"Lies Borne Out By Facts, If Not the Truth" Appendices (September 11, 2009)

8/14/2019 "Lies Borne Out By Facts, If Not the Truth" Appendices (September 11, 2009)

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LIES BORNE OUT BY FACTS,IF NOT THE TRUTH

Senator James Webb, Thom Shanker & The New York Times and theWhitewash of General McChrystals Role in the Aftermath of Pat Tillmans Death

By GuyMontag425, feralfirefighter.blogspot.comSeptember 11, 2009

Allegations, lies, denials, dissembling, distortions And all the while they secretlywhispered to the media And the media gave them their forum, always ascertaining

beforehand that their allegations were borne out by facts, if not the truth.

--- James Webb, Something to Die For (1991)


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LIES BORNE OUT BY FACTS, IF NOT THE TRUTH

TABLE OF CONTENTSPDF Page #:

September 11 th 2009 Letter to New York Times Public Editor Clark Hoyt 4. . .

Thom Shanker & The New York Times, and the Whitewash of General 17

McChrystals Role in the Aftermath of Pat Tillmans Death

Rebuttal of Thom Shankers Pre-Hearing NYT Article: 35Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case

Rebuttal of Thom Shankers Post-Hearing NYT Articles: 60Nominee to Command U.S. Afghanistan Forces Stresses Civilian Safety& U.S. Report Finds Errors in Afghan Airstrikes

. . .

Senator James Webb and the Whitewash of General Stanley McChrystals Role 77

in the Aftermath of Pat Tillmans Death

May 25 th 2008 Letter to Senator James Webb (from Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?) 89

April 3 rd 2008 Letter to Senator James Webb (from larger untitled document) 99

APPENDICES:

A: Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet? (refer to separate Volume II binder):

Operational & Administrative Chain of Command (from IG Report)Fratricide Investigation Flowchart (Appendix C, IG Report) Casualty Reporting and Next of Kin Notification Flowchart (Appendix D, IG Report)

Timeline of Tillman Fratricide Notification (GuyMontag425 5-17-08)

Transcript of General McChrystals June 2 nd 2009 Senate TestimonySenate ASC 6-02-09 Confirmation Hearing (from Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?)

B: E-Mail Correspondence Between Guy Montag & The New York Times

C: New York Times Articles about General Stanley McChrystal:(5-12-09) Pentagon Ousts Top Commander in Afghan War(5-13-09) A General Steps from the Shadows(5-14-09) New Commander for Afghanistan (NYT Editorial)(5-15-09) Afghan Villagers Describe Chaos of U.S. Airstrikes(5-26-09) Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case(6-01-09) Questions for General McChrystal (NYT Editorial)(6-02-09) Nominee to Command U.S. Afghan Forces Stresses Civilian Safety(6-02-09) U.S. Report Finds Errors in Afghan Airstrikes

D: 5 Years Ago: When the Pentagon and Media Lied About Jessica Lynch Rescue


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LIES BORNE OUT BY FACTS, IF NOT THE TRUTH

APPENDIX A:From Appendices of Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?

(refer to separate binder):

Operational & Administrative Chain of Command (from IG Report):

**

Fratricide Investigation Flowchart (Appendix C, IG Report):

**

Casualty Reporting and Next of Kin Notification Flowchart (Appendix D, IG Report):

**

Timeline of Tillman Fratricide Notification (GuyMontag, 5-17-08):

Timeline of Tillman Fratricide Notification Notes (Guy Montag, 5-17-08):

Transcript of General McChrystals June 2 nd 2009 Senate Testimony: http://armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2009/06%20June/09-36%20-%206-2-09.pdf

Senate ASC 6-02-09 Confirmation Hearing (from Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?)
http://opt/scribd/conversion/tmp/scratch8/%20http:/armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2009/06%20June/09-36%20-%206-2-09.pdfhttp://opt/scribd/conversion/tmp/scratch8/%20http:/armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2009/06%20June/09-36%20-%206-2-09.pdf


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5-20-08; Revised 7-17-08

TIMELINE OF TILLMAN FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION

IG Report, Appendix B Chronology (pp.70- 76): From Testimony & IG Report:

April 22:

Tillman killed in action in Afghanistan. Col [?] (McChrystals Chief of Staff)approves causalty report KIA.

PFC ONeal tells 1SG of possibility of friendly fire

April 23:

CSM Birch informs LTC Bailey of suspected fratricide, CSM Birch: I would say I was probably.recommends an investigation. 70% sure it was fratricide. (Jones, CS)

LTC Bailey verbally assigns CPT Scott to conduct 15-6

LTC Bailey tells COL Nixon suspects fratricide and Bailey tells Nixon I was certain we hadinvestigation initiated. killed him we need to do the 15-6, So

from that time forward I never doubtedwhether or not we had killed Pat Tillman

.COL Nixon calls GEN McChrystal to inform OR McChrystal: about a day or two after thehim of Tillmans death. incident [Nixon] told me he suspected

fratricide and was investigating it.Note: Wouldnt Nixon tell McChrystal of (no later than 25th)suspected fratricide & investigation the same day

Nixon was told? Wouldnt Chief of Staff have alreadytold him of KIA? Or seen it on CNN?

GEN McChrystal while meeting with GEN Abizaid McChrystal tells Abizaid while intells him that Tillman had been killed in action. Qatar for a meeting that Tillman had

been killed in combat, and that thecircumstances surrounding his death wereheroic. (Abizaid, Waxman 8/07)

OR

Note : Wouldnt McChrystal tell Abizaid of McChrystal informs GEN Abizaid of suspected fratricide and investigation the same Tillmans death while they were in Qatar for day he learned of it? (not death or KIA) a meeting at the time of Tillmans death

but he received no details and did not knowAbiziad says no details but later heroic death? that friendly fire was suspected (Abizaid,

IG 3/07)

Abizaid called the Chairman and discussedthat with the Chairman. (Waxman, 8/07)


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IG Report, Appendix B Chronology (pp.70- 76): From Testimony & IG Report:

April 23 (continued): Nixon said he told Kensinger almostimmediately of the possibility of friendly fire and beginning investigation.

Yellen testified that he told Kensinger of the possibility of friendly fire the day after Tillmans death [23 rd].

OR Yellen testified that told of death by Nixonon 23 rd and friendly fire investigation on the24 th.

McChrystal calls Brown shortly after perhaps a few days after the death - to say itwas a possibility that this was friendly fireand that he was investigating

April 24:

2nd Platoon returns to battalion FOB. CPT Scott takes statements and beginsinterviews.

Bailey: After the first day [of interviews] there was no doubt about it. I

Note: CPT Scott and LTC Bailey confirmed confirmed it. So, after [Scott] did the firstfratricide and told Nixon on the 24 th! Nixon five interviews, he came back to me and saidnever passed this information up his chain Sir, Im certain. Im sure. And then Iof command?! called [Nixon]

Nixon: I believed it was myresponsibility to tell the family once I hadthe facts involved with that. it took aconsiderable time [2 days!] to get truth or the best level of truth that we could get outof the investigation.

Nixon told Yellen that possible fratricide.April 25 :

No later than April 25 th, COL Nixon informs GEN Yellen: just a few days after the

MG McChrystal and BG Yellen of suspected incident Nixon called me doing thefratricide and that investigation was initiated. investigation may be friendly fire.

Platoon AAR conducted GEN Brown: [McChrystal] called shortlyafter perhaps a few days after death - possibility friendly fire investigating

Note: It was COL [?]s responsibility as Joint Task McChrystal and COL [?] (Joint Task ForceForce Chief of Staff to transmit supplemental casualty Chief of Staff) were aware of friendly firereport after learning of friendly fire. (see IG p. 80) as early as [NLT?] 25 th.


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IG Report, Appendix B Chronology (pp.70 76): From Testimony & IG Report:

April 27:

Autopsy conducted by AFME.COL Nixon approves Silver Star

April 28:

MG McChrystal approves Silver Star. Abizaid in Afghanisatan. Claims no onetold him of fratricide. Visits LT Uthalut inhospital on the 29 th.

April 29:

Written appointment of CPT Scotts 15-6 by COL Nixon Scotts AR 15-6 Final Report 4-29-04

submitted to Nixon?

MG McChrystal sends P4 to Abizaid, Brown, and P4 drafted by Nixon.Kensinger that friendly fire likely outcome of pendinginvestigation. However, the fratricide should not takeaway from the valorous Silver Star award.

Silver Star approved by Acting Secretary of the Army. Note: Recipients of P4 already knew about

fratricide and investigation. The only newswas that the Silver Star was going through.

It appears to me that the P4s purpose was just to cover McChrystals butt by providinga paper trail that even knowing about thefratricide he still felt the Silver Star wasdeserved.

April 30:

PA press release announcing Silver Star award Premature release of Silver Star draft

Regimental JAG does not disclose fratricideto CID acting on request by medicalexaminer.

