Long. the Self-Defeating Character of Skepticism

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Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearchVol. LI1,No. 1, March 1992

The Self-Defeating CharacterofSkepticism

DOUGLASC. LONG

The University f NorthCarolina t ChapelHill

1. SKEPTICISM AND THE EPISTEMIC PRIORITY OFEXPERIENCE

An important source of doubt about our knowledge of the "external

world" is the thought that all of our sensory experience could be delusive

without our realizing it. For all I know, my life could be only a coherent

dreamin which objects and otherpeople do not really exist. Such wholesale

questioningof the deliverancesof all forms of perceptionseems to leave us

no resources for successfully justifying our belief in the existence of an

objective world beyond our subjective experiences.

Not all epistemologists agree with that assessment. For instance,

"externalists" hold that our knowledge of the world is secure, provided

that certain conditions are in fact satisfied, such as the reliability of the

perceptual mechanisms giving rise to our perceptualbeliefs. They do not

believe it is necessary to know that our senses arereliable in orderto possess

knowledge about the world. This curt response to skepticism does not

satisfy "internalists" who seek a way, using epistemological resources

which are available to us, to justify the claim that we do in fact have reliable

perceptual access to objects. Such justification might be achieved by

producing a positive justification for a general "belief in objects."V

Alternatively we might try to show that there is something wrong with the

skeptical argumentand thatno such justification s necessary.

In what follows I pursue the latter strategy, arguing that there is a fatal

flaw in the very expression of philosophical doubt about the "externalworld." The feature of skepticism which I believe renders it vulnerable is

the assumptionthateach of us has a right to be certain of his own existence

as a subjectof conscious experienceeven in the face of comprehensivedoubt

about our empirical beliefs. From the time of Descartes's cogito argument,

philosophers have thought that the most extravagant doubts about our

cognitive faculties cannotassail our assuranceof ourown existence. For that

THiESELF-DEFEATINGCHARACTEROF SKEPTICISM 67



assurance,it is said, we do not requireveridical sensory perception."Inner

perception"provides us with an indubitableself-awareness, if not directly,

at least by inference from the fact of one's experiences. Moreover, the

possibility of this inference accounts for our ability to refer to ourselves

independently of any knowledge of the external world. This alleged

capacity for self-reference under skeptical ground rules may be thin,

pointing to no more than "the thinking subject," yet it has seemed to

provide an adequatebasis for expressingskepticismin a self-conscious, first

person form: "I know thatI exist, along with my experiences and thoughts,

but I cannot claim to have knowledge of the world aroundme."

Contrary to this tradition, I question the coherence of self-conscious

skepticism on the grounds that our "introspective" self-knowledge

ultimately depends upon our capacities to perceive ourselves as individualagents from an objective point of view sharedby others. My thesis is that

philosophical doubt undercuts the perceptual access to oneself as an

individual subject of mental states that is required both to know of one's

existence as a subject and to be capable of self-reference. Hence, self-

conscious skepticism is internallyincoherent and self-defeating.

To defeat skepticism it is important to challenge the doctrine that

"direct" awareness of the mental or subjective character of experience has

what Barry Stroud calls epistemicc priority" over ordinary empiricalknowledge.' Unless this challenge is successful it is unlikely that we can

justify rejecting with confidence the thought that all our perceptionsmay be

delusive. For if we concede that the concept of "mere experience" is

available to the doubting ego, without any essential reference to objective

existence, this permits the speculation that all experiences purporting to

representwhat is outside theego's mind are non-veridical. It is the apparent

intelligibility of this speculation which renders the "loss of significant

contrast" argument offered by Gilbert Ryle and J. L. Austin ineffective

against traditional doubt.2 It may be that the concept of non-veridical

perception makes sense only to someone with the concept of veridical

perception, but the skeptic claims the ego has the relevant contrasting

concepts. The ego's problem is to determine which representational

experiences,if any, arein factveridical.

Both the importance of attacking the skeptic's subjective startingpoint

and the possibility of doing so are easily overlookedbecause we tend to as-

1 Barry Stroud correctly points to the "epistemic priority of ideas or appearancesor per-

ceptions over external physical objects" as the key to skepticism. However, he does not

think he can show this starting assumption to be incoherent. See The Significance of

Philosophical Scepticism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 140 and also chap. vii.

Subsequentreferences to this book will be cited as (SPS) in my text.2 Gilbert Ryle, Dilemmas (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press; 1950), p. 95. Austin,

Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1962), 11.

68 DoUGLAs .LONG



sume that philosophical skepticism arises within our ordinaryfirst person

point of view. We need to be reminded that a "purely subjective epistemol-

ogy," one that questions the deliverances of perception across the board, is

not the perspective of common sense. As Austin pointed out, ordinarily we

do not raise doubts about what we see and hear without some special reason

for doing so.3 We should not be surprised, therefore, to find thatgiving up

all perceptual judgments at once creates problems not only for our

knowledge of material objects in the world but knowledge of ourselves as

well, since we too are in the world. The crucial issue to consider then is

whether the resources for expressing skepticism are available within a

resolutely subjective epistemology.

