has not occurred.Cheshire: condition subsequent that is void or becomes impossible of fulfillment is disregarded, and gift takes effect as if condition was not imposed; determinable interest fails entirely if terminating event is void under the rules in question, because treating it as absolute alters its quantum as fixed by the limitation.Megarry and Wade: difference is really one of words; whether words limit utmost time of continuance of the estate, or mark an event which (if it takes place in the course of that time) will defeat an estate already granted; a limitation marks the bounds or compass of the estate, while a condition defeats the estate before its attains its boundary.Word “until” would usually suggest a determinable interest – but “until her death” could just be indicating a life interest. Words “until her death or until she is not residing therein personally” are external to the limitation, thus creating an interest upon condition. Condition “until she is not residing there personally” is vague: easy to demonstrate compliance, but difficult to show breach à condition fails completely à Kovalchick gets an absolute life estate.M intended enjoyment of the property as a home not to be dependent on beneficiaries’ own monetary resources à if Kovalchick needs housekeeping, gardening, etc., fund should pay it. Kovalchick can lease the premises or any part of them.

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Ratio: Characterisation of a qualification is crucial to assessment of the granted or devised interest. Must consider (1) whether life estate is determinable or defeasible, and then (2) whether qualification is valid or void, and (3) if valid whether determining event or condition subsequent has or has not occurred. // Clavering v. Ellison (1859): where vested estate is to be defeated by a condition, condition must be such that court can see from the beginning, precisely and distinctly, upon the happening of what event it was that the preceding vested estate was to determine.Notes: (1) The issue of whether this estate is subject to a condition precedent is not addressed. (2) Rephrasing the devise to remove mention of Kovalchick’s death would have made it possible for her, if condition was voided, to take an absolute fee simple. Cf. the arguably similar situation but opposite verdict in Rynard: criteria are enunciated but not applied with great consistency. (3) The court here likely knew that the qualification was going to be void, and then characterised the interest such that Kovalchick would get something rather than nothing (maybe it was important that she’d cared for M, that the potential residual beneficiary didn’t show up, etc.)

Sifton v Sifton, [1938] 3 All ER 435 (Ont PC)Facts: Miss Sifton is entitles to a certain sum of money from her father, “only so long as she shall continue to reside in Canada”. She was able to study in Europe; however, she would now like to travel again and wishes to know under what conditions she may do so. She and the trustees are seeking an interpretation of the clause from the courts.Issue: xHolding: Void for uncertaintyReasoning: Lord Romer: If an estate is to be defeated by a condition, that condition must be such that a court can identify from the very beginning exactly what the required event may be. The word “reside” is far too vague for there to be any interpretation, except possibly one based upon the specific facts of the case. He must have intended that, though Canada was to be her home in general, yet she was to be at liberty to leave Canada for some purposes and for some periods of time. Unfortunately, he omitted to define either the purposes or the periods.Ratio: If the clause is a condition subsequent, it can be of no validity, for no judge could have clearly identified the event that would make the grant cease.Note: The court further found that the condition was defeasible, not determinable. Therefore the condition could be struck down, yet the grant could remain.

Clayton v Ramsden, [1943] AC 320 (HL)Facts: Dans son testament, un homme lègue à sa fille un héritage substantiel. Mais il met une condition : que si un jour sa fille se marie, elle doit marier un homme de “jewish parentage”. Dans le cas contraire, son héritage serait confisqué (forfeiture). Elle se marie à une homme qui tous reconnaît qu’il n’est pas d’origine juive. Le couple veut faire annuler la clause du testament.Issue: La condition au testament est-elle valide? NON. Répond-elle au test de clarté précédemment établi en jurisprudence? NON.Holding: Non. La clause au testament est invalidée, car elle pas assez précise. L’intention du testateur ne peut être prise en compte parce qu'il n'a pas choisi de l'exprimer - en des termes suffisamment équivoques, mais cela ne justifie pas que le tribunal lui fasse un nouveau testament et le traite comme s'il avait exprimé une intention complètement différente.Reasoning: Les tribunaux ont toujours insisté sur le fait que les conditions de défaisance, pour être valables, doivent être encadrées de telle sorte que les personnes concernées (ou le tribunal, s'il leur demande conseil) puissent d'emblée savoir avec certitude l'événement exact au cours duquel leurs intérêts doivent être cédés.

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Ce test est issu de Clavering v. Ellison et reconfirmé dans Sifton v. Sifton.Dans le cas présent, il est impossible de déterminer ce que la clause “d’origine juive” signifie exactement. - Parle-t-on de pratique de la religion? Si oui, quel degré de dévotion serait jugé acceptable par le défunt? - Parle-t-on de la race? I.e voulait-il que son futur gendre ait du sang juif? Si oui, encore une fois, à quel degré? - Ces détails ne sont pas définis au testament.Ratio: Le droit d’un testateur de mettre des conditions à l’héritage est incontestable, mais dans un tel cas, il lui appartient de définir avec la plus grande précision et dans le langage le plus clair les événements dans lesquels la déchéance de l'intérêt accordé au bénéficiaire doit avoir lieu.

Re Noble v Wolf, [1949] 4 DLR 375 (Ont CA)Facts: Un promoteur foncier a spécifié qu’un terrain - situé dans une colonie de vacances pour familles - ne pouvait pas être utilisé ou vendu à des Juifs ou à des personnes de couleur pendant 15 ans. Le propriétaire essaie de le vendre à une personne juive et veut rendre cette condition inapplicable.Issue: (1) La clause restrictive est-elle illégale, nulle et inapplicable, étant contraire à l'ordre public? NON. (2) Ladite clause est-elle nulle et inapplicable pour incertitude? NON.Ces questions avaient pourtant été répondues par la positive dans un cas précédent en common law : Re Drummond Wren . Holding: La clause est valide et exécutoire.Reasoning: La clause n’est pas contre l’ordre public : I am of the opinion that the judgment in Re Drummond Wren is wrong in law and should not be followed. I do not know that we have, in Ontario, a public policy concerning this matter. I do know that in thousands of ways there exist restrictions which have always existed, and always will continue to exist, by which people are enabled to exercise a choice with respect to their friends and neighbours, and I can think of no reason why a group of people who have adopted a manner of living during two or three months of the year as a summer colony, and who have by agreement among them placed restrictions upon those who may become owners of that colony, are infringing the rights of anybody. // Mrs. Noble is bound by her covenant entered into knowingly and willingly, and of which she has had the benefit for a period of 15 years, and in my opinion this Court should not lend itself to enable a breach of it. The sanctity of contract is a matter of public policy which we should strive to maintain. // Pas d’incertitude : With regard to the argument that the covenant is bad for uncertainty, in my opinion a common-sense reading of the covenant makes its interpretation certain and unquestionable. I am unable to understand why we should enter into refinements as to the percentage of blood which constitutes any person a member of the Jewish, Hebrew, Semitic, negro or coloured race or blood. Mr. Cartwright, in his able argument, agreed that in his opinion the ingenuity of man is not equal to framing a covenant of this kind which would be certain.C'est une communauté d'été où les gens décidé innocemment entre eux d'exclure les autres. L'harmonie interraciale est bonne, mais elle ne peut pas être imposée aux gens par les lois. Les faits sont différents que dans Re Drummond Wren : dans ce cas, il n’y avait pas de limite de temps spécifié et le terrain n’avait pas d’utilisation visée de façon spécifique, comme c’est le cas ici. // Concurrence 1: Aucune politique publique + le contrat est sacré. // Concurrence 2: Liberté d'association : it seems to me unarguable that an association of land owners by means of common covenants is contrary to the long accepted principle of freedom of association - and that only when such association becomes unreasonable and, unduly oppressive of the public generally, should it be restricted or voided either by the Courts or the Legislatures. Concurrence 3: Les tribunaux devraient être extrêmement prudents lorsqu'ils se lancent dans une politique publiqueRatio: (1) Les droits de common law ne doivent pas être réputés abrogés par la loi, à moins que la législation ne le prévoie expressément. (2) En cas de doute sur l'existence d'une politique publique dominante, le bénéfice du doute est étendu au contrat.

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CLASS 11: What is property anyway?

Ministre de la Justice du Québec, Commentaires du ministre de la Justice : le Code civil du Québec (Quebec: Publications du Québec, 1993), “Livre quatrième : des biens”.THESIS: Explication des différentes parties du Livre 4 du Code Civil KEY POINTS:Titre Premier: De la distinction des biens et de leur appropriation (art. 899 à 946 CcQ)Spécification relatives à la classification des biens meubles et immeubles

1. La réforme du Code a fait disparaître la division des immeubles en immeubles par nature.Titre deuxième: De la propriété (art. 947 à 1008 CcQ)Cette section traite de la nature et de l’étendue du droit de propriété , de l’accession et des règles particulières à la propriété immobilière.

● La réforme du Code a changé un peu la notion du droit de propriété comme droit absolue en y aménageant les droits respectifs de multiples propriétaires et en protégeant l’intérêt général (ex: règles sur le zonage et règles d’urbanisme). Ce droit est susceptibles de modalités diverses qui sont devenues plus usuelles avec le temps.

● Le Code pose aussi le principe qu’on doit accepter les inconvénients normaux du voisinage et il considère les limitations, tels le bornage te l’écoulement des eaux, non pas comme des servitudes, mais plutôt comme des limitations au droit de propriété, imposées par le voisinage ou la situation des lieux. Il introduit également, dans ces limitations, des règles sur l’usage des eaux, les arbres, l’accès au fonds d’autrui et l’empiétement.

● Spécificité de l’art. 947: Sur les modalités et les démembrements - On traite des modalités de la propriété lorsque les règles de droit régissent les rapports de plusieurs personnes qui ont un droit de propriété complet comportant tous les attributs de la propriété, usage, jouissance et libre disposition. On parle cependant de démembrement lorsque deux ou plusieurs personnes possèdent chacune un ou plusieurs attributs du droit de propriété sur un même bien, mais non tous.

Article 544 du Code civil français. 544. La propriété est le droit de jouir et disposer des choses de la manière la plus absolue, pourvu qu’on n’en fasse pas un usage prohibé par les lois ou par les règlements.

Article 406 du Code civil du Bas-Canada. 406. La propriété est le droit de jouir et de disposer des choses de la manière la plus absolue, pourvu qu’on n’en fasse pas un usage prohibé par les lois ou les règlements.

Civil Code Revision Office, Report on the Quebec Civil Code: Draft Civil Code (Quebec: Éditeur officiel, 1978), art 34.34. La propriété est le droit d’user, de jouir et de disposer des choses de la manière la plus complète, dans les limites et aux conditions établies par la loi.

Bill 58, An Act to Add the Reformed Law of Property to the Civil Code of Quebec , Quebec, 1963. 988. La propriété est le droit pour une personne d’user, de joui et de disposer librement et complètement d’un bien dans les limites établies par la loi et suivant les conditions d’exercice qu’elle peut fixer.

Sylvio Normand, Introduction au droit des biens , 2nd ed (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2014) at 83–150. THESIS: Explications des développements du droit de propriété, descriptions de ses composantes et de ses limitations.KEY POINTS:Historique:

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Mode féodal: Le droit coutumier envisage le rapport de la personne aux biens de manière pragmatique: le pouvoir exercé sur un bien = la saisine.

● Saisine = le droit auquel une personne peut prétendre sur un bien dépend du contrôle effectif qu’elle exerce sur celui-ci. La saisine suppose un usage et une exploitation du bien. Toutes les utilités qu’un bien est susceptible d’offrir peuvent être l’objet de saisines. Sur un même lieu, il peut y avoir plusieurs titulaires de saisines qui jouissent de leur droit successivement ou concurremment. En revanche, un bien qui n’offre aucune utilité ne peut être objet de saisine.

Révolution française: La propriété est considérée comme un droit naturel et est officiellement reconnue comme un droit de l’homme et du citoyen. On abolit le système féodal et il y a une hostilité par rapport aux biens collectifs.

➢ Le Code Civil Français en 1804 consacre la propriété individuelle comme étant la base de l’organisation sociale. La propriété est alors perçue comme un droit souverain, exclusif et perpétuel. “Le corps entier du Code civil est consacré à définir tout ce qui peut tenir à l’exercice du droit de propriété; droit fondamental sur lequel toutes les institutions sociales reposent, et qui, pour chaque individu, est aussi précieux que la vie même, puisqu’il lui assure les moyens de la conserver” (Portalis)

Au Québec: Le droit coutumier persiste jusqu’au milieu du 19e siècle. ● Le Parlement du Canada-Uni procède à l’abolition du régime féodale en 1854 et cette

intervention législative amène une mutation de la propriété qui est désormais unifiée entre les mains de son titulaire. L’art. 406 du C.c.B-C. est donc écrit de la même façon que le Code civil Français.

● La Charte des droits et libertés de la personne reconnaît, comme droit fondamental, le droit à la jouissance paisible et à leur libre disposition.

○ Le droit de propriété n’a par contre pas été enchâssé dans la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés.

Définition:La propriété confère à son titulaire la maîtrise matérielle et juridique d’un bien. Elle constitue l’expression d’une souveraineté sur l’objet du droit.

➢ Les attributs du droit de propriété: le droit d’usage, le droit de jouissance, le droit de disposition et le droit d’accession

➢ Les caractères du droit de propriété: absolu, exclusif et perpétuel.En raisons de certaines limitations imposées par la loi ou par convention, le droit de propriété peut plutôt être considéré comme: le droit de tirer d’une chose tous ses services sauf exception, et chaque service particulier peut, à l’occasion, faire partie des exceptions.

● Droit des autochtones: la notion de propriété telle qu’établie en droit canadien est inadéquate pour décrire le lien des Autochtones avec la terre. Un principe de base du régime foncier autochtone veut que la terre et les ressources qu’elle comprend et produit ne puissent être attribuées en exclusivité à une personne. Les Autochtones privilégient la mise en commun des ressources.

Attributs:Le droit d’user (usus):Le droit de jouir (fructus):Le droit de disposer (abusus):Le droit d'accession (accessio): se divise en deux aspects - matériel et juridique

● Aspect matériel: Le propriétaire a la capacité de faire sien ce que génère le bien et ce qui s’y greffe: “la propriété du bien donne droit à ce qu’il produit, et à ce qui s’y unit, de façon naturelle ou artificielle, dès l’union. Ce droit se nomme l’accession” (948 CcQ).

● Aspect juridique: Capacité du propriétaire à récupérer les fragments épars du droit de propriété.Caractères:Ce sont ces caractères qui permettent d’affirmer la plénitude du droit de propriété et ce, avec encore plus d’assurance que le libellé du Code ne l’énonce.

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Absolu (947 CcQ): Signifie que la propriété constitue le droit réel le plus étendu qui soit. Elle transmet à son titulaire la maîtrise totale d’un bien, alors que les autres droits réels ne confèrent que des maîtrises partielles. Le propriétaire peut à loisir utiliser son bien sans reconnaître l’existence d’un droit supérieur au sien. Mais la primauté de la propriété ne signifie pas que ce droit soit illimité.Exclusif: Le propriétaire est seul à prétendre à l’ensemble des attributs sur l’objet de son droit. Le propriétaire à le droit de défendre sa propriété et il bénéficie d’un arsenal de recours propres à assurer la défense de sa propriété.Perpétuel: Veut dire que ce droit dure aussi longtemps que le bien sur lequel il porte. Il découle de cette assertion que la propriété s’éteint par la perte du bien qui résulte de sa destruction ou de son abandon.Modifications de la propriété:Démembrements: le démembrement amène un partage des prérogatives entre le propriétaire, d’une part, et le titulaire du démembrement d’autre part. Il y a quatre titres: l’usufruit, l’usage, l’emphytéose, la servitude.Objet du droit de propriété:La propriété repose sur deux pôles: un sujet de droit et un objet ou, autrement dit, un propriétaire et le bien sous sa maîtrise.Particularités: Le droit de propriété porte nécessairement sur un bien qui peut être corporel ou incorporel (les propriétés incorporelles, les titres négociables et les créances - 899 CcQ). L’objet ne comprend donc pas que des biens matériels, il inclut aussi des biens dématérialisés.Propriété foncière: La propriété foncière occupe une longueur, une largeur et une hauteur/profondeur. Elle occupe donc un volume.

● Le sol: Le propriétaire a la pleine propriété de la couche de terre arable et de ce qui s’y trouve. Cette mince surface correspond au plan cadastral.

● Le dessus: La propriété d’un fonds de terre donne droit de réaliser, au-dessus du sol, des constructions, ouvrages ou plantations (951 al. 2 CcQ). Le droit s’élève jusqu’à la hauteur de l’espace qu’on peut considérer comme étant susceptible de donner lieu à une occupation. Cela veut dire qu’il existe des limitations quant aux constructions en hauteur du sol (ex: limitation de la hauteur des constructions en bordure des aéroports).

● Le dessous: Le propriétaire possède au-dessous du solles mêmes facultés qui lui sont accordées au-dessus (951 al. 2 CcQ). La loi le reconnaît maître du sous-sol et de ce qu’il contient et il a la faculté d’y entreprendre des travaux dans la mesure de ses capacités d’accès aux profondeurs (ce droit est aussi sujet à des limitations).

Restrictions législatives à la propriété:La législation particulière pose d’importantes restrictions au droit de propriété. Plusieurs lois visent à assurer une mise en valeur harmonieuse des collectivités en empêchant un développement anarchique du territoire. Exemples:

● Loi sur le patrimoine culturel: a pour mission la préservation du patrimoine et protège les biens culturels (besoin de l’autorisation du ministre des Affaires culturelles pour y porter atteinte)

● Loi sur la Régie du logement: dans le but de préserver le nombre de logements locatifs, empêche la démolition de logements et l’aliénation d’immeubles situés dans des ensembles immobiliers (entre autres..)

● Loi sur la qualité de l'environnement: a pour fonction de veiller à ce que soit limitée la pollution de l’environnement, interdit l’émission d’un contaminant, prévoit la démolition d’immeubles en état sérieux d’insalubrité, etc.

Protection de la propriété:Actions principales:

● Action en reconnaissance d’un droit réel (912 CcQ): Action pétitoire - Ouverte au propriétaire et à tout autre titulaire d’un droit réel. La partie demanderesse doit établir la preuve du titre qui fonde l’existence du droit réel et prouver l’atteinte au droit.

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● Action en revendication d’un bien (953 CcQ): Action pétitoire - Permet au propriétaire de revendiquer un bien contre le possesseur ou celui qui le détient sans droit. Elle permet de s’opposer à tout empiètement ou à tout usage non autorisé du bien. Elle est ouverte au propriétaire contre le possesseur. La preuve du titre est essentiel.

● C’est la Cour Supérieure qui a le pouvoir de se prononcer sur un recours de nature pétitoire (exclusivement).

Recours auxiliaires: l’injonction (751 CPC) et l’action en dommages-intérêts (1457 CcQ) constituent des recours auxiliaires fréquents.

Madeleine Cantin-Cumyn et Michelle Cumyn, « La notion de biens » dans Sylvio Normand, dir, Mélanges offerts au professeur François Frenette : études portant sur le droit patrimonial , Québec, Presses de l’Université Laval, 2006, 127.THESIS: Réitère que les biens se caractérise comme immeuble ou meuble et corporel ou incorporel - fait état de certains cas d’exception.KEY POINTS:La notion de biens dans le Code civil du Québec

● Distingue les biens selon qu’ils sont meubles ou immeubles et selon qu’ils sont corporels ou incorporels. Tout bien doit donc être placé dans la catégorie des meubles ou des immeubles, et aussi être qualifié comme bien corporel (res corporalis) ou incorporel (res incorporales).

● Le caractère mobilier ou immobilier est déterminé par l’application des articles 900 à 903 CcQ.○ Les droits de créance et les droits intellectuels sont meubles par détermination de la loi:

en effet, le critère de mobilité ou de fixité ne leur est pas applicable.● P. 138-139 talks about the different ways the term “biens” can be understood (author ends each

sentence by saying it’s basically very ambiguous… so there ya go).L’affaire Greenberg c Gruber

➢ Facts: Le litige principal opposait trois associés, actionnaires en parts égales de deux compagnies différentes. Les associés avaient convenu dans un écrit non signé qu’un seul d’entre eux serait inscrit comme actionnaire de l’une des compagnies alors que les deux autres étaient les seuls actionnaires enregistrés et l’autre compagnie. À la suite d’une mésentente entre les associés, les actionnaires inscrits de cette dernière compagnie ont écarté le demandeur de la gestion de l’entreprise et rejeté la prétention qu’il soit aussi actionnaire un tiers des actions.

➢ Décision où la Cour d’appel a statué que le droit de propriété n’est pas assujetti à la prescription extinctive parce que c’est un droit “perpétuel”. Le droit peut seulement être “perdu” si les actionnaires auraient acquis les parts de Greenberg par la voie de la prescription acquisitive (en prouvant un droit réel par une possession utile pendant le temps requis pour la prescription).

➢ Décision controversée parce que l’actionnaire n’est jamais propriétaire de ses actions puisque l’action n’est pas une chose corporelle. La décision de la Cour d’appel montre que la distinction entre le droit réel et le droit personnel s’évanouit et tous les droits patrimoniaux sont perpétuels (I don’t know what that means but it seemed important…)

L’affaire Caisse populaire Desjardins de Val-Brillant c Blouin (Super complicated case about bank stuff so I summarized the essential)

- Cas visant à démontrer que les créances peuvent des fois avoir un statut corporel (c’est une exception).

- Les “titres au porteur” sont des types de créances qui sont valides seulement lorsque la chose matérielle est obtenu (ex: un chèque en blanc).

Barbara Pierre, “Classification of Property and Conceptions of Ownership in Civil and Common Law” (1997) 28:2 RGD 235.THESIS: Article describes the fundamental differences/similarities between Common Law and Civil Law Property KEY POINTS:

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● The classification of property in a legal tradition both reflects and generates a particular approach to allocating the powers and benefits of property generally, and of land in particular. It creates a mind-set, which is manifested in the kinds and deployment of institutions recognised in the tradition, and influences the options that are perceived for responding to the demands of our changing societies.

Distinctions between the concept of ownership:➢ Rights in relation to land in the English law of property developed in an ad hoc manner. There

did not exist a notion of “rights”, so much as a notion of “interest in land”. These “interests” in land were created as and when the need arose, largely through the concept of “estates”.

➢ Today, the holder of the estate known as the “fee simple absolute in possession” is hardly distinguishable from the civil law owner from the point of view of the rights that they can exercise over their land. They can both “sell” it (or allow it to pass to their heir by their act or the operation of the law), give others the right to take part of its benefits, or use it as security for obligations

The nature and characteristics of ownership:Idea of ownership in the common law is based on the multi-proprietorship system that was feudalism. Whereas that in France, and Québec and St.Lucia which were based on it, is the adoption of the Roman concept of dominium.The natureThe nature of the common law and civil law ownership differs by virtue of the existence of an obligation; the notion of property; and the object of the right

● The existence of an obligation:○ Common law = property + obligation (obligation is superimposed of the holding of the

property). BUT the incidents of obligations no longer have any practical importance but the recognition of this obligation is essential to the understanding of the concept of estate.

○ Civil law = property only (liberation from obligation)● The notion of property:

○ Common law: you don’t “own the land itself” you own the an estate in it. The right is against or pertaining to the land, which signifies that this right is enforceable against all persons. To , determine whether a right is proprietary, the common lawyer considers whether it can be enforced against the whole world or not.

○ Civil law: The right is in the land, considered as establishing a direct link between the person and the thing. It is referred to as a real right, the consequences of which are that it is enforceable against all persons, and it accords among other benefits a droit de suite and a droit de preference to the holder. To determine whether a right is proprietary the civilian lawyer must consider whether it is a direct right in the thing.

● The object of property:○ Common Law: Owner is used in the common law to describe not just the person entitled

to an estate in land, but also of all other hereditaments. The object of ownership is therefore always incorporeal.

○ Civil Law: Ownership of an incorporeal thing is not, strictly speaking, accurate in the context of civil law. A distinction is made between the owner of things, and the holder of rights.

The characteristics➢ The extent of the right

○ Common law: Ownership is not absolute. The proprietor of land in England, in contrast to the owner of an object, is not considered as appropriating the land absolutely. Land is held in tenure and for a period, which though uncertain, is limited. It is not appropriated.

○ Civil Law: ownership is by nature absolute. Absolute here is used to mean total appropriation of the thing, and the consequent absence of an intermediary between owner

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and the land. Ownership entitled one directly to full power (plena in re protestas): so the right to the full economic and social benefit that the land affords.

➢ The number of owners: difference in proprietorship that can exist concurrently in relation to the same parcel of land.

○ Common Law: the owner is a tenant to an estate so several tenancies can exist on the land concurrently through the process of subinfeudation and the creation of settlements (more detailed info on that process on p.152)

○ Civil Law: Only one owner because the concept of ownership means absolute appropriation. But many people can have rights to the property - so ownership can be split but there still remains only one “right of ownership”.

➢ The relation with other rights in the property structure○ Common Law: in the doctrine of estates ownership does not exist as a right separate and

apart from other rights in land. All are equally interests in land. They are the component parts of the total powers that exist in relation to the appropriation of the land, each treated as an independent entity, an object of separate ownership.

○ Civil Law: Notion of absolute ownership means that there is no other right like it. Other rights in land are placed in two groups: they are either modes of ownership (eg: co-ownership and superficie) or dismemberments of it (eg: use, usufruct, emphyteusis and servitudes). In contrast to ownership and its modes which are the jus in re, each dismemberment is jus in re aliena which is a right in the land owned by another.

Tony Honoré, “Ownership” in AG Guest, ed, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 107.THESIS: Article gives the main components of the right to ownership which is the right to possess, the right to use. Also includes a brief section on ownership and lesser interests (concept similar to biens indivises). KEY POINTS:The liberal concept of ownership:

➢ Ownership stands not merely for the greatest interest in things in particular systems but for a type of interest with common features transcending particular systems.

The right to possess:● The right to possess - to have exclusive physical control of a thing, or to have such control as the

nature of the thing admits, is the foundation on which the whole superstructure of ownership exists. It may be divided in two aspects:

○ The right (claim) to be put in exclusive control of a thing○ The right to remain in control - the claim that others should not without permission,

interfere.● Important to distinguish the action of “being in possession of something” and the protection of

the right to possess which leads to the protection of ownership. So, there is different between merely “having” and the notion of “having a right to”.

● The protection of the right to possess is achieved only when there are rules allotting exclusive physical control to one person rather than another, and that no merely on the basis that the person who was such control at the moment is entitled to continue in control.

● An important characteristic of ownership is the availabilities of remedies in order to obtain,keep, and if necessary, get back the thing owned.

The right to use:● The right to use at one’s discretion is a cardinal feature of ownership

Ownership and lesser interests:➢ The existence of B’s interest in a thing, though it restricts A’s rights, does not call in question A’s

ownership of the thing.

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➢ Ok, example to help understand this weird sentence: So my landlords own my apartment building (they are A). I have an interest in living in one of those apartments but not to actually own it (I am B) - therefore, I have a lesser interest. The fact that they would allow me to live in the apartment means that I would be entitled to some rights which protect my lesser interest and restrict their rights (for ex: they can’t come into my apartment when they see fit, the furniture in the apartment remains mine, etc.). But in no circumstance is their ownership of the building questioned.

➢ A suggestion is that the rights of the holder of a lesser interest can be enumerated while the “owners” cannot. Another view is that the lessee’s interest is determinate rather the owner’s is merely determinable.

The Thing Owned:➢ External things are “owned” versus a holder of rights is said to “have”.

○ The distinction is made to clarify which protected interests are conceived in terms of ownership.

○ The notion of copyrights plays within both as “the notion of ownership applies to copyrights in an extended and somewhat weaker sense than that in which it applies to material objects and interests in them”.

Social control:➢ Ownership has never been absolute as it has a social aspect. This has usually been expressed in

such incidents of ownership as the prohibition of harmful use, liability to execution for debt, to taxation and to expropriation by the the public authority.

➢ To summarize this section: the concept of social control of ownership is based on the criteria of public order. The extent to which these criteria should be applied in the “private sphere” and to the individual is up or debate (but we know this…)

CB MacPherson, “The Meaning of Property” in Property: Mainstream and Critical Positions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), 1-12.THESIS: Author argues that the term “property” means rights, not things; and that the concept of property cannot logically be confined to private property.KEY POINTS:Property a right, not a thing:

➢ As soon as we make a distinction between property and mere physical possession we have in effect defined property as a right. To have property is to have a right in the sense of an enforceable claim to some use of benefit of something, whether it is a right to a share in some common resource or an individual right in some particular things. What distinguishes property from mere momentary possession is that property is a claim that will be enforced by society or the tate, by custom or convention of law.

➢ Property as a right, in the sense of an enforceable claim, does not imply that the right rests on nothing more than the threat of force. The perennial justification of any institution of property is that property ought to be an enforceable claim because property is necessary for the realisation of man’s fundamental nature or because it is a natural right. Property is not thought to be a right because it is an enforceable claim: it is an enforceable claim only because and in so far as the prevailing ethical theory holds that it is a necessary human right.

➢ Property is a political relation between persons. For any given system of property is a system of rights of each person in relation to other persons. This is clearest in the case of modern private property which is my right to exclude you from something, but it is equally true of any form of common property, which is the right of each individual not to be excluded from something.

Common property, private property, State property:● Society or the State may declare that some things - for example common lands, public parks, city

streets, highways - are for common use. The right to use them is then a property of individuals, in

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that each member of the society has an enforceable claim to use them. It need not be an unlimited claim.

● Thy are the property of individuals, not of the state. The state indeed creates and enforces the right which each individual has in the thing the states declares to be for common use. But so does the state create and enforce the exclusive rights which are private property. In neither case does the fact that the state creates the right make the right the property of the state. Common property is created by the guarantee to reach individual that he will not be excluded from the use of benefit of something; private property is created by the guarantee that an individual can exclude others from the use or benefit of something.

● State property: is to be classed as corporate property, which is exclusive property not as common property. State property is an exclusive right of an artificial person.

The misconception of property as things + the misconception of property as private property:- These two sections recount the historical reasons why we ended up associating property with

“things” and with private property. Mainly, it is because of industrialization and capitalism. The author has stated in the above sections why property is to be understood as a right and not a thing + why it doesn’t necessarily equate to private property. I saw no need to repeat this.

Larissa Katz, “Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law” (2008) 58:3 UTLJ 275.Pierre-Emmanuel Moyse, “Propriété : un acte de foi?” (2008) 38:1 RGD 259.THESIS: Article suggests the exclusivity based approach better explains the nature of ownership harmonizing everyone’s interest in the object with the owner’s position of agenda-setting authority, rather than by excluding others.KEY POINTS:What is an exclusion-based approach?

● Ownership on an exclusion-based or boundary approach, is the product of a norm that protects the boundaries around an object so as to exclude the whole world but the owner.

● An owner in effect has a gatekeeping function● The essential feature of ownership in this approach is that others have a duty not to cross over the

boundary of the object owned without permission. Ownership is nothing more than the space left for the use of the thing by the owner once others are kept out.

Exclusion and the contours of ownership:● Criticism of a boundary approach: can’t look to the right/duty of exclusion to define the contours

of an owner’s position.○ Eg: Seeing a “do not pass” sign tell us we can’t go there, but does not give us any

information about what is being protected and who it belongs to.Exclusivity-based approach to ownership:Agenda-setting authority:

● Ownership is an exclusive right that does not always depend for its exclusivity on protecting the boundaries of the thing. Ownership’s defining characteristic is that it is the special authority to set the agenda for a resource. The exclusivity of ownership is just one aspect of ownership’s character as a position of agenda-setting authority.

Analogy to sovereignty:➢ Ownership most closely resembles sovereignty in its structure as a supreme right rather than in its

substance as a position of power. Ownership, like sovereignty, relies on the notion of hierarchy: others need not be excluded from the owned resource, so long as their position is subordinate to the owner’s. Thus, an owner is not necessarily the only decision maker with respect to a resource - just as sovereign governs a territory without making all decisions that concern it., so the fate of a thing is not solely a function of an owner's decisions. Thus, the character of ownership is not lost where others have a part in determining what happens to a resource.

Exclusivity without exclusionProtecting agendas through trespass law:

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- In most societies, multiple users have property interests in the resources owned by others, and property law then aims to render those interests consistent with the owner’s position. Other potential users of a resource have a subservient rather than a competitive relationship with the owner, who is left in charge of the resource.

- Eg of Scandinavian custom of Allemansratt which ensures that anyone can use rural land for recreational purposes, so long as these uses are not inconsistent with the use to which the owner has decided to put the land.

Recall : Bradley Bryan, “Property as Ontology: On Aboriginal and English Conceptions of Ownership” (2000) 13 Can JL & Jur 3.

CLASS 12: Patrimoine, Privacy

[missing] Emerich plenary notes

Articles 2, 302, 414, 1261, 2644-2645, 780-782 du Code civil du Québec . 2. Every person is the holder of a patrimony. It may be the subject of a division or of an appropriation to a purpose, but only to the extent provided by law. 302. Every legal person has a patrimony which may, to the extent provided by law, be divided or appropriated to a purpose. It also has the extra-patrimonial rights and obligations flowing from its nature. 414. Marriage entails the establishment of a family patrimony consisting of certain property of the spouses regardless of which of them holds a right of ownership in that property. 1261. The trust patrimony, consisting of the property transferred in trust, constitutes a patrimony by appropriation, autonomous and distinct from that of the settlor, trustee or beneficiary and in which none of them has any real right. 2644. The property of a debtor is charged with the performance of his obligations and is the common pledge of his creditors. 2645. Any person under a personal obligation charges, for its performance, all his property, movable and immovable, present and future, except property which is exempt from seizure or property which is the subject of a division of patrimony permitted by law. However, the debtor may agree with his creditor to be bound to fulfil his obligation only from the property they designate. 780. The patrimony of the deceased is separate from that of the heir by operation of law until the succession has been liquidated. The separation has effect with regard to both the creditors of the succession and the creditors of the heir or of the legatee by particular title. 781. The property of the succession is used to pay the creditors of the succession and to pay the legatees by particular title, in preference to any creditor of the heir. 782. The property of the heir is used to pay the debts of the succession only in the case where the heir is liable for debts of greater value than the property he takes and the property of the succession is insufficient. In that case, payment of the creditor of the succession is made only after payment of the creditor of each heir whose claim arose before the opening of the succession. However, a creditor of the heir whose claim arose after the opening of the succession is paid concurrently with the unpaid creditors of the succession.

Charles Aubry & Charles Rau, Cours de droit civil d'après la méthode de Zachariae , 5th ed by Etienne- Adolphe Bartin (Paris: Marchal et Billard, 1917) at paras 573–74.