May 3:

Tillman memorial service


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IG Report, Appendix B, Chronology (p 70 76): From Testimony & IG Report:

May 4:

CPT Scott submits his AR15-6 recommendations GEN Kensinger says [Nixon] informed himof possible fratricide and they were going todo investigation. (Jones; AN)

May 6: GEN Abizaid probably received P4message. Called Chairman Myers and told

Note: Are we to believe that McChrystal never him that possibility of fratricide and picked up the phone to tell Abizaid about the McChrystal has appointed people tofratricide and investigation when he learned about investigate Said that important that theit on the 23 rd? leadership know, i.e. Rumsfeld and

President.Note: Possible fratricide & investigation begun

information not in P4 memo! (see Brown Meyers cant recall specifically how told. Notification) about potential fratricide & investigation.

Meyers cannot recall if he informed

Secretary Rumsfeld.May 8:

COL Nixon appoints LTC Kauzerich to conduct2nd 15-6 investigation

May 16:

LTC Kauzerich completes 15-6 investigation.

Sometime between May 16 and 20, GEN Abizaid

Receives P4 message sent by GEN McChrystal onApril 29 th. May 18: Around the 18 th to 20 th Abizaid informed

Rumseld about investigation and looked likefriendly fire (Waxman 8/07).

Note : Abizaid told IG that he never told Rumsfeldabout possible fratricide.

May 20: Rumsfeld says he assumes he was told onMay 20 th. Doesnt recall when told or who

told him.May 26:.

LTC Bailey informs Kevin Tillman of fratricide. COL Bucci tells Rumsfeld of fratricidesometime between 5/24 and 5/29.

May 28:

GEN Abizaid approves 15-6 investigation. GEN Abizaid approves report as beingdefinite proof of friendly fire. Doesntrecall mentioning it to the President untilafter he signed off on report.


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5-17-08; Revised 7-18-08

COLONEL NIXON S FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION

From the IG Report, Appendix B Chronology (pp. 70 -76):

April 23, 2004: LTC [Bailey] and CSM [Birch] tell COL [Nixon] that hesuspects fratricide and that an investigation was initiated.

COL Nixon calls GEN McChrystal to inform him of Tillmans death.

MG McChrystal while meeting with GEN Abizaid tells him thatTillman was killed in action.

April 25, 2004: No later than April 25 th, Nixon tells McChrystal that fratricide issuspected and an investigation initiated.

NOTE: How is it that Nixon is notified of possible fratricide and investigation, yet didnot pass that information up to McChrystal that same day? Or if he learned later that day,why didnt Nixon pick up the phone and give McChrystal an update?

. . .

Sworn Statement of CSM Birch (Jones, CS):

by 1000 on the morning of the 23 rd, I spoke with [Bailey] face-to-face and said, Thislooks like it might be fratricide. You need to do an investigation and get to the bottom of itand find out the facts, sir. (p. 2)

probably when I left that canyon to link up with [1SG?] in my mind, I would say I was probably 70 percent sure it was fratricide, sir. (p. 8)

Sworn statement of LTC Bailey (Jones, Z):

So you talked to [Nixon] on the 23 rd and told him that it was your initial indication that hehad been killed by fratricide? -- Yes, sir. (p.18)

Sir, theres no doubt about it [fratricide]. It cant be anything but that. I think thatafter the first day [of interviews, 24 th] after [Scott] talked to the main kind of players outthere there was no doubt about it. It was a case where there were 6 or 7 Rangers thatsaw this vehicle shooting at them. (p. 21) Sir, within 3 or 4 hours of being out here on the ground by the incident [23 rd], I went back

and told [Nixon] that I was certain that we had killed him. I mean, theres some doubt andwe need to do the 15-6. So, from that time forward, I never doubted whether or not we hadkilled Pat Tillman. In fact, I think just about everybody around knew that. (p. 52)

And certainly, by the next day [24 th] when we did the investigations, I confirmed it.Because I called him [Nixon] back within a day or two and said, Sir, I want you to knownow, after getting the first five interviews in fact, that was, I guess, the next day. So,after [Scott] did his first five interviews, he came back to me and said, Sir, Im certain.Im sure. And then I called [Nixon]. I think it was the 24 th . (p. 53)


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, 5-17-08

COLONEL NIXON S FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION(continued)

Sworn statement of COL Nixon (Jones, AM):

I believed it was my responsibility to tell the family once I had the facts involved with

that. And it took a considerable time to get truth or the best level of truth that we couldget out of that investigation. (p. 9 -10)

NOTE: Considerable time being two days! Scott was certain. Im sure on the 24 th!This fratricide confirmation was passed up to Nixon, and presumably up the chain of command!

The night after or probably the day after the actual incident [I learned of possibility of fratricide]. I think on the day of the 23 rd I got some indication that there might have

been some fratricide. (p. 2)

Sir, I believe it was on the [23rd?

] 24th

[that I directed Bailey to conduct an initial 15-6](p. 3)

NIXONS NOTIFICATION TO CENTCOM

From IG, p. 12:

The operational chain of command for CPL Tillmans unit was:1. Headquarters, Operations Team [LTC Bailey?]2. Headquarters, 75 th Ranger Regiment [COL Nixon]3. Headquarters, Joint Task Force [GEN McChrystal]

4. CENTCOM [GEN Abizaid]

From IG, p. 59:

COL Nixon failed to initiate, through the chain of command, timely notification to CENTCOM of suspected friendly fire in CPL Tillmans death.

From IG, p.26:

without timely notification that friendly fire was suspected, GEN Abiziad and his staff at CENTCOM could not convene a legal investigation as required .

From IG, p. 43:

COL Nixon compartmented the information flow to prevent outside communication this meant that the people that needed to know in 2 nd Ranger Battalion, the Ranger Regiment, or the Joint Task Force [McChrystal] were the people [who] continue[d] to beinformed throughout.

NOTE: How could Nixon have failed to notify CENTCOM when McChrystal, the link between Nixon and Abizaid, was informed throughout and notified of fratricide on the23 rd or no later than the 25 th?! Are we to believe McChrystal never told Abizaid?


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, 5-17-08

COLONEL NIXON S FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION(continued

From GEN McChrystal sworn statements (Jones 15-6, AP):

NOTE : Testimony was taped, but defective and unintelligible. How curious this wasthe only Jones interview that was lost.

[Nixon] called me and told me he was going to conduct an investigation into this incident.I told him I agreed an investigation needed to be done and I was comfortable with hisdecision to do an investigation

I was in Qatar when I was told [that possibly fratricide], about a day or two after theincident. [23 rd or 24 th] No more than three days later [25 th]. [Nixon] told me that theysuspected fratricide at that time no later than 25 April. He gave me a brief overview of the situation and told me that based on what he had heard, he believed there was a potentialfor fratricide and was investigating it. I told him that I concurred with him that an initial15-6 investigation was appropriate.

No one has ever shied away from saying this was a fratricide, but we did want to makesure we were correct before we said it. I did send a P4 message to GEN Brown, GENAbizaid, and LTG Kensinger about this, telling them we suspected fratricide, which I can

provide to you

NOTIFICATION TO OTHER GENERALS IN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

AP Lindlaw, 5-13-08:

Col. James Nixon said he recalled telling Kensinger almost immediately [23 rd?] of the possibility of friendly fire. I thought I did notify LTG Kensinger that there was a potentialfor fratricide and that we were beginning an investigation but can not recall the specificconversation.

. . . Nixon also recalled telling Kensingers deputy, BFG Howard Yellen. Yellen hastestified previously that he told Kensinger of the possibility of friendly fire the day after Tillmans death [23 th].


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, 5-17-08

MG MCCHRYSTALS FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION

From the IG Report, Appendix B Chronology (pp. 70 -76):

April 22 nd: The Joint Task Force Chief of Staff COL [?] approvedtransmission of the casualty report of CPL Tillmans death.

April 23 rd: LTC [Bailey] and CSM [Birch] tell COL [Nixon] thathe suspects fratricide and that an investigation was initiated.

COL Nixon calls MG McChrystal to inform him of Tillmans death.

MG McChrystal meeting with GEN Abizaid, tells him Tillman waskilled in action.

April 25 th: No later than April 25, 2004, COL Nixon informs MG McChrystal and BG Yellen that fratricide is suspected and that aninvestigation was initiated. MG McChrystal concurs with this

decision.

April 29 th: MG McChrystal sends a Personal For message to GEN Abizaid, GEN Brown , and GEN Kensinger telling them friendly firewould be the likely outcome of the pending investigation, however, thefratricide should not take away from the valorous Silver Star award.

NOTE: How is it that Nixon knew of probable fratricide on the 23 rd , yet did not tellMcChrystal? Or if McChrystal was told later on the 23 rd, why didnt he update Abiziad?They were both in Qatar for a meeting! Or he could have picked up the phone. How is it

possible McChrystal waited six days to send his P4 if he wanted to timely inform hischain of command?