2. SKEPTICISM AND THE MATERIAL SELF

The conception of "inner"knowledge that is at the heart of self-conscious

skepticism has no doubt derived some of its support from the traditional

dualistic bifurcation of humanbeings into bodies, whose existence may be

questioned, and immaterial minds known to their possessors either by

introspectionor by inference from what is introspected.Now that dualism

is in eclipse and the idea that human beings have a materialconstitutionis

ascendant, it might be thought that there is a quick way to show that the

self-awareness assumed by skepticism conflicts with general philosophicaldoubt. P. F. Strawson has remarked that "at its most general, the skeptical

point concerning the external world seems to be that subjective experience

could, logically, be just the way it is without its being the case that physical

or material things actually existed."4But if I believe that I am a material

being, it seems that the skeptic invites me to question my own existence

along with that of other material things. The invitation must, of course, be

refused, as it is incompatible with my belief that I exist to engage in the

inquiry.

However, the epistemological challenge of skepticism can be posed with-

out requiringacceptanceof a dualisticontology of persons. If I do not know

whether any material things exist, but I am certain of my own existence,

then I do not know that I am material. The question of my ontological

nature may be open in a way that my own existence is not. One's body need

not be conceived as being substantially distinct from an immaterialself in

the way envisaged by dualism to be part of the "external world." What'external' means here is that one's body or physical aspect is epistemically

beyond the grasp of introspective knowledge about oneself. This is

3 J. L. Austin, "OthcrMinds," in Philosophical Papers (Oxford, 1961), 56, 81.4 P. F. Strawson, "Skepticism, Naturalism, and TranscendentalArguments," chapter 1 of

Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties (New York: Columbia University Press,

1985), 5.

TIIESELF-DEFEATINGHARACTERFSKEPTICISM 9



compatible with being material;but it is not to deny that, were there no

material entities, and if I possessed indubitableself-awareness, this would

entail thatI exist as an immaterial ndividual.

Thereare,however, modem counterparts f the Cartesiandemonscenario

which appear to assume the material natureof the experiencing subject.An

example is the much-discussedhypothesisthat,withoutknowing it, one is a

brain floating in a vat of nourishingliquid. A streamof signals is fed into

the cerebrumby scientists who create a non-existent reality for the brain-

subject and "teach" t a languagewhich it uses to describeits experience of

"the world."5Closely related is Keith Lehrer's less invasive "braino cap,"6

which similarly feeds sensory signals into the skull of an intact human

being. Computercontrolled video goggles and datagloves alreadyare used

to create artificial walk-in environments within which a person canexperience a non-existent "virtual"reality.7Even without such technical

aids an individual might experience multi-sensory hallucinations or

continuous and coherent dreams for much of his life. We should note,

however, that none of these scenarios questions the subject's warrantfor

believing he exists; nor do they requirehim even to believe thathe may not

be material. At most what is threatened s his warrant or claiming to know

whatpropertieshe has and what situationhe is in. They invite him to wonder

whetherhe is in reality a brainthe size of a grapefruitor a being the size of aplanet. Thus, even in this ontologically less radical form, the success or

failure of self-conscious skepticism turns on whether or not perception of

ourselves is essential to (1) the justificationof beliefs about ourselves and

(2) the self-reference expressedin such beliefs.

3. KNOWLEDGE OF ONE'S OWN MENTAL AGENCY

The purely subjectiveepistemological startingpoint upon which skepticism

is based is dramatically described by Descartes at the end of the First

Meditationwhere he imagines that a malicious and powerful demon is pre-

senting him with a streamof data which project a nonexistent world outside

his mind. The only thing he is certain of is his own existence as a conscious

and thinking thing. Let us suppose for the moment that this skeptical hy-

pothesis is truein my case. Then the human protagonistof my delusion, this

person here (puttingmy hand on my chest) is merely part of the delusion.

5 See, for example, Ililary Putnam's much-criticized attempt to refute this skeptical hy-

pothesis in chapter 1 of Reason, Truthand History (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity

Press, 1981). John L. Pollock offers a particularly compelling "vat" story in

ContemporaryTheories of Knowledge (Totowa,N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986), 1-

3.

6 James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George S. Pappas, Philosophical Problems and

Arguments:AnIntroduction 3rd ed. rev.;New York: The MacmillanCompany,1982), 54.7 BennettDaviss, "illusions," Discover (June, 1990): 37-41.

70 DOUGLAS.LONG



The subject who actually has my experiencescannot be "me,"if this pronoun

is meant to refer to my ordinaryempirical self, which does not exist. Or if

we thinkin terms of one of the science fiction scenarios, the brain in the vat

which I am supposed to be is not this (empirical) brain here (pointing into

my skull) but some other entity altogether.

To whom or to what, then, do "my" experiences belong? The pro forma

answer that they belong to me tells us nothing about what individualentity

is supposed to have those experiences. But if I am not in perceptual contact

with my real self, how is it possible for me to know that there is a suitable

entity to whom a mind or experiences can be legitimatelyascribed?We must

be on guard not to let our common sense capacity for routine self-reference

make it appearthat there is no problemhere.