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Notion du patrimoine : Le patrimoine est l’ensemble des biens d’une personne, envisagé comme formant une universalité de droit

1. L’idée du patrimoine se déduit directement de celle de la personnalité. C’est un « tout juridique ». a. Le patrimoine est purement intellectuelle – les objets extérieurs sur lesquels portent les

droits d’une personne ne forme point des parties intégrantes de son patrimoine2. En pure théorie, le patrimoine comprend tous les biens indistinctement, et notamment les biens

innés, et les biens à venira. Le droit français conforme à cette théorie pour la plupart. Les exceptions = bien innés, les

actions qui peuvent causer les lésion, et les droit de puissance3. Le patrimoine, considéré comme ensemble de biens ou de valeurs pécuniaires, exprime lui-même,

en définitive, l’idée d’une pareille valeura. In other words, le patrimoine comprend les dettes tout comme il comprend les biens

4. Le patrimoine étant une émanation de la personnalité, et l’expression de la puissance juridique dont une personne se trouve investie comme telle, il en résulte :

a. Que les personnes physiques ou morales peuvent seules avoir un patrimoineb. Que toute personne a nécessairement un patrimoine, même si elle ne possède

actuellement aucun bienc. Que la même personne ne peut avoir qu’un seul patrimoine

L’unité et l’indivisibilité du patrimoine – Des universalités juridiques qui s’en distinguent 1. Le patrimoine est un et indivisible (comme la personnalité) pas susceptible à être partagé en

plusieurs universalités juridiquesa. Zachariae [doctrine] : le patrimoine d’une personne pourrait se diviser en [patrimoine

immobilier] et en [patrimoine mobilier], pour des raison pratiques, mais le patrimoine ne se divise pas en fonction des qualités naturelles des objets qui se trouvent dans le patrimoine

2. Le droit français reconnait certaines divisions dans le patrimoine, même s’il reste en principe indivisible

3. Le patrimoine est susceptible de se partager en parties intellectuelle ou de quotité

J Ghestin, Traité de droit civil : Introduction générale , 4th ed (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1994) at paras 204–213.Classification des droits subjectifs : Il y a multitude de classifications. Mais deux d’entre elles méritent attention :1. CLASSIFICATION DES DROIT SUBJECTIFS EN FONCTION DU PATRIMOINELa notion de patrimoine :

Le patrimoine = une universalité de droit Le patrimoine = un ensemble [de droits] et [de charges, actuels et futurs] dans lequel les droit

répondent des charges [définition au sens strict] Le patrimoine = l’ensemble des droits qu’une personne pourrait transférer à autrui contre argent

La valeur du patrimoine = total de ce qui serait obtenu en contrepartie de ces transmissions Le patrimoine = la masse des biens présentant une certaine cohésion résultant notamment de la

soumission à un même régime juridiqueo C’est ainsi que ‘patrimoine’ = patrimoine d’un époux ainsi que de la communauté

conjugale‘Universalité de droit’

‘Universalité’ = le facteur de cohésion qui permet d’accueillir de nouveaux éléments et qui subsiste malgré la disparition de certaines des pièces rassemblées

‘de droit’ = le patrimoine réunit à la fois des droits et des dettes; il comporte un actif et un passif inséparables l’un de l’autre

o Se distingue de ‘universalité de fait’ (=ensemble de choses ou de droits sans passif correspondant)

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Caractères du patrimoine dans la théorie classique Aubry et Rau : le patrimoine, émanation de la personnalitié

o Selon cette doctrine, l’unité des éléments qui constituent cette universalité n’est autre que celle du sujet des droits et des obligations; c’est la même personne qui est/sera titulaire des droits présents et à venir et qui est/sera obligée par ses obligations.

o 2 conséquences : 1) unité du patrimoine 2) intransmissibilité du patrimoine entre vifs

Critique de la théorie classique du patrimoine La confusion du patrimoine avec le sujet de droit est source de difficultés pratiques

o La majorité de la doctrine civiliste moderne partage cette critique d’Aubry et Rauo Ghestin : la fondation (l’affectation de certains bien à un but charitable, culturel ou

scientifique) = conséquence pratique de la confusion entre patrimoine/personnalité La conception « moderne » : le patrimoine d’affectation

o Principe d’affectation = opposé à la thèse fondant la cohésion de l’universalité du droit sur l’unité du sujet

o Idée = la destination ou la finalité peut constituer un facteur de droits et d’obligations Ainsi, l’affectation de certains biens à l’exercice du commerce/but commercial

permettent d’isoler une masse cohérente de droits et de dettes Succès limité des critiques de la théorie classique en droit positif

o La conception classique du patrimoine demeure encore la base du droit positif Elle favorise le crédit (I’ll be more willing to lend you money if I know I can take your stuff if you don’t pay me back)

o Cette conception = source d’entraves et de gênes nombreuses et la facilité de constitution des personnes morales rend assez illusoire la règle de l’unité du patrimoine

o Société unipersonnelle permet de réaliser une scission entre patrimoine professionnel et patrimoine familial

Ville de Québec c Cie d’immeubles Allard Ltée, [1996] RJQ 1566Facts: Quatre individus qui avaient formé une société de placement immobilier ont, 8 mois plus tard, acheté un immeuble; ils l'ont ensuite hypothéqué; Deux d'entre eux (Wong et Morisset) ont ensuite vendu leur part indivise de l'immeuble à l'intimée; ces deux mêmes associés ont aussi vendu au même acquéreur leurs parts respectives dans la société. L'appelante (la Ville)demande que l'intimée (la Cie) soit condamnée à lui payer 5 736$, à titre de droit de mutation, à la suite de l'acquisition de la part sociale de deux individus dans un immeuble.Proc. History: En 1992, la Cour du Québec a rejeté l'action de l'appelante en réclamation de droit de mutation. Le premier juge conclut qu'il n'y a pas eu transfert du droit de propriété d'un immeuble, au sens de la loi. S'appuyant sur une jurisprudence et une doctrine incontestablement majoritaires, il indique que la société possède une personnalité juridique et un patrimoine distincts de ceux des associés. L'immeuble, propriété de la société, n'aurait donc pas fait l'objet d'un transfert réel, mais bien d'un transfert purement fictive.Issue: (1) La société par actions, possède-t-elle une personnalité juridique propre, distincte de celle des associés, et, si oui, peut-elle être propriétaire, par opposition à simple possesseur, d'un patrimoine propre et distinct de celui des associés? NON. (2) S'il est indiscutable que la capacité à être sujet de droit, donc du droit de propriété, est une caractéristique de la personnalité juridique,la réciproque en découle-t-elle nécessairement? En d'autres mots, la société, personne juridique, si tel est vraiment le cas, dispose-t-elle nécessairement de tous ces attributs et en particulier du droit de propriété? NON.Holding: Une société civile ne constitue pas une personne juridique distincte de ses membres, et même si la société peut paraître posséder certains des attributs de la personnalité juridique, elle ne

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jouit pas de la propriété d'un patrimoine distinct de celui de ses associés. // ACCUEILLE l'action de l'appelante et CONDAMNE l'intimée à payer à celle-ci 5 736$, à titre de droit de mutation, avec intérêts.. DÉCLARE l'immeuble grevé d'un privilège en faveur de la Ville.Ratio: (1) Une compagnie ne constitue pas une personne juridique distincte de ses membres, et même si la société peut paraître posséder certains des attributs de la personnalité juridique, elle ne jouit pas de la propriété d'un patrimoine distinct de celui de ses associés. (2) Le droit de propriété est un attribut d'une personne et ne peut donc exister qu'en faveur d'une personne physique ou morale. Comme la société n'a pas de personnalité juridique distincte de celle des personnes qui la composent, elle ne peut donc pas avoir un patrimoine distinct de celui des associés.

Reasoning:● Historiquement, les sociétés n'étaient pas considérées comme des personnes morales et ne

pouvaient détenir directement des biens. La position française fut adoptée suite à l'application de la théorie de la fiction.

○ théorie de la fiction = la personnalité juridique ne peut être octroyée que par le législateur.

○ théorie de la réalité (Geny) = reconnaît la personnalité juridique à certains associations et fondations, mais pas celles des sociétés qui visent le gain personnel de chacun de ses membres

● AU Québec, une partie de la doctrine et de la jurisprudence québécoises adhèrent à la théorie de la fiction. La tendance majoritaire fut jusqu'ici de reconnaître à la société un patrimoine distinct et la personnalité morale, quoique l'on ait parfois qualifiée cette dernière d'incomplète.

● Parmi les articles du Code souvent invoqués dans la jp, on retrouve de façon prédominante, l'article 1899 C.c.B.-C. que plusieurs interprètent comme confirmation de la distinction à faire entre le patrimoine de la société et celui des associés:

○ 1899 - Les biens de la société doivent être employés au paiement des créanciers de la société de préférence aux créanciers particuliers de chaque associé; et si ces biens se trouvent insuffisants pour cet objet, les biens particuliers de chacun des associés sont aussi affectés au paiement des dettes de la société, mais seulement après le paiement des créanciers particuliers de tels associés séparément

● Je diffère d'avis quant à la portée de l'article 1899 C.c.B.-C car le rapport des codificateurs réfèrait à l'Acte concernant les société comme source de l'article 1899 C.c.B.-C. Selon Monk, cette disposition proviendrait d'une règle de Common Law en matière de faillite. Il me paraît discutable qu'une règle de Common Law, applicable au cas de dissolution d'une société, visant la protection des créanciers ayant contracté avec la société, soit invoquée pour accréditer la théorie concernant le patrimoine distinct des sociétés, alors que le «partnership» de Common Law ne reconnaît pas ce concept.

● Mais personne ne conteste le fait que le C.c.B.-C. ne confère pas directement la personnalité juridique à la société.

● Il cite ensuite plusieurs articles du C.C.B.-C (352, 537, 387), mais 399 semble déterminant, constituant selon lui un obstacle infranchissable à la reconnaissance implicite de la personnalité juridique à la société.

● Art 399 du C.c.B.-C Les biens appartiennent ou à l'état, ou aux municipalités et autres corporations, ou enfin aux particuliers.Ceux de la première espèce sont régis par le droit public ou par par les lois administratives.Ceux de la seconde sont soumis à certains égards pour leur administration, leur acquisition et aliénation, à des règles qui leur sont propres.Quant aux particuliers, ils ont la libre disposition des biens qui leur appartiennent sous les modifications établies par la loi.

● L’article 399, fort explicite, me semble exclure la société de la propriété de biens

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puisqu'elle ne se retrouve pas dans l'énumération qui est faite des entités qui y ont accès. Seuls les associés qui la constituent, des particuliers, possèdent cette capacité.

● Le droit de propriété est un attribut d'une personne et ne peut donc exister qu'en faveur d'une personne physique ou morale. Mon argumentation est que la société n'a pas de personnalité juridique distincte de celle des personnes qui la composent et qu’elle ne peut donc pas avoir un patrimoine distinct de celui des associés.

● La théorie de la réalité ne peut être invoquée afin de personnaliser la société. On peut donc parler, dans un sens descriptif, des activités d'une société. Les effets juridiques de telles activités, cependant, n'affecteront que les associés. Un parallèle peut être effectué avec un individu exerçant un métier par l'intermédiaire d'une entreprise individuelle. Quoique l'on puisse distinguer les activités relevant de la pratique de son métier du reste de ses occupations et ainsi les désigner sous un nom distinctif en parlant des activités de l'entreprise, il n'en demeure pas moins que les conséquences juridiques de ces dernières reposent sur lui.

Conclusion: je ne crois pas que le Code québécois accorde implicitement la personnalité aux sociétés. Au contraire, ses dispositions confirment plutôt l'absence de personnalité de la société et son incapacité à détenir des biens.

● Je conclus donc que l'immeuble ayant fait l'objet de la cession de Sam Wong et André Morisset à l'intimée demeurait la propriété des associés, que la vente des «parts sociales» détenues par Wong et Morisset ne signifiait pas autre chose que la vente de leur part indivise dans la propriété des actifs, et qu'il y a donc eu un transfert réel de la moitié indivise de l'immeuble social, assujetti au paiement du droit de mutation prévu par les dispositions de la Loi autorisant les municipalités à percevoir un droit sur les mutations immobilières

Opinion concordante du juge Biron, mais dissidente sur le constat de son confrère disant qu’une une société ne peut être propriétaire de biens.

● Je ne puis me convaincre que dans les articles du Code civil du Bas-Canada où le législateur parle des biens de la société, des choses appartenant à la société, des immeubles de la société, «the property of the partnership», il ne donne pas aux mots et aux expressions leur sens habituel.

● Je suis donc d'avis qu'une société peut être propriétaire de biens, mais que dans le cas à l'étude, l'immeuble dont la moitié indivise a été vendue à l'intimée n'a jamais appartenu à la société.Pour conclure autrement, il faudrait que la preuve révèle que les associés ont fait une mise en argent et que la société a ensuite acheté l'immeuble ou encore, que déjà propriétaires de l'immeuble, les associés en ont transféré la propriété à la société. Nous n'avons pas cette preuve.

○ les contrats d'acquisition de l'immeuble, d'hypothèque et de vente de la demie indivise, trois contrats enregistrés font voir que l'immeuble appartenait à quatre individus et non pas à la société, représentent bien la réalité juridique.

● Vu la Loi, cette réalité juridique oblige l'intimée à payer le droit de mutation immobilière.

Société Québécoise d’initiatives Agro-alimentaires (SOQUIA) c. Libman KEY WORDS: legal persons; extra-patrimonial rights; bankruptcy; not extinguished

Factso Libman member of National Assembly. Wants Financial records of Socomer, private

company that is now bankrupt.o SOQUIA has these Financial records as Socomer was one of their members.

Issueo Does a legal person have an extra-patrimonial right to privacy? Yes.o If so, is this right extinguised when the company ceases operation? No.

Reasoningo Financial records are attached to the extra-patrimonial rights of the legal person.

a. 301-303

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301: Legal persons have civil rights 302: Legal persons have a patrimony and extra-patrimonial

rights/obligations flowing from its nature. 303: Legal persons have capacity to exercise their rights

o The fact that Socomer was no longer engaged in commercial activities doesn’t change the objectively confidential nature of their financial records.

o This right is protected by a. 302; a.35-36 (person’s right to privacy and consent); a. 305 (civil rights for legal persons).

Also protected by a. 5 of Quebec Charter (right to private life).o Therefore, financial records protected under legal person’s right to privacy.

Ratioo Legal persons have extra-patrimonial rights (including right to privacy) that are not

extinguished by cessation of their activities.

Laprairie Shopping Centre c. Pearl KEY WORDS: shopping centre; bankruptcy; extra-patrimonial rights go to trustee?; not transferrable

Factso LSC made sketchy looking payments to attorney, Pearl, before they went bankrupt.o LSC’s appointed trustee took control of assets and sought to interrogate Peal re: nature of

these payments.o Trustee claims that as trustee, it represents LSC’s juridical personality and that is can

renounce LSC’s attorney client privilege with Pearl.o Pearl claims that trustee can’t renounce LSC’s attorney client privilege, that it still

belongs to LSC. Issue

o Does a trustee assume the bankrupt party’s juridical personality and therefore control over their extra-patrimonial rights? No.

o Is professional confidentiality a right that is transferred to a trustee or does it remain an extra-patrimonial right that stays with the bankrupt party? Remains attached to person.

Reasoningo A trustee exists to protect and fulfil the patrimonial (economic) obligations of the

bankrupt party to its creditors. A trustee assumes the patrimony of the bankrupt company and therefore the only rights that the trustee inherits are patrimonial rights.

o The right to professional confidentiality is an extra-patrimonial right and it cannot be devolved to a trustee upon bankruptcy. The trustee can therefore not renounce the consent of the bankrupt party. (Descoteaux c. Mierzwinski)

Ratioo Extra-patrimonial rights cannot be transferred or extinguished without the consent of the

holder of those extra-patrimonial rights.

Torrito c. Foundation Lise T. KEY WORDS: child; death; right to privacy; transferred to parents;

Factso Foundation used name, image, and video clips of T.’s deceased child for non-profit

publicity campaign. Did not obtain consent of parents (T).o Parents demand that Foundation stop using image of child, citing right to privacy.

Issueo Did the child’s right to privacy get transferred to her parents upon her death? Yes.

Reasoning

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o Succession of child goes to parents (a. 653).o This succession includes the rights outlined in a.35 – includes right to privacy.

**At the time, a.35 read “No one may invade the privacy of a person without the consent of the person or his heirs unless authorized by law.”**

o Thus, the Foundation violated the child’s right to privacy and the parents can bring suit. Ratio

o **This is really different from what we’ve seen in previous cases, which held that extra-patrimonial rights are not transferrable when they cease to undertake their functions (Laprairie & SOQUIA).**

We want to better protect people than companies – policy reason.o This is also different from what we saw in Laoun c. Malo – that her right to image was

not transferrable. But, this didn’t involve death/heirs.

Affaire Aubry KEY WORDS: magazine; right to image; right to privacy; consent; freedom of expression

Factso Editions Vice-Versa published, in an arts magazine, a photo of A. sitting in a public

place.o A. was 17 and did not consent to having her photo taken. Claims that publication of

photograph infringes her right to privacy. Issue

o Was A.’s right to privacy or the right to her image infringed by the publication of the photo? Yes.

o If so, are there extenuating circumstances that would justify this infringement? Yes – there can be circumstances where there is justification for publication of an image without the person’s consent (e.g. public interest), but not in this case.

Reasoningo Judge rules that right to image (which has both patrimonial and extra-patrimonial

aspects) is an element of one’s right to privacy. This is protected in s. 5 of Quebec Charter and a.35-36 in CCQ.

o Therefore, publication of A.’s image constitutes fault and an infringement of this right.o There are no extenuating circumstances that would reduce her right to privacy in this

case – she was neither engaged in a public activity, nor is she a person of notoriety, nor was she an accidental figure in the background of a photo.

o Compensation for patrimonial damages (money she would have been entitled to had she signed a contract allowing someone to use her image) and extra-patrimonial damages (money to compensate for the invasion of her privacy).

Ratioo There are two fundamental rights in conflict in this case – right to privacy and right to

freedom of expression. Right to privacy prevails – an artist has a right to have their work seen, but it is

not absolute.o Right to image is an element of right to privacy. This is protected by CCQ and Quebec

Charter and it has both patrimonial and extra-patrimonial aspects.

Roy c. Carrier Facts

o R. is a lawyer fired from C. Wants to sue the partnership and the individual partners simultaneously.

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o C. argues that a.2221 (CCQ) states that R. must first go after the partnership before he can come after the individual partners. Can’t do simultaneously.

Rulingo Judge found for C. – must use the partnership’s assets before pursuing the partners’

personal assets. Reasoning

o Under civil law, partnerships have no juridical personality and therefore cannot own property.

o However, property can be given to a partnership.o This makes a partnership’s property like a patrimony by appropriation, owned by

the partners but separate from their personal patrimonies. It’s not associated with a person because a partnership is not a person.

o Works because traditionally a patrimony is an emanation of juridical personality – if not attached to a person, must be appropriated to a particular purpose. This works with the idea of a partnership being like a patrimony by appropriation.

Ratioo Does not establish that partnerships have patrimonies, but views them as a

conceptual framework.o This is annoying – court just didn’t want to follow Allard it seems…

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Winter SemesterCLASS 13: Living together: family arrangements I

Coproprieté indivise; joint tenancy; tenancy in common

Class 13 notesCML: the word “ownership” is not used in legal terms, only commonly referring to things as ownership. The proper word is titleholder of a “fee simple”CVL: emphyteusis = like a long lease (one of the methods of dismemberment)The idea of estates allows us to cut up property over timeOwnership can be split or modified in different ways

Modification: e.g. overlapping rights – sharing propertyIn CML, we have seen sequential rights that are temporally staggered.Sharing property…

- Expenses, space, proceeds, benefits, uses, etc.CVL Modes of Ownership

- Ownership: division and indivision- Divided ownership (of internal shell OR of whole shell)

CML Co-Ownership- Joint tenancy: right of survivorship

o Owners are lumped in together and considered as one owner. In the end there is one sole owner.

o Need to have unity of interests.o Happens automatically. Can skip taxes bc no transfer of property.

- Tenancy in common: no right of survivorship.o Advantages: can reflect disproportional interests. No unity of interests.

CML Co-Ownership- Joint tenancy: e.g. Business doesn’t have to die, it can go on forever. Interests can look

different than interest of other co-owners.- The origin of estates came from the feudal relationship – passing on something to the heir.

Allice v. Potashner (1988)- One sister rents out her part of the house. Later, other sister objects.- They had an agreement where they would each occupy separate parts and be responsible

separately for maintenance and expenses.o Indivision.

- She was claiming that she was forced to remain in the indivision bc she could not sell her share, or buy the other share.

o If one portion gets sold, the connection is undone.- CCQ 1018, 1026- How would you fit a lease into these provisions? Fruits.- Could have a temporary suspension of the indivision.- Burden on Potashner to prove that there wouldn’t be any loss.- CCLC 698 = CCQ 1030

Robin c. Nicole (2006)- Indivision is useful for non-married couples.

Mary Jane Mossman and William Flanagan, Property Law: Cases and Commentary 2 nd ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2004) 651-659Concurrent Interests = shared interests in the same object at the same time

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-Historically, common feature of feudal property relationships. Up until several decades ago it was usual for farms to be left to siblings “in common”.-The concept of joint ownership is also applicable to public goods such as air and water-Indigenous communal ownership is also a similar conception. Indigenous shared ownership has been compared by Bruce Ziff with shared “customary” rights that traditionally existed at common law:Ie Wyld v. Silver, [1963] English Court of Appeal recognized a shared, customary right of the residents of Wraysbury to hold an annual fair.Concurrent (co-ownership) vs Successive: this is different from a life estate with a remainder owner, because in co-ownership both parties have a right to possession at the same time-Usually among family for this reason; concurrent possession among strangers would be impractical. Marriage is now governed by statute, but other forms of family relationships of co-property are still governed by common law principles.Two types continue today, with significant differences in the rights/responsibilities involved:

1. Joint tenancy = right of survivorship, ceases at death, interest in whole2. Tenancy in common = no right of survivorship, divided property into two shares and no right to the other’s share, can be inherited, fractional share

Right of survivorship means that when one tenant dies, the interest of the deceased is extinguished and the survivor inherits it (“enlarged”). So, if you are the last living co-owner, you now have exclusive interest.Historically, joint tenancy made more sense because over time it reduces the number of tenants from whom a feudal lord would have to collect dues. So, the common law favors joint tenancy for its historic convenience, but equity favors tenancy in common because there is more certainty in inheritance, which is more fair for the co-tenants.Joint tenancies are now used in family property for reasons of fairness/familial convenience.

William de Montmollin Marler & Georges C Marler, The Law of Real Property (Toronto: Burroughs, 1932) at para 9898. Definition: A thing belonging to several persons is stated to be in indivision when the right of each of them is in the whole and each part of the thing, and not in a definite portion of the thing itself. The right of each of the several persons is expressed as a fraction, such as a half, or a third, etc. It is the right of property which is divided between the co-owners; the thing itself is undivided.

Madeleine Cantin Cumyn, “L’indivision” in Ernest Caparros, ed, Mélanges Germain Brière (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 1993) 325Indivision : Susceptible de survenir à l’égard de tout bien ou tout droit patrimonialo Plusieurs espèces : Copropriété, cotitularité des démembrements du droit de propriété, les créances

conjointes ou la cotitularité des droits personnels ainsi que la pluralité de titulaires d'un même droit intellectuels.

Chapitre de la copropriété par indivision – concerne l’indivision, peu importe sa source :● L’indivision d'un seul droit patrimonial, hypothèse habituelle de l'indivision qui a sa source dans un

contrat et● L’indivision d'un ensemble de droits patrimoniaux, hypothèse courante dans l'indivision successoraleo Aucune définition de la nature du droit indiviso Peut être une modalité du droit de propriété et se qualifie de droit réel immobilier ou mobilier

dépendamment de s’il poste sur une chose immobilière ou mobilière.o Peut être détint autrement – demeure un droit réel immobilier et constitue une modalité des

démembrements de la propriété lorsque l'indivisaire est usufruitier conjoint d'une chose immobilière, s'il est cotitulaire d'une servitude ou d'une emphytéose

o L'indivisaire a un droit réel mobilier si l'usufruit conjoint porte sur une chose mobilière.o L'indivisaire a enfin un droit mobilier s'il est cotitulaire d'un droit personnel ou d’un droit intellectuel.

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o Qualification du droit de l’indivisaire dépendante de la nature du bien qui lui appartient, doit être qualifiée concrètement et ne peut être représenter par la notion de part,

o Droit de l’associé = indépendant de la nature des biens de la société = représenté par la notion de part abstraite

- Chapitre sur l’indivision : 2e sectiono Jouissance du bien indivis : pouvoirs que peuvent exercer les indivisaires pendant l’indivisiono 1015 C.c.Q. : droit de chaque indivisaire de disposer de sa quote-part du bien indiviso La liberté de l'indivisible de disposer de son droit est toutefois assujettie à l'exercice d'un droit de

retrait par ses coïndivisaires, lorsque l'aliénation est à titre onéreux.o Un droit de préemption est un droit légal ou contractuel accordé à des personnes privées ou

publiques d'acquérir un bien par priorité à toute autre personne et ce lorsque le propriétaire manifeste sa volonté de le vendre, rem

o 1016 C.c.Q. : règle l’usage que les indivisaires peuvent faire du bien indiviso 1017 C.c.Q. : lorsque valeur du bien augmente, tous indivisaires en profitent proportionnellement à

leur part + l'indivisaire qui a l'usage exclusif du bien indivis jouit seul, pendant l’indivision, de ce qui s'est ajouté au bien par accession.

o 948 C.c.Q. : Énonce le principe d’Accessorium sequitur principale : L'accessoire suit le principal. Un bien principal transmet sa condition juridique à un bien secondaire dépendant du principal.

o 1018 C.c.Q. En l'absence de partage, les fruits et revenus du bien indivis accroissent à l’indivision et aussi s’ils ne sont pas réclamés dans les trois ans de leur date d’échéance.

Administration du bien indiviso Absence de règle expresses capables de résoudre conflits ne milite pas en faveur de l’indivisiono 1026 : Règle de l’unanimité pour les décisions à prendre visant l’aliénation du bien indivis ou

affectent sa valeur + partage peut être provoqué par testament/loi/jugement avant le moment fixé par la convention d’indivision.

o 1030 : nul n’est tenu de rester dans l’indivision, indivisaire seul peut demander le partageo 1031. Malgré toute convention contraire, les trois quarts des indivisaires, représentant 90% des parts,

peuvent mettre fin à la copropriété indivise d’un immeuble principalement à usage d’habitation pour en établir la copropriété divise.

o 1026 vs 1020 : Seule la dépense nécessaire faite dans une situation d'urgence alors qu'il est impossible d'obtenir, en temps utile, l'autorisation requise, devrait donner ouverture à un remboursement de plein droit.

o 1027 : indivisaires peuvent nommer un d’eux ou un tiers pour administrer bien indivis en leur nom – intervention du tribunal lorsqu’il y a une mésentente sur la personne à choisir

o 1025 : Propose solution lorsque les indivisaires ne s’entendent pas sur l’opportunité même d’avoir un gérant - Les indivisaires administrent le bien en commun.

Robin c. Nicole, 2006 QCCS 1418, [2006] RDI 289Facts: Cohabiting CML couple. Acquisition of lot in indivision. Construction of house and share expenses. Breakup.Reasoning: Lorsque titre d’acquisition du terrain est silencieux = 1015 Parts des indivisaires sont présumées égales. 1016: If one co-o has the use and exclusive enjoyment of the property, liable for an indemnity. 1030: No one is bound to remain in indivision.

CLASS 14: Living together: family arrangements II Constructive Trusts; Superficie; Homes on Indian Reserves

Class 14 notes

- With families, we generally don’t share things in formal ways.

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- Legislative reform to recognize women’s interests in property- Ownership: patrimonial right

Patrimonial right v extra-patrimonial right

- Patrimonial rights: rights that can be sold- Extra patrimonial rights: all other rights you have as a legal person that cannot be sold

(inalienable); can’t get rid of them, cannot contract out of them.Within patrimonial rights: personal rights; property/real rights

- Direct relationship to the real thing. Anything that looks contractual should belong in personal rights.

Equity and Property- Equity came after CML to remedy CML – it was too strict.

o Equity is between people – cannot stand between rights if it would be unconscionable to do so.

- Equitable property: use (now referred to as “trust”).- Feudal associations with being considered the tenant.- Trustee: transferring the legal title to someone they could trust for the benefit of someone

else.o Crusaders did it to have someone back home look over feudal stuff while they were

away (a trusted advisor). If there was a dispute about who owned the land, the CML would see that he trustee had the title. If not, they would have nothing. Beneficiary – person who gets to benefit from equity.

- Legal title goes to trustee, beneficiary is person who benefits.- Not really a property right. Equity is always a personal action.

o Trustee will be enforced to give the rent to beneficiary or allow them to live there (give substantive right). It would be against their good conscience to not do that.

o When selling: property rights are not personal, they are good against the whole world. Good for legal titles.

§ For equitable titles, if it is acting like property it should be enforceable. But equity is concerned with conscience of the person. Trustee sells to 3rd party. Does 3rd party need to respect that trust? If it was just a mirror image of property, yes.

§ So in some cases it is an opposable right (good against the whole world). If 3rd party has notice of that interest, then yes. If not, no – you are protected; you have done nothing wrong.

- Remedies – damages. Specific performance is an equitable remedy (required to fulfill your end of bargain).

o For contract of sale of land: if land is not so special (commercial development) à damages. Specific performance could require forcing someone to make a transaction à Equitable property right.

o Contractual right itself could act like property bc of equity.- Injunctions.- Express trusts – when you deliberately want to give someone legal title or

beneficial/equitable title. BUT equity does not care about legal form, rather the substance of the relationship. Implied/resulting trust because it looks like that is what the parties intended to do.

- Development of promissory and proprietary estoppel: idea that you cannot go back on a promise to contract. Stopped from relying on your legal rights.

Creation of Trusts- Constructive trust as a remedy

Proprietary Estoppel

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- Estoppel by acquiescence (mistake, reliance, acquiescence)- Lord Denning: A license coupled with equity- License: permission to do something on land that would otherwise be considered trespass or a

breach of civil rights (might be contractual, gratuitous)o Patrimonial righto Personal right (not a real right)

Clark v Johnson- Son-in-law has built a camp (cabin). They get divorced. Grandson not allowed on the land by

dad. Grandma wants to have grandson there. How do we match that to some kind of right?- As far as the law is concerned, only the 3 branches of family are owners.- In terms of equity, where do we begin?- Treat unjust enrichment and proprietary estoppel as two equitable treatments- Proprietary estoppel: interest in land (access to land), relying on someone’s promise to your

detriment.- Clark has a license to be there (dad) and he should be estopped from excluding his son.

Grandma is estopped from revoking the license from the son-in-law (dad). Dad had put money into the cabin – detrimental reliance.

o Grandma claims that it was part of license that it was never intended that you could stay there if you excluded the grandson.

o It would be unconscionable for grandma to go back on that acquiescence.o Court doesn’t agree that allowing grandson to visit is a condition.

- Clark (dad) cannot get a real property right, but can have the license with benefits (tries to reflect the intentions that the court has read them), but he’s allowed to stay there without conditions (e.g. condition of allowing grandson on the land)

Morin v Gregoire (CVL)- Family situation where sibling was invited to build on the land. Some money/help was given

to build the house. Brother in law was invited to live on the land. Paid taxes for many years.o Permission, not just tolerance.

- Tolerance vs permission (CML = license)- Facultative acts ≠ possession. Cannot be adverse possession.- Something less strong tolerating the act of building the house vs receiving permission.- M saying it was only supposed to be 2y. G claiming full right to ownership of the land.- Equity does not exist the same way as the CML. NO PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL HERE.- He ends up getting a real right to the land he built on. Superficie. Physically dividing it into 2.

Not getting ownership, but getting a real right.- How do you transfer real rights? Normally, have to have it done by a notarized act (positivist

system).- Emphasis on charitable acts attached to a natural obligation (not a legal obligation). No

mention of contracts.- Obligation that will be upheld invoking equity. Not as developed as CML, but still holds in

CVL. Equity can step in when there’s an injustice.Family Property [Property Rights of Married Women]

- Sometimes women contributed through purchase price, and sometimes through labour.- Great advance in the understanding of housework as having financial value (and contributing

to the economy in the general sense)- What happens when woman hasn’t made financial contribution? Taking care of children,

house work, helping with business, etc.o Family home is 50/50 with whoever owns the title. One person might be granted

absolute possession if there are exceptional circumstances (e.g. one party being violent)

- Sense that you are engaged in an enterprise w/ financial aspect (the family)

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- Women were at greater risk of living in poverty after divorceFamily Property on Reserves (Indigenous Reserves) – GAP

- Do outside laws apply within reserves? General laws do apply, and anything relating to Indian reserves 91(24) – fed govt. laws that do not relate to “Indianness” do not apply.

o Hunting regulations don’t apply to Indians. But family law generally would, health and safety, etc.

- Section 88 – still has to be a law of general application, but would not apply if it conflicts with the Indian Act.

- Property parts of family law (divisional property on divorce) do not apply.Peter v Beblow – GAP

Unjust enrichment

Kirsten Anker, “Wife’s Equity and Women’s Property Rights”Prevailing ideologies about marriage until 19th centuryà Blackstone: “coverure” = legal existence of the woman is suspended during marriage, or at least incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband (not permitted to administer property, transfer property, enter into contracts, sue, or get sued)legal reform then improved the position of women in marriage17th and 18th century: trust was created to protect the property. this property did not pass to the husband upon marriage.However, not available to the vast majority of womenAlso Dower did not attach to equitable interests, and so trusts were also used to avoid the wife’s interest.Dower= inchoate right of a wife to any estate of inheritance that passed to her husband during his lifetime, and that converted to a life interest in one-third of the estate on his death.Change occurred through statutory reformà“married women’s property acts,”Constance Backhouse’s three phases:1. emergency relief to women who had been deserted by their husbands2. separate estates for women which could not be touched by husbands or their creditors3. attacked common law rules and tried to remove legal incapacity** considerable advantages for men engaged in business activities who were now able to protect their home by ensuring that their wives held title.This did not address the continuing relative disadvantage that women facedà less likely to own property, much more likely to be living in poverty after divorceMechanism for other contexts could potentially apply: equity would recognise a proprietary interest based on the financial contributions of parties to the purchase priceà implied trust based on the intention of the parties to share ownership.Gissing v Gissing- that where a trust is not in writing, it can only be created by a transaction between the trustee and the cestui que trust in connection with the acquisition by the trustee of a legal estate in land- subsequent conduct may be evidence of intention at the time of acquisition, whenever the trustee has so conducted himself that it would be inequitable to allow him to deny to the cestui que trust a beneficial interest in the land acquired.- by inducing the cestui to act to her detriment in the belief that she was gaining an equitable interest, the trustee will be required by equity to make good on that apparent promiseMurdoch v Murdoch [1975)] 1 S.C.R. 423Murdoch did considerable physical labour in running the family’s Albertan farmTrial court: claimed “equal partnership”àdenied partnershipSupreme court: claimed resulting trustà rejected given that she had made no direct financial contribution. Martland J. said she did work of “any ranch wife” Legislative response: Ontario’s Family Law Act RSO 1990, which provided that the value of all property held by spouses be shared on the breakdown of the marriage.Pettkus v Becker (1980)

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Facts: Becker’s salary went to household expenses, and her spouse’s income to paying off business debtsFinding: The court approved an even division of the couple’s assetsReasoning:Dickson J set out three elements for a constructive trust:1. One person, in a relationship tantamount to spousal, prejudices herself in the reasonable expectation of receiving an interest in property.2. The other person in the relationship freely accepts benefits conferred by the first person in circumstances where he knows or ought to have known of that reasonable expectation3. It would be unjust to allow the recipient of the benefit to retain it.Any contribution of common law spouses=constructive trust?? Sorochan v Sorochan: Dickson CJ found that the woman had contributed to the maintenance and thus the value of the titled cohabitee’s property and was therefore granted part of title

Peter v Beblow, [1993] 1 SCR 980Facts: Appellant and respondent lived together in a common law relationship for 12 years. Appellant cooked, cleaned, took care of children and did a bunch of landscaping and house maintenance stuff. Respondent did not pay appellant for any of her work. Respondent worked full-time. Respondent began to drink and became abusive, appellant moved out. Appellant brings action claiming the respondent has been unjustly enriched over the years.Issue: Is there unjust enrichment? In what cases does unjust enrichment lead to monetary remedy or a constructive trust?Holding: xReasoning: Unjust enrichment arises when: (1) There is an enrichment, (2) A corresponding deprivation and (3) Absence of a juristic reason for the enrichment. -- Was it a gift? Did the plaintiff submit to or compromise the defendant's honest claim? Does public policy support the enrichment? -- The remedy of constructive trust arises where monetary damages are inadequate and where there is a link between the contribution and the property.Unjust enrichment: All 3 criteria were met - she enriched him because of all the work she put in and she was deprived (was abused etc) and there was no reason for this enrichment. The argument that she voluntarily assumed the role of wife and stepmother and that unjust enrichment can't apply is not correct. There is no general duty presumed by the law on a common law spouse to perform work and services for her partner. There is no reason to distinguish domestic services from other services. Because the legislature has chosen to exclude unmarried couples from the right to claim an interest in matrimonial assets on the basis of contribution to the relationship - this is a good case for unjust enrichment which is an equitable remedy. Unjust enrichment was found here.Remedy: Monetary or constructive trust? For constructive trust to arise, plaintiff must establish a direct link to the property by reason of the contributions made. Also, monetary compensation must be inadequate. For this, need to consider the probability that the award would be paid and the special interest in the property acquired by the contributions. Flexible approach used.Another question for determining constructive trust value is whether the value of the services which the claimant rendered (value received approach) or whether regard should be had to the amount by which the property has been improved (value survived) approach should be used. Court says value survived should be used to calculate the amount of constructive trust. The maintenance of the family enterprise through work in cooking, cleaning, landscaping helped to preserve the property and save the respondent large sums of money - value survived approach used. Last question was whether the trial judge erred in awarding the appellant a full interest in the house - NO. Award is maintained.Ratio: Unjust enrichment can arise in common law relationships and household services are no different economically from other services. Unjust enrichment can lead to either monetary award or

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constructive trust as a remedy. To establish constructive trust, there needs to be a direct link between the contributions made and the property and monetary award must be insufficient.