. . .From IG Report (p.43):

The Joint Task Force Chief of Staff COL [?] approved transmission of the casualty reportof CPL Tillmans death at about 10:30 PM local time, April 22, 2004.

NOTE: There was no need for Nixon to inform McChrystal of Tillmans death on the23rd. McChrystals Chief of Staff would have told him on the 22 nd. Or he would haveseen in on CNN!

From IG Report (p. 47):

COL Nixon failed to comply with the requirements of AR 600-8-1 in not ensuring that asupplemental casualty report was filed as soon as he suspected friendly fire.

NOTE: If you examine the Casualty Reporting and Next of Kin Notification Proccesstimeline (IG, p. 80), the Joint Task Force Chief of Staff COL [?] was responsible for submitting a supplemental casualty report and never did. Its also noted that bothMcChrystal and COL [?] were aware of friendly fire as early as [NLT] 25 April 2004.(Wallace report claims supplemental casualty report was Kensingers responsibility).


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MG MCCHRYSTALS FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION(continued)

. . .

From GEN Browns testimony (Jones 15-6, AQ):

[McChrystal?] called shortly after perhaps a few days after the death to say that itwas a possibility that this was a friendly fire incident and that he was investigating.

From Waxman transcript of August 1, 2007 hearing:

Question: But the actual investigation was begun promptly is that correct? GENBrown: That is my understanding from Gen. McChrystal. He called me the day [23rd?]that he was going to initiate the 15-6. (p.122)

. . .


No one has ever shied away from saying this was a fratricide, but we did want to makesure we were correct before we said it. I did send a P4 message to GEN Brown, GENAbizaid, and LTG Kensinger about this, telling them we suspected fratricide, which I can

provide to you


GEN Abizaid: Clearly, Gen. McChrystal knew by the 28 th that there was a high probability that there was friendly fire. When I discovered the problem, I relayed itto the Chairman [Meyers] in as timely a manner as I could, given the circumstances. Gene. McChrystal reported the incident in a forthright and timely fashion. (p. 142 -143)

so again Gen McChrystal did exactly the right thing. He sent a timely message in atimely fashion through the most secure channels. (p. 155)

NOTE : McChrystal knew on the 23 rd (NLT 25 th) of fratricide yet it was timely to wait6 days to send a P4 instead of merely picking up a phone to call Abizaid?

Recipients of P4 already knew about fratricide and investigation. (McChrystal had alreadycalled Brown a week earlier). The only news was that the Silver Star was going through.

It appears to me that the P4s purpose was just to cover McChrystals butt by providing a paper trail that even knowing about the fratricide he still felt the Silver Star was deserved.If pressed, he could show that he had informed his superiors.


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, 5-17-08

GENERAL ABIZAID S FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION

From IG, Appendix B, Chronology (pp. 70 76):





May 16 th: Some time between May 16 and 20, Abizaid receives the P4message transmitted by MG McChrystal on April 29, 2004.

NOTE: How is it that Nixon knew of probable fratricide on the 23 rd , yet did not tellMcChrystal? Or if McChrystal was told later on the 23 rd, why didnt he updateAbiziad? They were both in Qatar for a meeting!

. . .From IG Report (p. 24):

On interview with us, GEN Abizaid testified that MG McChrystal informed him of CPLTillmans death while they were in Qatar for a meeting at the time CPL Tillman was killed.GEN Abizaid said that the action resulted in other casualties, but he received no details anddid not know friendly fire was suspected.

GEN Abizaid told us there was a delay of 10-20 days in his receipt of the (P4) message because he was in Iraq.

From Waxman transcript of August 1, 2007:

GEN Abizaid: I believe about the 23 rd, GEN McChrystal called me and told me thatCorporal Tillman had been killed in combat, and that the circumstances surrounding hisdeath were heroic. I called the Chairman and discussed that with the Chairman. (p. 23)

From 1/15/07 Written Response to Waxman Committee:

When General McChrystal called on or about 23 April he did not mention any possibilityof friendly fire. He told me that Corporal Tillman had been killed in a fire fight inAfghanistan.

From Waxman transcript of August 1, 2007:The incident took place on the 22 nd. The chain of command[Meyers/Rumsfeld/President?], through me [Abizaid], was notified of CPL Tillmansdeath. (p. 154)


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, 5-17-08

GENERAL ABIZAID S FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION(continued)


Note: testimony taped, but defective and unintelligible (only interview lost!)

GEN McChrystal: I was in Qatar when I was told [that possibly fratricide], about a dayor two after the incident [23 rd or 24 th]. No more than three days later. [Nixon] told me thatthey suspected fratricide at that time no later than 25 April. He gave me a brief overviewof the situation and told me that based on what he had heard, he believed there was a

potential for fratricide and was investigating it. I told him that I concurred with him thatan initial 15-6 investigation was appropriate.

NOTE: Did Abizaid meet with McChrystal in Qatar or talk on the telephone?How does Abizaid go from received no details to heroic death?How is it possible that McChrystal did not tell Abizaid of possible fratricide and

investigation on the 23rd

after he was told by Nixon? Both in Qatar!

From 1/15/07 Written Response to Waxman Committee:

While in Afghanistan, did anyone inform you that Corporal Tillmans death was a possiblefratricide? Answer: NO

Did anyone inform you that Corporal Tillmans death was a possible fratricide at any time prior to your receipt of the P4 memo? Answer: NO

Did you inform anyone else that Corporal Tillmans death was a possible fratricide prior toyour receipt of the P4 memo? Answer: NO

. . . probably the sixth [of May, Abizaid received the P4] (p. 24)

the sixth is the logical day. It is not the day; the day is somewhere between 10 and20 days [5/2 to 5/12] after the event. (p. 157)

probably the sixth [of May after reading the P4] I [Abizaid] called the Chairman[Meyers]. I told the Chairman about having received McChrystals message that friendlyfire was involved. (p. 24) I [Abizaid] contacted General Myers. And my responsibility is to report to the Secretary[Rumsfeld] through the Chairman. I said it is clear there is a possibility of fratricideinvolving the Tillman case; that Gen. McChrystal has appointed the necessary people toinvestigate to determine precisely what happened; and that while it is likely that there isfratricide, we will know for sure after the report is finalized (p.24)


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, 5-17-08

GENERAL ABIZAID S FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION(continued)

NOTE : McChrystal has appointed the necessary people to investigate and possibilityof fratricide is not in the P4 memo! The P4 refers to a 15-6 investigation nearing

completion Instead, Abizaids response sounds like the 4/24 phone call from GENMcChrystal to GEN Brown: possibility that this was a friendly fire he [McChrystal]was investigating.

I [Abizaid] said [to Meyers after receiving P4] that it was important that the leadershipknow. And between the Chairman [Meyers] and me I mean, its clear that the leadershipup above us is the Secretary and the President. (p. 155)

. . .

On the 28 th [of May] I approved the report that came from Gen. McChrystals command

as being definite proof of friendly fire. (p135)

I dont recall mentioning it to the President except perhaps after the period where I signedoff on the report that said it was absolutely friendly fire. Once we confirmed the friendlyfire, which was on the 28 th. (p. 76)


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, 5-17-08

GENERAL MEYERS FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION

From IG, Appendix B, Chronology (pp. 70 -76):

April 23rd

: LTC [Bailey] and CSM [Birch] tell COL [Nixon] thathe suspects fratricide and that an investigation was initiated.




. . .May 16 th: Some time between May 16 and 20, Abizaid receives the P4

message transmitted by MG McChrystal on April 29, 2004.. . .


I [Abizaid] believe about the 23 rd, GEN McChrystal called me and told me that CorporalTillman had been killed in combat, and that the circumstances surrounding his death wereheroic. I called the Chairman [Meyers] and discussed that with the Chairman. (p. 23)

. . .

probably the sixth [of May after reading the P4] I [Abizaid] called the Chairman[Meyers]. I told the Chairman about having received McChrystals message that friendlyfire was involved. (p. 24)

I [Abizaid] contacted General Myers [about sixth]. And my responsibility is to report tothe Secretary [Rumsfeld] through the Chairman. I said it is clear there is a possibility of fratricide involving the Tillman case; that Gen. McChrystal has appointed the necessary

people to investigate to determine precisely what happened; and that while it is likely thatthere is fratricide, we will know for sure after the report is finalized (p.24)

. . .

GEN Meyers: I cant recall specifically, but it is entirely likely that it is exactly as he[Abizaid] recalls it.

GEN Meyers: What I would normally do, if I thought the Secretary [Rumsfeld] did notknow that, I would so inform the Secretary. I cannot recall whether or not I did that. (p.29)


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, 5-17-08

SECRETARY RUMSFELD FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION


April 23rd

: LTC [Bailey] and CSM [Birch] tell COL [Nixon] thathe suspects fratricide and that an investigation was initiated.




