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People v Abines

e. Disciplinary Actions over Local Appointive Officials

Sec. 84-89 LGC

Mendez vs. Civil Service Commission

Facts:The Acting Register of Deeds of Quezon City Vicente N. Coloyan filed an administrative complaintagainst the petitioner, a legal research assistant in the Quezon City Office of the City Attorney, for Gross

Misconduct and Dishonesty, allegedly for having torn off a portion of TCT 209287 from the registry book of

Quezon City and for having pocketed it.

After three months of investigation, Quezon City Mayor Adelina Rodriguez dismissed the said complaint

against the petitioner for insufficiency of evidence.

Coloyan appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board which reversed the decision and ruled that Mendez

is guilty as charged and therefore dismissed from service. The CSC affirmed on appeal.

Issue: WON the exoneration made by the mayor is unappealable

Held: Yes

Ratio:The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, assailing the reversal of the city mayor's decisionby the MSPB and the CSC on the ground that Coloyan is not an aggrieved party or "party adversely affected by

the decision" allowed by law to file an appeal. Moreover, the petitioner claimed that his exoneration by the

city mayor is unappealable pursuant to Section 37, paragraph (b) of P.D. 807.

It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner

and in accordance with the provision of law.

A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as "The Philippine Civil Service Law" shows that said law

does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges.

The phrase "party adversely affected by the decision" refers to the government employee against whom the

administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension,

demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office. In the instant case, Coloyan who filed

the appeal cannot be considered an aggrieved party because he is not the respondent in the administrative

case below.

Finally, pursuant to Section 37 paragraph (b) of P.D. 807, the city mayor, as head of the city government, isempowered to enforce judgment with finality on lesser penalties like suspension from work for one month

and forfeiture of salary equivalent to one month against erring employees.

By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is

found guilty of the charges filed against him. But when the respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in

this case, there is no occasion for appeal.

Macalincag and Carlos vs. Chang

Facts: Lorinda Carlos signed a formal administrative charge approved by Victor Macalincag accusing Robert

Chang of dishonesty, neglect of duty and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service. They are for: (a)

disbursing the amount of P30,000 to Ms. Marisa Chan during the local elections, (b) disbursing certain funds

allegedly as financial assistance to bereaved families, (c) disbursing funds for merienda of the employees, (d)

incurring overdrafts, (e) transferring certain amounts from the treasurers safe to the realty tax divisions

safe, and (f) remitting to the Bureau of Treasury the national collection.Macalincag issued an Order of Preventive Suspension against Chang. Chang filed a petition for prohibition

with writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC against Macalinlag and Carlos. The judge sustained the

power of the Secretary of Finance to issue the Order of Preventive Suspension. Upon MR, the court set aside

its decision and ordered the petitioners to cease and desist from enforcing the order of preventive

suspension.

Issue: WON the Secretary of Finance has jurisdiction to issue an Order of Preventive Suspension against the

acting municipal treasurer of Makati, Metro Manila.

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Held: Yes

Ratio: Chang contends that a government officer is not suspended until someone has assumed the post and

the officer subject of the suspension order has ceased performing his official function; that the

implementation of the questioned suspension order was overtaken by the issuance of EO 392 creating the

Metropolitan Manila Authority and that the power to discipline is vested solely on the person who has the

power to appoint.It is very apparent from the records that Chang was administratively charged on October 6, 1989 for

dishonesty, neglect of duty and acts Prejudicial to the best interest of the service. It was signed by Carlos,

Executive Director, Bureau of Local Government and approved by Macalincag, Undersecretary of Finance,

then acting Secretary. Simultaneous with the charge, Chang was preventively suspended which caused him to

file a complaint for Prohibition with preliminary injunction in the lower court. The lower court pointed out

that in order that a preventive suspension will be implemented, there are two steps involved, viz: 1) service of

a copy of said order on the respondent and 2) designation of his replacement. The trial court ruled that until

an acting municipal treasurer is appointed to replace the respondent, the order of preventive suspension

dated October 6, 1989 is incomplete and cannot be said to have taken effect. This ruling of the trial court is

untenable.

