.·t· ;

/ SOCIAL CHANGE:

Explorations, Diagnoses,

and Conjectures

Edited by.

George Klzo/lschan _ and Walter Hirsch L---.~

With an Introduction by

DON MARTINDALE

Schenkman Publismng Company

A Halsted Press Book

JOHN WILEY & SONS New York - London - Sidney - Toronto

, "

"1'1"\'" ~ ..J 1., 'oJ \.

,1 ,

13 David Lockwood

Social Integration and

System Integration

The terro "social change" will be taken to mean a change in the institu­tiona] structure of a soCial system; more particularly, a transformation of the core instituti(!!laLor.deL of a society such that we can .peak of a chan'ge in tYPe'~f society. 1 do _Dot belíeve that it is necessary to reach agreement on what is meant by the "core institutional arder" of a society aI on how a typology of societies i5 to be diHerentiated befare tbere can be.meaningful discussion of how the process of change takes place. That is, unless there is sorne a priori commitment to a "dominant factor" theory of social change; in which case the wrangle about whether change has "really" taken place can be endless.

The main purpose of tbis chap'ter is to discuss sorne of the implications of recent criticisms of functionalism, especially those which have a bear­Jng on how social change is internally generated in a society. The fuesiS is tliat, in concentrating their fire on a s.pecial, albeit prominent, --version of functionalism ("normative functionalism"), cIltlcs have hecome over­involved with what may be called the problems of "social integration." As a result, they have tended to ignore what is just as relevant to their central interests in con:8ict and social change, namely, the problem of "system integration." And here the perspective of general functionalism would still seem to be the most useful instrumento

370

SOCIAL AND SYSTEM IN'IEGRATION 371

I

In a recent artiele, Kingsley Davis (6) bas proposed such a catholic definition of functionalism as to make it virtually indistinguishable from the most hasic presuppositions of contemporary saciology. This is a11 very cornforting. But if by functionalism nothing more were meant than seeing society as a system of interdependent parts, and an aversion to "reductionism," then most of those who have been engaged in criticism of functionalism would be proselytized overoight. How many would ac­cept the attendant ideas, such as that of "functional requisites," is more debatable, and would probably depend on bow they were interpreted. Again, exactly what elements are included as "parts" of a social system, and the exact implieations of the idea of "interdependence" itself, are ob­viously areas of potential disagreement (10).

But, omitting these eansiderations, surely the "general" funetionalist standpoint which Davis has restated must be distinguished from its more specifie and controversial fann. Davis avoids mentianing preeisely those characteristics which are now widely associated with, though not logically entaile.d by, a functionalist orientation: fust, the emphatic role attributed to "common vaIue elements" in the integration of social action; and secand, the unwarranted assumption tbat the study of social stahility must precede the analysis of social change. Both these predispositions, but especially the :6rst, typify what we wish to speak of from now on as norma­tive functionalism. 1

Before going on to examine the position to which we are led by the critics of nonnative functionalism, one further distinetion is relevant to the subsequent argumento It is the wholly artificial one between "social integration" and "system integration." Whereas tbe prohlem of social integration focuses attentia_n upon the orderly or eonHictful re1ationships between the actors, the prohlem of system integration focuses on tbe or­derly or conflictful relationships between the pan., of a social system.

It may be said at once that tbe connection between tbese twe aspects of integration is neatly made by normative fuflctionalism. The logic js simple. Since the ouly systematically differentiated parts of a society are its institutional patterns, the only sauree of social disorder arising from system disorder is that which takes the form of role conHict stem­ming from incompatible institutional pattems. If, however, it js held that such institutional pattems do not exhaust the generally relevant uparts'"

1 Couldner quite properly points out that tlrls tendency has amounted to what i8 in fact "implicit factor-tbeorizing": "Although the methodological position of the earlier functionaUsts commonly a-ffirmed an amorphous, :lnterdependence of parts within a social system, it does not follow that the specmc empirical analysis in which they -engaged actually utilized this principIe. In particular, the classic contributioDs, from Comte to Parsons, haya gone out of their way to stress the significance oI 'shared vaIne elements' in maintaining the equilibrlwn of social systems" (10 p.265). '

SOCIAL SYSTEM MODELS

of a social system, then this particular articulation of system and social integration is only one way of relating tbe phenomena of «devianee'" and "conillct" to the operation of the system as a functioning entity. 'Fo!bis point we shalI return later. For tbe moment, what needs stressing is tlté!t th.e exities of normative functionalism have devated their critique entirely to the way in which !bis theory handles the problem oE social integration; and particularly to the ambiguities of the concept of "institution."

