"Lies Borne Out by Facts, If Not the Truth" (September 11, 2009)

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―LIES … BORNE OUT BY FACTS,

IF NOT THE TRUTH‖

Senator James Webb, Thom Shanker & The New York Times and theWhitewash of General McChrystal’s Role in the Aftermath of Pat Tillman’s Death

By GuyMontag425, feralfirefighter.blogspot.com

September 11, 2009

―Allegations, lies, denials, dissembling, distortions … And all the while they secretly

whispered to the media … And the media gave them their forum, always ascertaining

beforehand that their allegations were borne out by facts, if not the truth.‖

--- James Webb, ―Something to Die For‖ (1991)



September 11, 2009

Clark Hoyt,

In the accompanying binder, ―Lies … Borne Out by Facts, If Not the Truth,‖ I argue that

Washington Pentagon Reporter Thom Shanker (and his NYT editors), whitewashed

General McChrystal‘s central role in orchestrating the cover -up of Pat Tillman‘s 2004friendly fire death.

Instead of an objective search for the truth (―without fear or favor‘) of General

McChrystal‘s actions, The New York Times displayed its stenographical willingness to

parrot official government positions ―borne out by facts, if not the truth.‖ Once again, as

with their coverage of the Jessica Lynch case, the Times has published coverage (or lack

thereof) that brings into question the integrity of its journalism and its ability to use a

―mountain of evidence to arrive at an honest or even sensible conclusion.‖

Accompanying this cover letter are two binders that present my detailed arguments:

At the end of May, I sent my binder, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖-- Senator

James Webb, General Stanley McChrystal, and the Betrayal of Pat Tillman, to both

Senator Webb and NYT Pentagon reporter Thom Shanker. This binder presents the case

that Congress and the top leadership of the Army acted to shield General McChrystal‘s

actions in the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide from public scrutiny and acted to

protect him from punishment.

Last week, I completed the second binder, ―Lies … Borne Out by Facts, If Not the Truth‖

-- Senator James Webb, Thom Shanker & The New York Times, and the Whitewash of

General Stanley McChrystal.‖ This binder explores in detail the role of Thom Shanker(& his NYT editors) in ―clearing‖ McChrystal of any wrongdoing in the Tillman case and

whitewashing McChrystal‘s central role in orchestrating the cover -up of Pat Tillman‘s

2004 friendly fire death.

As Public Editor, I believe you should question Thom Shanker (and his editors) about

their coverage of General McChrystal and the Tillman case. Those involved should be

held accountable for whitewashing McChrystal‘s role in the cover -up of Pat Tillman‘s

fratricide, and the New York Times should publish a detailed correction.

Please feel free to contact me for follow-up with any questions or comments about mywork.

Sincerely,



―LIES … BORNE OUT BY FACTS, IF NOT THE TRUTH‖

TABLE OF CONTENTSPDF Page #:

September 11th

2009 Letter to New York Times Public Editor Clark Hoyt 4

. . .

Thom Shanker & The New York Times, and the Whitewash of General 17

McChrystal‘s Role in the Aftermath of Pat Tillman‘s Death

Rebuttal of Thom Shanker‘s Pre-Hearing NYT Article: 35

―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case‖

Rebuttal of Thom Shanker‘s Post-Hearing NYT Articles: 60

―Nominee to Command U.S. Afghanistan Forces Stresses Civilian Safety‖

& ―U.S. Report Finds Errors in Afghan Airstrikes‖

. . .

Senator James Webb and the Whitewash of General Stanley McChrystal‘s Role 77

in the Aftermath of Pat Tillman‘s Death

May 25th

2008 Letter to Senator James Webb (from ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?) 89

April 3rd

2008 Letter to Senator James Webb (from larger untitled document) 99

APPENDICES:

A: ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ (refer to separate Volume II binder):

Operational & Administrative Chain of Command (from IG Report)Fratricide Investigation Flowchart (Appendix C, IG Report)Casualty Reporting and Next of Kin Notification Flowchart (Appendix D, IG Report)

Timeline of Tillman Fratricide Notification (GuyMOntag425 5-17-08)

Transcript of General McChrystal‘s June 2nd 2009 Senate Testimony

Senate ASC 6-02-09 Confirmation Hearing (from ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?)

B: E-Mail Correspondence Between Guy Montag & The New York Times 101

C: New York Times Articles about General Stanley McChrystal:

(5-12-09) ―Pentagon Ousts Top Commander in Afghan War‖(5-13-09) ―A General Steps from the Shadows‖(5-14-09) ―New Commander for Afghanistan‖ (NYT Editorial)

(5-15-09) ―Afghan Villagers Describe Chaos of U.S. Airstrikes‖ (5-26-09) ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case‖

(6-01-09) ―Questions for General McChrystal‖ (NYT Editorial)

(6-02-09) ―Nominee to Command U.S. Afghan Forces Stresses Civilian Safety‖

(6-02-09) ―U.S. Report Finds Errors in Afghan Airstrikes‖

D: ―5 Years Ago: When the Pentagon and Media Lied About Jessica Lynch Rescue‖



―They ought to make a movie about this. Mr. Smith comes to Washington.‖ ―Yeah, I called my pa last night

and he says, Judd boy, you been up there with them muck-a-mucks two days, now. Did they teach you how to

lie yet?‖

-- James Webb, ―A Country Such As This‖ (1983)

―Allegations, lies, denials, dissembling, distortions … And all the while they secretly whispered to the media… And the media gave them their forum, always ascertaining beforehand that their allegations were borne out

by facts, if not the truth.‖

-- James Webb, ―Something to Die For‖ (1991)

. . .

September 11, 2009

To: Public Editor Clark Hoyt, The New York Times

Re: ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case‖ (5-26-09)

Clark Hoyt,

I‘m writing to express my concerns about The New York Times coverage of General Stanley

McChrystal‘s role in the aftermath of Pat Tillman‘s death.

In my letter (and attached supporting documents) I argue that Washington Pentagon Reporter

Thom Shanker, and his New York Times editors, whitewashed General McChrystal‘s central

role in orchestrating the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s 2004 friendly fire death.

Thom Shanker wrote his May 26th article, ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives

Questions in Tillman Case,‖ clearing General McChrystal of wrongdoing in the Army‘s handling

of Tillman‘s fratricide. However, although Shanker‘s article was full of official government

―facts,‖ my own review showed that his none of his substantive assertions were truthful.

Thom Shanker failed to further investigate the Tillman case or write a follow-up article

correcting his mistakes, even after he (and the NYT editors) received my 100 page document

(that Shanker said was ―impressive,‖ ―exhaustive‖ and ―well-researched‖). Thom Shanker‘s

articles covering the confirmation hearing did not incorporate my new disclosures, but merely

recycled his ―facts‖ clearing McChrystal of wrongdoing.

I believe you should question Thom Shanker and his NYT editors about their coverage of

General McChrystal‘s handling of the Pat Tillman fratricide and of his confirmation hearing.

. . .



On May 12th

, President Obama nominated General McChrystal to be his new Commander of the

Afghan War. On May 14th

, The New York Times expressed their concerns about his nomination

in their editorial, ―New Commander for Afghanistan,‖ writing ―… it was General McChrystal

who approved the falsified report that covered up the 2004 friendly-fire death of Cpl. Pat …

senators must assure themselves that he …will insist on lawful treatment of detainees and candid

military reporting.‖

On May 26th, after his review of investigative documents, Thom Shanker wrote his NYT article,

―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case,‖ that concluded

General McChrystal had been cleared of wrongdoing in the handling of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide.

However, my review (of the same documents) found General McChrystal had played a central

role in the Army‘s cover up of Pat Tillman‘s friendly fire death; none of Thom Shanker‘s

assertions clearing McChrystal of wrong doing held up under close scrutiny.

On May 28th, I emailed Thom Shanker documents from my 100 page binder, ―Did They Teach

You How to Lie Yet – Senator James Webb, General Stanley McChrystal and the Betrayal of PatTillman,‖ that laid out the evidence that Congress and the senior leadership of the Army had

acted with a series of ―investigations‖ to shield General McChrystal‘s actions from close scrutiny

and to protect him from punishment for his central role in orchestrating the cover-up of Pat

Tillman‘s fratricide. On May 29th

, Thom Shanker received my Fed-Exed paper copy.

However, Thom Shanker failed to further investigate McChrystal‘s role in the Tillman case or to

write a follow-up article incorporating my new disclosures and correcting his erroneous ―facts‖

contained in his May 26th article.

On Monday June 1st

, the NYT published their editorial ―Questions for General McChrystal.‖Aferwards, I wrote to the Editorial Page Editor (and seven other NYT editors and newsrooms)

expressing my surprise that, after I had sent Thom Shanker my new disclosures, their editorial

didn‘t mention McChrystal‘s role in the handling of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide.

Was their omission because Shanker‘s May 26th

review had―cleared‖ General McChrystal of any

wrongdoing?

On June 2nd, The Senate Armed Services held a ―pro forma confirmation‖ and the Senators did

not ―rigorously question― McChrystal during the hearing. Thom Shanker failed to incorporate

any of my new disclosures about General McChrystal‘s central role in the cover-up of Tillman‘sfratricide in ―Nominee to Command Afghanistan Stresses Civilian Safety‖ and recycled the

same false assertions that McChrystal was ―cleared of any wrongdoing.‖ In addition, Thom

Shanker failed to note three new key revelations from McChrystal‘s testimony further showing

his complicity in the cover-up.



Obviously, the real Senate confirmation hearing took place last year behind closed doors. Why

didn‘t Thom Shanker follow-up and ask what the Senators learned when McChrystal‘s actions

were ―discussed in detail‖ during the secret ―executive session‖ on May 15th 2008?

By that evening, Shanker‘s article had disappeared from the NYT website. It had been replaced

by ―U.S. Report Finds Errors in Afghan Airstrikes‖that discussed mistaken U.S. airstrikes inAfghanistan and included only a couple of token lines about the hearing at the very end of the

article. Why did Thom Shanker‘s original article disappear?

On June 5th

, I emailed Thom Shanker and asked why ―my document wasn‘t sufficient to prompt

you to write a follow-up to your May 26th article? Or at least include some of my findings in

your June 2nd article about the hearing as a counterpoint to the official government position?‖

But, despite Thom Shanker‘s praise for my document as "exhaustive", "impressive", and "well

researched,‖ he never answered my question. He never responded to my last email on June 7th.

. . .

Note: Following is an ―executive summary‖ that presents a more detailed outline of my

arguments. The following sections in Binder I: ―Lies … Borne Out By Facts, If Not the Truth‖

provide an even more detailed argument and supporting documents.

Binder II: ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ is the document sent to Thom Shanker

(portions were also emailed to the NYT editors). This binder lays out the case that Congress

(House & Senate) and the top leadership of the Army acted to shield General McChrystal‘sactions in the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide from public scrutiny and protected him from

punishment. Portions of Binder II are included in the Appendices to Binder I.

. . .

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On May 12th 2009, President Obama nominated General Stanley McChrystal for promotion to

four-star general and to become his new Commander of the Afghanistan War. The following

day, President Obama gave a commencement address at Pat Tillman‘s alma mater inside Sun

Devil Stadium without once mentioning Tillman‘s name. Afterwards, Bob Young (Arizona

Republic) wrote:



‖Why the omission? … ―Perhaps Obama was sensitive to the fact that the speech came

shortly after the announcement that Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal would become the topAmerican commander in Afghanistan. McChrystal was deemed by a Pentagon

investigation to be responsible for inaccurate information from the Army about Tillman's

death, and the Tillman family has been critical of what it believes was his role in a cover-

up of the real events that took place.‖On May 14th

, The New York Times expressed their concerns about McChrystal‘s nomination in

their editorial, ―New Commander for Afghanistan‖:

―And it was General McChrystal who approved the falsified report that covered up the

2004 friendly-fire death of Cpl. Pat Tillman in Afghanistan. … Before confirming him in

his new command, senators must assure themselves that he …will insist on lawful

treatment of detainees and candid military reporting.‖

Five years prior to McChrystal‘s nomination, Pat Tillman‘s family were handed a tarnished

Silver Star. I felt it would be a travesty of justice if McChrystal was confirmed by the Senate,

promoted to the Army‘s highest rank, and handed his fourth star. So, I once again took out my box of Tillman documents, and closely reviewed General McChrystal‘s actions in the aftermath

of Tillman‘s death.

. . .

After completing my review, I concluded that Congress and the top leadership of the Army had

acted to shield General McChrystal from close scrutiny and to protect him from punishment for

his central role in orchestrating the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide:

General William Wallace‘s final Army review singled out General Kensinger as thescapegoat, while clearing General McChrystal of wrongdoing. However, McChrystalwas guilty of the same charges for which Kensinger was blamed!: McChrystal receivedconfirmation of Tillman‘s fratricide within two days yet didn‘t send his ―timely‖ P4memo until a week later, had the responsibility to notify the family & chose not to do so

(the family wasn‘t told until 35 days later), and personally led the packaging of thefraudulent Silver Star recommendation (with a false narrative and fabricated witness

statements).

Congressman Waxman‘s House Oversight & Reform Committee conducted a pro forma

investigation into the Tillman fratricide. Waxman‘s decision to narrow the scope of his

investigation to only ―look up‖ the chain of command took the focus off General

McChrystal. And he allowed General McChrystal to ―decline‖ to appear before the

Committee and took his name off the list of those scheduled to testify.

During May 2008, Chairman Carl Levin asked Senator James Webb to conduct a secret

review of General McChrystal‘s actions in the aftermath of Tillman‘s death for the

Senate Armed Services Committee. On May 15th 2008 the Committee met in a closed

―executive session‖ where McChrystal testified ―in detail‖ about his actions in theTillman case. On May 22th 2008, McChrystal was unanimously confirmed by the



Committee. Shortly afterward, the full Senate promoted him to Director of the Joint

Staff.

Note: for more details, refer to the binder ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖

Senator James Webb, General Stanley McChrystal and the Betrayal of Pat Tillman‖

. . .

James Webb had been a hero of mine for three decades. I hadn‘t always agreed with his

positions, but I had never before doubted his integrity or his sense of honor. I‘d read his novels

that dealt with themes of honor, loyalty, integrity, and betrayal for thirty 30 years; long before he

became a U.S. Senator from Virginia in 2006.

With Webb‘s background as a decorated Vietnam Marine, I believed he would feel a sense of

kinship with Pat Tillman and his family. But, shortly after I asked Senator Webb in April 2008

to become Mary Tillman‘s Senate advocate (and while Mary Tillman was in Washington DC onher book tour) Senator Webb conducted the secret Senate review that shielded General

McChrystal‘s role in the cover -up of Tillman‘s fratricide from public scrutiny! And instead of

punishing McChrystal for his actions, the Senate promoted him!

But, perhaps, even after his secret ―review,‖ Senator Webb wasn‘t fully aware of McChrystal‘s

complicity. Or, perhaps I thought I could shame him into finally doing the right thing for the

Tillman family: ―I‘d like to think that after three years in Congress you haven‘t yet lear ned the

lesson your grandmother Hodges asked of you decades ago when you first worked in

Washington DC, ―Did they teach you how to lie yet?‖

Note: for more details on Senator Webb‘s role in this story, refer to ―Senator James Webb and

the Whitewash of General Stanley McChrystal‘s Role in the Aftermath of Pat Tillman‘s Death‖

. . .

On May 27th,

I was finishing my letter to Senator Webb that asked him to place a ―hold‖ on

McChrystal‘s confirmation. In my 100 page document, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet –

Senator James Webb, General Stanley McChrystal, and the Betrayal of Pat Tillman,‖ I argued

Congress and the senior leadership of the Army had acted with a long series of ―investigations‖to shield General McChrystal‘s actions from close scrutiny and to protect him from punishment

for his central role in orchestrating the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide.

That evening, I read the NYT article, ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives

Questions in Tillman Case.‖ (5-26-09), written by Thom Shanker (NYT Washington Pentagon

Reporter).



Thom Shanker wrote that General McChrystal had been cleared of wrongdoing in the Army‘s

handling of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide: McChrystal was not responsible for investigating the

fratricide and notifying the family, had sent a ―timely‖ P4 memo to warn his superiors, and had

merely signed off on Tillman‘s misleading Silver Star citation without firsthand knowledge.

However, my analysis (of the same investigative reports Thom Shanker reviewed) found

General McChrystal had played a central role in the Army‘s cover up of Tillman‘s friendly fire

death; none of Thom Shanker‘s assertions clearing McChrystal of wrongdoing held up under

scrutiny!: McChrystal received confirmation of Tillman‘s fratricide within two days yet didn‘t

send his ―timely‖ P4 memo until a week later, had the responsibility to notify the family and

chose not to (the family wasn‘t told until 35 days later), and personally led the packaging of the

Silver Star recommendation (with a false narrative and fabricated witness statements).

Note: For a very detailed, point-by- point refutation of Shanker‘s assertions, see

―Rebuttal of Thom Shanker‘s Pre-Hearing Article: ―Nomination of U.S. AfghanCommander Revives Questions in Tillman Case‖

I e-mailed Thom Shanker that evening. I wrote that my document discussed in detail every point

raised in his article and I described the highlights of my new information about the Tillman case

not addressed in his article. Shortly afterwards, Thom Shanker replied: ―Please feel free to send

me your material, as I would be eager to review it.‖

The following morning, on the 28th, I sent Shanker an email containing the Word documents

from ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet‖ and an email with much of the Appendices

material. That afternoon, I sent a hard-copy of my document by Federal Express to both Thom

Shanker and Senator James Webb. Thom Shanker received my document on Friday the 29th

at

9:38 AM. That afternoon, he replied to my follow-up email: ―Yes, it arrived. I will review your

documents this weekend. Thanks.‖ But, I was concerned that Shanker hadn‘t contacted me with

questions about my document. And why was he waiting so long to review my materials? Was

he sitting on the story?

. . .

On Monday June 1st, I awoke to read the NYT Editorial ―Questions for General McChrystal.‖

The editors wrote that General McChrystal ―needs to be rigorously questioned‖ and ―The Senateowes the American people more than a pro forma confirmation of Lt. Gen. S tanley McChrystal.‖

But, why didn‘t the editors mention General McChrystal‘s actions in the aftermath of Pat

Tillman‘s death? (In their May 14th editorial, they had raised concerns about McChrystal‘s

―falsified report‖ and his less-than ―candid military reporting‖). Was this omission due to Thom

Shanker‘s May 26th

review that had ―cleared‖ General McChrystal of any wrongdoing?



I immediately emailed Thom Shanker, ―Why isn't there any mention of McChrystal's role in the

handling of the Tillman case? … Will the NYT be publishing a follow up to your May 26th

article before the confirmation hearing?‖

Shanker replied: ―… any question about an editorial should be directed to The Times editorial

board, and not to a newsroom reporter.‖ … ―Do you have any sense at all that Senators will be pressing on the Tillman case?‖ … Again, thanks for the very detailed and voluminous file you

sent. It was very well researched and quite thorough.‖

Well, it‘s always nice to receive praise, but why wasn‘t Thom Shanker ―pressing‖ the Senators

on the Tillman case? Why wasn‘t Shanker questioning his Congressional sources? Why wasn‘t

he doing anything to follow up on the revelations in my document?

Later that morning, I tried again: ―Could you please answer my question? Are you going to

publish a follow-up to your May 26th piece based on my document or any other information

you've received? If not, why not? Why did you even bother to raise questions about McChrystaland Tillman in your May 26th article?‖

Thom Shanker replied: ―At this point there will not be a follow-on story on the Tillman

investigation prior to the hearing, although we will see what the hearing brings up tomorrow.‖

―See what the hearing brings up‖? Couldn‘t Shanker play a more active role? He was very

familiar with the Tillman case after writing his May 26th

article (which I had discredited). Why

wasn‘t he doing further investigation?

. . .

I decided to take Thom Shanker‘s advice that ―any question about an editorial should be directed

to The Times editorial board, and not to a newsroom reporter.‖ On Monday afternoon, June 1st,

I sent the following email to the NYT editors (Letters to the Editor, Editorial Page Editor, News

Dept., the Executive Editor, the Managing Editor, News-Tips, National Newsroom, and the

Washington Newsroom. Unfortunately I neglected to email the Public Editor):

I was surprised that your editorial today, ―Questions for General McChrystal,‖ did not

mention General McChrystal‘s role in the aftermath of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide.

I‘ve been corresponding with Thom Shanker, your NYT Pentagon correspondent, sincelast Wednesday in reference to his May 26th article ―Nomination of US AfghanCommander Revives Questions in Tillman‘s Case.‖ Last Thursday, I FedExed my 100

page document to him detailing new disclosures of General McChrystal‘s central role in

the whitewash of Tillman‘s death.

However, it doesn‘t appear that Thom Shanker is following up with another article. Ithink the NYT editorial board would find it useful to speak with him and get a copy of



this document before tomorrow‘s June 2nd

confirmation hearing of General McChrystal

before the Senate Armed Services Committee (or read my letters below and attachments).

Below, you can read my May 27th

letter to Thom Shanker and my letter to Senator Webb.

If you would like more information, I‘ve also ―attached‖ many of the documents in the

package I sent to Thom Shanker.

I never received a response to my email from any of the editors at The New York Times (At the

time, I hoped that an editor might prod Shanker into a follow-up story on the Tillman case).

. . .

On June 2nd 2009, the Senate Armed Services Committee held General McChrystal‘s

confirmation hearing. However, the hearing was just a ―pro forma confirmation‖ and the

Senators did not ―rigorously question― McChrystal. David Corn commented on PBS‘s News

Hour: ―And so the Pat Tillman questioning … I thought, seemed very orchestrated and didn't

give a full airing … a lot of what happened today made it clear to me that Democrats and

Republicans had both decided, "He's our guy in Afghanistan‖

Note: For more detailed information on the Confirmation hearing, refer to the Appendices:

―Senate ASC 6-02-09 Confirmation Hearing‖ (from ―Did They Teach You How to Lie

Yet?) and ―General McChrystal‘s Testimony at Senate ASC 6-02-09 Confirmation

Hearing‖ and ―Rebuttal of Thom Shanker‘s Post-Hearing Article: ―Nominee to

Command U.S. Afghanistan Forces Stresses Civilian Safety‖

Shortly after the hearing ended, Thom Shanker‘s article covering the hearing, ―Nominee to

Command Afghanistan Stresses Civilian Safety,‖ appeared on the NYT‘s website. However,

Shanker failed to incorporate any of my new information about General McChrystal‘s central

role in the Army‘s cover -up of Tillman‘s fratricide into his article. Instead, Shanker merely

recycled his same rebutted assertions (from his 5-26-09 article) that McChrystal was ―cleared of

any wrongdoing.‖

In addition, Thom Shanker failed to note three new revelations from McChrystal‘s testimony:

1. McChrystal‘s new account of when and where he first learned of Tillman‘s fratricidecontradicted his previous testimony and the testimony of General Abizaid and COL

Nixon. Their accounts over the course of several investigations simply didn‘t match up.



McChrystal, Abizaid, and/or Nixon gave false testimony before the investigators and/or

Congress.

2. General Wallace cleared McChrystal since he only ―signed off‖ on the Silver Star

recommendation and ―had no reasonable basis to question the recommendation.‖ But,

McChrystal testified he was in Afghanistan and led the Ranger officers during the SilverStar recommendation process! He didn‘t just sign off on a piece of paper that just

dropped onto his desk!

3. General McChrystal publicly confirmed the existence of last year‘s secret review prior

to his 2008 confirmation hearing: ―You gave me the opportunity to discuss in detail one

of those failures, Corporal Pat Tillman, in closed session with this committee a year ago,

in advance of my confirmation as Director of the Joint Staff …‖

Obviously, the real confirmation hearing took place last year behind closed doors. Why didn‘t

Thom Shanker (or any other reporter) follow-up and ask the Senators what the Senators learned

during last year‘s ―executive session‖ when McChrystal‘s actions were ―discussed in detail‖?

. . .

Later that evening, I was unable to find Thom Shanker‘s article. It had disappeared from the

NYT website sometime after 4 PM! (Luckily, I was able to find a copy of the original version

that had fortuitously been posted onto the Internet).

―Nominee to Command Afghanistan Stresses Civilian Safety‖ that provided coverage of the

hearing had been replaced by a drastically different article, ―U.S. Report Finds Errors in AfghanAirstrikes.‖ This article focused on mistaken U.S. airstrikes in Afghanistan and included

literally only a couple of token lines about McChrystal‘s hearing at the very end of the article:

Why did Thom Shanker‘s original ar ticle disappear? Perhaps one of my emails sent to the NYT

editors had been read by someone in the editorial food chain who made the decision to

―disappear‖ Thom Shanker‘s article?

. . .

After cooling off for a few days, on June 5th, I emailed Thom Shanker and asked why he never

did a follow up on the Tillman case using my new information:

… I still don‘t understand why you didn't write a follow-up to your article last week

―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case.‖ You wrote that

―Unless new information on General McChrystal‘s role in the episode emerges between now and

his confirmation hearing, set for June 2nd, the question is not expected to figure heavily in the

Senate debate." …



Could you please explain to me why my document wasn‘t sufficient to prompt you towrite a follow-up article? Or at least include some of my information in your June 2ndarticle about the hearing? I would welcome any criticism from you of my arguments or

facts contained in my document.

Thom Shanker replied:

Thank you for your note. Your research is exhaustive and impressive. My question back to you would be:

Why are even senators who were most outspoken in criticism of the handling of the

Tillman case -- in particular Senator Webb, who has figured extensively in your researchand in comments by the Tillman family -- now expressing satisfaction with the public

resolution of the inquiries and now, apparently, ready to confirm General McChrystal

next week? Remember, as I know you do, that the legislative branch is a key check andbalance not only of the executive, but of the military. It controls funding and

confirmation to senior general officer jobs.

Again, thanks for sharing your impressive work with me.

On June 6th, I once again tried to get an answer from Thom Shanker as to why he didn‘t follow-

up on my disclosures:

… I would guess that Webb, and the other senators, think McChrystal is the best man tolead the Afghan escalation and are willing to forgive his central role in the cover-up of

Tillman's fratricide. And they all know that McChrystal was just obeying orders from

Rumsfeld and the White House to get out good PR at a bad time (Abu Gharib, etc.).Besides, now the senators are stuck with the "hot potato." They're the last link in the

chain of "investigations" into the handling of the Tillman case. They've got to cover their

own ass now.

But my question for you still remains unanswered. Despite your praise for my document

as "exhaustive", "impressive", and "well researched" none of my findings appeared inyour following articles concerning the Tillman case. Wouldn't my 100 page document

qualify as "new information"? (or are only official government leaks considered

authoritative enough to appear in print?) Could you please explain to me why my

document wasn‘t sufficient to prompt you to write a follow-up to your May 26th article?

Or at least include some of my findings in your June 2nd article about the hearing as a

counterpoint to the official government position?

I never received a response from Thom Shanker. Perhaps I shouldn‘t have needled him a little

with my with my ―government leaks‖ remark (referring to Thom Shanker‘s NYT coverage of the

Jessica Lynch coverage in 2004).



. . .

―Lies … Borne Out by Facts, If Not The Truth‖

Despite Thom Shanker‘s praise for my document, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ as

"exhaustive", "impressive", and "well researched", he never used it‘s revelations to follow-up onhis deeply flawed May 26th review ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions

in Tillman Case‖ that supposedly ―cleared‖ General McChrystal of any wrongdoing. Why not?

I suspect that Thom Shanker and the editors of the NYT were not interesting in exploring

disclosures that would be embarrassing to the leadership of the Army, Congress, and the

Presidency. And embarrassing to Shanker and the NYT since his May 26th

article was full of

inaccuracies (based largely upon on his own inadequate review of the Tillman investigation

documents).

I‘m still puzzled as to who was responsible for posing the ―questions [that] have surfaced againafter General McChrystal‘s nomination to be the top American commander in Afghanistan.‖?

Who at the NYT prompted Thom Shanker to write his May 26th

article?

