Public Relations Review 31 (2005) 263–275

Lost in space: A critique of NASA’s crisis communicationsin the Columbia disaster

James Kauffman∗

Department of Communication Studies, Indiana University Southeast, 4201 Grant Line Road, New Albany, IN 47150, USA

Received 5 November 2004; received in revised form 31 January 2005; accepted 1 February 2005

Abstract

The explosion of space shuttle Columbia on 1 February 2003 shocked the nation and threatened to destroythe image and confidence NASA had labored years to restore in the wake of its poor handling of the Challengerdisaster. This paper examines NASA’s crisis communications regarding Columbia’s explosion. It argues that thespace agency did most things right in responding to the crisis, but it made errors that reflect serious and long-standingproblems with its organizational culture. The paper concludes that NASA’s handling of the crisis ultimately helpedthe agency to maintain good will with Congress, the media, and the American public. It proposes that the spaceagency must fix flaws with its organizational culture, or it may be forced into the unenviable position of relying oncrisis communications to protect its image and reputation.© 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Keywords:Columbia disaster; Space shuttle; NASA

1. Introduction

At 9:10 a.m. on 1 February 2003, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) lostcommunications with space shuttle Columbia 16 min before its scheduled landing at Kennedy SpaceCenter in Florida. Rocked by multiple explosions, Columbia disintegrated over Texas, killing the sevenastronauts and spreading debris across a several hundred mile radius over Texas and Louisiana. The mediabegan reporting on the accident immediately. “Television viewers around the globe sat in anguish as video

∗ Tel.: +1 812 941 2256; fax: +1 812 941 2529.E-mail address:jkauffm@ius.edu.

0363-8111/$ – see front matter © 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2005.02.013

264 J. Kauffman / Public Relations Review 31 (2005) 263–275

footage of the tragedy, captured by professional cameramen and amateurs alike, played over and overagain” (Cantrell & Vaughan, 2003,p. 5). NASA’s response to the crisis would be critical to the spaceagency.

At stake not only was NASA’s image, which it had labored 17 years to restore in the wake of theChallenger explosion and the agency’s disastrous handling of the crisis, but also congressional and publicsupport for the agency and America’s human space exploration program (Davidson, 2003). “Columbia’sdestruction,” assertedCabbage and Harwood (2004), “left the nation one failure away from the potentialabandonment of human space exploration” (p. xiii). Critics quickly called for the elimination of the spaceshuttle program (Biddle, 2003; Easterbrook, 2003; Krugman, 2003). As Freemantle and Tolson (2003)observed, unlike the tragedies of Apollo 1 and Challenger, the Columbia accident forced the nation toconfront “long-standing concerns” about the efficacy and direction of America’s human space explorationprogram (p. A1).

2. Initial praise

Observers praised NASA’s initial response to the tragedy, a sharp contrast to the assessment the agencyreceived for its handling of the Challenger explosion.Jenkins (2003)labeled NASA’s response to theColumbia tragedy “a crisis-communications triumph” and proposed that it could serve as a “handbook”for managing crises (p. 8);Zeeck (2003)gushed that “NASA is now giving a tuition-free tutorial inAdvanced Public Relations 301: Crisis Communications” (p. A2); Representative Sherwood Boehlert (R.,NY), chair of the House Science Committee, praised NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe for responding“magnificently” during the crisis (Space Shuttle Columbia, 2003, p. 3); and Representative Sheila JacksonLee (D., TX) commended NASA’s “diligence, progress, and openness” in handling the crisis (p. 8).

Even theColumbia Accident Investigation Board (2003), which provided a blistering critique ofColumbia, the space shuttle program, and NASA management and culture, praised the agency for “pub-licly and forthrightly” informing the nation about the accident and all “associated information” as itbecame available. The Board declared that NASA’s crisis communications could be a “source of nationalpride” (p. 6).1

3. Not an unqualified success

Yet, contrary to the glowing assessments the space agency received for its crisis communications,NASA’s response to the explosion was not an unqualified success. The agency made mistakes in respond-ing to the crisis that reflect serious problems with its organizational culture. This paper examines NASA’scrisis communications regarding the space shuttle Columbia explosion. It argues that NASA’s handling ofthe crisis ultimately helped the agency to maintain good will with Congress, the media, and the Americanpublic, but that it also highlighted and reflected serious and long-standing problems with the agency’sorganizational culture. The paper proposes that NASA must address the problems with its organizationalculture, thereby reducing the likelihood of future accidents and making the agency less reliant on crisiscommunications to protect its image and reputation with stakeholders.