II

The leading exponent of the general functionalist school, Robert K. 5 Merton, has aIready drawn attention to the static connotation of tbe tenn ~ institution: "It is not enough," he writes, "to refer to tbe <institutions' as :S thougb they were all uniformly supported by all groups .and strata in the '" ¡¿:" 'SOcietY. Unless systematic consideration is given to th.e degree of su.p- --~ c" port of particular 'institutions' by specific groups we shall overlook the -l:

?:. important place of power in society" (15, p. 122). The major criticism' ~ ;:::r- of normative functionalism which has frequently heen made is that it '-' ;!::: _ treats institutions primarily as moral entities, with.out rigorously exploring _ " §: the. in~erp~ay.between norms ":,,d power that is univ."rsally present in·iL~\\\

.;;. maJor IDstitutional contexts. This weakness has beeo seIzed upon by such '" writers as Dahrendorf (5) and Rexl!9). -Their basic theses are sufll-M ~" " ciently similar to be treated jointly. For the sake of convenience, their.ü.n

-::::;--S ideas may be called "conillct theory." ".-~ ~ The conHict theorists have pointed out fust that nonns and power must """ ~ be considered as general alternative modes of "institutionalizing" social

. .:;; relationships. To quote Rex:

We have also to recognise tbat sorne of the ends which the aetors in om system pursüeS.ay be random ends frOID the point of view of the systern or aetually in conflict with it. If there is an actual conflict of ends, the be­haviour of actors towards one another may not be detennined by shared Donns but by the success which each has in ~ the other to act in aecordance with his interests. Power then becomes a crucial variable in lhe study of social systems (19, p. 112).

Second, potential conHicts of interest are seen as endemic in aU social systems which uinstitutionalize" power relatíonships,.2 because power

.2 Briefly, to define authorlty as institutIonallzed power is to beg exactly the ques­tion that Mérton raises, if the Une between authorlty and, power is drawn -in teIlDs of the presence or absence of a c1aim to legitimacy, not in terms of .tbe sentimenj:s of tbose (prlncipally) over whom authority is exerc1sed. Perhaps the most· general" consideration which makes tbe "de-institUtionallzation" of authority an ever-present possibility is the fact that, whereas the legitimacy _oÍ- authority tends to taIce the form of general principIes, acts of authoritjt. are always specrnc; and fuey are· always. more specific than derived rules of authority, no matter how well developed the 18tter. Thus, the "exploitable" ambiguity surrounding the dúivation and interpre-

SOCIAL AND SYSTEM INTEGRATION 373

(authority) over others is the most general farol' of "scarce resource" and one that is inherent in society itself. "The distribution of authority in associations," writes Dahrendorf, "is the ultimate 'caus~' of the formation of conillct groups" (5, p. 172). Thus, if potential conHicts of interest be­tween those who exercise authority and those over whom authority is exercised are a "normal" feature of social organization, the de-instirntion­alization of power, and the use of power to maintainmstitutions, are ever present possibilities. In any realistic and dynamie víew of instirntionaliza­tion, the role of power, both in the generation and control of conHict, is of prime concern.

Al lirst sight, it would seem that the image of society constructed by nonnative functionalism has given rise to counter-arguments which bring us round fu]] cirele to the polemical starting point of modern soci­ology, namely, the debate on social contracto But forhmately both nor­mative functionalists and conillct theorists are not prepared to recognize

\:1 as a real issue the Greenian dichob;>my of ''Will'' versus "Force" (ll). ~ 111e themes of norms-consensus-order, and power-alienation-conBict are --é... not regarded as viable sociological alternatives.a