In his Second Meditation Descartes noticed this consequence of hisradical doubt. "ButI was persuaded that there was nothing in all the world,

thattherewas no heaven,no earth,that therewere no minds,norany bodies:

was I not then likewise persuadedthatI did not exist?"8He realized, firstof

all, that a purely mentaland immaterialsubstance,as he conceived the mind

to be, is nota properobjectof perception.On the otherhand,if he cannotrely

cognitively on sight, touch, or kinesthetic feeling, he cannot claim to be

perceptually aware of any individual, including himself. Why then did he

and later philosophers not conclude that all-encompassing doubt aboutperception completely undermines first person claims to know of one's

existence?

The answer, of course, is that, with the notable exceptions of Hume and

Kant, philosophers have generally assumed with Descartes that one's exis-

tence as a subject is not in doubt because belief in one's existence can be

justified independentlyof perceptual knowledge.9 Such self-access has not

been regardedas being epistemically direct, because the soul or mind is not

itself an object of introspection.Descartes, for example, held that any sub-

stance is known by its attributes,which in the case of the mind are mind-de-

pendentmodes of thinkingor cogitationes.10 He canjustify belief in his own

existence as a mental substance throughhis immediateawareness of mental

actions, such as doubting,affirming,willing, all of which can occuronly in a

mind. He first identifies what is occurringas "mentalaction" (thinking)and

then employs the principle-call it Principle MA (for mental acts)-to

8 Meditations, HR II, 150.9 P. F. Strawson develops Kant's argument that self-awareness is not possible without

supposing that one is able to perceive an objective order, a world of objects of "outer

sense" in space-time in The Bounds of Sense (London:Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1966), 97-

110, 125-32. My simpler anti-skeptical argument focuses directly on skepticism's

troublesome implications for self-knowledge.10 Principles I, Iii (HR I, 240) and xi (HR I, 223).

MHEELF-DEFEATINGHARACEROFSKEPCISM 71



be an illusion, a possibility that should increase our appreciation of our

capacity to think for ourselves.

When focusing our attention on the more limited threat of general

sensory deception, skepticism takes illegitimate advantage of the fact that

we think of dreams and hallucinations as occurring to a person who

possesses a genuine core of active mentalcapacities. Against thisbackground

the skeptic invites us to imagine that our proprietary capacities are

artificially stimulated so as to create a "world" to which the victimized

mind is free to respond rationallywithin the delusion. If, however, we take

seriously the very powerful demon or brain-in-a-vat cenarios, there appears

to be no convincing way to justify one's belief that one is an active, creative

locus of mental agency, as opposed to an entirely passive arena of mere

happenings.Can the skeptic evade this objection by stipulating that the imagined

braino engineer has control only of the victim's peripheral sensory input,

leaving his central thought processes free to think his own thoughts? No,

since, by hypothesis, we cannotknow of such epistemologically convenient

but arbitrary estrictions.I cannot ascertainhow much I am contributingto

the origination and processing of what are supposed to be my ideas or

thoughts. In order to justify the belief that one is a "thinkingself' in the

sense of an individuallocus of originalmentalagency, one must know some-thing about his individual unity, identity through time, behavioral indepen-

dence, and self-control. The purelysubjectiveview at theheartof skepticism

affords none of this importantontological information about oneself as an

individual capable of action. For that we require ordinary observational

capacitieswhich the skeptic denies us.

4. INFERRING ONE'S OWN EXISTENCE

Doubts about our knowledge of our own mental agency may not appearto be

sufficient reason to give up the traditionaldogma that skepticism about the

material world leaves our awareness of ourselves relatively unscathed. It

might be thought that we can at least be certain that we exist as conscious,

experiencing subjects-whether we are active or only passive. It seems we

can infer by a Principle-call it ES this time-from the occurrence of

experiencesto theexistence of a conscious mindor subject thathas them.We

may know nothing of the metaphysical nature of that subject; but surely

theremustbe sucha thing.

There is, however, reasonto question the legitimacy of this inference be-

cause we cannotclaim to have therequiredpremise. Under the skeptic's rules

the humanbeing which common sense takes me to be is possibly partof a

delusion. Yet, I can claim no perceptual knowledge of an objective subject

who has the delusive experiencesin question.I have no knowledge of a being

THIEELF-DEFEAT1NGHARACTERFsKEPTiCISM73



whose behavior would provide grounds for thinking that there are mental

processes occurring within or to a particular subject which would explain

that behavior, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions.This suggests that, if I

am initially in doubt about the objective existence of a subject, then my

regarding what occurs within my consciousness as "experiences" or as

"conscious states of a subject" is not justifiable. For all I can tell from

"inside" my consciousness, as it were, my experiences could be simply

happenings, completely independent of any subject, and having no

significance beyond themselves. If so, skepticism deprivesme of knowledge

of my own existence as a subject of experience by denying me the use of

Principle ES.