May 16 th: Some time between May 16 and 20, GEN Abizaid receives the P4message transmitted by MG McChrystal on April 29, 2004.

. . .

GEN Abizaids testimony from Waxman transcript of August 1, 2007 hearing:

I believe about the 23 rd, GEN McChrystal called me and told me that Corporal Tillmanhad been killed in combat, and that the circumstances surrounding his death were heroic. Icalled the Chairman [Meyers] and discussed that with the Chairman. (p. 23)

. . .The incident took place on the 22 nd. The chain of command[Meyers/Rumsfeld/President?], through me, was notified of CPL Tillmans death. (p.154)

. . .

probably the sixth [of May after reading the P4] I called the Chairman [Meyers]. Itold the Chairman about having received McChrystals message that friendly fire wasinvolved. (p. 24)

I contacted General Myers. And my responsibility is to report to the Secretary[Rumsfeld] through the Chairman. I said it is clear there is a possibility of fratricideinvolving the Tillman case; that Gen. McChrystal has appointed the necessary people toinvestigate (p.24)

I said [to Meyers after receiving P4] that it was important that the leadership know.And between the Chairman [Meyers] and me I mean, its clear that the leadership upabove us is the Secretary and the President. (p. 155)

. . .


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, 5-17-08

SECRETARY RUMSFELD FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION(continued)

Testimony from transcript of Waxman August 1, 2007 hearing:

GEN Meyers: What I would normally do, if I thought the Secretary [Rumsfeld] did notknow that, I would so inform the Secretary. I cannot recall whether or not I did that. (p.29)

I [Abizaid] did not talk to the Secretary [Rumsfeld] that I can recall directly about it untilI was back in D.C. Around the time period of the 18 th to the 20 th. And at the time Iinformed him that there was an investigation that was ongoing, and it looked like it wasfriendly fire. (p. 26)

From Waxman Report 7-14-08:

Yet when asked by the Defense Department IG whether he spoke with the Secretary uponlearning of the fratricide, General Abizaid stated, No. I didnt speak to the Secretary of Defense about it.

NOTE: Abizaid told Waxmans committee that he told Rumsfeld between May 18 th and20 th. Yet he previously testified that he never spoke to Rumsfeld about it!

. . .

Testimony from transcript of Waxman August 1, 2007 hearing:

Davis: Do you remember when you learned that this was a possible fratricide?

Rumsfeld: Well, I dont remember. he assumes I was told on or after May20 th. Whether I was told before that, I just dont have any recollection. I dont recall when I was told, and I dont recall who told me (p.32-33)

I [Rumsfeld] simply do not know when I first learned of the possibility of fratricide (p157)

I [Rumsfeld] dont remember precisely how I learned that he was killed. It could have been internally, or it could have been through the press. (p. 30)

From Rumsfeld Letter to Waxman 7-26-07:

I am told I received word of this development sometime after May 20, 2004, but myrecollection reflects the fact that it occurred well over two years ago. As a result, I do notrecall when I first learned about the possibility that Corporal Tillmans death might haveresulted from fratricide.


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, 5-17-08

SECRETARY RUMSFELD FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION(continued)

From Waxman Interview Col Bucci 9-20-07:

Col Bucci, who returned to the Secretarys personal office on Monday, May 24, 2004 Sometime during that week [5/24 5/29], he said he received a call you need to letthe Secretary know. he shared this information with Secretary Rumsfeld within 15minutes . And it was clear to me from his reaction that this was the first timeanyone had heard anything about it being a fratricide.

NOTE: Did Rumsfeld learn about the fratricide by Abizaid between the 18 th and 20 th (or not at all from Abizaid) or from Bucci between the 24 th and 29 th? Id assume he actuallywas told much sooner, a month before!


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, 5-17-08

GENERAL KENSINGER S FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION



COL Nixon calls MG McChrystal to inform him of Tillmans death.April 25 th: No later than April 25, 2004, COL Nixon informs MG McChrystal

and BG Yellen that fratricide is suspected and than aninvestigation was initiated. MG McChrystal concurs with thisdecision.


. . .AP Laidlaw, 5-13-08:


. . . Nixon also recalled telling Kensingers deputy, BFG Howard Yellen. Yellen hastestified previously that he told Kensinger of the possibility of friendly fire the day after Tillmans death [23 th].

From IG, p 39:

BG Yellen testified that COL Nixon advised him of CPL Tillmans death on April 23,2004, and the initiation of an investigation into friendly fire about 24 hours later [24 th]. BGYellen stated that he informed LTG Kensinger about the initiation of an investigation thatsame day that he learned of it from COL Nixon.

From IG, p. 44:

LTG Kensingers Deputy Commander [Yellen] informed him [Kensinger] onapproximately April 25, 2004, that friendly fire was suspected, after receiving notice fromCOL Nixon.

From IG, p.25:

Evidence established that no later than April 25, 2004, COL Nixon notified BG HowardYellen who in turn notified LTG Kensinger of suspected fratricide.

. . .

From GEN Kensingers testimony (Jones 15-6, AN):It was mentioned this was a possible fratricide on 4 May, and that they were going todo an investigation.


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, 5-17-08

GENERAL YELLENS FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION



COL Nixon calls MG McChrystal to inform him of Tillmans death. April 25 th: No later than April 25, 2004, COL Nixon informs MG McChrystal


. . .AP Laidlaw, 5-13-08:


From IG, p 39:

BG Yellen testified that COL Nixon advised him of CPL Tillmans death on April 23,2004, and the initiation of an investigation into friendly fire about 24 hours later [ 24th ].BG Yellen stated that he informed LTG Kensinger about the initiation of an investigationthat same day that he learned of it from COL Nixon.

From IG, p. 44:

LTG Kensingers Deputy Commander [Yellen] informed him [Kensinger] onapproximately April 25, 2004, that friendly fire was suspected, after receiving notice fromCOL Nixon. Nixon also recalled telling Kensingers deputy, BG Howard Yellen.Yellen has testified previously that he told Kensinger of the possibility of friendly fire theday after [23 rd] Tillmans death.

From IG, p.25:

Evidence established that no later than April 25, 2004, COL Nixon notified BG Howard

Yellen who in turn notified LTG Kensinger of suspected fratricide.. . .

From GEN Yellens testimony (Jones 15-6, AO):

It was just a few days after the incident. I mean, [Nixon] called me and said Well,were doing the investigation. We think it may be friendly fire, was his theory. And hesaid hed get back to me and he told me he had put [Scott] as the investigating officer(p.1)


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, 5-17-08

GENERAL BROWNS S FRATRICIDE NOTIFICATION



COL Nixon calls MG McChrystal to inform him of Tillmans death. April 25 th: No later than April 25, 2004, COL Nixon informs MG McChrystal



. . .

From GEN Browns testimony (Jones 15-6, AQ):

[McChrystal] called shortly after perhaps a few days after the death to say that it wasa possibility that this was a friendly fire incident and that he was investigating.


Question: But the actual investigation was begun promptly is that correct?

Brown: That is my understanding from Gen. McChrystal. He called me the day [April23rd?] that he was going to initiate the 15-6. (p. 122)


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Transcript of General McChrystals June 2 nd 2009Senate Confirmation Hearing Testimony:

armed-services.se http://nate.gov/Transcripts/2009/06%20June/09-36%20-%206-2-09.pdf
http://opt/scribd/conversion/tmp/scratch8/%20http:/armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2009/06%20June/09-36%20-%206-2-09.pdfhttp://opt/scribd/conversion/tmp/scratch8/%20http:/armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2009/06%20June/09-36%20-%206-2-09.pdf


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SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEESCONFIRMATION OF GENERAL MCCHRYSTAL

(JUNE 2 nd 2009)

Summary of Newspaper Coverage of Senate Hearing:

Note: This section is largely edited & rearranged quotes from various newspapers articles, withno specific annotation provided. My following response was written hastily after the hearing.[Postscript 9-01-09: My response has been updated using the transcript of the Senate Hearingnow available from the Armed Services Committee website.]

. . .

Unless new information on General McChrystals role in the Tillman episode emerges betweennow [5-26-09] and his confirmation hearing, the question is not expected to figure heavily in theSenate debate, Congressional officials said. Congressional officials said senators would have toexplain why they confirmed him then [May 2008] but were challenging his qualifications now toreceive a fourth star and take over the Afghan mission absent new disclosures.