1 For similar assessments of NASA’s crisis communications response, seeBarron, 2003; Dickey, 2003; Gustin & Sheehy, 2003.

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During a crisis like the Columbia explosion, an organization must communicate effectively with itspublics to minimize damage to the organization’s image.Fern-Banks (1996)has defined crisis com-munications as “communication between the organization and its publics prior to, during, and after thenegative occurrence” (p. ix). Effective communication cannot only defuse or eliminate a crisis, but it cansometimes “bring the organization a more positive reputation than before the crisis” (p. 6).

Johnson & Johnson’s handling of the Tylenol poisonings stands as one of the best examples of an orga-nization enhancing its public image through effective crisis communications (Fern-Banks, pp. 148–149;Cutlip, Center, & Broom, 1994, p. 59). NASA must be especially vigilant in maintaining public trust andconfidence for two reasons. First, the agency receives the vast majority of its funding from Congress.Therefore, NASA must maintain public and congressional trust and confidence to maintain funding. Sec-ond, the agency must, by law, keep Congress and the American public informed regarding its operations.NASA has a more difficult time than businesses and many other federal agencies simply refusing toprovide information about itself, information that might damage its credibility and threaten its funding.

The space agency responded well to the crisis because it created, practiced, and followed a contingency,or crisis communications, plan. In the wake of its disastrous handling of the Apollo 1 fire in 1967, thespace agency developed a crisis communications plan, which it employed effectively when dealing withApollo 13’s harrowing mission (Kauffman, 1999, 2001). However, it failed to follow the plan whenChallenger exploded (Marshall, 1986). The agency vowed not to make the same mistake in the event offuture shuttle accidents.

4. Crisis plan priorities

Recognizing the importance of effective crisis communications, NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefemade it a top priority when he became head of the agency in 2001. His first day on the job,O’Keefe(2003b)asked managers to share with him the agency’s plan for responding to a mishap like Challenger(p. 2). He asked that the meeting occur “within an hour” of his request so managers would not feel theyhad to “run off and make something up, that they’d just pull off the shelf what was there” (Space ShuttleColumbia, 2003, p. 136).

O’Keefe and the managers reviewed the document in light of the agency’s public response to Challenger.He learned that since 1986, NASA had altered the plan to more fully integrate public communicationsinto its long list of required tasks (O’Keefe, 2003b, p. 2). In a speech about NASA’s public response toColumbia,O’Keefe (2003b)pointed out that NASA updated its contingency plan before each shuttle flight.NASA revised its space flight operations contingency plan in January 2003, only weeks before the tragedy.The Agency Contingency Action Plan for Space Flight Operations (NASA, 2003a), a thorough anddetailed crisis communications plan, identifies the “pre-planned contingency response” to a space flightproblem, defining six “mishap categories” for which a contingency response is required and assigningresponsibility for each action taken by the agency (p. 1).

Not only did NASA develop and update a crisis plan, but it rehearsed the plan, too.O’Keefe (2003b)viewed it as “critical” that the agency practice its contingency plan “on a regular basis” (p. 2). In mid-November 2002, just three months before the Columbia accident, NASA ran an accident simulation.O’Keefe noted a “glaring deficiency” in the plan: the agency did not include its public affairs staff inthe simulations. “We revised the plan immediately to correct this oversight,” (p. 2) he recalled. O’Keefefound the simulation crucial not only to helping the agency identify strengths and weaknesses, but also

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in developing a familiarity that helped them to respond more effectively: “We found that in our timeof crisis, the ability to lean on these tools enabled us to set aside our emotions and concentrate on therequirements of the moment” (p. 2).