Brian Egan and Jessica Place, “Minding the Gaps: Property, Geography, and Indigenous Peoples in Canada” (2013) 44 Geoforum 129, 134-135 matrimonial real property (MRP): to property owned by one or both spouses that includes land and anything permanently attached to the land (Grant-John, 2007)à provincial and territorial laws govern how these family assets are distributedthese laws do not apply on indian reserves, rather it is the indian actàDoesn’t say anything about MRPtraditional indigenous MRP laws are not recognized by non-indigenous gov.creates legislative gap on indian reservesLandholding on reserves (colonial heritage): Granting individual rights to parcels of reserve lands in the form of ‘certificates of possession’ (CPs). The property right held through a CP can only be transferred to another member of the First Nation.Underlying title is held by the federal government àattempts to balance the protection of an Indigenous community’s collective property interests with individual interestsOther interests exist for families and individuals, some not formally recognizeddifficult to finance the construction of a family home because it is prohibited under the Indian Act to mortgage property on reserveà different types of housing on reserve—capital housing, social housing, and band-owned rentalsàchronic housing shortagesProblem: Makes it difficult for a spouse leaving his or her family home to find another dwelling in the communityàleads to forced assimilationAlso leads to disproportionate impact of the MRP legislative gap on Indigenous women stems from systemic gender inequalities enshrined in the Indian Act:1. individual property rights on reserve are most often held by men2. Indigenous women were not granted the right to vote until 1951, which has (in part) led to their underrepresentation in band councils and leadership positions3. removed status from Indigenous women who married non-Indigenous men, but not from Indigenous men who married non-Indigenous womenBill C-31

1. separated band membership and Indian status and gave bands control over membership2. limited reinstatement of status to Indigenous women who had been forcibly disenfranchised through the Indian Act’3. re-entrenched gender discrimination by creating two categories of Indian status: status that can be passed onto offspring and status that cannot4. women who regained their status did not necessarily regain their band membership, which includes the right to live in on reserve (no access to homeland)

Family Homes on Reserves and Matrimonial Interests or Rights Act- First Nations to apply their own laws to questions of matrimonial real propertyCritiques:1. non-legislative solutions, such as financial and administrative supports, increased housing supply, and better access to the justice system, have to be addressed before this law will function adequately2. based on the idea of individual entitlement to propertyà are at odds with many Indigenous laws and values that recognize that MRP issues may affect family relations beyond the spouses as well as relationships to land and to the collective identity of the First Nationstep towards recognizing the role of customary laws relating to property and family, but it also represents the problematic process of consultation and the limited capacity to enact Indigenous laws

Clarke v. Johnson, 2014 ONCA 237

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Facts: C paid for and built cottage on island owned by his in laws (J). C divorced his wife but continued to use maintain and pay bills for more than 20 years (built dock, painted, build sauna, etc). Family issues, J purported to ban C from cottage.Issue: (1) Is proprietary estoppel the right approach? (2) Was J unjustly enriched, and how do we compensate C?Holding: (1) No, (2) Yes, permanent license to camp.Reasoning: Historical approach to proprietary estoppel had 5 prongs: (1) Claimant’s mistake as to legal right to a property. (2) Money spend by claimant based on mistake. (3) Knowledge of correct legal right by owner. (4) Owner’s knowledge of claimant mistake as to legal right. (5) Owner’s encouragement of expenditure of money by claimant.Slightly more modern approach has 3 prongs: (1) Owner of property induces a claimant to believe will enjoy a right to property. (2) Claimant acts to his/her detriment upon mistaken belief. (3) Owner takes unconscionable advantage of claimant by denying him/her expected right.ONCA considered both, but held modern is better and C satisfied all 3 prongs (induced to believe he would own, contributed significantly, eviction would be unconscionable). Remedy of irrevocable exclusive license to use camp for life was appropriate remedy since monetary award would have been unsuitable per emotional attachment.Ratio: Modern approach re: proprietary estoppel & rectifying unjust enrichment.

Morin c. Grégoire (21 janvier 1967) (CS)Facts: M exerce une action pétitoire contre G qui occupe une partie de son terrain (M is propriétaire). G claims he is proprietaire en bonne foi and asks for 5000 in costs he did to improve part M’s part of lot, which he was permitted to live on by M. G paid taxes for 18 years for that part of land.Issue: Who is the owner of what in regards M’s part of land, of which he permitted G to live on and built a house upon; and is G entitled to moneys for improvement of the piece of land?Holding: No.Reasoning: Difference between tolerating and permitting – la permission suppose de la part de celui qui la donne une renonciation à un droit; c’est pourquoi la situation juridique de celui a qui l’on a donné une permission est supérieure à la situation de celui que l’on a toléré.G est donc propriétaire des constructions qu’il a érigés sur le terrain de son beau frère (M) par les circonstance qui font échec à cette ‘présomption’ (voir ccq 441). Circonstance includes being permitted; G paying taxes, G never built stuff with intention to aid profits of M but rather simply to live in.“Si les construction ont été faites à sa connaissance (du proprio) et surtout avec son autorisation … il y a création au profit du constructeur d’une sorte de droit de superficie”« la cour croit équitable de n’accorder aucun frais, ni pour l’action principale (de M) ni pour la demande reconventionnelle (de G); M est proprio de l’immeuble décrit au premier paragraphe de sa declaration (doesn’t specify what building this is) mais il a consenti un droit de superficie au défendeur sur une partie du terrain compris dans ledit immeuble; G est proprio des bâtisses qu'il a érigées sur le terrain affecte son droit de superficie et qu'il ne peut en être expulsé.Ratio: Huge difference between tolerance et permission.

Christine Morin, “L’enrichissement injustifié entre conjoints de fait : vers une meilleure prise en compte des situations vécues” (2013) Repères (EYB2013REP1301). THESIS: Abstention dans le code civil de certaines injustices vécues au moment de la rupture d’unions de fait signifie que le droit québécois ignore – par contre, de plus en plus de juge sont enclins a considérer la situation particulière vécue par les conjoints de fait lorsqu’ils doivent rendre une décisionKEY POINTS:

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● Union en fait is different from union civile and marriage, absence de cadre legal shouldn’t result in allowing injustices

● Enrichissement injustifie is considered as a measure of equity to correct injustices (see CCQ 1493)

● Les conditions de l'enrichissement injustifié ont été expliquées dans l'arrêt Viger : 1) un enrichissement, 2) un appauvrissement, 3) une corrélation entre l'enrichissement et l'appauvrissement, 4) l'absence de justification, 5) l'absence de fraude à la loi et 6) l'absence d'autres recours

● la Cour d'appel suggère que « l'analyse pour déterminer s'il y a eu enrichissement injustifié entre des conjoints de fait doit se faire en appliquant une approche analogue à celle développée en matière de prestation compensatoire entre conjoints mariés » en faisant appel « aux mêmes six critères juridiques » :

1) l'apport de cette dernière, 2) l'enrichissement du patrimoine du conjoint (hors le patrimoine familial), 3) le lien de causalité entre les deux, 4) la proportion dans laquelle l'apport a permis l'enrichissement, 5) l'appauvrissement concomitant et6) l'absence de justification à l'enrichissement.

● Contrairement aux conjoints mariés ou unis civilement, les conjoints de fait doivent démontrer que leur situation familiale ou conjugale concrète a fait naître une forme particulière de partenariat, une coentreprise familiale

CLASS 15: “L’enfer c’est les autres”Copropriété Divise et Condominium

Class 15 notesCML Proprietary Interests in Land

- Tenure: relation of feudal structure. Terms on which land is held.- Estate: corporeal interests (possessory)

o Interests that give you a right to exclusive possession- Incorporeal: non-possessory

o E.g. Right to harvestEstates – Dividing in Time

- Estates came out towards the end of feudalism. Thinking about property as having a life beyond the person.

- Tenure – mostly about personal obligations. Estate – something you could leave to your heirs and sell.

- Conditional estates: condition precedent – I give you my estate if prior to that, you do something else

o Don’t get the estate until you fulfill the deed o Condition subsequent

- Equitable interests- How is it that equity creates property rights?

o Through trusts (a structure where you can have one person holding the legal title)§ Legal title –had to be signed, sealed, delivered

- Personal rights: equitable title (in terms of substance)- If the purchaser has notice of the beneficial interest, their conscience is bound.- Equity of redemption: force the bank to transfer fee simple back to you

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- Clark v Johnson (2014): cabin on the island. Proprietary estoppel.- Peter v Beblow (1993):

o Unjust enrichment (remedy = compensation for what you lost) versus granting property.

§ Is there enough funds to pay that without bringing the property into question?o The house was a collective asset.o Corresponding deprivation v monetary damages:

§ Someone looks after the kids for free – I am being enriched bc I don’t need to pay for child care. They are being deprived because they are giving themselves for free. If unjust enrichment à remedy = monetary damages.

· Has nothing to do with property. Look at assets of the house and value that wife contributed.

· Constructive trust as a remedy (for unjust enrichment) OR he holds legal title for half the value for her.

o Constructive trust- Read the conclusion of Jane Matthews Glenn.

o Habit of jurisdictions to choose one over another. In Canada, we use constructive trust.

o Proprietary estoppel is a course of action.- Unjust enrichment can cover more areas than proprietary estoppel because it covers innocent

dealings.Condominium

- Condo fees. Why is this an issue for CML property?o Only kinds of binding covenants on future owners is a negative one.o Covenant has to relate to the land (e.g. fees, hang-washing on balcony, won’t build

over a certain height, won’t use space as daycare, etc.)o Couldn’t enforce a positive obligation. Could not require them to build the house in a

certain style, or pay fees.o Can have negative covenants.

- Covenant = promise that is related to land- Now, want to enforce positive obligations.

o Pre-existing devices: attach conditions to lease (e.g. obligation to pay rent)§ Problem with lease: no security of tenure. Not like ownership. Can’t sell and

accrue investment.o Long term leases. 99-year lease. Value of what you are selling becomes diminished.

CML Strata Line- Statutory. Stata title or condominium title (depends on jurisdiction)- Tenants in common. Own the building and common areas.

o Individually (through statute) – the individual owners have fee simple in a slice in space.

o Corporation is the structure for managing decisions about the company. Doesn’t own, only a decision-making body. Not a co-op!

§ Same as divided co-property in QC (The Syndicat).- Co-ops are people that reside in the building and take care of the management of it.- CVL: balance of collective interests vs individual interests

o Can only restrict use in relation to the locationo Amselem (sukkah), Martin (daycare)

PDFs on Divided/Undivided Agreements- CONS of divided: costs a lot (have to get the division approved by the Regie)

o Once you’re formally recognized as divided, you’re regulated by the Code.- Binding on newcomers no matter what.

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- Differences in how they manage responsibilities for maintenance, and detailed procedural rules for how decision-making body (Syndicat) proceeds.

o Undivided is general – has to be unanimous or it does not work.

Douglas Harris, “Condominium and the City: The Rise of Property in Vancouver” (2011) 36 Law & Social Inquiry 694–726IntroductionIn past decade: Vancouver became a poster city for urban redevelopment in North America (but also notorious for having one of poorest/troubled neighborhoods in Canada: Downtown Eastside)Statutory condominium facilitates an increase in the density of private interests by enhancing the capacity to subdivide land in three dimensions (Before statutory condominium, fee simple interests might commonly be subdivided in two dimensions) → Condominium 3-dimensions: fee simple interest in a defined area + common-property interest in shared spaces with others + structure of government for regulating the use of the private/common propertyStatutory CondominiumSubdividing the landIn BC Strata Titles Act (1966) provided that “land may be subdivided into strata lots by the deposit of a strata plan,” and those strata lots “may devolve or be transferred, leased, mortgaged, or otherwise dealt with in the same manner and form as any land” (s. 3(1)).→ Combination of private parcels with common ownership of shared facilities in multi-unit buildingsBounding in Three DimensionsIn common law, the idea of possession (physical possession + intention to possess) lies at the core of ownership of land. However, it needed to define the height and depth to which the ownership of land was extended: vague: Sir William Blackstone (2001), “hath also, in its legal signification, an indefinite extent, upwards as well as downwards”. EX: Using this three-dimensional aspect, property owners in NY and then Chicago began trading air rights or airspace parcels in the early 1900s : Air Space Titles Act (1971) has definition of the volume of an airspace parcelBy contrast, the Strata Titles Act (1966) defined a strata lot by reference to floors, walls, and ceilings. However, airspace titles and strata lots shared the requirement for a detailed definition of the volume of land, not only of its plane: Effect of this subdivision was to detach the category of land from the surface of the earthCommon Property and GovernanceWithout common property through which people can move freely, private property becomes unusable because of the resources required to negotiate and secure access: Role of the common property in a condominium is to facilitate access to, while preserving the integrity of, private property.BC's original Strata Titles Act (1966) defined common property as land “in a strata plan that is not comprised in any strata lot shown in the plan” (s. 2) ie lobby, elevators, corridors, etc and any other part of the building/land shown on a strata plan that was not included within a strata lot were common property and owned collectively by the owners of individual strata lots.The owners of the strata lots held the common property “as tenants in common in shares proportional to the unit entitlement of their respective strata lots”Condominium as PropertyJustifications for regimes of statutory condominium: link between private property and freedom + economic efficiency.Reich (1964) article “The New Property”: suggests “property performs the function of maintaining independence, dignity and pluralism in society by creating zones within which the majority has to yield to the owner”→ In other words, “private property provided a sphere of freedom for the individual and the platform from which the individual could fully and freely participate in society. Condominium made possible a

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wider distribution of ownership and, potentially, of freedom, at least if one were an owner”.Rosenberg: Condominiums also increase the efficiency of cities: by subdividing land, creating smaller, more affordable interests that opened the possibility of home ownership to more peopleWright on efficiency: “the capacity to subdivide land in three dimensions was a refinement that secured the more efficient allocation of resources by enabling land, material or ethereal, to lodge with the owner that valued it most”.Condominium, Property and the cityCondominium has extended the possibility of home-ownership to many otherwise excludedHOWEVER its success displaced other forms of tenure and those who might occupy buildings structured around those forms of tenure: In Vancouver, as elsewhere, the conversion of rental apartment buildings to condominium, coupled in most cases with a renovation of those spaces, has displaced tenants, pushing out those who might rent in older buildings but not purchase the renovated unitsChanging forms of tenure in individual buildings affect land values more broadly (+ wealthier owners have different standards than lower income owners)

Wilson c. Syndicat des copropriétaires de condominum Le Champlain, [1996] R.J.Q. 1019 (CS)Facts: Copropriétaire amène un chien vivre dans son condo.Issue: Le Syndicat est-il en droit de prohiber la possession d’un chien?Holding: xReasoning: Une disposition de la déclaration de copropriété affirme qu’on ne peut garder des animaux vicieux, malodorant ou malpropre. L’art. 1056 CCQ affirme: « La déclaration de copropriété ne peut imposer aucune restriction aux droits des copropriétaires, sauf celles qui sont justifiées par la destination de l’immeuble, ses caractères ou sa situation ». 1063 CCQ: « Chaque copropriétaire dispose de sa fraction; il use et jouit librement de sa partie privative et des parties communes, à la condition de respecter le règlement de l’immeuble et de ne porter atteinte ni aux droits des autres copropriétaires ni à la destination de l’immeuble ».Le droit de propriété conféré aux copropriétaires n’est pas un droit de propriété diminué. Il est un droit de propriété complet, dont l’exercice ne peut être limité que dans la mesure où la loi le prévoit.Ratio: la légalité d’une restriction dans la déclaration de copropriété dépend de la destination de l’immeuble qui comprend (1) un élément objectif, soit les caractéristiques de l’immeuble – situation, qualité des matériaux, distribution des appartements, confort, luxe; (2) un élément subjectif, soit l’ensemble des conditions en vue desquelles un copropriétaire a acheté sa fraction; et (3) un élément collectif, soit le fait que la destination représente la sauvegarde de l’intérêt général des copropriétaires. Ces éléments doivent être appréciés au regard des faits pertinents, incluant la déclaration de copropriété dans sa totalité.DANS CE CAS: les habitants de l’immeuble recherche confort et tranquillité ainsi que les attributs rattachés aux environnements qui les assurent. Il n’existe pas de lien rationnel entre la prohibition d’animaux domestiques et la destination.

Bergeron c. Martin, [1997] R.D.I. 241 (CS)Facts: M exploite une garderie dans une unité de copropriété divise alors que la destination résidentielle de l’immeuble est affirmée en termes univoques dans la déclaration de copropriété.Issue: M peut-elle tenir une garderie dans son unité de copropriété divise?Reasoning: Les copropriétaires exercent une entreprise dans leur unité et les parties communes de l’immeuble. Ils font clairement atteinte à sa destination. Les éléments objectifs de l’immeuble soulignent les exigences de la déclaration de copropriété. C’est un petit immeuble sur un petit terrain. Les propriétaires doivent donc composer avec une certaine promiscuité, laquelle est impossible avec la garderie. De plus, l’immeuble a également une dimension esthétique: insonorisation supérieure, éléments

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la tranquillité luxueux. L’élément subjectif pour les copropriétaires a toujours été la tranquillité qu’on attend d’un immeuble résidentiel.

Amselem c. Syndicat Northcrest, [2002] R.J.Q. 906 (CA)Facts: un groupe de juifs orthodoxes érige des souccahs sur les balcons attenants à leurs unités de copropriété.Historique judiciaire: Le juge de première instance détermine qu’à la lecture de l’ensemble des dispositions de la déclaration de copropriété, l’érection de souccahs est interdite. Les restrictions font voir une volonté non équivoque d’uniformité et du maintien de l’apparence extérieure de l’immeuble dans sa condition originale.Issue: (1) Quelles sont les restrictions décrites à l’acte de copropriété? (2) Ces restrictions sont-elles justifiées eu égard à la destination, aux caractéristiques et à la situation de l’immeuble? (3) Ces restrictions enfreignent-elles la liberté de religion des intimés et portent-elles atteinte à leurs droits à l’égalité? (4) Dans l’affirmative, le requérant a-t-il proposé des mesures d’accommodement raisonnables pour mettre un terme à cette inégalité? (5) Dans l’affirmative, l’atteinte est-elle justifiée par le recours à l’article 9.1 de la charte? (6) L’absence d’un préjudice sérieux et irréparable, peut-on contraindre un copropriétaire à se conformer à la déclaration de copropriété (art. 1080 C.C.Q.)?Reasoning: Juge Morin: Sur la question de savoir si une souccah est une construction, le juge de première instance et le juge d’appel s’entende pour dire que oui. Sur la question des droits religieux, la Cour d’appel rappelle que l’art 1039 CCQ énonce que « la collectivité des copropriétaires constitue, dès la publication de la déclaration de copropriété, une personne morale qui a pour objet la conservation de l’immeuble, l’entretien et l’administration des parties communes, la sauvegarde des droits afférents à l’immeuble ou à la copropriété, ainsi que toutes les opérations d’intérêt commun ». Le syndicat des copropriétaires a-t-il démontré que les normes visées aux articles en question de la déclaration de copropriété ont été adoptés sur la base d’une croyance sincère qu’elles étaient nécessaires pour réaliser le but légitime sans intention de faire preuve de discrimination? La Cour juge que oui. Il a appliqué son règlement rigoureusement à tous sans discrimination.Juge Dalphond: Les dispositions attaquées n’affectent pas de façon préjudiciable les copropriétaires ayant des croyances religieuses. Tous les croyants et non-croyants sont affectés par cette disposition (voir para 140 et s). Le juge Baudouin adhère à l’opinion du juge Dalphond (voir para 165).

Cass civ 3e, 8 juin 2006, Époux X…c. Syndicat des copropriétaires Les jardins de GorbellaFacts: Couple apporte en appel la demande du syndicat de retirer leur cabane, construtite dans le contexte d’une fête juive. Un règlement existait qui empéchait d’ériger des structures et les époux disaient qu’ils n’étaien pas au courant.Historique juridique : la cour d’appel a maintenu la décision du syndicat de copropriété.Reasoning: l’immeuble avait une vocation d’habitation et ne justifiait pas la restriction des droits des époux X. Décision d’un règlement de copropriété ne peux pas priver un copropriétaire du droit d’exercice de son culte en l’absence de toute nuisance pour les autres. Ces droits sont protégés par les articles 9 du Code civil et 9 de la Convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales du 4 novembre 1950. Le seul objectif de la limite du droit était de nuire aux époux X. Néanmoins, le règlement de copropriété peux restraindre les droits au dela de la vocation de l’immeuble. La liberté religieuse ne peut pas rendre licite les violations des dispositions des règlements de copropriété. Dans ce cas, la cabane portait atteinte à l'harmonie générale de l'immeuble puisqu'elle était visible de la rue. Donc, le syndic pouvait exiger l'enlèvement de la cabane.

CLASS 16: Multiple Interests I - Usufruit/Usage

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Class 16 notes- Usufruct (in Indigenous law context) right to land based on use.

- In order to be able to sell the thing, you need to have all the papers.- In CML – landowner would transfer the fee simple (legal title) to the bank giving them all the

deeds subject to equity of redemption.o Bank technically becomes owner (but we don’t use that language)

- In CVL – a hypotheque is a contract that creates a charge on property. The owner still has ownership of the thing but it is now affected.

o Bank is not the owner.o Fuse the personal right to the property.o All your property is subject to the debts that you create (the idea of patrimony)

§ Patrimony is the envelope of all personal obligations that are monetizable and all title that you own.

§ When you don’t have enough to pay the debt, then you have to go bankrupt. When there is more than creditor, you have to determine which one gets the first slice of the pie.

§ If there are competing debts, they will get priority.o A charge is a word for debt that is attached to the land.

- When someone is in debt to more people than they can pay:1. Secured debts2. Preferred creditors (Statutory categories for paying people (e.g. employers)

- Old CML, only system where creditor owns things.- CVL: Usufruct comes under dismemberments

o Servitude and usufruct: difference = extent of the righto Usufruct gets full extent of the use and benefit of the property, but doesn’t get the

abusus (right to sell or destroy the property; remains with the bare owner).§ Bare owner: if usufruct gets bundle of rights that property entails [usus +

fructus], what’s left over is given to someone else. That person retains abusus (right to sell [ownership right] and right to destroy).

o Accessio: right to bring back the bundle of property rights into oneo Servitude: a right of way is a classic servitude (more restrained kind of right)

§ E.g. Temp ability to be able to cross the land to get to the beacho CCQ 1120 – the right of use and enjoyment for a certain time

§ Cemented to the life of a person (FR: viager) or can be for a specific duration§ Used to separate use from ownership

o CCQ 1121, 1124, 1126, 1128 (rights of administration; a real right), 1135o You can sell right, can sell usufruct, but cannot sell underlying property.

§ Why do this instead of leasing? In the CVL, this is a real right, and a lease is just a contract (regulated by statute)

§ This is usually in families. Want security. Concerned with keeping the revenues and having an obligation to maintain.

- Temporary usufruct in CVL = CML possession in land for a set period of time (a lease)CML Life Estate

- Way of splitting up ownership with radical title owner by the crown.- Remainder: what’s left over. Shorter than forever. Cut out life estate, and what’s left over is

the remainder. Goes to a 3rd party. A creates life estate in B and gives what’s leftover to C.o If she specifies that it comes back to A, it’s called a reversion. If it’s not specified, it

goes to the grandkids (in the case we read).- Life tenant does not have the right to consume.- Life tenant ≠ lease holder.

Obligations

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- Separating ownership from use and making sure that there’s something being preserved to come back to the owner.

o Elaborate in CVL. Usufructuary has obligation to control the substance. To provide security or insurance that will cover those obligations. Duty to replace or reimburse. (Beauchamps)

o CVL: idea of waste from CML is less developed in the CVL (preserving the substance)

Other Characteristics- No difference of thinking about movables and immovables in CVL.- CML: Debt, bailment, trust

o Debt: trustee has contractual rights against Bo Bailment: ownership of objects or things

§ Separating ownership from possession§ Only for personal property

o Bail (FR = lease)o In trust: separating management from possession

§ Trustee has legal title§ Beneficiary has equitable title

- CML: fungible (money)o Can give money to someone and call it a loan or a usufruct. If you have usufruct, you

get to keep the interest (the fruit) only have to return the original property.- Corporeal and incorporeal

o Corporeal: thingso Incorporeal: intangible things (that can be bought and sold)

§ E.g. Intellectual property, shares, etc.- Fruits

o CVL: you have a right to whatever is growing, but have no right to attached things at the end (1129)

§ What about when you put cost into production? Can get indemnity.§ At end of life estate, people can come and harvest the fruits that are growing

Laroque v Beauchamps (1975)- Triplex on Clark street.- Leaving usufruct for life with the ownership left to the heirs. Mortgage given on the property

and it was foreclosed (debtors didn’t pay their debt) and creditors were claiming it from sole and unique owner and trying to kick the woman out.

o CML partner of Raymond (but not mother of children) inherits the usufruct for life in triplex, but ownership is for legal heirs (children). Laroque (spouse of one of the heirs) loans 8.4% interest

o Default on loan. Judgment by court that says in lieu of payment of loan, you can call in hypothèque (mortgage). Court declares her sole owner retroactive to the date of the loan.

o She’s trying to eliminate the usufruct.- What is the legal reason why usufruct has to pay the interest on the loan that bare owners

have taken up?o Seems like there was a previous loan. Why is she paying interest for new loan?o In assuming the rights of the usufruct, you have to pay what’s going out (taxes

associated with the property and any ordinary charges [e.g. insurance])- Issue of:

o Can she be kicked out?o What is the rationale for saying you don’t have the grounds to evict her?

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§ Bc usufruct was created before loan was made. Cannot give more than you have. Couldn’t put usufruct in guarantee because they didn’t own it.

- Laroque’s right was subject to the usufruct.- Does she have to pay the new charge?

o Failure to pay does not affect her right of usufructuary.Banque Nationale c. Gravel (CVL)

- Sold house to adopted daughter (for 1$) and was given right of occupation. Daughter mortgaged the house and defaulted. Bank is trying to foreclose and force a sale. Is that against the right of occupation of the mother?

o What are the rights of the mother? Like a usufruct, can stay there her whole life.- CCQ: 676, 496- 676: Contract for sale – interpreted in favour of seller.- What does habitation include? Right to occupy, or secondary panoply or other benefits (e.g.

heating)o Cannot live somewhere without heating bc it’s very cold here. +electricity+repairs

§ Local context and local norms§ Habitation includes heating.

- Right of habitation qualifies as a right to usufruct.- Quasi-usufruct: idea that consumables are not a strict usufruct, but a quasi-usufruct.

o Consumable: something you eat, burn, use up.§ E.g. firewood, food.§ Why is using it up a problem conceptually? Bc you’re supposed to preserve

the substance. Using is abusing (cannot preserve consumables).§ Classic version of usufruct doesn’t work, need to transfer ownership

w/usufructuary.§ Both usus, fructus, and abusus are transferred. Usufruct to owner. Creates debt

to person who would be bare owner.· Can’t separate usus and abusus.

o What’s the difference with debt?o Who is best placed out of bare owner and usufruct? The person in possession.

A. J. McClean, “The Common Law Life Estate and the Civil Law Usufruct: A Comparative Study” (1963) 12 Int’l & Comp LQ 649 CVL and CML are most different in the case of realtyHowever, arrived at substantially the same solution in the case of usufruct and life estate.**same purpose of giving effect to the desire found in most countries of providing for someone for life without making him absolute ownerCMLBasis of English land law: only the crown can own landThe land owner ‘owns’ an abstraction called an estate, which is a time in the land.System deals with both successive and concurrent ownershipàtwo or more people having separate ownership in the same property at the same time.Ex: Life tenant in possession owns a time in the land for life, while the remainderman with vested fee simple holds at the same time a separate present ownership of ‘a time in the land without end’.Made more complicated by trust: array of equitable interests erected behind the legal ownership of a trustee. CVLAbsolute undivided ownershipàA person either owns a thing or does not. Burdens or restrictions on the use of the land can exist but do not detract from ownership as such. Usufruct and life estate

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Life tenant: owner of one of the freehold estates, may be concurrent but sepaate from other ownerships or interests in the same property. Has right to the fruits of the property, the right to possession if he is a legal life-tenant, and the right of disposal of his interest Usufruct: no ownership of the property but a burden upon a single undivided ownership. has the right to the fruits of the property and to possession; he has not however the right to dispose of his interest. It’s a personal servitude. Lasts for life of usufructuary and cannot alienate it. Personal right against the owner and real right against the world.(i) Objects over which a Usufruct or Life Estate may existUsufruct- at its termination the property will be returned to its owner intact- quasi-usufructàright to consume fungibles (usually money or securities) on conditions of returning others of like quality and quantity or their value at the end of the usufruct. (in this case, th usufructuary is the owner of the goods)Life estatecommon law admits only of a legal life estate in realty- In both England and the United States it has been suggested that the life- tenant should be regarded as a trustee or “quasi-trustee” of his interest, or perhaps more accurately of his possession of the property, for himself and the remainderman- in England it has been held that the life-tenant is in the position of a bailee- a legal life estate in personalty will largely be upheld (exception: if fungibles, the apparent life-tenant will be held to be an absolute owner).Creation of the interestAt law through an act of the parties (transaction-sale, exchange, gift inter vivos, will)Usually created in favour of a spouse on the death of the otherOther mechanisms: Prescription (civil law) to either the usufruct or full ownership. Statutes of limitation (CML): prior life interest extinguishment by statutes of limitation does not prejudice the remainderman (no ownership granted).(iii) Rights of the Usufructuary and Life-Tenant1. possessionboth usufructuary and life tenantPrerequisites for possession of usufruct: 1. Inventory of the movable and description of the immovable (not required but generally done for life estate transaction) 2. Giving security or securing a guarantor (not necessary if where donor or vendor reserves a usufruct or, in france, in the case of the usufruct of parents over property of minor children. (US also requires security for life estate)**equitable life interest considerationsàonly income from corpus, no right to possession (unless intended by creator) Englandàequitable tenant for life will invariably be in possession2. fruitsIn both cases entitled to the fruits of the property. Usufruct or life estate in shares: the life-tenant is entitled to the declared dividends. Instead of declaring a dividend, a company may capitalise the income and later issue it in the form of shares. (accretion to the capital) Land: CVLà“Natural fruits are those which result from the spontaneous production of the earth. The produce and growth of animals are also natural fruits. Industrial fruits are those obtained by cultivation.” Civil fruits are generally moneys derived from the commercial exploitation of the property.Upon death of usufructuary, fruits that have resulted from his labor either become property of the owner (France), must be compensated for (Germany), become property of executors (Scot law), subject to right to emblements whereby representatves of life-tenant may re-enter to harvest the fruits (CML).3. alienation (two aspects)1. the right of the usufructuary or the life-tenant to sell either his own interest or the property over which his interest subsists2. given such a right, the extent to which it may be curtailed.

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CVL: while the usufructuary may dispose of the use and enjoyment of the usufruct, he may not dispose of the usufruct itself (can be sold, leased or mortgaged, but usufructuary remains personally liable).where the property is for consumption or is by its nature designed to be dealt with in the course of commerce, it may be sold CML: unrestricted power of alienation to both the legal and equitable life tenant, the grantee becoming a tenant pur autre vie and assuming all the rights and obligations arising out of the interestLand may be leased, sold or mortgaged, personalty invested and re-invested, and often the corpus itself may be consumed for certain specified purposes**difference could be due to usufruct being a servitude while life tenant is an ‘independent owner’.** in both systems, the property cannot be affected beyond the period of his own interest (comparable to a lease). There are some exceptions: in France, the lessee may retain the property for the full period even though the usufruct should terminate before the lease falls in. In England, , the equitable tenant for life has wide powers of leasing, in some cases up to 999 years (in effect disposing of the land).(iv) Obligations of Usufructuary or Life-Tenantobligation of ensuring that the property is returned intact at the cessation of their interestCVL: duty of exercising the highest degree of careCML: obligation not to cause lasting or permanent damage to the inheritance**However, the life-tenant unimpeachable for waste is not under such a stringent burden to conserve and maintain the property as is the usufructuary.(v) Position of “Owner” and RemaindermanTheory: The owner enjoys the absolute ownership of the property and the usufruct is a servitude burdening this ownership while the remainderman is the owner of a common law estate.Practice: both may sell their interests, though in each case the buyer must accept title subject to the life interest, vis-a-vis the life-tenant or the usufructuary the sole obligation of the remainderman and owner is to leave him in possession of the property. Action for injunction or damages against life-tenant/usufructuary or a third party exist.(vi) Termination of usufruct or life estateThe death of the usufructuary or the life-tenant, and in the case of the civil law the expiration of the specified period, the consolidation or vesting in the same person of the two capacities of usufructuary and owner (Merger at CML), total loss of the property and renunciation by the usufructuary.**CVL only: non-use for a specified period will end the usufruct, Article 618 of the French Code provides that the “usufruct may also terminate by the wrongful use which the usufructuary makes of his enjoyment either by committing waste upon the estate or by allowing it to be damaged for want of repairs.”**Like all servitudes it may perish due to non-user and an absolute owner is able to oust someone entitled only to a servitude if obligations attached thereto are flagrantly violated.

Larocque c Beauchamps, [1975] CS 384Facts: Demanderesse veux faire partir la défenderesse qui exerce des droits d’usufruitière suite au deces de Raymond St-Denis, auteur antérieur de l’immeuble. La demanderesse a fait un prêts de 2500$ aux héritiers de St-denis, avec un taux très élevé et créant une hypothèque sur l’immeuble. Elle donne ensuite l’avis de 60 jours afin de se prévaloir de la clause de dation en paiement. Elle reçoit ensuite un jugement de la court la déclarant seule et unique propriétaire. La création du prêt c’est fait à l’insu de la défenderesse, même si c’est elle qui aurait du couvrir les intérêts. La demanderesse demande de chasser la défenderesse et de condamner cette dernière à lui payer des dommages, soit les fruits et revenus dudit immeuble depuis quelle a été déclarée unique propriétaire.Historique juridique: demanderesse déclarée seule et unique propriétaire de l’immeuble.Holding: action rejetée

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Reasoning: L’usufruit predate la date du prêt et du jugement. Ce jugement n'a pas eu pour effet de rayer les charges antérieures dûment enregistrées sur l'immeuble. Le changement de propriétaire suivant l’action en dation n’a pas mis fin à l’usufruit. La défenderesse a à un moment donné cessé de payer les intérêts sur le prêt, mais cela ne lui fait pas perdre son usufruit. l'usufruit d'un immeuble est constitué d'une part des revenus de cet immeuble moins les dépenses (entretien, taxes et paiement des chargesàexistent tant que les nus propriétaire n’ont pas rembourser le capital). la défenderesse a le droit de jouir de son usufruit tant et aussi longtemps qu'elle vivra et que cet usufruit ne s'éteindra qu'à son décèsRatio: l’usufruit est indépendant de l’identité du propriétaire et, tant que l’usufruit prédate le changemnt de propriétaire, existe jusqu’à la mort de l’usufruitier.

M. Cantin-Cumyn, De l’usufruit, de l’usage et de l’habitation (extracts)Le quasi-usufruit : La nature de certains objets, dits consomptibles, rend impossible d’en faire usage sans les consommer. Le droit de propriété des choses consomptibles n'est donc pas susceptible d'un démembrement qui attribuerait l’usus à une personne et l’abusus à une autre. Plutôt que de refuser à l'usufruitier le droit de se servir des choses consomptibles, on a donc recours à une notion modifiée de l'usufruit qui prend l'appellation de quasi-usufruit, qui n’opère pas un démembrement. Il transporte le droit de propriété au « quasi-usufruitier » et le rend simultanément débiteur du « nu-propriétaire ». La créance de celui-ci naît lors de la constitution du quasi-usufruit, mais n’est pas exigible avant l’extinction de l’usufruit.La situation juridique du quasi-usufruitier est différente de celle de l'usufruitier. Il assume les risques de perte de la chose et n'a pas l'obligation de conserver. Ainsi, l'usufruitier n'est pas tenu de placer les sommes d'argent reçues en l'usufruit, malgré l'opinion en ce sens exprimée dans une espèce. Quoi qu'il advienne de la chose consomptible pendant la durée du quasi-usufruit, l'usufruitier est tenu de la même dette de restitution à l'égard du « nu-propriétaire ».L’obligation de restitution de l’usufruitier est flexible. L'usufruitier a le choix de rendre une chose semblable ou sa valeur lors de l'extinction de l'usufruit. L’usufruitier assume donc le risque de l’augmentation de valeur de la chose à sa charge. Lorsque l'usufruit porte sur une somme d'argent, l'usufruitier doit restituer le même montant d'espèces numéraires reçues. L'acte constitutif peut faxer lui-même l'étendue de l'obligation de restitution. Par ailleurs, le quasi-usufruitier ne peut être contraint de rendre les choses mêmes qu'il a reçues s'il les a encore en main lors de la fin de l'usufruit. Le nu-propriétaire n'exerce donc qu'un droit de créance contre l'usufruitier.

