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A Comprehensive Investigation of PLUTONIUM CONTAMINATION AND GOVERNMENT COVER-UP LORING AIR FORCE BASE, MAINE JANUARY – MAY, 1992 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE TEXT VERSION: K ISSUED: SUMMER 1999 AIDREC ® Agency Investigating DoD Radioactive Environmental Contamination

Transcript of Loring Building 260

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A Comprehensive Investigation of

PLUTONIUM CONTAMINATION AND GOVERNMENT COVER-UP

LORING AIR FORCE BASE, MAINE

J A N U A R Y – M A Y , 1 9 9 2

F O R I M M E D I A T E R E L E A S E

TEXT VERSION: K ISSUED: SUMMER 1999

AIDREC ®

Agency Investigating DoD Radioactive Environmental Contamination

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive summary ........................................................................................................... 3

Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 4

Charges ............................................................................................................................ 4

Overview of the facility ...................................................................................................... 5

Closure of Caribou Air Force Station ................................................................................ 6

The radiation exposure ..................................................................................................... 7

The arrival of the radiation response team ....................................................................... 7

Maine politicians get involved ........................................................................................... 8

The reported source of the radiation ................................................................................. 8

The radon story is contested ............................................................................................. 9

Maine politicians intensify their involvement ..................................................................... 9

A review panel is formed ................................................................................................. 10

The panel’s findings and recommendations ................................................................... 12

What the Air Force wouldn’t tell the media about “site easy” .......................................... 13

What the Air Force wouldn’t tell the media about building 260 ...................................... 14

The vault’s contents: the nuclear capsule ....................................................................... 16

Spring of 1992, the unsealing of the building 260 ........................................................... 17

The truth about radon and plutonium .............................................................................. 18

Plutonium in weapons use .............................................................................................. 19

Decommissioning of licensed nuclear facilities ............................................................... 20

Decontamination for release for unrestricted use ........................................................... 22

Radioactive waste ........................................................................................................... 24

The wild life refuge .......................................................................................................... 25

Final summation .............................................................................................................. 27

Terms, abbreviations and names .................................................................................... 28

Index ............................................................................................................................... 30

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the spirit of truthfulness, uncensored historical accuracy, and candor with the citizens of the State of Maine and the United States of America, the following report is submitted for public review and comment.

The subject of this report focuses on areas of misconduct on the part of the United States

Government. Conduct that through fraud, deception, waste, and undue secrecy, has obstructed the very domestic tranquility in which it is designed to ensure.

This report’s findings, research, and conclusions are provided not to challenge our national

integrity, but rather to warrant fundamental accountability of those whom have been elected, commissioned, enlisted, or appointed to serve the interests of our nation.

Please read this document carefully, for its detail and completeness is exacting. Your own

findings and perceptions should be directed toward the elected officials of your locality, state, and nation.

The authors of this report hereby release it for unrestricted distribution and publication.

(Name Omitted), Principle Researcher AIDREC® August 1999

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. This document brings to light facts concerning an incident that occurred during the period of January – May 1992 at a U.S. Nuclear Weapons Storage Facility in northern Maine. The incident involved the exposure of government workers to radiation.

1.2. The official explanation was that the radiation was caused by a natural occurrence of radon gas, which had built up inside an “unknown” building that had been sealed for more than 30 years. It is now known that the building once housed early atomic weapons components, and that these components contained radioactive fissionable material. It was the residue from this material that was the source of the radiation.

1.3. The investigation into this event uncovered the fact that representatives of the United States Government deliberately lied about the history, use, and subsequent disposition of the building. These facts, along with supporting documents also provide indisputable evidence that the source of radiation was due to plutonium residue which had migrated to the inside walls of the structure.

1.4. These same government representatives engaged themselves in a deliberate cover-up of the facts involving this incident, in order to divert attention away from this site, and the dangers it contains. These dangers include radioactive waste, some of which may still be present.

1.5. The government has gone as far as establishing a fictitious, unnecessary and costly use for this land. Because the facility was due to be closed and turned over the public, the Aroostook Wildlife Refuge was developed, a bureaucratic ploy to keep this waste site in the control of the federal government, who can better control access and hide the site from the public.

1.6. The government of the United States and it’s representatives continue to this day to keep the true facts pertaining to this site from the citizens of Aroostook County Maine, and the United States of America, therefore, we bring forth the following charges:

2. CHARGES

2.1. (1) The United States Air Force, its organizations and members, hereafter referred to as “The Air Force”, made willfully false and misleading statements to the public and news media regarding a radiation exposure of employees who were attempting to gain entry to a long-time sealed nuclear materials vault at Loring Air Force Base, Limestone, Maine.

2.2. (2) The 42nd Bomb Wing Commander, the 42nd Civil Engineering Squadron Commander, spokespersons at the Loring Public Affairs office, and other duly empowered government officials made false, incomplete, and obscure statements to the public and news media regarding the ownership, design, functional purpose, and historical significance of building number 260, where the exposure occurred.

2.3. (3) The Department of Defense failed to act to clearly identify or placard that the building was in fact a DOE licensed, entombed nuclear structure, and that a potential radiological hazard existed to any person, military or civilian, whom worked in or around the building. This failure to

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adequately identify the hazards associated with nuclear material is clearly demonstrated by this careless and needless exposure of unsuspecting personnel to radiation.

2.4. (4) The Air Force made false and misleading statements to the public and news media regarding the root cause or fundamental source of the radiation that had contaminated personnel, and was detected within the building.

2.5. (5) The Air Force failed to truthfully inform the public and news media that during the investigation of this structure, the residue of a highly lethal, radioactive, weapons-grade nuclear material called Plutonium (Pu-239) was suspected as being present, was tested for, and found in measurable levels to be inside the structure.

2.5.1. It is further stipulated that these officials and representatives have made false statements and/or taken actions subsequent to this incident, which have directly led to preventing the citizens of the State of Maine from being aware of the potential dangers surrounding the site where this incident occurred. These officials and representatives were engaged in a pattern of conduct that was inconsistent with their constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws of the State of Maine and the United States of America.

2.5.2. These acts, and others, were part an effort to conceal information relating to the magnitude of radiological environmental contamination that exists at Loring Air Force Base, and other similar Government Installations that were involved in early production and management of atomic weaponry.

2.5.3. All of the facts and circumstances surrounding this event are true and have been substantiated by written documented sources. These sources include newspaper articles, historical documents, histories, and reports relating to this event.

2.5.4. The danger surrounding the cause of the incident was rooted in events that took place some 40 years earlier. It is the legacy left behind to all the citizens of this nation who live near, or on installations of this kind. A Cold War legacy. The legacy of nuclear weapons waste.

3. OVERVIEW OF THE FACILITY

3.1. DEVELOPMENT OF LORING AIR FORCE BASE

3.1.1. Loring Air Force Base, originally named Limestone Air Force Base, was built in the town of Limestone, Maine in the early 1950’s to serve as the first of several new

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Strategic Air Command “B-36” Bomber bases that were to sprout up amidst the rich economy of post-WWII America.

3.2. DEVELOPMENT OF CARIBOU AIR FORCE STATION

3.2.1. Within the perimeter of Loring’s property lies a remote portion of the base that was commonly referred to as “East Loring.” The area is geographically isolated from the main base by nearly two miles of runway. The area is accessed by only one roadway.

3.2.2. Within the boundaries of East Loring, lie the remains of a separate mini-base, which operated for approximately the first ten years of Loring’s history. This base was operationally independent of Loring itself until 1962.

3.2.3. The function of this inner-station was essentially to maintain and store the weapons (bombs) that would be used by Loring’s massive fleet of bomber aircraft. The facility, originally named Site Easy, became officially known as “Caribou Air Force Station.”

3.2.4. From the time of its top-secret design and construction in the early 1950s until Loring Air Force Base closed in 1994, this area was used to store and maintain nuclear and conventional weapons.1

4. CLOSURE OF CARIBOU AIR FORCE STATION

4.1. The Air Force decided to close Caribou Air Force Station in 1961. Air Staff members reviewed the overall Air Force “special weapons” storage and maintenance program. They had concluded that advances in technology made it feasible to reduce the number of people and facilities that Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) used to accomplish the special weapons mission.