= ... It is, ,therefor<:..a little surprising to find that both Dahrendorf and Rex ~ consider it necessary to develop their antitheses to normative functional-

ism in- a systematíc fOnDo These take th.e shape, respectively, of a "coer­cion theory of society" and a "conillct model of society".'· For!bis strategy they give reasons which are even more surprising. The rust is that they both feel their <fmodels" or «frames of reference" are specially suited to certain problem areas in sociology, particularly to the shldy of industrial societies (5, pp. 161-164; 19, p. 112, p. 114). And, second, Dahrendorf feels that the unification of the "integration theory" (normative function-

tation of the legitimacy of specific acts means that authority is never given, but is al­ways contingent upon its exercise. It is precisely with such conHicts arising within the inte'rstices of iDstitutionalized power that "conBict theory" 1s concerned; and not simply with the more unosual approximations to "unstructured" power conHicts.

3 At any rate, in fonnal tenns. For instance, Parsons: «1 do not think it is usefuI to postulate a deep dichotomy between theones which give importance to bellefs and values on the one hand, to allegedly 'reaUstic' interests, e.g., economic, on the other. Bellefs and valnes are actualized, partially and imperfectly, in realistic situa­tions of social interaction and the outcomes are always codetennined by the values aud reaUstic exigencies; conversely what on concrete leveIs are called 'interests' are by no means independent of the values which have been institutionallzed in the relevant groups" (18, p. 173). See also Dahrendon (5, p. 159, p. 163) and Rex (19, p. 112). But while there is formal agreement on this point, both the norma­tive functionallsts and the conflict theorists fail to explore in any rigorous way the interre1ationship of "normative" and "realistic" elements oI social systems.

""" Both authors state their propositions in smnmary form (5~ pp. 236-240; 19~ pp. 129-131, p. 195, pp. 236-240). Their premises are _very siÍnilar: "Every society clisplays at every point ci!~P~ and conHict; social· conflict. is ubiquitous" (5, p. 162"); "Instead óf being organised arcond a consensos oI values, social systems ·may be thought of as involving eonflict situations at central points" (19, p. 129). The m'ajor disagreement between the two would seem to be how fat, in fact, Unes oI social CQnilict overlap. See Rex (19, pp. 117-118).

374 SOCIAL S,YSTEM MODElaS

aJism) and the "coercion theory" is unlikelyand probrbly impossible (5, p. 164). r J~ \) I f1 « ¡~ re Ó'~ nt¡", (

Neither DI these reasons is very. compellin..s. You cannot _ass~~ that society is unthinkable as...ei.the¡ a purely moral ar a purely coercive entity, and then ;uggest that a vocabulary built around one or the other of these unthinkable premises is necessary because sorne societies are manifestly more orderly al conHictful than others. To be sure, fue degree to which power enters into social relationships is a factor indispensable far tbe­understanding DI both the «imperfectiou" af consensus aud the propeusity

'1 \ to confli<;:t, But even in siruations where power is very evident aud C0D-'

{Ve ~Jl flict enderic, it is. doubtful wbether the phenomena of conflict can be kadeguatel'L.. grasped withoÜt incorporating into conflict theory many

(l),',¡\~V\cl( DI the concepts ano propositions concerning tbe dynamic properties of , I iD value systems (or ideologies) ~eh have been developed, or taken over, ;; €I'\~t( by normative functionalism. ~iven the power structure, the nature ::: of the vaIue system is of signallll1portance for the genesis, intensity, and

direction of potential conflicto Particularly crucial is the way in wbieh it structures the levels of aspiration of different social strata. It may, of its own accord, create aspirations which generate demands for change, or add fuel to the fire of conHicting material interests. It may be sumo ciently open and ambiguous to be exploited simultaneously by difIerent conillct groups; Dr, contrariwise, be capa:ble of absorbing counter-ideolo­gies within itself. Or, sudden change in the relative material positions oI different groups may· result in widespread conillct as a consequence oI what Durkheim calls "moral de-classification." It could, therefore, be argued that even the analysls 01 t1iat facefOISocial integration to which Dahrendorf and Rex consider their" theories to be especially relevant­namely, social conflict - requires nothing less than a systematic extension of their framework to take explicitly into acconnt the variable properties of vaIne systems that have been the focus of normative functionalism. 5

To the extent that this is done, their conflict theory ceases to be a "spe­ciar' approach. That 'status is reserved for the unmodified version of normative functionalism.