Was there was a bit of in-fighting at the NYT among the editors? Perhaps the Editorial Page

side raised the ―questions that have surfaced again.‖ Whereas the News Editors told Shanker to

write his article to ―clear‖ McChrystal of wrongdoing, sat on the new disclosures contained in

my document, and disappeared Shanker‘s initial coverage of the Senate Hearing?

. . .

General McChrystal acknowledged during his testimony that he and the Army had ―failed thefamily‖. In Senator James Webb‘s 1983 novel, A Country Such As This, Congressman Judd

Smith argued: ―And no, the military isn‘t just fine. The point is, it isn‘t corrupt. It‘s a system

with human failures.‖

But when ―human failures‖ systematically extend up every single link in the chain-of-command

(to include the Chair of the Joint Chiefs, Army Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense) up

to and including the White House, how is this not a corrupt country? Every single institution in

this country has failed the Tillman family, including the Army leadership, Congress, White

House and the mainstream media.

In the Tillman case, Thom Shanker and The New York Times bear the dishonor of playing the

final role in the Tillman cover-up story. The New York Times laid the topmost layer upon the

tall stack of Army and Congressional cover-ups (‗investigations‖) of the Tillman fratricide.

. . .

During Kevin Tillman‘s testimony before a 2007 House hearing, he said:

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F06E6D8103AF931A25756C0A96F9C8B63&scp=1&sq=Pentagon%20Ousts%20Top%20Commander%20In%20Afghan%20War%20&st=cse




―… while each investigation gathered more information, the mountain of evidence was

never used to arrive at an honest or even sensible conclusion … Writing a Silver Star

award before a single eye witness account is taken is not a misstep. Falsifying soldier

witness statements for a Silver Star is not a misstep. … Discarding an (15-6)

investigation that does not fit a preordained conclusion is not an error in judgment. These

are deliberate acts of deceit. This is not the perception of concealment. This is

concealment.‖

At McChrystal‘s confirmation hearing, Senator James Webb read from a 2005 letter from Pat

Tillman, Sr. (Pat‘s father):

―No investigator worth a damn would have made the presentation I sat through unless

they had an agenda different from the truth. … No one has been confronted with their

conduct. The issue of importance is the integrity of the military from the lieutenant

colonel on the ground all the way up and past General Jones [3 rd investigator].‖

Once again, as in the Jessica Lynch case, The New York Times has provided coverage (or lack

thereof) that brings into question the integrity of its journalism and its ability to use a ―mountain

of evidence to arrive at an honest or even sensible conclusion‖.

Instead of an objective search for the truth of General McChrystal actions in the aftermath of Pat

Tillman‘s death, The New York Times has displayed its stenographical abilities to parrot the

official government position borne out by the ―facts,‖ if not the truth.

I believe you should question Thom Shanker and his NYT editors about their coverage of

General McChrystal‘s Senate confirmation hearing and his handling of the Pat Tillman fratricide.

They should be held accountable for their actions in whitewashing General McChrystal‘s role in

the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s friendly fire death.

Sincerely,

SSG, Co. ―F‖ (Ranger), 425th

Infantry MI ARNG 1983 – 1991

P.S. Who am I? What‘s my agenda? Here are some remarks based on my October 2005

newspaper editorial, ―Remember the Iconoclast, Not the Icon‖:

I‘ve taken the cover -up of Pat Tillman‘s death a bit personally. Like Stan Goff, I feel a sense of

kinship with Pat Tillman. In 1983, when I was ―young and dumb,‖ I enlisted with an Airborne

Ranger Long-Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) company. I grew up in the Army, enjoyed the



camaraderie and the challenges. But, the lies of the first Gulf War were the last straw. After

eight years, I finally left the Army in March 1991, and have been a firefighter the past 18 years.

Four years ago, I believed Pat Tillman was a patriotic ―dumb jock‖. I refused to watch any of

the flag waving coverage of his memorial service. It seemed like a sideshow distraction to the

Abu Gharib story.

But, the reality of Pat was much deeper than his iconic image. In October 2005, I read David

Zirin‘s article, ―Our Hero.‖ I discovered a side of Pat Tillman not widely known – a fiercely

independent thinker, avid reader (a favorite author was Noam Chomsky), and critic of the Bush

administration and the Iraq war (―…this war is so fucking illegal‖). Pat was a remarkable man

who was driven by a core of honesty and integrity, led by personal example, and lived his life

intensely.

I was angered that the truth about Pat‘s life and death had been buried by the media and

government. Tillman was enshrined as an icon while the man fell by the wayside, his parentsused as props at his funeral. Pat‘s family still don‘t have the meager consolation of k nowing the

truth about his death. ―The truth may be painful, but it‘s the truth,‖ his mother said. ―If you feel

you‘re being lied to, you can never put it to rest.‖

Let us honor Pat Tillman‘s memory by honoring the man, not the myth. The iconoclast, not the

icon. As his mother said, ―Pat would have wanted to be remembered as an individual, not as a

stock figure or political prop. Pat was a real hero, not what they used him as.‖

Pat Tillman, never at a loss for words himself, is now silent. Of the many tragic aspects

surrounding his death, one is that he cannot define his own legacy. Now, it‘s been up to his

family and friends to reclaim the truth and integrity of Pat‘s life and death.



THOM SHANKER, THE NEW YORK TIMES, AND THE

WHITEWASH OF GENERAL MCCHRYSTAL’S ROLE IN THE

AFTERMATH OF PAT TILLMAN’S DEATH

―Ron Holcomb [Secretary of Defense] never told a lie, at least not in the way he could be caught in it. …As a

consequence, his remarks were a mix of bald truth, diplomatic half-truths, and what Holcomb had privately called

‗necessary, unconfirmable distortions.‘ Nonetheless, they would become the government‘s official

pronouncement on the day‘s action.‖

―Allegations, lies, denials, dissembling, distortions … And all the while they secretly whispered to the media …

And the media gave them their forum, always ascertaining beforehand that their allegations were borne out by

facts if not the truth.‖

--- Senator James Webb, ―Something to Die For‖ (1991)



―Allegations, lies, denials, dissembling, distortions … And all the while they secretly whispered to the media … And

the media gave them their forum, always ascertaining beforehand that their allegations were borne out by facts if not

the truth.‖

--- Senator James Webb, ―Something to Die For‖ (1991)

THOM SHANKER, THE NEW YORK TIMES, AND THE

WHITEWASH OF GENERAL MCCHRYSTAL’S ROLE IN

THE AFTERMATH OF PAT TILLMAN’S DEATH

During the summer of 2008, I reviewed the Tillman investigation documents and found

General McChrystal had played a key role in the Army‘s cover -up of Tillman‘s friendly fire death:McChrystal received confirmation of Tillman‘s fratricide within two days from the investigating

officer (―I‘m certain, I‘m sure), had the responsibility to tell Tillman‘s family about the fratricide

but decided not to tell the family, he waited a week before sending his ―timely‖ P4 memo to

supposedly warn his superiors of ―potential fratricide‖, and he personally led the Ranger officers

while they wrote the ―misleading‖ Silver Star recommendation (with a false citation and tampered

witness statements).

Note: For a detailed account of my review of the Tillman documents and Senator Webb‘s

role in the Tillman case, refer to the section titled, ―Senator James Webb and the

Whitewash of General Stanley McChrystal‘s Role in the Aftermath of Pat Tillman‘s

Death.‖

. . .

The following year, on May 12th 2009, President Obama nominated General Stanley McChrystal

for promotion to four-star general and commander of the Afghanistan War. Five years ago, Pat

Tillman‘s family were handed a tarnished Silver Star. I felt it would be a travesty of justice if

McChrystal was confirmed by the Senate, promoted to the Army‘s highest rank, and handed his

fourth star!

So, I decided to take a closer look at General McChrystal‘s actions in the aftermath of Tillman‘s

death. I started writing a letter to Senator Webb that asked him to place a ―hold‖ on McChrystal‘s

confirmation. During the last two weeks of May 2008, this letter became the introduction to my

document, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ – Senator James Webb, General Stanley

McChrystal, and the Betrayal of Pat Tillman‖ (with fifty pages of text and 50 pages of supporting

investigative documents).



In ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ I wrote that Congress and the senior leadership of the

Army had acted to shield General McChrystal‘s actions from close scrutiny and to protect him

from punishment for his central role in orchestrating the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide:

On July 31st 2007, Secretary of the Army Pete Geren and General Cody presented the

findings of General William Wallace‘s review. General McChrystal received noreprimand. Instead, Wallace singled out General Kensinger as the scapegoat. However,

their defense of McChrystal doesn‘t hold up under scrutiny.

General McChrystal was guilty of the same charges for which Kensinger was scapegoated!

That is, General McChrystal was required to ―inform the family about friendly fire,‖ failed

to ―inform the family about friendly fire in a timely manner,‖ failed ―to inform the acting

Secretary of the Army [his chain of command] of the fratricide investigation,‖ and

(arguably) made ―false official statements.‖

From April 2007 through July 2008, Congressman Waxman‘s House Oversight & ReformCommittee conducted a perfunctory investigation and held two hearings on the Tillman

fratricide. Chairman Waxman‘s decision to narrow the scope of his investigation to only

―look up‖ the chain of command took the focus off General McChrystal.

And the Committee permitted General McChrystal to ―decline‖ to appear and they never

interviewed him later. After raising questions about the Silver Star, they didn‘t look into

McChrystal‘s role in approving the Silver Star with a fraudulent citation, justification and

altered witness statements. The Committee never questioned the ―timeliness‖ or

misleading contents of General McChrystal‘s P4 memo.

During May 2008, the Senate Armed Services Committee conducted a secret review of

General McChrystal‘s role in the Tillman case. On May 15th 2008 they met in closed

session to question McChrystal‘s actions during the aftermath of the Tillman fratricide.

On May 22th 2008, McChrystal was unanimously confirmed by the Committee and

promoted to Director of the Joint Staff.

Note: To read my detailed argument that Congress and the senior leadership of the Army

acted to protect General McChrystal, refer to the separate binder, ―Did They Teach You

How to Lie Yet?‖ – Senator James Webb, General Stanley McChrystal & the Betrayal of

Pat Tillman.‖ Some sections from this binder have been placed into the Appendices.



Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case

On May 27th 2009, I was finishing my document ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ and

preparing to send a copy to Senator Webb. That evening, I checked the news and read The New

York Times article ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman

Case.‖ (5-26-09). Thom Shanker (NYT Washington Pentagon Reporter ) wrote:

The death of Corporal Tillman, the handling of his Silver Star commendation and the

initial, false information released to the family and the public were the subjects of multiple

investigations. … The four-star general [William S. Wallace] who was the final judge of

the case ordered punitive action against seven officers … General McChrystal was among

the three cleared of wrongdoing. … But questions have surfaced again after General

McChrystal‘s nomination to be the top American commander in Afghanistan …

A review of the voluminous documents, transcripts and findings … showed that General

McChrystal was cleared in part because he was not serving in the chain of command …

responsible for investigating Corporal Tillman‘s death and notifying the family and the

public of details.

General McChrystal‘s [P4] memorandum, sent a week after the episode, warned that ―it is

highly possible that Corporal Tillman was killed by friendly fire,‖ … [and] asked his three

superiors to warn President George W. Bush and the acting Army secretary ―about

comments they might make in speeches to preclude embarrassment if the public found out

friendly fire was involved.‖ … General Wallace … said that General McChrystal

responded ―reasonably and quickly‖

Initially, the Pentagon inspector general‘s inquiry criticized General McChrystal for

signing a Silver Star commendation that ―erroneously implied that Corporal Tillman died

by enemy fire‖ … But the final judgment by General Wallace concluded that General

McChrystal ―had no reasonable basis to call into question the recommendation that came

up endorsed by the commanders in the field who were there and had firsthand knowledge

of the circumstances of his death and his heroic actions.‖

The Senate last year confirmed General McChrystal to a three-star job in a vote taken long

after the inquiries were complete. In explaining why the Tillman case was not expected to

affect the general‘s new confirmation, Congressional officials said senators would have toexplain why they confirmed him then but were challenging his qualifications now to

receive a fourth star and take over the Afghan mission absent new disclosures.

Unless new information on General McChrystal‘s role in the episode emerges between

now and his confirmation hearing, set for June 2, the question is not expected to figure

heavily in the Senate debate, Congressional officials said.




http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/b/george_w_bush/index.html?inline=nyt-per






Wow! The New York Times had actually published an investigative piece on the Tillman case.

But who was responsible for posing the ―questions [that] have surfaced again after General

McChrystal‘s nomination to be the top American commander in Afghanistan.‖? Perhaps the same

editors who had written the May 14th

NYT Editorial ――New Commander for Afghanistan‖:

―it was General McChrystal who approved the falsified report [Silver Star citation?] thatcovered up the 2004 friendly-fire death of Cpl. Pat Tillman in Afghanistan. … Before

confirming him in his new command, senators must assure themselves that he has learned

the hard lessons from these mistakes and will insist on lawful treatment of detainees and

candid military reporting.‖

Wow! The New York Times had actually published an investigative piece on the Tillman case.

But who was responsible for posing the ―questions [that] have surfaced again after General

McChrystal‘s nomination to be the top American commander in Afghanistan.‖? Perhaps the same

editors who had written the May 14th NYT Editorial ――New Commander for Afghanistan‖:

. . .

Thom Shanker wrote that General McChrystal had been cleared of wrongdoing in the Army‘s

handling of Pat Tillman‘s fratr icide: McChrystal was not responsible for investigating the

fratricide and notifying the family, had sent a ―timely‖ P4 memo to warn his superiors, and had

merely signed off on Tillman‘s misleading Silver Star citation without firsthand knowledge.

However, my review found that none of Thom Shanker‘s assertions clearing McChrystal of

wrongdoing held up under scrutiny! General McChrystal played a central role in the Army‘s

cover up of Tillman‘s friendly fire death: McChrystal received confirmation of Tillman‘s

fratricide within two days yet didn‘t send his ―timely‖ P4 memo until a week later , had theresponsibility to notify the family and chose not to, and personally led the packaging of the Silver

Star recommendation (with a false narrative and fabricated witness statements). Although

Shanker and I had both reviewed the same investigative documents from the Tillman case, we

arrived at opposite conclusions!

Why did our conclusions differ so dramatically? First, Thom Shanker had failed to review

General Jone‘s 2004 15-6 Report which contains the key testimony that confirmed fratricide was

passed up the chain of command to McChrystal just two days after Tillman‘s death. Second,

Shanker‘s review of the IG report failed to notice the IG conclusions did not always match the

IG‘s own findings; especially as outlined in their process flowcharts in Appendix C & D of the IGReport. Third, Shanker appeared to uncritically accept the assertions of General Wallace and the

Inspector General (IG) without checking their assertions against other evidence.

Note: For a very detailed, point-by- point discussion of Shanker‘s assertions, see ―Rebuttal of

Thom Shanker‘s Pre-Hearing Article: ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives

Questions in Tillman Case‖













May 27th

Letter to Thom Shanker with Tillman Disclosures

The evening of May 27th

, I e-mailed Thom Shanker and told him I‘d been working on a long letter

to Senator Webb that discussed in detail every point raised in his article and contained newinformation about the Tillman case not found in his article:

This past week I‘ve been working on a long letter to Senator James Webb. I write thatCongress and the senior leadership of the Army have shielded General McChrystal from

close scrutiny and protected him from punishment. I review and critique Senator Webb‘sArmed Services Committee review, General Wallace‘s review, and Congressman

Waxman‘s House Oversight & Reform Committee investigation.

I‘d like to send you a copy of my letter. My letter discusses in some detail every point

raised in your article. In addition, I‘ve uncovered new information about the Tillman case

not mentioned at all in your article.

Here‘s a preview of some of the information (without details or documentation):

1. Senator Webb did a ―thorough review‖ last year of the aftermath of the Tillmanfratricide at the request of Chairman Carl Levin for the Senate Armed Service Committee.

(In retrospect, I realize this was part of the vetting process for McChrystal‘s confirmationlast year as Director of the Joint Staff). Webb mentioned this review May 27th 2008 on

the Diane Rhem NPR radio show (about 40 minutes into show). When I tried to follow up,

Webb‘s Military Affairs aide, Gordon Peterson, stonewalled me and ref erred me to Gary

Leeling 202-224-9339 (legal counsel for Senator Levin)

2.) Congressman Waxman ―invited‖ McChrystal to testify on August 1

st

2007. TheCommittee permited McChrystal to ―decline‖ to appear at the hearing despite his key rolein notifying senior leadership, writing the misleading P4 memo, and approving the

fraudulent Silver Star. And the Committee never interviewed McChrystal during the next

year until their report was issued. .

3.) General Kensinger was blamed for failing to notify the family because he supposedly

had the ―administrative‖ responsibility to do so. Yet, if you look at ―Appendix D: CasualtyReporting & Next of Kin Notification Process‖ in the IG report, the flowchart clearly

shows that McChrystal had that responsibility (and it‘s noted both he and his Chief of Staff

failed to make that notification despite knowing about fratricide NLT April 25th.

4). There was nothing ―potential‖ about Tillman‘s friendly fire death. Most of the troopson the ground knew immediately what had happened. On the 23

rdword was passed up

―70% sure‖ to Nixon. But, if you look at the IG report‘s ―Appendix B: Chronology,‖ its

noted that LTC Bailey tells COL Nixon of potential fratricide on the 23rd

yet Nixonsupposedly only tells McChrystal of Tillman‘s ―death‖ (no mention of fratricide). How isthat possible? And then supposedly McChrystal tells General Abizaid only of Tillman‘s

death. It looks as though Abizaid wasn‘t being truthful when he testified before Congress

about when he learned about fratricide.



5.) And on the 24th

, the initial investigating officer CPT Scott passed on confirmation

(―I‘m certain, I‘m sure‖) to LTC Bailey, who then called COL Nixon (McChrystal wasnext in the chain of command). The Army knew of confirmed FF two days after Tillman‘s

death!

6.) McChrystal is praised for his ―timely‖ P4 memo to alert his superiors on the 29th.

There was nothing timely about it. Even if you accept his own testimony at face value, he

knew about friendly fire on the 23rd

, 24th

, or 25th

. Yet he didn‘t send out his P4 until the

29th? How is waiting four to six days ―timely‖?

7.) No one seems to have carefully read McChrystal‘s P4 memo. The contents are

damning. For example, He says ―IF the circumstances of CPL Tillman‘s death become

public.‖ Not when, IF.

Note: see ―E-Mail Exchanges Between NYT Pentagon Reporter Thom Shanker and David

Parish‖ for the unabridged versions of the email correspondence between Shanker andmyself.

. . .

Shortly afterwards, Thom Shanker replied: ―Please feel free to send me your material, as I would

be eager to review it. Above is my direct e-mail address. Thanks for writing.‖

. . .

I stayed up very late that night finishing my document ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖

and gott it ready to copy and send by Federal Express the following day to Thom Shanker.



―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ Fed-Exed to Thom Shanker

Thursday May 28th, first thing in the morning, I sent Shanker an email containing the Word

documents comprising my binder ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet‖. Shortly thereafter, Isent him a download of most of the Appendices.

That afternoon, I sent a hard-copy of my document to Thom Shanker and Senator Webb by

Federal Express.

I was a bit surprised that Shanker hadn‘t emailed me sometime during the day for clarification or

questions about my emailed material. Perhaps he was waiting to receive my hardcopy materials?

. . .

On Friday morning May 29

th

, I emailed Shanker:

―I sent my document ―Did They Teach You to Lie Yet?‖ by Fed Ex yesterday afternoon.

It‘s supposed to get to your office around 10:30 Friday morning. This is a hard-copy of

what I emailed yesterday, with a numbered Table of Contents and the full set of

appendices. ….‖

I sent a follow-up email later that afternoon:

―I just checked Fed Express. My package was delivered this morning at 9:38 AM. Just

thought I'd pass this information on in case the package hasn't yet made it to your desk.‖

Late Friday afternoon, Thom Shanker replied:

―Yes, it arrived. I will review your documents this weekend. Thanks.‖

. . .

―I will review your documents over the weekend‖? Why was Shanker waiting so long? I thought

that I had certainly provided Shanker with enough ―new information on General McChrystal‘s role

in the episode‖ to pursue a follow-up article prior to his confirmation hearing.

Wouldn‘t Shanker have been doing some digging into the Tillman story (e.g. re-questioning his

Congressional sources, checking out my facts, etc.)

I was a bit surprised that Thom Shanker was going to wait until the weekend to review my

documents. Shanker didn‘t appear to be very enthusiastic about my revelations. Was he doing

anything to follow-up? Was he just sitting on the story?



June 1st NYT Editorial: ―Questions for General McChrystal‖

On Monday, June 1st, I awoke to read the New York Times Editorial ―Questions for General

McChrystal‖ (6-01-09):

―The Senate owes the American people more than a pro forma confirmation of Lt. Gen.

Stanley McChrystal … General McChrystal, who goes before the Armed Services

Committee on Tuesday, built an impressive reputation as commander of the Pentagon‘s

Joint Special Operations teams … But there are other, more disturbing aspects of that

record that the Senate also must consider. [i.e. torture by JSOC special operations] … The

overall performance of the Special Operations Command under General McChrystal‘s

leadership — both acts of heroism and acts of abuse — is an essential part of measuring

General McChrystal‘s fitness for his new assignment. He needs to be rigorously

questioned.‖

In their previous NYT editorial, just two weeks prior, the editors had written ―McChrystal who

approved the falsified report that covered up the 2004 friendly-fire death of Cpl. Pat Tillman in

Afghanistan‖ and the ―senators must assure themselves that he has learned the hard lessons from

these mistakes and will insist … on lawful treatment of detainees and candid military reporting.‖

I agreed with the NYT editors that General McChrystal ―needs to be rigorously questioned‖ and

that ―The Senate owes the American people more than a pro forma confirmation of Lt. Gen.

Stanley McChrystal.‖ But, why was there no mention of General McChrystal‘s actions in theaftermath of Pat Tillman‘s death in their editorial just prior to his hearing?

Why were the editors no longer asking the Senate to question McChrystal about the Tillman case?

Was it because Thom Shanker‘s May 26th

review had ―cleared‖ General McChrystal of any

wrongdoing in his actions in the afterman of the Tillman fratricide?

. . .

Monday morning, on June 1st, I emailed Thom Shanker and asked, ―Why isn't there any mention

of McChrystal's role in the handling of the Tillman case? … Will the NYT be publishing a follow

up to your May 26th article before the confirmation hearing?‖

Thom replied:

―As such a careful reader of the paper, you are no doubt aware of the strict and importantinstitutional divide between the newsroom and those who write editorials. Thus, any

question about an editorial should be directed to The Times editorial board, and not to a

newsroom reporter.



Do you have any sense at all that Senators will be pressing on the Tillman case?

Again, thanks for the very detailed and voluminous file you sent. It was very well

researched and quite thorough.‖

Well, praise for my ―detailed‖, ―very well researched and quite thorough‖ document was fine, butwhy wasn‘t Shanker doing anything with my information? And, how would I have ―any sense at

all that Senators will be pressing on the Tillman case?‖ Wouldn‘t that be the job of a NYT

Pentagon reporter to question his sources in Congress using my revelations? Couldn‘t the NYT

press the Senators to take a closer look at McChrystal before confirming him?

. . .

Later that morning, I tried again: ―Could you please answer my question? Are you going to

publish a follow-up to your May 26th piece based on my document or any other information

you've received? If not, why not? Why did you even bother to raise questions about McChrystal

and Tillman in your May 26th article?‖

Thom replied:

―At this point there will not be a follow-on story on the Tillman investigation prior to the

hearing, although we will see what the hearing brings up tomorrow.‖

―See what the hearing brings up‖? Obviously, Thom Shanker wasn‘t going to use the revelations

contained in ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‘ to do any sort of follow-up investigation into

McChrystal‘s role in the Tillman case.

. . .

So, I decided to take Thom Shanker‘s advice that ―any question about an editorial should be

directed to The Times editorial board, and not to a newsroom reporter.‖

I decided to write a letter to the editor. To as many editors as I could!



June 1st

Letter to the New York Times Editorial Board

Monday afternoon, on June 1st, I sent the following letter by email to as many NYT editors that I

could find on the website (except, unfortunately the Public Editor). I also ―attached‖ to the emailsthe same Word documents from ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ that I had sent to Thom

Shanker the previous week.

Note: See the Appendices to refer to a copy of my email and my ―Sent Items‖. I sent this email

and attachments to the following editors: Letters to the Editor, Editorial Page Editor,

News Department, the Executive Editor, the Managing Editor, News-Tips, National

Newsroom, and the Washington Newsroom.



I‘ve been corresponding with Thom Shanker, your NYT Pentagon correspondent, since

last Wednesday in reference to his May 26th article ―Nomination of US Af ghan

Commander Revives Questions in Tillman‘s Case.‖ Last Thursday, I FedExed my 100 page document to him detailing new disclosures of General McChrystal‘s central role in


However, it doesn‘t appear that Thom Shanker is f ollowing up with another article. I think the NYT editorial board would find it useful to speak with him and get a copy of this

document before tomorrow‘s June 2nd

confirmation hearing of General McChrystal before

the Senate Armed Services Committee (or read my letters below and attachments).


letter to Thom Shanker and my letter to Senator Webb.

If you would like more information, I‘ve also ―attached‖ many of the documents in the

package I sent to Thom Shanker.

Note: The May 27th email to Thom Shanker outlining my new information in the Tillman case

and my May 25th

Letter to Senator Webb appeared in the body of this email to the NYT

editors. Refer to the Appendices to view the contents of those documents.

. . .

I never received a response to my email from any of the editors at The New York Times



―Nominee to Command U.S. Afghan Forces Stresses Civilian Safety‖

On June 1st 2009, the editors of the NYT wrote, in their editorial ―Questions for General

McChrystal,‖ that he ―needs to be rigorously questioned‖ and that ―the Senate owes the American

people more than a pro forma confirmation of Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal.‖

On the following day, June 2nd

2009, the Senate Armed Services Committee held the confirmation

hearing for General McChrystal‘s promotion to four -star general and commander of the

Afghanistan War. However, the Senators did not ―rigorously question― McChrystal, and the

hearing was very much just a ―pro forma confirmation‖.

As David Corn commented on PBS‘s News Hour:

―And so the Pat Tillman questioning, the questioning about detainee abuse, I thought,

seemed very orchestrated and didn't give a full airing to these very, I think, hot-button

issues‖. … ―You know, he came up with what sounded to be a plausible explanation, but,again, a lot of what happened today made it clear to me that Democrats and Republicans

had both decided, "He's our guy in Afghanistan‖

Note: For more detailed information on the Confirmation hearing, refer to the Appendices:

―Senate ASC 6-02-09 Confirmation Hearing‖ (from ―Did They Teach You How to Lie

Yet?) and ―General McChrystal‘s Testimony at Senate ASC 6-02-09 Confirmation

Hearing‖

In his June 1st

email, Shanker had written ―there will not be a follow-on story on the Tillman

investigation prior to the hearing, although we will see what the hearing brings up tomorrow.‖ So,

I was surprised to see that shortly after the hearing ended, Thom Shanker‘s article covering the

hearing, ―Nominee to Command Afghanistan Stresses Civilian Safety,‖ appeared on the NYT‘s

website.

Note: For a very detailed, point-by- point discussion of Shanker‘s confirmation hearing

Coverage of the Tillman case, see ―Rebuttal of Thom Shanker‘s Post-Hearing Article:

―Nominee to Command U.S. Afghanistan Forces Stresses Civilian Safety‖

Shanker merely recycled the same discredited arguments (from his 5-26-09 article) to assert that

McChrystal was ―cleared of any wrongdoing‖ in the Tillman case. He failed to include any of mynew information about General McChrystal‘s central role in the Army‘s cover -up of Tillman‘s

fratricide.

