LIBRARY LONG RANGE, PATROL. -...

14-I LIBRARY

COCEC FT ORO CALIF LONG RANGE, PATROL. ..,. SFP ? (1968

13504 No., ____ _ AD

CONFERENCE; S'U ARY

BY CGUSACD1J,_1 0 AUG 1968 SUBJECT TO GENERAL SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR· INTERVALS I 9. DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER

/

L .HEADQUARTERS. UNITED SUITES ARMY VIETNAM

, APO SAN FRANCISCO 1163715

AVHGB-P

SUBJECT: USARV Long Range Patrol Conference

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. A USARV conference on Long Range Patrolling was held at the MACV Recondo School, Nha Trang, 9 !lnd 10 August 1968. The purpose of the conference was to exchange ideas and lessons learned in order to improve the tactics, techniques and utilization of Long Range Patrols throughout the command.

2. Designated units presented prepared briefings, each of which was followed by a question and answer period. A summary of the briefings to include main points brought out during the question and answer periods is appended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

3 Incls 1. List of Attendees (U) 2. Agenda (U) 3. Summary of Briefings (C)

.............. FRANK H. LINNELL Brigadier General, US Army Acting Chief of Staff

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED when separated from CLASSIFIED .iJlclosure

AVHGB-P SUBJECT: USARV Long Range Patrol Conference

DISTRIB UTION: COMUSMACV (10) CG, I FFORCEV (10) CG, II FFORCEV (10) CG, XXIV Corps V (5) CG, III MAF (5) SA, IV Corps (5) CG, 1st Inf Div (16) CG, 1st Cay Div (AM) (16) CG, 4th Inf Div (16) CG, 9th lnf Div (16) CG, America1 Div (16) CG, 25th Inf Div (16) CG, lOlst Abn Div (AM) (16) CG, 1st MAR Div (5) CG, 3rd MAR Div (5) CG, 1st Bde, 5th Mech Div (7) CG, 3rd Bde, 82nd Abn Div (7) CG, 173rd Abn Bde (7) CG, 199th Lt lnf Bde (Sep) (7) CO, 5th SFG (16) CO, 11th ACR (5) CO, 2nd SAS SQN (Aust) (5) USARV Gl (2) USARV G2 (5) USARV G3 (5) USARV G4 (5) USARV C-E (5) ACTIV (5) CDC LNO (5) USARV Science Advisor (5) EUSA 02 (5) ECOM Rep (2)

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Roster of Attendees

USAR V Long Range Patrol Conference

LTG William R. Peers COL Charles W. Allen COL Harold R. Aaron COL Lloyd W. Brown LTC Arthur Winn LTC Alfred W. Matthews LTC Donald L. Green MAJ James S. Hanke MAJ Donald A. Mattson MAJ Robert L. Stevens MAJ Robert G. Lunday MAJ Charles W. Judge MAJ William O'Connor MAJ William A. Suhanin MAJ John F. Pipia MAJ Paul F. Keefe MAJ Thomas A. Koentop MAJ Robert H. Grassi MAJ Brian Wade MAJ T. A. Simcox MAJ John H. Dorf MAJ Randolph E. Sahle CPT Joseph S. Parker CPT Joseph K. Kukea CPT Frank L •. Alverson CPT Raymond C. Hinde CPT John B. Hendricks CPT Carl R. Ariola CPT Richard M. Stacy CPT Reuben H. Siverling CPT Robert Yearout CPT Ralph C. Clarke CPT Ruben D. Quinones CPT Raymond C. Dawson CPT J. Buczacki CPT Richard W. Jordan

9 - 10 August 1968

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CG,IFFORCEV ACofS, GZ, USAR V CO, 5th SFG (Abn) Ch, Intel Ops Div, JZ MACV Chief, P&tP Div, GZ USARV Ch, Programs Br, P&tP Div, GZ USARV CDC Liaison Officer to I FFORCEV Programs Br, P&tP Div, GZ USARV Ground Recon Off FAB, JZ MACV Aut Comdt, Recondo School CO, 36th MsFC CO, ZOth MSFC Co E, .ZOth In! (LRP), I FFORCEV Hq, I FFORCEV GZ, 4th Inf Div GZ, Hq I FFORCEV GZ, Hq II FFORCEV G3, Hq 11 FFORG:EV 2 SAS SQN (Aust) Co C, 5th SFG (Abn) G2, America1 Div Aero Scout Co, America1 Div Co F, 20th Inf (LRP), I FFORCEV Co E. 5Znd Inf (LRP). 1st Cav Div (AM) Hq Trp, 1/9 Cav. 1st Cav Div (AM) AATTV - II Corps Mike Force (Aust) 1st Recon Bn, 1st Mar Div (USMC) 3rd Recon Bn, 3rd M;ar Div (USMC) III MAF, USMC Co, 58th Inf (LRP), 4th Inf Div GZ Ops. 9th Inf Div Co E. 51st Inf (LRP). Americal Div Hq 25th Inf Div Co F, 50th Inf (LRP). 25th Inf Div 74th Inf Det (LRP), 173rd Abn Bde