Undoubtedly, familiarity with the plan paid off for the agency. NASA Associate Administrator forSpace Flight Bill Readdy carried a copy of NASA’s contingency plan with him to every flight. Readdyand O’Keefe, waiting at the Kennedy Space Center runway for the arrival of Columbia on the morning ofFebruary 1, immediately left for the Launch Control Center when the shuttle did not arrive at its scheduledtime. Upon arriving at the Center at 9:29 a.m., Readdy declared a contingency. They immediately beganimplementing the agency’s contingency plan. O’Keefe addressed the first item on the list: notificationof the president. After a brief conversation, the two agreed that O’Keefe would hold a press conferenceat 1:00 p.m.; the president would make a statement at 2:00 p.m. Continuing to follow the contingencyplan, O’Keefe next contacted the Homeland Security Advisor, soon to be Secretary, Tom Ridge. The twodiscussed the possibility that Columbia’s explosion was an act of terrorism. They quickly discounted thepossibility. NASA continued to follow the plan closely as it responded to the tragedy.

4.1. Controlling the flow of information

NASA had to respond promptly to the crisis. The first rule of crisis communications is to control theflow of information (Barron, 2003). Organizations need to remain in control as the source of informationduring a crisis. If an organization does not respond to a crisis in a timely fashion, then an informationvacuum is created. When faced with an information vacuum, the media will seek information elsewhere.Often, the sources of information from which the media receives its information are not well informed,may have a negative opinion of the organization, may have an alternative perspective, or may speculateabout the causes of the crisis.

Instant and continuous media coverage today make its essential that an organization provide not onlya prompt response to a crisis, but a continuous flow of information. News of Columbia’s explosion brokewithin minutes of the accident, and the major news organizations began continuous coverage, repeatedlyreplaying footage of the shuttle’s fatal dissent and updating information as it became available. The visualand instantaneous nature of television made Columbia a natural and attractive story: “Television was thereagain for a nation in shock, providing the latest and most thorough information available on a story that,for at least a few hours, galvanized the American public” (Television news, 2003, p. 10). The mediaperformed admirably in the first few hours of covering the story, but by Saturday afternoon, they had runout of news.

Typically, an organization facing a crisis lacks reliable information. Although tempting, an organizationis well advised not to speculate beyond the facts it possesses. Such was the case with Columbia. “NASAofficials did their best to provide information to the demanding members of the press, but in the firstfew hours of the disaster there was little to give” (Cantrell & Vaughan, 2003, pp. 33–34). However,the competitive nature of the media created a demand for information that dictated the coverage. Oncethe news about Columbia’s accident had run out on Saturday afternoon, the media succumbed to the“inevitable: the catchy graphics packages, the dreaded parade of marginal ‘experts’ and endless hours ofpointless speculation from talking heads, as each news outlet scrambled to trump the competition in afutile search for an angle that had not already been beaten to death” (Television news, 2003, p. 10).

The space agency responded quickly to the crisis.O’Keefe (2003b)explained that NASA immediately“seized control of the public communication high ground and we maintained it” (p. 4). In addition to

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announcing the contingency plan, the agency informed the public that O’Keefe would make a statementat 1:00 p.m. and that it would hold a press conference at 3:00 p.m. from its Johnson Space Center. Thepress conference, led by NASA’s Space Shuttle Program Manager Ron Dittemore, lasted over 2 h andreceived high marks for the openness and candor of NASA officials.

Finally, NASA explained that in accord with its contingency plan, it had activated both an internal andan external investigation team. The external team, O’Keefe stressed, would be independent of NASA,consisting of a number of specialists, mostly from government agencies and chaired by retired NavyAdmiral Harold Gehman. The agency worked tirelessly over the next few days to communicate withits publics. For example, O’Keefe made the morning talk-show circuit on Sunday and Monday. Heexpressed the agency’s sorrow, explained what NASA knew and how it would proceed, and pledged thatit was already working toward finding the cause of the accident and fixing it so that the shuttle wouldreturn to flight, and human space exploration would continue.

5. Television and Internet

NASA used television and the Internet to great effect in communicating promptly and openly withits publics.O’Keefe (2003b)highlighted the “significant role” NASA television played in the agency’s“communications activities” during the crisis (p. 4). O’Keefe recognized the agency’s “unique,” in-housetelevision capability for providing news footage for broadcasters and conducting interviews from itsheadquarters studio. The day following the accident, recalled O’Keefe, “I was able to appear on allnetwork Sunday morning news shows, while staying in close touch with our recovery effort” (p. 4). Inthe days following the accident, the agency used NASA television to conduct press conferences to updatethe public on its recovery efforts, to provide networks the opportunity to interview crewmembers of theInternational Space Station, and to broadcast testimony before the external accident investigation boardand congressional committees.