Note: For a very detailed, point-by- point discussion of Shanker‘s ―discredited arguments‖, see

―Rebuttal of Thom Shanker‘s Pre-Hearing Article: ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan

Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case‖



In addition, Thom Shanker failed to notice two new revelations from McChrystal‘s testimony

during the Senate Hearing that provided further evidence of his complicity in the Tillman

fratricide cover-up:

1. ―Corporal Tillman was killed on the 22nd

of April … I arrived back into Afghanistan

from a meeting in Qatar with General Abizaid on about the 23 rd, and I was informed, atthat point, that they suspected that friendly fire might have been the cause of death, and

that they had initiated what we call a 15-6, or an investigation of that.‖ (p.18 transcript)

McChrystal‘s new account of how he first learned of Tillman‘s fratricide contradicted his

own previous testimony and the testimony of Abizaid and Nixon. Their accounts simply

don‘t match up. McChrystal, Abizaid, and/or Nixon gave false testimony before the IGinvestigators and/or Congress.

2. “I sat down with the people [Ranger Regiment officers] who recommended it [Silver

Star]. … and we went over a whiteboard, and we looked at the geometry of the battlefield,

and I queried the people to satisfy myself that, in fact, that his actions warranted that, eventhough there was a potential that the actual circumstances of death had been friendly

fire.” (p. 18 transcript)

General Wallace cleared McChrystal of wrongdoing since he only ―signed off‖ on the

Silver Star recommendation and ―had no reasonable basis to question the recommendation

that came up endorsed by the commanders in the field who were there and had firsthand

knowledge of the circumstances of his death and his heroic actions.‖

But, General McChrystal was in Afghanistan with the Ranger officers discussing what

happened! McChrystal led the Silver Star approval process! McChrystal wasn‘t far

removed from the process. He didn‘t just sign off on a piece of paper that just droppedonto his desk! He was intimately involved with the process and had firsthand knowledge.

. . .

Further, Thom Shanker failed to mention that both Chairman Carl Levin and General McChrystal

publicly confirmed the existence of last year‘s secret confirmation hearing:

General McChrystal said ―You gave me the opportunity to discuss in detail one of those

failures, Corporal Pat Tillman, in closed session with this committee a year ago, in advance

of my confirmation as Director of the Joint Staff, which I appreciated. I stand ready to

answer any additional questions you may have.‖

Obviously, the real confirmation hearing took place last year, behind closed doors, with no

accountability whatsoever. Wouldn‘t you think someone in our intrepid watchdog media (perhaps

Thom Shanker and the NYT) would follow-up on this disclosure? Perhaps ask the Senators about

last year‘s ―executive session‖ during which McChrystal‘s actions were ―discussed in detail‖?



―U.S. Report Finds Errors In Afghan Airstrikes‖

The Senate Armed Services Committee held their confirmation hearing for General McChrystal

on June 2nd

2009. Within an hour, Thom Shanker‘s article ―Nominee to Command AfghanistanStresses Civilian Safety‖ appeared on the NYT‘s website.

Later that evening, I was unable to find the article. It had disappeared from the NYT website

sometime after 4 PM! Unfortunately, I neglected to print or save the article when I first read it

shortly after the hearing. Luckily, I was able to find a copy of the original version that had

fortuitously been posted onto the Internet.

Shanker‘s first article that covered the confirmation hearing had been replaced by a 2nd

version,

―U.S. Report Finds Errors in Afghan Airstrikes.‖ Version #2 had been drastically revised,

focused not on the Senate hearing, but about mistaken U.S. airstrikes in Afghanistan. The second

version deleted nearly all references to the Tillman case and the Senate confirmation hearing. The

extent of the NYT‘s hearing coverage about McChrystal‘s role in the Tillman case was only the

following lines at the very end of the article:

―Under questioning, General McChrystal also acknowledged that the Army had ―failed the

family‖ in its mishandling of the friendly-fire death of Cpl. Pat Tillman, the professional

football star who enlisted in the Army after the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001.‖

―A final review by a four -star Army general [Wallace] cleared General McChrystal of any

wrongdoing, but punished a number of senior officers [eg Kensinger] who were

responsible for administrative mistakes in the days after Corporal Tillman‘s death.

Initially, Army officials said the corporal had been killed by an insurgent ambush, when in

fact he had been shot by members of his own Ranger team.‖

. . .

Why did the original article disappear?

On June 1st, I had sent an email to the NYT editors that included my May 27th letter to Thom

Shanker and my May 25th

letter to Senator Webb with my disclosures about McChrystal‘s central

role in the cover-up of the Tillman fratricide.

Perhaps, someone in the editorial food chain finally saw my email and made the decision to back

off the NYT‘s initial (and full of error) coverage of the hearing. Include just a couple of token line

so they could still say they covered the hearing?

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/t/pat_tillman/index.html?inline=nyt-per




―Why Didn’t You Write a Follow-Up to Your Article?‖

After cooling off for a few days, I finally emailed Thom Shanker again on June 5th:

First, I thought I‘d pass on my comments about General McChrystal‘s testimony at his

confirmation hearing. For what it matters, General McChrystal just dug himself a deeperhole with his own words on Tuesday:

Note: Here followed four points about McChrystal‘s testimony that were the basis for my

―Rebuttal of Thom Shanker‘s Post-Hearing Article: ―Nominee to Command U.S.Afghanistan Forces Stresses Civilian Safety‖]

Finally, I still don‘t understand why you didn't write a follow-up to your article last week

―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case.‖ You wrote

that ―Unless new information on General McChrystal‘s role in the episode emergesbetween now and his confirmation hearing, set for June 2nd

, the question is not expected to

figure heavily in the Senate debate."

Yet, last week I provided you with a copy of my document ―Did They Teach You To Lie

Yet?‖ (with 50 pages of text and 50 pages of Appendices) describing ―new disclosures‖

about McChrystal‘s role in the Tillman case.

Could you please explain to me why my document wasn‘t sufficient to prompt you to writea follow-up article? Or at least include some of my information in your June 2nd article

about the hearing? I would welcome any criticism from you of my arguments or facts

contained in my document.

Thom Shanker replied:

Thank you for your note. Your research is exhaustive and impressive. My question back to

you would be:


Tillman case -- in particular Senator Webb, who has figured extensively in your research

and in comments by the Tillman family -- now expressing satisfaction with the public

resolution of the inquiries and now, apparently, ready to confirm General McChrystal nextweek? Remember, as I know you do, that the legislative branch is a key check and balance

not only of the executive, but of the military. It controls funding and confirmation to senior

general officer jobs.




On June 6th

, I once again tried to get an answer from Thom Shanker as to why he didn‘t follow-up

on my disclosures:

You asked why even Senator Webb has expressed satisfaction with the public resolution of

the inquiries into the Tillman case and is now ready to confirm General McChrystal?

I would stress "public" inquiries. General McChrystal appeared in "executive session" (i.e.

closed, secret) during the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 15, 2008 forhis confirmation to Director of the Joint Staff. I would assume he was a bit more frank

with the senators during that discussion. I talked to Gerald Leeling on June 1st about that

meeting. He would say nothing in response to my questions except "it was in executive

session" and "we did as thorough a review given the information available to us at thetime." I would assume Senator Webb knows McChrystal and the Army have been lying

about their handling of the Tillman case.

But, I would guess that Webb, and the other senators, think McChrystal is the best man to

lead the Afghan escalation and are willing to forgive his central role in the cover-up of Tillman's fratricide. And they all know that McChrystal was just obeying orders from

Rumsfeld and the White House to get out good PR at a bad time (Abu Gharib, etc.).

Besides, now the senators are stuck with the "hot potato." They're the last link in the chain

of "investigations" into the handling of the Tillman case. They've got to cover their ownass now.

But my question for you still remains unanswered:

Despite your praise for my document as "exhaustive", "impressive", and "well researched"

none of my findings appeared in your following articles concerning the Tillman case.

Wouldn't my 100 page document qualify as "new information"? (or are only officialgovernment leaks considered authoritative enough to appear in print?)

Could you please explain to me why my document wasn‘t sufficient to prompt you towrite a follow-up to your May 26th article? Or at least include some of my findings in

your June 2nd article about the hearing as a counterpoint to the official governmentposition?

. . .

I never received a response from Thom Shanker.

Perhaps I shouldn‘t have needled him with my ―or are only official government leaks considered

authoritative enough to appear in print?‖ comment? I was trying to make a subtle reference to

Thom Shanker‘s role in the Jessica Lynch coverage as described by Greg Mitchell‘s April 4th

2008

article ―5 Years Ago: When the Pentagon and Media Lied About Jessica Lynch Rescue.‖



The New York Times and the Whitewash of General McChrystal’s Role

I‘m still puzzled as to who was responsible for posing the ―questions [that] have surfaced again

after General McChrystal‘s nomination to be the top American commander in Afghanistan.‖?

Who at the NYT prompted Thom Shanker to write his May 26th article?

Perhaps there‘s a bit of in-fighting at the NYT among the editors; perhaps those writing the NYT

Editorials raised the ―questions that have surfaced again‖ while the editors on the news side of the

NYT had Shanker write his article to ―clear‖ McChrystal of wrongdoing and later sat on my

revelations contained in my document?

Despite Thom Shanker‘s praise for my document, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ as"exhaustive", "impressive", and "well researched", he never used it‘s revelations to follow-up onhis deeply flawed May 26th review ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions

in Tillman Case.‖ Why not?

I suspect that Thom Shanker and the editors of the NYT were not interesting in exploring

disclosures that would be embarrassing to the leadership of the Army, Congress, and the

Presidency. And embarrassing to himself and the NYT since his May 26th article was full of

inaccuracies (based largely upon on his own inadequate review of the Tillman investigation

documents).

In any case, Thom Shanker and The New York Times bear the dishonor of playing the final role in

the Tillman cover-up story, and laid the topmost layer upon the tall stack of Army and

Congressional cover-ups of the Tillman fratricide.

. . .

General McChrystal acknowledged during his testimony that the Army had ―failed the family‖.

However, the Army wasn‘t the only institution that failed the Tillman family:

The House Oversight Committee‘s ―investigation‖ was pro forma and protected

McChrystal actions covering up Tillman‘s fratricide from public scrutiny.

Senator Webb conducted a secret review of the Tillman case prior to the Senate Armed

Services Committee‘s 2008 confirmation hearing.

The New York Times Pentagon reporter Thom Shanker (and presumably his editors) failedto follow-u p on their receipt of my ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ showing

General McChrystal was a central figure in the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s death.

It appears that even President Obama nominated McChrystal to be his new Afghan

commander knowing of McChrystal‘s complicity in the Tillman case!

. . .





In Senator James Webb‘s 1983 novel, A Country Such As This, Congressman Judd Smith argued:

―And no, the military isn‘t just fine. The point is, it isn‘t corrupt. It‘s a system with

humanfailures.‖

But when ―human failures‖ systematically extend up every single link in the chain-of-command

(to include the Chair of the Joint Chiefs, Army Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense) up toand including the White House, how is this not a corrupt country? Every single institution in this

country has failed the Tillman family, including the Army leadership, Congress, White House and

the mainstream media.

Perhaps Senator Rowland, in Senator Webb‘s novel, Something to Die For , hit the nail on the

head:

―How lofty it must have been to have burnt with the purity of the Revolution! Before the

days of multi-million dollar election campaigns that brought politicians to their knees

before the monied temple of the contributors. Before the time of computerized politics thatcause them to await the wisdom of those oracles known as pollsters before they spoke. Or

maybe it had been trash from the get-go, myths to feed the public.‖



May 26, 2009

Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander

Revives Questions in Tillman Case

By THOM SHANKER New York Times

Note: See my following rebuttal of Thom Shanker‘s assertions that General McChrystal

was ―cleared of wrongdoing‖ in the handling of the Tillman fratricide. I dispute the truth

of every substantive assertion Thom Shanker made in his article.

Each assertion discussed in my rebuttal has been high-lighted and numbered for easy

reference (Italics within bold-face are mine).

. . .

WASHINGTON — One was a football hero who roused the nation when he quit

a high-paying job as star safety for the Arizona Cardinals to join the Army and

become a Ranger after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

The other is a three-star Special Operations general who has spent most of his

career in the shadows, commanding secret counterterrorism missions carried out

by the military‘s most elite capture-or-kill units.

But the lives of Cpl. Pat Tillman and Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal became

entwined in a most public way after Corporal Tillman died in Afghanistan in

2004. [2] General McChrystal, commander of a Special Operations task

force in Afghanistan at the time, was among 10 officers singled out for

scrutiny after details belatedly emerged that Corporal Tillman was killed

not by an insurgent ambush, as the Army originally asserted, but by fire

from his own team of Rangers.

The four-star general who was the final judge of the case ordered punitiveaction against seven officers, including four generals. General McChrystal

was among the three cleared of wrongdoing.

[3] But questions have surfaced again after General McChrystal’s

nomination to be the top American commander in Afghanistan, the latest

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/s/thom_shanker/index.html?inline=nyt-per



http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/a/us_army/index.html?inline=nyt-org


http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/stanley_a_mcchrystal/index.html?inline=nyt-per






http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/stanley_a_mcchrystal/index.html?inline=nyt-per


http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/a/us_army/index.html?inline=nyt-org




step in an urgent effort by the Obama administration to put together a new

strategy and salvage the faltering mission.

[1] The death of Corporal Tillman, the handling of his Silver Star

commendation and the initial, false information released to the family andthe public were the subjects of multiple investigations. Among them were

inquiries by the Army’s Criminal Investigation Command, the Defense

Department’s inspector general and a Congressional committee, as well as

the final four-star review by Gen. William S. Wallace, then in charge of the

Army’s Training and Doctrine Command.

[11] Initially, the Pentagon inspector general’s inquiry criticized General

McChrystal for signing a Silver Star commendation that ―erroneously

implied that Corporal Tillman died by enemy fire.‖

[12] But the final judgment by General Wallace concluded that General

McChrystal ―had no reasonable basis to call into question the

recommendation that came up endorsed by the commanders in the field

who were there and had firsthand knowledge of the circumstances of his

death and his heroic actions.‖

[7] General Wallace also said that General McChrystal responded

“reasonably and quickly” — being the first to alert the three generals who

were his superior officers at Central Command, Special Operations

Command and Army Special Operations Command that there was

emerging evidence that Corporal Tillman had been killed by fellow Rangers.

[6] General McChrystal’s memorandum, sent a week after the episode,

warned that ―it is highly possible that Corporal Tillman was killed by

friendly fire,‖ according to the Pentagon inspector general’s report.

[9] In his message from the field, General McChrystal also asked his three

superiors to warn President George W. Bush and the acting Army secretary

―about comments they might make in speeches to preclude embarrassment

if the public found out friendly fire was involved.‖

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/s/united_states_special_operations_command/index.html?inline=nyt-org








[10] General McChrystal’s message was sent not through standard

reporting channels, but through a ―Personal For‖ message system.

Investigators ruled that while it was an unusual choice for communications,

the general could reasonably have assumed that this specialized report

would be acted upon urgently.

[8] ―General McChrystal did exactly the right thing: he sent a timely

message in a timely fashion through the most secure channels,‖ said Gen.

John P. Abizaid, then the top officer of Central Command, overseeing

forces in the Middle East. He spoke during 2007 testimony to the House

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.

Even so, Corporal Tillman‘s family was not informed of the true cause of death

until 35 days after he was killed, and some family members voiced doubts that

the full truth had emerged about who in the Pentagon knew what, and when.

The puzzle was compounded by the fact that it took three years and three months

for the Army and the Defense Department to finish the array of investigations

and mete out punishment for the events, which took place outside Manah,

Afghanistan, on April 22, 2004.

Even the Army‘s top civilian conceded at the conclusion of the investigations in

July 2007 that damage had been done to the service‘s reputation. Pete Geren, the

Army secretary, voiced regret for the ―errors and failures of leadership that

confused and misinformed the American people and compounded the grief

suffered by the Tillman family.‖

[5] A review of the voluminous documents, transcripts and findings made

public after the inquiries showed that General McChrystal was cleared in

part because he was not serving in the chain of command for personnel issues

or administration, the part of the Army responsible for investigating Corporal

Tillman’s death and notifying the family and the public of details.

[4] Officers in administrative headquarters of the Army were most severely

criticized and punished for the confusion and incorrect information released

to the family and the public.

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/a/john_p_abizaid/index.html?inline=nyt-per




[5] In contrast, General McChrystal was part of the separate, war-fighting

Army in the field, with responsibilities for commanding Corporal Tillman’s

Ranger unit and other Special Operations forces in combat — but not for

the administrative actions faulted by investigators.

A detailed forensics inquiry by the Army‘s Criminal Investigation Command

found that Corporal Tillman‘s death came after a day of heavy combat in eastern

Afghanistan. Hobbled by a broken-down vehicle and faulty radios, the Rangers

had split into two groups, and in the chaos of combat one team of Rangers fired

on the other, killing Corporal Tillman and an Afghan soldier.

[14] Unless new information on General McChrystal’s role in the episode

emerges between now and his confirmation hearing, set for June 2, the

question is not expected to figure heavily in the Senate debate,

Congressional officials said.

[13] The Senate last year confirmed General McChrystal to a three-star job in

a vote taken long after the inquiries were complete. In explaining why the

Tillman case was not expected to affect the general’s new confirmation,

Congressional officials said senators would have to explain why they

confirmed him then but were challenging his qualifications now to receive a

fourth star and take over the Afghan mission absent new disclosures.

. . .

Timeline: A General‘s role in the Aftermath of a Famous Corporal‘s Death:

http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2009/05/26/world/26command.grafic.ready.html

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/f/forensic_science/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier




http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/f/forensic_science/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier



REBUTTAL OF SHANKER’S PRE-HEARING ARTICLE:

―NOMINATION OF U.S. AFGHAN COMMANDER

REVIVES QUESTIONS IN TILLMAN CASE‖ (NEW YORK TIMES, 5-26-09)

In his May 26th NYT article, ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions

in Tillman Case,‖ Thom Shanker argued that General McChrystal was cleared of

wrongdoing for his role in the handling of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide.

However, in the following rebuttal, I argue that none of Thom Shanker‘s assertions

clearing McChrystal of wrongdoing hold up under scrutiny. For example:

McChrystal did not ―reasonably and quickly‖ alert his superiors of fratricide. He

received fratricide confirmation from the investigating officer (―I‘m certain, I‘m

sure‖) just two days after Tillman‘s death. Yet, McChrystal did not immediately

notify the Army Safety board and (supposedly) did not notify his superior General

Abizaid to initiate the required safety and legal investigations. Instead, he

supposedly waited a week before he finally sent his misleading P4 memo, just after

the Silver Star award had been approved.

Thom Shanker reviewed the investigative documents and concluded that

McChrystal was cleared of ―administrative mistakes‖ because he was not serving in

the administrative chain of command responsible for investigating the fratricide

and notifying the family. However, Shanker‘s analysis is incorrect. Although

General Wallace, General Cody, and Secretary Geren asserted otherwise, the

process flowchart (IG Report Appendix D) shows that McChrystal failed to submit

the required supplementary casualty report to notify the family of fratricide. In

addition, McChrystal was in the operational chain of command and failed in his

responsibility to quickly notify CENTCOM (Abizaid) to initiate the legal andsafety investigation into Tillman‘s death (see IG Report Appendix C).

McChrystal did not merely sign off on the Silver Star without firsthand knowledge

of the circumstances, he personally led the Ranger officers who wrote the Silver

Star package (with a false narrative and fabricated witness statements).



First, Thom Shanker had failed to review General Jone‘s 2004 15-6 Report. Granted

Jone‘s 15-6 2000 page report, with all the names and ranks ―redacted‖ is difficult to read

and understand.

But I was able to find the key testimony where the investigating officer confirmed fratricide (I‘m certain, I‘m sure) just two days after Tillman‘s death and this confirmation

was immediately passed up the chain of command. Once you understand confirmed

fratricide went up the chain of command on the 24th, all the assertions by the Army that

they were waiting for confirmation until they told the family or not including fratricide in

the Silver Star are obviously false.

And Jone‘s 15-6 contains McChrystal‘s testimony which contradicts his later testimony

before the Senate and leads to my finding that General McChrystal, General Nixon, and/or

General Abizaid lied to investigators or Congress.

Second, Thom Shanker appeared to uncritically accept the assertions of General Wallace

and the Inspector General (IG). Upon examination, I found several instances where the

conclusions of the IG did not match their own findings. For example, McChrystal‘s

responsibility to notify the family and initiate the legal investigation are laid in the IG

report appendices.

And, I would speculate that the IG did not include most of the adverse findings against

McChrystal in their report, where the logic of the evidence would indicate such findings;

where COL Nixon or General Kensinger were held accountable for their actions, when

General McChrystal was between those two in the chain of command.

On May 27th

, I sent Shanker an email outlining my disclosures that General McChrystal

was at the center of the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide. On the morning of the 28th ,

he received my email documents via attachments. On the morning of May 29th

, Shanker

received my 100- page binder ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ that laid out the

case that the Army leadership, House, and Senate acted to shield General McChrystal‘s

actions in the cover-up of Tillman‘s fratricide from public scrutiny.

However, Shanker failed to follow up on my new disclosures before the June 2nd

Senate

hearing. And, he didn‘t use my disclosures when he wrote his post-hearing articles. In

fact, he merely repeated the same discredited assertions.



I suspect that Shanker was not interesting in exploring disclosures that would be

embarrassing to the leadership of the Army, Congress, and the Presidency. And

embarrassing to himself since his May 27th article was full of inaccuracies (based largely

upon on his own inadequate review of the Tillman investigation documents).

Note:

Quotations from Shanker‘s 5-26-09 article are bold-faced & numbered They correspond

to the boldfaced & numbered quotes in the copy of the original article.

All italics have been added and any content in [ ] was added for clarification.

Much of the content of my rebuttal consists of quotes from the binder ―Did They Teach

You How to Lie Yet?‖ I included these quotes so the reader could easily compare the

disclosures Shanker received from me prior to hearing to the contents of his 5-26-08 NYT

article.

The binder ―Did They Teach You to Lie Yet?‖ is not included in this binder ―Lies …

Borne Out by Facts, If Not The Truth‖. It is enclosed in the same package as this binder.

Portions of the ―Did They Teach You to Lie Yet?‖ are included in the Appendices.



CONGRESS AND THE SENIOR LEADERSHIP OF THE ARMY HAVESHIELDED GENERAL MCCHRYSTAL FROM CLOSE SCRUTINY AND

PROTECTED HIM FROM PUNISHMENT FOR HIS CENTRAL ROLE IN

ORCHESTRATING THE COVER-UP OF PAT TILLMAN’S FRATRICDE:

1.) The death of Corporal Tillman, the handling of his Silver Star commendation and

the initial, false information released to the family and the public were the subjects of

multiple investigations. Among them were inquiries by the Army’s Criminal

Investigation Command, the Defense Department’s inspector general and a

Congressional committee [House Oversight & Government Reform], as well as the

final four-star review:

It‘s important to realize that none of the multiple ―investigations‖ reached their findingsand conclusions based upon an honest evaluation of the evidence. As Kevin Tillman said

before the April 2007 House hearing: ―… while each investigation gathered more

information, the mountain of evidence was never used to arrive at an honest or even

sensible conclusion.‖

The only open Congressional investigation of the Army‘s handling of the Tillman case was

held by Waxman‘s House Oversight Committee. The Committee held two hearings in2007 and released their final report in July 2008. However, the Committee failed to

scrutinize McChrystal‘s key role in the handling of Tillman‘s fratricide and conducted a

half-hearted, perfunctory ―investigation.‖

(p.28, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖):

Overall, it appears Waxman‘s Oversight & Reform Committee acted to protect

McChrystal from close scrutiny of his central role in the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘sfratricide:

Chairman Waxman narrowed the scope of his investigation to exclude examination of

McChrystal, permitted him to refuse to testify at the hearing, and never interviewed

McChrystal despite his central role in the handling of the Tillman fratricide.

Waxman‘s Committee never questioned the ―timeliness‖ of General McChrystal‘s P4

memo. Although McChrystal was informed of confirmed fratricide just two days afterTillman‘s death, he decided not to inform the Tillman family.

The Committee never took a hard look at the contents, and forthrightness of

McChrystal‘s misleading P4 memo or McChrystal‘s role in approving the Silver Star package containing a fraudulent citation and altered witness statements.




Why did Congressman Waxman narrow the scope of his investigation to only ―look up

the chain of command‖? McChrystal was the key link in the chain of commandbetween Col. Nixon (Ranger Regiment) and General Abizaid (CENTCOM), he wrote

the controversial P4 memo, approved the false narrative of the Silver Star citation, and

made the decision not to notify Tillman‘s family about his friendly fire death.

2.) General McChrystal … was among 10 officers singled out for scrutiny after

details belatedly emerged that Corporal Tillman was killed not by an insurgent

ambush … but by fire from his own team of Rangers. ... The four-star general

[William S. Wallace] who was the final judge of the case ordered punitive action

against seven officers, including four generals. General McChrystal was among the

three cleared of wrongdoing.

Although Wallace, Secretary Geren and General Cody asserted that McChrystal was

cleared of wrongdoing, their assertions don‘t withstand scrutiny. And it‘s important to

realize that Wallace didn‘t conduct an investigation of his own. General Wallace‘s report,

―Executive Summary, Army Action – DoDIG Report Related to the Death of Corporal

Patrick D. Tillman‖ (undated), was never released to the public so we could examine

Wallace‘s evidence and reasoning for ignoring the findings of the IG investigation.


Wallace ―cleared‖ McChrystal of wrongdoing. But Wallace merely reviewed the

previous investigations, and then asserted McChrystal‘s innocence despite ampleevidence to the contrary. Yet, a close look at the DoD IG report shows that

McChrystal was at the center of the Army‘s cover -up of Tillman‘s fratricide. (It‘s

important to realize that even the IG report wasn‘t an ―honest‖ investigation. Althoughmost of their facts are correct, it appears that the many of the IG‘s conclusionsinexplicably do not draw the logical conclusions from their own findings and

evidence).

p.17, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖):

During the question and answer period of the press conference, Secretary Geren andGeneral Cody defended General McChrystal‘s handling of the Tillman fratricide.However, their defense of McChrystal doesn‘t hold up under examination. In fact,

although General Kensinger was culpable, I believe General McChrystal was guilty of

exactly those same charges for which Kensinger was scapegoated!

p.20, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖):



Overall, General Wallace‘s review was merely the final layer of the Army‘s cover -up

of the handling of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide. A cover -up of the cover-up. Although

Wallace singled out General Kensinger as a scapegoat, it‘s clear that General

McChrystal was guilty of failing to ―inform the family about friendly fire in a timelymanner‖, failing ―to inform the acting Secretary of the Army [his chain of command]

of the fratricide investigation,‖ and ―made false official statements.‖

3.) But questions have surfaced again after General McChrystal’s nomination to be

the top American commander in Afghanistan, the latest step in an urgent effort by

the Obama administration to put together a new strategy and salvage the faltering

mission.

Who raised these questions? What or who prompted Thom Shanker to write the article?

The NYT May 15th editorial said ―it was General McChrystal who approved the falsified

report that covered up the 2004 friendly fire death of Cpl. Pat Tillman.‖

But after Shanker‘s article appeared on the 26th

, the NYT editorial of June 1st,

―Questions

for General McChrystal,‖ did not have any further questions about McChrystal‘s role in

the Tillman fratricide. Was that because Thom Shanker‘s review of the Tillman case had

―cleared‖ McChrystal of wrongdoing?

Was the agenda of the NYT editors (like the Army, Congress, and President) to shield

General McChrystal from public scrutiny of his role in the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s

fratricide?








GENERAL KENSINGER WAS THE SCAPEGOAT, GENERAL MCCHRYSTAL

WAS ALSO RESPONSIBILE FOR NOTIFYING FAMILY OF FRATRICIDE AND

INVESTIGATING THE FRATRICIDE:

4.) Officers in administrative headquarters [i.e.General Kensinger] of the Army were

most severely criticized and punished for the confusion and incorrect information

released to the family and the public.