.20th MSFC

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AVHGB.P Roster of Attendees

CPT Lawrence Dover CPT James Leidy CPT William C. Graham lLT Albert J. Snyder lLT William E. Jonea lLT George Davis lLT Owen D. Williams lLT J. E. Marshall CW2 Ashley Urquhart Mr. W. G. Nance Mr. William Marroletti MSG Paul Tracy SFC John Fernandez SFC Jason Woodworth SFC Darol Walker SFC George W. Hunt SSG Roy H.Powell. Jr. SSG Gordon W. Dewey

MACV Recondo School MACV Recondo School MACV Recondo School Co F. 51st Inf (LRP). II FFORCEV HHC. 3/82 LRP Platoon G2. XXIV Corps V Co F. 58th Inf (LRP). lOlst Abn biv (AM) Co E. 50thInf (LRP). 9th In! Div 20th MSFC MACSA USAR V Science Advisor MACV Recondo School MACV Recondo School MACV Recondo School Co F. 58th Inf (LRP); lOlst Abn Div (AM) FOB /12. CirC Det HHC. 3/82 LRP Platoon HHC. 3/82 S·2

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AGENDA j

\ USARV Long Range Patrol Conference

9 - 10 August 1968

1. 9 August 1968

TIME SPEAKER UNIT

0900-0930 . LTG Peers CG,IFFORCEV

0930-0945 COL Aaron CO, 5th SFG (Abn)

0945-1015 MAJ Stevens MACV Recondo School

1015-1030 BREAK

1030-1045 MAJ Keene IFFORCEV

1045-1l15 MAJ Koentop, LT Snyder 11 FFORCEV

1115-1130 MAJ Wade 2 SAS SQN (Aust)

1130-1330 LUNCH

1330-1345 CPT Kukea 1st .Cav Div (AM)

1345-1400 MAJ Pipia 4th Inf Div

1400-1415 CPT Yearout, LT Marshall 9th Inf Div

1415-1430 CPT Clark America1 Div

1430-1445 CPT Dawson 25th Inf Div

1445-1500 BREAK

1500-1515 LT Williams 101st Abn Div (AM)

1515 -1530 CPT Buczacki 173rd Abn Bde

1530-1545 MAJ Lunday 36th MSFC

1545-1615 CPT Stacy. CPT Hendricks 111 MAF. USMC

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AVHGB-P , • Agenda

)615-1630 MAJ Hanke G2 USARV

1630-1645 MAJ Mattson J2 MACV

1645-1700 MAJ Hanke G2 USARV

2. 10 August 1968

TIME SUBJECT SPEAKER UNIT

0800-0830 Recondo School Graduation COL Allen G2 USARV

MAJ Stevens Recondo School

0830-0845 Organize into Discussion LTC Matthews G2 USARV Groups

0945-1000 BREAK

1000-1015 Air Assets MAJ Dod Americal Div

1015-1030 MTOE Changes MAJ 0' Connor I FFORCEV

1030-1045 Reduction in Size of LRP CPT Clark Americal Div Units

1045-1100 Training Requirements for MAJ Lunday 36th MSFC New Members

1l00-1ll5 Employment MAJ Stevens Recondo School

11l5-ll30 Summary LTC Matthews G2 USARV

1130-1140 Send Off COL Allen G2 USARV

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PRESENTATION OF LTG PEERS

Rather than talk of high level planning and coordinations of LRPs I will talk basically about what I consider the fundamentals of the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Program. My remarks are based on my experience during World War II and on my experience here in Vietnam with the 4th Infantry Division, The first thing that you must look at is the people that make up the overall program, that make up the individual Long Range Patrols. In my judgment, not every soldier, not every combat soldier is qualified for LRP duties for several reasons.

The first reason is that an individual must be qualified both physically and psychologically. I would insist upon this. Physically, because LRP duties are very, very arduous and you never know when you are going to have to cover 10 to 15 kilometers on the ground in very short order. You must have the kind of people that are capable of doing this. I see too many of what I would call fat people in the LRPs, and I know very well that they cannot do this. If you think about it, this may be one of the reasonswhy on many occasions, LRPs get into difficulty and want to get extracted. Instead of evading they want to extract.