The agency made use of the Internet, too. O’Keefe pointed to a lucky coincidence regarding the accidentand NASA’s webpage. “The night before the accident,” he disclosed, “NASA inaugurated a new Webportal to make it easier for the public to navigate through our Web offerings” (p. 4). Within the first24 h after the tragedy, the site received 49 million hits, a record for NASA. O’Keefe proposed that theagency later learned that its old site would have collapsed because of the tremendous traffic. The agencycontinually posted and updated information about Columbia on the page. “Throughout February, with aColumbia memorial section prominently displayed,” O’Keefe explained, “our web site received nearly530 million hits, almost as many hits in a single month as the old site got last year” (p. 4). NASA’s webpresence did not go unnoticed. The agency’s crisis site, updated frequently, and linked to its home page,was “a solid source on everything from space shuttle debris to the investigation process” (Barron, 2003,p. 26).

6. A swift and open response

The space agency received high praise for its swift response to the Columbia accident.Jenkins (2003)applauded the space agency for responding promptly: “By going public right away, NASA prevented aninformation vacuum that would have been filled with self-styled experts and analysts, whose personal

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biases would have set the communications agenda” (p. 8).Gustin and Sheehy (2003)praised the agencyfor the “speed” with which it conducted its the first news conference and the “frequent updates” thatit began broadcasting “within the hour of initial reports of the problem” (p. 5). Similarly,Sappenfield(2003)attested to the agency’s promptness: “Never before have accident investigators shared so muchdata with the public so quickly” (p. 2).

Not only did NASA respond promptly, it also responded openly. Observers underscored the openness ofthe agency and pointed out the sharp contrast with its handling of the Challenger accident. Clearly, NASAhad learned its lesson from its abysmal response to the shuttle explosion 17 years earlier. The agencyworked tirelessly to open the organization and share its information about Columbia and the accident.As Ron Dittemore commented, the agency had broken precedent by sharing information so quickly andcompletely that the agency itself did not fully comprehend its significance or meaning (NASA, 2003h,p. 6). The agency released volumes of information and raw data in various ways. It used the Internetto disseminate a great deal of the information, making access continuous and simple.O’Keefe (2003b)summarized NASA’s approach, proposing that the agency released information “whether it seemed tobenefit the Agency or not,” understanding that “in the end,” openness was paramount. “News doesn’timprove with age,” he observed. “In fact, if you hold back, you are likely to take even more hits, anddeservedly so” (p. 4).

The space agency received high praise for its openness and candor.Johnson (2003)referred to NASA’sopenness as “stunning” (p. 4d); theSeattleTimesapplauded the agency’s “surprising candor and openness”(NASA once again, 2003, p. A3) while the WorcesterTelegram& Gazettepointed to the space agency’s“new era of candor” (Charting a path, 2003, p. A10). Senator John McCain (R., AZ), chairman ofthe Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, applauded NASA for its “opennessand availability” in the aftermath of the tragedy (Space Shuttle Columbia, 2003, p. 2). Moreover, in aletter to President George W. Bush criticizing the NASA-appointed board to investigate the accident,sixteen Democratic members of the House Committee on Science nevertheless commended NASA forthe “openness” with which it had “shared information” about the Columbia accident with Congress andthe public (Cong. Democrats, 2003, p. 2).

Observers attested to the positive impact of NASA’s openness.Davidson (2003)argued that NASA’scandor had drawn “sympathy and support for the agency” (p. A16).Rutenberg (2003)predicted that theagency’s “openness could help it take some of the edge off criticism of its operations” (p. 23). Proposingthat reporters were giving NASA management the benefit of the doubt in covering the tragedy,Jurkowitz(2003)asserted that NASA was “already reaping the rewards of its media-friendly strategy” (p. A22).The agency’s openness reassured Congress, the media, and the public that the agency was not trying tohide anything, not trying to protect itself. Its openness conveyed that it was willing to allow all observersto view the agency, its data, and its operations surrounding the Columbia flight and tragedy.

7. NASA stumbles

Although NASA did most things right in responding to the Columbia explosion, it made mistakesthat reflect serious and long-standing problems with the agency’s organizational culture. The ColumbiaAccident Investigation Board defined organizational culture as “the basic values, norms, beliefs, andpractices that characterize the functioning of a particular institution” (p. 101). Attempting to protect itsimage and reputation, the space agency tried to control the investigation of the accident by appointing

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the investigation board members, by making the board reliant upon NASA for support and funding, andby requiring the board to report its findings to the space agency.