Finally, both normative functionaJism and conflict theory quite ob­viously utilize many sociological concepts (which are tbe property 01 neither the one perspective nor the other for the solntion oI their re­spective problems). Witness only Dahrendorf's (5, pp. 213-218) extensive use of the concept of "multiple group relationships" to account for. the variability of cIass conflict in a way that is not at alI dissimilar from the way it is used, for example, by WilIiams (24, pp. 560-561). Surely it is in the active use of precisely such common concepts and propositions, rather

15 To take an actual example, compare the explJcit use of the idea oí the "explona­bllity" of the common value system by Parsons (17, p. 293, p. 355) in accounting for the intensification oí "deviance" with the implicit reference to such an idea by Rex. (19, p. 125) in discussing class conflicto

SOCJLU.- AND SYSTEM- INTEGRATION 375

than in procnring an agreed definítion of "institution" or "society,'" that the desired uuification of whicb Dabrendorf is so sceptical is constantly being achieved. In actual fact, the divergence between wbat he calls "íntegration theory" and "coercion theory'" ís much more evident in de­fining problems than in solving lhem.

Why, then, the concentration on the development of alternative con~ ceptual schemes in wbieh the ideas of power and conflict playa central role? PartIy because the recognition given by normative functionalism to the arguments put fOlward along these 'lines has so far amounted to nothing more than lip service. More fundamentally, perhaps, it is be­cause, in seeing equilibrium analysis combined in normative functional­¡sm with a focus on shared vaIue elements, Dahr~ndorf and Rex, with their manifest ínterest in social change, have as a consequence sought the key to this problem in the area of power and conflic!. lf this is so, how far do the. conflict theorists take us in the analysis of social ehange?

Dabrendorf and Rex assert that social cbange is a result of the sbifting balance of power between conflict groups (5, pp. 231-236; 19, p. 196). Now, while social chang~ is very freqnentIy associated with conBict, the reverse does not necessarily hold. Conillct may be both endemic and intense in a social system withont causing any basic structural change. Why does sorne conillct result in change while other conHict does ;not? Conflict theory would bave to answer that tbis is decided by the variable factors affecting the power balance between groups. Here we reach the analytícallimits of conHict theory. As a reaction to normative function~ aJism it is entirely confined to the problem of social integration. What is missing is the system integration focus of "general functionalism, which, by contrast with normative functionalism, involves no prior cornmihnent to the study of system stabiJity.6

Tbis is exceedingly interesting because both Dabrendorf and Rex arrive at their respective positions throngh a "generalization of Marx. Yet it is precisely Marx who clearly differentiates social and system integra­tion. The propensity to c1ass antagonisffi (social integration aspect) is generally a function of the eharacter of production relationsbips (e.g., possibilities of intra-class iclentification and cornrnunication). But the dynamics of c1ass antagonisms are clearly related to ·the progressively

61 may refer here once more to the excellent essay by Gouldner (10) and espe­cially to his idea of the "functional autonomy" of parts. This concept prevides D.n obvious link between social and system integration. He explicitly points out tbat "the concept of the differential functional autonomy of parts directs atlention to the need to distínguish between parts having a greater or lesser vested interest in system maintenance," and that "not only efforts to change the system, but ruso those directed at maintain1ng it are likely to entail confUct and resistance" as a result of differential functional autonomy. What 1 find a little ambiguous, however, is rus use of the term "parls" of a system: at one stage they seem to mean structural aspects (e.g., ecologi­cal conditions)j at another, actual groups (the French bourgeoisie). The "parts" which may become functionally D.utonomous are sureIy g10UpS; the "parls" whose interplay conditions their functional autonomy are the stTuct1Jlal elements of the sys­temo 1 hope this will become clear in the subsequent argumento

376 SOCIAL SYSTEM MODELS

growing "contradictions" DI the economia system. One might almost say that the "conflict" which in Marxian theory is decisive for change is Dot the power conIDat arising from the relationships in the productive -system, but the system conillct arising from "contradictions" between "property institutions" and the "forces of productiono" Though definitely linked, these two aspects of integration are not only analyticaIly separable, but also, because of tbe time element involved, factuaIly distinguishable. Thus it is perfectly possible, according to !bis theory, to say that at any particular paint DI time a society has a high degree of social integration ( eogo, relative absence of class conllict) and yet bas a low degree of sys­tem integration (mounting excess productive capacity ).