This argument echoes Hume's problem about knowledge of the "self,"

but it is muchmore radical.Hume noted that,since the perceivingself is notwithin its own ken, a personcan focus only upon the streamof "distinctper-

ceptions"which "have no need of any thing to supporttheirexistence."13 f

thereis no a priori or logical connectionbetween suchperceptionsanda sup-

porting self, thenone cannot infer that a substantialsubjectexists on the ba-

sis of thoseperceptions.

It is tempting to dismiss Hume's objection on the grounds that mental

phenomena, such as perceptions, thoughts, and pains, must be ascribed to a

mind, since the contents of consciousness are not, as Hume suggests, inde-pendent particulars,but are essentially dependentfor theirexistence upon a

mind or subject. This is not merely a point about language to the effect that

mental verbs must have a grammaticalsubject, as does 'hurts' in "It hurts."

It is ratherthatwe are entitled by the very meaning of these psychological

expressions to assert that if perceiving, thinking, or pain is occurring, then

thereis a perceiver,thinker,or pained subject.Mentalphenomenaare, to use

Strawson's phrase, "dependent particulars,"in the sense that they occur

only to a subjectwho is in the mental state or undergoesthe mentalprocess

in question.14This appears to vindicate Descartes's reasoning over Hume's

objection.

Nonetheless, this reply fails to meet my criticism of the subjective ac-

count of self-knowledge. My claim is that the inference from experiences to

a subject illegitimately assumes the desired conclusion by invoking in its

premise the idea of something mental or subjective, even though Principle

ES is appealed to in the firstplace precisely because the existence of a subject

is in question.If the data for the premises are described, not as experiences,

but neutrallyand nonsubjectivelyas being merely something "happening,"

then, as Hume noticed, the inference to a subject of awareness by Principle

13 Treatise, Book I, part iv, section 6. Selby-Bigge, ed. (Oxford:ClarendonPress; 1951), 252

14 P. F. Strawson,Individuals(London:Methuenand Co. Ltd., 1959), 170.

74 DOUGlAS . LONG



ES is not justified. On the other hand, the ego has no way to establish the

essentially subjectiveanddependentcharacterof experienceby introspection

alone. If the subject is not included within the contents of the experiences

themselves, then it and its relation to the experiences are not accessible to

the ego. There are no purely introspectable grounds for saying that a

phenomenonis "mental,"where this means it is happeningin a mind or that

it is an object of awareness.15The doubtingego has no right to suppose that

something appropriately called "thinking," "pain," "anger" or, more

generally, "experience" is occurring, where these terms by their very

meaning carry the implicationthat there is a mind or subject to which they

belong.'6 Ourmerely having experiences is not sufficient to account for our

right to regard them as such. That requires the external perspective on

ourselves as objective subjects which perceptionprovides. And so the egocannot legitimately claim that his initial data are subjective experiences if

he is reduced to using only the meager resources available on the purely

subjectiveview.

My claim that one would have no right on the subjective view to charac-

terize the data initially as "mental"or "subjective"may seem counter-intu-

itive. Surely I can identify my experiencesand ascribe them to myself with-

out "external" observation of my behavior. Descartes is not alone in

insisting that the mental character of cogitationes is manifestly evident tointrospection. Many will insist that it is not possible to have a thought

without being aware that it is a thought having a certain content. Its

intentionality surely evidences its relation to the awareness of a mind or

personalsubject.

I suggest, however, that this self-intimatingcharacterof experience is an

illusion that is fostered by the fact that, with common sense epistemology

as a background, we have learned to describe much of our mental life

without having to appealexplicitly to our behavior.Descartes assumed that

the mind is more easily known thanthebody; but the truth s that each of us

is a competentself-ascriberonly because we are aware of our own existence

as active, purposive humanbeings. We understandthat we are appropriate

subjects for the ascriptionof mentalpredicatesby both othersand ourselves.

And so we can refer to our thoughts and feelings in the context of the

independently warranted belief that we are individuals to whom such

15 In "A Neo-KantianRefutationof CartesianScepticism " SouthwestPhilosophy Review, 3

(1986): 146, Edward S. Shirley argues similarly thatthe mental characterof sense-datais

not a propertyof them and so they cannot be experiencedas mental.16 Strawson seems to hint at this point on p. 101 of Individuals, when he says that "...the

most I may be allowed to have noted is thatexperiences,all experiences, stand in a specialrelation to body M.... (This 'most' is perhaps too much-because of the presence of theword 'experiences'.)"

THESELF-DEFEATINGCHARACTEROF SKEPTICISM 75



mentalphenomena are justifiablyascribable.The alleged epistemic priority

of introspectiveawareness of the mind is a myth.

5. EXTERNAL VERSUS TRANSCENDENT EXPERIENCE

I have argued that skepticism is much more troubling than has beentraditionally recognized, because it unwittingly undermines our self-

awareness. It might be suggested, however, that the fact that the ego's

beliefs abouthimselfcannotbejustifiedin the absence of perceptiondoes not

render completely unintelligible his speculation that a mind exists. This

suggestion is intended to parallelthe idea that someone who at least had the

concept of "an object" could engage in an intelligible speculation about

whether there are materialobjects, even if a belief in them was unwarranted.