1 It is the official policy of the U.S. Air Force to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons, at any time or location.

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4.2. They directed AFLC to implement a reduction and consolidation program. In January 1962, AFLC officials notified Caribou Air Force Station of its demise, to become effective on July 1, 1962. During the intervening months, AFLC worked closely with the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and the 42d Bombardment Wing, Loring’s principle unit, in accomplishing a smooth transition from a depot maintenance facility to an operational weapons storage area. At the same time, the Atomic Energy Commission transferred ownership and control of the “Special Weapons” to SAC.2 The site was then renamed East Loring.

5. THE RADIATION EXPOSURE

5.1. On January 9, 1992, twelve workers were contaminated by alpha radiation after cutting a golf-ball-sized hole in the steel door of a mysterious building located inside Loring’s weapons storage area. Carl M. Drechsel, utilities superintendent, and Mike Thurlow, foreman of the exterior electric division, were the ones doing the cutting. As such, they were the first, and the most thoroughly exposed of the twelve workers.

5.2. The exposed workers were reported to be conducting a base-wide inspection for toxic materials. The base had recently been slated for closure, so teams were dispatched to locate polychlorinated biphenyl’s as part of a massive environmental cleanup project.

5.3. Workers had penetrated the outer layers of building number 260 on January 8, and detected no radiation emitting from a hole above the door where a pipe once had been. The door was the third into a series of layers surrounding concrete vaults. This third door was a vault door similar to those found in most banks. Geiger counters detected the presence of the radiation. Instruments used by a bioenvironmental team detected the radiation less than 30 minutes after the hole was cut with a torch. After the radiation was detected, the hole was sealed with putty.

5.4. The workers, including six civilians in the environmental division, were taken to a power production facility and decontaminated by gargling, blowing their noses, and taking a soap and water bath. Other tests reportedly had been done on those exposed. Col. Gary N. Schneider, the commander of Loring’s 42nd Bomb Wing, stated that the alpha particles would not be a hazard to crops or the community. Col Schneider also stated that base officials had been in contact with the Department of Defense, Strategic Air Force, the Maine Department of Environmental Protection, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

5.5. A team from Brooks Air Force Base in Texas soon arrived to examine those who were contaminated, and the “unknown” building.3

6. THE ARRIVAL OF THE RADIATION RESPONSE TEAM

6.1. On January 10, 1992, Col Gary N. Schneider directed that a Loring KC-135 tanker fly to Brooks Air Force Base near San Antonio, Texas and retrieve the Air Force Radiation Assessment Team (AFRAT).4 The Team, made up of specially selected Air Force personnel is based at

2 The Loring Episode, Stevens & Tyson, April 9, 1980 3 BDN, January 11, 1992, Gloria Flannery 4 Verified in Telephone Interview with (Name Omitted) of AFRAT, 1997

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Armstrong Laboratory, and provides assistance worldwide for on-site detection, identification, and quantification of any ionizing radiation hazard.

6.2. AFRAT stands ready in the event of a nuclear weapon accident or any incident involving the potential release of radionuclides.5 In a 1997 telephone interview with a member of the AFRAT team, it was stated that the incident at Loring was “the most significant event in the history of the team.”6

7. MAINE POLITICIANS GET INVOLVED

7.1. On January 10, 1992 U.S. Senator William S. Cohen called for an Air Force report on the condition of those contaminated and whether the surrounding communities and base personnel were in danger of radiation exposure.

7.2. U.S. Senator George J. Mitchell said he was concerned about the detection of radiation at Loring. “It is imperative that those who were exposed be given the best possible medical attention,” Mitchell stated.

7.3. U.S. Representative Olympia J. Snowe sent a letter to the Secretary of the Air Force, calling for a full investigation into the incident. “I want to know exactly what happened, why it happened, is there any chance for a wider contamination for the community, and not least of all, the exact condition of those exposed,” she said. Snowe further stated she wanted to know what steps the Air Force would take to make sure this incident was not repeated at other cleanup sites. “I will get to the bottom of this,” she said.7

8. THE REPORTED SOURCE OF THE RADIATION

8.1. On January 12, 1992, Loring’s Office of Public Affairs made a statement that RADON GAS was reported as the source of alpha radiation according to the team of radiation experts from Armstrong laboratory.

8.1.1. Base officials reported that the radon gas occurs naturally in this geographical area, and most likely accumulated undetected during the more than 30 years the building was sealed.

8.1.2. A press release issued by the Air Force stated that building 260, situated inside the heavily guarded munitions storage area of East Loring, poses no health hazard to the community, according to officials with Armstrong Laboratory.

8.2. In the mid 1960s, the 42nd Bombardment Wing underwent a reorganization in Operational and Support Groups. These functional realignments increased operational efficiency, but they also resulted in poor building use, often leaving buildings vacant or nearly empty. Such buildings still required maintenance and general upkeep that burdened both the budget and the workload.

5 AFRAT Web Site at http://www.brooks.af.mil/hsc/products/afrat.html 6 Verified in Telephone Interview with (Name Omitted) of AFRAT, 1997 7 BDN, January 11, 1992, Gloria Flannery

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8.3. In early 1964, the base initiated Project ICE (Increased Combat Efficiency), a program that surveyed facility use and developed disposal plans for vacant buildings. The first step called for a total review by all functions of the space each occupied. Then actions were taken to reduce this space to the smallest practical area. Vacated buildings fell into two classes: (1) those of temporary construction, of limited use, and more economical to destroy than retain; and (2) those of permanent value which could be inactivated and sealed off for future use.

8.4. Project ICE extended through December 1964 and closed portions of four aircraft maintenance hangars and numerous buildings. But, East Loring (Site Easy) received the hardest review. Base officials consolidated munitions storage areas and closed the base (conventional) ordnance area adjacent to the (special) weapons storage area. They also consolidated active functions at the (special) weapons storage area, closing another large group of buildings.

8.5. In all, a total of 36 buildings were inactivated and sealed at East Loring (Site Easy) in 1964, yet in 1992, while preparing to close Loring Air Force Base, only building 260 was reported to contain a build-up of radioactive Radon Gas.8

9. THE RADON STORY IS CONTESTED

9.1. Some experts disputed the theory of the buildup of radon gas as determined by the Air Force’s team from Armstrong Lab. One professor of physics at the University of Southern Maine, Charles Armentrout, questioned the Air Force explanation that radon accumulated over the years inside the sealed building. His statements in the Bangor Daily News indicated that “the ground in the area surrounding the base in northern Maine isn’t the type that would release radon.”

9.2. “It doesn’t sound plausible at all,” said another physics professor, Lee Grodzins, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). He said, “radon disappears after 20 days, limiting the amount that can build up. It doesn’t matter if the building was sealed for 20 years or two weeks, the radon level would be the same”9

9.3. State of Maine environmental officials decided to conduct their own testing of building 260 because as they were quoted as saying, “There’s been some doubt cast on the Air Force analysis and what they came up with.” A two-member team from the state’s radiological health program was reported to have visited the base to conduct tests.10

9.4. On January 16, 1992, the State team of inspectors found the same levels of radon that Texas radiologists had reported in building 260. Both teams, who used the same methods, found radon levels of 15 picocuries per liter.

10. MAINE POLITICIANS INTENSIFY THEIR INVOLVEMENT

10.1. On January 14, 1992, Senator William S. Cohen and Representative Olympia J. Snowe of Maine called for an independent investigation of the source of radiation that contaminated a dozen workers at Loring Air Force Base. In a letter to the Air Force Secretary, the two Maine

8 The Loring Episode, Stevens & Tyson, April 9, 1980 9 BDN, January 14, 1992, AP News Story 10 BDN, January 15, 1992, AP News Story

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congressional leaders stated “Sufficient doubts remain about the cause of the radioactive material detected at Loring, that we believe further investigation is necessary.”

10.2. Cohen and Snowe, both Republicans, said the Air Force needed to convene a panel of experts from inside and outside the government to resolve questions about the radiation. “A matter of this potential gravity certainly warrants further investigation,” their letter said.