The psychological qualifications to be a member of a LRP are extremely difficult. You need somebody out there who has nerves of steel, who can stay in there along the side of a trail, can sit there and watch that trail with a large enemy formation going by and not have the slightest inclination to stand up and fire a rifle or even move. He goes out to do a specific job. To do this, he has to be qualified mentally and physically. I also think from my own point of view that the size of an individual is a factor to consider. I've maintained and I will still maintain that a LRP member should not be a big individual.

Why? In the first place, if he is operating properly he is operating in the bush. You just think about getting a 220 or 240 pound monster out there charging around and pushing his way through the bush with about an 80 pound pack. He probably would have an 80 pound pack because he would have to take that much food along to feed himself. So you get all this pushing and pulling going on, and he makes himself known, which is exactly what you don't want. r . C· . .I .:' .f

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-P Presentation of LTG Peers

Furthermore, in a situation like this, I don't think that the big fellow has the endurance to do the job. Stop to think about how many big people you find that are long distance runners in this category? You don't find any. Your big men do the spurt jobs like playing football. Well, I can tell you being a LRP member is not playing football. It might be advantageous to weigh 250 pounds to be a shot-putter but we are not putting the shot in this LRP business. In my opinion, you need somebody small who can get around quietly through the jungle unobserved and who has the endurance to do the job.

Those are my views. You don't have to agree with them, but I've seen this go on for quite a time. When I say size, I've seen some six footers who have been some real good LRPs, but they don't have excess fat hanging on them. Of the six footers, the best ones weigh about 150 to 155 pounds. Generally speaking, I think you will find that many of these are the old Kentucky boys that know the woods.

I would like to mention just briefly what I consider the number of people that should compose a LRP. I think the first thing you have to do is figure out what this LRP is going out to do. If the LRP is going on a surveillance miss ion, the job can actually be done by one man. Perhaps he is going to have to communicate, so it might be advisable to have a second man. Frankly, when I was in Burma the best patrols that I had consisted of two people. Being soldiers, our people are accustomed to be a little more gregarious, so I think that four or five people, a maximum of six, should make up a LRP. I would try to hold it down to something less than that if it were at all possible, depending upon the individuals making up the team. There is nothing magic about saying a team is six people. A team depends on the capability of its members and it should be tailored that way, for each trip, each mission.

Suppose the team runs into a large enemy formation. They are supposed to be trained in evasion, and they should be able to evade. Furthermore, they shouldn't be running into a large enemy formation. A large enemy formation is going to be corning down the trail. Very seldom will the VC or the NVA, the NVA in particular, beat their way through the jungle. They use trails that are already established. Our LRPs shouldn't be operating on the trails. They should be operating out in the jungle away from the trail where they can observe the trail, and they should not encounter these VC/NVA formations.

If a unit is going out on ambush or a hunter /killer type of operation, it should be small, because the LRP is not going to go out and try to ambush a battalion. They are going to ambush the enemy's small recon units. The object is to hit them and move out of the area rapidly.

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cam 18l'UflAli .. AVHGB-P Presentation of LTG Peers

In this regard, I think the most important thing on a LRP is the actual integrity of the team itself. Much of this depends upon the leaders you have, the working leaders who know the capabilities of every single man on that team. The leader knows their strengths and he knows their weaknesses. Every man on that team has to rely on every other man of that team so that one thing you never want to do is to take out a weak man or one that is questionable. Why? Because you are endangering the rest of the team. Remember that any time you add another man to that team, the greater your chances are of being discovered. If you have anybody that has a tendency to smoke, to talk, and to. do these things which would cause the team to be discovered, this is the individual you better leave home, and get him out of the program because he's not fit for this kind of work. I would say that you would have to be brutal in this. I would as soon have a few really well qualified LRPs than to say I had a LRP program just because I had large groups of people.

I have found here in this environment that it is very advantageous to utilize one or two indigenous personnel with each of the LRP teams. The reason for this is that they are natives of these areas and know the patterns, the markings, the life within the jungle. They can see and hear things that the ordinary American ear or eye is not accustomed to seeing or hearing. They have proved most satisfactory.

On the matter of equipment: It is my view that most of our LRPs go in too heavy. They've got every thing but the kitchen sink hung on them. The mission that these people have to perform should determine the equipment that they take along. There are a few basic items and anything beyond that is pure impedimenta. First is the man himself: of course, he must take along food, but he should not have to take along water. In dry areas during certain seasons; maybe yes, because it may be a tremendous inconvenience and dangerous to go back and forth to a water hole. So he should take along food, possibly water. He needs his weapon. He needs ammunition, and he perhaps needs a poncho. That's all he needs to perform his mis sion. But if you look at some of these LRPs, they have everything that you can possibly imagine. They look like a dime store when they get all the stuff hung on them, and then they slip a 70 or 80 pound pack on their back. You would think they want to eat in the Waldorf Astoria because of the amount of food they take along with thenl. Well you can't do it. There are certain items on these special missions that you must have. In our environment we operate with the radio, so a radio has to go along. If they are going out on a surveillance mission, it would be ".dvantageous to take along a pair of binoculars.