It is controversial whether anyone could be said to "have" suchfundamental concepts as "object" or "mind" without having any

opportunity to apply them appropriately to objects and to intelligent

beings. But, leaving thataside, the fatal problemwith skepticismto which I

wish to call attention is that it undercuts the possibility of meaningful

reference to the particular ndividualthatis oneself. Self-reference requires

more than merely having a concept of "mind" or "person."One's words

must connect up with a particular ndividual,and one should have reason to

think there is that connection with oneself. But the ego can have no suchreason where skeptical doubts preclude its having warrantedbeliefs about

the existence of a particular individual from either external or internal

sources. The external world doubt implies that the ego has no right to

suppose thatthere is any humanbeing to which occurrences of the word 'I'

refer. And I claim that my argument against the identificationof a subject

purely by "internal experience" blocks the move that the first person

pronounrefers to whateverbeing it is that has (my) "experiences."There is

no possibility of legitimate reference to experiences. Given such deep

uncertaintiesabout self-reference from the ego's point of view, there is no

reason to think that it can be said to understandeven the bare speculation

that "I might exist." There is nothing within its ken to which it knows the

pronouncould refer.

The skeptic may attempt to meet this objection by citing a parallel with a

less controversialcase in which it seems thatI can refer to myself as a sub-

ject of experience even when I am not perceptuallyaware of myself. The ex-ample concerns the way my self-reference works in a dream when I say, "I

am only dreaming."It seems plausible to identify the protagonist who says

these words in the dream with the dreamer, i.e. the person who is really

asleep in bed. Yet, the sleeperis epistemically externalto the dreamer.Why,

asks the skeptic, should I not similarly identify myself with the possible

transcendent brain in the vat who is experiencing "my" biography in his

76 DOUGLAS.LONG



delusion? The suggestion is that if I were a brainin a vat, the word 'I' used

by me within my delusion would not designate the nonexistent protagonist

in the world of my delusion, but would refer right throughmy delusion to

the brain-subject which I really would be. This is possible, just as in mydreams, despite the fact that my real nature would be unknown to me

because it transcends my perceptual grasp. On this view of pronominal

reference,if, in the vat, I entertained he thought"I am sitting at a computer

keyboard now," that thought would be false, because the "I" in question

would in reality be a small round spongy item, lacking appendages, and

floating in liquid. It is perhaps not out of the question, the scenario

continues, that I might some day "wake up" to that "higher" reality and

realize my truecondition.All this sounds superficially intelligible, and the intelligibility of self-

reference in the scenario is all that the skeptic claims at this point. He need

not convince us that the vat speculation is true or that it is even plausible.

Nevertheless, serious doubt can be cast upon this apparent ntelligibility by

questioning the force of the analogy with self-identification in ordinary

dream examples. It is certainly possible for me to dream that I am having

wild adventures,while someone else sees that I am actually lying in bed.

When I awaken, I myself take up the role of observer, perceiving my truesituation, and from thatwaking vantage point I am in a position to speak of

what I did in my dream. It is plausible to suggest that my waking

identificationof the dreamprotagonist as myself is what gives sense to the

claim that my use of the first person pronoun when asleep referred

"through" he dream,so to speak, to the real, material me and not merely to

the protagonist n the dream. Had I always been in a deep sleep therewould

be no reason to think thatwhatever understandingof self-reference I might

have could escape the confines of my dreams. What is crucial to thepossibility of genuine self-reference in a dream, then, is that the person is

capable of ordinary,waking reference to herself as a humanbeing and that

when she awakes she reports the dreamin the firstperson as something that

(seemed to) have happened to her. Of course, if one agrees with Anthony

Kenny that "one cannot make judgments during dreams" or "entertain

beliefs in sleep," then one will object that a dreamercannot, refer in her

thoughts "out" of the dream to herself or anythingelse. But then, so much

the worse for the skeptic's appealto this analogy.17

If we comparethis dreamexample to the allegedly parallelskeptical sce-

nario, we find that there is a significant difference. Suppose the common

sense notion of "a dream" is expanded by the reckless philosophical

imagination to encompassboth my dreamingand my presentwaking life, so

17 AnthonyKenny,Descartes (New York: RandomHouse, 1968), 30-31.

THESEI-DEFEATINGCHIARACR OFSKEPTICSM77



that nothing within my experience is permitted to count as a genuine

perception of myself. My "real self" transcends my present sense

experience.But in this case no paradigmatic elf-referenceis availableto me

of the sort I have when awake to lend credibility to the suggestion thatI, inmy totaldelusion, may now be referring o my transcendent elf. There is no

provision in the skeptical scenario for validating my self-reference by my

actually perceiving and identifying myself from the alleged transcendent

view, as there is in the case of a dream. Hence, ordinarydreamexperience

cannot be used to render intelligible the idea of a merely speculative

referenceto something dentifiedas oneself in an unexperienced econd-order

reality.