General Kensinger was singled out as the scapegoat responsible for the public

believing the Army covered up Tillman‘s fratricide. Secretary of the Army Pete Geren

said: ―General Kensinger failed in his duty to his soldiers, and the results were acalamity for the Army …‖ He ―failed in his duty to inform the family about the

friendly fire incident in a timely manner …‖, ―failed to inform the acting Secretary of

the Army [his chain of command] of the fratricide investigation‖ and ―made falseofficial statements.‖

During the question and answer period of the press conference, Secretary Geren and

General Cody defended General McChrystal‘s handling of the Tillman fratricide.However, their defense of McChrystal doesn‘t hold up under examination. In fact,

although Kensinger was culpable, I believe General McChrystal was guilty of exactlythose same charges for which Kensinger was scapegoated!

5.) A review of the voluminous documents, transcripts and findings made public after

the inquiries showed that General McChrystal was cleared in part because he was not

serving in the chain of command for personnel issues or administration, the part of the Army responsible for investigating Corporal Tillman’s death and notifying the family

and the public of details. … General McChrystal was part of the separate, war-

fighting Army in the field, with responsibilities for commanding Corporal Tillman’s

Ranger unit and other Special Operations forces in combat — but not for theadministrative actions faulted by investigators.

Thom Shanker‘s conclusion that McChrystal was not responsible for the failure to notifyhis family of fratricide was incorrect.

A more careful review of the IG report reveals that McChrystal was responsible for

sending a supplemental report to notify Tillman‘s family of the fratricide investigation.

The process flowchart in Appendix D of the IG report clearly shows that notification of



friendly fire should have flowed from Nixon to McChrystal to Kensinger. In fact,

Tillman‘s initial KIA report followed exactly that notification chain (p. 42 IG report).


When asked why McChrystal couldn‘t have just called Tillman‘s family about

potential fratricide, General Cody replied that ―in the casualty reporting business … wedo not encumber the JSOC commander with all of that … that‘s done by the regiment

and done by the Army through SOCOM.‖ Secretary Geren added, ―So it was General

Kensinger‘s responsibility.‖

However, if you look at Appendix D: ―Casualty Reporting & Next of Kin Notification

Process‖ [p.80, DoD IG report], you‘ll see that McChrystal‘s Chief of Staff wasresponsible for sending a supplemental casualty report to USASOC [General

Kensinger] after learning of friendly fire.

It‘s also noted on the flowchart that both McChrystal and his Chief of Staff knew aboutthe fratricide by the 25th and yet did not send the required report as required by

regulations (this finding is not included in the IG Report conclusions).

Furthermore, McChrystal himself told General Jones that ―there was a consciousdecision on who we told about that potential [fratricide] because we did not know all

the facts. … I believe that we did not tell the family of the possibility because we didnot want to give them some half- baked finding.‖ Shortly afterwards, he contradicted

himself, saying, ―I did not know there was a decision not to tell the family. They had

another [son] in the firefight.‖

. . .

Thom Shanker‘s conclusion that McChrystal was not responsible for the failure to properly

investigate Tillman‘s fratricide (an ―administrative mistake‘) was incor rect.

After the Senate Hearing, I conducted a more careful review of the IG report and found

that McChrystal was serving in the operational chain of command which was responsible

for the legal investigation of Tillman‘s fratricide.

The process flowchart in Appendix C of the IG report and a careful reading of the IG

Report (especially pp. 2, 6 – 27, and 59) shows that General Abizaid at CENTCOM was

the GCMA and the ―Combatant Commander‖ responsible for the legal investigation:

In cases of ―Friendly Fire, the combatant commander will convene a legal

investigation‖ (p. 7). The IG Report Appendix C ―Fratricide Investigation Process‖

flowchart shows that the combatant commander was Abizaid (CENTCOM), in



McChrystal‘s operational chain of command. And the IG report found that

―Commander [Abizaid], CENTCOM, who was charged by DODI 6055.7 to

convene the legal investigation into a friendly fire incident. (p. 27)

Regulation AR 15-6 ―directs that only a general court-martial convening authority

(GCMA) may appoint an investigation or board for incidents resulting in the death

of one or more persons.‖ (p.8) Once again, the flowchart in Appendix C shows

Abizaid was the GCMA in the operational chain of command responsible for the

legal investigation.

. . .

Notification of friendly fire should have flowed quickly through the chain of command to

Abizaid and to the Army Safety Center. That is, from Bailey to Nixon to McChrystal to

Abiziad. However, the IG report conclusions only faulted Nixon for his failure to notify

CENTCOM (i.e. Abizaid) of friendly fire. But Nixon had notified McChrystal. Yet

McChrystal was not held accountable by the IG for his failure to immediately notify

Abizaid!

AR 385-40 ―Accident Reporting and Records‖ states that ―Fratricide … must bereported promptly and investigated thoroughly with both a safety investigation …

and a legal investigation.‖ … ―and requires the commander who first becomes

aware of any Army Class A accident to immediately notify, through the chain of

command , the Commander, Army Safety Center.‖ (p. 9)

It‘s important to realize the IG report Conclusions sometimes contradict their own findings

and process flowcharts! It appears that Nixon and Kensinger‘s wrongdoing was

emphasized, and McChrystal‘s role omitted by the IG, even though McChrystal was the

man in the middle of the reporting chain!

For example, the IG found that ―COL Nixon failed to initiate, through his chain of

command, timely notification to the Army Safety Center and CENTCOM of suspected

friendly fire‘ (p.59) However, the IG neglected to mention that Nixon did tell McChrystal

of fratricide on the 23rd. McChrystal was responsible for notifying Abizaid (CENTCOM),

not Nixon

Also, ―COL Nixon was accountable for his decision to delay notification to the primary

next of kin until the completion of the friendly fire investigation.‖ (p. 60). Yet, once again,

the IG report neglected to mention that Nixon did tell McChrystal of fratricide on the 23rd

.



McChrystal was then responsible for passing the supplementary casualty report on to

Kensinger at USASOC. Further, McChrystal even testified in the Jones 15-6 that he made

the decision not to notify the family of fratricide!

After being notified of fratricide on the 23

rd

, McChrystal failed to immediately notify hischain of command, Abizaid (as discussed in the following section, McChrystal claims he

waited a week until he tried to notify Abizaid with the P4). Yet the IG conclusions do not

fault McChrystal. Instead, they blame Nixon and Kensinger for delaying notification to the

next of kin.

In actuality, McChrystal promptly passed up probable fratricide on the 23rd

and

confirmation on the 24th to Abizaid. Either Abizaid or McChrystal lied in Congressional

testimony about when they learned about the fratricide.



GENERAL MCCHRYSTAL’S PREVARICATING P4 MEMORANDUM:

6.) General McChrystal’s [P4] memorandum, sent a week after the episode, warned

that ―it is highly possible that Corporal Tillman was killed by friendly fire,‖

according to the Pentagon inspector general’s report.


I want to emphasize there was nothing ―potential‖ or ―suspected‘ about Tillman‘sfratricide. Confirmation of Tillman‘s fratricide was passed up the chain of commandto McChrystal just two days after his death by the first investigating officer!:

The Army leadership claimed they waited to inform the Tillman family of fratricide

until they were sure of the facts. COL Nixon said it took a ―considerable time to getthe truth‖. General Abizaid testified before Congress, ―But it is clear that all alongfratricide was called as early as the 29th of April, and that on the 28th of May we

conclusively stated it was fratricide … in terms of fratricide investigations, by the way,that‘s not a slow investigation. That‘s a fast investigation.‖

Yet, the day after Tillman‘s death, on the 23rd

, CSM Birch was ―70% sure‖ and LTC

Bailey ―was certain‖ it was fratricide. CPT Scott, the first 15-6 investigating officer,

confirmed Tillman‘s fratricide just two days after Tillman‘s death (not five weeks), and

immediately passed that information up the chain of command to LTC Bailey who toldCol. Nixon:

―And certainly, by the next day [24th

] when we did the investigations, I [ Bailey]confirmed it. Because I called him [Nixon] back within a day or two and said, ―Sir, Iwant you to know now, after getting the first five interviews‖ in fact, that was, I guess,

the next day.‖ … ―So, after [Scott] did his first five interviews, he came back to me and

said, ―Sir, I‘m certain. I‘m sure.‖ And then I called [Nixon]. … I think it was the 24th.

(p. 53).

General McChrystal was next in line in the chain of command, then Abizaid.

7.) General Wallace also said that General McChrystal responded ― reasonably and quickly‖ — being the first to alert the three generals who were his superior officers

at Central Command, Special Operations Command and Army Special Operations

Command that there was emerging evidence that Corporal Tillman had been killedby fellow Rangers.

―Emerging evidence‖? As noted above, McChrystal was told of confirmed fratricide a

week before he sent his P4 memo!






General Wallace asserted that McChrystal acted ―reasonably and quickly‖ when healerted his higher headquarters about the fratricide investigation. Secretary Geren said

―General McChrystal, when notified of the friendly fire incident, he alerted, through

his P4 … his chain of command …‖:

Response:

There was nothing ―timely‖ about McChrystal‘s P4 memo! Secretary Geren implies

that McChrystal learned about potential fratricide on the 29th, then sent the P4 to alert

his superiors.

However, on April 23rd (NLT 25th), COL Nixon told McChrystal about probable

fratricide and the 15-6 investigation. How can waiting six days to send a P4 be

considered ―quickly‖? And on the 24th

, McCrystal received verbal confirmation of

fratricide from Nixon.

8.) ―General McChrystal did exactly the right thing: he sent a timely message in a

timely fashion through the most secure channels,‖ said Gen. John P. Abizaid, then the

top officer of Central Command, overseeing forces in the Middle East. He spoke

during 2007 testimony to the House Committee on Oversight and Government

Reform.


During the Waxman Hearing, General Abizaid said: General McChrystal did exactly

the right thing. He sent a timely message [P4] in a timely fashion through the most

secure channels‖ and ―… it is clear that all along fratricide was called as early as the29th of April, and that on the 28th of May we conclusively stated it was fratricide … in

terms of fratricide investigations, by the way, that‘s not a slow investigation. That‘s afast investigation.‖

Response:

There was nothing ―timely‖ about McChrystal‘s P4 memo supposedly alerting hischain of command! General Abizaid asserts that McChrystal learned about potential

fratricide on the 29th, then immediately sent his P4 to alert his superiors.


… the DoD IG Chronology (Appendix B) asserts that after Nixon was told of suspected fratricide on the 23

rd, he then told McChrystal only of Tillman‘s death,

which McChrystal passed onto General Abizaid. Yet, McChrystal testified in General






Jones 15-6 that he was told of possible fratricide by Nixon ―… about a day [23rd

] or

two [24th

] after the incident. No more than three days later [25th

].‖

Note: McChrystal testified on 6-02-09 that he was notified of possible fratricide on the

23rd

after returning to Afghanistan from a meeting in Qatar.

Somebody is lying here. Nixon, McChrystal, or Abizaid (or all three).

In actuality, McChrystal quickly notified his chain of command. McChrystal toldGeneral Abizaid of probable fratricide on the 23rd, and updated Abiziad with

confirmation on the 24th

. Five weeks later the Army announced Tillman ―probably‖died from friendly fire!

9.) In his message from the field, General McChrystal also asked his three superiors

to warn President George W. Bush and the acting Army secretary ―about comments

they might make in speeches to preclude embarrassment if the public found out

friendly fire was involved.‖


Chairman Waxman said ―Much of our focus will be on a ―Personal For‖ message …

that MG McChrystal sent on April 29th

2004.‖ General Abizaid testified that ―General

McChrystal reported the incident in a forthright and timely fashion.‖

Response:

Chairman Waxman never focused on the content of McChrystal‘s P4 memo. If you

carefully read it, the memo was anything but ―forthright‖. As Mary Tillman said in aninterview (8-10-07) with Mike Fish:

"That memo is damming as hell. And yet, nothing happens to [McChrystal]. He is

writing fraudulent language in that memo. He is giving examples of how they canscript the Silver Star award, even though Pat was killed by fratricide. And he is

saying we need to keep our leadership abreast of things so they don't embarrass

themselves, IF the circumstances of Pat's death should become public … He shouldbe saying 'We're going to have to put a hold to the silver star and we're going to

have to notify the family [of suspected friendly fire].' That is what he would say if

he was innocent, but he is not. He is trying to find a way that they can continue this

false, elaborate story of theirs. And the fact that he is off the hook is atrocious."

And Mary wrote in her book ―Boots on the Ground by Dusk‖:

―Not only is he [General McChrystal] lying about the circumstances surrounding

Pat‘s death, … he is proposing false language for the Silver Star narrative. … His





statement [P4 memo] indicates that no one had any intention of telling us, or the

public, that Pat was killed by fratricide unless forced to do so.‖

John R. Reed does a hilarious job of tearing apart the P4 memo point-by-point in

his article ―Lessons to Be Learned from Pat Tillman‘s Death.‖ For example,

―McChrystal is absolutely certain about Tillman deserving the Silver Star, whichnormally requires a highly subjective assessment. However, he has to await the

outcome of an investigation to determine whether Tillman was killed by friendly

fire, which was a no brainer in this case. Apparently, public-relations efforts likeawarding dubious medals require virtually no investigation or thought, but

revealing unattractive truth, well, we gotta do a whole formal ―15-16 investigation‖ before such an unnatural act.‖

Here‘s s few of my additional comments on the P4 memo:

―It is anticipated that a 15-6 investigation nearing completion will find that it is

highly possible that CPL Tillman was killed by friendly fire‖:

How is it ―nearing completion‖ when Scott‘s 15-6 was a ―Final Report‖?

(And how was it ―nearing completion‖ when Nixon ―officially‖ started the15-6 on the 29th

?) Scott‘s report concluded friendly fire; ―highly possible‖means ―definitely.‖ Of course, in reality, General McChrystal was told of

probable friendly fire on the 23rd

and confirmed fratricide on the 24th

!

If McChrystal is waiting for the completion of the 15-5 investigation,

wouldn‘t it make sense to wait until it is complete to forward the Silver Star package?

―I felt it was essential that you received this information as soon as we detected it

in order to preclude any unknowing statements by our country‘s leaders whichmight cause public embarrassment if the circumstances of CPL Tillman‘s death

becomes public‖:

Note the ―if‖. Not when! And McChrystal‘s concern is for embarrassmentof his bosses, not to ensure his family knows or that the Secretary of the

Army knows before approving the Silver Star!

Why did McChrystal send the P4 memo on the 29th? Well, on the 29th CPT Scott

submitted his 15-6 ―Final Report‖ concluding friendly fire. It‘s interesting to note

that COL Nixon ―officially‖ appointed Scott on the 29th (even though Scott beganwork on the 23rd). Perhaps Nixon was creating a paper trail to show friendly fire

wasn‘t suspected and an investigation begun until after he approved the Silver Star

package on the 28th

?

I believe McChrystal sent the P4 memo to provide a paper trail he could use later, if

necessary, to cover his butt. The P4 provides a paper trail that he told his superiors



about fratricide, it allows him to argue that he thought Tillman deserved the Silver

Star even if it was from friendly fire. And he could argue that he had approved theSilver Star before he was informed about possible friendly fire.

10.) General McChrystal’s message was sent not through standard reporting

channels, but through a ―Personal For‖ message system. Investigators ruled that

while it was an unusual choice for communications, the general could reasonably

have assumed that this specialized report would be acted upon urgently.


A P4 is not the most ―timely‖ or ―secure‖ fashion to send a message. How about

simply picking up the telephone? That‘s how all the earlier notifications by

McChrystal and the other officers were done!



MCCHRYSTAL’S FR ADULENT SILVER STAR RECOMMENDATION:

11.) Initially, the Pentagon inspector general’s inquiry criticized General McChrystalfor signing a Silver Star commendation that ―erroneously implied that Corporal

Tillman died by enemy fire‖

(p.17, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖)

… General Wallace disregarded the findings of the Department of Defense Inspector

General (DoD IG) review which found General McChrystal ―accountable for inaccurate and misleading assertions contained in the award recommendation pack age‖

and ―accountable for not notifying the award processing channels [Secretary of theArmy] that friendly fire was suspected to ensure that the recommendation was

considered based on accurate information.‖

12.) But the final judgment by General Wallace concluded that General McChrystal

―had no reasonable basis to call into question the recommendation that came up

endorsed by the commanders in the field who were there and had firsthand knowledge of

the circumstances of his death and his heroic actions.‖


Another reporter asked why McChrystal received no punishment after being singledout in the DoD IG report for inaccurate Silver Star award information. Secretary

Geren replied that McChrystal ―reasonably and appropriately‖ presumed the Silver Star packet presented to him for his signature was accurate. He said that McChrystal was

aware it was friendly fire when he approved the award and that he ―had no reasonable

basis to call into question the recommendations that came up endorsed by the

commanders in the field …‖

Note: McChrystal testified before the 6-02-09 that he actually personally led the Silver

Star recommendation process. It didn‘t just land on his desk!


Wouldn‘t General McChrystal have a ―reasonable basis‖ to question a Silver Star package containing no mention of friendly fire after he had been informed of

confirmed fratricide? The Silver Star narrative justification and citation bore little

resemblance to reality and were carefully edited to imply Tillman died by enemy

fire.



General McChrystal testified he relied on four factors to conclude that Tillman

deserved the Silver Star. Yet the DoD IG report states he ―did not directly, or clearly, state these four factors in the award recommendation.‖ .‖ And if McChrystal only knew what was in the recommendation presented to him for his

signature, how could he know about these four factors!

Both of the Silver Star witness statements were altered to remove any mention of

friendly fire and contained inaccurate statements. Inspector General Gimble said

this was done ―somewhere in the approval chain‖ but refused to ―speculate‖ who

was responsible. It appears that COL Nixon, Nixon‘s XO, and/or General

McChrystal were involved.

Even if you take the P4 at face value, that McChrystal first learned of suspected

fratricide on the 29th

after he had sent up his Silver Star recommendation, why

didn‘t he directly warn the Secretary of the Army about fratricide before the

Secretary approved the award?



SECRET 2008 SENATE CONFIRMATION OF GENERAL MCCHRYSTAL:

13.) The Senate last year confirmed General McChrystal to a three-star job in a votetaken long after the inquiries were complete. In explaining why the Tillman case was

not expected to affect the general’s new confirmation, Congressional officials said

senators would have to explain why they confirmed him then but were challenging his

qualifications now to receive a fourth star and take over the Afghan mission absent

new disclosures.

Actually, ―the inquiries‖ were not yet complete. The House Oversight Committee didn‘t

issue their report until a couple of months later. And Shanker doesn‘t mention that

McChrystal‘s previous hearing was held in ―executive session‖ (i.e. in secret).


Last year, the Senate Armed Services Committee conducted a secret review of General

McChrystal‘s role in the Army‘s handling of the Tillman fratricide. On May 15th 2008

the Senate Armed Services Committee met in ―executive‖ (closed) session to consider

McChrystal‘s nomination. On May 22th 2008, General McChrystal was unanimouslyconfirmed by the Committee and promoted to Director of the Joint Staff.

Last year, I spoke with you [Senator Webb] on the Diane Rhem NPR radio program

(May 27

th

2008; at 40:56). You said he ―went through a fairly thorough review of thatprocess [what happened in the aftermath of his death] at the request of the Chairman of

the [Senate] Armed Services Committee [Senator Levin].‖ … ―the Army knew that thiswas a friendly fire incident fairly quickly, they did not tell the family, they allowed a

ceremony to go forward which implied otherwise…I‘m not sure where responsibilityfor that decision really lies, in terms of the chain of command, how it was handled

publicly… You cannot help but still feel angry about how his death was used.‖


I was surprised to learn of Senator Webb‘s review. Although I was familiar with

Congressman Henry Waxman‘s (House Oversight & Reform Committee) hearings on the

Tillman fratricide, I was unaware that any sort of Senate review had also been conducted.

When I attempted to follow up to find out more about the Senate review, I was stonewalled

by Senator Webb‘s Military Legislative Aide Gordon Peterson:

―Regarding your questions about the radio interview, I‘m not in a position to

elaborate. I did not participate in the review that Senator Webb mentioned and have



no information to provide to you. The senator‘s involvement occurred in his

capacity as a member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. I checked with

Senator Webb, and he has nothing more to add to what he said last week. If you

have any additional questions you should contact a representative for the

Committee -- Gary Leeling, 202 224-9339. He is out of the office until next

week.‖

To my regret, I never followed up with Gary Leeling (Legal Counsel for Senator Carl

Levin). I was very busy with life (and had just spent far too much time on the Tillman

case) and figured I was just getting blown off.

A year later [2009], after General McChrystal‘s nomination as the new commander of the

Afghanistan War, I finally realized Senator Webb‘s review was for the previous Senate

confirmation of General McChrystal. On May 15th 2008 the Senate Armed Services

Committee met in ―executive‖ (closed) session to consider McChrystal‘s promotion. On

May 22th 2008 General McChrystal was unanimously confirmed by the Committee. Thefollowing month McChrystal was promoted to Director of the Joint Staff by a Senate voice

vote.

14.) Unless new information on General McChrystal’s role in the episode emerges

between now and his confirmation hearing, set for June 2, the question is not

expected to figure heavily in the Senate debate, Congressional officials said.

Wouldn‘t you think that Thom Shanker would have considered receiving my 100 page

binder ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ to be ―new information‖? But Shanker

never wrote a follow-up to his May 26th article prior to the hearing and apparently never

went back to his Congressional sources to ask follow up questions. I suspect that Shanker

was not interesting in revisiting the Tillman case and exploring questions that would be

embarrassing to the leadership of the Army, Congress, and the Presidency (not to mention

himself and The New York Times!)



POSTSCRIPT: REBUTTAL OF ―A GENERAL’S ROLE IN THE

AFTERMATH OF A FAMOUS CORPORAL’S DEATH

The graphic timeline, ―A General‘s Role in the Aftermath of a Famous Corporal‘s Death,‖

accompanied the text of Thom Shanker‘s 5-26-09 NYT article ―Nomination of U.S.Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case‖. Initially, I overlooked this

graphic when I first read Shanker‘s article on May 27th

. I finally read the article early on

May 30th

, and sent Thom Shanker the following email with my comments correcting his

timeline:

I overlooked your graphic showing a timeline of McChrystal's role in the aftermath

of Tillman's death. If you look in my Appendices, I've included a "Timeline of Tillman Notification" which compares the IG timeline to my own (my Fratricide

Notes has supporting details). I just wanted to point out a couple corrections:

1.) April 23rd, Nixon is told Tillman "may have" been killed by own troops. Heinforms McChrystal:

"may have": CSM Birch was "70% sure", LTC Bailey was "certain".

"informs McChrystal": According to the IG chronology, Nixon tells McChrystal

only of "death". I overlooked this at first, but according to the IG timeline, Nixon

didn't mention potential fratricide to McChrystal, and then McChrystal told Abizaidonly of "death"! Not likely.

And if McChrystal did learn of fratricide on the 23rd and told Abizaid, then

Abiziad lied in testimony before the IG and Congress. (A look at the IG interviewsof Nixon, McChrystal, and Abizaid might be illuminating).

2.) May 16th, "investigation concludes Tillman killed by friendly fire:

This is the 2nd 15-6 investigation by LTC Hodne. The first 15-6 was done by CPT

Scott who verbally passed confirmation of FF to LTC Bailey on the 24th whopassed it onto COL Nixon. CPT Scott submitted his "15-6 Final Report" on April

29th concluding friendly fire. Nixon said this report was only a "draft:. (Scott's

15-6 disappeared, there is no copy! Although the IG said they managed to

reconstruct it somehow.)

You noted that the "Source" for the graphic is the DoD IG and the report of General

Wallace. Do you have a copy of the Wallace Report. I wasn't able to find it. I'd

appreciate you sending me a copy if possible.

Thom Shanker didn‘t reply to my email correcting his timeline.



Note: During May 2008, I constructed my own detailed timeline of the Tillman case

(focusing especially on when the chain of command first learned of fratricide).

Refer to Appendix B, ―Timeline of Tillman Fratricide Notification & Notes‖ located in the

second binder ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet? – Senator James Webb, General

Stanley McChrystal, and the Betrayal of Pat Tillman‖

** link to marked timeline

. . .

Later, I wrote a series of short corrections on the binder copy of the timeline to mark the

errors in Shanker‘s timeline; every one of Shanker‘s assertions was incorrect!:

1. April 24th

the investigating officer notified his chain of command of confirmed

fratricide Scott Bailey to NixonMcChrystal Abizaid

2. Nixon told by Bailey ―certain‖ it was fratricide.

3. IG Report says Nixon did not notify McChrystal on 23rd

(contradicts McChrystal‘stestimony)

4. McChrystal follows Nixon in chain of command. McChrystal was responsible to notifythe family and Army Safety Center of fratricide.

5. ―suggesting‖? The IG report said anyone reading citation would assume KIA.

6. McChrystal was told of confirmed fratricide on the 24th; how is waiting a week to

―warn‖ his superiors ―timely notification‖?

7. The IG Report Appendix D flowchart shows it was McChrystal‘s responsibility toinform the family and he failed to do so.

8. General Wallace said McChrystal was ―cleared of wrongdoing.‖ Saying something

doesn‘t make it so!

9. Incorrect. McChrystal‘s operational chain of command was responsible for notificationand the legal investigation, not the administrative chain of command.

10. McChrystal did more than ―approve‖, just sign off, he personally led the Ranger

officers packaging the Silver Star package.



―Nominee To Command U.S. Afghanistan Forces

Stresses Civilian Safety ―

New York Times June 2nd 2009, Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt

2009-06-02 16:02:50 (18 hours ago)Posted By: Intellpuke

(Read 59 times || 0 comments)

[Note: This article was changed before the evening of June 2nd

to the version that appearson June 3rd, ― U.S. Report finds Errors in Afghan Airstrikes‖. This is a cached copy from a

website.]

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The Special Operations general nominated to be commander of American and alliedtroops in Afghanistan testified on Tuesday that coalition forces must reduce civilian

casualties, a step that is ―essential to our credibility.‖

The commander, Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, said that ―how we conduct operations

is vital to success,‖ and warned that any victory would be ―hollow and unsustainable‖ if

allied operations created popular resentment among Afghanistan‘s citizens.

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General McChrystal saidthe measure of American and allied effectiveness would be ―the number of Afghansshielded from violence,‖ not the number of enemies killed.

Even so, strikes by warplanes and Special Operations ground units would remain an

essential part of combat in Afghanistan, said General McChrystal. He pledged to make

sure these attacks would be ordered only based on solid intelligence, and would be as

―precise‖ as possible.

General McChrystal formerly served as commander of the Joint Special OperationsCommand, whose hunter-killer units scored significant successes in Iraq and Afghanistan,

and he was questioned about reports of abuse of detainees held by his commandos.

When he took command of these units in 2003, the general said, the Special Operations

detention facilities in Afghanistan were limited and disorganized, and the forces involved

in the detention mission lacked experience.

Under questioning by Senator Carl Levin, the Michigan Democrat who is the committee

chairman, General McChrystal said that he ―was uncomfortable‖ with some of the harshtechniques that were officially approved for interrogations. At the time, the approved

techniques included placing detainees in stress positions, sleep deprivation and use of

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attack dogs.

He said that while he was in command, all reports of abuse were investigated, and all

substantiated cases resulted in disciplinary action. He pledged to ―strictly enforce‖American and international standards for treatment of battlefield detainees if he is

confirmed to the post in Afghanistan.

―I do not and never have condoned mistreatment of detainees, and never will,‖ said

General McChrystal.

―Unfortunately, criminal acts take place on the battlefield, just like they do in normalsociety,‖ General McChrystal said in separate, prepared answers to questions submitted by

the committee. ―Fortunately, through improved training and education, substantiated

allegations of abuse have decreased over time.‖

If confirmed, General McChrystal said, he would take a number of steps to improve

detention operations.