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AVHGB-P Pr e s entation of

I would advocate that in of taking additional people, take claymores. Why? Your people in themselves provide a possible warning system for the enemy by talking, smoking, banging equipment and this and that among other things. But the claymore doesn't make a bit of noise. One of the most effective ambushes you can have is one man with about six claymores. Let him take care of the enemy columns. I would recommend to all of you that you cut down to the minimum what these men will take to the field. Don't let them take any extraneous material along with them. Sure it would be a lot nicer to have all these things, but it will slow them down in the jungle.

Now I would like to mention just a few things on operations. Even in II Corps where I think we have some pretty good LRPs, I read reports every day that say a LRP on a surveillance mission was discovered. Well, I maintain that a LRP on a surveillance mission that is discovered is not doing its job properly. The individual member should not be in a position or location where he can be discovered. He's done something wrong. He has walked up a trail like a big bird or left his foot marks on the trail, or he's done some-thing to cause the enemy to suspect his presence. He may have fired at the enemy. But a LRP should not be discovered if it is on a surveillance mission.

Another point has to do with extractions. I see this all the time too, but I must say that we are reversing the trend. That is, every time a LRP sees an enemy or knocks off one enemy, they want to be extracted. Well, I don't believe in this. The theory seems to be that they are compromised. A LRP is not compromised if it's hidden properly and observing. The enemy is not supposed to see it. On the other hand, if there are one or two enemy walking down the trail, the LRP should be able to ambush them properly. There should not be anybody else to bother the LRP in the immediate area, and it is not necessarily compromised. If it does run across a larger group, instead of having that LRP extracted, I personally believe in building upon it. That is, putting in a reaction force.

The most difficult thing in all of South Vietnam is to find the enemy. We've got to find him, then we have to fix him, then we have to defeat him. But the most important job is finding him. If the LRPs get out there and find somebody and then we extract them, this isn't doing us one bit of good. If we can find him and build on it so we can fix him and then defeat him, we'll be doing our job that much better. So you can write it down for me, that I am definitely opposed to all this extraction business that goes on.

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I I ____________ J

AVHGB-P Presentation of LTG Peers

Part of the LRP business when they get to what I call the hostile or hunter /killer business is the ambush. I tell you that I am a little disenchanted with the way I see some people conduct ambushes. Going out and digging foxholes along side of a trail, debris all around the place, sometimes putting the ambush in the same place it has been day after day. Even when they do get an ambush put in properly, when they go in after dark, go into position where they can cover areas with fire and get proper cover, they'll open fire at a 100 or 200 yards. That is no ambush. All you are doing is scaring him.

Another thing I've seen happen is one or two people come down the trail and instead of letting the enemy come into the killing zone, the LRP calls artillery on them. How stupid can you get? All this means to me is that we've got a lot of scared people out there who should never have been in this business. Those are the kind of people you want to eliminate. This is what I mean by psychologically tough, to be able to hang in there and hold them until you do get the enemy in the kill zone and get all of them in there so no one comes out alive. Then you will have some successful ambushes. But you cannot do it when you get one yokel that fires or rattles his gear or puffs on a cigarette. You might as well have stayed at home. We have to teach our people how to set up an ambush properly and when to set it up.

Looking at it from a commander's point of view; my point of view as Commander of I Field ForceV or as a division commander or as a brigade commander, the LRPs are expensive and don't forget it. Why are they expensive? You want to remember that you are dealing with select people. Where do you get select people? You get them from the units and when you take 200 select people from the combat elements of an infantry division, you have taken 200 potential fire team and squad leaders. Believe me, that hurts a division. So that is one item of expense, and it's a critical one.

The other item of expense is helicopter support. You must have helicopters to put these people in, not only slicks but you also need gunships. In the event some of these people do get into serious difficulty and need gunship support, or if extraction becomes absolutely necessary, the slicks and the gunships that help get them out or that lift your reaction force must be available. Any time you get about five or six LRPs out you have to keep about two gunships, sometimes four gunships depending upon the situation, and two to four slicks setting aside that you cannot use for anything else. So helicopter support is another item of expense. In I and II CTZs it is a very critical item because we don't have enough helicopters to do the things we have to do. So we have to budget them very closely and very carefully.

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Remember that anything you give to the LRPs, you are taking away from someone else. Therefore, you want the best people you can get your hands on, you want to have people you know can do the job; you want to make sure that they are being used properly and efficiently, or you are costing the unit and the government unnecessarily. This is above and beyond the time that is involved in the planning, the development, the training and the other things that go into making up a LRP program.