10.2.1. The State inspection team went to the site because “our agency is responsible for protecting the public from radiation and we felt we should go up there and take a look,” said Donald Hoxie, director of the State’s health engineering division.11

10.2.2. Hoxie said the State was responding to a request from U.S. Senator William S. Cohen for an independent review after the report of the team from the Brooks Air Force Base. Hoxie said that samples would be tested for particulates at the radiological laboratory that monitors nuclear reactors such as those found at the Maine Yankee nuclear power facility and the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard where nuclear submarines are outfitted and repaired.

10.2.3. Clough Toppan, an engineer from the Department of Human Services radiological control program downplayed concern about cesium, uranium and potassium levels which the Brooks Air Force Base team reported detecting in the exposed workers’ urine samples. He stated that “cesium was a residue from the 1960s atomic weapons testing and is in the food chain. Everyone has traces of it,” he said. “Traces of uranium and potassium are also present, and should be considered ‘background’ and subtracted from any analytical report,” Toppan said.

10.2.4. Toppan said the Air Force had agreed to allow him to be on hand when the building is opened in warmer weather. “Not that we suspect anything, but there have been enough questions raised by the public that it would make sense to have radiological experts from the state there,” Toppan said.12

11. A REVIEW PANEL IS FORMED

11.1. On January 17, 1992 the Air Force agreed to allow outside officials to review a recent radioactivity exposure incident at Loring Air Force Base and procedures for cleaning up low-level radioactive waste at the base, officials said. The Air Force agreed to appoint a review panel made up of officials from other government agencies, at the request of Maine’s congressional delegation.13

11.2. Earlier, Cohen and Snowe said the Air Force needed to convene a panel of experts from inside and outside the government to resolve questions about the radiation.

11.2.1. “The Air Force clearly is taking this problem seriously, which should provide some reassurance to base personnel and residents of surrounding communities,” the congressional delegation said in a joint statement. “We will continue to monitor this situation closely to make sure that safety is the paramount concern as the base cleanup continues.”

11 BDN, January 16, 1992, Gloria Flannery 12 BDN, January 16, 1992, Gloria Flannery 13 BDN, January 18, 1992

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11.3. The Maine congressional delegation also asked the Air Force to determine whether radioactive material had been stored in other areas of the base, what precautions should be taken in disposing of it, and whether there is any danger to Loring employees or nearby residents. It is believed that Mitchell, Cohen, and Snowe were then briefed with more detail about Loring’s various radiological and environmental issues associated with the pending closure of the base.

11.4. In a letter to the delegation, Gary D. Vest, the Air Force official in charge of cleaning up toxic wastes at Loring, stated that an outside panel would be formed. It will include representatives from the Department of Defense, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Energy, and state and local agencies.

11.4.1. “The group will review and advise the Air Force on additional courses of action necessary to characterize and deal with the radioactivity found in Building 260 and evaluate other locations at Loring,” said Vest, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force.

11.4.2. Vest said the panel also would be asked to determine how to clean up of low-level radioactive waste dumped by the Atomic Energy Commission in two disposal trenches years ago in Loring’s weapons storage area.14

11.5. The following individuals and agencies comprised the so-called independent review panel:

(a) Col Dean Bartel - Panel Chief, from the Compliance Division, Headquarters Air Force at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, D.C.

(b) Col David R. Case, from the Aerospace Medical Consultants

Division, Headquarters Air Force’s Surgeon General’s Office. (c) Col Edward F. Maher, from Armstrong Laboratory,

Bioenvironmental Division at Brooks Air Force Base in Texas (AFRAT).

(d) Maj. Donald W. Jordan, from Armstrong Laboratory,

Bioenvironmental Division at Brooks Air Force Base in Texas (AFRAT).

(e) J. Michael Smith, from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s

National Air and Radiation Environmental Laboratory in Montgomery, Alabama.

(f) Edwin L. Sensintaffer, from the U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency’s National Air and Radiation Environmental Laboratory in Montgomery, Alabama.

(g) Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty, from the U.S. Department of Energy’s

Office of Transportation Safeguards and Emergency Management in Germantown, Maryland.

14 BDN, January 18, 1992

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(h) Naji Akladiss, from the Maine Department of Environmental

Protection’s Federal Facilities Unit in Augusta, Maine. (i) Robert J. Schell, from the Maine Bureau of Health, Division of

Health Engineering, Radiation Control Program Office in Augusta, Maine. 15

12. THE PANEL’S FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

12.1. According to a statement prepared by the Loring Office of Public Affairs, the panel’s objectives were to independently review Air Force and State DEP data and conclusions regarding the radioactivity found in Building 260. They would then advise the Air Force on additional courses of action necessary to characterize and, if necessary, mitigate any radioactivity.16

12.2. The panel indicated that radon concentrations inside the sealed building ranged from 13 to 18 picocuries per liter of air. Those measurements were said to fall well within the safe range for homes, according to Col Dean Bartel.

12.3. The Air Force continued to profess that “the discovery of radioactivity at Building 260 at Loring Air Force Base posed no danger to the 12 workers contaminated on January 9, or to anyone in the surrounding communities.” However, in a cover letter of the panel’s full report to U.S. Senator William Cohen, Col James R. Van Orsdol, Deputy Chief of Programs and Legislative Division, wrote “further investigation would be required to determine if any longer-lived radionuclides are contained in the building.”

12.3.1. The radiation surveys could not rule out airborne radioactivity or surface contamination inside the building, the report said. If extensive contamination with longer-lived radionuclides had been present, the situation could have been serious, the report added.

12.3.2. The panel concluded that follow-up sampling and surveys inside Building 260 were necessary to confirm the absence of longer-lived radionuclides, other than those naturally occurring in the soil and building materials, inside the building.17 State officials agreed there would be no way to be certain if radon was the source of the radiation until the building was opened and authorities determined what’s inside.18

12.4. The full report of the panel described in detail the background of Building 260, details of the January 9 incident, steps taken to protect the workers afterwards, and evaluations made by the Air Force and state’s DEP team to detect the source of radioactivity.

12.5. The panel found that existing training standards and confined space entry procedures did not adequately address intrusive entries into facilities with a potential for radioactive contamination. Subsequently, it was remanded that Loring AFB develop an ACTION PLAN to enter Building 260 safely to assess potential sources of radioactivity.

15 Aroostook Republican & News, January 29, 1992, George Chappell 16 Aroostook Republican & News, January 29, 1992, George Chappell 17 Aroostook Republican & News, January 29, 1992, George Chappell 18 BDN, January 18, 1992

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12.6. Following the entry and evaluation of the structure, Loring needed to expeditiously complete and submit an after-action report of the event, so those lessons learned could be communicated throughout the Air Force.

13. WHAT THE AIR FORCE WOULDN’T TELL THE MEDIA ABOUT SITE “EASY”

13.1. THE ARMED FORCES SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT

13.1.1. On December 31, 1946, the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) was established and charged with the mission of assisting in the development of military applications for atomic energy. Beginning in 1947, the AFSWP organized and trained teams capable of assembling atomic weapons. Though infused with a sense of urgency, early production of nuclear weapons was slow and development suffered from low funding and technological difficulties.19

13.2. DEVELOPMENT OF SITE “EASY”

13.2.1. Improvements in production efficiency and an increase in the number of stockpiled weapons by 1950 led to increased pressure for the construction of storage sites. In 1951, the DoD, through the AFSWP, allocated funds for an ordnance storage site in the vicinity of Loring (then named “Limestone Air Force Base.”) This was the first operational storage site to be constructed in association with nuclear weapons. Its exact location was top-secret and its code name was Site “Easy.” The facility was to be designed as a forward distribution point for atomic weapons.

13.3. The United States Army Corps of Engineers, New England Division developed a plan for the development of property adjacent to the proposed Limestone Air Force Base. This plan titled “General Plan and Perimeter Survey”, was dated January 1948. The Corps of Engineers, New England Division also subdivided the plan into different lots.