7.1. Attempting to control the investigation

NASA’s investigation board came under attack from the start. In the wake of the Challenger tragedy in1986, the space agency altered its contingency plan to include a standing Mishap Investigation Board withspecified members from the military and government agencies with expertise in human flight and accidentinvestigation. O’Keefe attempted to justify the board by arguing that NASA could activate it quickly andavoid delays in investigating a mishap. However, the board’s charter suggests that NASA hoped to controlthe standing board and limit the scope of mishap investigations. For example, the charter declared thatthe board would conduct its “activities in accordance with direction from the NASA administrator andthe provisions of applicable NASA management instructions” (NASA, 2003a, Appendix D). Further, theplan stated that the board would “work with the NASA Administrator to schedule board activities, interimboard reports, and submission of the final board report.” Moreover, the charter explained that the boardwould limit its investigation to determining the facts and cause of the mishap and recommending waysto prevent future mishaps: “The investigation will not be conducted or used to determine questions ofculpability, legal liability, or disciplinary action.” The charter also states that the board would submit itsfinal report to NASA’s Administrator.

The media and congressional space committees questioned the independence of the board. Althoughthe space agency called the board “independent,” it was a NASA creation: O’Keefe appointed its members;the space agency provided its budget and support staff; the charter limited the investigation to identifyingthe cause of the accident; and, ultimately, the board would report its findings to NASA’s boss. Observersquestioned whether the board amounted to NASA investigating itself and asked why the space agency didnot follow the Challenger example and ask for a presidential commission to investigate the tragedy. Theissue of the board’s independence quickly flared up into “a political firestorm” (Cabbage & Harwood,2004, p. 181).

The media attacked the board. For example, theState Journal-Registercommented that “a NASAindependent panel is an oxymoron” and called for the agency to disband the panel and replace it withone appointed by the White House (Look at NASA, 2003, p. 8). TheSt. Louis Post-DispatchchastisedNASA, proposing it should have known not to “pack” its investigation board with “military personnel andagency insiders” (The razor’s edge, 2003, p. B6). TheOrlando Sentinel, questioning the independenceof the board, cautioned that “even the suspicion of a whitewash would be devastating for NASA” (Don’tgive up, 2003, p. A24).

Members of congressional space committees questioned the board’s independence. On February 6, 16Democrats from the House Science Committee sent a letter to President Bush declaring that the groupappointed by the agency appeared “a non-independent board controlled by NASA” (Cong. Democrats,2003, p. 2). They called on the president to re-draft the board’s charter to expand the board’s membership,to have it report directly to the president and Congress, to have its support staff from outside of NASA,and to expand its investigation to examine “contributory causes, management issues, and pressures onthe system” (p. 2). NASA felt the full force of Congress’s displeasure with the investigation board ata joint hearing of the Senate and House space committees on February 12. In his opening remarks,Representative Sherwood Boehlert (R., NY) demanded that NASA rewrite its charter to “guarantee”its “independence.” He also called on the space agency to add members to the board (Space Shuttle

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Columbia, 2003, p. 3). Representative Bart Gordon (D., TN) attacked the control the charter gave toNASA in the investigative process and told O’Keefe: “I am afraid this will not pass anybody’s smelltest of independence” (p. 81). Similarly, Senator Byron Dorgan (D., ND), called for the impanelling ofa presidential commission, telling O’Keefe “an agency can’t very effectively investigate itself” (p. 85).Representative Nick Lampson (D., TX), criticized the board as “too closely tied” to NASA and pointed outthat to have “credibility,” the nation needed a “truly independent” board similar to the Rogers commission(pp. 86–87).

Faced with pointed and persistent questioning about the board’s charter and independence, NASAretreated and recapitulated. O’Keefe agreed to make changes to the board and its charter so that itschairperson, Admiral Gehman, had “whatever he needs” to “guarantee the independence and objectivityof the board” (p. 67). On February 18, NASA announced it had amended the board’s charter to allowthe board greater “flexibility” in adding support staff and experts outside of the agency. O’Keefeproposed that NASA would continue to update the charter as necessary to “ensure” it “remainsindependent during the continuing investigation” (NASA, 2003i, p. 1). NASA also announced theaddition of Dr. Sheila Widnall, a university professor. On March 5, NASA announced the additionof three more university professors to the board, including former NASA astronaut Dr. Sally Ride(NASA, 2003j).