Some of the things that I have indicated, you might think are on the negative side. This is not correct, because if there is anybody in this theater who believes in the LRPs, I think you are looking at him. I do believe in them, but I insist that they be the proper people, and they be operated properly.

In 1967, before we had any form of surveillance unit such as the people sniffer and the Air Cav with the scout unit, every major battle that the 4th Infantry Division got itself into was initiated by the action of a LRP. Every single one of them. That include the battle of Dak To for the LRPs completely uncovered the enemy movement. We knew exactly where he was coming from through our LRP action. So, I am a great believer in LRPs but I am also insistent that they be the proper people, they be organized properly and that they be utilized properly.

We should try to select these proper people, qualified people or those who can be developed into qualified people. And then they can become precious assets to you. You have to handle them and use them properly. In the same sense, you must have a really well qualified individual to run your LRP platoon or your LRP company. I've seen too many cases where it's a case of "old Joe" can run this. When you get down to it, checking the qualifications, "old Joe" doesn't have too much. "Old Joe" might be a fine officer, but he doesn't have too much background. He may develop into something six or eight months from now, but you need someone right now who can operate this kind of thing. As a consequence, you must take, whether you want to or not, the best officer you have to run this program. He must be qualified for this particular job, not only a good officer, but he must have the stuff to run this particular kind of job. He should have had this kind of training and operated on some of these patrols. He is a key individual, and you must be extremely careful in selecting him.

The people above him at brigade and at division level must also understand this whole business. It isn't something you get by osmosis; you have to make a business of it. Study Long Hange Patrolling and go into detail. Most of

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our commanders have not had the background and experience. They must be encouraged to learn and understand the limitations' and capabilities of LRPs, how and under what conditions they operate. This includes the brigade commander and the entire brigade staff because if you think about it, you're talking about personnel, you're talking about intelligence, you're talking about operations and you're tal'.<hg about supply. So all those people are intimately involved.

The same thing is true at division level. In II CTZ we think so highly of the capabilities of LRPs that we are doing everything within our power to develop a comparable capability within the ARVN organization. I am sure you know that in a recent change by JGS each of the AR VN divisions is authorized six LRP teams, each of the regiments is authorized six LRP teams, and each of the battalions is authorized three LRP teams. We are training people for the 22nd and 23rd Divisions and the 24th Special Tactical Zone. We are about half way through the program. In some cases we are down to the battalion level. Here we are not going to train them as LRPs. We are going to train them in what we call MRPs. Instead of being Long Range patrols, they will be Medium Range Patrols, so they do not have to operate with PRC-25s. If they need a radio, they can get along with an AN/PRC-lO. I am sure that many of them can get along without a radio. We are just about at the point where we will be revising our program to accommodate this level of per sonnel.

We even have gone one step further in some areas, and we will expand later. In two or three of the provinces we have LRPs that are training with the Regional Force and Popular Force. Some of them are also serving on our US teams, and having had this experience, they will go back and develop more within the RF and PF. I would expect these would not be the Long Range type either, but will be short range. I expect that we will develop some highly effective personnel in this sort of business.

Gentlemen, I am very appreciative of this opportunity to address you while you are in this conference and are exchanging ideas. I think it is through these conferences that we can really improve the operation of what I call a very valuable source of information, and a unit with high potential of inflicting severe damage upon the enemy through ambushes. Thank you very much.

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PRESENTA TION OF COL AARON

Gentlemen, I am a great believer in LRP and reconnaissance techniques. Our main focus right now is to get prisoners to find out just where the enemy base areas and supply routes are located. I like to look on the 5th Special Forces Group participation as being a strategic reconnaissance screen with the bigger elements of the Free World Forces finding Charlie and bringing him back. We provide the direction from which he may be coming and perhaps the time. So in the capacity as Commanding Officer, 5th SFG. I'm very much interested in reconnaissance.

As the Commandant of the MACV Recondo School, I must confess to you that I have been perturbed ever since I have been here about the caliber of personnel we have been getting. As you know, we send down a report on each class as to how many come, how many are graduating, and why the others didn't make it. I've already talked to General Mildren about this. I am perturbed by the large number that are washed out of this school because of academics. If I were a division commander. a recipient of a message which reports those who fail the course - and 60 percent of the input fail this courSe - I would begin to wonder what the story was.

You consistently will find that some units will send six students who will be very good and all six will graduate. Other divisions or separate brigades will send four to six and be lucky to end up with one graduating. We looked into this. Why do we have such a ratio?

The reason is because of improper selection, which bears out exactly what General Peers said. Fir st, they are physically unfit to do the jOb. The second thing is attitude and performance. You take a man out of the pipeline and as soon as he arrives at Cam Ranh Bay he goes to your replacement company. You say, okay, you go to the Recondo School and fill the quota. He may be a truck driver. He doesn't have any desire to be a LRP. As General Peers said, ·He doesn't have those nerves of steel. He has had no experience in-country and doesn't even know what Charlie is like. He probably has a healthy respect for him.