Among them, he said, would be efforts to ―separate and segregate the extremists,‖ and to―impart basic education and vocational skills‖ to detainees. Troops would be ordered to

―develop a moderate understanding of Islam,‖ the general said, and he would continue the

use of extended family members and tribal groups ―to aid in a released detainee‘s

abstention from violence.‖

Under questioning from Sen. John McCain, of Arizona, the committee’s ranking

Republican, General McChrystal discussed his actions following the friendly-fire

death of Cpl. Pat Tillman, the professional football star who enlisted in the Army

after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

General McChrystal expressed his ―deepest condolences‖ to the Tillman family and

to Corporal Tillman’s fellow Rangers, and acknowledged that he would do things

differently if presented again with such a tragedy.

[1] A four-star Army review cleared General McChrystal of any wrongdoing, but it

punished a number of senior officers who were responsible for administrative

mistakes in the days following the death of Corporal Tillman.

[2] General McChrystal explained that he signed a Silver Star recommendation, even

though he already suspected death by friendly fire, because Corporal Tillman’s valorin the field earned him the honor regardless of the manner of his death. However, the

general acknowledged that the recommendation produced confusion.

[3] At the time, Army policy was to rush those medals of valor so they could be

received by the family at the time of the honored soldier’s funeral; that policy has

been changed to allow more thorough evaluations.



[4] General McChrystal said that within a week of Corporal Tillman’s death, he sent

an urgent message to his three senior commanders specifically to inform them of

mounting evidence of death by friendly fire, and to push the Army to quickly halt anymisinformation regarding Corporal Tillman’s death.

[5] Sen. James Webb, a Virginia Democrat who has championed the Tillman’s familycase, returned to the topic late in the hearing during a heartfelt exchange in which the

Senator chastised the Army for its initial incorrect reports that Corporal Tillman was

killed in an insurgent ambush, and not by fire from his own Ranger unit.

―The Army failed the family,‖ said Senator Webb.

[6] ―We failed the family,‖ General McChrystal agreed. ―I was a part of that, and I

apologize,‖ but the general repeatedly stated that any errors committed by soldiers

and officers in the field of combat in Afghanistan ―were not intentional,‖ and he

added, ―I didn’t see any activities by anyone to deceive.‖

Senator Levin called for strong cooperation between General McChrystal and Adm. James

G. Stavridis, who also testified Tuesday; the admiral has been nominated to becomeNATO's supreme allied commander and commander of American forces in Europe. If

confirmed, Admiral Stavridis would be the first Navy officer to hold that position.

NATO supplies the majority of the nearly 35,000 non-American troops in Afghanistan, but

Senator Levin said that ―only a portion are in the fight where the fight mainly is - in the

south and east of Afghanistan.‖

The NATO contribution to the Afghan mission ―remains inadequate,‖ Senator Levin said.

He urged Admiral Stavridis to do all he could to press ―NATO and other allies in Europeto do their share for the Afghanistan mission.‖

Under President Obama's new Afghan strategy, the number of American troops in the

country will double to about 68,000 this year.

Intellpuke: You can read this article by New York Times staff writers Thom Shanker and

Eric Schmitt, reporting from Washington, D.C., in context here:

www.nytimes.com/2009/06/03/world/asia/03military.html?_r=1&hp

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June 3, 2009

U.S. Report Finds Errors in Afghan Airstrikes

By ERIC SCHMITT and THOM SHANKER

Note: Eric Schmitt probably provided most of the content of this NYT article ―U.S.

Report Finds Errors in Afghan Airstrikes‖ (6-02-09); Version #2 of Thom Shanker‘s Post-

Hearing articles. Thom apparently just worked in a few references to the Senate hearing

into the body and a short summary at the end.

WASHINGTON — A military investigation has concluded that American personnel made

significant errors in carrying out some of the airstrikes in western Afghanistan on May 4

that killed dozens of Afghan civilians, according to a senior American military official.

The official said the civilian death toll would probably have been reduced if American air

crews and forces on the ground had followed strict rules devised to prevent civilian

casualties. Had the rules been followed, at least some of the strikes by American warplanes

against half a dozen targets over seven hours would have been aborted.

The report represents the clearest American acknowledgment of fault in connection with

the attacks. It will give new ammunition to critics, including many Afghans, who complain

that American forces too often act indiscriminately in calling in airstrikes, jeopardizing the

United States mission by turning the civilian population against American forces and their

ally, the Afghan government.

Since the raid, American military commanders have promised to address the problem. On

Tuesday, Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, nominated to be the American commander

in Afghanistan, vowed that reducing civilian casualties was ―essential to our credibility.‖

Any American victory would be ―hollow and unsustainable‖ if it led to popular resentment

among Afghanistan‘s citizens, General McChrystal told the Senate Armed Services

Committee during a confirmation hearing.

According to the senior military official, the report on the May 4 raids found that one plane

was cleared to attack Taliban fighters, but then had to circle back and did not reconfirm the

target before dropping bombs, leaving open the possibility that the militants had fled the

site or that civilians had entered the target area in the intervening few minutes.

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In another case, a compound of buildings where militants were massing for a possible

counterattack against American and Afghan troops was struck in violation of rules that

required a more imminent threat to justify putting high-density village dwellings at risk,

the official said.

―In several instances where there was a legitimate threat, the choice of how to deal with

that threat did not comply with the standing rules of engagement,‖ said the military

official, who provided a broad summary of the report‘s initial findings on the condition of

anonymity because the inquiry was not yet complete.

Before being chosen as the new commander in Afghanistan, General McChrystal spent

five years as commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, overseeing

commandos in Iraq and Afghanistan. Special Operations forces have been sharply

criticized by Afghans for aggressive tactics that have contributed to civilian casualties.

During his testimony, General McChrystal said that strikes by warplanes and Special

Operations ground units would remain an essential part of combat in Afghanistan. But he

promised to make sure that these attacks were based on solid intelligence and that they

were as precise as possible. American success in Afghanistan should be measured by ―the

number of Afghans shielded from violence,‖ not the number of enemy fighters killed, he

said.

The inquiry into the May 4 strikes in the western province of Farah illustrated the difficult,

split-second decisions facing young officers in the heat of combat as they balance using

lethal force to protect their troops under fire with detailed rules restricting the use of

firepower to prevent civilian deaths.

In the report, the investigating officer, Brig. Gen. Raymond A. Thomas III, analyzed each

of the airstrikes carried out by three aircraft-carrier-based Navy F/A-18 strike aircraft and

an Air Force B-1 bomber against targets in the village of Granai, in a battle that lasted

more than seven hours.

In each case, the senior military official said, General Thomas determined that the targets

that had been struck posed legitimate threats to Afghan or American forces, which

included one group of Marines assigned to train the Afghans and another assigned to a

Special Operations task force.


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But in ―several cases,‖ the official said, General Thomas determined either that the

airstrikes had not been the appropriate response to the threat because of the potential risk to

civilians, or that American forces had failed to follow their own tactical rules in conducting

the bombing runs.

The Afghan government concluded that about 140 civilians had been killed in the attacks.

An earlier American military inquiry said last month that 20 to 30 civilians had been

killed. That inquiry also concluded that 60 to 65 Taliban militants had been killed in the

fight. American military officials say their two investigations show that Taliban fighters

had deliberately fired on American forces and aircraft from compounds and other places

where they knew Afghan civilians had sought shelter, in order to draw an American

response that would kill civilians, including women and children.

The firefight began, the military said, when Afghan soldiers and police officers went to

several villages in response to reports that three Afghan government officials had been

killed by the Taliban. The police were quickly overwhelmed and asked for backup from

American forces.

American officials have said that a review of videos from aircraft weapon sights and

exchanges between air crew members and a ground commander established that Taliban

fighters had taken refuge in ―buildings which were then targeted in the final strikes of the

fight,‖ which went well into the night.

American troop levels in Afghanistan are expected to double, to about 68,000, under

President Obama‘s new Afghan strategy.

In his previous job as commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, General

McChrystal oversaw units assigned to capture or kill senior militants. In his

appearance before Congress on Tuesday, he was questioned on reports of abuses of

detainees held by his commandos.

Under questioning by Senator Carl Levin, the Michigan Democrat who is the committee

chairman, General McChrystal said he was uncomfortable with some of the harsh

techniques that were officially approved for interrogation. At the time, such approved

techniques included stress positions, sleep deprivation and the use of attack dogs for

intimidation.

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He said that all reports of abuse during his command were investigated, and that all

substantiated cases of abuse resulted in disciplinary action. And he pledged to ―strictly

enforce‖ American and international standards for the treatment of battlefield detainees if

confirmed to the post in Afghanistan.

[1] Under questioning, General McChrystal also acknowledged that the Army had

―failed the family‖ in its mishandling of the friendly-fire death of Cpl. Pat Tillman,

the professional football star who enlisted in the Army after the attacks on Sept. 11,

2001.

[2] A final review by a four-star Army general cleared General McChrystal of any

wrongdoing, but punished a number of senior officers who were responsible for

administrative mistakes in the days after Corporal Tillman’s death. Initially, Army

officials said the corporal had been killed by an insurgent ambush, when in fact he

had been shot by members of his own Ranger team.





REBUTTAL OF THOM SHANKER’S POST-

HEARING NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLES

Version #1: ―Nominee To Command U.S. AfghanistanForces Stresses Civilian Safety ―

(New York Times, June 2nd

2009, Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt)

The Senate Armed Services Committee held their confirmation hearing for General

McChrystal on June 2nd 2009. Within an hour, Thom Shanker‘s article ―Nominee to

Command Afghanistan Stresses Civilian Safety‖ appeared on the NYT‘s website.

Thom Shanker did not incorporate any of the disclosures from ―Did They Teach You How

to Lie Yet?‖ into his Senate hearing coverage. Instead, he merely repeated the same

discredited arguments that McChrystal was cleared of any wrongdoing in the Tillman case

used previously in his 5-26-09 article.

In addition, Thom Shanker failed to note two new key bits of information that came out of

the Senate Hearing:

McChrystal‘s new account of the circumstances when he first learned of Tillman‘s

fratricide contradicts his previous testimony and appears to indicate that McChrystal,

Abizaid, and or Nixon gave false testimony before investigators and/or Congress.

General Wallace cleared McChrystal of wrongdoing since he only ―signed off‖ on the

Silver Star recommendation. However, McChrystal testified that he was intimately

involved in Silver Star award recommendation process in Afghanistan!

Note: Quotations from Shanker‘s article are bold-faced and correspond to the numbers I

added to the original articles contained in Appendix D. All italics have been added andany content in [ ] was added for clarification.

Much of my rebuttal content consists of quotes from the ―Senate Armed Services

Committee June 2nd Confirmation Hearing‖ chapter in my binder ―Did They Teach You

How to Lie Yet?‖ Shortly after the hearing, I wrote that chapter as my response to Thom

Shanker‘s coverage of the Senate hearing.



1. A four-star Army review [Wallace] cleared General McChrystal of any

wrongdoing, but it punished a number of senior officers [e.g. General Kensinger] who

were responsible for administrative mistakes in the days following the death of

Corporal Tillman.

See my comments from the Pre-Hearing Rebuttal:

Point #2 for ―cleared of wrongdoing‖

Points #4 & #5 for ―administrative mistakes.‖

2. General McChrystal explained that he signed a Silver Star recommendation, even

though he already suspected death by friendly fire, because Corporal Tillman’s valor

in the field earned him the honor regardless of the manner of his death. However, the

general acknowledged that the recommendation produced confusion.

(Post-Hearing: p. 15.4, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖):

1. McChrystal said that he first learned of suspected fratricide and the 15-6 investigation

after returning back to Afghanistan from a meeting in Qatar with General Abizaid on

about April 23rd

:

“Corporal Tillman was killed on the 22

nd

of April … I arrived back into Afghanistan froma meeting in Qatar with General Abizaid on about the 23rd , and I was informed, at that

point, that they suspected that friendly fire might have been the cause of death, and that

they had initiated what we call a 15-6, or an investigation of that.” (p.18 transcript)

But during the Jones 15-6 McChrystal said that he "was in Qatar when I was told,

about a day or two after the incident NLT the 25th...". [OK, that matches the 23rd

,

but was he in Qatar or Afghanistan?].

During his DoD IG interview General Abizaid said "Gen McChrystal informed him

of CPL Tillman's death while they were in Qatar in a meeting .... he received no

details and did not know friendly fire was suspected." [So we're supposed tobelieve McChrystal didn't tell Abizaid about fratricide while they were together in

Qatar on the same day! Or, Abizaid lied about not being told about fratricide.] And during his Congressional testimony on 8-01-07, General Abizaid said "on

about the 23rd, Gen McChrystal called me and told me that CPL Tillman had beenkilled in combat and that the circumstances his death were heroic." [So was he told

―no details‖ or ―heroic‖?]



But the DoD IG Chronology (Appendix B) states that after COL Nixon was told of

possible fratricide and the 15-6 on the 23rd, Nixon only told McChrystal of the"death" of Tillman and then McChrystal told Abizaid only about Tillman's

"death". [But McChrystal said during Tuesday‘s hearing he was told of fratricide

on the 23rd

!]

McChrystal either failed to tell Abizaid about fratricide, or Abizaid lied about not

being informed about it. And Nixon lied about telling McChyrstal about Tillman‘s

―death‖ and/or McChrystal lied about Nixon telling him only of ―death‖.] So, McChrystal, Nixon, and/or Abiziad lied about when they learned about

―suspected‖ fratricide during their interviews with the DoD Inspector General andbefore Congress. A look at their IG interviews would be illuminating and resolve

this question [Scott Laidlaw at AP got these interviews through FOIA, but I haven‘tseen them].

. . .

(Post-Hearing: p.15.7, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖)

4.) General Wallace cleared McChrystal of wrongdoing because McChrystal only “signed

off’ on the Silver Star and “had no reasonable basis to question the recommendation that

came up endorsed by the commanders in the field who were there and had firsthand

knowledge of the circumstances of his death and his heroic actions.”:

But during Tuesday's hearing, McChrystal said he sat down with the officers (i.e. Nixon,

Kauzerlich, Hodne, Bailey) and went over Tillman's actions on a whiteboard to satisfy

himself that Tillman's actions merited a Silver Star!:

“I sat down with the people [Ranger Regiment officers] who recommended it [Silver Star].

… and we went over a whiteboard, and we looked at the geometry of the battlefield, and I queried the people to satisfy myself that, in fact, that his actions warranted that, even

though there was a potential that the actual circumstances of death had been friendly

fire.” (p. 18 transcript)

So, General McChrystal was in Afghanistan with the Ranger officers discussing what

happened! McChrystal led the Silver Star approval process! McChrystal wasn‘t far

removed from the process. He didn‘t just sign off on a piece of paper that just droppedonto his desk! He was intimately involved with the process.

―Potential… friendly fire.‖ As previously mentioned, all the Ranger officers andMcChrystal had been told of confirmed friendly fire on the 24 th!

5.) McChrystal said that the Silver Star citation wasn't well written and that he didn't read

it close enough to catch that it could "imply" Tillman wasn't killed by friendly fire:



“… my own mistakes in not reviewing the Sil ver Star citation well enough and making sure

that I compared it to the message [P4 memo] that I sent were mistakes.” (p. 48

transcript). “… in retrospect, they [Silver Star and P4 memo] look contradictory,

because we sent out a Silver Star that was not well written – and, although I went through

the process, I will tell you now I didn’t review the citation well enough to capture – or, I didn’t catch that if you read it, you can imply that it was not friendly fire.” (p.18

transcript)

Absolute bull. The IG report said that anyone reading the citation would assume

Tillman was killed by enemy fire: ―we concluded that an uninformed reader couldreasonably infer that CPL Tillman had been killed by enemy fire although a careful

review of the narrative and citation show no direct assertion that he was killed by

enemy fire. As a result, the narrative justification and citation were misleading.‖(p.55 IG report)

In fact, Maj. Hodne even said that he edited the narrative to ensure it didn't mentionfriendly fire!: ―Maj.[Hodne] testified that he carefully prepared the narrative toavoid stating that the enemy had killed CPL Tillman and distinctly remembered

removing a phrase asserting that CPL Tillman ‗died by enemy fire.‖(p.51 IGreport).

And the witness statements were altered by "someone in the approval chain" (i.e.

Nixon, McChrystal, and/or Kauzerlich). ―PFC [O‘Neal] stated that he did not signthe valorous award witness statement .. also pointed out parts he knows he did not

write and parts that were not accurate.‖ … Sgt [Weeks?] also pointed out parts that

were inaccurate, in that he was unable to see CPL Tillman‘s actions from his

location.‖ IG Gimble preferred not to ―speculate‖ as to who was

responsible while testifying before the House Oversight Committee in April 2007.!

―… we were not able to identify the specific drafter.‖ (p.53 IG report).

3. At the time, Army policy was to rush those medals of valor so they could be

received by the family at the time of the honored soldier’s funeral; that policy hasbeen changed to allow more thorough evaluations.

Incorrect. There was no Army regulation requiring medals of valor to be awarded prior to

the memorial service. Supposedly, the Ranger Regiment had an ―unwritten‖ policy toaward medals of valor before the memorial service as a matter of practice.

4. General McChrystal said that within a week of Corporal Tillman’s death, he sent

an urgent message to his three senior commanders specifically to inform them of



mounting evidence of death by friendly fire, and to push the Army to quickly halt any

misinformation regarding Corporal Tillman’s death.

(Post-Hearing: p.15.5, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖):

McChrystal said there was speculation early on that Tillman was killed by friendly fire, but

that he and others were waiting for the outcome of an "initial review" [Scott’s 4/29 15-6]

before coming forward with that information [sending P4]:

“And so, we initially were waiting for the outcome of that initial review [CPT Scotts 15-6]

before we went forward with any conclusions. So, it was a well-intended intent to get some

level of truth before we went up.” (p. 18 transcript)

There was never anything speculative or ―potential‖ or "suspected" about Tillman‘sfriendly fire death. The Rangers on the ground being shot at knew immediately

what had happened. On the 23rd word was passed up ―70% sure‖ by the CSM toLTC Bailey and on to COL Nixon. And on the 24

th, the initial investigating officer

CPT Scott passed on verbal confirmation (―I‘m certain, I‘m sure‖) to LTC Bailey,who then called COL Nixon (McChrystal was next in the chain of command).

McChrystal knew of confirmed FF just two days after Tillman‘s death! (If this

isn‘t ―some level of proof‖, what is?) Or, are we to believe Nixon never told

McChrystal of confirmation during the following days they were working together

on the Silver Star package?

McChrystal‘s ―outcome of an initial review‖ refers to CPT Scott‘s ―15-6 Final

Report‖ dated April 29th. Isn‘t it curious the 29th‘s the same date as McChrystal‘sP4? And further, that Nixon only officially appointed Scott on the 29

thas well?

Why? Perhaps, McChrystal could say he just got some ―emerging evidence‖ andstarted the investigation after he approved the Silver Star on the 29

th? And then

CPT Scott‘s April 29th 15-6 report literally disappeared!


3.) McChrystal said that he sent his P4 message to inform his chain of command that he

believed friendly fire was a possibility before the memorial service “which in retrospect

looks contradictory.” (After the Wallace report came out, McChrystal was praised by theSecretary of the Army for acting "reasonably and quickly" by sending his “timely” P4

memo to alert his superiors on the 29th)

:

“I also sent a message informing my chain of command that we believed it was fratricide,

and we did that when we were told there were going to be fairly high-profile memorial

services.” And “… when I sent the message, the intent entirely was to inform everyone up

my chain of command so that nobody would be surprised.’ (p. 18 transcript).



During the hearing McChrystal said he was told of suspected fratricide and the 15-6investigation on the 23rd . Yet he didn‘t send out his P4 until the 29th? How is

waiting six days considered ―timely‖? [and as I pointed out, he actually had verbal

confirmation of fratricide on the 24th!] Of course, in reality McChrystal toldAbizaid on the 23rd, and then it was passed onward to the Secretary of Defense and

White House.

And notice that McChrystal wasn‘t concerned about Tillman‘s family being

surprised. He wrote in his P4, ―I felt it was essential that you received thisinformation as soon as we detected it in order to preclude any unknowing

statements by our country‘s leaders which might cause public embarrassment if the

circumstances of Corporal Tillman‘s death become public.‖ (P4 Memo)

Note the ―if‖ not ―when‖ it becomes public. And how is sending the P4 on the 29th

―as soon as we detected it‖ when McChrystal said he was told on the 23rd

?

Further, McChrystal wasn‘t concerned with correcting the Silver Citation he had

just forwarded to the Secretary of the Army the previous day and that had alreadybeen approved.

5. Sen. James Webb, a Virginia Democrat who has championed the Tillman’s family

case, returned to the topic late in the hearing during a heartfelt exchange in which the

Senator chastised the Army for its initial incorrect reports that Corporal Tillman was

killed in an insurgent ambush, and not by fire from his own Ranger unit. “The Army failed the family,” said Senator Webb.

But I would argue that the Army wasn‘t the only institution that failed the Tillman family.

The House Oversight Committee‘s ―investigation‖ was perfunctory and half-hearted.

Webb reviewed the Tillman case for the Senate Armed Services Committee secretconfirmation hearing. The New York Times Pentagon reporter Thom Shanker (and

presumably his editors) failed to follow up on my information showing McChrystal played

a central role in the cover-up of Tillman‘s fratricide.

And I wouldn‘t exactly call Senator Webb a ―champion‖ of the Tillman family:


Note: Senator Webb has never spoken with Mary Tillman. Mary has spoken only with

Gordon Peterson (Webb‘s Military Affairs staff assistant). I mentioned in the previous



chapter how Peterson stone-walled my attempts to learn more about the 2008 Hearing. As

a ―gate keeper,‖ he probably never passed on my letters to Senator Webb.


I was surprised to learn of Senator Webb‘s review. Although I was familiar withCongressman Henry Waxman‘s (House Oversight & Reform Committee) hearings on theTillman fratricide, I was unaware that any sort of Senate review had also been conducted.



―Regarding your questions about the radio interview, I‘m not in a position toelaborate. I did not participate in the review that Senator Webb mentioned and have

no information to provide to you. The senator‘s involvement occurred in hiscapacity as a member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. I checked with


have any additional questions you should contact a representative for theCommittee -- Gary Leeling, 202 224-9339. He is out of the office until next

week.‖



case) and figured I was just getting blown off).

A year later, after General McChrystal‘s nomination as the new commander of theAfghanistan War, I finally realized Senator Webb‘s review was for a previous Senate


Committee met in ―executive‖ (closed) session to consider McChrystal‘s promotion. OnMay 22th 2008 General McChrystal was unanimously confirmed by the Committee and


(p.15.2, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖)

Note: It‘s curious that both Chairmen Levin and McChrystal both specifically mentioned

this secret hearing at the beginning of their remarks:

From Chairman Senator Levin‘s opening remarks (p.3 transcript): ―You

[McChrystal] may want to address … the Tillman matter in your opening

statement. Both subjects were discussed in executive session of the Armed

Services Committee last year in connection with your nomination to your current

position as director of the Joint Staff.

From General McChrystal‘s opening remarks (p.10 transcript): ―You gave me the

opportunity to discuss in detail one of those failures, Corporal Pat Tillman, in

closed session with this committee a year ago, in advance of my confirmation as



Director of the Joint Staff, which I appreciated. I stand ready to answer any

additional questions you may have.‖

Perhaps Levin and McChrystal mentioned the closed hearing to avoid the allegation they

were keeping even the existence of the previous hearing secret? The night before the 6-02-

09 hearing, I finally spoke briefly with Gary Leeling (legal counsel for Senator Levin). Heimplicitly confirmed the existence of the closed hearing, but would say nothing further in

response to my questions except ―it was in executive session.‖

Obviously, the real confirmation hearing took place last year, behind closed doors, with no

accountability whatsoever. Wouldn‘t you think someone in our intrepid watchdog mediawould follow-up on this disclosure? Perhaps ask the Senators a few questions about their

findings during last year‘s ―executive session‖ during which McChrystal‘s actions werediscussed in detail?

6. ―We failed the family,‖ General McChrystal agreed. ―I was a part of that, and Iapologize,‖ but the general repeatedly stated that any errors committed by soldiers

and officers in the field of combat in Afghanistan ―were not intentional ,‖ and he

added, ―I didn’t see any activities by anyone to deceive.‖

Perhaps Kevin Tillman said it best in his testimony before Congress:


never used to arrive at an honest or even sensible conclusion. … The handling of the

situation after the firefight was described as a compilation of ‗missteps, inaccuracies and

errors in judgment which created the perception of concealment.‘‖

―Writing a Silver Star award before a single eye witness account is taken is not a misstep.Falsifying soldier witness statements for a Silver Star is not a misstep. … Discarding an

(15-6) investigation that does not fit a preordained conclusion is not an error in judgment.These are deliberate acts of deceit. This is not the perception of concealment. This is

concealment.‖



REBUTTAL OF THOM SHANKER’S POST-

HEARING NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLES

Version #2: “U.S. Report Finds Errors in Afghan Airstrikes”

(New York Times, June 3rd 2009, Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker)

The Senate Armed Services Committee held their confirmation hearing for General

McChrystal on June 2nd

2009. Within an hour, Thom Shanker‘s article ―Nominee to

Command Afghanistan Stresses Civilian Safety‖ appeared on the NYT‘s website.

Later that evening, I was unable to find the article. It had disappeared from the NYT

website. Unfortunately, I neglected to print or save the article when I first read it shortly

after the hearing. Luckily, I was able to find a copy of the original version that had

fortuitously been posted onto the Internet.

Shanker‘s first article that covered the confirmation hearing had been replaced by a 2nd

version, ―U.S. Report Finds Errors in Afghan Airstrikes.‖ Version #2 had been drastically

revised, focused not on the Senate hearing, but about mistaken U.S. airstrikes inAfghanistan. The second version deleted nearly all references to the Tillman case and the

Senate confirmation hearing. There were only two lines, at the very end of the article,

about the Tillman case!

Why? The day before the hearing I had sent an email to the NYT editors with attachments

that included much of my disclosures about the Tillman case. I would speculate that

someone in the editorial food chain made the decision to back off and eliminate

commentary about McChrystal‘s confirmation hearing and the Tillman case.

A few days after the hearing, I emailed Thom to ask why he hadn‘t followed up on his

initial article and asked him to point out any errors in my argument that McChrystal played

a central role in the Army‘s cover -up of the Tillman fratricide. Shanker never answered

my questions despite his praise for my binder ―being very well researched and quite

thorough‖



1. Under questioning, General McChrystal also acknowledged that the Army had

“failed the family” in its mishandling of the friendly-fire death of Cpl. Pat Tillman,

the professional football star who enlisted in the Army after the attacks on Sept. 11,

2001.

See Point #6 from Version #1 Rebuttal

2. A final review by a four-star Army general [Wallace] cleared General McChrystal

of any wrongdoing, but punished a number of senior officers [eg Kensinger] who were

responsible for administrative mistakes in the days after Corporal Tillman’s death.

Initially, Army officials said the corporal had been killed by an insurgent ambush,

when in fact he had been shot by members of his own Ranger team.