In his first public testimony before a congressional committee, McChrystal testified about hishandling of the aftermath of Tillmans death. Yesterday's hearing was the first to address suchconcerns, because the Senate held a closed executive [secret] session last spring [5-15-08] toconfirm McChrystal in his current position as director of the Pentagon's Joint Staff

Note: Its curious that both Chairmen Levin and McChrystal both mentioned this secret hearingat the beginning of their remarks:

From Chairman Senator Levins opening remarks (p. 3 transcript) You [McChrystal]may want to address the Tillman matter in your opening statement. Both subjectswere discussed in executive session of the Armed Services Committee last year inconnection with your nomination to your current position as director of the Joint Staff.

From General McChrystals opening remarks (p. 10 transcript): You gave me the

opportunity to discuss in detail one of those failures, Corporal Pat Tillman, in closedsession with this committee a year ago, in advance of my confirmation as Director of theJoint Staff, which I appreciated. I stand ready to answer any additional questions youmay have.

Perhaps Levin and McChrystal mentioned the closed hearing to avoid the allegation they werekeeping the existence of the hearing secret? The night before the 6-02-09 hearing, I spoke

briefly with Gary Leeling (legal counsel for Levin). He implicitly confirmed the existence of the


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hearing, but would say nothing further in response to my questions except it was in executivesession.

The senators didn't press McChrystal aggressively during the nearly three-hour hearing, and theSenate is expected to confirm him as early as Thursday. Mary Tillman said, "I think more effort

should have been made on the part of the committee to find out more about his true nature, histrue character and his true actions in terms of the detainee abuse and Pat's situation.

On PBSs NewsHour, David Corn commented:

And so the Pat Tillman questioning, the questioning about detainee abuse, I thoughtseemed very orchestrated and didn't give a full airing to these very, I think, hot-buttonissues. You know, he came up with what sounded to be a plausible explanation, but,again, a lot of what happened today made it clear to me that Democrats and Republicanshad both decided, "He's our guy in Afghanistan

. . .

Mary Tillman criticized Sen. John McCain of Arizona, the ranking Republican on the committee,who questioned McChrystal on Tuesday, for "playing dumb" by not following up onMcChrystal 's explanations.

She also says she declined a personal invitation from McCain to submit questions to him to ask at Tuesday's confirmation hearing. Mary Tillman says she was put off by McCain's publicendorsement of McChrystal and did not want her questions used as part of the confirmation

process.

"If the Army chain of command didn't know what happened to Pat, why did it present us with a

false story" at the memorial service? Tillman asked. "That is not an error; that is not a misstep;that is deliberate deception. "What's very disturbing is that Senator McCain himself was presentat Pat's memorial and I would think he would be outraged that he was not told ahead of time or that he was lied to like everyone else. Did he know all along?"

. . .

Sen. Jim Webb said he had been contacted by members of the Tillman family when

McChrystal's nomination Afghanistan was announced. Sen. James Webb, a Virginia Democrat

who has championed the Tillmans family case, returned to the topic late in the hearing during a

heartfelt exchange in which the Senator chastised the Army for its initial incorrect reports that

Corporal Tillman was killed in an insurgent ambush, and not by fire from his own Ranger unit.

Note: Senator Webb has never spoken with Mary Tillman. Mary has spoken only with Gordon

Peterson (Webbs Military Affairs staff assistant). I mentioned in the previous chapter how

Peterson stone-walled my attempts to learn more about the 2008 Hearing. As a gate keeper, he

probably never passed on my letters to Senator Webb.
http://topics.cnn.com/topics/Stanley_McChrystalhttp://topics.cnn.com/topics/Stanley_McChrystalhttp://topics.cnn.com/topics/Stanley_McChrystal


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Sen. Jim Webb pressed McChrystal, prompting the general to agree that the Army had failed theTillman family, "You failed to properly notify the family of the investigation and theinaccuracies," "You have not been on the record, and I don't know how you feel about it."

. . .

General McChrystal denied the phony narrative of a raging firefight was anything more sinister than "mistakes" made to honor the famous GI. "They were well-intentioned" but created "doubtand the sense of mistrust.. "I didn't see any activity by anyone to deceive," he said.

McChrystal said the Army's handling of the case "produced confusion at a tragic time, and I'mvery sorry for that." "I was a part of that, and I apologize for it.. "I would do this differently if Ihad the chance again," "There is nothing we can do to automatically restore the trust which wasthe second casualty. "We failed the family. And I was a part of that." He earlier expressed his"deepest condolences" to Tillman's family and fellow rangers.

. . .

McChrystal said there was speculation early on that Tillman was killed by friendly fire, but thathe and others were waiting for the outcome of an "initial review" [Scotts 4/29/04 15-6?] beforecoming forward with that information [sending P4?]. "It was a well-intended intent to get somelevel of proof before we went out," he said.

Within days of the incident, McChrystal approved a Silver Star for Tillman, signing off on acitation praising his valor "in the line of devastating enemy fire. Asked whether he believed thatTillman earned the Silver Star before his death, Sir, I absolutely do. I did then; I do now Idon't believe that the circumstance of death detracts from the courage and commitment of hiscontribution.

My own mistakes in not reviewing the Silver Star citation well enough and making sure that Icompared it to the message [P4 memo] that I sent were mistakes. They were well intentioned, butthey created, they added to the doubt and the sense of mistrust. And we didn't get it right.McChrystal said the Silver Star citation was "not well written" and could have left theimpression that Tillman was not killed by fratricide.

What we have learned since is, it is better to take your time, make sure you get everything right

with the award, and not rush it. And I'm very sorry for that, because I understand that the

outcome produced a perception that I don't believe was at all involved, at least in the forces that

were forward.

. . .

Mary Tillman says she neither accepts nor believes McChrystal's apology


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"McChrystal was lying," she said of his comments Tuesday. "He said he didn't know for certainPat was killed by fratricide. That isn't true in and of itself, but the fact is, it doesn't matter whether he knew it for certain." Army protocol at the time required families to be told of

possible fratricide, whether or not it had been confirmed, she said.

"The whole point was to lie to the public," Tillman's mother Mary told ESPN.

. . .

My Response to General McChrystals Testimony :

1. McChrystal said that he first learned of suspected fratricide and the 15-6 investigation after returning back to Afghanistan from a meeting in Qatar with General Abizaid on about April 23 rd :

Corporal Tillman was killed on the 22 nd of April I arrived back into Afghanistan from ameeting in Qatar with General Abizaid on about the 23 rd , and I was informed, at that point, that they suspected that friendly fire might have been the cause of death, and that they had initiated what we call a 15-6, or an investigation of that. (p.18 transcript)

But during the Jones 15-6 McChrystal said that he "was in Qatar when I was told, abouta day or two after the incident NLT the 25th...". [OK, that matches the 23 rd, but was he inQatar or Afghanistan?].

During his DoD IG interview General Abizaid said "Gen McChrystal informed him of

CPL Tillman's death while they were in Qatar in a meeting .... he received no details anddid not know friendly fire was suspected." [So we're supposed to believe McChrystaldidn't tell Abizaid about fratricide while they were together in Qatar on the same day! Or,Abizaid lied about not being told about fratricide.]

And during his Congressional testimony on 8-01-07, General Abizaid said "on about the23rd, Gen McChrystal called me and told me that CPL Tillman had been killed in combatand that the circumstances his death were heroic." [So was he told no details or heroic?]

But the DoD IG Chronology (Appendix B) states that after COL Nixon was told of

possible fratricide and the 15-6 on the 23rd, Nixon only told McChrystal of the "death" of Tillman and then McChrystal told Abizaid only about Tillman's "death". [ButMcChrystal said on Tuesday hearing he was told of fratricide on the 23 rd! McChrystaleither failed to tell Abizaid about fratricide, or Abizaid lied about not being informedabout it. And Nixon lied about telling McChyrstal about Tillmans death and/or McChrystal lied about Nixon telling him only of death.]

So, McChrystal, Nixon, and/or Abiziad lied about when they learned about suspectedfratricide during their interviews with the DoD Inspector General and before Congress.


31/69

A look at their IG interviews would be illuminating and resolve this question [ScottLaidlaw at AP got these interviews through FOIA, but I havent seen them].

2.) McChrystal said there was speculation early on that Tillman was killed by friendly fire, but that he and others were waiting for the outcome of an "initial review" [Scotts 4/29 15-6] beforecoming forward with that information [sending P4]:

And so, we initially were waiting for the outcome of that initial review [CPT Scotts 15-6]before we went forward with any conclusions. So, it was a well-intended intent to get some level of truth before we went up. (p. 18 transcript)

There was never anything speculative or potential or "suspected" about Tillmansfriendly fire death. The Rangers on the ground being shot at knew immediately what hadhappened. On the 23 rd word was passed up 70% sure by the CSM to LTC Bailey and

on to COL Nixon. And on the 24th

, the initial investigating officer CPT Scott passed onverbal confirmation (Im certain, Im sure) to LTC Bailey, who then called COL Nixon(McChrystal was next in the chain of command).