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AVHGB-P Presentation of Col

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Right now this school is putting out about 60 percent of the input and I think it should reach 95 percent without any difficulty. When you go back to your unit the one thing I wruld like to get your support on is an increased participation by those people responsible for reconnaissance in the selection of Recondo School personnel. Ta.ke a look at it and see how effective you are, what you put in, what you get back and what your percentage is.

I am also interested in the reconnaissance aspect for another reason. And this is more from a theoretical standpoint. You know since World War II reconnaissance measures to find potential enemy and determine his activities have mac.e a quantum jump. Our expanding technology has given us the employment of satellites for reconnaissance, specially designed aircraft, sophisticated infrared techniques and many others. While these are important, the man on the ground, well trained and alert, still remains an important element in our reconnaissance structure. Only he can go places where the infrared or the aerial camera cannot go.

Between this man and our sophisticated array of reconnaissance technology, there continues to be a gap. A recon gap if you wish to call it. This gap includes doctrine to match the technology in a broader sense, but also doctrine which is the synthesis of our experience in this war. Despite our experience, the debate continues as to the best LRP organization and where it should be located in the field army. One consideration, under study at Ft. Bragg, is the establishment of two LRP battalions in a new Special Forces group organization.

Without a doubt, you people represent the most advanced thinking in long range patrolling techniques that has ever been gathered under one roof. Your combined and integrated efforts here should provide a focus on our manifold problems. For example, why is it that we have been engaged in reconnaissance for over three to four years in this country and you still find that people going on visual reconnaissance for landing zones still feel they have to hover over an LZ for 45 minutes. Then they are suddenly surprised when they go into the LZ and find it's hot. It seems to me that we should have learned that experience at the very outset or just know it from pure basic doctrine.

We find there is a gap between the lesson that has been learned and what has been passed on time and time again to new people as they corne in. Yet three years later we find that we are still making the same stupid mistakes. I hope you will look at some of these problems and produce worthwhile recommendations for a more efficient LRP program in Vietnam, not only for Vietnam but for the Army.

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SYNOPSIS OF PRESENTATION OF I FIELD FORCE, VIETNAM

Major Keefe, I FFORCEV: Company E, 20th Infantry, is OPCON to Company B, 5th Special Forces Group. However, three of the four LRP platoons have been placed OPCON to other units in II Corps Tactical Zone. The 1st Platoon is OPCON to the 4/503rd Infantry at Phu Hiep. The 2nd Platoon remains OPCON to Company B, 5th Special Forces. This platoon is now located at An Khe. The 3rd Platoon is OPCON to the 3/503rd Infantry at Bao Loc, and the 4th Platoon is OPCON to the 3/506th Infantry at Phan Thiet. The extreme northern and northwestern areas of the corps zone are covered by 4th Infantry Division and 173rd Brigade LRPs. This dis-tribution of I FFORCEV LRP assets has resulted in variations in the platoon operations.

The platoon at An Khe, for example, is part of a LRP /MSF package. The concept is to employ the Mobile Strike Force (MSF) as a reaction force to exploit LRP This package provides the most desirable LRP support available in II Corps. Aviation assets are available to the MSF units, primarily to support LRP operations. Therefore, LRP teams can expect full aviation coverage once the MSF heliborne deployment is completed. The other LRP platoons do not receive aviation support as consistently as those with the MSF. The platoons with US units are OPCON to battalions or task force control headquarters. The limited assets frequently delay or modify LRP operations since other priority tactical requirements must be satisfied.

An example of aviation assets which might be available to a battalion would be eight slicks and a gun platoon. Since LRP infiltration/exfiltration normally requires half of these assets, the deployment of organic battalion elements is considerably curtailed. Obviously if an urgent tactical situation arises during LRP operations, aviation support must be diverted to the main forces of the battalions. Such situations frequently preempt plarmed deployment of LRPs though they are seldom cause for exfiltrating elements already in the field.

Although the field force LRP company is widely dispersed, we feel that the present distribution of assets provides optimum effectiveness within this corps area. Basically, J:"iendly forces in II Corps are in an economy of force role. Reconnaissance efforts have been intensified while aviation

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AVHGB-P Synopsis of Presentation of I Field Force, Vietnam

support has been reduced. In order to maintain an offensive posture the management of combat and combat support assets has become a key con-sideration. The LRP company has decentralized its assets down to the OPCON units. In this way a larger land area can be kept under surveillance while aviation support provided to the OPCON units is employed both for battalion and LRP operations. Under less stringent limitations it would be desirable to provide aviation assets in direct support of the LRP unit. How-ever, LRP teams now share these assets with the OPCON unit.

