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Lindsay et al. (2004) Participants heard true and false stories about their childhood Group 1: saw a...
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Transcript of Lindsay et al. (2004) Participants heard true and false stories about their childhood Group 1: saw a...
Lindsay et al. (2004)
Participants heard true and false stories about their childhood
Group 1: saw a classroom photo from 2nd grademore likely to think false memories are true
Group 2: no photo
Cues enhance false memory!
Eyewitness testimony• Jury believes a confident witnessConfidence-accuracy correlation only 0.29200 people per day become accused based on eyewitness testimony
• Wells et al. (2000) - 40 cases where DNA evidence exonerated someone• 36 involved witness ID of innocent people• People served average of 8.5 years• 5 sentenced to death
Pick the gunman (Wells & Bradfield, 1983):• Participants watched a videotape• Gunman in view for 8 seconds• Then picked gunman out of a lineup• Each participant picked someone• The gunman was not even IN the lineup
Stanny & Johnson (2000)
ERRORS DUE TO ATTENTION
-during crime emotions are high-attention narrows as arousal increases (Easterbrook, 1959)
Fired weapon decreases memory for perpetrator, victim, etc.
Ross el al. (1994)ERRORS DUE TO FAMILIARITY
Proxy: Go with the teacher who resembles robber
Wells & Bradfield (1998):‘Good, you identified the suspect…’
[perpetratornot included]
ERRORS DUE TO SUGGESTION
Con
fid
en
ce r
ati
ng
Items correctly identified
Asked questions
Not asked questions
Items not correctly identified
Shaw (1996)
CONFIDENCE (AND ERRORS) DUE TO POSTEVENT QUESTIONING
-saw items in room-recognition testGROUP#1: no follow-up questionsGROUP#2: follow-up questions refer to answers on recognition test
What Is Being Done?
1. Don’t tell criminal is in this lineupthis caused 42% decrease in false ID (Malpass & Devine,
1981)
2. Increase similarity among lineup peoplemay decrease correct ID a bit, but will decrease errors as
well!
CH
OSE
IN
NO
CEN
T
CH
OSE
GU
ILTY
low highSIMILARITY
low highSIMILARITY
PERPETRATOR IN LINEUP
PERPETRATOR NOT IN LINEUP
Lindsay & Wells (1980)
What Is Being Done?
3. In lineup, use sequential presentation, not simultanoeus-avoid making a relative judgment of comparing people
when suspect not in lineup: % of falsely identified is…
…
…
…
…
17%
43%
10am
concept : mental representation used for a variety ofcognitive functions
categorization is the process by which concepts areorganized in some systematic way
Concepts are building blocks of knowledge
Why Categorize?understand new casesmake inferences about items in the categoryunderstand behaviorsnot to mention, organize our knowledge!
Definitions
insufficient to place things in categoriesvariability within a categoryfunctional considerations
family resemblance : members of a category resemble one another in number of ways
Prototypesaveraging the category members
prototypicality-high - member closely resembles prototype (sparrow)-low - member does not resemble typical (penguin)
“average” cat
Demo 1 (Rosch & Mervis, 1975)
write as many characteristics or attributes that you feel are common to each object
chairsofamirrortelephone
prototypical objects have high family resemblancea lot of overlap with other items in the category
Demo 2 (Smith et. al., 1974)
an apple is a fruita tomato is a fruita pomegranate is a fruita watermelon is a fruit
typicality effectstatements about prototypical items verified rapidly
Demo 3list as many objects as you can for each category
office furnituretransportationcolors
prototypical objects named first
office furniture - desk, chair, lamp, couch... bookshelftransportation - car, bus, truck, train, bike... pogo stickcolors - red, blue, yellow, green, orange, purple, black, white, teal... tan
prototypical objects affected more by priming
priming - presentation of one stimulus affects response to another
Rosch (1975)
SUMMARY
Exemplarscomparing to examples of members within a categoryatypical casesno ‘averaging’variable categories which are harder to form a prototype of
Exemplars & Prototypescomplementaryinitially try to form a prototypical member of categoryand later include exceptions (exemplars) that also fitcategory
smaller categories = exemplarslarger categories = prototypes
11am
Levelscategorization is organization of information
categories themselves are organized
hierarchical
Basic Level Categories easiest to access and use
How many common features can you
name?
3
9
10.3
Lose a lot of information
Gain just a little information
Basic Level Categoriesname items at the basic level categoryfaster at deciding membership at the basic level
individual differences[experts don’t rely as much on this ‘basic-level’]
Semantic Networksconcepts arranged in networks ~ the way concepts organized in the mind
model of knowledge representation
Semantic Networks
Collins & Quillian (1969)
Semantic Networks
Predictionstime it takes a person to retrieve information is determined by distance traveled through network
Spreading Activationactivity spreads out along any link connected to activated node
PRIMING!