Domaine du quasi-usufruit.· L’art. 452 vise les choses consomptibles par nature – ex. les choses mobilières comestibles,

les matières destinées à la combustion, les semences et le numéraire. Le quasi-usufruit sur ces choses est généralement établi accessoirement à un usufruit sur un ensemble de biens dont elles font partie.

· On admet aussi la consomptibilité par destination lorsque les parties choisissent de considérer ainsi des choses de nature non consomptibles. On peut ainsi constituer un quasi- usufruit sur toutes espèces d'objets – tel un portefeuille de valeurs mobilières – ce qui permet au quasi-usufruitier d’éviter plusieurs des restrictions inhérentes au droit d'usufruit. Toutefois, le « nu-propriétaire » n’est plus que simple créancier chirographaire, donc se trouve dans une position précaire si un quasi-usufruitier dispensé de l'obligation de fournir caution devient insolvable.

Banque nationale du Canada c. Gravel, J.E. 84-1027, [1984] J.Q. no 700Facts: B owed BN money, so BN had the B’s house seized and sold. B’s mother, G objected. She produced a document by which she had sold the house to B for $1, in exchange for a right to live in the house for the rest of her life. B also promised to pay all the upkeep of the house. G wants the bank to recognize her (real) rights in the building.

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Issue: (1) Does G’s right to live in the house constitute a real right? (2) Does B’s promise to pay the upkeep and taxes constitute a part of G’s real right?Holding: (1) Yes, (2) Yes.Reasoning: Use is a real right recognized by the code and thus the Bank’s seizure of the house must accept the charge upon it in G’s favour. The payment by B of the house’s upkeep cost is not necessarily part of G’s real right, since the CCLC’s definition of use makes no mention of this. However, in the context of this particular contract, which was clearly motivated by generosity on B’s part, the promise to let G live in the house “for free” must be interpreted as such. Thus the owner of B’s house must pay all the upkeep and taxes. Also, the bank cannot seize or remove elements of the house that are essential to G’s use of it, like light fixtures, etc… since that would violate the promise to let G live in the house in a normal and modern manner.Ratio: (1) The right of use is a real right (1119), therefore the bare-owner of a property upon which a right of use has been granted must respect this charge. (2) The right of use is distinguished by its holders right to temporarily enjoy the property of another to the extent of their needs (1172).

CLASS 17: Multiple Interests II - Bail; Lease/License

Class 17 notes - Bail: a contract and an estate in land- Possession not ownership of the land?

o Roman Law: tenant only has personal right against landlordo CML was different.

- CML: leases originally started as a personal right. Usury – practice of lending money for interest (now it means unjust interest).

o Lease: periodic payments. Creditor: landlord. Lending money, and allowing someone to use the land.

o Tenant doesn’t have much security if they can only claim damages against the landlord.

- Leases as chattel real – a personal property that ends up being treated as a real right bc of the ability to recover land.

Leasehold Estate- Estate in land: includes a grant of exclusive possession- Need to be for a fixed term.

o Periodic tenancy: e.g. a term of 5 months.o Tenancy at will: interim category. If you’ve run out of your 5y lease and haven’t

renewed but still in possession, neither party is under the obligations of the lease, but you otherwise have all the other content that goes with the lease.

- How do you attach a positive obligation (e.g. paying condo fees): could attach a positive obligation. Covenant = condition.

o Leases can be subject to conditions, or other independent covenants.- Tenure = nature of relationship btwn lord and tenant.- Estate = length of time- [K law] Contract that sets up ongoing relationship = executory contract

o Vision of service over time with regular payment- Lease – giving tenant right. Contract keeps going à executory contract

Licence- Have contractual licences and non-contractual licences

o If you have one, it means you are not trespassing. Permission to be there.- Bailment for personal property.- Licence is for land.

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In-Class Exercise (CML)

- Bailment (lend a car)- Licence (movie theatre ticket)- Lease (tenants as co-occupants – shared lease)- License (go to house party)- Bailment (send gift by Canada Post) – you remain the owner until the person received the gift- Bailment (Brick in the lake)- Licence (Job as a janitor in the building)- License (Pay to park in parking lot. If you lock it and leave it). If it’s a lot where you leave

the key with the attendant, you have a license to leave the car there but they have a bailment to keep it.

E.g. staying in AirBnB apartment. If you stay in the whole apartment: licence. Lease of License

- The substance matters, the effect of what is created/being granted.- Lord Denning: look at intention. Statutory protections for lessees.

o Focus on intent of the parties. Respecting contractual will.- Street v Mountford: intention to create legal relations

Consequences- Legal remedy: arrears. Recourse to personal property.- Assigning rights in a contract (lease): can do it.- Anticipatory damages

Metro-Matic Services v. Hulmann- Judge looks at language of agreement. Used words that made it look like a lease.

o Habendum = to have and to hold (latin)o Quiet enjoymento Employees guaranteed free access

- Parties intention to create a lease of substance of what they have created that matters?Termination & Remedies

- Consequential damages for anticipatory breaches- Rights to exclusive possession, rent, other obligations that go along with it etc. will endure as

long as the lease is.o If you terminate or cut it short, all these obligations disappear.

Options on Repudiation by Tenant- Tenant surrenders the lease or vacates premise before end of lease.- All rights and obligations are still in operation. Landlord can still insist on claiming the rent

even if tenant wants out. By choosing to keep the lease alive, all obligations are still in play.- If the landlord accepts the surrender, it prematurely brings to a close the obligations of the

lease. No obligation to pay rent.- Landlord took possession and tried to find a new tenant.- Has there been acceptance by taking over the premises?

o If you want to avoid an estoppel situation, you give notice or re-let (take possession) but on lessee’s behalf. Lease obligations are still active, but letting on lessee’s behalf.

North Bay TV v. Nova Electronics (1983)- Landlord changes locks, tenant has fallen behind on rent.

o What option is that? Accepted surrender, terminated lease. Taken an action that is incompatible with the lease. #2 or #4 (see PPT)

o Distinction btwn 2 and 4 is giving notice.- Put the plaintiff is in a position as if all covenants are to perform.

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- Why doesn’t notice have to come at the same time? Bc Highway Properties. They skipped it over a bit.

o Notice is required as an elaboration of the 4th option. Making a clear representation.TO Housing v. Postal Promotions (1981)

- Landlord is clear about option they are exercising (option 2 – bringing lease to a close, no obligations, just past damages [rent that you owe us]) but now they have much more valuable lease that should offset some of the money that they owe.

- No duty to mitigate.- Wholesale adoption of principles, or treat it as a series of options that are anchored in estate

law?o Should surplus be awarded to tenant? Why would tenant get to gain?o Shouldn’t deny repress repudiation.

- Apeco: K for lease that had not gone into possession. Deals with pre-possession period (K law applies, not necessarily estate law). When new lease arises out of consequence of breach. If there’s connection between two events.

o Estate kicks in as soon as possession takes place.o Cannot follow Apeco, but will get same result by following Highway Properties

(broad interpretation).o Mitigation for back-rent and future.

CVL Leases (Bail)- Don’t want double-liability for 3rd party interfering for possession.- Need to protect residential tenants.

o CML is more pragmatically oriented.o CML: equitable property that looks and acts like property

- Lease as a personal right, not a real right. Contractual right. But have special provisions that allow extra protections that are similar as the ones they would get if it was a real right.

- CCQ: 1863, 1936, 1937.o Same outcome as if you think of leases as an estate in land.o Cannot sell more than you have.

CCQ Lease Provisions- Purpose of these is to regulate rights btwn individuals, and managing as a whole the social

question of housing (housing policy – ensuring quality of housing in legislation).o E.g. obligations to repair, etc.

- Indian Act: change of right to possess has to be approved by the Minister.o Anything that involves commercial leasing has to be approved/issued by the Minister.

Fall 2008 CML Exam (eWork)Licence.

- Exclusive possession for a fixed term (decide who comes in and out)- Intention to create a grant of exclusive possession- Multiple parties coming and coming – they have that in a shared house/apt as co-tenants.

o How is this eWork different?§ Co-tenants pay rent. Occupation is tied to employment relationship.§ Co-tenants can decide to sub-lease, here they cannot. Restricted. Looking at

intention – what do parties assume that they have the right to do? You can choose your co-tenants.

- Fixed term. Looks like a lease. Periodic payments. BUT there is exclusive possession. Not a lease.

o Explain: this is what it takes to make a lease (cite cases) and explain how this doesn’t meet that.

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Metro-Matic Services Ltd v Hulmann, (1973), 48 DLR (3d) 326 (Ont CA)Facts: M executed an agreement titled “Lease Agreement” for the operation of laundry machines within the apartment building, with the landlord of the premises. The building was then sold to H. H realized that the laundry machines were not owned by the previous landlords, but that the space was used by M. H decided to hire another company to run the laundry room and asked M to vacate the premises. M is suing for breach of the lease and loss profits.Here are some key points of the “lease agreement”:2. To have and to hold the demised premises for and during the term of five (5) years to be computed from the 20 day of November, 1963; provided that this lease shall automatically renew itself for a further term of Five (5) years, unless either party, at least three months prior to the end of the term hereby granted or any renewal thereof, gives notice in writing to the other party of its intention to terminate this Lease.5. The Landlord covenants with the Tenant for quiet enjoyment6. The Landlord further covenants and agrees as follows: (a) the Tenant shall have the sole and exclusive right to install and maintain as many automatic washing machines and dryers, coin changers and soap machines as the Tenant in its absolute discretion shall deem necessary to properly serve the tenants of the Landlord's premises, as well as installing from time to time such other machines and equipment as the Tenant shall deem necessary. (b) the authorized employees and agents of the Tenant shall have free access to the demised premises at all reasonable times to install, inspect, service, repair or remove the said machines and equipment and to collect the monies deposited therein; (e) to permit the tenants of the Landlord's premises to have free access to the demised premises and to have the use of the machines and equipment at all reasonable times; (f) in the event the Landlord's premises shall be sold during the term hereby granted or any renewal thereof, then the Landlord shall, prior to the closing of any such purchase and sale, obtain from the purchaser and remit to the Tenant a written acknowledgment by the purchaser that he agrees to be bound by the terms, covenants and conditions set forth herein.Judicial History: the first judge dismissed the claim as he stated that the agreement amounted only to a licence and not a lease. The trial judge found that M was not in true possession of the premises as is required for the creation of a leasehold estateIssue: Is the agreement a lease or a mere license?Holding: Appeal allowed.Reasoning: The judge looked at 3 things to make his decision (trial level): The true possession of the T. This was based on the case Re B.A. Oil Co. and Halpert (1960), where the court found that to create a LL and T relationship, the T must have exclusive possession of the demised premises.The judge then looked at the intention of the parties in drafting the agreement – they were careful to use language that was used in creating leaseholds (i.e. “demise” and “lease”). The language of the “use” clause which required M to operate a laundry business and nothing else, without allowing their employees free access (was restricted to “reasonable times”)-Shows that there was no exclusive possession / control.The court of appeal nevertheless allows the appeal on the following grounds: The covenant for specific use does not change the possession of a T (for example, a covenant that a premise should only be used for residential purposes does not change the possession of such premises). Only express restriction as to possession and control should be upheld (restrictions should not be read into the document). The lease agreement did not need to include covenants regarding the access, installation and maintenance of the machines since such terms could be implied from the obligation to operate the laundry business in the premises. As such, missing these covenants does not reduce the possession of the T.

North Bay TV and Audio Ltd v Nova Electronics Ltd et al (1983), 4 DLR (4th) 88 (Ont HC)

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Facts: North Bay T.V (landlord) and Nova (tenant), a retailer of televisions and stereo products, entered into a lease of commercial with a term of 5 years from September 1, 1981 to August 31, 1986. Possession Occurred on Sept 1 1981. Business was slower than anticipated during the winter of 1982, and Nova experienced difficulty in making its rental payments in the spring of that year. On July 9, 1982 North Bay threatened to cut electricity that night if Nova failed to pay its electricity expense that day. Nova removed as much inventory as possible out of the premises that evening. While doing so, North Bay President arrived and confronted Nova about arrear of rent. Nova said they were moving out. President closed and locked the door, and posted a sign saying: Anyone entering and/or removing any items from these premises without permission of the landlord (north bay t.v. and audio ltd.) Will be prosecuted. Aug 31, 1982, North Bay statement of claim claimed damages for breach of the leasing agreement, those damages including arrears of rent up to the termination and damages equivalent to the loss of prospective rent over the unexpired portion of the lease.Issue: Does notice of prospective damages need to be contemporaneous with tenancy termination?Holding: No.Reasoning: Nova argued that the "notice" to the defaulting tenant - that the tenant would be held liable for damages suffered by the landlord as a result of the tenant's repudiation - must be given contemporaneously with the landlord's resumption of possession of the premises.RUTHERFORD J argues, however, that the law is that when a landlord retakes possession of leased premises upon a tenant's repudiation of the lease, he does not thereby preclude a claim for damages for prospective loss, based upon the rent that the repudiating tenant would have otherwise paid over the term of the lease.In Highway Properties, Laskin J. held that contract law is applicable when considering the consequences of repudiation of a commercial lease. Therefore when damages are calculated on the basis of breach of contract, the distinction between rent accrued and prospective rent or damages for other breaches of covenant are unimportant, the calculation being directed at placing the plaintiff in the same position as he would have been if all the covenants had been performed.Ratio: Notice given by the commencement of proceedings was sufficient to found the claim for damages for prospective loss, it need not be contemporaneously with the termination of the tenancy.

Toronto Housing Co Ltd et al v Postal Promotions Ltd (1981), 128 DLR (3d) 51 (Ont HC)Facts: Brentcliffe (landlord) and Postal (tenant) entered into a 20 year lease of 30,000 sqft in 1968. In 1979, Postal left and repudiated the lease, it remained vacant for 9 months. Postal tried to get consent of Brentcliffe to the assignment of their lease to Rolph-Clarke-Stone. Postal brought a motion for a declaration that Brentcliffe had unreasonably withheld its consent to the assignment. Motion was granted, but RCS walked away from the assignment of lease. Both parties tried to find a suitable tenant. It was agreed that any new tenant would enter into a fresh lease with Brentcliffe rather than a sublease through Postal. On March 31, 1980, Brentcliffe served notice of termination of its lease. By lease dated February 14, 1980, Brentcliffe leased 20,000 feet of the former space held by Postal to Victor Spring Custom Products Co. ("Spring") for a period of 10 years. Landlord gets $162k of windfall from this lease. Postal asks that this sum be first applied to satisfy the landlord's claim with the balance to be granted on the counterclaim.Issue: (1) Did the landlord unreasonably withhold consent to assignment of the lease? (2) Was the fresh lease for the landlord's or the tenant's account? (3) Should the increased value of a subsequent lease be considered in mitigation of the damages on termination of the original lease?Holding: (1) No, (2) Landlord’s (3) Yes.Reasoning: Apeco of Canada, Ltd. v. Windmill Place, [1978], SCC was asked whether rentals received from a subsequent tenant were in mitigation of damages. Though a plaintiff cannot generally recover for any part of its loss which it has successfully avoided by its subsequent action, in breach of contract cases

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the subsequent transaction, if to be taken into account, must be one arising out of the consequences of the breach and in the ordinary course of business. Therefore, the difference in value of two leases is to be deducted as a mitigational factor against the landlord's claim.Ratio: Increased rent received by a landlord should be applied in mitigation of the landlord’s claim.

Toronto Housing Co Ltd et al v Postal Promotions Ltd (1982), 140 DLR (3d) 117 (Ont CA)Facts: Appeal of the former caseIssue: Should the increased value of a subsequent lease be considered in mitigation of the damages on termination of the original lease?Holding: Appeal dismissed.Reasoning: Highway Properties Ltd. v. Kelly, Douglas Co, [1971] outlines that a Landlord has the choice of four courses of action when a tenant is in fundamental breach of a lease: (1) Do nothing to alter the relationship of landlord and tenant, but simply insist on performance of the terms and sue for rent or damages on the footing that the lease remains in force. (2) Terminate the lease, retaining the right to sue for rent accrued due, or for damages to the date of termination for previous breaches of covenant. (3) Advise the tenant that he proposes to re-let the property on the tenant's account and enter into possession on that basis. (4) Terminate the lease but with notice to the defaulting tenant that damages will be claimed on the footing of a present recovery of damages for losing the benefit of the lease over its unexpired term.Highway thus preserved for the parties to a commercial lease the full armoury of remedies ordinarily available to redress repudiation of covenants and thus the measure of the appellant's damage is not limited by his election of remedy. The damages include the present value of unpaid future rent for the unexpired period of the lease and should be decreased by the actual rental value for the same period, whether or not there was a duty on the appellant to mitigate. When damages are calculated on the basis of breach of contract, the distinction between rent accrued and prospective rent, or damages for other breaches of covenant, are unimportant, the calculation being directed at placing the plaintiff in the same position as he would have been if all the covenants had been performed. The appellant in this case had been made whole

David Schulze, « Le droit applicable au bail résidentiel dans les réserves indiennes » (2006) 36 RGD 381Aboriginals are often tenants: only 27% of the buildings occupied by Aboriginals in reserves were occupied by their owners; from that number, 59.4% belonged to the tribe and 13.6% were leased by individuals.Constitutional law: the provinces legislate property law and the federal level legislates anything regarding the reserves. The question is, what of the property regime on reserves?Important implications of the Indian Act:1) An Indigenous person is not in legal possession of a land on reserve unless the land is given by the Band Council with the approval of the Minister of Indian Affairs2) An Indigenous person who legally possesses the land can transfer his/her rights to it to another person in the tribe or to the band council, but that transfer must be approved by the Minister3) Any lease or contract between the band or a member of the band in which the premises are leased to a non-member is null and void unless it was approved by the MinisterB. LES LOIS PROVINCIALES NE PEUVENT SERVIR À DÉTERMINER QUI A LE DROIT D’OCCUPER UN IMMEUBLEDANSUNE RÉSERVE INDIENNE L'arrêt Derrickson c. DerricksonThe CCQ rules and the Régie Act with regards to residential leases do not apply in Indian Reserves.C. LA JURISPRUDENCE PERTINENTE À L’APPLICATIONDES LOIS PROVINCIALES AUX TERRES DE RÉSERVE 1. Jurisprudence sur l'application des autres lois provinciales portant sur l'utilisation des terres de réserveb. La tendance minoritaire élaborée par la Cour d'appel du Québec Simon c. Municipalité d’Oka is a case in which S (a Mohawk from Kanesatake) wanted to build a

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construction on a reserve and the city wanted to block the construction using provincial laws. Since these particular lands were not “reserves” per se by the Constitution Act 1867, the QCCA said that the provincial laws could be applied in this regard so long as the laws only affect their general use (or destination) and not their “Inidian use” (i.e. the construction of the building had nothing to do with Indigenous traditions or peoples). The QCCA applied the rules and pointed out that there were no other legislation dealing with this particular lot and that is why they could apply this (no conflicts). The situation would thus be different if the land was excluded by a federal legislation, which is the case under the Loi sur les immeubles fédéraux et les biens reels fédéraux at a.13 which states that no one can acquire a federally-owned chattel or real property under a provincial jurisdiction unless a federal law explicitly authorizes it. 2. Jurisprudence Québécoise sur les logements résidentiels sur réserveThe Régie has sometimes accepted jurisdiction over buildings located on reserves. The jurisdiction question is not even asked if the building is leased to a person that is not a member of the band – null. The Régie has taken jurisdiction under s.88 of the Indian Act (without mentioning Derrickson or the constitutional questions). 3. Jurisprudence des autres provinces sur les logements résidentielsThe superior courts have judged that the provincial laws do not apply to residential dwellings on reserves.A. LA PRIMAUTÉ DE LA LOI SUR LES INDIENS1. La législation provincialea. Le Code Civil du QuébecNot all leases fall under the leases provisions in the CCQ: a.1892 al. 3. Examples where the CCQ and the Indian Act clash:1) A.1870-1871 – anyone can sublease or assign their lease and if the landlord does not respond within 15 days, they are deemed to have accepted. a. If an Indigenous person sub-lease their land to a non-Indigenous person, and the landlord does not respond within 15 days, then they are deemed to have accepted. The subtenant could try to claim the right to the premises under the CCQ even if they are not allowed under s.18 of the Indian Act2) A successor can ask the renewal of a lease in their favor (a.1948 al.2)a. A non-indigenous successor to an Indigenous person tenant in a reserve land could ask for the renewal of the term in their favor2. La Loi sur les IndiensIt gives the Band Council certain powers with regards to residential leases on the reserves:1) The council can divide the lands in zones2) They can regulate the construction, use and maintenance of the buildings on the reserve3) Adopt administrative regulations concerning residences on the reserve3. L’incompatibilité du droit provincial et de la Loi sur les IndiensThe provincial laws aim to preserve the rights of tenants to maintain residency in the premises, while the Indian Act aims to exclude non-Indigenous persons from owning or leasing land on reserve if they are not part of the band. This is an obvious clash.B. LA DÉTERMINATION DU DROIT APPLICABLE AU BAIL DE LOGEMENT SUR UNE RÉSERVE2. Quel serait le droit applicable?In other provinces, the courts have been able to use the common law in order to resolve these conflicts (because the provincial laws were clearly not applicable). However, in Québec, the situation is different because only the lease provisions of the CCQ could apply. They resolve the question by separating the provisions in three groups:1) General laws on movables and immovables (any leases)2) General laws on real estate3) Specific real estate laws for residential tenanciesAll three can conflict with the Indian Act, while only 2) and 3) conflict also with the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal provisions. Therefore, if any laws could apply, it would be those from 1). They

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would apply if the conflict was about the general contracting methods (i.e. consent, capacity, execution of obligations, etc.). 3. Le pouvoir de légiférer des Conseils de bandeThe band Council could oppose the provincial laws by legislating their own administrative regulations. This could be done through their power for regulating construction, maintenance and use of the buildings within the reserve. However, they may not be able to legislate with regards to the residential leases in general under the Indian Act as this is a legal vacuum. However, certain First Nations are part of the Loi sur la Gestion des terres des premières nations which enables them to regulate all forms of leases within the reserves (1999).

CLASS 18: Commons Plenary - David Lametti

Lametti Plenary Notes Port Meadow, Oxford – a commons = land or resources belonging to or affecting the whole of a community. Common property.

- Commons still exist todayKarl Polanyi (1886-1964)

- Could make more money by selling parts of the land for the new economy (industrial revolution) or by growing different kinds of crops more industrially and selling them across the world.

- By enclosing the land and effectively dispossessing the people who were using the land prior, he could make more money.

- Enclosure movement = when the labour of human beings became part of the capital marketo This is the current term used in IP discourse

Beating a Boundary- Put up something that changes the nature of the commons as they have traditionally and

historically used it. Once a year, as a group, they can go up and knock the things down.o Enforcement mechanism to keep the commons common.

- Private property systems: individual controlling the land- Commons can have: common interest, common use- Abstract system based on ownership- Does my use effect your use?- Subtractability

o Public goods (e.g. sunsets)o Common-pool resources (e.g. library)o Toll or club goods (e.g. day-care centers)o Private goods (e.g. doughnuts)

Tragedy of the Commons- Tragedy of overuse so that the resource itself is destroyed- Self-interest model: people will act solo to assess what is best for themselves as an individual- Assumption that there is no normative system in place that is adequate to control the

resource.But Collective Action?

- Elinor (Lin) Ostrom (1933-2012) – Nobel Price in 2009o Found online: got her Nobel Prize by showing how common resources – forests,

fisheries, oil fields or grazing lands – can be managed successfully by the people who use them rather than by governments or private companies". Ostrom's work in this regard challenged conventional wisdom, showing that common resources can be successfully managed without government regulation or privatization

o There are a number of working commons around the world that have normative structures (rules) that are more than adequate for the maintenance of the resource

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o Acting within the structure of rules that bind themNew “enclosures” of the public domain

- James Boyle: digital locks…- Or the segregation of the Cloud

o Ideas are there for everybody. They cannot be privatized.o New intellectual commons as resource and its role in society.

§ Worth thinking about how we are going to regulate thatData

- Algorithms that exist to help determine a great deal about an individual- E.g. Google Waterfront Project (in Toronto)- The more machines can read, the more algorithms can interpret

o Sooner we’ll get self-driving cars!o Requires data and access to data.

- Should our government be thinking about data policies?- Who owns the data? Is it a commons?- Open access. Open science.

Take-aways from the Plenary- Attributes of the community: who are the users? Who are the providers? What kind of

community do you want to have? What kind of resources are you dealing with?- Given certain kinds of resources and our goal as a society, a commons model can be and

should be a viable alternative that we view as future policy makers have to think about in terms of social order.

CLASS 19: RVH Plenary - Cameron Charlebois

Charlebois Plenary Notes - McGill property surrounds the RVH site (Royal Victoria Hospital)- Moved out of the RVH 20 years ago. Moved to the Glen site (near Vendome)- Very central location, bracketed by McGill- McGill is completely imprisoned in its downtown campus. Not enough space for academic

programs.o Space that we do have is not modern space – can’t offer the kind of programming to be competitive in

the worldo Overpopulated. No rule for new development- The RVH space is way bigger than what McGill can use in the short term (10y). Can only use ¼ of

the site, and the question is what to do with the rest- The property belongs to a corporation (RVH Corporation), a trust. Whatever happens to the property

has to happen to all of the property. Cannot chunk pieces.- No capacity to sub-divide the property and split pieces to different users.- What to do with the entire property?- This is in McGill’s growth path! Cannot grow East, West, or South. Only North!o McGill already rents on Sherbrooke = expensive.- Proposals by McGill have been about obtaining property, need space to grow, but no clear academic

plan- Call for proposals across campus asking what would you do if you had more space on campuso Medicine and other faculties sent proposals- Joint proposal by science/engineering/arts to establish a center of sustainability and public policy- The biggest challenge of the world in the next generation is sustainability and development.o Best science in the world needs to be accompanied by public policyo New Max Bell School of Public Policy- Twice the size of Stuart bio!

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- Project Roadmap – RVH – Manifesto:o Had a visioning day and brought in stakeholders that was orchestrated by HECo Brought in 50 from inside/outside the university- The site itself is complicated because it’s on Mount Royal.- The McGill campus is on mount royal to a certain extent. Mount Royal is protected.o Work done to “mount royal” has to be approved by multiple organizations at the governmental level.

Expensive!- The Allen Memorial – operating psychiatric hospital. Used as a psychiatric research institute at

McGill.- Hersey pavilion + Ross pavilion + women’s pavilion + main pavilions of royal vic (near pine and

university) = heritage properties of Montrealo Costs govt 14M$ to heat/provide securityo At risk of being vandalized/burnt down- McGill said that they would get rid of the parking lots (an eye sore)o Didn’t propose a master plan, only offered minor suggestions.- Distinction between heritage and mountain:o Are these buildings designated? If it’s in the district, it is protected. Doesn’t need to be specifically

named (designated)- Interface – Strathcona building is in bad shape and is in close proximity to the Royal Vic. Currently

the Dentistry and Anatomy lab.- Urban design is an approach to site redevelopment. Looks at how the site should function and how it

should be added to the city.o RVH is sealed unto itself, isolated from the city.o Migration pattern to the campus (students coming from arts/science/engineering need to be able to

walk there directly)- How do you get people moving up the pathway and moving through Strathcona and going into the

RVH?o Strathcona needs to be repurposed. It’s at least 80M$ to fix the outside only.- Proposition:o Get rid of wings that are full of asbestos. Research and discovery in university settings fill into certain

column grids and designs that are not the same as a hospital. Not good for a hospital, not good for a building. Stripping the building and using the structure isn’t great for university use. Better to demolish.

§ Demolition could be considered as tearing down heritage building. Repurposed heritage.§ Some heritage wings can be repurposed for labs, common areas, study areas. Keep the underground.§ Montreal neurological institute is close. Does it need more space?o Repurpose whole site along with principles of urban design. If you remove these buildings, you can

see the city from them (nice view – economic opportunity)§ Who to fill the buildings with?- Whole open back space becomes a land bank for McGill’s future development.- Need to figure out what to do with residual/excess buildings (Ross, Women’s, Hersey pavilions)- Change parking spaces to connect Strathcona [heritage] to RVH.o These are big moves.§ Building under public streets§ Building under a parking garage (underground)§ Building on heritage space.o Non-heritage buildings- Have to have some green space – as part of Mount Royal- Swimming pool: would become part of Mount Royal.- Proposal: introduce new street: bikes, public transit, pedestrians – NOT CARSo Give an address to those 3 buildings

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o Allow people coming in from the East to access the campus and avoid the intersection at Parc/Pine- Infrastructure agreement – water, electricity, etc. (things that need to come in from the municipality

that require agreements)- Minister of Culture – has unilateral veto power of anything that happens on Mount Royal- Yellow part of diagram will need private sector funding for development- To get building permit, needs to be on subdivided piece of land.- Idea of master plan is to create a subdivision pattern to split btwn public and private domain. To get

subdivision is big undertakingo Public: new street, park land,o Private: university buildings, parking, etc.§ Where McGill can do transactions on that land.- Limited partnership- Idea is to undertake a master plan- The master plano Infrastructure question → who is going to pay for the infrastructure changes to the property?- Considerations for the Minister of Cultureo Minister has a unilateral veto power for any projects on Mont Royal§ Allows for serious influence from public pressure- Master plan to create subdivision pattern for division of public and private domaino Parking lot/street area/park area → public domain to belong to the governmento Other subdivided areas to belong to McGill for transaction worko But getting the subdivision itself is complicated because of the interaction between the public and

private areas and infrastructure- Need for McGill to organize governance structure to get properties to marketo Requires more knowledge about real estate development- Need to reconcile McGill’s intended usage for the property with the original intention of the land’s

owners for it to be used for public benefit- Trust - unresolvedo Ownership must move from the trust, to the government, then to McGillo Can’t presume anythingo Trust still has board of trustees who decide disposition of the asset when time comes§ McGill will continue to deal with the government as if it were the owner- Shareholder engagemento Important for the McGill community → community needs to believe that the project is good for the

university§ There needs to be serious stakeholder engagement, esp. in the construction and design· Students, faculty, staffo External stakeholders to contribute:§ City of Montreal and provincial regulatory bodies§ Les amis de la montagne§ Civil society- McGill project:o Does not include First Nations interestso Doesn’t know of any First Nations claims to the land- Basically, if there isn’t peace in the neighbourhood, the city won’t approve the project- McGill’s reputation is at risk – if they don’t do this project well, it looks bad on them.- Goal: Keep buildings low to keep a nice view of mount royal.

CLASS 21: Emphyteusis Plenary - Rober Godin

Class 21 notes

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- Protéger les droits de propriétéDémembrement:

- Cherche à séparer les éléments du droit de propriété- Le droit d’avoir des avantages, d’occuper et d’avoir la possession et la transferrer- “Le preneur”- Art 1119: droits réels – fondamentale- Le preneur peut hypohthèquer ou disposer ce qu’un locataire ordinaire ne peut pas faire- 1195: emphyteusis is the right which for a certain time grants the person the full benefit and

use of an immovable …- The right of ownership that is divided between what remains with the owner and what is

transferred or conveyed to the preneur. The preneur enjoys the domaine utile, the owner retains le domaine imminent.

- The lease is for a long term, could be perpetual. Doesn’t make sense to have perpetual dismemberments. The term is now 100 years (max. term)

- Following the French revolution, emphyteutic lease was not reproduced in the French civil code, but still existed as a real right. Was indoctrined in law le 25 juin 1902 as the emphyeustic lease.

- In Quebec, the use of emphyteusis was much more tied to commercial real estate development.

- Was a sought-after technique for commercial development in the 1970s-1980s in downtown montreal.

o E.g. Place Bonaventure is on an emphyteutic lease.- Underlying concept: land could not be sold because underneath the buildings there are

trains. Area occupying the railway could not be sold. Could still create an emphyteusis.o The whole area with the hotels and stations are still largely on an emphyteutic lease.

- Emphyteutic lease: the formula was that the developer would acquire a certain block or area, do land acquisitions, then a financial institution would buy the land from the developer at cost (usually), and would turn around and lease the land under emphyteusis for the developer and feel obliged to make improvements [necessary to emphyteusis]. Institution would convey property to the developer, developer could borrow or hypothecate to finance the project. At the end of the term, the whole thing would revert to the financial institution.

- Place Desjardins: expropriation du bloc. Ville de Montreal est devenue propriétaire. À louer la place à Place Desjardins.

o Idée de base: préserver les fonds de terre pour les générations futures – depends des conditions économinques

- Ile des Soeurs example.- Vieux code: Le cède pour un temps- Emphytéose: droit du propriétaire temporaire- Art 1199: emphyteuta – rights of the respective parties (owner and preneur) are both real

rights but are absolutely distinct.- Ile des Soeurs: art 1200 – the emphyteuta has all the rights in the immovable that are

attached to the quality of the owner subject to restrictions…o The constituting act must limit the exercise of the rights of the parties, granting rights

and guarantees of the owner…- Art 1205 – emphyteuta is liable for all charges regarding the immovable (taxes). The

preneur is responsible for taxes.o Owner has same obligation as vendor. Warranty of seller.

Sunlife Case- Art 1206- Art 1210: at the end of emphyteusis, the property returns to the owner without

compensation.

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- Emphytéose and co-propiété divisé- Co-propriété divisé en forme de condominium emphytéotique- Contested. Courts said not valid. Government allowed it retroactively.- Emphytéose soit un droit temporaire est inique.

o Title would disappear at the end of the lease.- Adopted several dispositions in the code to make this more do-able.- Art 1082:

o Syndicat de copropriété a un droit de préférence (first refusal rght)o Dans le cas de l’emphytéose le propriété perd le droit de retour, le choix de la

personne qui occupe sa propriétéo Devrait prévoir nommement que le prometteur ne pourra pas créer de copropriété dans

le contrat d’emphytéose (pas d’ordre public selon Me Godin, mais pas de jurisprudence)

- The improvemets are part of the consideration for entering the lease. They are part of the real right. Not a split of ownership.

o Emphyteutic lessee has an interest in the land. Entitled to be there because his rights include the rights of the building and the imrpovements on the land.

o If it is hypothecated, the bank can foreclose. Cannot give more rights than they have. Creditor cannot have more rights to the land than you have.

- Sous-emphytéose: a des droits réelles suffisants.- Peut pas démembrer indéfinitivement.- Advantage for preneur: intérêt commercial (not for private use)

o Pas besoin d’investir dans le fond de terreMont-Royal (Historique)

- The cross – religious and political significance- Maison Smith – built in 1858- Proteger Mont Royal en modifiant la Charte – 1874

RVH- RVH: built in 1893- Nov2013 – group of experts studying the data of Mount Royal. Detailed report published in

2014 with lots of recommendations for government and developers.- McGills project is the only one on the table right now.

o Don’t really know the physical state of the RVH (plumbing, electricity, foundational infrastructure)

- Who is going to pay for the project?o Recommended by the report: McGill, QC govt, Canadian govt. (1/3 each) but hasn’t

been approved by the governmental institutions.- Inter-institutional partnerships that can come work on the same site

o Not just McGill, other research institutions (international or otherwise)- Important recommendation: the property should remain in the public sector so that it can

belong to the community/public at the end of the emphyteusis.- Créer un organisme autonome gérer par McGill, the government of Montreal, et le

gouvernement du Quebec d’être le maître d’oevure de cette institution

Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada c. 137578 Canada Inc, [2000] R.D.I. 563 (CA Qc)Facts: Intimés cèdent par bail emphytéotique à Metro (60 years lease). Metro ne rencontre plus ses obligations auprès du prêt encontrés avec Sun Life -> délaissent l’immeuble au benefice de Sun Life. Intimés requiert de Sun Life de respecter les obligations du bail mais Sun Life ne se considere pas responsible des obligations de Metro.

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Issue: Does the taking-in-payment of the rights of an Emphyteutic Lessee by an hypothecary creditor of such rights, create a personal relationship between the Emphyteutic Lessor and the hypothecary creditor such that the Emphyteutic Lessor has a personal recourse against the hypothecary creditor for the collection of rental and the fulfilment of the other obligations of the original Emphyteutic Lessee?Holding: xReasoning: Le bail accorde ici à l’emphytéote le droit d’hypothéquer la propriété—Pas de mise en fin du bail en avance. Emphytéose est un démembrement du droit de propriété et constitue un droit réel (art 1119 CC). Tous les droits attachés à la qualité de propriétaire. Art 1199 : le créancier de l’emphytéote peut faire et saisir et vendre les droits de celui-ci. Sun Life est devenue propriétaire des droits de Metro dans l’immeuble, par l’effet de la prise en paiement. Par cela, elle s’est vue transférer la propriété des droits et obligations de Metro. Les droits dont SF a fait l’acquisition son des droits réels qui grevaient l’immeuble (démembrement du droit de propriété).Emphytéote jouit donc de l’immeuble comme un propriétaire, mais n’a pas tous les droits rattachés à cet qualité (limités et définis par acte constitutif). SL a acquis les droits de la nature de droits réels dans l’immeuble donné à bail, le contrat d’emphytéose s’applique à elle et lui est opposable. Comme droit réel, affecte l’immeuble et le suit en quelques mains qu’il passe.

