Literal Construction of Statutes

B. Premanand and ors. Vs. Mohan Koikal and Ors. AIR2011SC1925 (2011)4SCC266

Decided On: 16.03.2011

Judge: J. Markanday Katju, J. Gyan Sudha Mishra

Facts: Appeal against the judgment of the Full bench of the Kerala HC which had dismissed

appeal against the Judgment of the Single Judge which had ruled in favour of the respondents.

The respondents rank list (on 25.11.1987) was prepared before that of appellants (on 20.06.1992)

but the advice for appellants (on 08.07.1992) was sent before that of respondents (on

06.04.1993).

Issue: Inter se seniority on the post of Block Development Officer between general category

candidates (Respondents) and the SC/ST candidates (Appelants)

Relevant Provision:

Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1959

27(c) - Notwithstanding anything contained in Clauses (a) and (b) above, the seniority of a

person appointed to a class, category or grade in a service on the advice of the Commission shall,

unless he has been reduced to a lower rank as punishment, be determined by the date of first

effective advice made for his appointment to such class, category or grade and when two or more

persons are included in the same list of candidates advised, their relative seniority shall be fixed

according to the order in which their names are arranged in the advice list. (Emphasis added)

Judgment (Relevant Para.):

13. In our opinion, Rule 27(c) of the Rules is plain and clear. Hence, the literal rule of

interpretation will apply to it. No doubt, equity may be in favour of the Respondents because

they were selected earlier, but as observed earlier, if there is a conflict between equity and the

law, it is the law which must prevail. The law, which is contained in Rule 27(c), is clearly in

favour of the Appellants

24. No doubt in some exceptional cases departure can be made from the literal rule of the

interpretation, e.g. by adopting a purposive construction, Heydon's mischief rule, etc. but that

should only be done in very exceptional cases. Ordinarily, it is not proper for the Court to depart

from the literal rule as that would really be amending the law in the garb of interpretation, which

is not permissible.

32. The literal rule of interpretation really means that there should be no interpretation. In other

words, we should read the statute as it is, without distorting or twisting its language.

State of Rajasthan Vs. Babu Ram AIR2007SC2018

Decided on: 05.06.2007

Judges: Dr. Arijit Pasayat and D.K. Jain, JJ.

Facts: The accused was charged under section 17 of the NDPS act but later acquitted and the

conviction and consequential sentence was set aside by the HC because of non-compliance of

section 50 of the act.

Issue: Whether the word "person" occurring in Section 50 would also include within its ambit

any bag, briefcase or any such article or container, etc., being carried by such person and the

provisions of Section 50 have to be strictly complied with while conducting, search of such bag,

briefcase, article or container, etc.

Relevant Provisions:

S. 50- Conditions under which search of persons shall be conducted:

(1) When any officer duly authorized under Section 42 is about to search any person under the

provisions of Section 41, Section 42 or Section 43, he shall, if such person so requires, take

such person without unnecessary delay to the nearest Gazetted Officer of any of the

departments mentioned in Section 42 or to the nearest Magistrate.

(2) If such requisition is made, the officer may detain the person until he can bring him before

the Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate referred to in Sub-section (1).

(3) The Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate before whom any such person is brought shall, if he

sees no reasonable ground for search, forthwith discharge the person but otherwise shall direct

that search be made.

(4) No female shall be searched by anyone excepting a female.

Judgment(Relevant Para.)-

7. One of the basic principles of interpretation of Statutes is to construe them according to

plain, literal and grammatical meaning of the words. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with,

any express intention or declared purpose of the Statute, or if it would involve any absurdity,

repugnancy or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended or

abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further. The onus of showing that

the words do not mean what they say lies heavily on the party who alleges it. He must advance

something which clearly shows that the grammatical construction would be repugnant to the

intention of the Act or lead to some manifest absurdity (See Craies on Statute Law, Seventh

ed. page 83-85). In the well known treatise - Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice

G.P. Singh, the learned author has enunciated the same principle that the words of the Statute

are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are

construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or

unless there is something in the context or in the object of the Statute to suggest the contrary

(See the Chapter - The Rule of Literal Construction -page 78 - Ninth ed.). This Court has also

followed this principle right from the beginning. In Jugalkishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd.

MANU/SC/0005/1955 : [1955]1SCR1369 , S.R. Das, J. said:

The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute literally, that is, by giving to

the words used by the legislature their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however,

such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning the Court

may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the

ordinary rule of literal interpretation.

9. A bag, briefcase or any such article or container, etc. can, under no circumstances, be

treated as body of a human being. They are given a separate name and are identifiable as such.

They cannot even remotely be treated to be part of the body of a human being. Depending

upon the physical capacity of a person, he may carry any number of items like a bag, a

briefcase, a suitcase, a tin box, a thaila, a jhola, a gathri, a holdall, a carton, etc. of varying

size, dimension or weight. However, while carrying or moving along with them, some extra

effort or energy would be required. They would have to be carried either by the hand or hung

on the shoulder or back or placed on the head. In common parlance it would be said that a

person is carrying a particular article, specifying the manner in which it was carried like hand,

shoulder, back or head, etc. Therefore, it is not possible to include these articles within the

ambit of the word "person" occurring in Section 50 of the Act

Case remitted to the HC

Lalita Kumari Vs. Govt. of U.P. AIR2014SC187

Judges: P. Sathasivam, C.J.I., Balbir Singh Chauhan, Ranjana Prakash Desai, Ranjan

Gogoi and Sharad Arvind Bobde, JJ.