McChrystal knew of confirmed FF just two days after Tillmans death! (If this isntsome level of proof, what is?) Or, are we to believe Nixon never told McChrystal of confirmation during the following days they were working together on the Silver Star

package?

McChrystals outcome of an initial review refers to CPT Scotts 15-6 Final Reportdated April 29 th. Isnt it curious the 29 ths the same date as McChrystals P4? And

further, that Nixon only officially appointed Scott on the 29th

as well? Why? Perhaps,McChrystal could say he just got some emerging evidence and started the investigationafter he approved the Silver Star on the 29 th? And then CPT Scotts April 29th 15-6report literally disappeared!

3.) McChrystal said that he sent his P4 message to inform his chain of command that hebelieved friendly fire was a possibility before the memorial service which in retrospect lookscontradictory. (After the Wallace report came out, McChrystal was praised by the Secretary of the Army for acting "reasonably and quickly" by sending his timely P4 memo to alert his

superiors on the 29 th):

I also sent a message informing my chain of command that we believed it was fratricide, and we did that when we were told there were going to be fairly high-profile memorial services.

And when I sent the message, the intent entirely was to inform everyone up my chain of command so that nobody would be surprised. (p. 18 transcript).

During the hearing McChrystal said he was told of suspected fratricide and the 15-6investigation on the 23 rd . Yet he didnt send out his P4 until the 29 th? How is waiting six


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that was not well written and, although I went through the process, I will tell you now I didnt review the citation well enough to capture or, I didnt catch that if you read it, you can implythat it was not friendly fire. (p.18 transcript)

Absolute bull. The IG report discussion section (Appendix E) on the Silver Star concluded that anyone reading the citation would assume Tillman was killed by enemyfire: we concluded that an uninformed reader could reasonably infer that CPLTillman had been killed by enemy fire although a careful review of the narrative andcitation show no direct assertion that he was killed by enemy fire. As a result, thenarrative justification and citation were misleading. (p.55 IG report)

In fact, Maj. Hodne even said that he edited the narrative to ensure it didn't mentionfriendly fire!: Maj.[Hodne] testified that he carefully prepared the narrative to avoidstating that the enemy had killed CPL Tillman and distinctly remembered removing a

phrase asserting that CPL Tillman died by enemy fire. (p.51 IG report).

And the witness statements were altered by "someone in the approval chain" (i.e. Nixon,McChrystal, and/or Kauzerlich). PFC [ONeal] stated that he did not sign the valorousaward witness statement .. also pointed out parts he knows he did not write and parts thatwere not accurate. Sgt [Weeks?] also pointed out parts that were inaccurate, in thathe was unable to see CPL Tillmans actions from his location. IG Gimble preferred notto speculate as to who was responsible while testifying before the House OversightCommittee in April 2007.! we were not able to identify the specific drafter. (p.53IG report).

General McChrystal should not be confirmed as a four star general. First, he's got to learn howto prevaricate better (or follow General Meyers or Secretary Rumsfelds example from the April2007 House hearing of simply saying, I dont recall). Or, he shouldve just stuck to his story.Don't change it, keep it simple. McChrystal's testimony yesterday at the Senate hearing showsthat he and/or General Abiziad lied during their testimony before Congress.

Yesterday's Senate hearing was just the final layer of fertilizer upon the high mound of Armyand Congressional "investigations" of Tillman's death. The hypocrisy of the Senators isdisgusting. It's a travesty of justice that Pat Tillman's family were handed a tarnished Silver Star,while General McChrystal will be confirmed, promoted to the highest rank in the Army, andhanded his fourth star.

And its a further travesty that Thom Shanker, Washington Pentagon Reporter for The New York Times, had the initial version of this book the week before the hearing and did nothing with it,especially since he had just written a May 26 th article clearing General McChrystal of anywrongdoing in the handling of the Tillman case!

[For more information on the hearing, see my 9-11-09 binder sent to the NYT Public Editor Clark Hoyt, Lies, Denials, Dissembling, Distortions Borne Out by Facts If Not the Truth]


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LIES BORNE OUT BY FACTS IF NOT THE TRUTH

APPENDIX B:

EMAIL EXCHANGES BETWEENTHOM SHANKER (NYT PENTAGON REPORTER)

& GUY MONTAG

WEDNESDAY 5/27/09 about 9PM:

Thom Shanker,

I just read your May 26 th article, Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions inTillmans Case.

This past week Ive been working on a long letter to Senator James Webb. I write that Congressand the senior leadership of the Army have shielded General McChrystal from close scrutiny and

protected him from punishment. I review and critique Senator Webbs Armed ServicesCommittee review, General Wallaces review, and Congressman Waxmans House Oversight &

Reform Committee investigation.

Id like to send you a copy of my letter. My letter discusses in some detail every point raised inyour article. In addition, Ive uncovered new information about the Tillman case not mentionedat all in your article.

Heres a preview of some of the information (without details or documentation):

1. Senator Webb did a thorough review last year of the aftermath of the Tillman fratricide atthe request of Chairman Carl Levin for the Senate Armed Service Committee. (In retrospect, Irealize this was part of the vetting process for McChrystals confirmation last year as Director of

the Joint Staff). Webb mentioned this review May 27th

2008 on the Diane Rhem NPR radioshow (about 40 minutes into show). When I tried to follow up, Webbs Military Affairs aide,Gordon Peterson, stonewalled me and referred me to Gary Leeling 202-224-9339 (legal counselfor Senator Levin)

2.) Congressman Waxman invited McChrystal to testify on August 1 st 2007. The Committee permited McChrystal to decline to appear at the hearing despite his key role in notifying senior


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WEDNESDAY 5/27/09 10:39 PM:

Please feel free to send me your material, as I would be eager to review it. Above is my direct e-

mail address. Thanks for writing.

Regards,Thom

THURSDAY 5/28/09 7:27 AM:

Thom,

Thanks for sending your direct contact info.

Ive just finished up things (a bit of a all-nighter!)

Could you also send me the best snail mail address to send you a package tomorrow? I wouldlike to send you my material in a binder by Fed Ex, hopefully get to you by Friday. And a hardcopy form would be easier for you to read thru.

But, Ill send you my Word documents in the morning.

THURSDAY 5/28/09 8:07 AM:

Thom,

Here is a download of the Appendices material that I wrote included in Did They Teach You toLie Yet? Ill send the rest in a hardcopy form.

I tried to condense a lot of my information into the Timeline of Tillman Fratricide Notification.

FRIDAY 7:25 AM:

Thom Shanker,

I sent my document Did They Teach You to Lie Yet? by Fed Ex yesterday afternoon. Itssupposed to get to your office around 10:30 Friday morning. This is a hard-copy of what Iemailed yesterday, with a numbered Table of Contents and the full set of appendices. .


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FRIDAY 5/29/09 8:14 AM:

I very much look forward to reviewing you documentary file this weekend, and I thank you for sending it.

Regards,Thom

FRIDAY 5/29/09 2:42 PM:

Thom, I just checked Fed Express. My package was delivered this morning at 9:38 AM. Just thoughtI'd pass this information on in case the package hasn't yet made it to your desk.

FRIDAY 5/29/09 3:59 PM:

Yes, it arrived. I will review your documents this weekend. Thanks.

SATURDAY 5/30/09 6:59 AM:

Thom Shanker, I overlooked your graphic showing a timeline of McChrystal's role in the aftermath of Tillman'sdeath. If you look in my Appendices, I've included a "Timeline of Tillman Notification" whichcompares the IG timeline to my own (my Fratricide Notes has supporting details). I just wantedto point out a couple corrections: 1.) April 23rd, Nixon is told Tillman "may have" been killed by own troops. He informsMcChrystal:

"may have": CSM Birch was "70% sure", LTC Bailey was "certain".

"informs McChrystal": According to the IG chronology, Nixon tells McChrystal only of "death". I overlooked this at first, but according to the IG timeline, Nixon didn't mention

potential fratricide to McChrystal, and then McChrystal told Abizaid only of "death"! Not likely.


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And if McChrystal did learn of fratricide on the 23rd and told Abizaid, then Abiziad liedin testimony before the IG and Congress. (A look at the IG interviews of Nixon,McChrystal, and Abizaid might be illuminating).

2.) May 16th, "investigation concludes Tillman killed by friendly fire:

This is the 2nd 15-6 investigation by LTC Hodne. The first 15-6 was done by CPT Scottwho verbally passed confirmation of FF to LTC Bailey on the 24th who passed it ontoCOL Nixon. CPT Scott submitted his "15-6 Final Report" on April 29th concludingfriendly fire. Nixon said this report was only a "draft:. (Scott's 15-6 disappeared, there isno copy! Although the IG said they managed to reconstruct it somehow.)

You noted that the "Source" for the graphic is the DoD IG and the report of General Wallace.Do you have a copy of the Wallace Report. I wasn't able to find it. I'd appreciate yousending me a copy if possible.