CLASS 22: Limitations on Property - Public/Private

Class 22 notes - Dismemberment: cutting it up- Possessory rights v corporeal interests- Covenant: a promise that arises in the context of a contract

o Covenant can get bound up to a lease in land (CML, not CVL)o A right to access someone’s land + a right to take

- Easements Covenants

- Why did we stop needing covenants? Industrial revolution (urbanization)Servitudes (CVL)

- Only immovables, not movables- Art 1177- Required to tolerate certain acts / abstain from doing certain acts- Have to have two plots of land (dominant, servient)- CML: Easement through statute (in gross)- A real servitude v personal servitude (CVL)

o Both are real rightso Personal servitudes are held by individuals in their capacity as individuals

(transferable, and enforceable against owner)§ Usufruct, use, emphyteusis, OR ALSO a right of way, right to fish [extension

of these categories]. Not called personal servitude in the code, just referred to by authors

o Real servitude: exercised by A but only in their capacity as the owner of the dominant land

o Relationship between the two pieces of land (servient and dominant land)- Positive/Negative easements (CML)

o E.g. Right of way = Positive: allow them to something on servient land- Discontinuous and continuous servitude (CVL)

o E.g. Use that is about walking across someone’s land = discontinuouso E.g. Right to view = continuous

- Apparent / Unapparent (CVL)

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o E.g. pathway (that is apparent or unapparent – covered by land)- Grant/Reservation on Subdivision (CML)

o E.g. pathway on someone’s land (reserving an easement for themselves, reservation of an easement. A selling part of land to B, but A wanting access to the pathway).

- Natural servitudes (CVL) flow of the landRecording Rights of Way

- Mutual right to use the drivewayRe Ellenborough Park

- Seafront property in a medium sized English town. Might want to develop it.- Everyone who lives around the park has as right to use the park. Contractual right [personal

right] doesn’t follow the land, it follows the owner (personal right) when the owner dies.- Easement:

o Has to have a dominant/servient tenement.o Must accommodate dominant tenement

§ E.g. right to use the parko Must be different owners

Cadieux v Hinse- Servitude: options to purchase the other’s riverside property if they decide to sell- What does it take to create a servitude?

o Option to purchase is a contractual righto Default that if there is no clear intention to create a servitude, there won’t be oneo Have to have two immovables. Must serve or enhance dominant land

§ A servitude cannot impose an obligation to do something· Positive easement: owner of dominant land can do smtg on servient

land· Negative: owner of servient land has to not do something they

otherwise would do· Can you impose a positive obligation on owner of servient land?

Generally, no.o EXCEPTION: Obligation to allow your neighbur to have first

option.- Too hard to characterize an option to purchase

Metro v Centre Com. Victoriaville- Wanted non-competition clause so that no other supermarkets were built in that area =

limitation on the use of land- Owner of A and B have same directors of different companies

o Cannot have a servitude against yourself, so did that to add weight to the idea that they are creating a servitude

o A right to use land is broad and open, and if you restrict that, then that’s part of using land.

§ Commercial operation.o Usufruct is always temporary. 10y or the life of the person.o Emphyteusis is 100 y.o CVL has discomfort with anything that looks too much like ownership.

- Servitude: important that it is perpetual.o Difference btwn personal rght. It’s a land right. Land goes on forever.

Negative EasementsPhipps v Pears

- Damage.- Negative easement – your land is providing lateral support to another. Impose on neighbour

not to do something that they would otherwise be allowed to do.

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o Problems: too controlling, limiting how people build (cannot increase value/maximize the value and use of our land)

o If there was a covenant [agreement] beforehand, then you can impose the obligation.§ E.g. everyone deciding not to build over 2 stories so as not to block anyone’s

view§ Can you make this contract run onto future purchases?

· If negative covenant (prevent someone from doing something), then it can be enforced, but only in equity. (attaches to the conscience of the person – if you know there was a covenant, you cannot disrespect it)

o Does not apply for positive easement (restrictive covenants)o CVL: 1177 – servitude.

- For example: people who lived near the park had to pay annual fee for maintenance of the park – positive obligation – connected to the easement/servitude. Use to the right of way and agree to owner of servient land that they will pay for maintenance, it is ok bc it is connected to the servitude.

- CVL: 1178 – add a debt. Right to insist on the obligation.CVL: Real servitude, personal servitudeCML: Easement (+/-), covenants (restrictive or positive)Class Exercise

- Use of a laneway by neighbourso CML: easement

- Temporary storage of hay after annual harvest o Is the hay being cut on one person’s land and stored on another?o Storage? Worried about that looking like possession.

§ Railways/power cables/pipelines (even though they are permanent and possess a bit of land) they are still considered easements

§ CML – look at easement (granting smtg) only if it was EVERY YEAR§ Answer: License

- Limit on building heighto Personal in personal servitude = attached to the individual, not to the lando Real servitude: bc building height is attached to the immovable. Would have to

benefit the neighbourhoodo CML: restrictive covenant (NOT a negative easement)

- Ability to discharge green slime on neighbour’s land- Prohibition on digging holes that cause subsidence- Monthly fee for upkeep of park- Underground pipeline for Hydro QC - Can you turn different kinds of obligations into proprietary rights?

o CML is reticent abut creating negative easements (what people cannot do)§ Also hard to create positive obligations

o CVL: negative obligation is part of the definition of a servitude- Covenants are of contractual nature

How to create/transfer property 101- CML:

o Statute of frauds – any interest in land has to be in writing (used to be through formal symbolic ceremonies because people were illiterate)

o Equity: through oral promises, proprietary estoppelo Land Title systems: to create an interest in land, it has to be registered

- CVL:o Rights cannot be enforced against third parties unless they are published (1455)

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o CCQ 916, 1453, 2938Easements

- CMLo Expresso Implied in a grant (legal) – presumed intention

§ Rule in Wheeldon v Burrows*o Prescription: not a possessory right

- CVLo Expresso Destination of owner (1183)

§ Have to have dominant/servient§ Is there a right of way to the land?

o Prescription- The default position in any act of sale is that there is no servitude granted unless there is an

explicit intention to create a servitudeCML Implied Grant of Easement: Wheeldon v Burrows

- If A carves something out of the grant for B it is granting an easement.- Grant (n.) in interest of land- Grant (v.)/reserving of an easement- Difference in how those are treated?

o Easier to apply a grant of an easement, or a reservation of an easement? A grant because reservation is a loss for the grantee, and the law is more favourable for the grantee than the grantor

§ You should not derogate from a grant- Why protect the purchaser instead of the vendor?

o Because vendor has informational advantage. They are in a better position to supply that information.

§ Encourages people to partake in commercial exchanges (to stimulate the market) by protecting buyers rather than vendors. People will have faith in the market.

- TEST:1. A grant of an estate passes all continuous and apparent “quasi-easements”2. Necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of property granted

Whitworth v Martin (CML)- Private road covering 3 neighbouring lakeside properties- Martin should be allowed to use the existing road even though it goes through two existing

properties because it would cost tens of thousands of dollars to create a new path leading directly to his property.

- Does the road have to have access directly to the public road? No, so long as it leads there eventually.

- Can force them to provide you access and indemnify for the inconvenience.- Servitudes cannot be acquired by prescription

Wong v Beaumont (1965) UK CA- Tenant required a ventilation system. Owner refused. Is this a grant of an easement? Yes,

grant – adding something to the premise of the lease.- Principle grant was grant of the lease of the restaurant?

o Intention of the parties is that the lease be used for a restaurant. If you lease it, it has to be legally operating (requiring ventilation system)

§ Physically impossible to use the land without an easement. Legal necessity.- Does not pass Wheeldon v Burrows test step 1

Sandom v Webb (1951) UK CA

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- Grant or reservation? Reservation because owner is withholding the right to the wall. Can be tied to common intention, not integrally related to interest of running a hairdressing salon.

o Common intention: little evidence. More favorable for grantee than grantor§ Facts are not reasonably consistent with any other explanation

o Intentions are governed by official/unofficial norms- To consider this in CVL, there would need to be writing - CCQ1183.

Davidson v Rosaire Nadeau [2007]- Real right or personal right? Personal right – it is attached to himself. He keeps the right

himself; he has a personal right, but it is not a real right. If it changes owners, they do not have the same agreement. B uses the land, A sells his house to someone else. C bought the house and did not let B use the land. I did not buy something that had a reservation on it.

- Real servitude? Needs to be a heritage and a heritageo It is the right of a person towards the heritage (this would be a real right). “il se

reserve” it needs to be for the benefit of the land, or be a successor in title. Specify that it is transmissible to other parties with the land

Prescriptive Easements- CML: doctrine of modern lost grant

o When it doesn’t come from a grant (because it has been lost)o Preserving the idea that all easements lie in grant

- Criteria:1. Continuous use2. Use as of right (not secret or violent)3. Must accrue for and against a fee simple estate

Kaminskas v Storm (2009)- What kind of claim to any kind of easement?

o Implied easement?o Prescription?

- Prescription period: 20years back from 2008, in 1988 – in that period we have written permission. Permission negates prescription

- What effect does written or oral permission have?- Claim under statute or lost grant? Neither- No claim to an easement- Without secrecy and without permission: has to be obvious enough. User as of right. Have to

give the neighbour opportunity to insist on their rights.

Harrison v. Carswell (1975), 62 DLR (3d) 68 (SCC)Commentary on the case provided in the course pack: Property is rights not things—What are the different "bundles of rights"?Facts: Shopping centre - owns access roads, parking lots and sidewalks - open for use by members of the public. Private owner (shopping centre) has invested members of the public with a right of entry during the business hours of his tenants. Employee of one of the stores was picketing inside the mall, they asked her to leave, she started picketing on the sidewalk that is owned by the shopping centre. She was charged with trespass under the Petty Trespasses Act. Counsel for the appellant owner in this case stated that members of the public entered and remained in the shopping centre at the owner's whim - under what may be called a revocable license. Shopping centre argues that a person is subject to liability for trespass if they are asked to leave and don't leave even if they are peaceful.Issue: Can a shopping centre exclude members of the public from peacefully using their sidewalks thereby constituting trespass?Holding: x

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Reasoning: Trespass connotes unjustified invasion of another's possession. What does a shopping centre owner protect, for what invaded interest of his does he seek vindication in ousting members of the public from sidewalks in the shopping centre? There is no challenge to his (shopping centre) title and none to his possession nor to his privacy when members of the public use those amenities. Court says that the members of the public are privileged visitors whose privilege is revocable upon misbehavior. The respondent picketer in the present case is entitled to the privilege of entry and to remain in the public areas to carry on as she did (without obstruction of the sidewalk or incommoding of others). Need to balance the interest of the shopping centre owner with competing interests of members of the public. Privilege is the modern term applied to those considerations which avoid liability where it might otherwise follow. In its broader sense, it is applied to any immunity which prevents the existence of a tort. The liability for a harmless invasion of either an interest of personality or property is either punitive or compensatory. There is no reason why if the good likely to result from an act is greater than the harm it is intended to cause, the actor should be punished.Dissent: Right of entry to a particular class of the public has not thereby relinquished his or its right to withdraw its invitation to the general public or any particular member thereof, and that if a member of the public. The role of the judiciary is not to create new laws - that is the job of the legislature. If A is to be given the right to enter and remain on the land of B against the will of B, it would seem that such a change must be made by the legislature and not the courts.Ratio: An owner of a public-use space such as the sidewalk of a shopping mall has rights that are relative to the rights of others (non-owners) which must be balanced. Peaceful picketing on the sidewalk of a shopping mall is not trespass.

Nicholas Blomley, Unsettling the City: Urban Land and the Politics of Property (New York: Routledge, 2004)In 1993, Woodward’s, a large department store in West Hastings Vancouver, closed its doors.

➢ In 1995, community members and anti-poverty activists started beautification projects around the abandoned building

➢ The property owner planned to build 350 condo units in the building➢ Activists saw this as a threat to the community in terms of gentrification, they also saw the

building as “belonging” to the community○ The community wanted a “collective claim” over the building recognized

➢ In 1996 a partnership between the City of Vancouver, the proprietor and community representatives successfully agreed to developing the building into a mixed use site

○ The agreement was short lived, in 1997 the proprietor reverted to his original condo development plan

➢ Increased activism resulted in the provincial government buying the site in 2001, promising 300 co-op housing units

○ Later that year a new government was elected who sought to offload the building to a private developer

➢ Activists re-engaged efforts by squatting in the building and, when they were cleared out, by erecting a tent city around it.

➢ Eventually, the province sold the building to the City of Vancouver in 2003 with the promise of funding 100 units of non-market housing

This story is a powerful reminder of the how the law “categorizes as property only that which meets clear definitional tests.” Relationships to land of a collective nature are often dismissed out of hand.

Batty v. Toronto, 108 O.R. (3d) 571, 2011 ONSC 6862Facts: People who occupied St. James Park during the Occupy movement charged with trespass for staying there overnight and installing tents/shelters/structures.

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Issue: Does the city have the right to exclude the public from a public park?Holding: Yes.Reasoning: [Protesters using the space as a site for organizing and direct democracy and claiming this space as necessary to fully exert their freedom of association, freedom of expression rights]. Finds that the camp interferes with people being able to use the park as before b/c the structures take up space that would otherwise be available. Occupying the park is protected under s.2(b) of the Charter – the Trespass Notice infringes the Protestors’ s.2 freedoms. Infringement is justified b/c of the noise that could keep people up from all-night use of the park space, b/c of the way it excludes other people from using the parks and the interference with the City’s maintenance of the park → Objective of the Parks by-law is to balance the different uses of the public park and this is sufficient and important. There is rational connection b/c Trespass Notice asks the protesters to not monopolize the park and to share it with others. The by-law is within the range of reasonable alternatives – meets the minimal impairment **invokes ‘tragedy of the commons’.Ratio: The public does not have an absolute right to public space/parks – they can be regulated by by-laws.

Singh c. R. 2010 QCCA 1340Facts: Jaggi put a poster for the anarchist book fair in a place not allowed in contravention of a Montreal by-law. Jaggi alleges this by-law violates his freedom of expression under art. 2(b).Issue: Dose the by-law violate freedom of expression under s.2(b) of the Charter?Holding: Yes.Reasoning: City’s purpose is protection of the environment and the cleanliness of public space – seen as pressing legislative objectives by the court. BUT does not meet the minimal impairment objective – the by-law gives too much discretion to the administration, does not say anything about the number, the size of the spread of the designated billboards that posters are restricted to or even the requirement to have anyRatio: A by-law that regulates public space will be declared invalid if it does not allow sufficient space for effective assertion of s.2(b) rights.

CLASSES 23 & 24: Emphyteusis (Plenary w. Robert Godin)Servitudes, easements, restrictive covenants

Class 23 Notes - Dismemberment: cutting it up- Possessory rights v corporeal interests- Covenant: a promise that arises in the context of a contract

o Covenant can get bound up to a lease in land (CML, not CVL)o A right to access someone’s land + a right to take

- EasementsCovenants

- Why did we stop needing covenants? Industrial revolution (urbanization)Servitudes (CVL)

- Only immovables, not movables- Art 1177- Required to tolerate certain acts / abstain from doing certain acts- Have to have two plots of land (dominant, servient)- CML: Easement through statute (in gross)- A real servitude v personal servitude (CVL)

o Both are real rights

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o Personal servitudes are held by individuals in their capacity as individuals (transferable, and enforceable against owner)

§ Usufruct, use, emphyteusis, OR ALSO a right of way, right to fish [extension of these categories]. Not called personal servitude in the code, just referred to by authors

o Real servitude: exercised by A but only in their capacity as the owner of the dominant land

o Relationship between the two pieces of land (servient and dominant land)- Positive/Negative easements (CML)

o E.g. Right of way = Positive: allow them to something on servient land- Discontinuous and continuous servitude (CVL)

o E.g. Use that is about walking across someone’s land = discontinuouso E.g. Right to view = continuous

- Apparent / Unapparent (CVL)o E.g. pathway (that is apparent or unapparent – covered by land)

- Grant/Reservation on Subdivision (CML)o E.g. pathway on someone’s land (reserving an easement for themselves, reservation of

an easement. A selling part of land to B, but A wanting access to the pathway).- Natural servitudes (CVL) flow of the land

Recording Rights of Way- Mutual right to use the driveway

Re Ellenborough Park- Seafront property in a medium sized English town. Might want to develop it.- Everyone who lives around the park has as right to use the park. Contractual right [personal

right] doesn’t follow the land, it follows the owner (personal right) when the owner dies.- Easement:

o Has to have a dominant/servient tenement.o Must accommodate dominant tenement

§ E.g. right to use the parko Must be different owners

Cadieux v Hinse- Servitude: options to purchase the other’s riverside property if they decide to sell- What does it take to create a servitude?

o Option to purchase is a contractual righto Default that if there is no clear intention to create a servitude, there won’t be oneo Have to have two immovables. Must serve or enhance dominant land

§ A servitude cannot impose an obligation to do something· Positive easement: owner of dominant land can do smtg on servient

land· Negative: owner of servient land has to not do something they

otherwise would do· Can you impose a positive obligation on owner of servient land?

Generally, no.o EXCEPTION: Obligation to allow your neighbur to have first

option.- Too hard to characterize an option to purchase

Metro v Centre Com. Victoriaville- Wanted non-competition clause so that no other supermarkets were built in that area =

limitation on the use of land- Owner of A and B have same directors of different companies

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o Cannot have a servitude against yourself, so did that to add weight to the idea that they are creating a servitude

o A right to use land is broad and open, and if you restrict that, then that’s part of using land.

§ Commercial operation.o Usufruct is always temporary. 10y or the life of the person.o Emphyteusis is 100 y.o CVL has discomfort with anything that looks too much like ownership.

- Servitude: important that it is perpetual.o Difference btwn personal rght. It’s a land right. Land goes on forever.

Negative EasementsPhipps v Pears

- Damage.- Negative easement – your land is providing lateral support to another. Impose on neighbour

not to do something that they would otherwise be allowed to do.o Problems: too controlling, limiting how people build (cannot increase value/maximize

the value and use of our land)o If there was a covenant [agreement] beforehand, then you can impose the obligation.

§ E.g. everyone deciding not to build over 2 stories so as not to block anyone’s view

§ Can you make this contract run onto future purchases?· If negative covenant (prevent someone from doing something), then

it can be enforced, but only in equity. (attaches to the conscience of the person – if you know there was a covenant, you cannot disrespect it)

o Does not apply for positive easement (restrictive covenants)o CVL: 1177 – servitude.

- For example: people who lived near the park had to pay annual fee for maintenance of the park – positive obligation – connected to the easement/servitude. Use to the right of way and agree to owner of servient land that they will pay for maintenance, it is ok bc it is connected to the servitude.

- CVL: 1178 – add a debt. Right to insist on the obligation. CVL: Real servitude, personal servitudeCML: Easement (+/-), covenants (restrictive or positive)Class Exercise

- Use of a laneway by neighbourso CML: easement

- Temporary storage of hay after annual harvest o Is the hay being cut on one person’s land and stored on another?o Storage? Worried about that looking like possession.

§ Railways/power cables/pipelines (even though they are permanent and possess a bit of land) they are still considered easements

§ CML – look at easement (granting smtg) only if it was EVERY YEAR§ Answer: License

- Limit on building heighto Personal in personal servitude = attached to the individual, not to the lando Real servitude: bc building height is attached to the immovable. Would have to

benefit the neighbourhoodo CML: restrictive covenant (NOT a negative easement)

- Ability to discharge green slime on neighbour’s land

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- Prohibition on digging holes that cause subsidence- Monthly fee for upkeep of park- Underground pipeline for Hydro QC

Class 24 Notes

- Can you turn different kinds of obligations into proprietary rights?o CML is reticent abut creating negative easements (what people cannot do)

§ Also hard to create positive obligationso CVL: negative obligation is part of the definition of a servitude

- Covenants are of contractual natureHow to create/transfer property 101

- CML:o Statute of frauds – any interest in land has to be in writing (used to be through formal

symbolic ceremonies because people were illiterate)o Equity: through oral promises, proprietary estoppelo Land Title systems: to create an interest in land, it has to be registered

- CVL:o Rights cannot be enforced against third parties unless they are published (1455)o CCQ 916, 1453, 2938

Easements- CML

o Expresso Implied in a grant (legal) – presumed intention

§ Rule in Wheeldon v Burrows*o Prescription: not a possessory right

- CVLo Expresso Destination of owner (1183)

§ Have to have dominant/servient§ Is there a right of way to the land?

o Prescription- The default position in any act of sale is that there is no servitude granted unless there is an

explicit intention to create a servitudeCML Implied Grant of Easement: Wheeldon v Burrows

- If A carves something out of the grant for B it is granting an easement.- Grant (n.) in interest of land- Grant (v.)/reserving of an easement- Difference in how those are treated?

o Easier to apply a grant of an easement, or a reservation of an easement? A grant because reservation is a loss for the grantee, and the law is more favourable for the grantee than the grantor

§ You should not derogate from a grant- Why protect the purchaser instead of the vendor?

o Because vendor has informational advantage. They are in a better position to supply that information.

§ Encourages people to partake in commercial exchanges (to stimulate the market) by protecting buyers rather than vendors. People will have faith in the market.

- TEST:1. A grant of an estate passes all continuous and apparent “quasi-easements”2. Necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of property granted

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3. THIRD POINT IS ON THE SLIDE THAT SHE HAS NOT YET POSTEDWhitworth v Martin (CML)

- Private road covering 3 neighbouring lakeside properties- Martin should be allowed to use the existing road even though it goes through two existing

properties because it would cost tens of thousands of dollars to create a new path leading directly to his property.

- Does the road have to have access directly to the public road? No, so long as it leads there eventually.

- Can force them to provide you access and indemnify for the inconvenience.- Servitudes cannot be acquired by prescription

Wong v Beaumont (1965) UK CA- Tenant required a ventilation system. Owner refused. Is this a grant of an easement? Yes,

grant – adding something to the premise of the lease.- Principle grant was grant of the lease of the restaurant?

o Intention of the parties is that the lease be used for a restaurant. If you lease it, it has to be legally operating (requiring ventilation system)

§ Physically impossible to use the land without an easement. Legal necessity.- Does not pass Wheeldon v Burrows test step 1

Sandom v Webb (1951) UK CA- Grant or reservation? Reservation because owner is withholding the right to the wall. Can be

tied to common intention, not integrally related to interest of running a hairdressing salon.o Common intention: little evidence. More favorable for grantee than grantor

§ Facts are not reasonably consistent with any other explanationo Intentions are governed by official/unofficial norms

- To consider this in CVL, there would need to be writing - CCQ1183.Davidson v Rosaire Nadeau [2007]

- Real right or personal right? Personal right – it is attached to himself. He keeps the right himself; he has a personal right, but it is not a real right. If it changes owners, they do not have the same agreement. B uses the land, A sells his house to someone else. C bought the house and did not let B use the land. I did not buy something that had a reservation on it.

- Real servitude? Needs to be a heritage and a heritageo It is the right of a person towards the heritage (this would be a real right). “il se

reserve” it needs to be for the benefit of the land, or be a successor in title. Specify that it is transmissible to other parties with the land

Prescriptive Easements- CML: doctrine of modern lost grant

o When it doesn’t come from a grant (because it has been lost)o Preserving the idea that all easements lie in grant

- Criteria:1. Continuous use2. Use as of right (not secret or violent)3. Must accrue for and against a fee simple estate

Kaminskas v Storm (2009)- What kind of claim to any kind of easement?

o Implied easement?o Prescription?

- Prescription period: 20years back from 2008, in 1988 – in that period we have written permission. Permission negates prescription

- What effect does written or oral permission have?- Claim under statute or lost grant? Neither- No claim to an easement

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- Without secrecy and without permission: has to be obvious enough. User as of right. Have to give the neighbour opportunity to insist on their rights.

Re Ellenborough Park, [1956] 1 Ch 131 (CA)Facts: In 1855, two tenants in common owned the PE land, parts of which they sold off in order to build houses. Homeowners fronting and adjacent to the park were granted rights to enjoy the remaining parkland, specifically “the full enjoyment at all times hereafter in common with the other persons to whom such easements may be granted of the pleasure ground… subject to the payment of a fair and just portion of keeping”, provided they each pay a share of the upkeep. A century later, the new park owners want to build on the parkland so argue the homeowners only have a personal advantage (a license, with no proprietary rights). The homeowners argue they have an easement proper (which includes proprietary rights).Issue: whether the homeowners have any right known to the law, and now enforceable by them against the park owners, to the use and enjoyment of the park to the extent and manner of an easementHolding: Yes.Reasoning: There are four requirements for an easement to be said to exist: (1) A dominant and subservient tenement, (2) the easement must “accommodate” the dominant tenement by having a “sufficient nexus” between enjoyment of the right and use of the tenement, (3) the dominant and servient owners cannot be the same person, (4) rights conferred by easements must be rights that can otherwise be given in a property grant. ….in this case, #2 and #4 are contested.POINT 2: the easement must “accommodate” the dominant tenement by having a “sufficient nexus” between enjoyment of the right and use of the tenement. “…a right enjoyed by one over the land of another does not possess the status of an easement unless it accommodates and serves the dominant tenement, and is reasonably necessary for the better enjoyment of that tenement, for if it has no necessary connexion therewith, it is not an easement at all, but a mere contractual right personal to and only enforceable between the two contracting parties”Rights to the park clearly enhance the property value of the homes. This alone is not enough, since an easement must be “connected to the normal enjoyment of the property”, not simply an appurtement (right or restriction that attaches to the property i.e. can’t be random). // Homeowners argue that because none of the houses have gardens, the park represents a “common backyard” ish. This provides sufficient nexus since the enjoyment of gardens is a “beneficial attribute of residence in a house as ordinarily understood”NB the judges decide that, if the easement exists, its scope ought to be extended to the houses not directly fronting the property, but also adjacent to it (because those houses check all the boxes to the test that the fronting houses do).POINT 4: rights conferred by easements must be rights that can otherwise be given in a property grant. Must interpret the actual terms of the grant itself. Courts decide that properly interpreted, the rights in the conveyances are not so excessive that they deprive the park owners of their property rights, nor are they overly vague. They are like a right of passage over the land of another.Not too vague (b/c “full enjoyment” refers to territory of park, not scope of usage). Park owners argue that “full enjoyment” wording is too broad, offers no limitations upon its use; implies jus spatiandi i.e. right to go wander upon the park and every part of it and enjoy its ameneties and even its produce without stint. Court disagrees, says it is not jus spatiandi and that “full enjoyment” refers not to “some wider, less well understood or less definable privilege”, but to the fact that each plot/homeowner was annexed the right of enjoyment of the park as a whole.Not joint occupation inconsistent with the proprietorship or possession of the alleged servient owners i.e. doesn’t deprive owner of proprietorship. e.g. servient owner retained position of shrubs and trees and could sell them. // It is not a mere right of recreation without utility or benefit. E.g. domestic purposes such as taking our small children in prams. // There’s a sense that a house needs a backyard, which these

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do not have; garden can have equivalent function (cultural understanding of a ‘home’; may not have been decided this way today).Ratio: For an easement to exist, there are four things that must be present: (1) there must be a dominant and servient tenement; (2) an easement must "accommodate" the dominant tenant (the use of the land in question must be "connected" to the use of the dominant land - merely adding to the property value is not enough to satisfy this); (3) the dominant and servient owners must be different people; and (4) the right must be capable of being the subject matter of a grant.// this is because easements cannot be passed by possession, because they do not physically exist – they can only pass through grants. the right must be a "right of utility and benefit", and not merely for recreation or amusement; not too vague; not deprive owner from proprietorship.

Cadieux c Hinse, [1989] RJQ 353FAITS:Aujourd'hui

Requérant est le propriétaire du lot XC, et le mis-en-cause du lot Y8. Les deux fonds sont contigus.Requérant est le propriétaire du lot X15, et l'intimée du lot Y16. Les deux fonds sont contigus.Le lot X16 se situe entre Y8 et le Fleuve.

Servitudes d'achat de préférence● 1972, Y16: Acte notarié enregistré entre requérant et ancien propriétaire1 : "Les parties désirent

établir, pour le bénéfice réciproque desdits immeubles, une servitude de préférence d'achat prohibant la vente desdits immeubles avant de l'avoir au préalable offert l'un à l'autre et ce, à un prix non supérieur à la somme de [XXXX]"

● 1975, Y16 : Acte notarié pas enregistré entre requérant et ancien propriétaire2 : Ibid.Vente & location de lots

● 1974, Y16 : Acte notarié entre ancien propriétaire1 et ancien propriétaire2 : vente du Y16 à l'ancien propriétaire2

● 1976, Y16 : Acte notarié entre ancien propriétaire2 et mis-en-cause : bail pour un terme de 99 ans● 1976, Y8 : Acte notarié entre ancien propriétaire1 et mis-en-cause : vente du Y8 au mis-en-cause● 1985, Y16 : Acte notarié entre ancien propriétaire2 et mis-en-cause : annulation du bail

Requête de jugement déclaratoire● Y16 : Requérant veut faire déclarer qu'il a un droit de servitude réel d'acheter par préférence le lot,

et que, PCQ le bail de 99 ans = vente, il a le droit de l'acheter le lot à la somme stipulée.DROITQu'est-ce qu'un droit réel ?Montpetit-Taillefer

Le droit réel est une faculté opposable à tout le monde, et qui donne à une personne un pouvoir juridique direct et immédiat sur une chose déterminée.[…]Le droit obligationnel ou de créance, soit la faculté qui appartient à une personne qu'on appelle créancier d'exiger d'une autre personne qu'on appelle débiteur l'exécution d'une prestation consistant à donner, à faire ou à ne pas faire quelque chose.

MigneaultLe droit réel est un pouvoir direct et immédiat sur une chose. La relation qu'il établit existe, sans aucun intermédiaire, entre la personne qui en est nantie et la chose qui en est l'objet.Le droit personnel, au contraire, ne donne sur la chose qui en est l'objet aucune

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puissance directe et immédiate. Ainsi, lorsqu'une chose m'est due, je ne puis arriver à elle que par l'intermédiaire du débiteur, qui reste interposé entre elle et moi, tant qu'il n'a pas accompli son obligation […]En d'autres termes, le droit réel est un droit acquis, établi dès à présent sur une chose; le droit personnel est un titre pour avoir la chose, un acheminement vers le droit réel. Ainsi, quant je suis propriétaire, j'ai un droit acquis sur une chose: mon droit est réel. Si quelqu'un est obligé de me rendre propriétaire d'une chose qu'il se propose d'acquérir, j'ai un titre pour acquérir cette chose: mon droit est personnel; il sera réel, au contraire, lorsque mon débiteur m'aura, par l'exécution de son obligation, procuré le droit qu'il m'a promis.[…]Le droit personnel, au contraire, a pour corrélatif, non plus, comme le droit réel, une obligation générale, mais une obligation relative, c'est-à-dire une obligation imposée à une ou plusieurs personnes individuellement déterminées.

Quelle est la nature de la servitude réelle ?CCBC, art. 499

La servitude réelle est une charge imposée sur un héritage pour l'utilité d'un autre héritage appartenant à un propriétaire différent.

● Caractéristique #1○ Rapport entre deux immeubles/fonds appartenant à des propriétaires différents;○ Bénéfice ou service établi par la servitude l'est pour l'utilité d'un immeuble qui devient le

fonds dominant (v.-à-v. fond servant);■ " [L]'un est diminué, l'autre est augmenté " par la servitude;■ But de faciliter l'usage ou l'exploitation du fonds dominant ou dans le but d'en

augmenter l'agrément;■ Pas de servitude si l'avantage destiné à la personne plutôt qu'au fond.

○ Impossible par le biais d'une servitude réelle d'imposer des services d'une personne pour une autre personne; et

○ Droit conféré par la servitude réelle est un droit réel.● Caractéristique #2

○ Servitude =/ Obligation de faire.○ Servitude = Souffrir quelque chose, ou ne pas faire quelque chose.

■ Exemple de souffrance : Accorder au fond dominant le droit d'y passer pour l'exploitation de son fonds.

■ Exemple d'obligation de ne pas faire : Obligation de ne pas hausser sa maison, afin de ne pas nuire aux vues d'une autre maison.

■ Servitude telle obligation réelle : Le propriétaire n'est tenu qu'indirectement et en sa qualité de propriétaire. De là, pour lui, la faculté de s'affranchir de l'obligation dont il est chargé, en abandonnant le fonds assujetti au propriétaire du fonds dominant.

● Caractéristique #3 : Servitude réelle est perpétuelle, mais on peut convenir d'un terme qui lui met fin.

Quelle est la nature de la servitude personnelle ?● Autre nom : droit réel de jouissance.● Similarité avec servitude réelle : Confère au bénéficiaire un droit réel sur un fonds.● Distinction de la servitude réelle : Due à une personne désignée plutôt qu'un fond pour sa propre

utilité.Quelle est la nature du droit de préférence d'achat?

● Promesse unilatérale de vente en cas d'aliénation = Droit personnel, pas un droit réel opposable aux tiers (Marceau v. Turgeon, BR).

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● Remède en cas de vente à un tiers sans le consentement du créancier : La vente sera valable, sauf le cas de fraude (connaissance du tiers de la créance); le créancier n'aura qu'une action en dommages-intérêts.

Comment déterminer s'il y a création d'une servitude dans une clause donnée?● Conditions :

○ Les fonds servants et dominants y sont bien décrits; et○ Il est indiqué que la servitude doit bénéficier à un immeuble et non à une

personne désignée.Any doubt is interpreted against the existence of a servitude… The title must show clearly in favour of what land and upon what land the servitude is created. The title must be construed without extrinsic aid… Every effort should be made to ascertain the intention of the parties to the deed in question [Boucher c. Roy, CA].

APPLICATION EN L'ESPÈCE● Obligation de faire : Les droits de préférence d'achat ne constituent pas des servitudes réelles

puisqu'ils obligent le fond servant à faire quelque chose, vendre le fond à l'autre.● Relation entre personnes plutôt qu'entre immeubles.● Pas d'utilité au fond, mais utilité au requérant lui-même. Au plus, l'avantage pour le fond est indirect

puisque l'exercice du droit de préférence accroitrait le fond, mais cet accroissement est conditionné par l'exercice du droit contractuel.

● De toute façon, bail =/ aliénation, donc requérant t dans l’champ

Epiciers-Unis Metro Richelieu c. Centre commercial Victoriaville ltée, [2001] RJQ 587Facts: Victoriaville imposed a ‘no foods sales’ servitude on the mall. Standard Life Assurance Co seized the mall pursuant to a hypothec on it. Furthermore, they claimed that they are not subject to the servitude because it was not a proper servitude per art 1177, and also because SL is a third party. They also claimed fraudulent use of rights per art 1631 because the servitude decreased the value of the property under art 2734. The trial judge decided that the impugned clause was actually an exclusivity clause, not a real servitude, and thus cannot be set up against SL.Issue: x Is the “no food sales” clause a servitude?Holding: No.Reasoning: The new CCQ doesn’t change the regime of servitudes. Thus art 1177 doesn’t imply that the duties on the servient land restrict usage, only that they obligate the owner of the servient property to permit acts of usage by the owner of the dominant property. Here, we don’t have a real servitude because the stipulation doesn’t benefit the dominant property. It cannot benefit the renter directly. Furthermore, the servitudes are perpetual (art 1182) and these are tenants whose benefits will cease with the end of their lease or the closing of their business. Furthermore, a servitude cannot principally impose an active role on the owner of the servient property. In this case, we have a simple personal obligation in the form of a non-concurrence clause. This cannot be set up against third parties i.e. against SL.NB: ^ in the common law, this would be considered a restrictive covenant. CCQ doesn't have that type of language, so issue is whether it is a servitude.Ratio: A non-concurrence clause benefitting the lessor of a property cannot be a real servitude.

F Terré & P Simler, Droit civil, Les biens , 7th ed at 775, 878 Summary: Démembrements de la propriété et obligations propter rem

● Obligations propter rem = une obligation, tout en étant personnelle, peut peser sur le titulaire d'un droit réel, en cette qualité, et se transmette aux titulaires successifs de ce droit. Celui qui en est tenu ne peut se libérer qu'en faisant abandon de son droit réel.

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● Ces obligations ont ceci de particulier que le débiteur n'en est tenu qu'en tant que détenteur d'un fonds, avec lequel la charge se transmet; il peut s'en libérer en déguerpissant, c'est-à-dire en abandonnant le bien. Pour cette raison, on appelle ces obligations propter rem (parfois obligations réelles, mais l'expression prête à équivoque).