Priming EffectsMeyer & Schvaneveldt (1971)
lexical decision task - is it a word or not?
Priming EffectsMeyer & Schvaneveldt (1971)
Criticisms of Collins & Quillian
did not explain typicality effect (faster response for more typical members of a category):
“Canary is a bird.”“Ostrich is a bird.”
Collins et al. prediction: should be the same RT
Collins & Loftus Modelnot hierarchical
link length is how ‘related’ the two items are
based on person’s experience
explains too much!
model that explains everything, explains nothing
adjusting length of connections fits any result!
1pm
knowledge = distributed activity of many unitsparallel distributed processing (PDP)
nodes
links (weights)
‘neuron-like’: excitation/inhibition
CONNECTIONISM
McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986
These patterns are learned, not hardwired
supervised learning
model makes mistakes and gets corrected
TRIAL#1
TRIAL#2
Contains knowledge of canary. Where?
In the pattern!
graceful degradationdamage to part of the system does not disrupt all
generalizeabilitysimilar concepts have similar patterns of activation
computer models simulate it welllanguage processing
train on multiple conceptseach concept is ‘encoded’ in the network (weights)learns to respond to various inputsslow learning - so changes to weights don’t disrupt previous knowledge
Properties
Criticisms
how many units?
how many levels?
how much training?
who trains?
2pm
VISUAL IMAGERY
How is the furniture arranged in your bedroom?Is the gas tank on the left or right side of your car?
No sensory input sensory impression
History of science:
Aristotle: “thought impossible without an image”Watson (behaviorism): images “unproven, mythological”
Paivio (1963): easier to remember concrete vs abstract nouns
Shepard & Metzler (1971):mental rotation
Same or different?
RT=f(angle)
IMAGERY is like PERCEPTION
Mental scanning (Kosslyn, 1973):
Participants memorize image
• Move from one part of image to another
• Mental scan time is proportional to spatial distance
IMAGERY is SPATIAL
Mental scanning (Kosslyn, 1978):
IMAGERY is like LANGUAGE
Propositional, not spatial (Pylyshyn, 1973):
Spatial representation may be epiphenomenal
abstract&
symbolic
IMAGERY is PROPOSITIONAL
RT=f (conceptual “distance”) : how many nodes away?
…just like Semantic Networks
Tacit Knowledge?
• Imagining = mental simulation• ...in the real world it takes longer to move from A to B• ...this fact is incorporated into imagining• what Kosslyn considers spatial is simply based on experiential knowledge about the world – not necessarily image-likeEvidence against Tacit knowledge:Finke & Pinker (1982)
[2 sec delay]
Distance (dot, arrow)
React
ion
tim
e
Was the arrow pointing at
the dot?
3pm
Does the bunny havewhiskers?
Kosslyn (1978)
Interactions of imagery and perception
“Imagine a banana on the screen, and describe it.”Perky (1910)
Priming again!
Farah (1985)
Imagery and the brain
Krieman et al (2000): Neurons in the Temporal Lobe
Imagery and the brainLeBihan et al (1993): Neurons in the Visual Cortex
fMR
I
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS): knock out parts of brain for few minutes
fMRI not causing imagery
Pylyshyn: fMRI may be epiphenomenon
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS): knock out parts of brain for few minutes
Perception & Imagery conditionswhich stripes are longer?RESULTS: TMS caused a slowdown in response timeslowdown for both perception and imagery
4pm
Removing part of the visual cortex decreases image size
Farah (1992)
NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE FOR VISUAL IMAGERY
UNILATERAL NEGLECTBisiach & Luzzatti (1978)
R.M.: Can visually identify objects in front of him, but can’t accuratelydescribe imagery from memory. “A grapefruit is larger than an orange.”
C.K.: Cannot visually identify, but can draw vivid andaccurate pictures based on imagery
NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE FOR VISUAL IMAGERY:DOUBLE DISSOCIATION
Using imagery to improve memory
Visualizing interacting images enhances memory
Organizational effect of imagery enhances memory
Method of Loci
Folk psychology & memory self-help books: bizarre imagery helps memory?
INTERACTING > NONINTERACTING BIZARRE == NONBIZARRE
Mechanical problems: Hegarty (2004)
Schwarz & Black (1999)
Rule-based approach
Mental simulation
Which cup flows over earlier?0 delay: @ same angleAfter imagining: wide cup