Thanks,

MONDAY 6/1/09 06:33 AM:

Thom Shanker, I just read today's NYT editorial "Questions for General McChrystal."

Why isn't there any mention of McChrystal's role in the handling of the Tillman case? Therewasn't one, except perhaps an obscure reference in the last line "The overall performance of theSpecial Operations Command under General McChrystal's leadership -- both acts of heroism andacts of abuse -- ...".

Will the NYT be publishing a follow up to your May 26th article before the confirmationhearing? Sincerely,

MONDAY 6/1/09 6:56 AM:

As such a careful reader of the paper, you are no doubt aware of the strict and importantinstitutional divide between the newsroom and those who write editorials. Thus, any questionabout an editorial should be directed to The Times editorial board, and not to a newsroomreporter.

Do you have any sense at all that Senators will be pressing on the Tillman case?


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Again, thanks for the very detailed and voluminous file you sent. It was very well researched andquite thorough.

Regards,

Thom

MONDAY 6/1/09 11:08 AM:

Thom, Thanks for pointing out the separation of newsroom and editorial board. Obvious, in retrospect. Do I have any sense that the Senators will be pressing on the Tillman case? I don't see why theywould bring up the subject. They'll probably just ask a few questions about "enhancedinterrogation" at Camp Nama (sp?) in Iraq which will go nowhere. If Tillman is mentioned,they'll probably say he's gotten cleared by Wallace etc (without mentioning Senator Webb'sreview last year). Could you please answer my question? Are you going to publish a follow-up to your May 26th

piece based on my document or any other information you've received? If not, why not? Whydid you even bother to raise questions about McChrystal and Tillman in your May 26th article? Sincerely,

MONDAY 6/1/09 11:10 AM:

David,

At this point there will not be a follow-on story on the Tillman investigation prior to the hearing,although we will see what the hearing brings up tomorrow.

Regards,Thom

MONDAY 6-01-09 2:00 PM (sent many several NYT email addresses):

June 1 st 2009

New York Times Editorial Board,

I was surprised that your editorial today, Questions for General McChrystal, did not mentionGeneral McChrystals role in the aftermath of Pat Tillmans fratricide.


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Ive been corresponding with Thom Shanker, your NYT Pentagon correspondent, since lastWednesday in reference to his May 26th article Nomination of US Afghan Commander RevivesQuestions in Tillmans Case. Last Thursday, I FedExed my 100 page document to himdetailing new disclosures of General McChrystals central role in the whitewash of Tillmansdeath.

However, it doesnt appear that Thom Shanker is following up with another article. I think the NYT editorial board would find it useful to speak with him and get a copy of this document before tomorrows June 2 nd confirmation hearing of General McChrystal before the SenateArmed Services Committee (or read my letters below and attachments).

Below, you can read my May 27 th letter to Thom Shanker and my letter to Senator Webb. If youwould like more information, Ive also attached many of the documents in the package I sentto Thom Shanker.

Feel free to contact me with any questions. Unfortunately, I wont be able to respond to emails

until after 9 PM since my home computer is out (until my wife gets home with her laptop). But,Ill be home most of the day if you wish to call my home phone.

Sincerely,

. . .

No emails sent or received between Tuesday 6-02-09 and 6-05-09

. . .

FRIDAY 6-05-09 9:11 PM: Thom Shanker, First, I thought Id pass on my comments about General McChrystals testimony at hisconfirmation hearing. For what it matters, General McChrystal just dug himself a deeper holewith his own words on Tuesday:

1. McChrystal said that he first learned of suspected fratricide and 15-6 investigation after returning back to Afghanistan from a meeting in Qatar with General Abizaid on about April23 rd:

During the Jones 15-6 McChrystal said that he "was in Qatar when I was told, about aday or two after the incident ...". [OK, that matches the 23 rd, but was he in Qatar or Afghanistan?].


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During his DoD IG interview General Abizaid said "Gen McChrystal informed him of CPL Tillman's death while they were in Qatar in a meeting .... he received no details anddid not know friendly fire was suspected." [So we're supposed to believe McChrystaldidn't tell Abizaid about fratricide while they were together in Qatar on the same day! Or Abizaid lied about not being told about fratricide.]

During his Congressional testimony on 8-01-07, General Abizaid said "on about the 23rd,Gen McChrystal called me and told me that CPL Tillman had been killed in combat andthat the circumstances his death were heroic." [So was he told no details or heroic?]

And, the DoD IG Chronology (Appendix B) states that after COL Nixon was told of

possible fratricide and the 15-6 on the 23rd, Nixon only told McChrystal of the "death" of Tillman and then McChrystal told Abizaid only about Tillman's "death". [ButMcChrystal said on Tuesday he was told of fratricide on the 23 rd! McChrystal failed totell Abizaid about fratricide, or Abizaid lied about not being informed about it. And

Nixon or McChrystal lied about only telling about death]

So, McChrystal, Nixon, and/or Abiziad lied about when they learned about suspectedfratricide during their interviews with the DoD Inspector General. A quick check of their IG interviews would be illuminating.

2.) McChrystal testified that he waited for the outcome of the investigation before makingconclusions, he "wanted some level of truth" before he sent the information on a week later withhis P4:

As I wrote to you before, there was never anything potential or "suspected" about

Tillmans friendly fire death. The Rangers on the ground being shot at knewimmediately what had happened. On the 23 rd word was passed up 70% sure by theCSM to LTC Bailey and onto COL Nixon. And on the 24 th, the initial investigatingofficer CPT Scott passed on verbal confirmation (Im certain, Im sure) to LTC Bailey,who then called COL Nixon (McChrystal was next in the chain of command).

McChrystal knew of confirmed FF two days after Tillmans death! Or, are we to believe Nixon never told McChrystal of confirmation during the following days they wereworking together on the Silver Sta r package?

Perhaps McChrystals level of truth refers to CPT Scotts 15-6 Final Report dated

April 29th

. Isnt it curious the 29th

s the same date as the P4? And further that Nixononly officially appointed Scott on the 29 th as well? So McChrystal could say he just gotsome emerging evidence and started the investigation after he approved the Silver Star on the 29 th? And then CPT Scotts 15-6 disappeared!


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3.) General Wallace cleared McChrystal of wrongdoing because McChrystal only signed off onthe Silver Star and had no reasonable basis to question a recommendation by commanders in thefield with firsthand knowledge:

But during Tuesday's hearing, McChrystal said he sat down with theRanger officers (Nixon, Kauzerlich, Hodne, Bailey) and went over Tillman's actions on awhiteboard to satisfy himself that Tillman's actions merited a Silver Star! McChrystalwasn't just signing a piece of paper that dropped on his desk! He was in the field with thecommanders and discussing their firsthand knowledge!

4.) McChrystal said that the Silver Star citation wasn't well written and that he didn't read itclose enough to catch that it could "imply" Tillman wasn't killed by friendly fire:

Absolute bull. The IG concluded that anyone reading the citation would assume Tillmanwas killed by enemey fire. In fact, Maj Hodne even said that he edited the narrrative toensure it didn't mention friendly fire! And the witness statements were altered by

"someone in the approval chain" (i.e. Nixon, McChrystal, and/or Kauzerlich) to removereferences to friendly fire. IG Gimble preferred not to speculate as to who wasresponsible!

Finally, I still dont understand why you didn't write a follow-up to your article last week Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case. You wrote thatUnless new information on General McChrystals role in the episode emerges between now andhis confirmation hearing, set for June 2 nd, the question is not expected to figure heavily in theSenate debate."

Yet, last week I provided you with a copy of my document Did They Teach You To Lie Yet?(with 50 pages of text and 50 pages of Appendices) describing new disclosures aboutMcChrystals role in the Tillman case.

Could you please explain to me why my document wasnt sufficient to prompt you to write afollow-up article? Or at least include some of my information in your June 2nd article about thehearing?

I would welcome any criticism from you of my arguments or facts contained in my document.

Sincerely,

SATURDAY 6-06-09 9:58 AM:


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APPENDIX C:

NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLES ABOUTGENERAL STANLEY MCCHRYSTAL


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Pentagon Ousts Top Commander In Afghan War

By ELISABETH BUMILLER AND THOM SHANKER; ERIC SCHMITT AND JEFF ZELENY CONTRIBUTEDREPORTING.

Published: New York Times May 12, 2009

The top American commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David D. McKiernan, was forced out

Monday in an abrupt shake-up intended to bring a more aggressive and innovative approach to

a worsening seven-year war.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates announced the decision in terse comments at the Pentagon,

saying that ''fresh eyes were needed'' and that ''a new approach was probably in our best interest.''

When asked if the dismissal ended the general's military career, Mr. Gates replied, ''Probably.''

The move reflects a belief that the war in Afghanistan, waged against an increasingly strong

Taliban and its supporters across a rugged, sprawling country, is growing ever more complex.