● Ne PAS confondre droits réels sur la chose et obligations propter rem qui pèsent sur le propriétaire d'un fonds ou sur le titulaire d'un droit réel en cette qualité : obligations de l'usufruitier, du propriétaire d'un fonds grevé de servitude, du concessionnaire d'une mine. Ce ne sont pas, pour ceux qui en senties créanciers, des droits réels, car il s'agit d'obligations pesant sur la personne, et non de prérogatives d'usage ou de jouissance sur une chose.

Servitude et obligation propter rem● Attention : peut être difficile à distinguer!● Envisagée sous l'angle de la propriété du fonds servant, la servitude paraît particulièrement

proche de la catégorie des obligations propter rem. Elle revêt les mêmes caractères : elle pèse sur le propriétaire d’un fonds déterminé; elle se transmet avec ce fonds; il est possible de s'en affranchir en abandonnant le fonds qui en est grevé (art. 699).

● Par rapport au fonds dominant (qui reçoit un service) : la servitude est un droit réel, accessoire du droit de propriété de ce fonds et automatiquement transmis avec lui.

● Par rapport au fonds servant (qui rend un service): la servitude apparaît comme un démembrement de la propriété, comme une amputation du droit de propriété. Celui-ci ne peut pareillement se transmettre qu’ainsi amputé : nemo plus jurls transfere potest quam ipse habet. Le propriétaire du fonds servant et ses ayants cause subissent passivement la servitude. Il n'apparaît aucune obligation, même réelle, liée au bien et pesant sur ses propriétaires successifs. Il n'y a obligation que si une prestation ou une abstention est imposée à un débiteur. La servitude est un état du bien, subi par le propriétaire du fonds servant, mais sans que pèse sur lui une obligation.

● Mais des obligations propter rem peuvent exister de surcroît. Il est possible, par exemple, de mettre à la charge du propriétaire du fonds servant des obligations positives, complétant le dispositif au bénéfice du propriétaire du fonds dominant. Le Code civil en suggère lui-même quelques illustrations (art. 698 et 699, et 907).

Il convient toutefois de limiter la création d'obligations propter rem aux seules prestations nécessaires à la jouissance de la servitude, sous peine de contrevenir, par ce biais, à la règle formulée par l'article 686, qui interdit d'imposer une servitude à la personne ou en faveur de la personne.

P-B Mignault, Le droit civil canadien basé sur “les répétitions écrites sur le code civil” de Frédéric Mourlon […], vol 2 (Montréal : C. Théoret, 1896) at 1–7. Des servitudes réelles

· This is the heading in the CCQ· “réelles” is used to distinguish from personal servitudes such as “usufruit, usage, habitation, emphytéose et toute autre charge impose sur un immeuble en faveur de la personne SEULEMENT”

· A servitude is a charge or a right imposed on an inheritance for the use of another’s inheritance who is a different owner

· It is a charge if we consider the passive aspect (having to let someone pass) and a right if we consider the active aspect (being able to pass)· Usually servitude has been considered by its passive aspect, right to pass on another’s land

· Therefore, a charge will always be accompanied by a right of another· An obligation includes an benefit, a person who owes the right (debiteur) and a person who’s owed a right (créancier)

· Similarly, a servitude has a right, a passive subject (inheritance on which the right is imposed à fonds servant), and an active subject (inheritance which possessed the right à fonds dominant)

· Here it is a right between two inheritances, not two people as the obligation

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· An obligation cannot be passed on to a new property owner (promise to take care of another’s land), it is between two specific individuals, not attached to the land

· Servitude applies to all people who own the property to which it is attached· Cannot oblige the sale of the servitude for its value, as it is part of the property (you may give up an obligation for the price of that obligation though)· Someone who has a servitude cannot require any obligation on the owner of the land on which there is a servitude, this person is only obliged not to do something

· May be an obligation to maintain the passage for example, but it is attached to the property, not the person, so that person may rid themselves of the obligation by selling the land

· Used to call obligations on a thing for the benefit of a person (usufruit, usage et habitation) servitude personnelle, but term was removed because of its link to the feudal institutions where one person was subject to another· Cannot have a servitude on your own land because it would not add anything to the property right, which is absolute· Can have a servitude even if properties aren’t adjoining (servitude not to build in an area, blocking the view)

· Servitude useful as long as the owner of the property between does not build something blocking the view that is trying to be protected

Whitworth c Martin , [1995] RJQ 2388 (CA) Facts: M owns property that can only be reached by turning off the public road onto two private roads (Lower Road, High Road). Essentially, this forces m to park on his neighbour’s lawn and hike up to his own property. M is asking the courts to recognize he has a right of passage on W’s road.Issue: Can M be granted a right of passage on W’s land?Holding: YesReasoning: M’s land qualifies as an “enclave” under art 997. There is no way for him to access his home by car, or to transport heavy things onto his property. In modern times, access includes easy access by car, not just by foot. // The Court dismisses W’s arguments against the right of way through his property. W argues the right of way should be granted through another neighbour’s lot. Although this would be shorter way than through W’s land, constructing a right of way through the neighbour’s property would cost tens of thousands of dollars and would thus be too expensive, therefore we can make an exception to art 999. // W argues the right of way cannot go through his land because Upper Road doesn’t lead to a public road. The meaning in art 997 is not stricto sensu, meaning that is must lead to a municipal or provincial road, but rather to any road which leads to a public road. The road through W’s property (especially since it has been used since 1946) is the natural way. Here, “public” is not a reference to the right of property of the road, but to its use. Thus, a road such as Upper Road, because it is used by the public, qualifies as a “voie publique” // A right of way cannot be acquired by prescription pursuant to art 1181. However, ownership of the site can be prescribed (10 yrs) per art 291. Here, historical use (since 1946) gives rise to a presumption that M’s land is enclosed and that W’s path is the most natural and convenient access point. // M can also get damages for the summer that W blocked the access.Ratio: A right of passage may arise from the historical use of a given route as it gives rise to a presumption that is the most natural and convenient access point

Sylvio Normand, Introduction au droit des biens , 2nd ed (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2014) at 281–85. Modes d’établissement d’une servitude:Il n’y a pas de servitude sans titre (1181 C.c.Q.). Le titre peut prendre 2 formes : (1) titre exprès ou (2) titre par destination du propriétaire. Il n’existe pas de présomption de servitude : « l’existence d’une servitude ne se présume pas; c’est à celui qui l’invoque de la prouver ». Aussi, les tribunaux concluent à l’inexistence d’une servitude lorsqu’un doute demeure.

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Les servitudes et leur mode d’exercice ne s’acquièrent pas par prescription, c’est-à-dire par le simple écoulement du temps (1181 al. 2 C.c.Q.). Le titre établit la servitude. Il la cristallise en fixant ses limites.

1) Servitude établie par titre expressUne servitude peut être fondée sur un contrat, un testament ou par l’effet de la loi (1181 C.c.Q.).

a) Contrat: Un contrat peut avoir pour objet principal la constitution d’une servitude. Néanmoins, la servitude est souvent comprise dans un contrat de vente

b) Acte recognitif: Aucune exception: une servitude doit nécessirement être établie par un titre. Or, il arrive que la prevue de l’existence du titre soit difficile à établir (ex: titre oral) ou le titre peut être incomplete/ambigu. Dans ces cas-ci, un acte recognitif serait très utile: Un acte recognitif est une reconnaissance de l’existence de la servitude faite par le propriétaire du fonds servant. C’est un aveu émanant de ce propriétaire, soit une reconnaissance de sa part en faveur de l’établissement de la servitude.

c) Testament : La servitude prend parfois sa source dans un acte juridique unilatéral. En effet, un testateur peut établir, en faveur d’un légataire, une servitude sur un immeuble qu’il transmet à une autre personne

d) Lois : Des lois très particulières permettent l’établissement de servitudes en conférerant un pouvoir général à l’État + servir à des fins spécifiques (ex : construction de routes, etc.)

2) Servitude établie par destination du propriétaire : servitude qui découle d’un arrangement réalisé par le propriétaire d’un ou de plusieurs fonds.

Conditions : 1183 CCQ. Une même personne doit être propriétaire d’un fonds non encore morcelé ou de fonds distincts et pourvoir à un arrangement qui serait une servitude si les fonds appartenaient à des propriétaires différents. L’arrangement est consigné dans un écrit qui vaudra titre lorsque la servitude sera établie. Cet écrit peut prendre diverses formes. Il suffit d’un document qui atteste la création de la servitude.L’écrit précise la nature, l’étendue et la situation de la servitude (infra : section 6); en somme, il en donne une description. Dans plusieurs cas, la volonté de créer une servitude est rendue manifeste par un aménagement matériel des lieux (ex : tracé du bâtiment).→ L’écrit, s’il est nécessaire, n’est pas suffisant à lui seul pour créer une servitude par destination du propriétaire. L’expression de la volonté de créer une telle servitude doit être suivie par l’aliénation d’une partie du fonds après son morcellement ou, en cas de pluralité d’immeubles, de l’aliénation d’un des fonds à un tiers. L’aliénation a pour effet de mettre les fonds visés dans une situation de fonds dominant et de fonds servant.Publication : La servitude par destination du propriétaire doit être publiée pour valoir à l’égard des tiers (2938 et 2943 C.c.Q.) La publication se fait par présentation de l’acte ou par sommaire (2982 al. 2 CcQ.)

Davidson c. Rosaire Nadeau & Fils, 2007 QCCS 2928Facts: Trépannier bought property to make his primary residence. He drew water from the only near source of potable water, which was on land owned by N. T sold part of his land to N but reserved the right to draw water as well as the right of way in order to maintain and fix the aqueduct. T later sold his land, which included these rights, to D and D published them.Issue: Is N’s immovable subject to a servitude in favour of D?Holding: No.Reasoning: (1) There are particular requirements for the existence of a real servitude. Must have two neighboring pieces of land with different owners. The servitude must be in favour of one of them and obligate the other to suffer or refrain from doing something – it is perpetual. (2) There can also be a personal servitude (different than a real servitude). It is a real right on a property in favour of a person independent of the immovables they may or may not possess – established for a limited time. -- In this case, the contract of sale didn’t specify that the servitude would apply to either his representatives or heirs. It simply stated: “…se reserve le droit de prendre l’eau dune source…” which seems to imply a

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right for T. If T’s sale to N intended the servitude to apply to future owners, this would have had to have been expressly stipulated.Ratio: A personal servitude is a real right, which is a charge on the immovable of a person, in favour of another person.

Wong v. Beaumont Property Trust, [1965] 1 QB 173 (CA)Facts: W owns a restaurant in the basement of B’s building. Health inspectors require that W expands the ventilation duct for the kitchen, which would mean attaching it to the back of B’s building. The landlord refuses to allow W to do so, without any apparent reason. Now W applies to the court for a declaration that he is entitled to erect the duct and fix it on the wall without the landlord’s permission. To do this, he must show an easement of necessity. The original owner, from whom B bought the space, had a lease with the original tenant, from whom acquired the leased space. Their lease explicitly stated that the space was to be used for running a restaurant. The public health department had actually told B that he’d have to organize for a ventilation system, but the lease was already executed before any ventilation system was installed.Issue: Does W have an implied positive easement to put up the expanded duct?Holding: Yes.Reasoning: (Denning): If W is to have any right at all, it must be by way of easement and not merely by way of implied contract. He is not the original lessee, nor are the defendants the original lessors i.e. each is successor in title – so apply law as stated by Lord Parker of Waddington in Pwllbach: “the law will readily imply the grant or reservation of the parties to a grant of real property, with reference et the manner of purposes in and for which the land granted…is to be used. But it is essential for this purpose that the parties should intend that the subject of the grant…should be used in some definite and particular manner. It is not enough that the subject of the grant…should be intended to be used in a manner which may or may not involve this definite and particular use”It is clear that the intent of the original parties was to allow the running of a restaurant, which implies a definition purpose, which in turns justifies the creation of an easement for ventilation. The duct is not newly necessary, it was actually always necessary. B must tolerate the enlarged duct.Salmon J (concurring): The restaurant would be illegal without the enlarged duct. Both parties to the original lease can be presumed to know that compliance with health inspectors was required to run a restaurant, thus the easement is justified -- “if a lease is granted which imposes a particular use on the tenant and it is impossible for the tenant so to use the premises legally unless an easement is granted, the law does imply such an easement as of necessity…”Ratio: (1) “A man who has a right to an easement may use it in any proper way, so long as he does not substantially increase the burden on the servient tenement”; (2) Implicit easements giving effect to the intent of the parties to a land grant requires that the original parties intended a very specific purpose

Sandom v. Webb, [1951] 1 Ch 808 (CA)Facts: W owns a property with a house, lives on ground floor. Leases the first 2 floors to a tenant S, hair salon business operated. Needs permission from the landlord if he is to use the property for anything else. The agreement was a short document which contained no provision for the repair or upkeep of the exterior of the premises, no reference to the head lease and no reference to any means of access to the premises demised, such access apparently being obtained, in fact, through a door in the west side of the ground floor. Lease of 21 years. common-form covenants for tenant, covenant for quiet enjoyment for landlord.Trial judge held that there was an implied reservation in favour of the landlord which entitled him to use the outside of the demised premises for advertising purposes in the manner in which they were used at the date of the demise. The tenant appealed

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Issue: Advertisement put up my landlord since the beginning, tenant complains about it 10 years later. Ads were licensed, paid for, to the landlord. S asks for payment for these ads, since they encroach on the first and second floors.whether, on the true construction of the lease the landlord was entitled, until the determination of the lease, to use for the purposes of advertising the outer walls of the premises and, if so, what portions or portion of the outer walls without the tenant's consent. (Ie was there an implied/explicit reservation in favor of the landlord) The landlord has no reservation easement. He is not entitled to the advertising on the wallHolding: xReasoning: As a general rule a grantor, whether by way of conveyance or lease, of part of a hereditament in his ownership, cannot claim any easement over the part granted for the benefit of the part retained, unless it is expressly reserved out of the grant.... There are, however, certain exceptions to the general rule.Possible exceptions: easement of necessity, mutual easement, common intention of the parties must have been to reserve some easement to the grantor (issue to be examined in this case). Such implied easements: depend not upon the terms of the grant itself, but upon the circumstances under which the grant was made. Common intention of the parties to grant real property, manner and purpose of the grant. Must be a definite and particular use.Not met, therefore no reservation easement: i) If the landlord intended to reserve any such rights over the demised premises it was his duty to reserve them expressly in the lease of August 11, 1949 (Wheeldon v. Burrows); ii) The landlord having failed in this duty, the onus was upon him to establish the facts to prove, and prove clearly, that his case was an exception to the rule ...; iii) The mere fact that the tenant knew at the date of the lease of August 11, 1949, that the landlord was using the outer walls of the demised premises for the display of the advertisements in question did not suffice to absolve the landlord from his duty of expressly reserving any rights in respect of them he intended to claim, or to take the case out of the general rule.The advertisement license is not related in any way to the use or occupation of the ground floor for the existing or any other purpose.Ratio: implied reservations, and in particular “The law will readily imply the grant or reservation of such easements as may be necessary to give effect to the common intention of the parties to a grant of real property, with reference to the manner or purposes in and for which the land granted or some land retained by the grantor is to be used".

Barton v. Raine (1980), 114 DLR (3d) 702 (Ont CA)Facts: Father owns a house, lot 1, lot 2 beside his is built and both use the same driveway, between the two properties. Father buys lot 2 property, son moves in. Use of driveway remains the same. Lost 1 changes hands to other son. New owner of lot 2 builds a fence, prevent full access as before. B (lot 1) is seeking the removal of the fence and an order declaring his right to the use of a right of way for vehicles over the disputed driveway.Issue: can the plaintiff be regarded as having established a right of way over the defendants' portion of the driveway by implied reservation from the conveyance of what is now the defendants' property?Holding: Yes. At the time of purchase of the property, the driveway was a physical fact. Had notice, clear intent by the other party and accepted it at the time of purchase.Reasoning: Again refer to general rule: "if the grantor intends to reserve any right over the tenement granted, it is his duty to reserve it expressly in the grant". The outcome of this action turns on the question of what scope is to be given to the "other exceptions". It is not enough that the grantee knows the grantor retains adjoining land and would probably wish to use it in the same way as before". The necessary inference from the circumstances must be that he was intended to retain the precise easement that he

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claims". Such an intention that the driveway would be used in common was in fact present in the initial grant between father and son. Even at the time of purchase, a decade later, there was no misunderstanding about the use of the driveway. "Affirmative evidence" required to grant implied reservations? No, circumstantial, not an absolute requirement. Case would lead to "wild confusion" among the ranks of conveyancers? No, each case determined on its own facts.

Caldwell v. Elia (2000) 129 OAC 379BACKGROUND: An easement can be created through a “presumed grant”, that is by “prescription”. It is a fiction of creation by grant.This is not the same as adverse possession despite the fact that the Limitations Act and the notion of long use are common to both:

Presumed grant applies only to non-possessory rights It requires less than possessory title

In Ontario, prescription is dealt with by the Limitations Act (see sections 31, 32, 33 and 35).1) Section 31 establishes two periods for the creation of an easement:- User for a full 20 years beginning after 1189 (date at which records begin) can be defeated by whatever defence available under the common law.

After 40 years of adverse use, the easement becomes “absolute and indefeasible”, if the claimant has a fee simple (in other words, a tenant cannot prescribe against his landlord). The claim can be defeated by showing that user was: forcible, secret or allowed by permission.2) Section 31 can only be invoked if the period of user immediately precedes the bringing of an action. Twenty of forty years of user do not by themselves constitute prescription.3) The period must be without interruption. This does not mean mere nonuser by the person claiming the easement. The claimant must not be obstructed from enjoying used.4) Interruption has only taken place us user has been prevented for a full year. A year less a day’s interruption does not stop prescription.

Facts: This case clarifies the 4th criteria (reasonably necessary) of an easement. Two of three properties are situated on Lake Simcoe, one is not. In 1962 one person owned all three properties. She conveyed the landlocked property to her son. She had the deed to her son create a 15' right-of-way over the remaining lands to provide access for him to his property. Subsequently the remaining lands were conveyed away, one now owned by Caldwell and the other by the Walshs. The 15' right-of-way passes over the Caldwell property. That right-of-way, however, was never used. Instead of using the 15' right-of-way, all parties used a gravel road to get access to and from their properties.  When Walshs indicated their desire that the 15' right-of-way be developed and the use of the gravel road discontinued, no agreement was reached, so the Walshs blocked off the road. Caldwell claims an easement over the gravel road, arguing that prescription over 20 years of continuous use created the easement. Elia/Walshs argue that the 4th criteria is not satisfied frame the issue as one of a “way of necessity” and not prescriptive easement.PH: C applied for declaration that acquired right of way by prescription over gravel road was dismissed. C now appeals to ONCA.Issue: Is the easement C claims “reasonably necessary” under the 4th requirement of the Ellenborough Park easement test?Held: Yes. Appeal allowed. C had easement because the gravel road conferred convenience, enabling better enjoyment of applicant's tenement, and likely rendered C’s property more valuable. These features precisely justified the status of easement, since the gravel road accommodated C’s property. Judge below erred by dismissing application on basis that use of gravel road was not "necessary." C did not claim way of necessity, but prescriptive right accruing by virtue of use over 20-year period, and prescriptive claims need no element of necessity.Ratio: “Reasonably necessary” and “necessary connection”  under the 4th element of the Ellenborough Park test should be interpreted in relation to that case. Prescriptive easements have no requirement of necessity.

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Analysis:Austin, JA...First sets out four criteria of easements from Ellenborough Park but makes clear that these must be understood in the context of the case:

The essential characteristics of an easement are four-fold:(a) There must be a dominant and servient tenement;(b) The dominant and servient owners must be different;(c) The easement must be capable of forming the subject matter of a grant; and(d) The easement must accommodate the dominant tenement, and in accommodating the dominant tenement, it must be reasonably necessary for the better enjoyment of that tenement.

If it has no necessary connection therewith, although it confers an advantage upon the owner, and renders his ownership of the land more valuable, it is not an easement at all.

Judge below said “It is clear that the gravel driveway passing through the Walsh property is convenient to and enhances the better enjoyment of the Caldwell tenement, in the circumstances. It can hardly been deemed, "necessary" or "reasonably necessary" to provide or accommodate that "better enjoyment".

Caldwell’s use of the land is “reasonably necessary” and “necessary connection” in terms of Ellenborough Park language

Austin, JA analogizes to Ellenborough Park facts to clarify the meaning of “reasonably necessary.” In that case, the right of the owners of a group of houses to walk and sit in a garden across the street

from the houses constituted an easement. Employing the language of that case, the use by Caldwell of the gravel road across the Walsh

property is at least as "reasonably necessary for the better enjoyment" of his land as was the use of the garden for the homeowners across the street in Ellenborough.

As well, Caldwell's property has a more "necessary connection" with the easement claimed than was the case in Ellenborough. In the instant case the "connection" is immediate — the properties abut one another, while in Ellenborough the dominant and servient tenements were across the street from one another.

Regardless, Caldwell does not claim a “way of necessity” Way of necessity : Where A divides his land and sells part to B, if B's part is land-locked, the law

will imply a grant of an easement over A's land so that B will have access to and from his land. This is a way of necessity.

What Caldwell claims is not a way of necessity, but rather a prescriptive right accruing by virtue of use over a period of at least twenty years. A prescriptive claim need have no element of "necessity". Accordingly, the existence of the 15' right-of-way created expressly by deed is irrelevant to Caldwell's prescriptive claim.

CLASSES 25: How Many Interests? - Numerus Clauses

Class 25 notesEmail from Prof: The next two classes are on servitudes/easements. First, I apologise for the unnecessarily long and unedited nature of the CVL cases. Tomorrow we will discuss the readings up to and including Migneault. It will make sense to read also p. 247, which gives an overview of Easements in the CML, towards the beginning rather than in order. The case mentioned, Phipps v Pears, should have also been included and is attached (don't worry, it has been edited - less than 2 pages!

Easement: the right to use the real property of another for a specific purpose. The easement is itself a real property interest, but legal title to the underlying land is retained by the original owner for all other purposes.

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Servitudes CCQ 1177- Servant land + dominant land- Immovable- Effect: tolerate or stop from doing- Extends to all that is necessary for its exercise

CML:- Appurtenant / in gross (US) utility or conservation- Dominant / servient tenements- Positive/negative easements- Grant/reservation on subdivision

ð B grants easements to A on sale of fee simple to Að Reserves easements to herself on sale of FS to B

CVL- Real (1182) / personal servitude

ð Right of way without having piece of land benefitingð Real right held by a specific personð Traditionally – personal vs real servitudeð Both real rightsð Personal servitude = held by ind as capacity of ind, can sale to other person

§ Usufruct, Emphyteusis, right of way, useð Real servitude = right that they own in virtue of being the owner

§ So it becomes a rel between two pieces of land- Positive / negative easements

ð The right of way is a positive easement because it allows to do something on the serving of land

- Discontinuous / continuous servitudes (1179)ð Use it to walk on someone’s land = discontinuousð Right to view – continuous

- Apparent / unapparent (1181)ð Ex pathway = that is apparent or not

- By destination of the owner- Dominant / servient land- Conventional, legal or natural servitudes (979)

COVENANT is a promise that arise in context of K- Can be bound up to a lease in land (CML, not CVL)- E.g. licence to access (RIGHT OF WAY) somebody’s land

Why did we stop needing covenant?- Context: industrial revolution = urbanization

19th century = social cultural aspect of urban developmentEllenborough Park- Co-owners develop estate with a central park- Each one of them when sold when giving right to use the park- Some want to develop it = claim that it is a Personal right = not attached to the land- Easement criteria

ð Dominant and servient tenementð Must accommodate dominant tenement (utilité ou agreement – Cadieux)ð Must be diff ownersð a right must be capable of forming the subject-matter of a grant....

§ not tooð has to be connected to the use of land vs something garden

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ð cultural = was does it mean to be a bourgeois at that time? Was is it to enjoy a house? Enjoying a garden

ð Distinction between something that is purely personal vs something connected to enjoyment of land

ð Zoo analogy = purely recreational activities =- Cadieux v Hinse (1989)

Can option be enforced against successor in title to Letourneau?ð Option to purchase = purely personal right / contractualð Creation of a servitude requires clear intention a relationship between 2 immovables

and must serve the dominant landð A servitude cannot impose an obligation to do somethingð You can’t impose a positive obligation on owner of servient land

§ EXCEPTION: Obligation to your neighbor to have first option- Epiciers-Unis Metro Richelieu c. Centre commercial Victoriaville ltée, [2001]

ð Centre commercial = l’étage du haut appartient a un autre proprio que l’étage du basð A (en haut) wants to create a servitude to Bð Non compet clause = metro wants to buy upper floorð Appearance that they are creating a servitude by making another company (which

metro owns) buying the lower floorð How related to the land? Example of when it is not a limitation on the use of court, but

it is not a personal/contractual right, simple a commercial advantageð Because cant have a servitude against yourself

- Personal right vs servitude = in the durationð Servitude = not as extensive as a usufruct = why? Because it is so connected to the land

Phipps v Pears- CML reticent to impose negative easements

ð Lateral support = negative easement recognized by courtð Impose obligation on neighbour that they would otherwise be able to do, ex. not a

build an extra floor in order to not block your viewð Property is for increasing value = we should not impose a negative obligation on

othersð Can’t have limitation on developmentð Equity = If negative covenant = can only be enforced in Equityð Equivalent in CVL = servitude, art 1177

§ Ways that you can create them = by contract§ CML doesn’t want to impose an obligation by default

Pos obli CVL- Mignault = Jamais la servitude ne consiste à faire qqch- 1178- Right of way = positive and ok bc connected to servitude- Cantin Cumyn

ð Serv perso = droit de jouir sur la chose d’autrui. Une charge grève le droit du proprioð Parties peuvent convenir d’une obli spécifique pour faciliter exercice du droit membre.

S’ajoute comme droit de créance au droit réelExercise : what kind of right ?

- Use a lanway by neighboursð CVL:ð CML: easement

- Temporary storage of hay after annual harvestð Temporary = so not an easement

§ Look at easement criteria

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ð licenceð Servitude attached to that land

- Limit on building heightð Real right = can enforce it against othersð Real Servitude

§ dominant and servient land§ abstain

- Ability to discharge green slime on neighbours land- Prohibition on digging holes that cause subsidence

Class 22

CML CVL

Reticent at creating negative easements (what people cannot do)Also hard to create a positive obligationImplied In a grant (Titre) – presumed intention:Rule in W v B – grants onlyNecessity (NB + statue)Mutual easementsSimultaneous grants

System that protects the buyer- Way to stimulate the

market, so people have faith in it

Negative obligation = part of def of servitude Rights cannot be enforced against third parties unless published (1455)Importance of integrity of the ownerExpress:

- contract- Will

Legal- 976 Natural water flows- 985 Trees- 993 Sevitudes of view- 997 Right of way for landlocked property

Issue that can arise when subdividing the land on which the is a pre-existent easement is that you can’t have an easement against yourself, so you must include it when selling the land to new ownerCML implied Grant of easement: W v B

➢ Applies only on subdivision of land➢ A grant of an estate passes all continuous and apparent “quasi-easements” ➢ Necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of property granted ➢ Used by owners of entirety for benefit of part granted (ie does not include reservations) ➢ Why the distinction between grants and reservations?

Grantor shall not derogate from grant – reservations must usually be express. Exception for :

● Common intention ● Necessity (‘common intention’) ● Statutory easements of necessity ● Mutual easements

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● Simultaneous sale Compare to CVL 1183. “Servitudes by destination of the owner” => Requires writing; requires publication to be opposable to third parties. CML Implied reservationsYou should not derogate from a grant, to reserve an easement back to owner = big willingness to imply what has been relied on

- Reservation must be implied- Wrong v Beaumont

o Using the stairs is a Grant = because adding something to the original righto Basis for implied easement: common intention = it was necessary implied in the lease

which was for the running of a restauranto Necessity of common intention.

- Sandom v Webbo Advertisements presents on wall = reservation bc owner is withholding the right of the

wall. It can be tied to common intention, not usually related to the interest of running a hairdressing salon

o Common intention = little evidence. More favorable for guarantee than guarantoro Reservation of an easement = implied only if the use of the guarantee’s land be a

necessary incident of the parties contemplate use for the retained lando CI implied when the facts are not consistent when any other explanationo If it was in CVL = destination of the owner must be in writing (1184)

Davidson v RN- Se réserve le droit de prendre l’eau à la source sur le terrain + droit de passage pour l’entretient- Real or personal right? Personal right “Il se réserve” = has to be clearly expressed that this is useful to the land + must specify that it is transmissible to other parties with the land (héritiers)

Barton – family exceptionPrescriptive easements

- Continuous- Use as of right : not secret, not violent nor with permission- Must accrue for and against a FS estate

Doctrine of Modern lost Grant- When it doesn’t come from a grant (Fiction - because it has been lost!)- If you can show- No literal grant

Limitation Act- No claim to any easement which has been enjoyed without interruption for 20 years shall be defeated by showing that it was first used before those 20 years, otherwise claim is defeated; if easement has been enjoyed 40 years = absolute- Period must precede litigation, interruption must be acquiesced for one year- No prescriptive easement for act or air

Kaminskas v Storm● 1950 Driveway in use● 1970 Driveway paved together● 1980 Driveway in use● 1991 Written permission use● 2006 S & A agree to enrichment

- What period counts for prescription?o Prescription = long use, but permission negates prescription

- What effect does a written or oral permission have?- Claim under Statute or lost grant? Neither

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Duchaine c. Matamajaw, [1919] 58 SCR 222 (SCC)Facts: Lot C was on a river that was neither floatable nor navigable – so the river bed was owned by the owner of the riparian land (up to the median point) by right of accession. Through a deed, Blais ceded to Lord Mount Stephen all the rights to fish in the river (during fishing season), but the there was no term assigned. Lord Mount Stephen then sold those rights to the Restigouche Salmon Club, who then assigned them to Matamajaw Salmon Club. Duchaine bought the land and Matamajaw renewed its rights. Duchaine goes bankrupt and Matamajaw tries to assert its fishing rights in the context of the bankruptcy. One problem is that Matamajaw is asserting what appears to be a personal right, but is claiming it in perpetuity, which is impossible in Quebec CVL. Another problem is that this comes from a deed, to which the principle of freedom of contract applies. Art 1433 CCQ: A contract creates obligations and, in certain cases, modifies or extinguishes them. (2) In some cases, it also has the effect of constituting, transferring, modifying or extinguishing real rights.Issue: Did Lord Mount Stephen have a temporary right of enjoyment or a perpetual real right?Holding: He had a right of enjoyment or of usufruct, and extinguishes with the life of the grantee. No right over the riverbed was granted.Reasoning: Respondents argue that it is a property right (real right) and therefore they get the rights and do not have to renew them with sale. Appellants argue its a personal right, and so after Lord dies they get the rights. The majority’s analysis proceeds on the assumption of numerus clausus: the categories of property are closed, so this right must fit into an existing category. Brodeur: it’s a limited usufruct (ends at the end of the life of Stephen) Brodeur was against extending the list of real rights. Mignault: can’t be ownership – he just holds a right to fish, not to the land. It is not servitude, because not between 2 parcels of land – but there is a right of enjoyment. It’s a usufruct limited to certain fruits; essentially temporary and limited to the lifetime of Lord Mount Stephen. (But the problem here is that fish in the river are not exactly fruits because they don’t have an owner; they are res nullius, so it can’t really be a usufruct either, but Mignault gets as close as he can to the actual right granted by calling it a usufruct.).Two types of servitudes: (1) Personal - attached to the person, and thus end upon the person’s death, (2) Real - These rights are owed to the heritage and not to the person.Common Law Profit-a-prendre: Can take fruits of land for use of owner of rights and is a right that can continue in perpetuity. This is not analogous to a real servitude in CVL (above) because a real servitude can only be granted in favour of an immovable.So what kind of right is it? Ownership, enjoyment, or a servitude? Personal. It is a right of enjoyment, usufruct and expires upon the death of Lord Mount Stephen. (This is contrary to freedom of contract, deed does not include any indication that that parties intended the right to be time-limited).Ratio: (Later overruled by PC) The categories of property are closed, so new issues must be fit into those categories. Under Quebec law, the grant of fishing rights by a riparian owner is one of enjoyment only, essentially temporary in its nature and does not endure beyond the life of the grantee. Also: The right to catch fish in alieno solo cannot be assimilated to the "profit à prendre," a term found in the common law of England but unknown to the civil law of France and Quebec.

Matamajaw Salmon Club v. Duchaine, 1921 2 AC 426 (PC)Facts: Same as above, now at PC. Here, the PC places more emphasis on the deed and its wording; favoring freedom of contract interpretation. PC finds that in QC law one can have a usufruct, since if fishing involved the solum then it was a real right attached to the river.Issue: xHolding: Appeal allowed. Innominate real rights can be created in a distinct, self-contained property right “to a separable subject or incident of property.” In this case, a fishing right that arises incidental to ownership of the riverbed.

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Reasoning: The point made by the privy council is that if owner has the ability to dismember the rights then of course he could have intended for it to be a right in perpetuity. Not emphyteusis because emphyteusis is term limited and has further requirement of improving property. Not servitude because it was assigned to a person; servitudes must attach to immovables. Yet the wording of the clause suggests no time limit. Prof Kasirer has said: However, if you were allowed to own rights, then you could dismember them, too. It should be an innominate right; a personal servitude.Article 406 [similar to article 947 of the CCQ] says that “ownership is the right of enjoying and of disposing of things in the most absolute manner, provided that no use be made of them which is prohibited by law or by regulations.” Article 408 [similar to article 948 of the CCQ] provides that “ownership in a thing, whether moveable or immoveable, gives the right to all it produces, and to all that is joined to it as an accessory, whether naturally or artificially. This right is called the right of accession.” There appears to be no reason why, consistently with the language of these articles, there should not be ownership of a fishing right as a mode of enjoying and disposing of a separable physical subject for possession. (But the problem here is that this is ownership of a right, not a res). The title to take the fish is a title to take a product of the river, and art. 408 recognises as possible in the law the union with the title to take fish as an accessory of the right to use the bed of the river or the banks when naturally or artificially stipulated for as part of that which is joined to the fishing right.Ratio: Articles in CCQ allow for innominate real rights to be created in a distinct, self-contained property right “to a separable subject or incident of property.” In this case, a fishing right that arises incidental to ownership of the riverbed is a real right. Quebec doctrine and jurisprudence has accepted the existence of innominate real rights. (A.G. Quebec v. Club Appalaches Inc. [1999 CA]).

Saulnier v. Royal Bank of Canada, 2008 SCC 58Facts:

● S détient quatre permis de pêche. Pour financer son entreprise de pêche, il a signé un contrat de garantie générale (« CGG ») avec une banque et il s’est porté caution des dettes de sa société. La société a aussi conclu un CGG. Les CGG accordaient à la banque une sûreté grevant « tous [. . .] les biens personnels, actuels et acquis par la suite, y compris [. . .] les biens immatériels [. . .] et tous les produits et renouvellements y afférents ».

● En 2004, l’entreprise de pêche était en défaut et S a fait cession de ses biens.● L’année suivante, le séquestre et le syndic de faillite ont signé une entente concernant la vente

des quatre permis et d’autres éléments d’actif à un tiers pour la somme de 630 000 $, mais S a refusé de signer les documents nécessaires.

● Le syndic de faillite et la banque ont présenté une demande de jugement déclaratoire. S a soutenu que les permis de pêche commerciale ne constituaient pas des « biens » dont peut se réclamer un syndic sous le régime fédéral de la Loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité (« LFI ») ou un créancier ayant enregistré un CGG sous le régime de la Personal Property Security Act de la Nouvelle-Écosse (« PPSA »).

● Le juge de première instance et la Cour d’appel ont rejeté ces prétentions, pour des motifs différents.

Issues:Un permis de pêche commerciale constitue-t-il un « bien » au sens de la législation sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité et de la législation sur les sûretés mobilières? OUI.

Reasoning:● La CS est appelée en l’espèce à donner aux définitions des termes « bien » à l’art. 2 de la LFI

et « bien personnel » à l’art. 2 de la PPSA une interprétation téléologique qui tienne compte de leur contexte global, en suivant le sens ordinaire et grammatical qui s’harmonise avec l’esprit de la loi, l’objet de la loi et l’intention du législateur.