13.4. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers would undertake the planning and construction of the facility. The architect-engineer for the project

19 Sandia National Laboratories, The Post War Decade, 1990, Furman

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was Black and Veatch of Kansas City, Missouri. Following completion of construction, the facility would fall under the jurisdiction of the Air Material Command. The facility would be charged with the mission of protecting and maintaining the weapons used by SAC.20

13.5. This plan, containing 5 sheets, was titled: “Real Estate Limestone AFB”, and was dated May 1952. The U.S. Air Force (not the Atomic Energy Commission) purchased parcel B121, the largest of the parcels on the plan, from Mr. James H. Phair, for the sum of $250.00. This transaction took place in the form of a Transfer Deed filed in the Office of the Register of Deeds, courthouse, Aroostook County, Fort Kent, Maine. The Transfer Deed was dated April 2, 1951. Parcel B121, included the site of Building 260.21

13.6. Construction began on a Top Secret maximum-security storage area located in the northeast corner of Loring (Limestone) Air Force Base on August 4, 1951. The 3080th Aviation Depot Group, activated under the Air Force’s Air Material Command, assumed control of the storage area on December 15, 1951.

13.7. The 3080th Aviation Depot Group independently operated the maximum storage area as “Caribou Air Force Station” until July 1, 1962. At that time, the installation was transferred from the Air Force Logistics Command (formerly Air Material Command), to SAC and the 42nd Bombardment Wing. The property was incorporated into the rest of the base, and became known as East Loring.22

14. WHAT THE AIR FORCE WOULDN’T TELL THE MEDIA ABOUT BUILDING NUMBER 260

14.1. Col Gary N. Schneider was quoted as stating “the building (260) was sealed before the Air Force acquired it.” Second Lt. Bridget Reeder of the Wing Public Affairs office stated “the area was owned by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Army Corps of Engineers before Loring opened in 1953.” At one point in the 1950s or 1960s, the building housed a workshop, officials said. Col Schneider stated to the media that “the base has no documentation on the building used by other groups before it was acquired by the Air Force. It’s an unknown facility to us,” Schneider said. He also said that while going through the base closure process, the base did not want to leave any buildings unexamined.23

14.2. Loring officials further stated that building 260 was used decades ago by the old Atomic Energy Commission, but base officials have been unable to find any records indicating what the building’s purpose was. “They did an extensive search to try to find records here (at Loring) as to what it was used for and they hit a dead end,” said Tech. Sgt. Donald Moncrief, a base spokesman. “The commission didn’t keep any records, so there’s no way to trace it back. The AEC used the area in the late 1940s and early 1950s.”24

20 Historic Building Inventory & Evaluation Loring Air Force Base, Maine, September 1997, Earth Tech 21 The Loring Episode, Stevens & Tyson, April 9, 1980, Appendices - Tract Register of Land Acquisition for

Limestone (Loring) AFB 22 The Loring Episode, Stevens & Tyson, April 9, 1980 23 BDN, January 11, 1992, Gloria Flannery 24 BDN, January 18, 1992

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14.3. THE TRUTH ABOUT BUILDING 260; AN ATOMIC BANK VAULT:

14.3.1. The peculiar structure code-named the “A-Building” or “Able Building” was used as a nuclear capsule storage facility. (It’s believed the “A” in its code name stood for “Atomic.”) This heavily fortified vault was designed in concrete layers to withstand a direct hit in the case of an attack. The structure was 10 feet thick on the sides, 10 feet thick on the bottom (some of which was buried below ground), and more than 20 feet thick above the ceiling of the vaults. Inside each vault were permanently installed steel racks of shelves for storage of highly precious nuclear material.

14.3.2. The blueprints for these shelves, as well as the building blueprints clearly indicate that there were 16 full racks (3 shelves per rack), and 4 single racks (3 shelves per rack). The total shelves available according to the blueprints equaled 60. The building therefore, had a capacity for the storage of at least 60 nuclear capsules.25

14.3.3. Building 260 was designed to appear as a two-story structure; its second story was never accessible. The building is constructed of heavily reinforced concrete throughout. Its northern and southern elevations are blank. The western elevation appears to have three paired windows at both the first and second levels. These blind windows, made of concrete and covered with double pane 3-inch thick glass, were never operable. The eastern elevation has a similar configuration of blind windows at the second level. The first story of the eastern elevation has one blind window pair at the southern end and a projecting entrance at the northern end.

14.3.4. At the entrance, a straight run of six concrete steps leads to a raised concrete platform that is sheltered by a flat roof. At the southern end of the platform is a concrete enclosure with a doorway. Sheltered by the enclosure is a heavy steel door in the eastern wall. This door leads to a small room within the 10-foot-wide walls of the structure. Beyond this room is a corridor, off of which open four vaults. The vaults have a solid door that is similar to those at a bank. Each door had two different combination locks. Each vault is ten feet wide and nearly thirteen feet long. The vaults are fitted with steel shelving for the storage of weapon-related items.26

14.4. It is believed that approximately 35 “A” Buildings were constructed throughout the United States. The current condition and status of these buildings is difficult to corroborate, although it is known that they are located in the following states:

25 Confidential “eye witness” Collaboration 26 Historic Building Inventory & Evaluation Loring Air Force Base, Maine, September 1997, Earth Tech

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California Louisiana

Maine Massachusetts

Nevada New Mexico

New York South Dakota

Tennessee Texas

Virginia Washington

14.5. The “Q” Area, which denoted the overall “special” weapons complex at the station was surrounded by a parallel ribbon of four fences, one of which was electrified. This was still not enough protection for the A-Building. This building was surrounded by another chain link fence of it’s own. Just outside of its own fence were two additional structures numbered as Buildings 259 and 262. These were constructed as Sentry Posts for the A-Building. The “pillboxes” as they were referred, were used by the station’s air police during times the vaults were accessed. Constructed also in 1952, these structures are 7 feet square, 7.5 feet high, and are cast from reinforced concrete. Near the top of the towers on each elevation are horizontal openings for vision and gun targeting. The posts were individually heated and provided protection from heavy small arms fire. These security posts were used and occupied from 1952 until February 1955.27

14.6. Because of the importance afforded to the A-Building, security was tighter here than at any other building. The strict security access protocol, alarm monitoring, multi-redundant physical barriers, and armed sentries made the A-Building and its contents, the highest priority of any 1950’s wartime resource.

14.7. Building 260 was by far, the most important and structurally fortified building located at the site. This building was indeed top-secret, but to the Air Force’s mission, was hardly “unknown.”

14.8. Building 260 was utilized in this matter until nuclear capsules became obsolete. Subsequent weapon designs no longer required the fissionable material to be stored separately from the weapon.28

14.9. It is not known exactly when building 260 was no longer utilized by Caribou Air Force Station, though the period is estimated at the mid to late 1950s. It is also not known if the building had been sealed prior to the transfer of the site to the 42nd Bombardment Wing (SAC) in 1962.

15. THE VAULT’S CONTENTS: THE NUCLEAR CAPSULE

15.1. The weapon-related items that were stored in Building 260 were the most important items related to nuclear weapons. They were the nuclear core (pit) of the earliest weapons. After World War II, a major emphasis was placed on making nuclear weapons easier for the military to handle. Nuclear testing conducted in 1948 had first introduced the concept of a removable capsule design whereby the fissile nuclear material (Plutonium or Uranium) could be inserted or removed manually from an otherwise fully assembled weapon.29 The nuclear capsules stored in Building 260 contained the fissionable material that rendered the weapon “nuclear”. The material contained in these stored capsules was, among other elements Plutonium (Pu-239).

27 Historic Building Inventory & Evaluation Loring Air Force Base, Maine, September 1997, Earth Tech 28 Sandia National Laboratories, The Postwar Decade, 1990, Furman 29 Sandia National Laboratories, The Postwar Decade, 1990, Furman

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16. SPRING OF 1992, THE UNSEALING OF THE BUILDING 260

16.1. On May 15, 1992, it was announced that the contaminated building 260 at Loring would be opened. Officials at Loring stated that the building would be opened on May 21st, and the Air Force planned to “leave the building open and to turn it over to the Base Disposal Agency.”

16.2. An extensive training program was held Monday through Wednesday May 18-20 for those involved in the entry process. The training was to cover physical and medical hazards that may be encountered, the use of personal protection equipment, medical surveillance and emergency procedures.

16.3. The entry team consisted of two military officials who had returned from Armstrong Laboratory at Brooks Air Force Base Texas. Two civilian workers from Loring would assist them.30

16.4. The precautions and training that was completed prior to entry of building 260 was appropriate for the potential radiological hazards associated with structures of this type. Unfortunately, the Air Force was still unwilling to disclose the true nature of the event, the history of building 260, or the potential gravity of the situation to the news media that was covering the story day-by-day.