See Pre-Hearing Rebuttal, Point #2 for ―cleared of wrongdoing‖

See Pre-Hearing Rebuttal, Points #4 & #5 for ―administrative mistakes‖





SENATOR JAMES WEBB AND THE WHITEWASH OF GENERAL

STANLEY MCCHRYSTAL’S ROLE IN THE AFTERMATH OF PAT

TILLMAN’S DEATH

―… we have all been betrayed. It isn‘t just our family. Every time they betray a soldier, they

betray all of us.‖ … ―We had officers that we trusted. We had high regard for them. … in your

heart they are your kids and you turn them over, and we trusted. … we knew they [Pat & Kevin]could die or they could come back wounded … But we never thought that they would use him the

way they did …‖

-- Mary Tillman, House Oversight & Reform Committee Hearing (4-24-07)

―I found myself awash with a sense of injustice that I could not define. Or perhaps it was merely

that I was young. I had never seen with such clarity that … courage could destroy one man while

flight could make another man king.‖ -- James Webb, ―The Emperor‘s General‘ (1999)

―They ought to make a movie about this. Mr. Smith comes to Washington.‖ ―Yeah, I called my palast night and he says, Judd boy, you been up there with them muck-a-mucks two days, now. Did

they teach you how to lie yet?‖

-- James Webb, ―A Country Such As This‖(1983)



―They ought to make a movie about this. Mr. Smith comes to Washington.‖ ―Yeah, I called my pa last night

and he says, Judd boy, you been up there with them muck-a-mucks two days, now. Did they teach you how

to lie yet?‖


SENATOR JAMES WEBB AND THE WHITEWASHOF GENERAL STANLEY MCCHRYSTAL’S ROLE IN

THE AFTERMATH OF PAT TILLMAN’S DEATH

April 3rd

2008 Letter to Senator James Webb

Military service was prevalent and respected in the Tillman family. Mary Tillman‘s uncleswere at Pearl Harbor, her brother was a Marine, and her father was a Marine during the

Korean War. As Mary Tillman wrote in her book ―Boots on the Ground by Dusk: The

Life & Death of Pat Tillman‖:

―From the time I was very little, I was aware of my father‘s pride in being a

Marine. When I was three years old … I would stand between my parents, feet

digging into the soft leather of the big front seat, and sing the entire Marine Corps

Hymn at the top of my lungs.‖

I‘ve read the novels of James Webb over the past thirty 30 years, long before he became a

U.S. Senator from Virginia in 2006. His novels have dealt with themes of honor,

integrity, loyalty and betrayal. With Senator Webb‘s background as a decorated Vietnam

Marine, I believed he would feel a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman and his family.

On April 3rd 2008, I sent a letter to Senator Webb asking him to become a Senate advocate

for Mary Tillman‘s struggle to learn the truth about her son‘s death. I asked Webb to meet

Mary during the Washington stop of her May book tour.

On April 29th 2008, Senator Webb‘s Military Legislative Affairs Assistant Gordon

Peterson replied to my follow-up email: ―I have alerted the senator‘s scheduling director

to the information on the Washington leg of her tour and provided her with your letter to

the senator.‖

However, Senator Webb didn‘t meet Mary Tillman when she was in Washington on May

12th

at Olsson's - Penn Quarter bookstore. I don‘t know if Webb ever actually read my

letter.



Timeline of Pat Tillman Fratricide Notification Up the Chain of

Command

On May 8th 2008, after speaking with Mary Tillman during her book signing in Detroit, I

decided to take a more detailed look through the voluminous Tillman investigative

documents. On May 20th

2008, I finished my review and constructed a detailed timeline

showing when the Army chain of command learned about Tillman‘s fratricide. On May

25th 2008, I sent a copy of my findings to Scott Laidlaw at The Associated Press:

―A couple of weeks ago, while reading your article, ―Pat Tillman‘s Mother Recalls

Journey for Facts‖ (5-13-08), you mentioned AP had obtained new documents

under FOIA … Do your FOIA documents also include testimony from GEN

McChrystal and General Abizaid? Why? Well, I plowed through the GEN Jones

15-6 report, the DoD IG Report, and transcripts from the Waxman hearings to put

together a ―Timeline of Tillman Fratricide Notification‖. I spotted testimony that

suggest Gen. Abizaid gave false testimony to the IG and Congress, that Tillman‘s

fratricide was confirmed only two days after his death (not five weeks), and that

Gen. McChrystal‘s P4 message wasn‘t very ―timely.‖ … Perhaps you couldresolve (or confirm) these apparent contradictions using the documents you

obtained under FOIA? ―

Senator Webb Mentions Senate Tillman ―Review‖ on the Diane Rhem

Show

Just a couple of days later, on May 27th 2008, I spoke briefly with Senator Webb on NPR

radio during the call-in portion of ―The Diane Rhem Show‖ (40:56). During his response,Webb mentioned a recent Senate review of the Tillman fratricide:

―I just went through a fairly thorough review of that process at the request of the

Chairman of the [Senate] Armed Services Committee [Senator Levin] … What we

do know … is that the Army knew that this was a friendly fire incident fairly

quickly, they did not tell the family, they allowed a ceremony to go forward which

implied otherwise … I‘m not sure where responsibility for that decision really lies,

in terms of the chain of command, how it was handled publicly, but it was really

wrong. … You cannot help but still feel angry about how his death was used.‖

I‘ve followed the Tillman case very closely during the past four years. Although I was

familiar with Congressman Henry Waxman‘s House Oversight & Reform Committee‘s

Tillman investigation, I was surprised to hear about Senator Webb‘s ―review‖. I hadn‘t

read anything at all in the news about a Senate investigation.

And I shared Senator Webb‘s anger about how Pat Tillman‘s death was used. But I didn‘t

understand why Webb was ―not sure where responsibility for that decision really lies‖! I

doubted that Senator Webb actually conducted a ―fairly thorough review‖ of how the

Army handled Tillman‘s fratricide. My own review of the investigative documents,



completed just before I spoke with Senator Webb, revealed that General McChrystal had

played a key role in the Army‘s cover -up of Tillman‘s friendly fire death: McChrystal

received confirmation of Tillman‘s fratricide within two days from the investigating officer

(―I‘m certain, I‘m sure), had the responsibility to tell Tillman‘s family about the fratricide

but made the decision not to tell the family, and he personally led the Ranger officers as

they assembled a ―misleading‖ Silver Star package (with a false citation and tampered

witness statements), and then he waited a week before sending his ―timely‖ P4 memo to

supposedly warn his superiors of ―potential fratricide‖!

On May 30th

2008, I emailed Gordon Peterson to try to learn more about Webb‘s Senate

review:

―As Senator Webb‘s Military Affairs Legislative Assistant, I assume you took the

lead in in conducting that review process. What is the status of that process? What

were your findings? Could send me a copy of your findings?‖ …―… I believe that

responsibility ultimately lies at the top of the chain of command, with Rumsfeld

and/or the White House (It would be interesting to hear Scott McClellan‘s take on

his role in the Tillman case). But, I haven‘t seen a paper trail to directly supportmy belief.

However, there is a paper trail that indicates false testimony by either COL Nixon,

GEN McChrystal, or GEN. Abizaid … I‘ve appended my supporting timeline and

notes at the end of this letter. Hopefully, this information may be useful for you

during your review of how the Tillman fratricide was handled by the Bush

administration.‖

However, Gordon Peterson stone-walled my attempts to learn more about the Senate

review. Later that day, he replied:






have any additional questions you should contact a representative for the

Committee -- Gary Leeling [Lead Counsel for the Personnel Subcommittee of the

Senate Armed Services Committee] , 202 224-9339. He is out of the office until

next week.‖

I didn‘t immediately follow up with Gary Leeling (Legal Counsel for Senator Carl Levin).

I was very busy with life (and had just spent far too much time on the Tillman case) and

figured I was just getting blown off again by Gordon Peterson.

Note: Although Senator Webb has spoken with Pat Tillman, Sr., he has never spoken with

Mary Tillman. Mary Tillman wasn‘t able to get past Gordon Peterson to speak directly

with the Senator.



House Oversight Committee Investigation Protected General McChrystal

On July 14th 2008, Congressman Henry Waxman‘s House Oversight & Reform Committee

finally issued their report ―Misleading Information from the Battlefield: The Tillman and

Lynch Episodes.‖ The Committee concluded:

―the pervasive lack of recollection and absence of specific information makes itimpossible for the Committee to assign responsibility for the misinformation in

Corporal Tillman‘s and Private Lynch‘s cases…‖

But after reviewing the Committee‘s report, I realized their perfunctory investigation had

served to protect General McChrystal from close scrutiny and was just another layer upon

the previous investigative cover-ups of the Tillman fratricide. On July 26th

2008, I sent an

email to Mike Fish (investigative reporter for ESPN):

―After reading your article, ―House Calls Out Government in Tillman Friendly Fire

Death‖ (ESPN 7-14-08), I wasn‘t particularly surprised at the White House‘s ―lack of recall‖ about Pat Tillman‘s fratricide (although I did find myself wishing that

Scott McClellan had been put on the spot during his book tour circuit!).

However, after reading Waxman‘s House Oversight Committee‘s report, I was

surprised to learn the Committee never interviewed General McChrystal!

McChrystal was the key link in the chain of command between Col. Nixon (Ranger

Regiment) and Abizaid (CENTCOM), he wrote the P4 memo, and he approved the

false narrative of the Silver Star citation. Initially, McChrystal was scheduled to

appear before the Committee, but he ―declined‖ to appear at their August 2007

hearing. Why didn‘t the Committee follow up? Were they (and the Army)protecting McChrystal? Was the Waxman report just the final layer upon the

cover-up of the Tillman fratricide?

―Last August, General Kensinger was singled out as the primary reason many

people believe the Army covered up Tillman‘s fratricide … However, I believe

General Kensinger was merely the scapegoat for the sins of the Army and Bush

administration. I would argue that General McChrystal, COL Nixon, and GEN

Abiziad were just as guilty of the same charges for which Kensinger was singled

out.‖

. . .

After the House Oversight Committee issued their report, the Tillman story was

pretty much laid to rest. Tillman‘s name was rarely mentioned, even when

Tillman‘s NFL football team, the Arizona Cardinals, played at the Superbowl.



Obama Nominates General McChrystal to Become Afghan Commander

On May 12th 2009, President Obama nominated General Stanley McChrystal for

promotion to four-star general and commander of the Afghanistan War.

The following day, on May 13th, President Obama gave the commencement address for

Arizona State University inside Sun Devil Stadium without once mentioning Pat Tillman‘sname! (in the very stadium in which he played college football!) Why the omission?

In his May 17th

column, ―Obama‘s Big-time Fumble,‖ Bob Young (The Arizona

Republic) speculated that Obama was sensitive to the fact that his speech was the day afterhis nomination of General McChrystal:

―knowing what a big sports fanatic Obama is … we were shocked that he passed upa wide-open opportunity. … He encouraged ASU's graduates not to chase "the

usual brass rings" … He told them such an approach elevates "appearance over

substance, celebrity over character, … and said it's just the sort of thinking today's

young people must end. … With apologies to all whom Obama cited … is thereany better example of character over celebrity and substance over appearance than

Pat Tillman, the guy who made his name in the very stadium where Obama stood?

Tillman literally stopped chasing the brass ring and gave up millions and an NFLcareer to join the Army's elite Rangers and fight in Afghanistan. He died there, the

victim of friendly fire.‖

―Maybe it simply was an oversight that Obama forgot Tillman, although we were

told Sunday that Obama was staged inside the Arizona State football locker room

before his speech - where there is a photo of Tillman. And he walked right up andout of Tillman Tunnel to reach the stage.‖

―Perhaps Obama was sensitive to the fact that the speech came shortly after theannouncement that Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal would become the top American

commander in Afghanistan. McChrystal was deemed by a Pentagon investigation

to be responsible for inaccurate information from the Army about Tillman's death,

and the Tillman family has been critical of what it believes was his role in a cover-up of the real events that took place.‖

… ―Obama had a wide-open opportunity to remind us that Tillman could be thebest example in our lifetimes of someone who eschewed popularity and personal

advancement to devote himself to a bigger purpose. For some reason, the

president passed.‖

I think Bob Young hit the nail on the head. President Obama didn‘t want to risk once

again raising the issue of McChrystal‘s handling of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide by even

mentioning Tillman‘s name!

http://www.azcentral.com/sports/heatindex/articles/2009/05/17/20090517spt-p2mainyoung.html








Has Congress Been Protecting General McChrystal? – Diane Rhem Show

Five years ago, Pat Tillman‘s family was handed a tarnished Silver Star. I felt it would be

a travesty of justice if McChrystal was confirmed by the Senate, promoted to the Army‘s

highest rank, and handed his fourth star!

On May 15th 2009, I managed to (once again) call into the NPR Diane Rhem radio showduring her Friday News Round-up program. General McChrystal‘s recent nomination was

a topic of conversation for her guest panelists:

―Good morning Diane, I‘d like to raise the following question for your guests: has

Congress been protecting General McChrystal from hard scrutiny into his central

role in the Army‘s cover up of Pat Tillman‘s friendly fire death?

Senators Levin and McCain don‘t foresee any problem with General McChrystal‘s

confirmation as the new commander of the Afghanistan War. But, in her book,

Mary Tillman strongly criticized McChrystal: ―Not only is he lying about the

circumstances surrounding Pat‘s death, … he is proposing false language for theSilver Star narrative. … His statement indicates that no one had any intention of

telling us, or the public, that Pat was killed by fratricide unl ess forced to do so.‖

Last May, McChrystal‘s role in the handling of Tillman‘s fratricide was reviewedby the Senate Armed Services Committee. Shortly afterward, about a year ago, I

spoke to Senator Jim Webb here on The Diane Rhem Show: Webb said, ―… the

Army knew that this was a friendly fire incident fairly quickly, [but] they did not

tell the family, … I‘m not sure where responsibility for that decision really lies, interms of the chain of command … You cannot help but still feel angry about how

his death was used.

‖I share Senator Webb‘s anger. But, I don‘t understand why Webb was unable to

determine ―where responsibility … really lies.‖

[Note: unfortunately, Diane Rhem cut me off here, the following was not on the air]

―General McChrystal was the central figure in the Tillman cover up and made the

decision to withhold knowledge of Tillman‘s fratricide from his family. And I

don‘t understand why Congressman Henry Waxman allowed McChrystal to refuse

to testify at the House Oversight Committee‘s 2007 Tillman Fratricide Hearing.

Five years ago, Pat Tillman was awarded a tarnished Silver Star. I believe it will

be a travesty if McChrystal is confirmed by the Senate, awarded his fourth star, and promoted to the Army‘s highest-rank.‖



NYT Editorial Reveals Secret 2008 Confirmation Hearing

On May 14th

, The New York Times published their editorial, ―New Commander for

Afghanistan‖:

―Less impressively, some of his commando units were implicated in abusive

interrogations of Iraqi prisoners. And it was General McChrystal who approved thefalsified report that covered up the 2004 friendly-fire death of Cpl. Pat Tillman in

Afghanistan. These issues came at the time of his confirmation last year for hispresent job as director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Before confirming him in his

new command, senators must assure themselves that he has learned the hard

lessons from these mistakes and will insist on lawful treatment of detainees and

candid military reporting.‖

―These issues came at the time of his confirmation last year‖! After reading the editorial

on about May 16th, I finally realized the ―review‖ Senator Webb‘s mentioned last year on

the Diane Rhem Show was part of General McChrystal‘s previous Senate confirmation

process.

Sure enough, when I checked the Senate Armed Services Committee‘s website, I found the

full committee had met on May 15th 2008 to consider ―pending military nominations‖ in

―executive session‖ (―executive session‖: secret, closed hearing with no transcript). The

following week, on May 22nd

, General McChrystal was unanimously confirmed by the

Committee. Shortly thereafter, General McChrystal was promoted by the full Senate to

Director of the Joint Staff.

[Note: My speculation was confirmed by McChrystal‘s June 2nd 2009 testimony: ‖You

gave me the opportunity to discuss in detail, one of those failures, Corporal Pat Tillman, inclosed session with this committee a year ago, in advance of my confirmation as Director

of the Joint Staff …‖]

So, shortly after I asked Senator Webb in April 2008 to become Mary Tillman‘s Senate

advocate, and while Mary Tillman was in Washington DC on her book tour, Senator Webb

participated in a secret Senate review that protected General McChrystal‘s role in the

cover-up of Tillman‘s fratricide from public scrutiny! And instead of punishing

McChrystal for his actions, the Senate promoted him!

So, I got motivated to take out my box of Tillman documents, and take a closer look at

General McChrystal‘s actions in the aftermath of Tillman‘s death. I reviewed General

Jones‘s 2004 15-6 report, the 2007 Dept. of Defense Inspector General report (IG report),

transcripts from the two 2007 House Oversight & Reform Committee‘s Tillman hearings,

the 2008 House Oversight Committee‘s final report, the 2007 General Wallace report press

conference transcript, and other newspaper accounts about the Tillman case.



May 25th

2009 Letter to Senator James Webb

After completing my review, I concluded that Congress, the Dept. of Defense Inspector

General, and the top leadership of the Army had acted to shield General McChrystal from

close scrutiny and to protect him from punishment for his central role in orchestrating the

cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide.

During the final two weeks of May, I wrote another long letter to Senator Webb. I asked

the Senator to place a ―hold‖ on General McChrystal‘s confirmation and to take a closer

look at McChrystal‘s role in the aftermath of the Tillman fratricide.

James Webb had been a hero to me for three decades. I hadn‘t always agreed with his

positions, but I had never before doubted his integrity or his sense of honor. At the time, I

thought perhaps Senator Webb was unaware of McChrystal‘s actions (perhaps he had been

given incomplete information from Congressional staffers such as Gerald Leeling and

Gordon Peterson?) Or, perhaps I thought I could shame him into finally doing the right

thing for the Tillman family: ―I‘d like to think that after three years in Congress you

haven‘t yet learned the lesson your grandmother Hodges asked of you decades ago when

you first worked in Washington DC, ―Did they teach you how to lie yet?‖

My letter to Senator Webb became the introduction to my document, ―Did They Teach

You How to Lie Yet?‖ – Senator James Webb, General Stanley McChrystal, and the

Betrayal of Pat Tillman‖ (with fifty pages of text and 50 pages of supporting investigative

documents).

―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ laid out my argument that Congress and the

senior leadership of the Army had acted to shield General McChrystal‘s actions from closescrutiny and protect him from punishment for his central role in orchestrating the cover-up

of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide. From my 5-25-09 Letter to Senator Webb:

On July 31st 2007, Secretary of the Army Pete Geren and General Cody presented

the findings of General William Wallace‘s review. General McChrystal received no

reprimand. Instead, Wallace singled out General Kensinger as a scapegoat.

However, their defense of McChrystal doesn‘t hold up under scrutiny. General

McChrystal was guilty of the same charges for which Kensinger was scapegoated!

That is, General McChrystal was required to ―inform the family about friendly

fire,‖ failed to ―inform the family about friendly fire in a timely manner,‖ failed ―toinform the acting Secretary of the Army [his chain of command] of the fratricide

investigation,‖ and (arguably) made ―false official statements.‖

From April 2007 through July 2008, Congressman Waxman‘s House Oversight &

Reform Committee conducted a perfunctory investigation and held two hearings on

the Tillman fratricide. Chairman Waxman‘s decision to narrow the scope of his

investigation to only ―look up‖ the chain of command took the focus off General

McChrystal. And the Committee permitted General McChrystal to ―decline‖ to

appear and they never interviewed him later. After raising questions about the



Silver Star, they didn‘t look into McChrystal‘s role in approving the Silver Star

with a fraudulent citation, justification and altered witness statements. The

Committee never questioned the ―timeliness‖ or misleading contents of General

McChrystal‘s P4 memo.

During May 2008, as previously discussed, the Senate Armed Services Committee

conducted a secret review of General McChrystal‘s role in the Tillman case. On

May 15th 2008 they met in a closed session to question McChrystal‘s actionsduring the aftermath of the Tillman fratricide. On May 22th 2008, McChrystal was

unanimously confirmed by the Committee and promoted to Director of the Joint

Staff.

. . .

I sent Senator Webb a copy of ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ on May 27th

2009.

His office didn‘t receive this document until probably couple of weeks later (I was sleep

deprived and had forgotten about security delays in mail delivery to the Senate. I shouldhave just faxed it!) However, I did send his office an email version of the introductory

letter on May 28th.

. . .

On June 1st, I called Senator Webb‘s Washington office to follow-up and told the phone

staffer it was important for Webb to read my email prior to the next day‘s confirmation

hearing. Another staffer found my email and said he would print it and give it to Senator

Webb.

(I haven‘t had any response to my document from the Senator‘s office).

On June 1st, I finally called Gerald Leeling (legal counsel for Chairman Senator Carl

Levin) to whom Gordon Peterson (Senator Webb‘s Military Legislative Affairs Assistant)

had referred me to a year previously. I had a brief discussion with Gary Leeling.

Although he confirmed the existence of the hearing, in response to my questions, he only

said ―it was in executive session‖ and the Tillman case had ―been thoroughly reviewed

with the information available to us at the time.‖



General McChrystal’s June 2nd

2009 Senate Confirmation Hearing

On June 2nd 2009, The Senate Armed Services Committee held the General McChrystal‘s

confirmation hearing for his promotion to four-star general and commander of the

Afghanistan War. The Senators didn't press McChrystal aggressively during the nearly

three-hour hearing. As David Corn commented on PBS‘s News Hour:

―And so the Pat Tillman questioning, the questioning about detainee abuse, Ithought, seemed very orchestrated and didn't give a full airing to these very, I think,

hot-button issues‖. … ―You know, he came up with what sounded to be a plausible

explanation, but, again, a lot of what happened today made it clear to me that

Democrats and Republicans had both decided, "He's our guy in Afghanistan‖

Only Senator McCain and Senator Webb asked General McChrystal to comment on his

handling of the Tillman fratricide. Senator McCain asked McChrystal ―why he

[McChrystal] forwarded the Silver Star recommendation in the form that it was in.‖

Senator Webb said ―You have not … been on the record in terms of how you personally

feel about this incident, and I would like to give you the opportunity to do that.‖ Neither

Senator asked McChrystal any follow-up questions.

Note: For more detailed information on the Confirmation hearing, refer to the

Appendices: ―Senate ASC 6-02-09 Confirmation Hearing‖ (from ―Did They Teach You

How to Lie Yet?) , ―General McChrystal‘s Testimony at Senate ASC 6-02-09

Confirmation Hearing‘, and ―Rebuttal of Thom Shanker‘s Post-Hearing NYT Articles.‖

During the June 2nd

Senate Armed Services Committee‘s confirmation hearing, I found it

to be curious that both Chairmen Senator Levin and General McChrystal, at the beginning

of their remarks, specifically mentioned the previously secret 2008 confirmation hearing:

From Chairman Senator Levin‘s opening remarks (p. 3 transcript): ―You [McChrystal]

may want to address … the Tillman matter in your opening statement. Both subjects were

discussed in executive session of the Armed Services Committee last year in connection

with your nomination to your current position as director of the Joint Staff.

From General McChrystal‘s opening remarks (p. 10 transcript): ―You gave me the

opportunity to discuss in detail one of those failures, Corporal Pat Tillman, in closed

session with this committee a year ago, in advance of my confirmation as Director of the

Joint Staff, which I appreciated. I stand ready to answer any additional questions you may

have.‖

Perhaps Levin and McChrystal mentioned the closed hearing to avoid the possible

allegation they were trying to hide the existence of McChrystal‘s previous confirmation

hearing?



―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖

In Senator James Webb‘s 1983 novel, A Country Such As This, Congressman Judd Smith

argued: ―And no, the military isn‘t just fine. The point is, it isn‘t corrupt. It‘s a system

with human failures.‖

But when ―human failures‖ systematically extend up every single link in the chain-of-

command (to include the Chair of the Joint Chiefs, Army Chief of Staff, and the Secretary

of Defense) up to and including the White House, how is this not a corrupt country? Every

single institution in this country has failed the Tillman family, including the Army

leadership, Congress, White House and the mainstream media.

Perhaps Senator Rowland, in Senator Webb‘s novel, Something to Die For , hit the nail on

the head:

―How lofty it must have been to have burnt with the purity of the Revolution!

Before the days of multi-million dollar election campaigns that brought politiciansto their knees before the monied temple of the contributors. Before the time of

computerized politics that cause them to await the wisdom of those oracles known

as pollsters before they spoke. Or maybe it had been trash from the get-go, myths

to feed the public.‖

. . .

It was a travesty of justice that Pat Tillman's family had been handed a tarnished Silver

Star, while General McChrystal was confirmed, promoted to the highest rank in the Army,

and handed his fourth star!

I wrote my May 25th letter to Senator Webb believing the Senate Armed Services

Committee June 2nd

2009 confirmation of General McChrystal would be the final layer of

the Army and Congressional cover-ups of Pat Tillman‘s death.

. . .

However, I was wrong. Thom Shanker and ―The Gray Lady‖ played the final role in this

story, and laid the topmost layer upon the tall stack of Army and Congressional cover-ups

of the Tillman fratricide.



NOTE: This letter is basically an executive summary of a larger document ―Did They Teach You How to

Lie Yet?‖ that I sent to Thom Shanker (with fifty pages of text and 50 pages of supporting documentation).

. . .

They ought to make a movie about this. Mr. Smith comes to Washington.‖ ―Yeah, I called my pa last nightand he says, ―Judd boy, you been up there with them muck -a-mucks two days, now. Did they teach you how

to lie yet?‖


Memorial Day 2009

Senator James Webb,

Five years ago on Memorial Day weekend, five weeks after he was killed in Afghanistan,

Pat Tillman‘s parents were finally told their son was ―probably‖ killed by friendly fire.

This Memorial Day weekend, the Senate Armed Services Committee has scheduled

General Stanley McChrystal‘s confirmation hearing for June 2nd. Chairman Carl Levin

and Senator John McCain don‘t foresee any problem with his confirmation.

Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said, "We feel terrible for what the Tillman family

went through, but this matter has been investigated thoroughly by the Pentagon, by the

Congress, by outside experts, and all of them have come to the same conclusion: that there

was no wrongdoing by Gen. McChrystal."

However, Pat Tillman‘s parents believe McChrystal played a central role in the cover -up of

their son‘s fratricide. Pat Tillman Sr. said, "I do believe that guy participated in a falsified

homicide investigation.‖ Mary Tillman said, "It is imperative that Lt. General McChrystal

be scrutinized carefully during the Senate hearings."

Mary Tillman has harshly criticized the actions of General McChrystal, especially

regarding his ―Personal For‖ (P4) memo sent on April 29th

2004 (ostensibly to alert

President Bush against making embarrassing public statements about Tillman‘s heroism or

his Silver Star):

In her book ―Boots on the Ground by Dusk,‖ Mary wrote:

―Not only is he [McChrystal] lying about the circumstances surrounding Pat‘s

death, … he is proposing false language for the Silver Star narrative. … His

statement [P4 memo] indicates that no one had any intention of telling us, or the

public, that Pat was killed by fratricide unless forced to do so.‖

And shortly after General Wallace‘s findings were released in July 2007, Mary said:



"That memo [P4] is damming as hell. And yet, nothing happens to [McChrystal].

He is writing fraudulent language in that memo. He is giving examples of how they

can script the Silver Star award, even though Pat was killed by fratricide. And he is

saying we need to keep our leadership abreast of things so they don't embarrass

themselves, IF the circumstances of Pat's death should become public … ―

―He should be saying 'We're going to have to put a hold to the Silver Star and we're

going to have to notify the family [of suspected friendly fire].' That is what hewould say if he was innocent, but he is not. He is trying to find a way that they can

continue this false, elaborate story of theirs. And the fact that he is off the hook is

atrocious.‖

I believe the Senate Armed Services Committee should postpone General McChrystal‘s

confirmation and take a closer look at McChrystal‘s central role in the Army‘s handling of

Pat Tillman‘s fratricide.

Five years ago, Pat Tillman‘s family were handed a tarnished Silver Star. It will be atravesty of justice if McChrystal is confirmed by the Senate, promoted to the Army‘s

highest rank, and handed his fourth star.

. . .

Congress and the senior leadership of the Army have shielded General McChrystal from

close scrutiny and protected him from punishment for his central role in orchestrating the

cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide:

Last year, the Senate Armed Services Committee conducted a secret review of General

McChrystal‘s role in the Army‘s handling of the Tillman fratricide.

Shortly afterwards, on May 27th 2008, I spoke briefly with Senator Webb on NPR radio

during ―The Diane Rhem Show‖ (40:56). Webb spoke of a recent review of the handling

of the Tillman fratricide:

―I think what happened in the aftermath of Pat Tillman‘s death was really tragic.

I just went through a fairly thorough review of that process at the request of the

Chairman of the [Senate] Armed Services Committee [Senator Levin] and thebottom ...