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● Un permis de pêche constitue indiscutablement un élément d’actif commercial très important. Il donne le droit de participer à des activités de pêche exclusive en conformité avec les conditions fixées par le permis et un droit propriétal dans les poissons capturés et dans les revenus tirés de leur vente. L’objet du permis, assorti d’un intérêt propriétal sur les prises effectuées conformément au permis, s’apparente raisonnablement à un profit à prendre en common law, qui constitue sans conteste un droit de propriété.

● La LFI vise la réalisation de certains objectifs en cas de faillite qui exigent que, règle générale, les créanciers aient accès aux éléments d’actif non exclus. La définition d’un « bien » à l’art. 2 doit être interprétée en conséquence de façon à inclure un permis de pêche visé au par. 7(1) . Le législateur a clairement manifesté son intention d’englober un large éventail d’éléments d’actif du failli qui, en common law, ne sont pas habituellement considérés comme des « biens », et il faut respecter cette intention pour assurer la réalisation des objectifs de la LFI .

● S’il est vrai que, pour bénéficier d’un intérêt propriétal dans les poissons, il faut d’abord les capturer, l’existence de cette condition se reflète dans la définition de la LFI et n’exclut pas davantage un intérêt propriétal pour l’application de la LFI que ne l’exclut la condition équivalente propre au profit à prendre.

● Il s’ensuit que le syndic était en droit d’exiger que S signe les documents requis pour que les permis de pêche soient transférés au tiers acheteur. [44] [46-47] [49]

● Le permis de pêche constitue également un « bien personnel » au sens de l’art. 2 de la PPSA . La définition d’un « bien immatériel » énoncée dans cet article inclut un intérêt d’origine législative, ayant les caractéristiques d’un permis assorti d’un intérêt en common law. L’octroi par le ministre d’un permis assorti d’un intérêt propriétal dans les prises effectuées répond donc à la définition de la PPSA. L’enregistrement inclut donc valablement le permis de pêche visé au par. 7(1) et, aucun autre moyen de défense fondé sur la PPSA n’ayant été invoqué, la banque est en droit d’exercer les recours qui y sont prévus.[51-52]

English here :https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/6231/index.do

CLASS 26: Limitations on Property - Public/Private

Class 26 notesShopping Malls

- Labour disputes get filtered through the property paradigm- The CVL is top down (abstract structure)- CML is pragmatically driven to make a system to support what the needs/wishes are- Technically private property- What are shopping malls most like? Private dwellings or public space (e.g. a park)

Harrison v. Carswell (1975)- Mall owned by Cadillac Fairview – own malls all over the world. Person is picketing her

employer (allowed to under statutory labour law) and has been asked to move on (off the physical site)

- Charged under trespass law and charged as a crime under the Petty Crimes Act.- WHAT RIGHTS:

o Both judges agreed that an owner had a right to exclude. Dickson (majority) – there are already policies in place and this is the practice of the shopping center. Generic no solicitation policy on the inside spaces.

o Laskin (dissent): Rights to exclude and decide the basis on which exclusion could be affected.

§ Do they have the right to exclude anyone they want? No. Can base your decision on human rights/legislation.

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o Seeking to use trespass as a right of exclusion.§ Shopping malls as quasi-public space.

- Can we use trespass to allow a blank slate to the mall owner to decide who comes in and who doesn’t?

- Postscript to Petty Trespass Act – not guilty for trespass (can still be liable for damage) on any public outdoor area of business premises if a person communicates trues statements.

- Labour protests: does it put someone in a mall in a different position than a person who works in a store that is located on a public street?

- This was all pre-Charter!Exercise: Brainstorm other types of spaces that have similar issues balancing public/private interests as shopping malls.

- Parking lots- Private parks/beaches- Universities- Virtual spaces (Facebook, Twitter)- Hotels- Company towns

Woodwards Building in Vancouver- Department store that had a heritage building and became an important site for people in the

community to hang out. It became not profitable and the owners were going to knock it down and build condos. Lots of protests.

- Community groups started taking acts of care for the buildings – cleaning, painting, removing garbage. In Downtown Eastside: very poor neighbourhood.

- Claim being made to the space by the community members because of their investment in the site.

- Important to take into account different stakeholders- Sold the land to the province. The plan for the condos was not going to happen due to

political pressures from the community. They turned the space into public + private services – grocery store, bank, university campus, arts complex – public/private.

Occupy Toronto- Economic argument about global capital and 99% being disenfranchised from the system of

property, finance, and public governance.- Charter claim to the land – freedom of expression. Trespass order was infringing on freedom

of expression. Was saved on a s1 analysis.- Exercise: In the spirit of Occupy, write down one question that arises for you from the

decision, or from Woodwards. Be prepared to share.o Is there a difference in private property to public property use versus public property

to private property use? (Kevin P.)o Is public property just private property owned by the government? (Tom)

Katz c Reitz, [1973] C.A. 230 (Qc)Facts: Katz excavation of home caused Reitz’s house to cave. Katz’s had contracted a contractor to do the excavation. Reitz sued Katz.Issue: Was Katz responsible for the damages caused to the Reitz home?Holding: Yes (no fault liability)Reasoning: No fault in the choice of contractor, so no personal fault of the owner Katz (no legal basis at the personal responsible of the owner). Situation: innocent victim suffered harm as a result of what is done by the neighboring owner. Not abusing his right: Katz causes harm by his abuse of proprietary rights. (owner uses his property at his own risk and peril risk theory). Cause attributable to Quebec Foundations because they built an insufficient wall in relation to the groundwater table. Katz and

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Centretown accountable under CCBC 406 property right: the obligation not to harm his neighbor (even in the absence of fault). Therefore, responsible without fault for the damage suffered by the neighbor.Ratio: The fundamental case eliminating the concept of fault from the trouble de voisinage. In a well notorious remark the judges ruled that it is not a matter of fault but the entitlement of the neighbour to his right of ownership.

Lessard c. Bernard, [1996] R.D.I. 210 (CS Qc)Facts: Bernard installed a heating system which burns combustibles on the line of his property and Lessard’s. The smoke affects the Lessard’s inside and outside their home.Issue: Is the inconvenience more than what an ordinary neighbour should suffer?Holding: Yes.Reasoning: Article 976 establishes the criteria for nuisance of a neighbor. It must be of abnormal and exorbitant character. There is no question of fault, as long as use of right has an inconvenience that is abnormal on the neighbours, the person is responsible for the prejudice. Right to enjoy one’s property ends where another’s rights start. Being authorized to do something by municipality does not establish the legality of the behaviour. May ask for an injunction in addition to damages for the prejudice suffered, injunction prevents future damages and damages compensate for previous damages. Injunction: must move or burn woods so as to not cause abnormal nuisance. Damages: $5000 each for Mr. and Ms. Lessard for inconvenience, inability to use their outdoor space over several years.

Gourdeau c Letellier, [2002] R.J.Q. 1195, [2002] R.D.I. 236 (CA Qc)Facts: Respndents (L) built a family home next to appellants (G). G, 17 years later, built an apartment building where one of the walls was thought to be on the line dividing the two plots of land. L sued G for [bornage – boundary] – was not successful. L brought forward another bornage action and got a judgement to split the lots. G later asks for access to L’s property (injunction) to demolish a wall that he thinks is considered part of his property. Refused. Claims that the land belongs to him because of a 30y prescription period.Issue: (1) Ont-ils acquis la propriété des deux murs par prescription trentenaire? (2) La construction de ces deux murs constitue-t-elle un abus du droit de propriété de la part de l'auteur des intimés? Holding: (1) No (2) yes.Reasoning: (Thibault): la simple présence d'inconvénients anormaux n'est pas suffisante pour entraîner la responsabilité. Art 947(1) : Si la conduite d'un propriétaire excède la norme de tolérance acceptable, ce qui devra être déterminé dans chaque cas, l'harmonie risque d'être rompue sans pour autant qu'un dommage en résulte. l'article 1457 qui sera affecté par l'article 976 : l'article 976 doit donc être lu en conjonction avec l'article 1457, mais la responsabilité sans faute que l'on peut y déceler peut très bien se lire dans la combinaison des articles 976 et 1607. l'article 991 C.c.Q.13 codifie les principes énoncés par la Cour dans l'affaire Katz c. Reitz.Judge Beauregard (dissent) : A person who claims that a person is abusing a right specifically granted to him by law bears the burden of proof and must have serious arguments that immediately take the general assent.

Ciment St-Laurent c. Barette, 2008 CSC 64, [2008] 3 RCS 392Facts: A special statute passed by the Quebec legislature in 1952 authorized SLC to build a cement plant in a municipality. The neighbours did not like the dust, odours and noise. They filed a class action. TJ allowed the class action on the basis that a scheme of no-fault liability in respect of neighbourhood disturbances exists under art. 976 of the CCQ. QCCA rejected the theory of no-fault liability in respect of neighbourhood disturbances but found SLC liable on the basis of fault.

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Issue: xHolding: Appeal dismissed and cross-appeal allowed (restoring trial judgment).Reasoning: Even though it appears to be absolute, the right of ownership has limits. 976 exemplifies this in prohibiting owners of land from forcing their neighbours to suffer abnormal or excessive annoyances. Two regimes of civil liability in respect of neighbourhood disturbances should be recognized in Quebec law: one, under the ordinary rules of civil liability, is based on the wrongful conduct of the person who allegedly caused the disturbances, while the second is a regime of no-fault liability based on the extent of the annoyances suffered by the victim for the purposes of art. 976. Violating a legislative standard will constitute civil fault only if it also constitutes a violation of the standard of conduct of a reasonable person under the general rules of civil liability set out in art. 1457 . The Court recognized a scheme of no-fault civil liability in respect of neighbourhood disturbances under art. 976 C.C.Q. that is based on the annoyances suffered by the victim being excessive rather than on the conduct of the person who allegedly caused them. The inclusion of art. 976 in the book on property confirms that the legislature intended to separate neighbourhood relations from the general rules on obligations. This provision thus relates more to the right of ownership than to the general rules of civil liability.The actual words of art. 976 do not require evidence of wrongful conduct to establish the liability of an owner who has caused excessive neighbourhood annoyances. SLC did not commit any fault and met legislative standards. Nevertheless, the class members suffered abnormal annoyances that were beyond the limit of tolerance neighbours owe each other according to the nature or location of their land. all members living in the neighbourhoods adjacent to the plant were neighbours of the plant for the purposes of art. 976 on the basis that they lived close enough to itRatio: Article 976 contains a scheme of no - fault civil liability in respect of neighbourhood disturbances under art. 976 that is based on the annoyances suffered by the victim being excessive rather than on the conduct of the person who allegedly caused them. Neighbour is to be interpreted liberally.

CLASS 27: Expropriation

Class 27 notes- We are not islands and everything we do is connected. Who gets the cost of collective impact

of individuals?- Regulatory takings: in the guise of regulatory legislation, end up having an effect of

expropriating someone’s property. Grey zone.- In s. 35 of the Constitution Act – infringement principles of Aboriginal Rights- Things that are less than full acquisition: can government restrict or dictate private use of

public land? Yes. They impose restrictions in the common good.o What about compensation? In what circumstances will they have to compensate for

that?- Economic perspective: legal regulation through thinking about a cost-benefit analysis

o Overall costs and benefits of the activity. A good law will try to maximize efficiency (the benefits) over the costs.

- Idea that market efficiency is improved if you give people the individual right to say yes or no to what happens on their land

o Person who is highest bidder will win out. Person who is not willing to pay what something is worth to someone is a stand-in of value.

- Property rules as one way of regulating a market. Another is liability rules (seen through torts) where damage happens and people’s interest get affected and they get compensated for that.

o Allowing a veto for liability rule and compensate them for doing that

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- It is inefficient to “force people to succumb to development” (you can agree or disagree with this premise)

Legislative Bases- Expropriation of a seaway during the 1950s: expropriated land near St Lawrence river to

allow large ships to come in. Ended up cutting off Mohawk community from their seashore which was integral to their fishing culture.

Video clip: Kahnawake Revisited- Physical disconnected from the river- Expropriated everyone’s homes. They had to go to auctions to buy their homes back.- Their whole world got forcibly removed. The people were very angry and some turned to

drinking to cope with it.- People lost their land when they built in a seaway.- The Canadian settlers (many generations later) used coercion “you are going to have to move

anyway. You will get compensation if you sign off to let us do it”- For the “greater good” – compensation doesn’t address loss of networks- No constitutionally protected right to property. But any taking by the Crown is presumed to

provide compensation, and that compensation can be rebutted.Protection

- Magna Carta: no free man shall be disseised but by lawful judgment of his Peers or by the Law of the Lands

o There is a rule of law. Prohibiting taking property through executive action aloneo Judgment of his Peers = judiciaryo Law of the land = legislature

Expropriation or regulation?- What is expanded gains benefits from the expansion (e.g. demolishing a home will allow for

airport to be expanded – bringing value to expropriator)o Question of fairness or unjust enrichmento Landowner is losing house. Demolisher is benefitting. Who should be compensated? It

is unfair to expect the landowner to bear the cost of something that would benefit the public.

o Expropriation. Building an airport.- Permit to rebuild made conditional on allowing public right of way: not an easement per se,

but using regulatory power to give a permit to rebuilt as an exchange. Regulation.o Not an alienation of the use of the land.o E.g. regulation of an airport. Not removing something existing/adding something new.

- Expropriation: could expropriate certain kinds of property interests.o Definition of expropriation: to take away (property) from its ownero Expropriation of ownership vs expropriation of easemento E.g. removing the house vs. adding cables to someone’s land.

- E.g. Sensitive dunes get designated “beach,” construction now prohibited. People bought land that now can’t build on the land they purchased.

o Do these people merit compensation?§ Non-profitable uses of land§ Any uses left at all

· Turning private land into public park takes away uses as a private owner

- E.g. Ban on pornography renders bookstore stock illegal.Manitoba Fisheries v Canada

- Not only a question of what constitutes a taking, but can we even apply the property model to this situation? The nationalization of particular industries (e.g. fisheries)

o State regulates prices, production quality + quotas

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o It took over the business of this particular company.o Not talking about physical objects

- Main question is can putting someone out of business be considered expropriation? What is being lost? Their good will. Need to make it look like property that can be lost and gained.

o What is good will = grand valueo Difference between property and a legally recognized asset: asset can be defined in

some legislation as investments or other intangible things or immovables.§ E.g. brand reputation – the thing that becomes trademark§ What does it take for something to be considered property? Look to see what

the thing is defined as for the purpose of the legislation.§ Asset covers similar grounds semantically.

o How can good will be a thing that can be owned?§ Trust and confidence with client base, positive feeling that members of the

public have towards company à trademark (name, logo) à property- Concerned whether company has lost good will and whether the crown corporation has

gained somethingo If government has gained something that the company has lost, then compensation is

owedBC v Tener

- Gradually turning land into a public park- Restrictions imposed – has anything been taken? Where would you calculate compensation?

Where has it taken place?- Expropriation because something was lost – reasonable expectation to make profit and what

was gained from making a public parko Something valuable has been lost and something valuable has been gainedo Has to be creating a right of property in CML (like the park free from mineral

expropriation)Wallot v Quebec (2011)

- Individuals have to bear the cost of regulation in favor of public interest- Disguised expropriation: what is the degree of limitation imposed.

o Not entirety of the land, just a border. Could still access land.

B Ziff, “‘Taking’ Liberties: Protections for Private Property in Canada” in Elizabeth Cooke, ed, Modern Studies in Property Law, Vol 3 (Portland: Hart, 2005), 341

● No explicit constitutional protection for property in Canada. American model sometimes advocated – where property is otherwise validly expropriated by the government (at the federal or state level), the Constitution mandates that compensation be paid.

● However, “there exist in Canada certain measures, constitutional and quasi-Constitutional in nature, that equal—and in some ways may even surpass the American regime governing “takings”.”

● The issue of property rights was intensely debated as the Charter was being formulated and finalized – it nevertheless affects property rights in a range of ways:

● Protects against unreasonable search and seizure, and this abridges the power of law enforcement agencies to enter homes and business premises or to seize personal property.

● The guarantee of freedom of expression has been used to undo regulations affecting commercial advertising

● The right to freedom of religion has been used to attack Sunday trading prohibitions● Section 15 provides for equality under law and may be used to attack discriminatory

property entitlements.● The need to protect defined property interests can be marshalled as a justification under s.

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● Also, the Charter works to impose restrictions on the regulation of public property● The right to freedom of expression and assembly on public property can be abridged by

the state, provided that this is done in accordance with the Charter. ● SCC has held that restrictions on political leafleting at an airport must be shown to be a

reasonable limitation – access to public arenas of protect for freedom of speech is often essential.

● The Constitution also provides protections against state interference with Aboriginal rights – a claim to Aboriginal title must be supported by proof of exclusive occupation of the subject lands at the time of the assumption of British sovereignty. Such a claim, if recognized, gives rise to a communal interest in the lands, one that is inalienable except to the Crown. These land rights are not equivalent to fee simple ownership; rather they are sui generis (unique). (Delgamuukw).

● Division of powers under the Constitution also protects Aboriginal land by precluding a provincial government from expunging title.

● s. 35 also appears to prevent even the federal government from expropriating Aboriginal lands – however, the line between extinguishment on the one hand, and regulation and infringement on the other, is far from clear-cut.

Gerald Alfred, Heeding the Voices of Our Ancestors: Kahnawake Politics and the Rise of Native Nationalism (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1995), 156-161

● Through the operation of the Indian Act and the Indian Affairs regime which has been established in Canada, the Minister for Indian Affairs retains authority over land management on Indian reserves and has the power to sell or lease land for public purposes – since Kahnawake is right across the river from Montreal it is a clear target.

● Callous disregard from the government for the Mohawks' right to control development within their lands – expropriation of large amounts of territory from the reserve without Mohawk consent, and without either monetary or other forms of compensation to the community (railways, highways, electric towers, etc).

● On surrenders since the imposition of the Indian Act – most of the Mohawk surrenders revolve around the generation of revenues for the band council out of the operation of stone quarries in remote areas of the reserve. The federal surrenders, on the other hand, involve mainly land sales and pennanent rights of way to railway and electric compa- nies in the core residential and agricultural areas of the reserve.

● The St. Lawrence Seaway○ Most significant of government surrenders of Mohawk land, both in area and in long-

term destructive impact on the Canada-Kahnawake relationship○ Design of the Seaway called for the channel to run directly through the oldest

residential and historical section of the community – this separated the village and denied access to the river where Mohawks had traditionally lived and worked for centuries.

○ Order-in-Council authorized surrender of parts of the reserve to the St Lawrence Seaway Authority in 1955 – band council resisted from the start, trying to rely on treaties and seek legal redress.

○ Band council also council turned to the legality of the project given the specific powers afforded Indian governments under the Indian Act – including a challenge to the validity of the Order-in- Council authorizing the expropriations, given that the Indian Act established a relationship of wardship predicated on a trust responsibility toward Indian bands by the federal government.

○ Trust/honour angle didn’t work – band council then initiated a legal strategy to challenge the federal government's management of reserve lands – use of terms such as “invasion”, which reflects the nation-to-nation aspect of the Canada-Kahnawake relationship.

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○ Efforts to halt the project were unsuccessful – Mohawk leaders could do nothing except harbour a growing sense of resentment and a general perception that Canada had failed Kahnawake

Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. v. Canada, [1979] 1 SCR 101Facts: Manitoba Fisheries Ltd (M) owned and operated a profitable fish exporting business until, in 1969, the Freshwater Fish Marketing Act gave to a Crown corporation the exclusive right to carry on such businesses except on the issuing by the corporation of a licence, none of which was issued.The legislation empowered the Minister to compensate the companies affected. M was not compensated, and commenced an action against the government of Canada, claiming compensation for loss of its business, including the loss of goodwill. Goodwill is intangible, and is the reputation and connection of the firm which has been built up.The government responds that the effect of the legislation was indeed to take away M’s goodwill, but it was not done by the Crown or Corporation; the act was merely prohibitive.Appeal from the judgment of the FCA, which affirmed a judgment of the Trial Division of the FC holding that federal legislation giving a Crown corporation the exclusive right to carry on interprovincial fish marketing did not amount to a "taking" of the plaintiff's property and that consequently no compensation was payable.Issue: Can the establishment of a monopoly Crown Corporation, which has the effect of taking goodwill of a private company, constitute “taking” of “property” such that it was an expropriation?Holding: Yes. Appeal allowed. Taking means to take possession of the property; a mere negative prohibition on use by a private party is not taking. Ongoing business is similar to goodwill and is property for the purposes of compensation under the Act establishing the Corporation. The loss of the goodwill of the appellant's business which was brought about by the Act and by the setting up of the corporation was a loss of property and the same goodwill was by statutory compulsion acquired by the federal authority. Thus, the appellant was deprived of property which was acquired by the Crown. The loss was brought about the be prohibition on use of assets.Reasoning: Is goodwill property for the purposes of the Act? Richie, J says that the appellant’s suppliers and customers cultivated over the years were among its most valuable assets. Reviews jurisprudence, determines that goodwill is property. Letter from Minister to Manitoba Fisheries Ltd discussed compensating loss of “ongoing business” which Richie says is similar enough to goodwill to make goodwill property for the purposes of the act.What there a taking? Must take possession of the property; a mere negative prohibition on use doesn’t count. 'to take' means to acquire or take over and thus signifies a transfer or passing of property from one to another, in contra-distinction to a taking away without acquisition, as by dissipation or destruction; and (2) a mere prohibition is not a taking whatever else 'to take' may connote.Application: The loss of the goodwill of the appellant's business which was brought about by the Act and by the setting up of the corporation was a loss of property and the same goodwill was by statutory compulsion acquired by the federal authority. Thus, the appellant was deprived of property which was acquired by the Crown. In this case, the government acquired the goodwill because the Crown corp became a monopoly, totally “obliterating” the appellant’s entire business.Ratio: “Taking” cannot simply be prohibitive but must include taking possession of and use of the thing taken.

The Queen in Right of British Columbia v. Tener et al (1985), 17 DLR (4th) 1 (SCC)Juge Beetz and co. : Le droit des intimés a été exproprié par application de la Park Act et, par conséquent, la Lands Clauses Act ne s'applique pas et l'indemnisation doit prendre sa source dans la Ministry of Highways and Public Works Act. Si on tient pour acquis que l'effet combiné de la Mineral Act et la Park Act exige ce permis pour extraire ces minéraux concédés, le refus du permis d'utilisation du

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parc a donc mis en œuvre les interdictions de la Park Act de sorte que les droits concédés aux intimés ont été juridiquement diminués et récupérés en partie par Sa Majesté. Ce processus constitue une appropriation qui impose une indemnisation même si les intimés ont conservé leur droit dans les minéraux eux-mêmes.Juge Dickson and co: Il s'agit d'une expropriation en vertu de l'al. 11c) de la Park Act, pour laquelle une indemnité est payable en vertu de la Highways Act. Les intimés possèdent un droit d'extraction, c.-à-d. le droit de se rendre sur le bien-fonds aux seules fins d'en extraire les minéraux et de se les approprier, et non pas deux droits distincts comprenant les claims miniers et le droit d'accès. Les intimés possèdent un droit d'extraction en soi qui peut être éteint par la confusion. Sa Majesté a non seulement empêché les intimés de tirer profit de leur droit au moyen d'un règlement, mais elle a exproprié ce droit en ce sens qu'elle a acquis, par son refus permanent d'accorder un permis, un titre absolu à la propriété, libre de la charge que constituait le droit d'extraction. Cette dérogation de Sa Majesté à la concession qu'elle avait consentie antérieurement, quoique légale, équivaut à une négation du droit des intimés et constitue une expropriation.Ratio: Under Canadian law, expropriation claims are not limited to the taking of physical property but may include compensation for the loss of other business interests or investments

Canadian Pacific Railway v. Vancouver (City), 2006 SCC 5Background:

- in 1886: BC (provincial Crown) granted the Canadian Pacific Railway Company ("CPR") a corridor of land for the construction of a railway line, called the Arbutus corridor, which lies at the heart of this appeal.

- 1902: railway line built on the corridor- Train traffic diminished- CP a donc présenté des propositions visant l’aménagement résidentiel et commercial de ce dernier.- Cependant la ville de Vancouver a adopté par règlement un plan d’aménagement officiel («

Règlement PAO ») :o Désignait le corridor comme voie publique réservée au transporto A eu l’effet d’empêcher d’exploiter le potentiel de réaménagement du corridor et de confiner

CP à des utilisations non rentables du terrain (conserver le corridor intact sans qu’il puisse être acheté)

- Finalement, Ville a fait savoir qu’elle n’achèterait pas corridor et à la place adopte Règlement PAO qui désigne le corridor comme voie publique réservée au transport et aux « voies vertes »

- CP soutient que :a. Le règlement excède la compétence de la Ville et devrait être annulé ;b. Ville doit l’indemniser pour le terrain ;c. Règlement souffre d’irrégularités procédurales et devrait en conséquence être annulé.

Questions en litige1. Le Règlement PAO excède-t-il les pouvoirs légaux de la Ville ?2. Dans la négative, la Ville doit-elle indemniser CP pour le terrain ?3. Le règlement devrait-il être annulé pour irrégularités de procédure?Analyse:

- Vastes pouvoirs conférés à la Ville lui permettant de déterminer l’utilisation de son territoire- Mais Charte de Vancouver prévoit que la Ville n’est pas tenue d’indemniser les propriétaires

fonciers pour la perte subie par suite de ces restrictions :(1) confère à la Ville un vaste pouvoir lui permettant d’adopter des PAO à des fins de planification, sans l’obliger à les mettre en œuvre, et(2) expressément prévoit que les PAO peuvent avoir une incidence négative sur l’utilisation du terrain et dégage la Ville de toute responsabilité à cet égard.

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=> N’imposent pas à la Ville l’obligation d’acquérir tout terrain visé par un PAO ou d’avoir un plan pour son acquisition

Appropriation :Pour qu’une appropriation de fait impose une indemnisation en common law, deux conditions doivent être remplies :(1) L’acquisition d’un intérêt bénéficiaire dans le bien - fonds ou d’un droit découlant de ce bien ;

- Ici, CP n’a pas réussi à démontrer que la Ville a acquis un intérêt bénéficiaire relatif au terrain. Pour satisfaire à ce volet du critère, il n’est pas nécessaire d’établir le transfert forcé du bien-fonds. L’acquisition d’un intérêt bénéficiaire relatif au bien-fonds suffit.

(2) La suppression de toutes les utilisations raisonnables de la propriété- Le règlement ne supprime pas toutes les utilisations raisonnables du bien-fonds. Cette condition

doit être appréciée « non seulement par rapport à l’utilisation potentielle optimale du terrain, mais aussi compte tenu de la nature du terrain et des diverses utilisations raisonnables dont il a effectivement fait l’objet »

- Le règlement n’empêche pas CP d’utiliser son terrain pour exploiter un chemin de fer, soit la seule utilisation dont le terrain a fait l’objet au cours de l’histoire de la Ville. Il ne l’empêche pas non plus, contrairement à ce qu’elle prétend, d’entretenir sa voie ferrée, ni de louer le terrain pour une utilisation conforme au règlement ni d’établir des partenariats public-privé

Art. 952 C.c.Q952. Le propriétaire ne peut être contraint de céder sa propriété, si ce n’est par voie d’expropriation faite suivant la loi pour une cause d’utilité publique et moyennant une juste et préalable indemnité.

Lacroix v. R, [1954] Ex.C.R. 69, [1954] 4 D.L.R. 470Facts:

2 claims for compensation:➢ For the expropriation of an easement over his property and the injurious affection of his

remaining land as a result of the easement➢ For the establishment of a flightway over his land as the owner not only of the land but also of

what is above and under it.AnalysisFlightway

· 414 of the CCQ: "that the owner of the soil is also the owner of what is above and what is below."· Jack E. Richardson on Ad coelum doctrine (Cuius est solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos = "whoever's is the soil, it is theirs all the way to Heaven and all the way to Hell")

o No CML court has gave effect to this maxim.o Court have always accepted the general right of the landowner to the uninterrupted use

and enjoyment of his propertyo An aircraft may fly above private property in the United States provided the flight does

not interfere with the occupier's use and enjoyment of the land.· Nicolas Mateesco in « À qui appartient le milieu aérien ? » :

o L'application de l'art. 552 C.N. quant à la propriété sur 'l'espace aérien' du propriétaire n'est pas soutenable; dès qu'on construit ou qu’on plante, le volume occupé en espace cesse d'être aérien = ne veut pas dire qu’on a pris propriété de l’espace aérien.

o Le milieu aérien est res communis = constitué par 'l'atmosphère' de la façon que la mer constitue le milieu de la navigation maritime.

o L’espace aérien est un bien commun mis à l'usage pacifique de l'humanité, sans conditions et sans restrictions

Application of these principles in the case :

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- The principle that the suppliant has the right to the uninterrupted use and enjoyment of his land is sound; but has the use and enjoyment of his property been interrupted? If so, when, how and by whom were his rights interfered with?

o Does not live on the land, which serve for agricultural purposeso To agree with the position taken by the suppliant that the Crown, by expropriating an

easement for a lighting system, had created a flightway and appropriated air space over his land would be admitting that air and space may be appropriated or possessed = No, air and space cannot be owned, fall under res communis.

**NO INTERFERENCE with his rights- Claim for easement: Undoubtedly entitled to compensation for the value of the easement taken.- Claim for the injurious affection of the remaining land: Having people in and out of the property

to maintain the works will interfere in some degree with the use and enjoyment of the property.

Sula c. Duvernay (Cité de), (1970) C.A. 234Facts: Sula est propriétaire de trois lots de terrain. La Cité de Duvernay les a transformés en parc en utilisant son pouvoir de zonage conféré par le Règlement de Zonage. Elle n’a accordé aucune indemnité d’expropriation au demandeur. Sula prétend que le règlement est illégal et inconstitutionnel, et qu’il devrait être annulé.Issue: Le règlement de zonage est-il illégal ?Holding: OuiReasoning: Le législateur, en donnant aux municipalités le pouvoir de zonage ne voulait pas leur permettre d’exproprier une personne de son terrain sans l’indemniser, contrairement à l’article 407 du CcBC. Un règlement qui ne permet à un propriétaire aucun usage de son terrain n’est pas un règlement de zonage mais une expropriation. Cela constitue de la part de la Cité intimée un abus de pouvoir équivalent à une fraude.Ratio: Une atteinte à la liberté de jouir et d’user de son droit de propriété constitue une forme expropriation

Wallot c Québec (Ville de), 2011 QCCA 1165Facts: À cause de la prolifération des cyanobactéries dans la source d’eau potable de la ville de Québec, cette dernière adopte des règlements qui prévoit la naturalisation des bandes riveraines tout le long du lac et de la rivière. Les riverains ne sont pas en accord avec le règlement et prétendent que la ville tente par règlement de s’approprier les biens-fonds ou qu’elle veut les exproprier.Holding: Rejeté

Questions en litige :1. La Cour supérieure a-t-elle errée en concluant qu’en vertu de l’article 19 de la Loi sur les compétences municipales la ville de Québec avait le pouvoir d’adopter le règlement ?

- Non, c’est bien le cas, car l’article 19 de la Loi sur les compétences municipales donnait le pouvoir à la ville d’adopter le Règlement.

2. Si la Ville avait le pouvoir d’adopter le Règlement, la Cour supérieure a-t-elle errée en concluant que le règlement respecte les limites du pouvoir habilitant ?

● Non, il n’y a pas de négation absolue de l’exercice du droit de propriété, il peut encore y avoir une utilisation raisonnable de ce droit. Il n’y a pas d’expropriation déguisée parce que le terrain n’appartient pas à la Ville.

Motifs : La Ville avait le pouvoir d’adopter le Règlement et ce dernier respecte les limites du pouvoir habilitant. La Ville a acquis un intérêt bénéficiaire sur le bien-fonds mais cela ne supprimait pas toutes les utilisations raisonnables des immeubles. Il n’y a donc pas d’appropriation déguisée ou d’expropriation sans indemnisation. La Ville exerce sa compétence de manière raisonnable.

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Note on Harvard Investments Ltd. v. City of Winnipeg (1994), 54 L.C.R. 163 (Man. Q.B.) Facts:

- Listing prevented demolition of the building and limited the alterations that could be made to it.- In 1980 The City of Winnipeg designated the Fort Garry Hotel as an historic building.- In 1983 the city refused a request from the hotel's owner for it to be delisted.- Harvard argued that it was tantamount to an expropriation in that it deprived Harvard of certain

of its rights of property and ownership to the hotel by converting such rights and ownership to the City, for example the right to demolish the hotel.

The trial court's response:- City listing the hotel = merely an exercise of a regulatory power similar to the regulation of the

use of lands through a zoning by-law.- While it may have the effect of limiting and curtailing the use of the lands, it does not amount to

a taking nor does it vest any rights to the property in the City"Court of Appeal:

- Kroft J.A.:City acquired nothing; nothing was added to the value of public property. As a result, listing was "akin to the limitations that zoning, and planning regulations may impose upon a property."

- Philp J.A.: cited Tener for the proposition that to constitute a taking action short of expropriation of title must add value to public property.

- He added: if a listed building "becomes commercially impracticable" either because of the listing, or as a result of a combination of that listing and other factors, such facts "may amount to a taking and entitle an owner to compensation".

- Twaddle J.A.: two elements to a taking: a. "the acquisition of an asset by the authority involved", and b. "the complete extinguishment of an asset's value to the owner" = neither of these elements present in this case

- Twaddle J.A.’s statement in Harvard Investments that the complete extinguishment of the asset’s value to the owner could constitute a taking was refuted by Cromwell J.A. in Attorney General of Nova Scotia v. Mariner Real Estate Limited et al (1999).

- He asserted that neither Manitoba Fisheries nor Tener supported this conclusion => in neither case was it the loss of economic value that triggered a finding of a taking, but the fact that the regulations respectively prevented the company from carrying on business at all and denied all access to the minerals.

- It may be that the distinction between the value of land and interests in land = highly technical", but it was nonetheless a fundamental one.

MARCH BREAK

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CLASS 29: Fiduciaries & TrustsEmerich Plenary

Emerich Plenary notes- Trust = CML- Fiducie = CVL- Settlor, trustee, beneficiary - Est-ce que le trust est un être intraduisible?o Trusts evolve from fiduciary law (law of equity CML) which doesn’t exist in the CVL- Un trust a un multiplicité de fonctions. Souvent considéré comme très difficilement définissiable because of its multiplicity- Peut avoir un double titre pour propriété equité + propriété légale- L’origine du trust + fiducie: wanted to ensure that upon return the settlor could get their property back- Fidéiscommis & Fiducia cum créditore (fiducie-sûreté)o Renaissance de ces mecanismes en CVL en droits récentes1. Trust on CML et elements transsystèmiques- Trust & Fiducie definitions:o Creation of 2 rights to the same property o Transfer of property from one person to another for the benefit of another- Trustee holds legal title to the thing- Fiducie is different from CVL: patrimoine d’affectation 2. Fonctions et Types de trust- The trust is not a contract- Trust used comme outil successorale- Constructive trusts – trust by intention- Functions (listed on the slide)o Trusts liés aux relations d’affaireso D’origine legislative3. Droits des parties - Intérêt du bénéficiaire est plus controverséo Droit reel?- Consider breach of trust4. Fin du trust- Reclamation by beneficiaires- Decisions by tribunal- Charitable trusts – for social purpose II. Fiducie en CVL - Office du revision du code civil- Lepaulle: le trustee n’a ni l’usus ni le fructus ni l’abususo Le trustee fiduciaire peut pas traduire les droits du trusteeo Pas de liberté du propriétaire1. Notion de fiducieRoyal Trust Co. c. Tucker CSC 1982- Beetz: always has to be an owner. Cannot be ownerless.- Who is the owner of the property in a trust? o Trustee? He is temporary. No fructus. - Art 1260, 1261- Patrimoine d’affectation autonome where no one has a real right (not trustee or beneficiary)2. Fonctions et Types de fiducie- Art 1266, 1267, 1269, 1270

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- Fiducie personelle: familiale ou testamentaire - Fiducie a des fins d’utilité privée: o A titre gratuito A titre onéreux3. Droits des parties- Opposition entre droit subjectif: pourvoir qu’on exercise pour un autre - Art 1278- Imposer tous les actes possible sur un bien- Doit respecter l’affectation du patrimoine- Art 1306, 1308, 1309, 1310- Trusts as patrimony - L. Smith: a CML trust is a way in which a person holds property

Royal Trust Co v. Tucker, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 250Facts : Respondent made a deed of donation and trust with appellant as per Art. 981CCQ. Years later, respondent said the contract was void as the gift was made in favour of her unborn children, the primary beneficiaries (as they did not exist at the time) and in favour of her sisters, the secondary beneficiaries (as it is a gift in contemplation of death). When the respondent signed the agreement, she was unmarried and had no children but eventually had 4 daughters. The respondent asked the Court to void the deed of donation and trust and to be declared the sole owner of the property conveyed in trust.Issues : Is the deed of donation and trust made for the benefit of the donor’s unborn children valid? Is the deed of donation and trust made for the benefit of the donor’s sisters valid?Reasoning :

At the Superior Court it was held that acceptance by the trustee suffices to make the deed of donation and trust valid whereas acceptance by the beneficiary is not necessary. Trustees also have a limited right of ownership in the property.