Issue: Interpretation of Section 154 of the Code and incidentally to consider

Sections 156 and 157 also.

Judgment(Relevant Para.):

36. It may be mentioned in this connection that the first and foremost principle of

interpretation of a statute in every system of interpretation is the literal rule of interpretation.

All that we have to see at the very outset is what does the provision say? As a result, the

language employed in Section154 is the determinative factor of the legislative intent. A plain

reading of Section 154(1) of the Code provides that any information relating to the

commission of a cognizable offence if given orally to an officer-in-charge of a police station

shall be reduced into writing by him or under his direction. There is no ambiguity in the

language of Section154(1) of the Code.

37. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer to the following observations of this Court in M/s.

Hiralal Rattanlal (supra) which are as under:

22...In construing a statutory provision, the first and the foremost rule of construction is the

literary construction. All that we have to see at the very outset is what does that provision say? If

the provision is unambiguous and if from that provision, the legislative intent is clear, we need

not call into aid the other rules of construction of statutes. The other rules of construction of

statutes are called into aid only when the legislative intention is not clear....

The above decision was followed by this Court in B. Premanand (supra) and after referring

the abovesaid observations in the case of Hiralal Rattanlal (supra), this Court observed as

under:

9. It may be mentioned in this connection that the first and foremost principle of interpretation of

a statute in every system of interpretation is the literal rule of interpretation. The other rules of

interpretation e.g. the mischief rule, purposive interpretation, etc. can only be resorted to when

the plain words of a statute are ambiguous or lead to no intelligible results or if read literally

would nullify the very object of the statute. Where the words of a statute are absolutely clear and

unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to the principles of interpretation other than the literal

rule, vide Swedish Match AB v. SEBIMANU/SC/0693/2004 : (2004) 11 SCC 641.

45. . Reading 'shall' as 'may', as contended by some counsel, would be against the

Scheme of the Code. Section 154 of the Code should be strictly construed and the word 'shall'

should be given its natural meaning. The golden rule of interpretation can be given a go-by only

in cases where the language of the section is ambiguous and/or leads to an absurdity.

shall information book etc.

M/S Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Products v UoI AIR2000SC314

Decided on: 07.12.1999

Judges: S.P. Bharucha, R.C. Lahoti and N. Santosh Hegde, JJ.

Facts:

Issue: Whether the benefit of proforma credit procedure specified in Rule 56A (1) is available to

the appellants though the raw materials consumed by the appellants in their manufacture of the

final products are excisable under tariff items different from the one under which their final

products are excisable

Relevant Provision:

56. A. Special procedure for movement of duty-paid materials or component parts for use in

the manufacture of finished excisable goods-

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules the Central Government may, by

notification in the Official Gazette, specify the excisable goods in respect of which the

procedure laid down in Sub-rule (2) shall apply.

(2) The Collector may, on application made in this behalf and subject to the conditions

mentioned in Sub-rule (3) and such other conditions as may from time to time be prescribed by

the Central Government, permit a manufacturer of any excisable goods specified under Sub-

rule (1) to receive, material or component parts or finished product (like asbestos cement), on

which the duty of excise or the additional duty under Section 2A of the Indian Tariff Act,

1934(32 of 1934), (hereinafter referred to as 'the countervailing duty), has been paid, in his

factory for the manufacture of these goods or for the more convenient distribution of finished

product and allow a credit of the duty already paid on such material or component parts or

finished product, as the case may be;

Provided that no credit of duty shall be allowed in respect of any material or component parts

used in the manufacture of finished excisable goods-

(i) if such finished excisable goods produced by the manufacturer are exempted from the

whole of the duty of excise leviable thereon or are chargeable to nil rate of duty, and

(ii) unless-

(a) duty has been paid for such material or component parts under the same item or sub-item

as the finished excisable goods; or

(b) remission or adjustment of duty paid for such material or component parts has been

specifically sanctioned by the Central Government;

Provided further that if the duty paid on such material or component parts (of which credit has

been allowed under this Sub-rule) be varied subsequently due to any reason, resulting in

payment of refund to, or recovery of more duty from, the manufacturer or importer, as the case

may be, of such material or component parts, the credit allowed shall be varied accordingly by

adjustment in the credit account maintained under Sub-rule (3) or in the account-current

maintained under Sub-rule (3) or Rule 9 or Rule 178(1) or, if such adjustment be not possible

for any reason, by cash recovery from or, as the case may be, refund to the manufacturer

availing of the procedure contained in this rule.

Judgment (Relevant Para.):

8. The language of the rule is plain and simple. It does not admit of any doubt in interpretation.

Proviso (i) and (ii) are separated by the use of conjunction 'and'. They have to be read conjointly.

The requirement of both the provisos has to be satisfied to avail the benefit. Clauses (a) and (b)

of proviso (ii) are separated by the use of an 'or' and there the availability of one of the two

alternatives would suffice.