6. OBSERVATION BY OTHERS

Nonetheless, the thought persists that it at least makes sense to speculate

that I might be totally unaware of my real nature and situation,because we

know that sometimes one person is in a position to observe that anotheris

deceived abouthimself. Canwe imaginean extremecase, a twinof mine who

has been completely deludedsince birth,but who is rationaland who thinks,

just as I do, thathe has always been in touch with reality?We think of him

as referringto himself within his delusion and falsely believing that he is

able to perceive himself froman external,objective point of view. He has no

idea that he is seen to be totally deluded from a perspective that is

epistemically inaccessible to what he thinks of as his perceptionof objects.

If his case is conceivable, how can I insist withjustificationthatI am now in

an epistemic position superior to his? How can I resist the suggestion thatI

might be in an analogouspositionrelative to anotherobserver?

My answer is that, unlike me, my twin is, by hypothesis, incapable of

perceiving either himself or his surroundings.On the basis of our common

sense epistemology, accordingto which the reliability of sense perceptionis

the default position, we are able to identify and refer to the twin, and

ascertain that his cognitive faculties are not functioning properly with

respect to what is true about himself or the world. We find that he is not

awareof himself in any richersense thanthathe has feelings and sensations

occasioned by his body. He does not understand any seemingly self-

referential expressions that escape his lips because he is unaware of theperson in the world (himself) to which such terms normallyrefer.

On the otherhand,my situation is very differentfrom his since I can and

do perceive myself in my surroundingsand can refer to myself. I cannot

make sense of the suggestion that I may unknowingly be in a similar state,

because that would require me to ignore what I believe to be true about

myself insofar as I understand references to me at all. My having the

capacity to conceive that a humanbeing might be totally out of perceptual

78 DOUGLASC.ONG



contact with his environment does not entail that I also understand that I

could now be in that condition or that I might always have been in that

condition. The thought thatI am so cognitively incapacitatedwould cost me

the rightto believe I can entertain hatvery speculationaboutmyself.It is tempting to think that the hypothesis that I am now totally deluded

is intelligible to me because I can imagine anotherobserver,call her T, who

considers me to be out of touch with reality just as I think this of my twin.

The appealto a hypotheticalobjective observeris meantto convince me that

all of my beliefs may be false, even the ones regarding my own nature and

situation. What may slip by unnoticedis that T cannot be viewing me from

the ordinary external perspective which was the context of the twin

example and within which I believe I have perceptualaccess to myself, toother people, and to my surroundings.For if I were to institute a thorough

search of "my universe," I would not encounter T, just as I would not

discover the braino on my head, or my real self, for that matter. The

philosophical skeptic wants me to imagine my being viewed from a

perspective that stands "outside"the ordinary one, a transcendent point of

view from which I can be observed now to be a brain in a vat, despite my

perceptionsto the contrary.

This is the "higher-order"perspective of the Cartesian demon who is

able to perceive me at this moment and determine that, despite what I and

my friendsbelieve, my experiences are delusions and my ontological nature

(along with thatof my friends)is quite other thanI suppose it to be.

But this substitutionof what is in fact a transcendentperspective for the

external perceptual one we are all familiarwith and all normally share, is a

trick. There is no such perspective for T or anyone else to take up. The idea

that there is a level of Reality relative to which the world that we all live

in could turnout to be only someone's dream is nothing but a plausible bit

of nonsense. Such talkmay seem to be meaningfulat first because it appears

to appeal merely to an externalobserver,as in the twin case. However, if I

then fall in with the skeptical suggestion that ordinary seeing, hearing, and

touching provides merely subjectiveawareness of what is phenomenal, this,

in effect, places the observer of my conditionepistemically outside not only

me, but outside everything and everyone in my world. The perceptual

observation which is from a point within the world and external merely tomy introspection has become a "transcendent" observation which is

external even to perception.We have passed from ordinarydoubt about my

possible cognitive failings and delusions to a seemingly invincible

philosophical doubt that is based upon the allegedly subjective nature of

experience to which any observer is vulnerable.

'SE SELF-DEFEATINGHARACTERFSKEPCISM 79



This skeptical move illustrates the classic shift, noted by Thompson

Clarke, from doubt stated in "plain" talk to a "philosophical" question.18

It also representsthe way that Stroud, in the words of Hans-JohannGlock,

"quietly turns reality into REALITY-a metaphysical ordo essendi whichcan always show everythingwe say or believe to be wrong."19Not even the

demon or T is in a position to claim more reliable knowledge aboutReality

than I, so they too must be worried about skepticism in their turn.20Stroud

sees nothing objectionable in this result that "we all might be in the same

boat" (SPS, 272), but it in fact reveals how far we have come from the twin

example in which we supposed that persons with unimpaired,unquestioned

cognitive faculties could judge another ndividual to be deluded.The skeptic,

by questioning all perceptions, implicitly appeals to a "higher reality"relative to which our waking is a dream. But the idea of a "transcendent"

reality offering such a critical view of our world is empty. Unlike the

distinctions between waking and sleeping or clear-headed perception and

delusion, the relevant external/transcendentdistinction has not been and

cannot be intelligibly introduced.2',

7. THE LIMITS OF DELUSION

The moral of my anti-skeptical argument is that only limited

epistemological dislocations, occasioned by the sorts of deceptions, dreams,

and hallucinations that are possible within the context of our ordinary

epistemology, are compatible with having beliefs about oneself. There must

be at least some body of experience available to me which I can regardas

affordingme a baseline perceptualcontact with myself as an individual, if I

am to understand he suggestion thatat times I have been or might in future

be out of contact with the world.