I talked to his father years ago when my book ‗Born-Fighting‘ came out.

What we do know, this is what I think is so disturbing, is that the Army knew that

this was a friendly fire incident fairly quickly, they did not tell the family, they

allowed a ceremony to go forward which implied otherwise, and his own brother,

which had served with him, it was kept from him until the ceremony took place.



I‘m not sure where responsibility for that decision really lies, in terms of the chain

of command, how it was handled publicly, but it was really wrong.

Someone like me has to have a tremendous amount of respect for what Pat Tillman

did in terms of stepping forward among other things. You cannot help but still feel

angry about how his death was used.‖

I was surprised to learn of Senator Webb‘s review. Although I was familiar with

Congressman Henry Waxman‘s (House Oversight & Reform Committee) hearings on the

Tillman fratricide, I was unaware that any sort of Senate review had also been conducted.







Senator Webb, and he has nothing more to add to what he said last week. If youhave any additional questions you should contact a representative for the

Committee -- Gary Leeling [Lead Counsel for the Personnel Subcommittee of the

Senate Armed Services Committee] , 202 224-9339. He is out of the office until

next week.‖



case) and figured I was just getting blown off.

A year later, after General McChrystal‘s nomination as the new commander of theAfghanistan War, I finally realized Senator Webb‘s review was for a previous Senate


Committee met in ―executive‖ (closed) session to consider McChrystal‘s promotion. On

May 22th 2008 General McChrystal was unanimously confirmed by the Committee and


. . .

I share your anger about how Pat Tillman‘s death was used. But, I don‘t understand why

you were unable to determine ―where responsibility for that decision really lies‖ to cover

up Tillman‘s fratricide.

I doubt you actually conducted a ―fairly thorough review‖ of General McChrystal‘s role.

General McChrystal was the central figure in the Army‘s cover up of Tillman‘s friendly

fire death. McChrystal received confirmation of Tillman‘s fratricide within two days, had

the responsibility to tell the family, made the decision not to tell the family about fratricide,

and he approved the ―misleading‖ Silver Star award.

. . .



“I just went through a fairly thorough review of that process at the request of the

Chairman of the [Senate] Armed Services Committee [Senator Levin]… I’m not sure

where responsibility for that decision really lies, in terms of the chain of command, how it

was handled publicly … You cannot help but still feel ang ry about how his death was

used”:

I share Senator Webb‘s anger about how Pat Tillman‘s death was used. But, I

don‘t understand why Webb was unable to determine where responsibility lay forthe decision to cover-up Tillman‘s friendly fire death. I doubt Senator Webb

actually conducted a ―fairly thorough review‖ of how the Army handled Tillman‘s

fratricide.

General McChrystal played a key role in the Army‘s cover up of Tillman‘s friendly

fire death. McChrystal received confirmation of Tillman‘s fratricide within two

days, had the responsibility to inform the family, yet made a decision not to tell the

family about fratricide, and he approved a misleading Silver Star recommendation

(no mention of fratricide, altered witness statements by someone in the approval

chain, and ―inaccurate‖ assertions in the citation and supporting narrative)

“What we do know, this is what I think is so disturbing, is that the Army knew that this was

a friendly fire incident fairly quickly,”:

COL Nixon said it took a ―considerable time to get the truth‖. General Abizaid

told Congress, ―But it is clear that all along fratricide was called as early as the 29th

of April, and that on the 28th of May [36 days later] we conclusively stated it was

fratricide … in terms of fratricide investigations, by the way, that‘s not a slow

investigation. That‘s a fast investigation.‖

Yet, there was nothing ―potential‖ or ―suspected‘ about Tillman‘s fratricide. The

troops on the ground immediately knew it was friendly fire. Confirmation of

Tillman‘s fratricide was passed up the chain of command to McChrystal just two

days after Tillman‘s death by the first investigating officer!

On the 23rd, the day after Tillman‘s death, CSM Birch was ―70% sure‖ and LTC

Bailey ―was certain‖ it was fratricide. CPT Scott, the first 15-6 investigating

officer, confirmed Tillman‘s fratricide just two days after Tillman‘s death (not five

weeks), and immediately passed that information up the chain of command to LTCBailey who told Col. Nixon:

―And certainly, by the next day [24th] when we did the investigations, I [ Bailey]

confirmed it. Because I called him [Nixon] back within a day or two and said, ―Sir,

I want you to know now, after getting the first five interviews‖ in fact, that was, I

guess, the next day.‖ … ―So, after [Scott] did his first five interviews, he came back

to me and said, ―Sir, I‘m certain. I‘m sure.‖ And then I called [Nixon]. … I think

it was the 24th. (p. 53). (Note that General McChrystal was next in line in the chain

of command, followed by Abizaid at CENTCOM).



It‘s puzzling that the DoD IG Chronology (Appendix B) asserts that Nixon was told

of suspected fratricide on the 23rd, but told McChrystal only of Tillman‘s death,

which McChrystal passed onto General Abizaid. Yet, McChrystal testified in

General Jones 15-6 that he was told of possible fratricide by Nixon ―… about a

day [23rd] or two [24th] after the incident. No more than three days later [25th].‖

Which account is correct?

Somebody is lying here. Nixon, McChrystal, or Abizaid (or all three).

In actuality, McChrystal quickly notified his chain of command. McChrystal told

General Abizaid of probable fratricide on the 23rd

, and updated Abiziad with

confirmation on the 24th

. This information surely went up to the Secretary of

Defense and the White House.

“… they did not tell the family,”:

General McChrystal said in his Jones 15-6 statement: ―there was a consciousdecision on who we told about that potential [fratricide] because we did not know

all the facts. … I believe that we did not tell the family of the possibility because

we did not want to give them some half- baked finding.‖ Then, he immediately

contradicted himself, saying: ―I did not know there was a decision not to tell the

family. They had another [son] in the firefight.

. . .

When General Cody was asked why McChrystal couldn‘t have just called

Tillman‘s family about potential fratricide he replied, ―in the casualty reporting

business … we do not encumber the JSOC commander [McChrystal] with all of

that … that‘s done by the regiment and done by the Army through SOCOM.‖

Secretary Geren added, ―So it was General Kensinger‘s responsibility.‖

However, if you look at Appendix D: ―Casualty Reporting & Next of Kin

Notification Process‖ (p.80, DoD IG report), you‘ll see that McChrystal‘s Chief of

Staff was responsible for sending a supplemental casualty report to USASOC after

learning of friendly fire.

It‘s also noted on the flowchart that both McChrystal and his Chief of Staff knew

about fratricide no later than the 25th

and yet did not send a supplementary casualtyreport as required by regulations (this finding is not included in the DoD IG Report

conclusions).

…

General Wallace asserted that McChrystal acted ―reasonably and quickly‖ when he

alerted his higher headquarters about the fratricide investigation. Secretary Geren

said ―General McChrystal, when notified of the friendly fire incident, he alerted,

through his P4 … his chain of command.‖



During the Waxman Hearing, General Abizaid said: General McChrystal did

exactly the right thing. He sent a timely message [P4] in a timely fashion through

the most secure channels‖

Yet, there was nothing ―timely‖ about McChrystal‘s P4 memo! Secretary Geren

implies that McChrystal learned about potential fratricide on the 29th

, then sent the

P4 to alert his superiors. However, on April 23rd (NLT 25th), COL Nixon told

McChrystal about probable fratricide and the 15-6 investigation. How can waitingsix days to send a P4 be considered ―quickly‖?

“… they allowed a ceremony to go forward which implied otherwise, …”:

General McChrystal approved the Silver Star recommendation package and sent it

on to Secretary of the Army Brownlee without telling him about Tillman‘s

fratricide. At Tillman‘s memorial service, a Navy SEAL friend spoke of Tillman‘s

―heroic‖ death that using an account that was given to him by the Army.

Secretary Geren was asked why McChrystal received no punishment after being

held accountable in the DoD IG report for inaccurate Silver Star award information.

Secretary Geren replied that McChrystal ―reasonably and appropriately‖ presumed

the Silver Star packet presented to him for his signature was accurate. He said that

McChrystal was aware it was friendly fire when he approved the award and that he

―had no reasonable basis to call into question the recommendations that came up

endorsed by the commanders in the field …‖

But wouldn‘t General McChrystal have a ―reasonable basis‖ to question a Silver

Star package which contains no mention of friendly fire since he had been informedof confirmed fratricide?

General McChrystal testified he relied on four factors to conclude that Tillman

deserved the Silver Star. Yet the DoD IG found he ―did not directly, or clearly,

state these four factors in the award recommendation.‖ (And if McChrystal only

knew what was in the recommendations, merely signed off on the paperwork, how

could he know about these four factors!)

. . .

And Secretary Geren disregarded the DoD IG review which found GeneralMcChrystal ―accountable for inaccurate and misleading assertions contained in the

award recommendation package‖ and ―accountable for not notifying the award

processing channels [Secretary of the Army] that friendly fire was suspected to

ensure that the recommendation was considered based on accurate information.‖

Both of the Silver Star witness statements were altered to remove any mention of

friendly fire and contained inaccurate statements. Inspector General Gimble said

this was done ―somewhere in the approval chain‖ but refused to ―speculate‖ who



was responsible. It appears that COL Nixon, Nixon‘s XO, and/or General

McChrystal were involved.

The Silver Star narrative justification and citation bore little resemblance to reality

and were carefully and misleading edited to imply Tillman died by enemy fire

without actually coming out and saying it.

Overall, it doesn‘t appear that Senator Webb and the Armed Services Committee did a

thorough job of reviewing McChrystal‘s role in the aftermath of the Tillman fratricide. I

don‘t see how they could confirm General McChrystal given his role in the cover -up of Pat

Tillman‘s fratricide.

. . .

On July 31st 2007, Secretary of the Army Pete Geren presented the findings of General

William Wallace‘s review of the previous Tillman investigations. General McChrystal

received no reprimand for his role in the handling of the Tillman fratricide. Instead,General Wallace singled out General Kensinger as the scapegoat responsible for the public

believing the Army covered up the Tillman fratricide.

However, Secretary Geren and General Cody‘s defense of McChrystal doesn‘t hold up

under scrutiny. General McChrystal was guilty of the same charges for which Kensinger

was scapegoated! That is, General McChrystal was responsible to ―inform the family

about friendly fire,‖ failed to ―inform the family about friendly fire in a timely manner,‖

failed ―to inform the acting Secretary of the Army [his chain of command] of the fratricide

investigation,‖ and (arguably) made ―false official statements.‖

[NOTE: see ―General Wallace‘s Review of Tillman Fratricide‖ attachment for details]

. . .

During 2007, Congressman Waxman‘s House Over sight & Reform Committee conducted

an investigation and held two hearings on the Tillman fratricide. However, Congressman

Waxman‘s Committee appeared to conduct a half -hearted investigation.

Chairman Waxman‘s decision to narrow the scope of his investigation to only ―look up‖

the chain of command took the focus off General McChrystal. The Committee permitted

General McChrystal to ―decline‖ to appear and they never interviewed him later. After

raising questions about the Silver Star, they didn‘t look into McChrystal‘s role in

approving the Silver Star with a fraudulent citation, justification and altered witness

statements. The Committee never questioned the ―timeliness‖ or misleading contents of

General McChrystal‘s P4 memo.

[NOTE: see ―House Oversight & Reform Committee‘s Tillman Fratricide Hearings‖ for

more detail]

. . .



The Senate Armed Services Committee June 2nd confirmation of General McChrystal will

be the final layer atop the Army and Congressional cover-ups of Pat Tillman ‘s death.

During the April 24th 2007 Congressional hearing, Mary said,

―… Congress is supposed to take care of their citizens. … Pat died for this

country, and he believed it was a great country that had a system that worked. It is

not perfect. No one has ever said that. But there is a system in place to allow for it

to work, and your job is to find out what happened to Pat.‖

In your 1983 novel, A Country Such As This, Congressman Judd Smith argued: ―And no,

the military isn‘t just fine. The point is, it isn‘t corrupt. It‘s a system with human

failures.‖






Perhaps Senator Rowland, in your novel, Something to Die For , hit the nail on the head:

―How lofty it must have been to have burnt with the purity of the Revolution!

Before the days of multi-million dollar election campaigns that brought politicians

to their knees before the monied temple of the contributors. Before the time of

computerized politics that cause them to await the wisdom of those oracles known

as pollsters before they spoke. Or maybe it had been trash from the get-go, myths

to feed the public.‖

* * *

―Across the room … my mother‘s father, B.H. Hodges, stares out at me … as he has done in every office I

have occupied for more than twenty years. … Defiant he was, and tragic too. He was a fighter, a lonely

champion of lost causes who himself lost everything because of the causes he championed.‖

-- James Webb, ―A Time to Fight‖ (2008)

Four decades ago, you were drawn into the Randy Herrod case. A Marine patrol wasaccused of killing sixteen Vietnam Villagers. Herrod, the patrol leader and veteran of five

months, had been found not guilty. Yet Sam Green, a black eighteen year old with eleven

days in Vietnam had been convicted even though no testimony had been presented that he

had actually killed anyone. From Robert Timberg‘s ―The Nightingale‘s Song‖:

―The case continued to bedevil Webb …. He wanted to help Green, but wasn‘t sure

what he could do. … He joined forces, pro bono, … to try to get the conviction

overturned in a civilian court. … The secretary [of the Navy] declined to act. …



About two weeks later, in August 1975, Webb received a telegram …: TRAGIC

CONCLUSION SAM GREEN DESTROYED HIMSELF.‖

―He had never met Green, spoken to him only once by phone, but he had

committed himself to clearing his name. … He felt helpless, his sense of futility

laced with outrage. Isn‘t any of this going to come out right? … Green was dead,

but Webb couldn‘t let the case go. He … filed an appeal … asking that Green‘s

dishonorable discharge be upgraded to honorable. Webb personally argued thecase before the board.‖

―In December 1978, eight years after the shootings and three years after Green‘s

suicide, Webb wrote to Mrs. Green: ―At last, Sam‘s name is cleared.‖ He

explained that her son‘s discharge had been upgraded to a general discharge. …

―This is small solace, I know,‖ wrote Webb, ‗I only regret we were unable to do

more for him sooner.‖

. . .

I never met Pat Tillman. I never really knew anything about him until a year and a half after his death. But, I‘ve taken the cover -ups of his death a bit personally the last few

years. Why? I feel a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman. I‘m not in his league, but I was an

Airborne Ranger and an autodidact and a bit of maverick. And I‘ve always had outrage f or

injustice and rooted for the underdog.

I‘ve been bedeviled by the Tillman case. For five years, I haven‘t been able to let the case

go. I hoped this could be one small cause I might be able to make a difference with all the

other shit going on the past few years. It would be nice if this ―letter‖ of mine would make

a difference.

. . .

For thirty years your books have dealt with themes of honor, integrity, loyalty, and

betrayal. Re-reading your books, I noticed many parallels between your books and the

story of Pat Tillman‘s death. On April 3, 2008, I sent your office a letter asking you to

become an advocate in the Senate for Mary Tillman‘s struggle for the truth about her son‘s

death (I doubt my letter made it past your gatekeeper Gordon Peterson).

I believed you would feel a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman and his family:

The Tillman‘s are of Scots-Irish descent. Military service was prevalent andrespected in the Tillman family. Mary Tillman‘s uncles were at Pearl Harbor, her

brother was a Marine, and her father was a Marine during the Korean War. Mary

wrote, ―From the time I was very little, I was aware of my father‘s pride in being a

Marine. When I was three years old … I would stand between my parents, feet

digging into the soft leather of the big front seat, and sing the entire Marine Corps


―Pat Tillman was driven by a core of honesty, integrity, and loyalty. His mother

wrote, ―Pat was honest and incorruptible; he would be offended and outraged about



the actions taken in the aftermath of his death. … Honor, integrity, dignity; those

weren‘t just adjectives in Pat Tillman‘s life; they were his life. Pat Tillman was the

embodiment of loyalty and commitment. … He was such a loyal person. He

always wanted to do right by the people who mattered to him.‖

Similarly, in A Country Such As This, Senator Judd Smith said, ―If nothing ever

works out all the way, and if all things change, what‘s left? Your family and your

friends and your values, that‘s what‘s left. And your duty to them. … They‘re theonly important things in life. … And that the rest of it might change a million

times, be called wrong or right or anything else, but you must never violate your

loyalty if you wished to survive the judgment of the ages.‖

Five years ago, Pat Tillman‘s family were handed a tarnished Silver Star. It will be a

travesty of justice if McChrystal is confirmed by the Senate Armed Services Committee,

promoted to the Army‘s highest rank, and handed his fourth star.

But, perhaps you were right years ago in your novel, ―A Sense of Honor,‖ when CPT

Lenahan said, ―I guess that‘s what the world does to you. It makes you realize that honor

and loyalty are traps with no reward.‖

. . .

I feel you owe a duty to Pat Tillman and his family. A duty to place a ―hold‖ on General

McChrystal‘s nomination and stop his confirmation on June 2nd.

Yeah, that could be a lost cause. You‘d piss off a lot of people. But, at least you would

give Mary Tillman the small solace of knowing there is one man of integrity in the Senate

willing to stand as her advocate. Someone willing to ―be a lonely champion of lost

causes…‖ Perhaps you need to take a long look at the picture staring at you from your office wall?

You‘ve been a hero to me for three decades, since I was a teenager, through my years as an

Airborne Ranger LRRP, to the present day as a firefighter. I haven‘t always agreed with

your positions on the Vietnam War, etc. But I‘ve never before doubted your integrity.

I‘ve always trusted your sense of honor.

I‘d like to think that after three years in Congress you haven‘t yet learned the lesson your

grandmother Hodges asked of you decades ago when you first worked in Washington DC,

―Did they teach you how to lie yet?‖

Sincerely

SSG, Co. ―F‖ (Ranger), 425th Infantry MI ARNG 1983 – 1991



April 3, 2008

Dear Senator James Webb,

Four years ago Pat Tillman was killed by ―friendly fire‖ in Afghanistan. Six

―investigations‖ and two Congressional hearings later, Pat‘s family is still struggling to

learn the truth about the circumstances of his death and those involved in the cover-up of

his fratricide.

Mary Tillman, Pat‘s mother, has written a memoir, Boots on the Ground by Dusk: The

Life and Death of Pat Tillman. Her book will be released on April 29th

.

I‘m writing to ask that you consider becoming an advocate in the Senate for MaryTillman‘s struggle for the truth. Perhaps you could arrange to meet Mary in May during

the Washington D.C. leg of her national book tour? Mary‘s home phone is (408) 841-9912. Her editor at Rodale Press is Leigh Haber (212) 808-1340. Her publicist is Beth

Davey (212) 808-1627.

I believe you might feel a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman and his family. They areScots-Irish. Military service was prevalent and respected in their family (e.g. Mary‘sfather was a Marine in the Korean War). Like your own son, Pat did not feel he should

remain privileged during a time of war. After 9/11 he enlisted (with his brother Kevin) andthey fought together in Iraq and Afghanistan. Pat Tillman was driven by honesty,

integrity, and loyalty. He lived his life intensely, was well-read, and was an independent

thinker; ―… sensitive and fierce, a poet and a warrior, as Irish as the day is long.‖

I‘ve read your books for thirty years, starting before my eight years in the Army and

continued my past seventeen years as a firefighter. After recently re-reading your novels, I

noticed several parallels between Pat Tillman‘s fratricide and your novels:

In Something to Die For, Col. Fogarty was ordered into a mistaken battle, posthumously

awarded the Medal of Honor, and eulogized by the President during a televised memorialservice. The mistaken battle was covered-up. Similarly, a dangerous order resulted in Pat

Tillman‘s fratricide. He was posthumously awarded the Silver Star and eulogized bySenator McCain during a televised memorial service. Tillman‘s fratricide was covered-up

by Army generals, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and the White House.

In Fields of Fire, Lt. Hodges lost men after he was ordered to place them into a dangerous

LP. Later, Hodges was shot during a firefight around a disabled tank. Similarly, Lt.Uthlaut was ordered by his TOC to split his platoon, despite his repeated protests, to both

get ―boots on the ground by dusk‖ and escort a disabled humvee. During the resultingfratricide Uthlaut and his RO were wounded and Pat Tillman killed by criminally negligent

friendly fire.

In A Sense of Honor, Cpt. Lenahan and Fogarty were kicked out of the Naval Academy to

protect their superiors from a ―hazing scandal.‖ Similarly, Lt. Uthlaut (First Captain at

West Point) was offered up as a scapegoat and kicked out of his Ranger Battalion.

In The Emperor’s General, Army lawyer Frank Witherspoon railed against the injustice of

General MacArthur‘s war -crimes trial of Japanese General Yamashita. Just before the

2006 elections, Kevin Tillman railed against recent injustices in ―After Pat‘s Birthday.‖



Last year, on April 24, 2007, the House Committee on Oversight and Reform held a

hearing entitled ―Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield.‖

Kevin Tillman, Pat‘s brother, began his testimony with a prepared statement:

―Two days ago marked the third anniversary of the death of my older brother, Pat Tillman,

in Afghanistan. To our family and friends, it was a devastating loss. To the nation, it was

a moment of disorientation. To the military, it was a nightmare. But to others within the

government, it appears to have been an op portunity.‖

―Revealing that Pat‘s death was a fratricide would have been yet another political disaster

... So the facts needed to be suppressed. … An alternative narrative had to beconstructed. Crucial evidence was destroyed including Pat‘s uniform, equipment and

notebook. The autopsy was not done according to regulation, and a field hospital report

was falsified. An initial investigation completed … before testimony could be changed …[and which hit disturbingly close to the mark] disappeared into thin air and was

conveniently replaced by another investigation with more palatable findings.‖


never used to arrive at an honest or even sensible conclusion. … The handling of thesituation after the firefight was described as a compilation of ‗missteps, inaccuracies and

errors in judgment which created the perception of concealment.‘‖

―Writing a Silver Star award before a single eye witness account is taken is not a misstep.

Falsifying soldier witness statements for a Silver Star is not a misstep. … Discarding an(15-6) investigation that does not fit a preordained conclusion is not an error in judgment.

These are deliberate acts of deceit. This is not the perception of concealment. This is

concealment.‖

Mary Tillman, Pat‘s mother, also testified at that hearing about the fratricide cover -up:

―We had officers that we trusted. We had high regard for them. … in your heart they areyour kids and you turn them over, and we trusted. Certainly, we knew they could die or

they could come back wounded … But we never thought that they would use him (Pat) the

way they did.‖

[Mary wrote: ―… the Army was placed in a position to spin the narrative of Pat‘s death …(General) Yellen stated it was like, …‘It went up to the 2-star level and the 2-star took it

right to the 4-star level … now all of a sudden, … ‗Here is the steak dinner, but we‘re

giving it to you on this … garbage can cover.‘ You know, ‗You got it. You work it.‘‖]

―And we shouldn‘t be allowed to have smokescreens thrown in our face. … in every way,they (Army CID investigators) dodged. They are dodging us, and the (Department of Defense) IG condoned that even though they make the public believe they did such a grand

job because they pointed the finger at four generals and five other officers. That is a

smokescreen. These officers are scapegoats.‖

―It is a bit disingenuous to think that the (Bush) Administration did not know about whatwas going on, something so politically sensitive. … The fact that he (Pat) would be killed

by friendly fire and no one would tell (Defense Secretary) Rumsfeld is ludicrous … … the

idea that they wouldn‘t tell Abizaid (Centcom commander) what was going on if he didn‘talready know is ridiculous.‖



I believe you might feel a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman and his family:

The Tillman‘s are of Scots-Irish descent. Pat‘s picture is among those of famous

Americans featured on the cover of Parade Magazine‘s October 3, 2004 issue, entitled

―Can You Guess What They All Have in Common?‖ (adapted from Born Fighting.)

Military service was prevalent and respected in the Tillman family. Mary Tillman‘s uncles

were at Pearl Harbor, her brother was a Marine, and her father was a Marine during theKorean War. Mary wrote, ―From the time I was very little, I was aware of my father‘s

pride in being a Marine. When I was three years old … I would stand between my parents,feet digging into the soft leather of the big front seat, and sing the entire Marine Corps


Your own son chose to leave college to enlist with the Marines. Likewise, Pat Tillmanchose to leave a multi-million dollar NFL contract (and new wife) to enlist in the Rangers

with his brother Kevin. Pat didn‘t feel that he ought to remain privileged while others

were sent to fight. As his mother testified, ―Pat had high ideals for the country. He did,

and he thought it was imperfect. He certainly didn‘t join for political reasons. He thought

the country was in need. It didn‘t matter who was in office. It didn‘t matter which partyhe voted for. That is beside the point. The country was in need.‖

(Ironically, Pat and Kevin were later sent to fight in Iraq although they had come to

believe, in Pat‘s words, ―This war is so fucking illegal.‖)

Similarly, in Fields of Fire, Lt. Hodges said, ―They were only soldiers. They had never owned or determined the reasons for a war, and they had not asked for this one. They had

merely yielded to their honor and tradition and agreed to fight it. And they were not

wrong, not wrong.‖

Pat Tillman was driven by a core of honesty, integrity, and loyalty. His mother wrote, ―Patwas honest and incorruptible; he would be offended and outraged about the actions taken

in the aftermath of his death. … Honor, integrity, dignity; those weren‘t just adjectives inPat Tillman‘s life; they were his life. Pat Tillman was the embodiment of loyalty and

commitment. … He was such a loyal person. He always wanted to do right by the people

who mattered to him.‖

Similarly, in A Country Such As This, Senator Judd Smith said, ―If nothing ever works out

all the way, and if all things change, what‘s left? Your family and your friends and your

values, that‘s what‘s left. And your duty to them. … They‘re the only important things in

life. … And that the rest of it might change a million times, be called wrong or right or

anything else, but you must never violate your loyalty if you wished to survive the judgment of the ages.‖

Pat Tillman lived his life intensely, led by example, and went all out every play. He was

well-read and an independent thinker. In school, he earned a 3.84 grade-point average.Pat had written in his journal since he was sixteen years old (his wartime journal was

―lost‖ by the Army immediately after his death).

Pat Tillman was a character much like Cpt. Lenahan and cadet Fogarty in A Sense of

Honor : ―He is sensitive and fierce, a poet and a warrior, as Irish as the day is long. He is,

in fact, myself in a matchbox.‖



Over the past thirty years I‘ve read all your books. I started with Fields of Fire as ateenager, and continued reading your books during my eight years serving in an Airborne

LRRP company [SSGT, 1983 -1991, Co. ―F‖ (Ranger) 425th

Infantry MI Army National

Guard] and my past seventeen years as a firefighter with the City of Grand Rapids, MI.

After recently re-reading your books, I noticed several parallels between your novels and

Pat Tillman‘s fratricide:

In Something to Die For, Col. Fogarty was ordered to place his Marines into a precarious

fight in Eritrea. This mistaken battle was covered-up by the Secretary of Defense andFogarty was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor by the President during a

nationally televised funeral service:

―He [Secretary of Defense] knows the administration‘s position on the matter was acover-up. Eritrea was a mistake. But it worked. And they didn‘t want the president to look bad.‖

―Ron Holcomb [Secretary of Defense] never told a lie, at least not in the way he

could be caught in it. …As a consequence, the remarks were a mix of bald truth,diplomatic half-truths, and what Holcomb had privately called ‗necessary,

unconfirmable distortions.‘ Nonetheless, they would become the government‘sofficial pronouncement on the day‘s action.‖

―And the media gave them their forum, always ascertaining beforehand that their

allegations were borne out by facts if not the truth.‖

Similarly, Pat Tillman died as a result of a dangerous order to split his platoon, was

posthumously awarded the Silver Star, and his memorial service was televised with

Senator McCain among the dignitaries offering eulogies. Tillman‘s fratricide was covered-

up by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Army generals and the White House.…

In Fields of Fire, Lt. Hodges lost three of his men because he was ordered by Lt. Kersey

(at the Battalion command post) to put them out into a dangerous LP:

―LPs on the other side of this wire are crazy as hell. … The rule I use is, would Ithink it made any sense if I got sent out on it? And I wouldn‘t. So I don‘t like it.‖

―Now, if the Lieutenant believes the LP shouldn‘t be out there, I suggest he go talk

with the battalion staff.‖

―Hodges did not know how to force his point. ―Can‘t ask for more than having the

Big Six consider it, I reckon.‖

―Bullshit.‖ … ―He (1st Lt. Kersey) ain‘t gonna talk to the Colonel about this. … As

long as he‘s looking good to the Man, he couldn‘t give a rat‘s ass how many people

are bleeding.‖

―He (Lt. Hodges) had met a dozen Kerseys in the Marine Corps already. They

held all ranks, although to him they seemed to be mostly Majors.‖



Lt. Uthlaut was Pat‘s platoon leader. His platoon had been held up by a broken

humvee. Maj. Hodne at the TOC wanted ―boots on the ground by dusk‖ in thevillage of Manah merely so he could mark that task accomplished on-time on his

checklist. Major Hodne, through Cpt. Saunders, ordered Lt. Uthlaut to split hisplatoon. Half would go to Manah, and half would escort the humvee to the

highway for pick-up. Lt. Uthlaut thought it was dangerous and unnecessary to split

his platoon. He repeatedly argued the point with Cpt. Saunders in the TOC.