Another aspect of the distribution of the four LRP platoons is that in each case these platoons provide a LRP capability to those units not authorized organic LRP assets. It should be noted, however, that the 3/506th Infantry has provisionally trained, organized and deployed its reconnaissance platoon as a LRP platoon.

Company B is the Special Forces unit OPCON to I FFORCEV. It controls CIDG operations within II CT Z. To provide the numerous camp and mobile strike force units with adequate Air Force FAC coverage, the Air Liaison Officer (ALO) at 5th SF Group in Nha Trang monitors the requirements for Special Forces throughout the corps area. Based on his recommendations forward air controllers (FACs) are allocated to meet tactical requirements.

With the establishment of a LRP/MSF package several months ago, the group ALO determined that LRP operations required FAC coverage in direct support of the LRP platoon. The Special Forces Group ALO allocated two FAGs to support the two IJRP platoons then OPCON to Company B. These FACs were placed under control of the LRP company commander for further allocation as he saw fit.

The original arrangement provided FAC coverage for LRP platoons operating without other US support. These FACs were responsive to the LRP unit, not to the Special Forces unit. As the distribution of LRP platoons evolved, both FAGs remained in direct support of the LRP company. One FAC is always assigned to the LRP platoon operating with the MSF. The other FAC is allocated as the LRP company cOInmander desires. In those cases where an operation is supported by FACs from more than one unit, arrangements are made to pool all the FAC assets to support the entire operation. This does not Inean that LRP platoons receive full coverage froIn FACs supporting local operations, however, local FACs do provide assistance as required by the LRPs in emergency situations.

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The point illustrated can be summarized by stating that through an excellent working relationship, the 5th SF Group ALO provides timely, adequate FAC coverage for Field Force LRPs deployed in II CTZ. Through coordination with DASC A, Headquarters 7th Air Force, and local ground units, a flexible, effective support system has been developed. These procedures enable the LRP company to have responsive means for obtaining tactical air support.

Minor operational problems persist. Three unrelated points are noteworthy in Company E operations.

Ground-to-Air Communications Failures:

Experience has shown that exceptional team leaders will pursue their mission regardless of the status of communications. Unfortunately, som.e team leaders will terminate further reconnaissance in areas in which communication is lost or broken. The stronger team leaders will continue the mission without becoming overly concerned :if communications is disrupted. In one case the team leader continued his mission for 18 hours without seeking high ground to reestablish communications. Had a serious situation developed the team leader would have been compelled to rely only on evasion techniques until communications could be reestablished. This kind of leader typifies the caliber NCO which is desired for LRP operations. By citing their actions, as examples, we hope to develop greater confidence in those team leaders who are currently overly concerned with the need for continuous communications.

Equipment Limitations on Patrol:

Many team members occasionally attempt to carry more amrnunition or equipment than is necessary. Team leaders have been instructed to be alert for excess equipment during final inspections. Excess weight can be a liability to a patrol by inhibiting mobility. Only those items which are mission essential should be carried on patrol.

Water Shortages:

In the drier area in II Corps - around Phan Thiet for example - the lack of water sources has become a problem. This has been partially reduced by supplementing LRP rations with C ration wet units and by free dropping three-gallon water bags to patrols in need of water in certain circumstances.

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I FFORCEV has established an ARVN/US LRP integration and training program. This program has three major objectives:

(1) Intensification of Long Range Patrol activities in II CT Z by providing more ARVN personnel trained in LRP operations.

(2) Integration of US and ARVN operations at the lowest level of engagement with the enemy.

(3) Improvement of ARVN capability for unilateral, patrol training and operations.

There are three mobile training sites in the corps zone - one at each AR VN division or STZ. To date over 300 ARVN LRPs have entered this training course and 150 of these have been graduated by the US cadre. In addition, 84 ARVN LRP personnel have been integrated with US/LRP teams with exceptional results. Frequently the AR VN LRPs have contributed significantly to the success of the mission.

The language barrier has proven to be a difficult problem. Although the ARVN LRPs have demonstrated excellent ability in the field, they have not been successful in academic examinations. AR VN has imposed a require-ment that all LRPs be tested at Duc My Ranger Training Center to become LRP qualified. Because of a high rate of failure experienced in written examinations most of the last group tested will have to be retested. This does not reflect on the value of the training program. Previously, lesson plans in Vietnamese and specific test requirements were not available so that the students and interpreters could be adequately prepared. The Ranger Training Center will provide these items in the future.