This is my response to Stroud's challenge to show "that some unprob-

lematic knowledge of facts of the world is presupposedor involved in any

genuine dream-possibility, or more generally, that the only possibilities

thatcan threatenour knowledge must be understood n a 'plain' or 'internal'

or 'empirical' way." As he himself remarks,"that would be to show that

the fully 'external' or 'philosophical' conception of our relation to the

world, when pressed,is an illusion, and not a way we can coherentlythinkof

ourselves at all" (SPS, 273-74). Substituting 'transcendent' for Stroud'sphrase"fully 'external',"I believe that this is exactly what I have shown.

18 ThompsonClarke,"The Legacy of Skepticism,"Journal of Philosophy, 69 (1972): 758.19 Hans-Johann Glock, "Stroud's Defense of Cartesian Scepticism-A 'Linguistic

Response',"PhilosophicalInvestigations,13:1(Jan. 1990): 61.20 Clarkenotes the demon's plight in "The Legacy of Skepticism,"766.21 This supports Ludwig Wittgenstein's remark 19 in On Certainty (New York: Harperand

Row, 1969), that the Idealist's "furtherdoubtbehind practical doubt"is an illusion.

80 DoUGLAS .LONG



For instance,I might be ill with fever andconvinced thatI am waking up

in my bedroomwhen I amactuallyin the hospital.Given my priorhistoryof

normalvisual, tactual,and somatic awarenessof myself, there would be no

reason to question my reference to myself, even when I am suffering thisrelatively serious confusion, for we are not yet imagining that I am totally

cut off from perceptualcontactwith myself. We can also imagine a device,

drug, or disease inducing delusions and dreamswhich might become more

and more extensive so that eventually I would know nothing of my

environment, my identity, or even myself. Only others would be in a

position to ascertainwho I reallyam or whatmy condition is. However, it is

my present capacity for empirical self-awareness which permits me to

consider even the possibility that such a thing could happento me. And on

the assumption of that same self-awareness it is also empirically evident

that it has not in fact happened o me.

The perceptual self-awareness which serves as a basis for my self-

referencerules out the possibility thatI am now andhave always been asleep

and dreaming. However, my so-called knowledge that I am awake and

conscious is not a bit of information hatI discover to be trueand for which

I have particularevidence. As Kenny points out, "There is no fact better

known to me than the fact that I am awake, thatI can offer as a reason for

saying thatI am awake. When I say 'I am awake,' I do so without grounds,

but not without justification."22Ordinarily we know that we are awake

without performinga specific test simply because we perceive ourselves to

be active in oursurroundings.

Stroudwould object thatmy use of 'perceive' begs the question against

the skeptic, since it could be "thatI am now dreaming" SPS, 27). Any test I

performto determinewhetheror not I am asleep could itself be carried out

in a dreamandso be worthless (SPS, 22). However,as we have seen, the sup-

position that all my observations and actions could be merely dreamed is

self-defeating. If we accept such skepticismas a serious possibility, we then

raise all the problems to which I have called attention concerning self-

awareness and self-reference. My philosophical "justification" for the

belief that I am now awake, therefore, consists in the anti-skeptical

arguments hatI have presented n this essay.

What implications does my argument have for the brain-in-a-vat

scenario? It may eventually be feasible to keep humanheads conscious on

life-support systems that are connected to natural or artificial sense and

speech "organs."Norman Malcolm has insisted that the idea that a brain

could have thoughts, illusions, or pains is senseless, on the Wittgensteinian

22 Kenny,Descartes,30.

M1E ELF-DEFEATINGHARACTERFSKEPTICISM 1



grounds that "a brain does not sufficiently resemble a human being."23

However, we may think of the individual, not as a merely immobile and

faceless organ,but as a personwho has lost all of his naturalbody except his

brain. He is maintained on life-supportwhich replaces the functions of hisother bodily organs. Since, on our ordinaryepistemology my existence as a

human being is intelligible to me, I can understandthe idea that I might

undergo this procedure and thereafter be both physically and

epistemologically at the mercy of the scientists in chargeof my input.They

might render me completely deluded, cutting me off from reality entirely.

Having conceded all this, however, it does not follow that I must also

concede thatI might already have suffered thatfate. The very perceptions

thatpermitme to know thatI exist as a conscious being who can understandand examine the skeptical hypothesis as it might apply to me, conflict

directly with any such thesis aboutmy situation.