Near the end of Fields of Fire, Lt. Hodges is ordered to secure a dangerous perimeteraround a disabled tank. During the ensuing firefight, he is shot in the face and killed:

―Hodges grunted. ―Fucking tank.‖ … Snake shifted his gaze to the treadless tank that had anchored them in such an indefensible position. It sat like a wounded

mastodon in the middle of the exposed paddy. … The company was digging a

perimeter around it, to protect it.‖

Similarly, Tillman‘s platoon was put into danger by a disabled humvee. During the

―friendly fire‖ that resulted from splitting his platoon Lt. Uthlaut was hit in the face, his

RO shot in the leg, and Pat Tillman killed by criminally negligent fire by the lead vehicle

of the second section (Tillman was killed by rounds fired from only 35 meters away).. . .

In A Sense of Honor, Cpt. Lenahan and cadet Fogarty were kicked out of the Naval

Academy to protect their superiors from a ―hazing scandal‖:

―Admiral, I‘ve got a man in trouble on a plebe-indoctrination charge. … My manwon‘t stand a chance.‖

―Do you realize the implications if this gets out, Captain? You were there when

these violations were going on. … If we sided with Fogarty, we could lose the

whole plebe system. … In fact, we‘ve lost more than Fogarty. I‘m afraid you‘ve just become a casualty yourself. … You get orders out of here before somebodydecides to investigate you.‖

Similarly, Lt. Uthlaut (First Captain, top of his West Point Class) was offered up as a low-

ranking scapegoat and kicked out of the Ranger Battalion for his ―failure‖ to control his

platoon during the ―friendly fire‖ incident. (Captain Saunders and Major Hodne later

denied they ordered Lt. Uthlaut to split his platoon).. . .

In The Emperor’s General, Army lawyer Frank Witherspoon railed against the injustice of

General MacArthur‘s war -crimes trial of Japanese General Yamashita:

―… what he‘s [General MacArthur] doing is a sham. We‘re Americans, Captain.

We‘re supposedly bringing an accused man into the American system of justice. …

He‘s convened a military commission! It‘s not – a – court.‖

―I reminded him that we‘re supposed to be operating under traditional American

concepts of law, such as fairness, decency, and justice. … Do you realize what thistrial – if you can call it a trial – this illegal, judgeless commission is going to look

like? It‘s going to be nothing but a public circus! ... why are we wasting our

credibility as the United States on this man?‖



Kevin Tillman, Pat‘s younger brother, enlisted and fought with Pat in Iraq and

Afghanistan. After Pat‘s death, Kevin refused all interviews and remained silent for 2 ½years. Just before the November 2006 elections, Kevin finally broke his silence with a

short essay ―After Pat‘s Birthday‖ (excerpted below):

―It is Pat‘s birthday on November 6, and elections are the day after.‖

―Somehow our elected leaders were subverting international law and humanity by

setting up secret prisons around the world, secretly kidnapping people, secretlyholding them indefinitely, secretly not charging them with anything, secretly

torturing them. …Somehow that overt policy of torture became the fault of a fewbad apples. Somehow subversion of the Bill of Rights and The Constitution is

tolerated. Somehow suspension of Habeas Corpus is supposed to keep this country

safe.‖

―Somehow the most reasonable, trusted and respected country in the world hasbecome one of the most irrational, belligerent, feared, and distrusted countries in

the world. … Somehow American leadership, whose only credit is lying to itspeople and illegally invading a nation, has been allowed to steal the courage, virtue

and honor of its soldiers on the ground.‖

―Luckily this country is still a democracy. People still have a voice. People stillcan take action. It can start after Pat‘s birthday.‖

. . .

―Did they teach you how to lie yet?‖ (Senator Smith‘s dad in A Country Such As This)

Last summer, on August 1, 2007, the House Committee on Oversight and Reform held a

second hearing: ―The Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department

Knew.‖ The phrase, ―I don‘t recall,‖ was uttered repeatedly by witnesses.

Mary wrote, ―General Brown, retired generals Meyers and Abizaid, and Rumsfeld havegreat difficulty remembering what they knew and when they knew it. Someone sitting

next to me whispers, ‗They have collective amnesia.‘ Rumsfeld was asked several times in

various ways when he learned of Pat‘s death, but he couldn‘t recall.‖

Mary complained, ―… we were not happy with the hearing at all. We had spent weeks

helping getting questions prepared and sending information. The Republicans on the

committee were at best indifferent … Most of the Democrats disappointed us as well.

They were not prepared and they didn‘t think on their feet. We expected more from

Congress.‖

The White House claimed ―executive branch confidentiality‖ when the House Committeeon Oversight and Reform requested information about their handling of the Tillman

fratricide. The White House refused to release e-mails and documents or to allow WhiteHouse staff to testify before the committee.

During the April 24, 2007 hearing, Mary said, ―… Congress is supposed to take care of

their citizens. … Pat died for this country, and he believed it was a great country that had asystem that worked. It is not perfect. No one has ever said that. But there is a system in

place to allow for it to work, and your job is to find out what happened to Pat.‖



In A Country Such As This, Senator Judd Smith argued: ―And no, the military isn‘t just

fine. The point is, it isn‘t corrupt. It‘s a system with human failures.‖






Perhaps Senator Rowland, in Something to Die For , hit the nail on the head:

―How lofty it must have been to have burnt with the purity of the Revolution! Before the

days of multi-million dollar election campaigns that brought politicians to their knees

before the monied temple of the contributors. Before the time of computerized politics thatcause them to await the wisdom of those oracles known as pollsters before they spoke. Or

maybe it had been trash from the get-go, myths to feed the public.‖

. . .

Your novels over the past thirty years have dealt with themes of honor, integrity, loyalty,and betrayal. I believe you might feel a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman and his family.

Perhaps you could arrange to meet with Mary Tillman during her May book tour? And

perhaps you would consider becoming an advocate in the Senate for the Tillman family‘sstruggle for the truth?

Sincerely

P.S.

I was an early supporter of your long-shot ‘06 Senate campaign (from the fall of ‘05through your election I made six contributions to your campaign). Most satisfying money

I‘ve ever given to a ―lost‖ cause! Perhaps only the ―lost‖ causes are worth fighting for?



Last August, my family and I traveled to Washington D.C. to attend my step- brother‘s wedding. On ourlast day in town, we walked around the Capital building and took a snack break next to an old tree.

While walking back to Union Station we stopped by your Senate office. I‘d like to thank your staffer for

a gracious welcome. And your complimentary packets of Virginia peanuts were a hit with my children!(Nathan‘s ―loot‖ was firmly grasped by both hands).

That night riding the Amtrak train back home, while finishing your novel, ―A Country Such as This,‖ I

was surprised to read the following passage:

―At the corner of south Capital Street and Independence Avenue … he (Senator Judd Smith)

jogged across the avenue, passing through a curtain of shrubbery into a small park. … He foundhis favorite tree and removed his coat, folding it carefully inside out, and sat down, leaning

against the tree trunk as though it was a lounging chair. The park was his frequent daytime

hideout. …When it got to be too much, he simply picked up a carry-out lunch and escaped into

the plain view of the park.‖

―His public cloister allowed contemplation … Congress was a dog and pony show. He wasdoing vital things, at least part of the time, but it would end someday, just like everything else

always had and always would. … And the gnarled base of his favorite old tree was itself a

throne, from which he could peer out on the Capital, a few hundred feet away, and the House

Office Buildings just across the street. … The Capital building was a wonderfully dramatic

background.‖

It sure sounds like the same tree to me! (A bit of synchronicity?)



Note: see my forthcoming document: Appendices: ―Lies Borne Out by Facts,

If Not the Truth.‖ Time permitting, I may eventually link to each of these documentson my website: feralfirefighter.blogspot.com

However, I have copied my full email exchanges with Thom Shanker below.

. . .

APPENDICES:

A: ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ (refer to separate Volume II binder):

Operational & Administrative Chain of Command (from IG Report)Fratricide Investigation Flowchart (Appendix C, IG Report)

Casualty Reporting and Next of Kin Notification Flowchart (Appendix D, IG Report)

Timeline of Tillman Fratricide Notification (GuyMontag425 5-17-08)

Transcript of General McChrystal‘s June 2nd

2009 Senate TestimonySenate ASC 6-02-09 Confirmation Hearing (from ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?)

http://armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2009/06%20June/09-36%20-%206-2-09.pdf

B: E-Mail Correspondence Between David Parish & The New York Times

C: New York Times Articles about General Stanley McChrystal:

(5-12-09) ―Pentagon Ousts Top Commander in Afghan War‖

(5-13-09) ―A General Steps from the Shadows‖(5-14-09) ―New Commander for Afghanistan‖ (NYT Editorial) (5-15-09) ―Afghan Villagers Describe Chaos of U.S. Airstrikes‖

(5-26-09) ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case‖

(6-01-09) ―Questions for General McChrystal‖ (NYT Editorial)

(6-02-09) ―Nominee to Command U.S. Afghan Forces Stresses Civilian Safety‖ (6-02-09) ―U.S. Report Finds Errors in Afghan Airstrikes‖

D: ―5 Years Ago: When the Pentagon and Media Lied About Jessica Lynch Rescue‖

. . .






EMAIL EXCHANGES

THOM SHANKER (NYT PENTAGON REPORTER) & GUY

MONTAG

WEDNESDAY 5/27/09 about 9PM:

Thom Shanker,

I just read your May 26th

article, ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives

Questions in Tillman‘s Case.‖

This past week I‘ve been working on a long letter to Senator James Webb. I write that

Congress and the senior leadership of the Army have shielded General McChrystal from

close scrutiny and protected him from punishment. I review and critique Senator Webb‘sArmed Services Committee review, General Wallace‘s review, and Congressman

Waxman‘s House Oversight & Reform Committee investigation.

I‘d like to send you a copy of my letter. My letter discusses in some detail every point

raised in your article. In addition, I‘ve uncovered new information about the Tillman case

not mentioned at all in your article.

Here‘s a preview of some of the information (without details or documentation):

1. Senator Webb did a ―thorough review‖ last year of the aftermath of the Tillmanfratricide at the request of Chairman Carl Levin for the Senate Armed Service Committee.

(In retrospect, I realize this was part of the vetting process for McChrystal‘s confirmation

last year as Director of the Joint Staff). Webb mentioned this review May 27th

2008 onthe Diane Rhem NPR radio show (about 40 minutes into show). When I tried to follow up,

Webb‘s Military Affairs aide, Gordon Peterson, stonewalled me and referred me to Gary

Leeling 202-224-9339 (legal counsel for Senator Levin)

2.) Congressman Waxman ―invited‖ McChrystal to testify on August 1st 2007. The

Committee permited McChrystal to ―decline‖ to appear at the hearing despite his key role

in notifying senior leadership, writing the misleading P4 memo, and approving thefraudulent Silver Star. And the Committee never interviewed McChrystal during the next

year until their report was issued. .

3.) General Kensinger was blamed for failing to notify the family because he supposedly

had the ―administrative‖ responsibility to do so. Yet, if you look at ―Appendix D: CasualtyReporting & Next of Kin Notification Process‖ in the IG report, the flowchart clearly

shows that McChrystal had that responsibility (and it‘s noted both he and his Chief of Staff failed to make that notification despite knowing about fratricide NLT April 25th.



4). There was nothing ―potential‖ about Tillman‘s friendly fire death. Most of the troops

on the ground knew immediately what had happened. On the 23rd

word was passed up

―70% sure‖ to Nixon. But, if you look at the IG report‘s ―Appendix B: Chronology,‖ itsnoted that LTC Bailey tells COL Nixon of potential fratricide on the 23

rdyet Nixon

supposedly only tells McChrystal of Tillman‘s ―death‖ (no mention of fratricide). How is

that possible? And then supposedly McChrystal tells General Abizaid only of Tillman‘sdeath. It looks as though Abizaid wasn‘t being truthful when he testified before Congressabout when he learned about fratricide.

5.) And on the 24th

, the initial investigating officer CPT Scott passed on confirmation

(―I‘m certain, I‘m sure‖) to LTC Bailey, who then called COL Nixon (McChrystal was

next in the chain of command). The Army knew of confirmed FF two days after Tillman‘sdeath!

6.) McChrystal is praised for his ―timely‖ P4 memo to alert his superiors on the 29th

.

There was nothing timely about it. Even if you accept his own testimony at face value, heknew about friendly fire on the 23rd

, 24th

, or 25th

. Yet he didn‘t send out his P4 until the

29th

? How is waiting four to six days ―timely‖?

7.) No one seems to have carefully read McChrystal‘s P4 memo. The contents aredamning. For example, He says ―IF the circumstances of CPL Tillman‘s death become

public.‖ Not when, IF.

Anyhow, I believe you will find it worth your time to read through my letter.

Could send me your e-mail address? Then, I could simply send my documents as

―attachments‖ to an email. Could you also give me a mailing address? (I‘ll Fed Ex a

hardcopy of letter tomorrow).

If you have any further questions, I can be reached at my email: [email protected]. I can

also be contacted at my home phone, 616-866-0314. (Unfortunately, I‘m a dinosaur who

still doesn‘t have a cell phone, so that option is out!) I‘ll be home tomorrow in theafternoon and evening.

Sincerely,

mailto:[email protected]





WEDNESDAY 5/27/09 10:39 PM:

Please feel free to send me your material, as I would be eager to review it. Above is my

direct e-mail address. Thanks for writing.

Regards,

Thom

THURSDAY 5/28/09 7:27 AM:

Thom,

Thanks for sending your direct contact info.

I‘ve just finished up things (a bit of a all-nighter!)

Could you also send me the best ―snail mail‖ address to send you a package tomorrow? Iwould like to send you my material in a binder by Fed Ex, hopefully get to you by Friday.

And a hard copy form would be easier for you to read thru.

But, I‘ll send you my Word documents in the morning.

THURSDAY 5/28/09 8:07 AM:

Thom,

Here is a download of the Appendices material that I wrote included in ―Did They Teach

You to Lie Yet?‖ I‘ll send the rest in a hardcopy form.

I tried to condense a lot of my information into the ―Timeline of Tillman Fratricide

Notification.‖

FRIDAY 7:25 AM:

Thom Shanker,

I sent my document ―Did They Teach You to Lie Yet?‖ by Fed Ex yesterday afternoon.

It‘s supposed to get to your office around 10:30 Friday morning. This is a hard-copy of

what I emailed yesterday, with a numbered Table of Contents and the full set of

appendices. ….



FRIDAY 5/29/09 8:14 AM:

I very much look forward to reviewing you documentary file this weekend, and I thank

you for sending it.

Regards,Thom

FRIDAY 5/29/09 2:42 PM:

Thom,

I just checked Fed Express. My package was delivered this morning at 9:38 AM. Just

thought I'd pass this information on in case the package hasn't yet made it to your desk.

FRIDAY 5/29/09 3:59 PM:

Yes, it arrived. I will review your documents this weekend. Thanks.

SATURDAY 5/30/09 6:59 AM:

Thom Shanker,

I overlooked your graphic showing a timeline of McChrystal's role in the aftermath of

Tillman's death. If you look in my Appendices, I've included a "Timeline of Tillman

Notification" which compares the IG timeline to my own (my Fratricide Notes has

supporting details). I just wanted to point out a couple corrections:

1.) April 23rd, Nixon is told Tillman "may have" been killed by own troops. He informs

McChrystal:

"may have": CSM Birch was "70% sure", LTC Bailey was "certain".

"informs McChrystal": According to the IG chronology, Nixon tells McChrystalonly of "death". I overlooked this at first, but according to the IG timeline, Nixon

didn't mention potential fratricide to McChrystal, and then McChrystal told Abizaid

only of "death"! Not likely.

And if McChrystal did learn of fratricide on the 23rd and told Abizaid, then

Abiziad lied in testimony before the IG and Congress. (A look at the IG interviews

of Nixon, McChrystal, and Abizaid might be illuminating).

2.) May 16th, "investigation concludes Tillman killed by friendly fire:



This is the 2nd 15-6 investigation by LTC Hodne. The first 15-6 was done by CPTScott who verbally passed confirmation of FF to LTC Bailey on the 24th who

passed it onto COL Nixon. CPT Scott submitted his "15-6 Final Report" on April

29th concluding friendly fire. Nixon said this report was only a "draft:. (Scott's

15-6 disappeared, there is no copy! Although the IG said they managed toreconstruct it somehow.)

You noted that the "Source" for the graphic is the DoD IG and the report of General

Wallace. Do you have a copy of the Wallace Report. I wasn't able to find it. I'd

appreciate you sending me a copy if possible.

Thanks,

MONDAY 6/1/09 06:33 AM:

Thom Shanker,

I just read today's NYT editorial "Questions for General McChrystal."

Why isn't there any mention of McChrystal's role in the handling of the Tillman case?There wasn't one, except perhaps an obscure reference in the last line "The overall

performance of the Special Operations Command under General McChrystal's leadership -

- both acts of heroism and acts of abuse -- ...".

Will the NYT be publishing a follow up to your May 26th article before the confirmation

hearing?

Sincerely,

MONDAY 6/1/09 6:56 AM:

As such a careful reader of the paper, you are no doubt aware of the strict and important

institutional divide between the newsroom and those who write editorials. Thus, anyquestion about an editorial should be directed to The Times editorial board, and not to a

newsroom reporter.

Do you have any sense at all that Senators will be pressing on the Tillman case?

Again, thanks for the very detailed and voluminous file you sent. It was very well

researched and quite thorough.Regards,

Thom



MONDAY 6/1/09 11:08 AM:

Thom,

Thanks for pointing out the separation of newsroom and editorial board. Obvious, inretrospect.

Do I have any sense that the Senators will be pressing on the Tillman case? I don't seewhy they would bring up the subject. They'll probably just ask a few questions about

"enhanced interrogation" at Camp Nama (sp?) in Iraq which will go nowhere. If Tillman is

mentioned, they'll probably say he's gotten cleared by Wallace etc (without mentioning

Senator Webb's review last year).

Could you please answer my question? Are you going to publish a follow-up to your May

26th piece based on my document or any other information you've received? If not, why

not? Why did you even bother to raise questions about McChrystal and Tillman in yourMay 26th article?

Sincerely,

MONDAY 6/1/09 11:10 AM:

David,

At this point there will not be a follow-on story on the Tillman investigation prior to the

hearing, although we will see what the hearing brings up tomorrow.

Regards,Thom

MONDAY 6-01-09 2:00 PM (sent many several NYT email addresses):

June 1st

2009

New York Times Editorial Board,



I‘ve been corresponding with Thom Shanker, your NYT Pentagon correspondent, since

last Wednesday in reference to his May 26th article ―Nomination of US AfghanCommander Revives Questions in Tillman‘s Case.‖ Last Thursday, I FedExed my 100



page document to him detailing new disclosures of General McChrystal‘s centr al role in


However, it doesn‘t appear that Thom Shanker is following up with another article. I think the NYT editorial board would find it useful to speak with him and get a copy of this

document before tomorrow‘s June 2

nd

confirmation hearing of General McChrystal beforethe Senate Armed Services Committee (or read my letters below and attachments).


letter to Thom Shanker and my letter to Senator Webb.If you would like more information, I‘ve also ―attached‖ many of the documents in thepackage I sent to Thom Shanker.

Feel free to contact me with any questions. Unfortunately, I won‘t be able to respond toemails until after 9 PM since my home computer is out (until my wife gets home with her

laptop). But, I‘ll be home most of the day if you wish to call my home phone.

Sincerely,

. . .

No emails sent or received between Tuesday 6-02-09 and 6-05-09

. . .

FRIDAY 6-05-09 9:11 PM:

Thom Shanker,

First, I thought I‘d pass on my comments about General McChrystal‘s testimony at his

confirmation hearing. For what it matters, General McChrystal just dug himself a deeperhole with his own words on Tuesday:

1. McChrystal said that he first learned of suspected fratricide and 15-6 investigation afterreturning back to Afghanistan from a meeting in Qatar with General Abizaid on about

April 23rd:

During the Jones 15-6 McChrystal said that he "was in Qatar when I was told,

about a day or two after the incident ...". [OK, that matches the 23rd

, but was he inQatar or Afghanistan?].



During his DoD IG interview General Abizaid said "Gen McChrystal informed him

of CPL Tillman's death while they were in Qatar in a meeting .... he received nodetails and did not know friendly fire was suspected." [So we're supposed to

believe McChrystal didn't tell Abizaid about fratricide while they were together in

Qatar on the same day! Or Abizaid lied about not being told about fratricide.] During his Congressional testimony on 8-01-07, General Abizaid said "on about

the 23rd, Gen McChrystal called me and told me that CPL Tillman had been killed

in combat and that the circumstances his death were heroic." [So was he told ―no

details‖ or ―heroic‖?] And, the DoD IG Chronology (Appendix B) states that after COL Nixon was told

of possible fratricide and the 15-6 on the 23rd, Nixon only told McChrystal of the

"death" of Tillman and then McChrystal told Abizaid only about Tillman's"death". [But McChrystal said on Tuesday he was told of fratricide on the 23rd!

McChrystal failed to tell Abizaid about fratricide, or Abizaid lied about not being

informed about it. And Nixon or McChrystal lied about only telling about ―death‖] So, McChrystal, Nixon, and/or Abiziad lied about when they learned about

―suspected‖ fratricide during their interviews with the DoD Inspector General. A

quick check of their IG interviews would be illuminating.

2.) McChrystal testified that he waited for the outcome of the investigation before makingconclusions, he "wanted some level of truth" before he sent the information on a week later

with his P4: As I wrote to you before, there was never anything ―potential‖ or "suspected" aboutTillman‘s friendly fire death. The Rangers on the ground being shot at knew

immediately what had happened. On the 23rd word was passed up ―70% sure‖ bythe CSM to LTC Bailey and onto COL Nixon. And on the 24

th, the initial

investigating officer CPT Scott passed on verbal confirmation (―I‘m certain, I‘m

sure‖) to LTC Bailey, who then called COL Nixon (McChrystal was next in the

chain of command).

McChrystal knew of confirmed FF two days after Tillman‘s death! Or, are we tobelieve Nixon never told McChrystal of confirmation during the following days

they were working together on the Silver Sta r package?

Perhaps McChrystal‘s ―level of truth‖ refers to CPT Scott‘s ―15-6 Final Report‖dated April 29

th. Isn‘t it curious the 29

th‘s the same date as the P4? And further

that Nixon only officially appointed Scott on the 29th

as well? So McChrystal

could say he just got some ―emerging evidence‖ and started the investigation after he approved the Silver Star on the 29th? And then CPT Scott‘s 15-6 disappeared!



3.) General Wallace cleared McChrystal of wrongdoing because McChrystal only signed

off on the Silver Star and had no reasonable basis to question a recommendation bycommanders in the field with firsthand knowledge:

But during Tuesday's hearing, McChrystal said he sat down with the

Ranger officers (Nixon, Kauzerlich, Hodne, Bailey) and went over Tillman'sactions on a whiteboard to satisfy himself that Tillman's actions merited a Silver

Star! McChrystal wasn't just signing a piece of paper that dropped on his desk! He

was in the field with the commanders and discussing their firsthand knowledge!

4.) McChrystal said that the Silver Star citation wasn't well written and that he didn't readit close enough to catch that it could "imply" Tillman wasn't killed by friendly fire:

Absolute bull. The IG concluded that anyone reading the citation would assume

Tillman was killed by enemey fire. In fact, Maj Hodne even said that he edited thenarrrative to ensure it didn't mention friendly fire! And the witness statements were

altered by "someone in the approval chain" (i.e. Nixon, McChrystal, and/orKauzerlich) to remove references to friendly fire. IG Gimble preferred not to

―speculate‖ as to who was responsible!

. . . Finally, I still don‘t understand why you didn't write a follow-up to your article last week

―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case.‖ You wrote

that ―Unless new information on General McChrystal‘s role in the episode emerges

between now and his confirmation hearing, set for June 2nd

, the question is not expected tofigure heavily in the Senate debate."

Yet, last week I provided you with a copy of my document ―Did They Teach You To Lie

Yet?‖ (with 50 pages of text and 50 pages of Appendices) describing ―new disclosures‖about McChrystal‘s role in the Tillman case.

Could you please explain to me why my document wasn‘t sufficient to prompt you to writea follow-up article? Or at least include some of my information in your June 2nd article

about the hearing?

I would welcome any criticism from you of my arguments or facts contained in my

document.

Sincerely,



SATURDAY 6-06-09 9:58 AM:

Thank you for your note. Your research is exhaustive and impressive.

My question back to you would be:


Tillman case -- in particular Senator Webb, who has figured extensively in your research

and in comments by the Tillman family -- now expressing satisfaction with the publicresolution of the inquiries and now, apparently, ready to confirm General McChrystal next

week? Remember, as I know you do, that the legislative branch is a key check and balance

not only of the executive, but of the military. It controls funding and confirmation to senior

general officer jobs.


Regards,Thom

SUNDAY 6-07-09 9:30 AM:

Thom,

You asked why even Senator Webb has expressed satisfaction with the public resolution of

the inquiries into the Tillman case and is now ready to confirm General McChrystal?

I would stress "public" inquiries. General McChrystal appeared in "executive session" (i.e.

closed, secret) during the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 15, 2008 for

his confirmation to Director of the Joint Staff. I would assume he was a bit more frank with the senators during that discussion. I talked to Gerald Leeling on June 1st about that

meeting. He would say nothing in response to my questions except "it was in executive

session" and "we did as thorough a review given the information available to us at the

time." I would assume Senator Webb knows McChrystal and the Army have been lyingabout their handling of the Tillman case.

But, I would guess that Webb, and the other senators, think McChrystal is the best man tolead the Afghan escalation and are willing to forgive his central role in the cover-up of

Tillman's fratricide. And they all know that McChrystal was just obeying orders from

Rumsfeld and the White House to get out good PR at a bad time (Abu Gharib, etc.).Besides, now the senators are stuck with the "hot potato." They're the last link in the chain

of "investigations" into the handling of the Tillman case. They've got to cover their own

ass now.

Bu my question for you still remains unanswered:



Despite your praise for my document as "exhaustive", "impressive", and "well researched"none of my findings appeared in your following articles concerning the Tillman case.

Wouldn't my 100 page document qualify as "new information"? (or are only official

government leaks considered authoritative enough to appear in print?)

Could you please explain to me why my document wasn‘t sufficient to prompt you to writea follow-up to your May 26th article? Or at least include some of my findings in your June

2nd article about the hearing as a counterpoint to the official government position?

Thanks,

. . .

No further response from Shanker as of Tuesday 6-09-09

"Lies Borne Out by Facts, If Not the Truth" (September 11, 2009)

Documents

Transcript of "Lies Borne Out by Facts, If Not the Truth" (September 11, 2009)