At the Court of Appeal, the English origins of trust are not of importance but rather the only question was as to whether acceptance by the trustee only sufficed.

Art. 754 on gifts profits that « a person cannot dispose of his property by gratuitous title, otherwise than by gift inter vivos or by will » As any other type of gift is prohibited, a gift cannot be made by trust to benefit unborn children

The gift made to the secondary beneficiaries is void because it is dependent on the stipulation made for the benefit of the unborn children, falling with it.

Holding : The deed of donation and trust made for the benefit of the unborn children and for the donor’s sisters is valid. Ratio : In the Canadian system, the trustee should be regarded as a limited owner and the trust as a sui generis property right. While the trust lasts, the beneficiaries do not have ownership of the property conveyed to the trustees.

Lionel Smith, “Trust and Patrimony” (2008-2009) 28 Est Tr & Pensions J 332Lepaule characterised the CML trust as a patrimony by appropriation, influencing the integration of the trust in the CVL system. Actually, trusts are obligations owed by the trustee in relation to the trust property. Rights of beneficiary not personal or real against trustee, but rather a set of rights of the rights of the trustee in the property. Therefore, characterization of the trust as a legal person is flawedIntroduction

· Trust characteristic of CML· Possible to have trusts in pure civilian and mixed civilian traditions, equity is not necessary· Mainly interested in whether trust can be understood as a patrimony, in the civilian sense

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· Cannot because the essence of the CML trust is that the beneficiary has rights in the rights that the trustee holds as trust property· CML trust not a legal person, eliminates trust as rather a legal institution

Is the Common Law Trust a PatrimonyLepaulle’s Theory· Conceptualized the trust as patrimony independent of any legal person, unity is defined by appropriation, unconstrained except for the limits imposed by law and public policy

· Influenced emergence of trust in Mexico, Quebec and France· Patrimony is the whole of rights and obligations of a person having an economic or pecuniary value

· Describes a container, not content, the focus is on a fluctuating whole· Can contain assets and liabilities, assets are available to fulfil liabilities, as such only one patrimony to avoid shielding

· Trust is a way of holding property, both the property and the person holding it in trust are essential

· While a trust does not fail without a trustee, a trust may not be without a trustee· There are legal mechanisms to ensure there will be a trustee in the future when one is lacking

· Lepaulle misunderstood the trust when he said the trustee was non essential· Could see the trust as a separate patrimony to the benefit of a person

· Indeed, trustee will have personal property and trust property· Creditors will not be able to touch trust property while trust creditors will

Creditors of Trustees in a Common Law Trust· While assets could be said to be held in a box, note that where the trustee is liable to a trust creditor, a creditor will so the trustee not in trust capacity but as a person (no separate identities)

· If creditor gets judgment, when executing the right, he does not have a right on trust assets· So liabilities of trustee both personal and under trust come back to him (can pay himself back through trust, nevertheless)

· Creditor may agree to only exercise right against trust assets, this only protects the trustee from claims on his assets, but does not give a right to the trust assets (enforce this agreement by forcing trustee to use his rights to pay through trust assets)· Trust creditor claim on assets never superior to the trustee’s claim to assets· Where trustee bankrupt, right of reimbursement and the supporting lien allowing to reimburse expense occurred due to trust are considered assets so part of bankruptcy

· Creditor will not be protected by claim on trust assets because it is only an execution claim of the trustee’s rights

· Trust clearly not patrimony, since creditors have access to trustee’s personal assets in claimBeneficiaries of a Common Law Trust· Several parallels between situation of a beneficiary and a creditor

· Beneficiary has no right to trust property except through trustee’s rights, therefore need a trustee, essential to a trust· Third party damages trust property, beneficiary has no claim, only the trustee does· Creditor inability to claim the trust property is not because of beneficiary claim but because it would affect trustee’s obligation towards the property

· Trust is a distortion of law of obligations, not from property, it is the expansion of the idea that a third party can be liable for interference of your obligations· Similarly in CVL can have claim against third party for interfering with your obligations

· Idea of equitable title is not literally true· There is no direct relationship between the beneficiary and the property

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· Beneficiary rights are rights in the rights of the trustee, converse of the trustee’s obligation towards the beneficiaries

· Obligational root to trusts*, explains why trusts may arise easily, as obligations can arise informally

· Equity much more willing to allow obligations to have an impact on third parties· Since it is an obligation, clearly not a legal person

· Moreover, clear that the trustee is essential as it is they who have an obligation· CML trust, only the assets are held in trust, not the liabilities (distinct from CVL trust)· Clear that estates are not trusts, more like patrimony, where both assets and liabilities are passed on and the representative is not liable (as a trustee is for liabilities)Conclusion: Trust and Personality· Many instances in CML jurisdictions where trusts are mistakenly treated as person· Push to entify trust especially where used as a business association

· Want to have same protections for investors if business is carried on as a trust· Issue is that trust cannot go bankrupt only holding assets, so bankruptcy protections do not apply, moreover just a way of holding assets, a relationship cannot go bankrupt

· In Quebec· Trustee is full civil law owner, usus, fructus, abusus

· Beneficiary only personal rights against the trustee in his function as such as rights are only exigible against the trust patrimony· Extension of obligations to be able to impose rights on third parties

· Example, lessor owns buildings lessee only has right, but these rights remain when lessor sells the building, imposing constraint on property right of third party due to obligations

· Entification of trust would remove its particularity, the void it fills in being unable to attain the same objectives through contract or the law of persons· Scotland able to preserve law of trust, in civilian notion of property, without equity through recognizing the trustee as a debtor rather than only an administrator in QC

[missing] Madeleine Cantin Cumyn, “La fiducie, un nouveau sujet du droit?” in Mélanges Ernest Caparros (Montreal : Wilson & Lafleur, 2002) 129

[missing] JEC Brierley, « De la fiducie » in La réforme du Code civil (Quebec : Presses de l’Université Laval, 1993) 735

CLASS 30: Indigenous Land CodesAnker Plenary

Plenary notes(Discussion on Nitaskinan land and how it has not been recognized as indigenous land in Canada.)Indian Act: sought to (1) Restrict First Nations to reserves where they could be « civilized » and turned into citizens who could vote, (2) Redefine « Indian », (3) Impose new forms of government and land-holding practices with the eventual goal of assimilation.

o Indian status: registering Indians o Reserveso Band council system, electionso Cultural political and legal prohibitionso Indian agent and ministerial discretion

- Possession of land on reserveso Customary rights

● Informal recognition oral tradition or via band council resolution

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● Unenforceable by courts – BC has legal authority● Permits as collateral for bank loans up to 10K● Tends to produce band owner housing rent unenforceable

o Certificate of possession s 20● Allotment by BC● Lawful possession

- Video: Why are Indians so poor? ● Can’t own property● Indian who have privately owned land are doing better i.e. in the USA where in some

reserves with fee simple land, indians are doing better● Simplistic way of thinking. ● What about if the land isn’t productive, or if people don’t have the knowledge to know

how to manage it correctly? Would private property clash with their conception of the land?o Hernando De Soto

● = prob with poor people is not that they have anything – but those assets are dead capital – can’t increase value of their assets

● Need a proper property system● Parallel life = live capital… and additional benefits such as locus for personhood

(?)● Mysteries = missing info, obstacles to legality – red tapes (transactions can take

6 years) and legal failure- Security of Tenure

o Québec has a pretty protective regime vs. in Vancouver if you don’t pay your rent, you can be evicted in two weeks!

- Inalienability – Indian act● Individual can only sell or devise land to fellow band members● Land is not subject to mortgage in favour of anyone than an Indian for a band

89(1) + Reserve lands not subject to seizure s 29● New designation provisions allow leases as security for lenders s 89 1.1● Financing for house construction

○ Bank/Can Mortgage and Housing Corp○ Internal fund supported by INAC

● Transaction costs● Opting out of Indian Act

➢ Land claims + self-governance agreements (Nisga’a)○ How to get a structure that looks a bit like a fee simple but that is not susceptible of being

then just assimilated to the rest of the land?○ Self-governance and politics

o First Nations Land Management Acto Other proposals… First Nation Property Ownership Act

- Security of tenureo Land codes could provide a well-defined, enforceable titleo Fee simple title would offer the most secure titleo Restrictions on uncompensated expropriation

- Alienabilityo More liberal rules (ind ownership, transferable)

➢ Facilitate transition to more valuable uses➢ Market facilitate the most valuable use on the thing➢ Enhance personal autonomy

o Negative effects

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● Issue with privatization of the land = creates inequality, migration of groups, ecological consequences (fish stream - well managed by FN, but not when private interests come into play)

● Fewer communal resources for risk-spreading● Concentration of wealth and inequality migration and reduction of group cohesion● Erosion of land base● Market incentives restrain use of collective governance powers- Formality

o Documentation: How does documentation affect economic development?○ Certainty = Will my rights be enforced and what are my rights?○ Symbolization = how did we do before to create a certainty on who owned a

particular land? Fences, Houses, Public demonstration, stories, practice, individual memories = all to insure collective memory

○ Deed = representation of transaction (CML)o Registration (publicly in CVL, Registry systems at CML)

● How do you ensure that deeds are not frauded?· Give all the paper to notary – Public registry system to keep track

o Guarantee (Torrens systems)➢ Torren system - Guarantees that only what is on records is reliable, guarantee that the name is on

title because the state ensures you against fraud➢ Part of Nisga’a property management control

Purpose of property regimes?- Incentives for labour investment- Economic growth – maximizing value- …

Property and economic dev

- Where does property fit in the dynamics of value creation under contemporary capitalism?- Things become commodities …

Reserve and colonialism

- It ignores cultural, identity, rights and responsibilities for their future generations and focus solely on the pursuit of individualized material wealth

- We look at FN as if they were one person, but so many different bands

Indian Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. I-5) // Loi sur les Indiens (L.R.C. (1985), ch. I-5)

Christopher Alcantara, “Reduce transaction costs? Yes. Strengthen property rights? Maybe: The First Nations Land Management Act and economic development on Canadian Indian reserves” (2007) 132 Public Choice 421.

- Properly designed property rights can significantly improve economic development conditions on contemporary Indian reserves

o Poorly designed property rights can create significant drag- The American federal government’s imposition of fee simple ownership on Indian reserves

under the Dawes Act actually increased poverty rather than reducing ito Would have worked better if Indian communities had been allowed to create their own

property rights based on their traditions and selected western values and ideas, free from federal interference

- First Nations Land Management Act (FNLMA): an experiment in institutional change to improve the conditions for economic development on Canadian Indian reserves

o Allows Indian bands to develop land codes to take over the administration of their reserve lands while minimizing federal interference

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o Once a band opts into the FNLMA, it is no longer subject to the land management provisions of the Indian Act, which a number of observers have identified as being a major source of drag on on-reserve development

- The key to prosperity on Indian reserves is tribal sovereigntyo Aboriginal communities should have the power to make their own decisions; they

should establish stable and effective political institutions and policies; and their cultures should be congruent with the structures of their governing institutions

- Agricultural lands held in trust by the federal government are much less productive than lands held in fee simple

o Creates legal barriers, which increase both organizational and transaction costs- The Indian Act states that all lands reserved for Indians are held by the Crown to be used by

Indian bands to occupy and live on.- Band members can gain individual possession of reserve lands through three mechanisms,

customary rights, certificates of possession, and leases, depending on which mechanisms a band decides to use

Customary Rights- Two forms of customary rights:

o When the band council allots individual tracts to band members who then occupy and use the lands at the pleasure of the band council

o When community members and/or the band council informally recognize and tolerate an individual’s or family’s traditional occupation of a tract of reserve land

- No statutory basis, they are specific to each community- Vary according to the level for formalization, the range of usage rights, the level of

recognition by the band council, recording and surveying practices, and dispute resolution processes

o Tend to be poorly documented and enforced- Used for: housing, farming, or starting a business- On many reserves, especially in Western Canada, families rely on agricultural and grazing

permits as their only source of incomeo Constrains bc lack security of tenure (and not recognized by the Indian Act)

- Band councils have ultimate authority over the allotment, administration, and enforcement of all interests in band land, unless such interests are recognized by the Indian Act à unenforceable in Canadian courts

Certificate of Possession (CP)- a CP is the evidence of a member’s lawful possession to a tract of reserve land. To acquire a

CP, the band council must pass a resolution formally allotting the land to the band member. The allotment must be surveyed and then approved by the federal Minister of INAC and recorded in the federal Indian Lands Registry before being issued to the individual member. With a CP, a band member has a number of important rights

o Need approval of multiple authorities! Lengthy and procedural!o E.g. Six Nations Indian reserve near Brantford, Ontario – approval process can take 1-

11 years- With a CP, the member may build a house on the property, farm it, or use it as he desires

within band by-laws. He can sell or devise it in a will, but only to fellow band members. He can also lease his land under s. 58(3) of the Indian Act to off-reserve residents and corporations, who can then farm the land, or build commercial and housing developments on it to sublease to off-reserve residents

- Stronger than customary right. Cannot give their holders fee simple ownership.Leases

- The main function of s. 38(2) is to allow band councils and band corporations to obtain financing from non-Indian lending institutions to develop reserve lands.

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- Bc of s89(1) of Indian Act, off-reserve lending institutions cannot seize reserve properties in the event of a default, they are reluctant to provide financing for on-reserve development projects.

o Section 38(2), however, allows the band to circumvent these restrictions by designating reserve land as a leasehold interest

- Leasing reserve land is different than leasing off-reserve land:1. Need for the approval of the entire community (surrender or designations), the

Minister of INAC [Indian and Northern Affairs Canada] (CP-held leases), or both the band council and the Minister of INAC (customarily-held permits) before a lease can be issued

2. s. 38(2) leases are administered by INAC, rather than directly by the band [can have disagreement on how leases should be administered]

3. leased land may have a land value that is lower than its off-reserve equivalent§ SCC: Musqueam v. Glass bc of their “Indian reserve features;” reserve lands

are subject to a complex set of rules, jurisdictions, and powers to which off-reserve lands are not

§ Moreover, leaseholders who are not band members cannot run for office nor can they vote in band council elections despite the fact that band councils can pass by-laws regulating the use of their lands

Scugog Island First Nation (as an example)

Malcolm Lavoie and Moira Lavoie, “Land Regime Choice in Close-Knit Communities: The Case of the First Nations Land Management Act” (2017) 54 Osgoode Hall LJ 559. - Indian Act: Maladaptive to local needs; top-down nature of Aboriginal policy- an increasing number of First Nations have taken advantage of the 1999 First Nations Land Management Act (FNLMA), which allows bands to adopt a custom land code that replaces most of the reserve land provisions of the Indian Act in their community- First Nations-led movement for greater flexibility and autonomy with respect to land interests on reserve- three matters on which First Nations under the FNLMLA have made different choices about the rules governing land interests on reserve: 1. Whether to require a vote of the community as a whole for the grant of a lease in community-held lands to a non-member; 2. Whether to require the approval of the band council or a delegated body for the transfer of any leasehold interest to a non-member; and 3. Whether to require the approval of the band council or a delegated body for the inter vivos transfer of one member’s interest to another member.- Begs the question: how freely alienable land interests should be in Indigenous communities?o Contentious bc individual autonomy vs economic efficiencyFirst Nations as Close-Knit Communities- Close-knit (Robert Ellickson): groups in which power is broadly dispersed and members have regular face-to-face interactions with one another- that land rules within a close-knit group evolve in a manner that minimizes members’ costso material economic well-being but also values related to liberty, privacy, equality, and communityConsiderations Related to Alienability- More liberal rules regarding the alienation of land interests can encourage economic development under the right circumstances, particularly where interests are well-defined and institutions like registries are in place- Restrictions on alienation introduce transaction costs that impede the ability to move land from lower- to higher-value uses.- mutually beneficial exchanges may be deterred.

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- Alienability: can be economic, or community interest (broad)- The process of formalizing and defining interests with precision may thus be seen as a precursor to allowing freer transactions, but this process is not without costs.- The first set of rules we examine are those pertaining to the granting of a lease in community lands.o Most First Nations require a vote of the community as a whole for longer-term leases, with the threshold for holding a vote varying significantly.- A long-term lease can effectively reduce a First Nation’s collectively held land base for generations, restricting its ability to control what goes on in its territory and reducing the space available for traditional activities or members’ homes.”- inter vivos transfer of member interests among members of the First Nationo They are usually referred to as “certificates of possession” or “allotments” in the land codes analyzed in this study- Inequality of land holdings could have negative effects on the welfare of community members.Rules for Leasing Community Lands- The large majority of the communities in our sample require a community vote for the lease of community lands to non-members, at least above certain thresholds for the term of the lease.- The absence of a council approval requirement removes potential transaction costs that could impede the efficient allocation of interests.Rules for Transferring a Leasehold Interest- Free transfer of leasehold interest: important factor is the presence of a significant non-First-Nations population on the reserve- Communities that already had a significant non-First-Nations population on their reserve lands at the time they adopted a land code likely possessed two characteristics. First, they likely had valuable residential land development prospects.- Second, these communities appear to have been willing to exploit these development prospects prior to the adoption of their land code, most likely using the leasing provisions of the Indian Act.o it is not necessarily the case that all of the prior non-Aboriginal residential development enjoyed robust support in the community- It could be that communities that are inclined to use their land for real estate development are already more market-oriented, and thus more inclined to allow for liberal land markets with respect to member interests- statistically significant negative correlation between the adoption of a requirement for council approval for the transfer of a member interest and the change in the proportion of members living off reserve between the year before and the third year after the land code came into force.- that one of the ways that long-standing communal societies like Hutterite colonies and Israeli kibbutzes discourage exit from the community is by refusing to give members who leave the community a share of the group’s property. Members who leave must essentially leave with nothingo Similar to member interest (although this is much subtler): by increasing transaction costs, such an approval requirement makes it less lucrative to sell one’s home and leave the community, which discourages exit from the community

Sari Graben, “Lessons for Indigenous Property Reform: From Membership to Ownership on Nisga’a Lands” (2014) 47 UBC L Rev 399

- Nisga’a Nation has engaged in over 150 years of legal and political advocacy for governmental and proprietary control of its territories

- An entitlement replaces the certificate of possession or is an entirely new grant where an individual does not hold a certificate and confers upon its recipient a right to possess a particular parcel of Nisga’a Village Lands. However, a grant can only be made to an eligible recipient, which includes “(a) a Nisga’a citizen, (b) the Nisga’a Nation, (c) Nisga’a settlement trust established by the Nisga’a Nation, or (d) a Nisga’a housing service provider”.

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- “Having the right to use land for credit is one motivation” for the adoption of private property ownership. The opportunity of Nisga’a citizens to own residential properties in fee simple is therefore to Stevens “part of our ongoing process for increasing economic prosperity for the Nisga’a”.

- the conversion of Nisga’a lands to fee simple title makes those lands available for purchase, residency, and control by non-Nisga’a citizens

- An obvious way that land reform can affect the use of land is that a Nisga’a citizen can lose ownership where he or she fails to pay his or her mortgage. […] A second way that a Nisga’a citizen might potentially lose property is for nonpayment of taxes.

- as a concern that a significant influx of non-Nisga’a residents onto Nisga’a lands will alter the community that currently exists

- a greater cultural impact may result from the proliferation of ownership by absentee landlords. An absentee landlord is one who is the ultimate owner of the land but uses it to extract rental payment for its use by another

o interest is extracting economic value from lando These owners have almost no social, economic, or political relationship with the

tenant, nor social or physical attachment to the land or the community in which that land is located.

o . Where the landlord resides elsewhere, the money generated by the property is spent in another jurisdiction

- enforcing landlord-tenant rights, remedying large-scale damage, and ensuring the property meets public requirements are difficult to enforce against absentee landlords. It thus becomes the de facto responsibility of the government to track down the owner and ensure that the problems are remedied. This can be costly and ineffective for a small community.

- fee simple ownership may also concentrate ownership in the hands of a few Nisga’a citizens and thereby undermine the goals of developing capital wealth for numerous Nisga’a citizens

- Based on the preponderance of historical allocations to men under the Indian Act, it seems likely that Nisga’a men will more often receive entitlements for land where houses have already been built. Moreover, women who reside in homes allotted to men remain vulnerable to loss of rights in the home resulting from divorce, separation, and default discussed above.

- Use Nisga’a Law!! the Nisga’a Lisims Government can subject persons to taxation, irrespective of who owns the lands

- positive psychological value for the Nisga’a that is likely unquantifiable- Property rights include two fundamental components: the right to exclude others by granting

or withholding permission, and the enforcement of this right by the state. In short, if one has a right to ownership, one also obtains the right to call upon state powers to ensure that such rights will be realized. In practice, however, this right contains an assumption that an agent of the state will have the corresponding authority to enter onto the land and enforce those rights.

Pamela Palmater, “Opportunity or Temptation? Plans for private property on reserves could cost First Nations their independence” Literary Review of Canada April 2010 Tom Flanagan’s 2000 work First Nations: conviction that since First Nations in Canada are uncivilized and their governments produce “wasteful, destructive, familistic factionalism,” they should not be entitled to self-governing powers, special tax exemptions or federal funding, but should be assimilated and their reserves divided up into parcels of individually owned, “fee simple” lands available for sale to non-aboriginal people and corporations.

o A professor in the University of Calgary’s political science department since 1968 and a former advisor to Stephen Harper

- Alcantara also argues that the commercial, recreational and residential aspect of First Nations land is their greatest economic asset and should be used by individuals to lever economic activity even if, as the book later explains, that means sale to non-aboriginal people.

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- Le Dressay’s section highlights the difficulties associated with the current reserve-based property system, such as high transaction costs and time delays on economic development. He argues that the Indian Act prevented market economies on reserve and that capitalism requires appropriate legal, administrative and institutional frameworks to be effective

- Le Dressay goes on to argue that implementing taxes on reserves for things such as property will attract private investment, which will fund infrastructure. His assumption is that this will make band governments and individuals accountable and, furthermore, taxation “is how every other Canadian community grows.” (Very little attention is paid to the large number of businesses that are attracted to First Nations because of the different taxation rules and other attractive bylaws, however, such as those in New Brunswick allowing businesses to operate on Sunday.)

- the majority of First Nations have chosen not to sign on to existing optional legislation: only 58 out of the more than 615 First Nations in Canada are participants

- It has taken many years for the Conne River Mi’kmaq people and the Innu to negotiate their standing or legal recognition in Canada, but at the end of the day they still opted to become Indian Act bands, with reserve lands and all the rules that come with that status

- section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 is a significant promise to aboriginal peoples to both recognize and protect their aboriginal and treaty rights. Perhaps most importantly, section 35 is a constitutional promise to aboriginal peoples to protect their distinctive cultures and identities for future generations. Since land is critical to the identity of First Nations as well as to the maintenance of their cultures and communities, it seems illogical to suggest that First Nations are best served by dividing up their reserves into individually owned parcels of land available for sale to non-aboriginal people in the name of economic development.

o CONSIDER NEGATIVE IMPACTSo Carolyn – consider the modernizations vs dependency argument for development.

- the erosion of aboriginal territory likely to accompany privatization of reserve property would ultimately lead toward full cultural and political assimilation

CLASS 32: Intellectual PropertyPiper Plenary

Plenary notes- IP isn’t very property-like. The fact that we call it property is more of a historical accident. - A license is essentially a contract. Very few copyright holders are involved in the marketing and

resale of their rights. - The world of IP is the world of contracts. - Is IP property?

o Why has this exploded in popularity?o What is the word “property” doing in IP? Patent, copyright, trademark, design, etc. o Covers all aspects of business relations. o Provides a tool for commodifying rights and interests.

- Example over ice cream: no one can claim rights to the recipe of making ice cream. It is universally well known.

o You can claim parts to ice cream as it is sold on the market. o Ben & Jerry’s = trademark. Consumer sorting. Associate the branding, packaging is

pleasing. o Method of making ice cream using liquid nitrogen (a lot faster than traditional ways). =

patent = invention. Has quality of novelty, hasn’t been done before.

- Patent: exclusive right and privilege of using the invention and selling it to others to be used- Copyright: expressions

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o Not ideas. - Image of ice cream recipe:

o Copyright and patent. o Patent = method of making ice creamo Text of the recipe, framing, expression of recipe. E.g. Red border, different use of ice

cream. = copyright o If you copy sufficient use of skill and judgment [creativity] in the original recipe (text)

and copy it over, then perhaps you could claim copyright violation. - Copyright isn’t just text, it’s expression.

A Patent- S42 Patent Act - A patent lasts 20 years from the date of filing- You don’t get money just by having a copyright or patent - Why get a patent unless you’re pretty certain that you can make money?- Need to protect yourself against risk.

Copyright- Sole right to produce or reproduce the work, or a substantial part of the work. (the expression)- “Sole holder of the right”

Trademark- Cannot take someone else’s trademark and market it (e.g. Fake Louis Vuitton bags)

What gives you the right to call it property? - Music is easily reproduced and transmitted across the world. You can invoke legal rights to

exclude, but if the practice or people in fact don’t exclude then the right becomes meaningless.- There is language of exclusion and we would like to exclude people from reproducing and

retransmitting, but the practical reality is that they can’t.Tri-Tex c. Gideon QcCA 1999

- Excludability problem is key - Want to give IP rights to incentivise people to innovate that improve lifestyles, communication,

work or just to make things different. o Public polity of ideas

- Chemical formula as idea not expressions - Following instructions to make chemical formulae would not infringe the copyright act (think of

ice cream example).- If you stole an exam paper from a photocopier, copied it and returned it, have you stolen

anything? o Not a matter if you did something wrong, but did you steal something? No. because the

piece of paper was returned. Oxford v. Moss (1971)

- Similar case to the stealing an exam. Not criminal.//

- If you bought confidential digital list not theft. Answer is B. Stewart v. R SCC 2002

- Enforcement under private law. For the purposes of the state, the state was not going to enforce it as a theft.

- How to protect intangibility? Do you bring in the state? Bring in created locks? Make things tangible (forced) or refuse to make them intangible (refuse to make things exclusively digital – which is impossible)

TRIPS 1995- Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 

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- Agreement that tried to export US IP norms to the rest of the world to a US standard (in exchange for trade deals). Tried to make a harmonized version of IP norms.

- From video: wealth is in the product of the mind- Disneyland look alike in Asia. Americans upset. Want control.

What is the problem with “property” anyways? - Language of property is not used in Canadian acts. - Property language produces no logic of law it should follow in IP. No rewards, how long the

rights should be, what the rights look like, etc.- May tip the balance against other rights – freedom of expression, etc. - Storage, reproduction, transmission. - Why should a company be allowed to overcharge for these rights? (e.g. Pharma)

o Trying to find a way to encourage people to produce useful drugs and compensate from them, but not compensate them too much.

- Lack of fit – 20y term. Doesn’t work with today’s technological advancements. (might have worked in 1950s with the invention of toasters)

o Might stop people from innovating because worried about patent rights o Might create patent trolls – spend their time creating patents and charging license fees. o Not incentivizing innovation.

Consider the Gaps- IP law is all about a regulatory regime- Negative spaces – IP without IP – socio-legal scholarship- USA: everything is covered by IP except little areas without IP. - Rest of the world: nothing is covered by IP except little areas.

Physicians- Intellectual property is not present among doctors- Only professions-based exclusion from patent law. Lobbied for an exclusion to patent law

because they have robust internal processes for managing internal IP among themselves. o Compensate doctors through referrals and otherwise. o Don’t want conflict of interest.

- Ethically undesirable to profit from invention that would benefit patients. Military “men”

- Developed technology transfer within the ranks so that tech could make its way to the battlefield.- 8 patents granted to men.

//Have you ever used a commercial note-sharing service?

- Paying for notes servicesThe Legal Profession

- Complimentary to the kind of legal work you do before you enter practice- Musicians don’t belong to a profession, so they need to patent for guaranteed income stream. - Lawyers and doctors don’t need to worry about that because they make so much money

otherwise. CCH

- Deeply intentional case to expand for dealing in Canada. Chosen because it was thought that the information practices would be understood.

- Black Mirror, Season 3 Ep 1: Nosediveo Girl lost airline points for misbehaviour (profanity and intimidation)o Think of how reputation can be monetized. o E.g. artists not about monetizing music, but their reputation. Ability to go to shows, get

people to buy merchandise. o Think about restaurant reviews!

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o People are saying that IP is going towards reputation as the token that gets monetized. - #Vanlife – not getting income from people posting pictures, but people putting products in the

pictures and getting paid to post the photos.

Tri-Tex Co inc c. Gideon [1999] RJQ 2324 (CA) (CP-I 160)Facts:

1. T-T created chemical formulas for dye–and allege that formulas are like a literary work and should be covered under copyright protection

2. Say that two former employees stole formulas3. Employees were paid by G for formulas and so G can produce same product w/out having to

pay to develop them4. T-T caused there to be issued a writ of seizure before judgment – as in they thought they were

owners of everything ---that formulas are in the computers of G etc so has right to them)

Issues:● Is a chemical formula covered under copyright law? NO● Does chemical formula constitute moveable property that can be seized before judgement?

○ (Is it a commercial / trade secret? A patent issue?) NO

Reasoning:● Copyright protects the idea itself but not the expression of an idea● So basically like a recipe –not a copyright issue for following a recipe –so not copyright issue● May be seen as a trade secret/professional secrecy but this isn’t protected● T-T can’t prove that formula is a movable –so can’t be seized –also can’t prove that they are

owner so can’t seize (old CCP, art 734)● Could have used patent law but formula wasn’t patented

Ratio:- Chemical formulas are not subject to copyright – they are not an expression of a new idea.

They are merely ideas in themselves.- Chemical formulas could, however, be protected under patent law.- The fact that the chemical formulas were written down doesn’t make them literary works within

the meaning of the Copyright Act.

Wendy Ann Adams, “Meaning and metaphor: Associative thinking and the unacknowledged images of ‘use’ in intellectual property” (2009), online: Myths and Metaphors of Private Law and Intellectual Property <m-m.mcgill.ca/sem1_WAA.html>.Digital rights management is the most illustrative example of the influence of the associate imagery of the property metaphor, an unconscious assertion of "mine, all mine" that uses technology to eradicate the non-rival and non-exclusive characteristics of knowledge assets.One can only imagine how copyrights and patents might be reconceived if other metaphors are adopted in place of the associative imagery of property:

● we might think of intellectual property in the same way as an agricultural marketing board, with intellectual property law functioning as the market intermediary. Intellectual property law provides a guaranteed return on investment (an incentive) for creators, and determines a fair price for consumers (as opposed to the price being determined by the principles of supply and demand).

● intellectual property as a state corporation, such as a public utility. Intellectual property law makes decisions about the amount and distribution of knowledge assets based on governmental policy as opposed to the price mechanism

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characterize intellectual property as a form of state subsidy, similar to payments or preferential tax treatment granted to private corporations.Core principles: Such metaphors are unlikely to take the place of "intellectual property" as a convenient and inclusive phrase for referring to copyrights, patents and related rights. But the use of the phrase itself is not so much an issue as the unacknowledged process of associative thinking that accompanies linear legal reasoning in this field. Once we understand the role of metaphor in constructing legal meaning, we can start to identify the points of disconnect between our formal understanding of intellectual property as public goods and our unconscious tendencies towards reification.

Laura J. Murray, “Introduction” in Laura J. Murray, S. Tina Piper, and Kirsty Robertson, Putting Intellectual Property in its Place: Rights Discourses, Creative Labor, and the Everyday (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) at 1-11

- IP law has effects- In seeking a full understanding of what IP law is, statutes and cases are the last thing we

should look at, not the first.- “IP law,” we refer to the complex interactions between statute and case law (what lawyers

would call “IP law”) and the ways it is understood or mobilized as a symbol or discourse.- people actually choose to understand the law through information and opinion gathered from

friends, strangers, coworkers, and the media. And they choose to share, create, negotiate, and dispute based on what seems fair, just, or necessary in the context of how their group functions in that moment, often ignoring legal mechanisms adapted for this purpose.

- “understanding the processes that generate artistic and intellectual change requires careful attention to the ways in which processes of cultural production and transmission are mediated by and through texts, objects, bodies, and spaces”

- “the theoretical discussion of intellectual property policy has been myopically focused on extremes of exclusion and open access, ignoring a wide range of constructed commons that persist between the extremes”

- Our rights-laden public discourse easily accommodates the economic, the immediate, and the personal dimensions of a problem, while it regularly neglects the moral, the long-term, and the social implications.

S. Tina Piper, “Putting Intellectual Property in its Place: Rights Discourses, Creative Labor, and the Everyday” in Laura J. Murray, S. Tina Piper, and Kirsty Robertson, Putting Intellectual Property in its Place: Rights Discourses, Creative Labor, and the Everyday (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014)

- Professions are particular microcosms of the social life of intellectual property: self-regulated, require a high level of skill, the importance of collective specialized knowledge and skills for their success

- Citations as IP capital in medicine- Lawyers rarely appeal to formal IP law to regulate information exchanges among them and rely

instead on informal norms and practices- Judges: regarded as the authors of the decisions they write even though those decisions may

include substantial, often unacknowledged, contributions from others.- Lawyers create and circulate much more utilitarian documents – their success is judged by how

effectively it enacts certain consequences, rather than its originality or written craft (unlike literary works). Not clear who would own the copyright even if they tried to copyright it. Most do not meet the threshold of originality.

- Copyright law is rarely (if ever) relied on to clarify norms or resolve disputes between lawyers. Lawyers have little use for copyright’s rules, incentives, and rewards given the features of their professional context. Their income and rewards derive primarily from favorable outcomes for their clients and their reputation among peers.

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- Sharing and exchanging documents is one of the collegial functions lawyers provide to one another. Some see this collegiality as an essential characteristic of a profession.38 Lawyers, thus, owe a duty to each other and to the profession to share knowledge in the pursuit of the greater goal of justice.

- Law students share summaries and this reinforces a largely nonmonetized, collegial, reputation-based network.

CCH v Law Society:- The main doctrinal development in CCH was the SCC’s conclusion that the Copyright Act’s

requirement of originality meant neither “creativity” nor “sweat of the brow.” The court instead adopted the approach that to attract copyright protection a work had to be an exercise of “skill and judgment.”

- My argument is that it is just as plausible that the standard adopted by the SCC mirrors the nature of lawyers’ work.

- Applying skill and judgment is so central to what a (legal) professional does that the legal standard seems perfectly tailored to the special nature of professional knowledge.

- On one extreme, a standard of “creativity” would suggest that lawyers and judges do not apply or follow the special knowledge accumulated by the profession. More profoundly, creativity as it is colloquially understood could even threaten the legitimacy and authority of the law and legal institutions by suggesting that justice is arbitrary and subjective. At the other extreme, a labor standard would suggest there is nothing “special” about the knowledge that professional self-regulation protects. The application of labor without skill or judgment would jeopardize the legal profession’s informal practice that basic facts or structures of legal documents produced by labor should remain free. Thus a “skill and judgment” standard protects professional knowledge well.

- Two contradictions sit at the heart of this case study. First, while a lawyer’s job is to interpret, apply, and uphold the law, formal law has little purchase on lawyers’ own information norms and practices. Legal and judicial practice prizes predictability over originality, and legal authors are entitled to copy liberally from others, often without attribution. Second, while lawyers have had little use for copyright law in their own affairs, I argue that how they manage their special professional knowledge has shaped contemporary copyright law in Canada through the CCHdecision.

Cory Doctorow, Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom (Tor Books, 2013), “Prologue” ● Excerpt from a sci-fi novel where “whuffie” is the currency● In this story, money has become obsolete; all necessities (and luxuries) of life are provided,

and people can live on indefinitely if they want to, so the only currency people use is Whuffie, this ephemeral “social capital” ranking based on reputation

● Similar to the Black Mirror episode “Nosedive” where people are constantly being ranked in every interaction, and certain social privileges depend on having a high score (kind of akin to Yelp ratings, but for people!)

● You accumulate Whuffie by doing socially favoured actions that people approve of, and lose it by tarnishing your reputation and garnering disapproval

● The narrator has lost most of his Whuffie by being flaky and annoying, but because some of his musical compositions continue to be enjoyed, they bring in some Whuffie (kind of akin to “royalties”).

● "Whuffie recaptured the true essence of money: in the old days, if you were broke but respected, you wouldn't starve; contrariwise, if you were rich and hated, no sum could buy you security and peace. By measuring the thing that money really represented—your personal capital with your friends and neighbors—you more accurately gauged your success".

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