Further interest atlaches ta the faet tbat the idea DI stIucturaI contra­diatians is central to the general functionalist view of change:

The key concept bridging the gap between statics and dynamics in functional theory is that of strain. tension. contraruction. or discrepancy between the component elements of social and cultural structure. Such strains may be dysfunctional for the social system in its then existing fonn; they may al50 be instrumental in leading to changes in that system. When social mechanisms for controlling them are operatfug effectively. these strains are kept within such bOWlds as to limit change of social sb."ucture (15,po122)o

The vital question is, oI course: what are the "component elements" of social systems which give rise to strain, tension, or eontradiction? General functionalism, as 1 understand it, does not attempt to fonnulate an answer to !bis question (10, ppo 244-248) o It is, by contrast, in norm­ative functionalism that institutional patterns emerge as the on1y gen­erally identified and systematically difEerentiated components of a social system between which there can be conHict and resultant strain. Sinee social systems are differentiated on1y along the institutional axis, there can be no place for the kind of contradictions wbich Marx envisaged, contradictions which are obviously relevant to the problem focus oI con­fliet theory. We may ask, ther.efore, does the Mandan view contain the elements of a more general sociological formuJation?

III

Criticism oI the Marxian interpretatian of society and social change has focused on the meaning and importance attributed to the ~<material mode of production." Sometimes, this has been simply and erroneously inter­preted as technology. Yet it is quite obvious that in the Marxian schema technological change is not regarded as the prime mover, but as a force wbich operates interdependently with the productive relations of the society, that is, the prevailing organization of property and laboro The inclusion of productive relationships in the concept «mode of production" lays lhe lheory open to the criticism lhat the degree of differentiation and

SOCIAL,1\NIf. 5YSTEM""1NTEORATION

Í'odependence of such relationships from other social structu.r.es in the same society varies very considerably; .and that in particular, the salleney oE the economie system under capitalism is not at aH characterist:fe of most histdrical societies in which the mode of political organization heavily conditioned the structure and potential change of productive re­lationships.7 Marxian theory has not, for fairly obvious reasons, been overmuch concerned to rehut such criticisms of its basie sociological \ assumptions. Given its premises about the general long~run decisiveness of the eeonomie arder for social change, it has quite logically confined its discussion of system integration to the internal dynamics of -the mode of production itseIf - to the economíc theory of the contradiction between "forces of production" (tecbnological potential) and lhe "relations of production" (property institutions ) 0 8

Wbile !bis narrowing down of the problem of system integration is higbly questionable, the idea of a contradiction between the material conditions of production and the productive institutioDS of the economic system has a more general relevance that should not be ignored.

First, contradietion implies that the material means of production (eogo, industrial tecbnology) favor a set of potential social relationships (socialist ownership) wbicb constitutes a tbreat to the existing social reo lationsbips institutionalized in the property system (private ownersbip)o Now, whatever reservations oue may have abaut the. specific linkage oI industrial production with socialist property relationships, there is noth­ing metapbysical about the general notion of social relatioDsbips being somehow implicit in a given set of material conditions. Material condi­tions most obviously inelude tbe technological means of control over the physical and social environment and the skills associated with these means. They inelude Dot only the material means af production, hut also what Weber frequentIy refers to as the material means of organizatioD and violence. Such material conditions must surely be included as a variable in any calculus of system integration, since it is cIear that they may facilitate the development of "deviant" social relationsbips wbicb ron counter to the dominant institutional patterns of the system. MicheIs' study of oligarcbical tendencies is only the classic exampleo

Secand, according to Marx, the actualization of these potential counter~ relationsbips is detennined by lhe success with wbicb lhose with vested interests in the existing order are able to resolve the functional incom­patibility between the material means of production and theproperty frameworko In the capitalist case, !bis incompatibility arises from the inability of private property institutions to accommodate the productive capacity of the industrial systemo The focal point of strain is "overpro­ductiono" The argrnnent, of course, goes furlher than !biso The theory of lhe "crisis mecbanism" not only postuIates dysfunctionality but attempts

T See especially. Weber (22, pp. 739-43). 8 Sea, for example, Baran (1) and Sweezy (20). For the difficulty of locating the

~<crisis mechanism" of feudalism, see Dobb (7).