NASA should have known that its attempts to control the investigation would come under attack andpotentially threaten its image and reputation at a critical time for the agency. The space agency tried todo the same thing in the wake of the Apollo 1 fire, appointing its own board to investigate the tragedy.The move provoked a blistering attack from the media and Congress (Kauffman, 1999). NASA’s desireto protect its image and reputation by controlling the Columbia investigation appears to have blinded theagency to how the media and Congress would view its action. Ironically, NASA’s attempt to protect itsimage and reputation in this case had the opposite effect. The media and Congress questioned NASA’scommitment to discovering the true causes of the accident; both wondered if the space agency hadsomething to hide.

7.2. Speculating about the accident’s cause

NASA made its biggest mistake when it speculated about the cause of the accident, a mistake thatreflected flaws in the agency’s organizational culture. At NASA’s initial press conference 6 h after theaccident, Space Shuttle Program Manager Ron Dittemore discounted foam strikes as the cause of theaccident: “We don’t believe, at this time, that the impact of the ET debris on the tile was the cause of ourproblem” (NASA, 2003b, p. 10). He assured his audience that NASA had reviewed debris shedding in thepast and concluded that debris impact on the tile did not represent “a safety-of-flight issue” (p. 13). Dit-temore maintained this position at the press conference the following day (NASA, 2003c). Prophetically,he warned his audience of the possibility that “we’ll contradict ourselves from day to day” (p. 4).

When pressed about the foam strike at the February 3 press conference, Dittemore relayed the tentativefindings of an investigation tree and gave the impression that the foam strike was the cause of the accident:“We’re making the assumption from the start that the external tank was the root cause of the problem thatlost the Columbia” (NASA, 2003d, p. 8). The press jumped on the new position. The misstep changed thedirection of the media coverage of the accident. Dittemore tried to correct the misperception on February5, but he made another blunder: he “swung too far the opposite way” (Cabbage & Harwood, 2004, p.185).

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Early in the press conference on February 5, Dittemore told his audience that NASA engineers andmanagers found it “difficult” to believe that “this particular piece of foam debris shedding from the tankrepresented a safety-of-flight issue” (NASA, 2003e, p. 4). He all but dismissed the foam as a possiblecause of the accident: “Right now it just does not make sense to us that a piece of foam would be the rootcause for the loss of Columbia and its crew. There’s got to be another reason” (p. 4). Dittemore’s mistakesent O’Keefe “through the roof” for speculating and drawing conclusions that were the purview of theembattled investigation board. The error caused “another wide swing” in media coverage (Cabbage &Harwood, 2004, p. 186).

The following day, O’Keefe engaged in damage control. In a statement from NASA headquarters,NASA (2003f) declared that any conclusions about the cause of the accident would come from theinvestigation board “and only from them” (p. 4). O’Keefe stressed that any view NASA officials expressedabout the accident would not “foreclose,” close out,” or “eliminate any theory” or “conclusion” that couldbe drawn because “only the Board” would be “authorized” to make such a conclusion (p. 4).

At his press conference on February 6, Dittemore also tried to repair the damage of the previous day.“Let me emphasize that we have not ruled out any possible cause” (NASA, 2003g, p. 2). He tried tobackpedal regarding his dismissal of the foam strike as a possible cause of the accident. “And so eventhough I mentioned to you I thought it was not one of the primary items in our mind, we are pursuing itwith great effort. No possibility is being ruled out” (p. 2).