16.5. On May 22, 1992, Loring public affairs officer Lt. Bridget Reeder released the following information:

16.5.1. “You can see inside, see four closed doors, but don’t know if they are locked.” It was stated that workers removed the plug that had resealed the third of a series of heavy steel doors leading to the building’s interior after the radiation incident in January. They cut a small hole in the lower section of the third door to test for oxygen, and explosive and toxic gases.

16.5.2. Col Allan K. Bean, Loring’s civil engineer and coordinator of the project, said the door led to an inside hallway with four smaller rooms. Two rooms were located on each side of the hallway. When the process began Bean said, the first order of business was to look inside. He was quoted as stating “if the other four doors are open, our job will be a whole lot easier.”

16.5.3. “We don’t plan to find anything but we have a plan for anything we find,” Bean said. The action plan clearly indicates that they certainly did have a plan to find something. The plan was designed to provide the required level of safety for those expecting to find a lethal source of radiation. An enclosed pathway was built from the entrance of the building to a trailer where workers were to take a shower if contamination was found. Bean said 20 to 30 people would be involved in the process but that only four would be in the building at one time.31

16.6. By the late afternoon on the first day of the operation, it was reported that workers still had three vaults to unlock in Building 260. As the workers reached the interior of the building, they found

30 BDN, May 15, 1992, Central Aroostook Bureau 31 BDN, May 22, 1992, Gloria Flannery

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one of the four inside vaults unlocked and empty. The location of the lock on that door assisted the locksmith to determine how the drilling should be done in the 4” thick heavy metal doors.32

16.7. Col Bean said after a door was opened that results of tests for oxygen deficiency, toxicity, explosive levels and radioactive material were negative. “Once the door was open, all tests so far have been negative.” Bean said the worst scenario would be to find radioactive material of any kind. “If we do find anything like that, we will lock it up and call in a contractor.”

16.8. With air tests continuing at safe levels, workers could work without extensive protective equipment, Bean said. Before the doors are opened, protective gear will be donned. Work was expected to continue into the following evening, Bean said.33

16.9. It was later reported that Air Force and civilian workers had finally opened Building 260 at 9:30 p.m. Saturday, and found what authorities expected to find - nothing. “There was nothing in there but the old empty shelves,” Col Bean said. “We found just exactly what we expected to find, nothing.”

16.10. Officials at Loring claimed that the entire building had been empty. Col Bean said the radon could have been generated from the concrete building, which he described as “10 feet thick in every direction.” Although a locksmith was employed to free the locking mechanisms in the three doors to the vaults, sliding bars had rusted into place and had to be cut.

16.11. “Cutting was the last choice, but we had to do it,” Bean said. The walls of the 10-by-12 foot vaults were lined with heavy metal shelves. The walls were 12 feet high. Safety was a critical part of the operation.34 Bean stated that the radon level fell below the elevation found last January because of its interior exposure to the air. The team used a negative air ventilator to suck the stale air out through a long tube and draw the fresh air inside. “The picocurie count was not unusual because we were providing air flow,” Bean said.

16.12. Bean said he was pleased to have the presence of the independent teams from the state. “We really appreciate all the support we got from the state,” he said. “They stayed with us from beginning to end providing expertise and equipment.” Workers spent from 7 a.m. to 9:30 p.m. Thursday through Saturday, finishing Saturday night. The operation was concluded late on a Saturday night when the base would be quiet and operations were at a minimum. Most personnel were off duty, and would not be in the area. Only the four individuals, who entered building 260 that day, know for sure what was actually found on the shelves inside the vaults.35

17. THE TRUTH ABOUT RADON AND PLUTONIUM

17.1. RADON:

17.1.1. Radon is a radioactive gas given off by the decay of plutonium or uranium. Uranium is present in nature, explaining why radon shows up periodically in older homes and schools. Radon is an active alpha emitter.

32 BDN, May 23, 1992, Gloria Flannery 33 BDN, May 23, 1992, Gloria Flannery 34 BDN, May 27, 1992, Gloria Flannery 35 Aroostook Republican & News, May 27, 1992, George Chappell

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17.1.2. Col Bean’s suggestion that the uranium and/or plutonium that caused the radiological exposure of workers occurred naturally is not feasible, likely, or believable. In fact, Armstrong Lab’s official conclusions do not indicate that the alpha radiation was caused by radon gas that was, or was not naturally occurring.

17.2. PLUTONIUM

17.2.1. Plutonium residue was tested for, and found on the walls of the vaults. This information was only disclosed in Armstrong Laboratory’s official report. It is unknown if any other material was found because the report does not indicate that the vaults or the shelves were empty.

17.2.2. The report of the investigation relating to this event clearly indicated that “Swipe samples taken inside each of the interior vaults (Base Sample Nos. WX920786-920789) were analyzed for Pu-239.” (Pu-239 is the abbreviation for plutonium on the periodic table of elements.) All measured levels were below the Nuclear Regulatory Commission unrestricted release criteria of 20 dpm/100 sq. cm removable.”36

17.3. The report’s findings were documented as follows:

17.3.1. “Conclusions: No alpha/beta/gamma contamination above Nuclear Regulatory Commission unrestricted release criteria was found in Building 260. As suspected from initial measurements made in January 1992, and confirmed during this survey, elevated radon levels in Building 260 were responsible for the alpha contamination observed on personnel during the initial attempts to enter the building.”37

18. PLUTONIUM IN WEAPONS USE

18.1. Plutonium (element 94) is a heavy silvery metal, bright like nickel when freshly cleaned. It is a highly electronegative, chemically reactive element, considerably more so than uranium. It quickly tarnishes, forming a succession of interference colors (like an oil film), eventually becoming dark purple-black. If corrosion is sufficiently severe, a loose olive-green powder (PuO2) forms on the surface.

18.2. Plutonium oxidizes readily, and corrodes very quickly in the presence of even traces of moisture. Oddly, it corrodes much faster in an inert atmosphere if moisture is present, than it does in ordinary air or pure oxygen. The reason is that direct attack by oxygen forms an adherent plutonium oxide layer that retards further corrosion, attack by moisture produces a loose oxide and hydride mixture. Although plutonium presumably exhibits chemical toxicity like other heavy metals, this effect is insignificant (in fact, unobservable) compared to its radiotoxicity. Plutonium’s toxic properties are due to the fact that it is an active alpha emitter.

18.3. There are fifteen known isotopes of plutonium, all are radioactive. Plutonium-239 is the preferred isotope for weapons use. In the weapons produced in the early 1950’s in fact, Pu-239 was the only desired isotope for weapons use. Pu-239 has a higher fission and scattering cross

36 Consultative Letter, AL-CL-1992-0123, Health Physics Consultation for Entry into Building 260, Loring AFB 37 Consultative Letter, AL-CL-1992-0123, Health Physics Consultation for Entry into Building 260, Loring AFB

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sections than uranium (U-235), and a larger number of neutrons produced per fission, and consequently a smaller critical mass.38

18.4. One thing that scientists know about the storage of plutonium is that there is a long-term storage problem, given the element’s tendency to migrate and gather together where it doesn’t belong. It will interact with a container in various ways until that container fails. It is not a static material. Ironically, the most successful storage method for plutonium so far has been the one that has benefited from the most research—the spherical sealed container of fuel that fits inside a thermonuclear weapon. If you were to sit down and design from scratch a storage container for plutonium with the sole goal of maximizing safety, you’d end up with something pretty close to a pit inside a nuclear weapon. A pit’s geometry is critically safe too, which means you can stack together an infinite number of them and still not get a critical mass. It is very well sealed when new.39

18.5. While plutonium can be stored this way for quite some time, it will not keep the material safe indefinitely. A pit stored for 50 years most assuredly will fail. Of course there are no 50-year-old nuclear weapons around. As the pits age, they become increasingly toxic to the workers who have to remove them from decommissioned facilities.

18.6. Plutonium changes into plutonium americium 241, a strong gamma-ray emitter that renders the surface of a twenty-five-year-old pit five times more radioactive than when it was made. This represents a serious safety concern. An incident at Los Alamos in November 1993 brought to light some of the weaknesses of short-term plutonium storage strategies. A can of plutonium inside a concrete bunker at Los Alamos swelled and burst open. The pewter-colored plutonium metal had been ground to red dust by oxidation, similar to the way iron rusts.