378 SOCIAL SYSTEM M0DELS

to demonstrate how the internal contradictions of tbe mode of production are endogenously intensi/ied to lhe point of system breakdown by lhe inherent development of productive forces. This mechanism, most fully elaborated in the case of capitalist societies, is the conveyor belt which moves a society froID one stage of its historieal evolution to the next. But in order to use lhe idea of a functional incompatibility between lhe domi­nant institutional arder Df a social system and its material base, it i5 not necessary to assume that the system must inevitably break down al that it must inevitably be succeeded by another system of a given type.9

We now have a view cf system integration, particularly relevant to conflict lheory, whicb may be summed up as follows: .

1) ODe generally conceivable sonree of tension and possible change in a social system is that which arises from a <1ack of .6t" between its core institutional order and its material subshucture. 2) The material substructure in such a case facilitates the development of social relationships whicb, if actualized, would directly lhreaten the existing institutional order. 3) The system will be characterized by a typical form of "strain" arising from the functional incompatibility between its institutionaJ order and material base. 4) The actualization of !he latent social relationships of lhe system will depend on the success with whieh groups having vested interests in the maintenance of the instihrtional order are able to cope with the dys­functional tendency of the system in the faee of particular exigencies. 5) If these exigencies lead to an intensification of the funcf:ionaI in­compatibility of the system, and if compensating measures by vested interest groups lead (unintentionally) to a furlher actualization of lhe potential social relationships of the system, a vicious circle of social disintegration and change oI the institutional order is under way. H, on the other hand, compensating measures are effective, the institu­tional order wilI remain intact, but the focal point of strain wiIl con­tinue to be evident so long as lhe functional incompatibility of lhe system persists. These propositions do not limit fue analysis oI system integration to

lhe productive system of a society, Nor do lhey imply a differentiation of types of soeieties primarily in terms of their modes oE production. Such problems cannot be settled a priori. ConsequentIy, the «dominant" or ((eore" institutionaI orders may vary from one type oE society to an­other; and the ide;ntification of such institutional orders would seem to be /irst and foremost a way of deflning what is meant by saying lhat a so­ciety has changed.10 There are, however, certain problems which arise

D See the mstnlctive remarks of Coulborn (4, pp. 254-269). 10 Thus differences of opinion about the endurance of Western feudal society

depend very largely on whether the military, the political, or the econornfc aspect of this institutional complex is singled ou~ as the "core" order. See Hintze (13).

SOGlAL AND SYSTEM INTEGRATION 379

when the concepts of "dominant" institutional order and material base are applied to social systems. It may make sense to apply such a distinc­tion to some particular subsystem of a society or to sorne particular type of corporat.e group; is it equally relevant, in the case of a society, to re., gard, fal example, the productive systern as a ·"material base" from the point of view of lhe "dominant" political system, even lhougb lhe produc­tive system manifestIy ineludes institutianal elements? Insofar as the pre­dominant concern is with the way in which the material preconditions af a certain type of political action are, or are not, to he faund in a given economic order, there would appear to be' good reasan for answering this question in tbe aHinnative.11 Such an answer would, of course, in no way prejudice the furtber explanation of how such a given economic order carne about; the problem of fue "causes" of the type oI system in­stability under consideration is, anyway, a quite separate issue. It should also be noted lhat !he degree of institutional diflerentiation of economic and political structures varies very considerably. In cases w here the re­latioos of production and lhe relations of political power are hot insti­tutionally very distinct, and especially where !he relations of production are institutionalized to a considerable extent around polltical goals, it would seem reasonable to regard the economic arder much more directly as a "material base" of lhe "dominant" political institutions, A brief reference to Weber·s discussión of patrimonialisrn may serve to illustrate these points as well as the propositions previously.advanced.