The media pounced on the agency’s speculating and waffling. For example, theSt. Louis Post-Dispatchzeroed in on NASA’s changing position: “On Tuesday, shuttle manager Ron Dittemore said the foam theorywas the focus of the investigation. On Wednesday, Mr. Dittemore said engineers had all but dismissed thetheory. On Thursday, the foam theory was back in the mix. By Friday, fuzzy photographs taken by theAir Force appeared to show damage in the area of the shuttle’s son, called ‘wing glove,’ the spot wherefoam had struck the orbiter” (The razor’s edge, 2003, p. B6). TheTimes-Picayunecriticized NASA forflip-flopping over the cause of the accident and for being “too eager” to identify a cause. The paper scoldedNASA: “It is folly to leap to conclusions” (Searching for a cause, 2003, p. 6).Murray (2003)reportedon O’Keefe’s efforts to end the speculating, pointing out that on February 6, the agency’s boss “blocked”the agency from “altering” again “its stance” about what caused Columbia’s explosion and announcingthat all future declarations about the accident’s cause must come from the external investigation board(p. A14).2

NASA admitted that it had made a mistake in speculating about the cause of the accident. At hisFebruary 7 press conference, Dittemore reminded his audience that from the start, he had cautionedpeople not to jump to conclusions. “I think over the past week you have witnessed an inside view of ourups and downs as we attempted to steer a course throughout the week” (NASA, 2003h, p. 1). O’Keefewas more direct. Reflecting on NASA’s crisis communications efforts regarding Columbia in a speech atthe 2003 Public Relations Society of America International Conference,O’Keefe (2003b)stressed thatduring a crisis, it is “essential” not to “speculate about things unknown” (p. 4). He pointed out that theColumbia Accident Investigation Board “appropriately took NASA to task for speculating on a matter onwhich we had no certain knowledge, and indeed we were wrong” (p. 4). He pointed out that the agency’s“ill-advised speculation” led to “some hits in the press” (p. 4).

2 For similar media coverage regarding NASA’s speculations about the cause of the accident, seeBroder, 2003; Date, 2003;Glanz, Sange, & Schwartz, 2003; Hemmer & Flock, 2003; Lunsford, 2003; Vedantam, 2003.

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8. Problems with NASA’s organizational culture

One may view NASA’s denials that the foam strikes caused the Columbia accident not simply asmisstatements in the heat of a crisis, but as a reflection of a serious problem with NASA’s organizationalculture. TheColumbia Accident Investigation Board (2003)identified flaws in NASA’s organizationalculture as a key cause of the accident (pp. 99–102, 121–204). Furthermore, the Board concluded thatmany of the same flaws with NASA’s organizational culture that led to the Challenger accident also ledto the Columbia accident. The Board pointed out a systemic problem with NASA which caused it to“normalize deviance,” or to accept the deviant (recurring problems with O-rings and foam strikes) asroutine and normal. The Board concluded that the Challenger and Columbia accidents occurred in largepart because NASA’s organizational culture led it to discount the hazards posed by the O-rings and foamstrikes and to use successful flights as evidence that the O-rings and the foam strikes were safe, in directcontradiction of its own studies (pp. 195–204).3

With Columbia, NASA became blind to the dangers posed by foam strikes. It became convinced itunderstood the foam debris; it became convinced of the “invincibility” of its “organizational and technicalsystems” to identify whether foam strikes posed a serious threat (Columbia Accident Investigation Board,2003p. 199). The agency became so certain that foam strikes did not pose a serious hazard that not onlydid it fail to set up procedures that would effectively monitor foam strikes, but it strongly dismissed foamstrikes as a potential cause of the accident while proclaiming it would not speculate about causes andlecturing the media not to jump to conclusions. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board pointed outhow blind NASA had become to the threat posed by foam debris and how convinced the agency was inthe efficiency of its decision making:

So ingrained was the agency’s belief that foam debris was not a threat to flight safety that in pressbriefings after the Columbia accident, the Space Shuttle Program Manager still discounted the foam as aprobable cause, saying that Shuttle managers were ‘comfortable’ with their previous risk assessment (p.196).

9. Blunting impact of Board’s report

NASA tried to minimize the negative impact of the highly critical, final report of the Columbia AccidentInvestigation Board. The agency did so in three ways. First, during its investigation, the Board sharedsome of its findings and recommendations with the space agency. Consequently, NASA was able tomake substantial progress on an implementation plan to return to flight, which responded to the report’sspecific criticisms and suggestions (Cabbage & Harwood, 2004, p. 264). Second, O’Keefe tried to bluntthe report’s criticisms by publishing an article in theWall Street Journalon the day the Board releasedit (O’Keefe, 2003a). In the article, O’Keefe applauded the work of the Board, pledged to implement allof the findings and recommendations, and promised to return America’s human space exploration to itsformer glory. Third, O’Keefe bent over backwards to praise the work of the board and to embrace itsfindings before lawmakers (NASA’s Response, 2003, pp. 92–109).