Why then is it so tempting for us to believe that the skeptic's false hy-

potheses are not falsifiable? Why have philosophersso readily accepted the

doctrine of the epistemic priorityof experience? I suggest that this attitude

is to be explained in part because we are tempted to treat introspection and

perception as separableaspects of ourcommon sense epistemology when in

fact they cannot be understoodin isolation from one another. The purely

subjective view which nourishes skepticism highlights our introspective

capabilities, especially the ability to express our thoughts and to ascribe

them to ourselves without always engaging in the perceptualobservationof

us that others require. But emphasis on "inner perception"underplays the

fact that our self-knowledge and our capacity to make self-ascriptions

depends fundamentally on our perceptualawarenessof ourselves as proper

subjects of both behavioralandpsychological ascriptions.

On the other hand, the impossibly "transcendent"point of view, by

which skepticism appears to undermine our empirical beliefs, takes its

inspiration from our ordinary status as objects of "external"perception by

others. However, like the subjective notion, this idea of transcendencealso

leaves out of account our own capacity for self-perception from that same

ordinaryexternal view. Ignoringthe fact that self-awareness and perception

are inseparably inked for us in self-perception, skepticism creates mischief

by insulating my references to myself from the references to me by others.The artificial dissociation of these two elements of our common sense

epistemology, self-consciousness and perception, creates the Cartesian

fiction that we can know that we exist and have experiences but not know

what we really are like from the "outside." Such a view is fundamentally

23 NormanMalcolm,"ScientificMaterialism nd the IdentityTheory,"Dialogue, 3:2(1964):124-25.

82 DOUGLAS. LONG



misguided, not merely because it leads to radical skepticismabout the world

and self, but because this separationof the "interior" rom the "exterior"

views we have of ourselves deprives us of a proper understandingof our

essentially unifiedsubjective/objectivenatureas persons.

8. CONCLUSION

It should be evident that I do not agree with those philosopherswho have re-

cently expressed either pessimism or resignation about meeting the

skeptical challenge. BarryStroud believes "theproblem has no solution; or

ratherthat the only answer to the questionas it is meant to be understood s

that we can know nothing about the world around us" (SPS, 1). He

concludes that none of the several major attempts to defeat traditionalskepticism which he examines is successful. They eitherdogmatically reject

the skeptical conclusion, or miss the skeptic's point altogether,or appeal to

a discreditedverifiability theoryof meaning.On the contrary,I have argued

without appealing to a verifiabilitytheory of meaning that, if perception is

generally questioned, self-knowledge and self-reference are jeopardized

along with knowledge of the world.

In contrastto Stroud, who arguesthat no one has yet defeated skepticism,

Thomas Nagel insists, in The Viewfrom Nowhere, thatno one can defeat it.

The theories of verifiability and reference that have been arrayed against

philosophical doubts are themselves refuted by the "evidentpossibility and

intelligibility of skepticism...."24 According to Nagel, skepticism is in-

evitable because it expresses something true of our epistemological

situationand is not something to be overcome or refuted,even though"our

natural realism makes it impossible for us to be content with a purely

subjective view."25

Although this attitude of resigned acceptance has romanticcharm, I do

not agree that skepticism is inevitable or that it expresses something true of

our epistemological situation. It is indisputable that the human situation is

subject to variouskinds-of troublingdoubt, but full-fledged skeptical theses

are either false or empty, depending on whether we highlight their conflict

with ordinary epistemological assumptionsor the attemptby the skeptic to

make illegitimate use of the correlative but inapplicable concepts of the

purely subjective and purely transcendent.It is not, as Nagel suggests, our"naturalrealism" which makes it impossible to be content with a "purely

subjective view." It simply is not a point of view we can adopt without

losing an epistemologicalgrip on ourselves.

24 Thomas Nagel, The View rom Nowhere, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 73.2 T. Nagel, The View rom Nowhere, 74.

THESELF-DEFEATINGCHARACTEROF SKEPTICISM 83



Since I hold that self-conscious skepticism cannot be intelligibly ex-

pressed and so requires no refutation,I agree with Strawsonthat a "rational

justificationof the belief in external objects" is not the way to rebut skepti-

cism. However, I disagree when he adds that, because our beliefs represent"natural, nescapable commitments which we neither choose nor give up,"

skeptical arguments and counter-arguments are "equally idle-not

senseless" and the skeptical challenge should be ignored.26 have tried to

show on rational grounds appealing to the interrelations of fundamental

conceptionsof subjectivityand objectivitywhy "commonsense" is not open

to question in the way the skeptic suggests. Yet, the skeptical challenge

should not be ignored,because meetingit can teach us valuablelessons about

our epistemology. We learn in particular hat we must resist the temptationto think of our epistemic resourcesas reducedby doubts aboutperceptionto

mere "experiences," f we are to account for self-knowledge.27

26 "Skepticism,Naturalism,and TranscendentalArguments,"chapter 1 of Skepticismand

Naturalism:SomeVarieties,27.

27 I wish to express my appreciation o my colleague William G. Lycanfor his helpful com-

mentson earlierversions of thisessay.

Long. the Self-Defeating Character of Skepticism

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