A1lhougb Weber's concept of patrimonialism, and especially lhat of patrimonial bureaucracy, refers primarily to a type of poJitical structure, it is c1ear from his remarks lhat this structure might well be regarded as the «core'· institutional order of the sociely and as a major point of reference for societal change. 'Moreover, Weber's analysis of the material preconditions of bureaucratization clearly indica tes the nature of the functional problems facing societies of the patrimonial bureaucratic type. These center on.the relationship between the institution oI bureaucracy and the material substructure of a subsistence economy. After setting out the general rule that: "A certain measure oI a developed money econ­omy is the normal precondition for the uncbanged and continued exist­ence, ti not for the establishment, of pure bureaucratic administration," Weber goes on to note lhat historical cases of "distinctly developed and quantitatively large bureaucracies" may be found which "to a very great extent, partly ·even predominantIy, have rested upon compensation DI lhe oflicials in kind·," This he explains byargninglhat "even ,lhough lhe full development oI a money econorny is not an indispensable preeon-

11 What eIse does Weber imply when he writes: "Der Zerfall des Reichs war die notwendige politische Folge des allmaehlichen Schwindens. des Verkehrs und dar Zunahme de! Naturalwirtscbaft. Er bedeutete irn wesentlichen nur den Wegfall .jenes Verwalhmgsapparats und damit des geldwirtschaftlichen politischen Ueberbaus, der dem naturalwirlschaftlichen oekonomischen Unterbau nicht mehr angepasst war" (21, p, 306),

380 SOCIAL SYSTEM MODELS

dition far bureacratization, bureaucracy as a permanent strucrure is knit to the one presupposition of a constant incorne far maintaining it," and that "a stable system of taxation is the precondition far the pennanent existence of bureaucratic administration." But again: "Far -well-known and general reasans, onIy a- fully developed money economy ofEers a seeure basis for sueh a taxation system" (23, pp. 205-209).

TIle strategic functional problem, then, i5 one DI maintaining a taxation system that can eHectively meet the material needs DI a bureaucracy in the context of a subsistence, Dr near-subsistence, econorny. The central­izing goal oI bureaucratic institutions is constantIy Hable to sabotage by the potential social relationship struchue DI fue subsistence econorny whieb favors the deeentraJization and I<feudalization" of power relation­ships.12 As Weber bimseIf says: "Aecording to all.historical e<perienee, without a money economy the bureaucratic structure can hardIy avoid undergoing substantial internal changes, or indeed, .fuming into another type of strueture" (23, p. 205). The relationsbip between bureaueraey and taxation is a highly interdependent one. The efllcieney of the bu­reaucraey depends upon the effectiveness of its taxati.on systern; and the effeetiveness of the taxation system depends on the efficieney -of the Qureaucratic apparatus. Thus, for whatever reaSOD, any inerease in the bureaucratie load or deerease in taxation eapacity may generate a vicious cirele of decentralization of power. Indeed, it might be argued that tbe "taxation" erisis oI patrimonial bureaueracy is essentialIy anal­ogous to the "production" crisis oI capitalismo At any rate, the focal point of strain in this type oI society is taxation capacity relative to bureau­cratic needs.

This strategie funetional problem sets the stage for the characteristie conHicts of interest that arise between tbe bureaucratie center, the official­dom, landed magnates, and peasantry. The points of tension are those wbich represent an actualization oI the potential for "feudalization": the tendency oI officials to "appropriate" the economic and political resources of the ofllee; the struggle of large landowners to gain immunity f.rom taxation and/or usurp fiseal and politieal funetions; and the local rela­tionships of eeonomie and politieal dependeney into whieh the peasantry are forced in seeking protection against the tax burden oI the bUfeau­era tic center. These "centrifugal" tendencies may be seen as both a cause and a· conseqnence of the possible failure of mechanisms for maintain­ing effective taxation capacity and central control. The outcome oI snch struggles, and the sueeess with whieh the funetional problem is solved by the bnreaucratic center, is, of course, decided in each. historical case by the particular circumstanees facing the patrimonial bureaucracy. These may vary very eonsiderably; but whether they make for stability

12 The logie of t1rls 1<1 succinct1y argued by BIoch (3,. p. 68}· and Hartman (12, p.19).

SOCIAL AND SYSTEM INTEGRATlON 381

Dr breakdown of bureaucratic institutioDs, all societies of this type ma,y be studied froID tbe point oI view of their conunon contradiction.13