NASA’s response to the report received praise from the media and lawmakers.

3 For a detailed analysis of the Challenger disaster, NASA’s organizational culture, and how the agency “normalized deviance,”seeVaughan, 1996.

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For example, theOrlando Sentinellabeled the agency’s initial response to the report “encouraging” (Abroken agency, 2003, p. G2). TheWashington Postcongratulated O’Keefe on “saying the right things” inresponding to the report (A crucial manned, 2003, p. A20), and theTimes-Picayuneapplauded NASA’scommitment to implementing the report’s recommendations as “an essential first step in rehabilitating atroubled agency” (After Columbia, 2003, p. 6). Similarly, Representative Boehlert congratulated O’Keefeand NASA for “their wholesale embrace” of the report and for the swiftness with which they put togethera detailed plan in response (NASA’s Response, 2003c, p. 5). Representative Tom Feeney (R., FL) com-mended O’Keefe for fully embracing the report, “not only the words but also more importantly its spirit”(NASA’s Response, 2003, p. 13).

10. Conclusion

NASA’s handling of the Columbia crisis ultimately helped to maintain confidence and trust in thespace agency. NASA demonstrated that it learned from its poor handling of the Challenger explosion; itresponded to the Columbia disaster with a well-rehearsed crisis plan that stressed promptness, openness,and candor. The agency effectively used television and the Internet to communicate with its stakeholders.It blunted the negative impact of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board’s blistering critique ofColumbia and the agency. However, the agency could not overcome flaws with its organizational culturethat led it to conclude that the foam debris could not have caused the accident and, based on that assumption,to speculate about the accident’s cause. Further, NASA displayed an obsessive concern with protecting itsimage. It created a detailed contingency plan that tried to exert control over the accident’s investigation.The agency did this in spite of its experience with the Apollo 1 fire in which it received a tremendousbacklash for trying to control the investigation.

11. Lessons learned

The errors NASA made in its crisis communications regarding the Columbia explosion provide im-portant lessons for crisis communications professionals. First, if a crisis warrants an investigation, anorganization should ensure that an independent investigation takes place. An organization must not givein to the desire to protect its image and reputation by trying to control an investigation. Stakeholders willview such attempts as a sign that an organization has something to hide or that it is not committed todiscovering the actual causes that led to the crisis. As the Columbia case demonstrates, NASA’s attempt toprotect its image and reputation by controlling the investigation had the opposite effect, eliciting questionsand criticism of the space agency. Moreover, stakeholders may dismiss the findings of an investigation ifthey believe that an organization has exercised undue influence over that investigation.

Second, an organization should refrain from speculating about the cause of an accident until it hassufficient evidence to do so. The Columbia example illustrates that an institution’s organizational culturemay make it blind to problems or mistakes. NASA hurt its credibility when, the day after the accident, itdismissed what turned out to be the cause of the explosion. In short, when faced with a serious crisis, anorganization may be best served by viewing as tentative what it “knows” and not speculating about causes.

Finally, as an organization develops or reviews its crisis communications plan, it should examine itsorganizational culture to identify potential problems that may lead to crises or hinder its ability to respond

274 J. Kauffman / Public Relations Review 31 (2005) 263–275

effectively to crises. An organization’s crisis communications will reflect its organizational culture: thevalues, beliefs, norms, assumptions, and practices that characterize the organization. The Columbia caseillustrates that an institution’s organizational culture may blind it to assumptions, practices, and processesthat can lead to a catastrophe and may hinder its ability to respond effectively to a crisis. In many cases,an organization may need someone outside the organization to examine its organizational culture sinceits own employees may be too immersed in the culture to identify values, beliefs, norms, assumptions,and practices that could lead to crises or hinder the organization’s ability to respond effectively to a crisis.

It remains to be seen how NASA’s response to the Columbia crisis will influence future shuttle flightsand America’s human space exploration program. NASA must address a variety of problems, includingsystemic problems with its organizational culture, if it hopes to avoid future shuttle explosions. If it fails tomake necessary changes, it may be forced into the unenviable position of relying on crisis communicationsto protect its image and reputation and to maintain good will and trust with stakeholders.

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