Preventive Suspension is governed by Sec. 41 of P.D. 807 or the Civil Service Law. It will be noted that under

the law, designation of the replacement is not a requirement to give effect to the preventive suspension. On

the contrary, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, provides in Section156, Article 5, Chapter 3, Title II thereof for the automatic assumption of the assistant municipal treasurer or

next in rank officer in case of suspension of the municipal treasurer.

Accordingly, there appears to be no question that: the Order of Preventive Suspension of respondent Chang

became effective upon his receipt thereof, which is presumed when he filed a complaint in the trial court

preventing the implementation of such Order of Suspension. Otherwise stated, the designation of the

OFFICER-IN-CHARGE to replace Chang is immaterial to the effectivity of the latter's suspension. A contrary

view would render nugatory the very purpose of preventive suspension.

Among others, Chang argued that EO 392 gave rise to the creation of the Metropolitan Manila Authority

(MMA) and vested in the President of the Republic of the Philippines the power to appoint municipal

treasurers in Metro Manila. As the power to suspend and remove a municipal official is an incident of the

power to appoint, he maintained that it is the President who may suspend or remove him. Earlier, prior to EO

392, the power to appoint the aforesaid public officials was vested in the Provincial Treasurers and Assessors

of the Municipalities concerned, under PD 477 and later transferred to the Commissioner of Finance under PD921, but under both decrees, the power of appointment was made subject to Civil Service Laws and the

approval of the Secretary of Finance. Verily, the intention of the aforesaid legislations to follow the Civil

Service Laws, Rules and Regulations is unmistakable. Correspondingly, the power to discipline is specifically

vested under Sec. 37 of P.D. No. 807 in heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces and

chartered cities who have original jurisdiction to investigate and decide on matters involving disciplinary

action. Stated differently, they are the proper disciplining authority referred to in Sec. 41 of the same law.

The Office of the Municipal Treasurer is unquestionably under the Department of Finance as provided for in

Sec. 3, P.D. No. 477. Hence, the Secretary of Finance is the proper disciplining authority to issue the

preventive suspension order. More specifically acting Secretary of Finance, Macalincag, acted within his

jurisdiction in issuing the order.

By and large, even assuming that the power to appoint, includes the power to discipline as argued by Chang,

acting Secretary Macalincag as Secretary of Finance is an alter ego of the President and therefore, it is within

his authority, as an alter ego, to preventively suspend Chang.

Garcia vs. Pajara and City of Dagupan

Facts: Sebastian Garcia is an employee at the City Treasurers Office, Dagupan City. He was ordered

suspended by City Treasurer Juanito Pajaro and directed the withholding of his salary because of the Formal

Charge filed against him. However, Pajaro continued reporting for work because he did not honor the

suspension order as the City Treasurer acted as the complainant and that there was no complaint against him

from the Office of the City Mayor.

Juanito Pajaro, the City Treasurer of Dagupan City, claimed that Garcia has been rating unsatisfactory in his

performance for several semesters, which is the reason why he was formally charged. Garcia was

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preventively suspended for ninety days since the charge is a major offense. An investigation was scheduled

but Garcia failed to appear and testify. Garcia also did not answer the subpoena. So, Pajaro proceeded with an

ex parte investigation. The Bureau of Local Government Finance favorably approved the suspension. This was

affirmed by the Regional Director.

Affirming the RTC Decision, the CA held that private respondent was vested with legal power and authority to

institute disciplinary action against subordinate officers and employees.

The appellate court further held that the requisites of administrative due process had been fully observed byPajaro while investigating petitioner. But despite being informed of the charges against him and being given

the opportunity to be heard in a formal investigation, petitioner chose not to answer those charges.

Issue: WON the City Treasurer has disciplinary powers over the petitioner

Ratio: At the outset, it should be pointed out that under the old and the present Local Government Codes,

appointive officers and employees of local government units are covered by the Civil Service Law; and such

rules, regulations and other issuances duly promulgated pursuant thereto, unless otherwise

specified. Moreover, the investigation and the adjudication of administrative complaints against appointive

local officials and employees, as well as their suspension and removal, shall be in accordance with the Civil

Service Law and rules and other pertinent laws.