Another example of a not to"o dissimilar kind is that of the functioDal tensions arising frOID -the relationship between the totalitarian political system and the industrial eeonomy of the Soviet U nion. It is noteworthy in this eonneetion that many who would deny the relevanee of the idea of "internaI contr-adictions" to capitalist societies have only too readily exag­gerated the ineompatibility of industrialism and the institutions of a one-party state. Be this as it may, it would seem that the type of eon­tradiction envisaged bere is one which those baving an interest in the dom­inant politieal institution bave thus far sueeessfully eontrolled, but which nevertheless is likely to remain as a focal point of strain and potential change. It arises from the tendency oI an industrial mode of production to create latent interest groups oI a class character. This tendency must be "dysfunctional" Ior a totalitarian politicaI system, one precondition oI which is a "c]ass1ess" society, i.e., an absence oI bases oI potentia1 social organization outside the party bureaucracy.

Snch a contradiction could manifest itself either by sucb latent interest groups striving Ior an autonomous corporate existence (which seems un­likely given the nature of party eontrol) or by their subversion of the party organization from within. OI suob groups, associated with indus­trialization, the least potentially tbreateuing is that of worker opposition. Using Webers typology of class formation, worker protest hardly ad­vanced beyond tbe stage ot ~~mass reactions of a c1ass character" (labor turnover and 50 on) in the earIy phase oI Soviet indus'trialization; and, while disruptive to the economy, it was not allowed to develop into a more politioally dangerous "societal" action. More oI a threat from tbis point oI view, however - and this is the element oI truth in BurnhamYs otherwise extravagant thesis oI a "managerial revolution" - is the 50-ealled"Soviet bourgeoisié': the funetionally important quasi-group of predominantly industrial bureauerats which has emerged as a result of rapid industrialization (9).

The focal point of strain far the totalitarian politieal system is not simply that tbis Jatent c1ass tends to deve10p vested interests in its po­sition and privileges, but that it has an organizational capadty and co­hesiVFness that eould form the basis of a politieal opposition. And, given the nature of the political system, snch an interest group would be most

180n the particular conditions favoring the stability of patrimonial bureaucracy in Egypt aud China, see Weber (22, pp. 706-709ff.). The most famous instance DI breakdown, that of the later Roman Empire, 1s a case where tbe "defense mech­anisms" introduced by the bureaucracy (apUy described by Lot as the "regime of castes") intensified fue trend towards subsistence economy and actualized the poten­tial foc "feudal" relationships. See Weber (21); Lot (14, pp. 62-153); Bloch (2); and for the Byzantine case, Ostrogorsky (16). The general problem of "feudalizing" tendencies in patrimonial bureaucratic societies is discussed in Coulbom (4). On the major Unes of conHict :In such societies, see Eisenstadt (8).

382 SOCIAL SYSTEM" MODEI..S

Iikely to take the fonn initial!y of eliques within the party bureaueraey. Therefore, the strategic functional probIem of the dominant instihItional arder, from this point of view, is that oI maintaining the control oE the party bureaucracy ayer the industrial bureaucracy, and more especialIy of seeuring tbe party against infiltration by vested interest groups ofthe manageriaI elite (which ineludes insulating the latter from any wider support in the society). Most fundamental!y, the party must develop means by which it can systematically «de~classify" tbe lines of strat::ifica­tian and interest-group fonnation that have their basis in the industrial substructuIe. At the same time, however, (and heIe arises the point of system tension) such de-cIassification must not undermine the conditions of industrial efficieney.

IV

'lbe foregoing examples have been al! too sketehy, but perhaps they may serve the purpose of illustrating the viewpoint advanced in the main body of the ehapter. It has not been the intention to elaim that this per­spective is the only possible way to approach the prohlem of social ehange, still less to imply that there is anything other than a polemiea! advantage to be gained by focusing on system integration as opposed to social integration. What has been suggested, however, may be summed up as follows:

1) The propensity to social change arising from the functional incom­patibility between an institutional order and its material base has been ignored by normative functionalists because of their concentration on the moral aspects of social integration. 2) It has been equally ignored by conflict theorists, who, in concen­trating on the weakness of the normaJive functionalist approach to social integration, have failed to relate their interest in social change to the prohlem of system integration.

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