Defense Department officials said General McKiernan, a respected career armor officer, had

been removed primarily because he had brought too conventional an approach to the challenge.

He is to be replaced by Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal , a former commander of the Joint

Special Operations Command. He served in Afghanistan as chief of staff of military operations

in 2001 and 2002 and recently ran all commando operations in Iraq.

Forces under General McChrystal's command were credited with finding and capturing Saddam

Hussein and with tracking and killing Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in

Mesopotamia. His success in using intelligence and firepower to track and kill insurgents, and

his training in unconventional warfare that emphasizes the need to protect the population, made

him the best choice for the command in Afghanistan, Defense Department officials said.

At the same time, he will be confronted with deep tensions over the conduct of Special

Operations forces in Afghanistan, whose aggressive tactics are seen by Afghan officials as

responsible for many of the American mistakes that have resulted in the deaths of civilians.

Pentagon officials have begun to describe Afghanistan as the military's top priority, even more

important than the war in Iraq. President Obama announced a major overhaul of American

strategy in Afghanistan in March. Planned troop levels are expected to reach more than 60,000

Americans.


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Mr. Gates said General McChrystal would be assisted by a deputy commander, Lt. Gen. David

M. Rodriguez, who is to serve in a new position with responsibility for the day-to-day

management of the war. General Rodriguez had a previous tour in eastern Afghanistan as

commander of the 82nd Airborne.

A West Point graduate from the class of 1976, General McChrystal is himself a Green Beret and

a Ranger, as well as a veteran Special Operations commander. One spot on General

McChrystal's generally sterling military record came in 2007, when a Pentagon

investigation into the accidental shooting death in 2004 of Cpl. Pat Tillman by fellow Army

Rangers in Afghanistan held General McChrystal accountable for inaccurate information

provided by Corporal Tillman's unit in recommending him for a Silver Star.

The information wrongly suggested that Corporal Tillman, a professional football player

whose decision to enlist in the Army after the Sept. 11 attacks drew national attention, had

been killed by enemy fire.

In recent work as director of the Joint Staff, General McChrystal has developed a plan to select a

group of some 400 troops and officers to go back and forth from assignments in the region and

the United States. While at home, the troops and officers would continue in their military jobs

and work on some aspect of Afghan strategy, training or operations. The troops would remain in

the cadre for three to five years, depending on the job. The approach is similar to the way

General McChrystal ran Special Operations forces.

Most troops now deploy to Afghanistan for about a year or less without any formal training in

the region before they go. They often move on to unrelated jobs when their Afghan tours end.

''The idea is to develop a group of people who give you continuity, expertise and relationships.

They know each other plus the people they're going to work with,'' said a senior military official

who has worked closely on the plan. ''As they build relationships among themselves,

relationships with Afghan partners and relationships with Afghan units, their relative

effectiveness is just going to go up.''

The official said that the program, which Admiral Mullen has approved, should be up and

running within 60 days after details are worked out, and its effects would be noticeable in

Afghanistan within six months.


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May 13, 2009 The New York Times

MAN IN THE NEWS: General Steps From Shadow

By ELISABETH BUMILLER AND MARK MAZZETTI

Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the ascetic who is set to become the new top Americancommander in Afghanistan , usually eats just one meal a day, in the evening, to avoidsluggishness.

He is known for operating on a few hours' sleep and for running to and from work whilelistening to audio books on an iPod. In Iraq, where he oversaw secret commando operations for five years, former intelligence officials say that he had an encyclopedic, even obsessive,knowledge about the lives of terrorists, and that he pushed his ranks aggressively to kill as manyof them as possible.

But General McChrystal has also moved easily from the dark world to the light. Fellow officerson the Joint Chiefs of Staff, where he is director, and former colleagues at the Council onForeign Relations describe him as a warrior-scholar, comfortable with diplomats, politicians andthe military man who would help promote him to his new job.

''He's lanky, smart, tough, a sneaky stealth soldier ,'' said Maj. Gen. William Nash, a retiredofficer. ''He's got all the Special Ops attributes, plus an intellect.''

If General McChrystal is confirmed by the Senate, as expected , he will take over the postheld by Gen. David D. McKiernan, who was forced out on Monday. Obama administrationofficials have described the shakeup as a way to bring a bolder and more creative approach to thefaltering war in Afghanistan.

Most of what General McChrystal has done over a 33-year career remains classified, includingservice between 2003 and 2008 as commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, anelite unit so clandestine that the Pentagon for years refused to acknowledge its existence. Butformer C.I.A. officials say that General McChrystal was among those who, with the C.I.A.,

pushed hard for a secret joint operation in the tribal region of Pakistan in 2005 aimed atcapturing or killing Ayman al-Zawahri, Osama bin Laden's deputy.

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld canceled the operation at the last minute, saying it wastoo risky and was based on what he considered questionable intelligence, a move that former intelligence officials say General McChrystal found maddening.

When General McChrystal took over the Joint Special Operations Command in 2003, heinherited an insular, shadowy commando force with a reputation for spurning partnerships withother military and intelligence organizations. But over the next five years he worked hard, hiscolleagues say, to build close relationships with the C.I.A. and the F.B.I. He won praise from


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C.I.A. officers, many of whom had stormy relationships with commanders running the wars inIraq and Afghanistan.

''He knows intelligence, he knows covert action and he knows the value of partnerships,'' saidHenry Crumpton, who ran the C.I.A.'s covert war in Afghanistan after the Sept. 11 attacks.

As head of the command, which oversees the elite Delta Force and units of the Navy Seals,General McChrystal was based at Fort Bragg, N.C. But he spent much of his time in Iraqcommanding secret missions. Most of his operations were conducted at night, but GeneralMcChrystal, described nearly universally as a driven workaholic, was up for most of the day aswell. His wife and grown son remained back in the United States.

General McChrystal was born Aug. 14, 1954, into a military family. His father, Maj. Gen.Herbert J. McChrystal Jr., served in Germany during the American occupation after World War II and later at the Pentagon. General Stanley McChrystal was the fourth child in a family of five

boys and one girl; all of them grew up to serve in the military or marry into it.

''They're all pretty intense,'' said Judy McChrystal, one of General McChrystal's sisters-in-law,who is married to the eldest child, Herbert J. McChrystal III, a former chaplain at the UnitedStates Military Academy at West Point.

General McChrystal graduated from West Point in 1976 and spent the next three decadesascending through conventional and Special Operations command positions as well as taking

postings at Harvard and the Council on Foreign Relations. He was a commander of a GreenBeret team in 1979 and 1980, and he did several tours in the Army Rangers as a staff officer anda battalion commander, including service in the Persian Gulf war of 1991.

One blot on his otherwise impressive military record occurred in 2007, when a Pentagoninvestigation into the accidental shooting death in 2004 of Cpl. Pat Tillman by fellow ArmyRangers in Afghanistan held General McChrystal accountable for inaccurate informationprovided by Corporal Tillman's unit in recommending him for a Silver Star. Theinformation wrongly suggested that Corporal Tillman had been killed by enemy fire.

At the Joint Staff at the Pentagon, where General McChrystal directs the 1,200-member group,he has instituted a daily 6:30 a.m. classified meeting among 25 top officers and, by video,military commanders around the world. In half an hour, the group races through militarydevelopments and problems over the past 24 hours.

Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, brought General McChrystal back to Washington to be his director last August, and the physical proximity served GeneralMcChrystal well, Defense officials said. In recent weeks, Admiral Mullen recommended GeneralMcChrystal to Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates as a replacement for General McKiernan.


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One other thing to know about General McChrystal: when he was a fellow at the Council onForeign Relations in 2000, he ran a dozen miles each morning to the council's offices from hisquarters at Fort Hamilton on the southwestern tip of Brooklyn.

''If you asked me the first thing that comes to mind about General McChrystal,'' said Leslie H.

Gelb, the president emeritus of the council, ''I think of no body fat.''


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THE NEW YORK TIMES

May 15, 2009

Afghan Villagers Describe Chaos of U.S. Strikes

By CARLOTTA GALL and TAIMOOR SHAH

FARAH, Afghanistan The number of civilians killed by the American airstrikes in Farah

Province last week may never be fully known. But villagers, including two girls recovering from

burn wounds, described devastation that officials and human rights workers are calling the worst

episode of civilian casualties in eight years of war in Afghanistan.

We were very nervous and afraid and my mother said, Come quickly, we will go somewhere

and we will be safe, said Tillah, 12, recounting from a hospital bed how women and children

fled the bombing by taking refuge in a large compound, which was then hit.

The bombs were so powerful that people were ripped to shreds. Survivors said they collected

only pieces of bodies. Several villagers said that they could

"Lies Borne Out By Facts, If Not the Truth" Appendices (September 11, 2009)

Documents

Transcript of "Lies Borne Out By Facts, If Not the Truth" Appendices (September 11, 2009)