The Administrative Code of 1987, -- specifically Book V on the civil service -- is the primary law governing

appointive officials and employees in the government. They may be removed or dismissed summarily (1)[w]hen the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong; (2) [w]hen the respondent is a recidivist x x x;

and (3) [w]hen the respondent is notoriously undesirable. Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not

strictly applied; due process in the administrative context cannot be fully equated with that in the strict

judicial sense.

The power to discipline is specifically granted by Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1987 to heads of

departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces and cities. On the other hand, the power to commence

administrative proceedings against a subordinate officer or employee is granted by Section 34 of the Omnibus

Rules Implementing Book V of the said Administrative Code to the secretary of a department, the head of

office of equivalent rank, the head of a local government unit, the chief of an agency, the regional director or a

person with a sworn written complaint.

Further, the city treasurer may institute, motu propio, disciplinary proceedings against a subordinate officer

or employee. Local Administrative Regulations (LAR) No. 2-85, which was issued by the Ministry of Finance

on March 27, 1985, authorized the minister (now secretary) of finance, the regional director, and head of alocal treasury or an assessment office to start administrative disciplinary action against officers or employees

subordinate to them.

In the case at bar, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority referred to in Section 47 of the

Administrative Code of 1987. The term agency refers to any of the various units of the government

including a department, a bureau, an office, an instrumentality, a government-owned or controlled

corporation, or a local government or a distinct unittherein. Respondent Pajaro, as the city treasurer, was the

head of the Office of the Treasurer; while petitioner, a senior revenue collector, was an officer under

him. Thus, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority who could investigate petitioner and issue a

preventive suspension order against him.

Petitioners contention that it is only the city mayor who may discipline him is not persuasive. Section 455

(b-1-x) of the 1991 Local Government Code states that the city mayor may cause to be instituted

administrative or judicial proceedings against any official or employee of the city. This rule is not

incongruent with the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code, which authorizes the heads of agencies todiscipline subordinate employees. Likewise, the old Local Government Code does not vest in city mayors the

sole power to discipline and to institute criminal or administrative actions against any officers or employees

under their jurisdiction. In fact, there is no provision under the present Local Government Code expressly

rescinding the authority of the Department of Finance to exercise disciplinary authority over its employees.

By the same token, there is nothing that prohibits the city treasurer from filing a complaint against petitioner.

As a corollary, the power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. In the present case, Pajaro

was authorized to issue the assailed Preventive Suspension Order against petitioner, because the latter was

charged with gross neglect of duty, refusal to perform official duties and functions, and insubordination --

grounds that allowed the issuance of such Order, as provided by Section 51 of the 1987 Administrative Code.

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Clearly, the city treasurer acted within the scope of his power when he commenced the investigation and

issued the assailed Order.

Issue: WON Garcia was denied due process

Held: No

Ratio: In an administrative proceeding, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain

ones side. Such process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. One

may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation in an oral argument, but also -- and perhaps even many times

more creditably and practicably -- through pleadings. So long as the parties are given the opportunity to

explain their side, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with. Moreover, this

constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of an

action or a ruling.

In the case at bar, the administrative proceedings were conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in

the 1987 Administrative Code and other pertinent laws. First, petitioner was furnished a copy of the May 30,

1990 formal charge against him. Second, Pajaro requested the approval of the Order of Preventive

Suspension in his June 1, 1990 letter addressed to the Bureau of Local Government Finance regional director,

who approved the Order in the First Indorsement dated June 4, 1990. Third, a subpoena dated July 31, 1990

was issued to petitioner ordering him to testify during an investigation on August 15, 1990. However, headmittedly refused to attend the investigation; thus, it was conducted ex parte. Fourth, the Department of

Finance affirmed Respondent Pajaros findings in its August 1, 1991 Decision,.

We need only to reiterate that parties who choose not to avail themselves of the opportunity to answer

charges against them cannot complain of a denial of due process. Petitioners refusal to attend the scheduled

hearings, despite due notice, was at his own peril. He therefore cannot validly claim that his right to due

process was violated.

As to petitioners claim for damages, the extant rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral

and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of

bad faith, malice or gross negligence. There was no such showing in the present case.