18.7. There have been six known instances in the past ten years in which plutonium had ruptured its containers and migrated into storage vaults. No one had been contaminated or had a permanent exposure to plutonium, and it was contained within the facilities, but it represents a breakdown of boundaries. Anytime you lose that much control; it’s a concern. A 1994 DOE internal review found significant hazards from leaking packaging and decaying buildings at thirty-five government sites in over a dozen states. (This study did not include the plutonium that was being stored inside warheads and pits.)40

19. DECOMMISSIONING OF LICENSED NUCLEAR FACILITIES

19.1. The Action Plan for Building 260, Loring AFB was an operations plan. Under section 6.0 of that plan titled OPERATIONS, the plan referenced a diagram showing decision points for the operation. This diagram (Appendix B) of the Action Plan was a decision matrix dealing with the entry operation. This decision matrix begins with the first step of opening door 153, and progresses through different decisions based on the level of radioactivity found during the operation. Near the bottom of the decision matrix, after a determination has been made that a

38 Nuclear Weapons Frequently Asked Questions Web Site, Version 2.22, May 1, 1998, http://www.fas.org/nuke/hew/ 39 Secret Mesa, Inside Los Alamos National Laboratory, Copyright © 1998 by Jo Ann Shroyer 40 Secret Mesa, Inside Los Alamos National Laboratory, Copyright © 1998 by Jo Ann Shroyer

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vault is safe for entry, the next step requires that a swipe test be compared with NRC Guide 1.86. This guide is listed as Appendix F to the Action Plan.41

19.1.1. Regulatory Guide 1.86 was published by the former U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in June 1974. The title of this guide is “Termination of operating licenses for nuclear reactors.”

19.2. The history of building 260 has already been established, as outlined in this report. This facility obviously was not a nuclear reactor. However, there are distinct reasons why this guide was included in the report, and why it was referenced to, as part of the decision making process. While the facility indeed was not a nuclear reactor, it was a facility that housed nuclear (fissionable) material. Therefore, because the facility was being abandoned, along with the rest of the weapons storage area, it had to be decommissioned.

19.3. The Atomic Energy Commission authorized the construction and use of this facility, and only the AEC (now the Department of Energy) could authorize its release.

19.4. The United States Air Force knew that these requirements had to be met in order to close the weapons storage area. The use of this guide is representative of the importance the Air Force afforded to this operation, and also indicates that they were well aware of the nature of the use of this particular structure. Regulatory Guide 1.86 describes in detail, the steps required for decontamination for release for unrestricted use.

19.5. The Atomic Energy Commission operated the facility known as building 260. This facility was part of the nuclear weapons complex. After the Air Force assumed responsibility for the entire site (including the AEC facilities), it was up to the Air Force to maintain the facility, and also to ensure that regulatory guidelines were adhered to.

19.6. The underlying reason for this regulatory guide’s use during this operation was to terminate the use and/or responsibility for maintaining this facility. In the introduction (Part A), and the discussion (Part B) sections of the guide, the following is stated:

19.6.1. “Applications for termination of licenses, specifies the requirements that must be satisfied to terminate an operating license. This guide describes methods and procedures considered acceptable by the Regulatory staff for the termination of operating licenses.” This particular facility (not being a reactor) was considered a facility requiring a possession-only license.

19.6.2. “A licensee (Air Force) having a possession-only license must retain, with the Part 50 license, authorization for special nuclear material (10 CFR Part 70, “Special Nuclear Material”), byproduct material (10 CFR Part 30, “Rules of General Applicability to Licensing of Byproduct Material”), and source material (10 CFR Part 40, “Licensing of Source Material”), until the radioactive components, and sources are removed from the facility”.42

19.6.3. “A possession-only license permits various options and procedures for decommissioning, such as mothballing, entombment, or dismantling. The requirements imposed depend on the option selected”. Radioactive components may be shipped off-site for burial at an

41 Action Plan For Building 260, Loring AFB 42 U.S. AEC Regulatory Guide 1.86 Termination of Operating Licenses For Nuclear Reactors

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authorized burial ground or secured on the site. Those radioactive materials remaining on the site must be isolated from the public by physical barriers or other means to prevent public access to hazardous levels of radiation. Before areas may be released for unrestricted use, they must have been decontaminated or the radioactivity must have decayed to less than prescribed limits (Table I)”.43

19.7. Another area of concern outlined in the Guide is Surveillance and Security:

19.7.1. “A facility which has been licensed under a possession-only license may contain a significant amount of radioactivity in the form of activated and contaminated hardware and structural materials. Surveillance and commensurate security should be provided to assure that the public health and safety are not endangered. The physical barriers to unauthorized entrance into the facility, e.g., fences, buildings, welded doors, and access openings, should be inspected to assure that these barriers have not deteriorated and that locks and locking apparatus are intact”.44

19.8. This facility was, for all intensive purposes sealed (entombed) when it no longer became necessary to utilize it. This occurred sometime between 1956 - 1964. As indicated before, it may have been sealed prior to 1962 by the AEC or by the Air Force in 1964, during Project Ice. Most likely it was sealed by the AEC.

19.9. Surveillance and Security was never a problem at this site. This site was maintained by the highest degree of security humanly possible. This was after all, a nuclear weapons storage site for at least 30 years (from 1952 until at least 1982). Even after the nuclear weapons left Loring (supposedly sometime in the early 1980s), the degree of security was maintained.

19.10. Maintaining the security was never a problem for this site until the decision to close Loring Air Force Base. The Air Force now had a problem. The only solution was to decontaminate the facility for release for unrestricted use. Throughout the report you have seen references to measured levels of radiation. According to the report, the Air Force reached the conclusion that “No alpha/beta/gamma contamination above Nuclear Regulatory Commission unrestricted release criteria was found in Building 260”. That sounds reassuring until you realize that the unrestricted release criteria applied to decommissioned nuclear reactors, and not some concrete building somewhere that had a little radon gas build up.

19.11. One cannot ignore the requirements outlined in the regulatory guide that the Air Force used to evaluate the release of this facility. The regulatory requirements to complete this task as outlined in Regulatory Guide 1.86 are as follows:

20. DECONTAMINATION FOR RELEASE FOR UNRESTRICTED USE.

20.1. If it is desired to terminate a license and to eliminate any further surveillance requirements, the facility should be sufficiently decontaminated to prevent risk to the public health and safety. After the decontamination is satisfactorily accomplished and the site inspected by the Commission, the Commission may authorize the license to be terminated and the facility

43 U.S. AEC Regulatory Guide 1.86 Termination of Operating Licenses For Nuclear Reactors 44 U.S. AEC Regulatory Guide 1.86 Termination of Operating Licenses For Nuclear Reactors

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abandoned or released for unrestricted use. The license (Air Force), should perform the decontamination using the following guidelines:45

20.1.1. The licensee (Air Force) should make a reasonable effort to eliminate residual contamination.

20.1.2. No covering should be applied to radioactive surfaces of equipment or structures by paint, plating, or other covering material until it is known that contamination levels (determined by a survey and documented) are below the limits specified in Table I. In addition, a reasonable effort should be made (and documented) to further minimize contamination prior to any such covering.

20.2. Prior to release of the premises for unrestricted use, the licensee (Air Force) should make a comprehensive radiation survey establishing that contamination is within the limits specified in Table I. A survey report should be filed with the Director of Licensing, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545, with a copy to the Director of the Regulatory Operations Regional Office having jurisdiction. The report should be filed at least 30 days prior to the planned date of abandonment. The survey report should:

20.2.1. Identify the premises;

20.2.2. Show that reasonable effort has been made to reduce residual contamination to as low as practicable levels;

20.2.3. Describe the scope of the survey and the general procedures followed; and

20.2.4. State the finding of the survey in units specified in Table I.

20.3. After review of the report, the Commission may inspect the facilities to confirm the survey prior

to granting approval for abandonment.46

45 U.S. AEC Regulatory Guide 1.86 Termination of Operating Licenses For Nuclear Reactors 46 U.S. AEC Regulatory Guide 1.86 Termination of Operating Licenses For Nuclear Reactors

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Table I of Regulatory Guide 1.86 lists ACCEPTABLE SURFACE CONTAMINATION

LEVELS. The table is broken down in to the following columns:47

NUCLIDE a AVERAGE b c MAXIMUM b d REMOVABLE b e

U-nat, U-235, U-238, and associated decay products

5,000 dpm a /100 cm²

15,000 dpm a /100 cm²

1,000 dpm a /100 cm²

Transuranics, Ra-226, Ra-228, Th-230, Th-228, Pa-231, Ac-227, I-125, I-129

100 dpm /100 cm²

300 dpm /100 cm²

20 dpm /100 cm²

Th-nat, Th-232, Sr-90, Ra-223, Ra-224, U-232, I-126, I-131, I-133

1000 dpm /100 cm²

3000 dpm /100 cm²

200 dpm /100 cm²

Beta-gamma emitters (nuclides with decay modes other than alpha emission or spontaneous fission) except Sr-90 and others noted above.

5000 dpm By /100 cm²

15,000 dpm By /100 cm²

1000 dpm By /100 cm²

(a) Where surface contamination by both alpha- and beta-gamma-emitting nuclides exists, the limits

established for alpha- and beta-gamma-emitting nuclides should apply independently. (b) As used in this table, dpm (disintegration’s per minute) means the rate of emission by radioactive

material as determined by correcting the counts per minute observed by an appropriate detector for background, efficiency, and geometric factors associated with the instrumentation.

(c) Measurements of average contaminant should not be averaged over more than 1 square meter. For

objects of less surface area, the average should be derived for each such object. (d) The maximum contamination level applies to an area of not more than 100 cm². (e) The amount of removable radioactive material per 100 cm² of surface area should be determined by

wiping that area with dry filter or soft absorbent paper, applying moderate pressure, and assessing the amount of radioactive material on the wipe with an appropriate instrument of known efficiency. When removable contamination on objects of less surface area is determined, the pertinent levels should be reduced proportionally and the entire surface should be wiped.

21. RADIOACTIVE WASTE

21.1. Conclusions regarding this investigation are anything but final. While much has been learned about this event that was unknown before, there are still many facts yet to be revealed. For one, the exact levels or amounts of radioactive material which were found inside building 260 still are not known. Were the shelves empty as the Air Force claims? There are individuals who know the answers to these, and other pertinent questions. However, these individuals either can’t, or won’t, talk about this event. And while this report is about building 260, this particular building is only one part of the entire story. In fact, there are many facilities and areas within the

47 U.S. AEC Regulatory Guide 1.86 Termination of Operating Licenses For Nuclear Reactors

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boundaries of this site, which equally compare to the levels discovered in the building 260 incident.

21.2. Some of these other facilities and areas, possessed radioactive dangers equal to or greater than building 260. And what about building 272? Building 272, while structurally different than building 260, was built and used for the same purpose. This incident was only the tip of the iceberg in relation to the hazards this site contained, and may still possess to this day.

21.3. The cleanup of the nuclear weapons complex is just beginning. The Department of Defense and the Department of Energy will tell you that the proposed cleanup is an overreaction that is grossly out of proportion to the risk the contamination represents and that this cleanup will be remembered as one of the most expensive environmental remediations in history.

21.4. The bill for simply isolating the damaged environments at 130 sites in 30 states in order to protect nearby neighbors could total at least $170 billion, while complete restoration could consume more than $500 billion, a conservative estimate. Other analysts have suggested that it will cost a trillion dollars—money this country really can’t afford.

21.5. In today’s new world of openness and environmental regulation, Los Alamos scientists have found themselves having to acknowledge that mistakes were made in the headlong race to outdo the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Some experts have admitted to carelessness. There were many considerations during the arms race that had nothing to do with environmental concerns. An analogy given was that you drop everything in the sink when you hear the baby fall in the next room. And you worry later about coming back and cleaning up. Well, now it’s time to come back. Not all of the radioactive waste has been found yet. Most people at Los Alamos think that we have to keep looking.

21.6. The extent of contamination throughout the nuclear weapons complex and at military installations isn’t even completely clear because no one knows for sure where it all is.48 Careful attention needs to be made in the area of current and future plans for this site. The cover-up is still going on to this day. Some of those who were involved in 1992 are still involved today. Some of these individuals are at the highest level of our government. The remainder of this report will address some startling facts that this investigation has uncovered. All of these facts are substantiated by documented evidence.

22. THE WILD LIFE REFUGE

22.1. In the summer of 1998, Senator Olympia Snowe (R-Maine) announced that a 4,800-acre property, which is an undeveloped portion of the former military base, would be used as a wildlife refuge. News accounts read “Loring land set for wildlife refuge”. The news article stated the following:

22.1.1. Ending years of wrangling between two federal departments, the Air Force transferred ownership of about half of the former Loring Air Force Base to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. The signing ceremony was held in Washington, D.C. “The Aroostook National Wildlife Refuge will provide a peaceful enclave on the former Loring Air Force Base where Aroostook County residents, and visitors from throughout America, can enjoy the solace

48 Secret Mesa, Inside Los Alamos National Laboratory, Copyright © 1998 by Jo Ann Shroyer

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and beauty of northern Maine,” Snowe said in a prepared statement. Snowe has worked with both the Air Force and the wildlife service to iron out differences on how the property should be transferred. An agreement was reached earlier this year between the two parties in which the Air Force will raze some buildings and provide fencing to protect the public from various hazards.

22.2. This investigation has uncovered that the fencing that will be installed to protect the public from “various hazards”, will surround the former boundaries of Caribou AFS. The question that needs to be asked, is just what hazards are the public being protected against?49

22.3. The agreement between the Air Force and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service came only after a much publicized criticism of the progress on the transfer of the property. Early in 1998, the Loring Development Authority, frustrated over the apparent inaction in establishing the wildlife refuge intervened in the standstill. The LDA stated that there had been some interest from the commercial sector in the former weapons storage bunkers, in which most of the problems lie for the wildlife service. Brian Hamel, president of the LDA had suggested that they expand its property lines to include that site. It was also stated that at one time, the University of Maine System also was interested in the property as a research forest, according to Elizabeth Reuthe, another LDA trustee.50

22.4. Air Force leaders knew that with the close of Loring, a closure that had been stalled for twenty years, the government was going to loose control over an area that was not environmentally maintained, or safe for public access and use.

22.5. Unfortunately, the closure of Loring was a nasty bureaucratic war between Congress’ Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) and an aggressive, citizen-base group called the “Save Loring Committee.” Having East Loring remain “Air Force Property” was now too controversial, so it was to be deeded to another agency of the government. Ownership by the Fish and Wildlife service would prevent parcels from being sold and falling into the hands of residents of Aroostook County, unsuspecting of the area’s contamination.

22.6. The public will not have free access, nor will it be allowed within the boundaries of the former Caribou Air Force Station. This will ensure that the land is protected and maintained by the government. National Wildlife Refuge’s have traditionally been established to set aside a portion of animal’s natural habitat when their environment is threatened. Most refuges are established because the area has undergone development to the point that the indigenous wildlife has no place to live. Their natural habitat has been destroyed to make way for progress. Progress includes business, roads, housing development, etc. Most of the nation’s refuges are in or near urban areas. Of the millions of acres of undeveloped wilderness in Aroostook County, some of which is already owned by the Federal Government, an abandoned Nuclear Weapons Storage site with “various hazards”, was chosen as the site for the refuge.

22.7. From the early 1950s through the mid 1960s, no one was that concerned about waste. It was simply buried on site. That much is already known. It was a well-established practice. Unfortunately records were not kept. Various site plans for this particular site identify no less than eight designated radioactive waste disposal areas. This does not however, mean that there are no other places waste was disposed of. The site covers more than a thousand acres. The Air Force will make sure that the public will not have access to these lands in the future. The

49 BDN, Debra Sund 50 BDN, Debra Sund

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fencing-in of Site Easy has already begun. The refuge is slated to open by the fall of 1999. A ribbon cutting ceremony is tentatively scheduled for September 1999.

23. FINAL SUMMATION

23.1. There is one overwhelming issue that is prevalent in this incident. It is the fact that the health and safety of the workers involved in the initial penetration of Building 260 was ignored. The government has an extensive track record of more than 50 years of denying; ignoring and explaining away reported exposures of government employees and the surrounding civilian population to radiation.

23.2. The nuclear testing program was just one of the most known series of events in radiation exposure. The fact that this particular site existed, the fact that nuclear weapons were present, or the fact that radioactive waste had remained, is not what this report is about. These facts, while certainly relevant and important do not constitute justification for the deliberate distrust, manipulation, and misinformation released to the news media by the Air Force and the Congressional representatives elected by the citizens of Maine.

23.3. Nothing about plutonium is benign. All through the endless series of tests, manufacture, and maintenance of nuclear weapons, the effects of plutonium on humans was overlooked. Plutonium has been called the deadliest poison in the world and the most deadly material in the world. Yet the studies on its toxic effects have been few. Plutonium belongs to an entirely new class of radionuclides. It has been estimated that if 1/30 millionth of an ounce of plutonium is inhaled, it will cause cancer. Plutonium possesses a hazardous life span of a minimum of 480,000 years. Its half-life is over 24,000 years. Being sealed up for only 30 years would not begin to decrease its lethal effects.51

23.4. No one can claim that the deceit and outright lies about this event were justified in the name of National Security. The Air Force and the government will continue to claim that neither the workers nor the citizens of Aroostook County were in any danger, at any time. In the spirit of truthfulness, uncensored historical accuracy, and candor with the citizens of the State of Maine and the United States of America, this report is submitted for public review and comment.

51 The Day We Bombed Utah: Americas Most Lethal Secret, Copyright © 1984 by John G. Fuller, Page 203.

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TERMS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND NAMES

(The positions and titles listed for individuals were for in 1992, unless otherwise stated) 3080 Aviation Depot Group The primary unit assigned to Caribou Air Force Station in the 1950s.

42 BMW The 42nd Bombardment Wing, the primary unit assigned to Loring Air Force Base. All personnel assigned to Loring were to support, directly or indirectly, its fleet of B-36, and then B-52 bombers.

AEC “Atomic Energy Commission”; the 1950’s name for what is now the “Department of Energy.” This is a civilian agency from which the “Manhattan Project” and subsequently the “Armed Forces Special Weapons Project” was regulated.

AFLC Air Force Logistics Command

AFRAT Air Force Radiation Assessment Team

Akladiss, Naji Employee of the Maine Department of Environmental Protection, Federal Facilities Unit, Augusta, Maine.

Aroostook A county in Northern Maine

Bartel, Col Dean From the Compliance Division, Air Force Headquarters, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C.

BDN Bangor Daily News

Bean, Col Allan K. Loring’s Civil Engineer and coordinator of the project unsealing building 260; Currently (1999) the Town Manager of Houlton, Maine.

Black and Veatch The Kansas City-based architect-engineer for the design of Caribou Air Force Station

BRAC Base Realignment and Closure Commission

Brooks AFB Located in San Antonio, Texas, home of “AFRAT”

CAFS Caribou Air Force Station, also called “Site Easy”, and “East Loring

Case, Col David R. Aerospace Medical Consultants Division, Headquarters Air Force’s Surgeon General’s Office.

Cohen, William S. Maine Republican Senator; currently (1999) Secretary of Defense

DoD Department of Defense

Carl M. Drechsel Utilities Superintendent, 42 CES, Loring Air Force Base

Gordon-Hagerty, Lisa E. From the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Transportation Safeguards and Emergency Management, Germantown, Maryland.

Hamel, Brian Currently (1999) president of the Loring Development Authority, a non-profit agency overseeing the civilian reuse of the former Loring Air Force Base property and facilities.

Hoxie, Donald Director of the Maine State Health Engineering Division

Jordan, Maj Donald W. Armstrong Laboratory, Bio-environmental Division, Brooks Air Force Base, Texas (AFRAT).

KC-135 A mid-1950’s Air Refueling & transport jet, based on the Boeing 707, assigned to Loring in the late 1950s

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LAFB Loring Air Force Base

Maher, Col Edward F. Armstrong Laboratory, Bio-environmental Division, Brooks Air Force Base, Texas (AFRAT).

Mitchell, George J. Maine Democratic Senator

Moncrief, TSgt Donald Spokesperson at the Loring Public Affairs Office

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

PCB Polychlorinated biphenyl

Radon A radioactive gas given off by the decay of plutonium or uranium

Reeder, 2LT Bridget Spokesperson at the Loring Public Affairs Office

Reuthe, Elizabeth A trustee of the Loring Development Authority

SAC Strategic Air Command, a major division of the US Air Force, specifically tasked with bomber type aircraft and missions.

Schell, Robert J. Maine Bureau of Health, Division of Health Engineering, Radiation Control Program Office, Augusta, Maine.

Schneider, Col Gary N. Commander of 42nd Bomb Wing, Loring Air Force Base

Sensintaffer,Edwin L. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Air and Radiation Environmental Laboratory, Montgomery, Alabama.

Site Easy A secret code name for “Caribou Air Force Station”

Smith, J. Michael U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Air and Radiation Environmental Laboratory, Montgomery, Alabama.

Snowe Olympia J. U.S. Representative (Maine), currently (1999) a Maine Senator

Mike Thurlow Foreman of the Exterior Electric Division, 42nd CES, Loring Air Force Base

Toppan, Clough Engineer, Maine State Department of Human Services, Radiological Control Program

USAF United States Air Force

Van Orsdol, Col James R. Deputy Chief of Programs and Legislative Division

Vest, Gary D. Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force; Official in charge of cleaning up toxic wastes at Loring,

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INDEX

AFLC, 6. See Air Force Logistics Command AFRAT, 7, 8, 11, 30 AFSWP, 13 Air Force Logistics Command, 14 Air Force Radiation Assessment Team, 7 Air Material Command, 14 Akladiss

Naji, 12 americium, 21 Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, 13 Armentrout

Charles, 9 Armstrong Laboratory, 7, 8, 9, 11, 18, 19, 20, 30 Army Corps of Engineers, 14 Aroostook

Wildlife Refuge,, 4 Atomic Energy Commission, 7 Aviation Depot Group, 14 Bangor Daily News, 9 Bartel

Col Dean, 11, 12, 29 Base Realignment and Closure Commission, 27,

29 Bean

Col Allan K., 18, 19 Black and Veatch, 14, 29 Brooks

Air Force Base, 7, 10, 11, 18, 29, 30 Caribou Air Force Station, 5, 6, 14, 17, 27 Case

Col David R., 11 cesium, 10 Cohen

Senator William, S., 8, 10, 11, 12, 30 Department of Defense, 7, 11, 26 Department of Environmental Protection, 12, 29 Energy

Department of, 11, 12, 14, 15, 21, 22, 24, 26, 30 Environmental Protection

Maine State Department of, 7 Environmental Protection Agency, 11

United States, 7, 11, 12, 30 Gordon-Hagerty

Lisa E., 12, 30

Grodzins Lee, 9

Hamel

Brian, 27, 30 Hoxie

Donald, 10, 30 ICE

Project, 9 Jordan

Maj Donald W., 11 KC-135, 7 Limestone Air Force Base. See Loring Air Force

Base Loring

Air Force Base, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 23, 26

Development Authority, 27 East. See Caribou Air Force Station East, 8, 14 Public Affairs, 4, 12, 14, 30

Maher

Col Edward F., 11, 30 Mitchell

Senator George J., 8, 11 Phair

James H., 14 picocuries, 9, 12 plutonium, 20, 21 Plutonium, 4, 5, 19, 20, 21, 30 Polychlorinated biphenyl, 7 potassium, 10 Pu-239. See Plutonium Q

Area, 17 radionuclides, 8, 12 Radon, 4, 8, 9, 12, 19, 20, 23 Reeder

2LT Bridget, 14, 18 Reuthe

Elizabeth, 27

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Schell Robert J., 12, 30

Schneider Col Gary N., 7, 14, 15, 30

Sensintaffer Edwin L., 12, 30

Site Easy, 9, 14, 28 Smith

J. Michael, 11 Snowe

Olympia J., 8, 10, 11, 26, 27, 31

Strategic Air Command, 5 Strategic Air Force, 7 Toppan

Clough, 10, 31 uranium, 10, 19, 20 Vest

Gary D., 11