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SYNOPSIS OF PRESENTATION OF II FIELD FORCE, VIETNAM

Major Koentop, First Lieutenant Snyder, II FFORCEV: Company F, 51st Infantry LRP, works as a complete unit. When a requirement is justified, the entire company will be placed OPCON to a major unit within III CT Z. In the past the company has been OPCON to the 199th Light Infantry Brigade, the 25th Infantry Division and directly to II Field ForceV Headquarters. In a case such as the latter the company will normally have a brigade-sized AO.

Company F, 51st Infantry LRP, has also had the mission of protecting Long Binh Post. To do this, F and D Troops of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regi-ment, the 36th Ranger Battalion and the 136th MSF Battalion were placed OPCON. The AO was covered by assigning individual AOs to the units and employing the LRPs on the periphery.

The tactic used is saturation patrolling. That is the reason for emphasizing employing the company as a whole. Normally 10 to 14 teams will be on the ground at all times. Initially these teams are five to six-man reconnaissance teams. They determine routes of movement, supply routes, feeder routes, and base camp areas. After this phase, "heavy" teams of 10 to 12 men are inserted to get more detailed information in the form of prisoners for interrogation and documents. This is done by arnbushing small enemy elements. The third phase is interdiction, done with "heavy" teams and various available conventional forces. Artillery is used to the maximum. This has proven successful, and has caused the enemy to change his route of march and move his base areas.

An 0-1 aircraft is used as an aerial relay for six hours a day. The teams normally move during this time period using the short antenna with the AN/PRC-25. The jungle antenna is used when the 0-1 is not available. When a significant sighting is made, this aircraft will overfly the area and help the teams adjust artillery. The enemy shoots at him because they think he is adjusting the artillery and many times expose themselves to the team on the ground.

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c Af.f I - - '" -..

AVHGB-P Synopsis of Presentation of II Field Force, Vietnam

Equipment carried by the patrol includes as little food and water as possible, M-16s, a Light Antitank Weapon (LAW), an M-79, and an M-60 MG with 700 rounds. The patrols remain in the area for five days and are extracted only if they have wounded personnel. If the wounds are slight, they will be treated and then reinserted.

Harassing and interdictory (H&I) fire continues in the AO even while teams are being inserted or on the ground. To stop the fire signals the enemy something is happening. The teams move between the fires. The fires are plotted 800 meters from the team, except at night when defensive concentrations are as close as 300 meters or closer if desired.

In the III CTZ operation areas where shots are heard in the jungle aU day, the teams snipe at close ranges. A noise suppressor would be beneficial to assist the sniping.

Another tactic especially effective at night is to set up a trip flare behind a team that is being pursued. If gunships are on the scene, they can fire at the trip flare when the enemy trips it.

The teams use the starlight scope and have found it effective. The LAW is used mainly as a psychological weapon to make the enemy think twice before assaulting a team. The weapon deceives the enemy as to the size of the team. Time pencils and fragmentation grenades are used, especially at night to mislead him On the location of the team. Claymores are used extensively. Wrist compasses are used also. .It saves the man from fiddling with the lensatic and getting it caught in the brush.

The Kit Carson Scout has proved very effective in operations. They are trusted and integrated into the patrols. They are given English lessons four hours per day by the interpreters while in base camp.

Problems:

A shortage of comrrlUnications trained personnel to repair the radios. Survival knives are on the MTOE but extremely hard to obtain. The M-l6, while a good weapon, is not as suitable to LRP operations as the CAR 15 because it is too long and catches in the brush. The present camouflage uniform tears easily and mosquitoes bite through the material. The CrDG tiger suit is better.

... 22

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AVHGB-P Synopsis of Presentation of II Field Force, Vietnam

The company has been short on personnel. Because it needs a full 28 teams to accomplish its mission, it maintains this number by cutting down on the number of people in each patrol from six to five, sometimes to four. A limiting factor is turn around time. This has been as low as 36 hours per five-day patrol. It is not desirable to cut the turn around time that much, especially with the influx of untrained personnel directly out of the replace-ment pipeline.

A LRP operation requires trained, experienced people, but theae replacements have been assigned directly to BCT, AlT, airborne school, then directly assigned to the Long Range Patrol unit. They do not even know squad tactics much less LRP tactics. Previously, every incoming individual had a training period of three months; now due to operational press)1re, they have to learn in the field.

II FFORCEV provides the support for the company. Air assets of one C&C, three slicks and three to four gunships are provided for exclusive use of the company. These are deemed essential. The H model UH-l is better than older helicopters such as the D model, which will not rise straight up 100 to 200 feet to clear the trees with a team on board. Artillery is on call but is general support rather than direct support. The reaction force, Delta Troop. 3/17 Air Cavalry, is OPCON. This is an operational necessity as in the past many good opportunities have been lost by not being able to reinforce.

23

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SYNOPSIS OF PRESENTATION OF THE SPECIAL AIR SERVICE

Major Wade, SAS: SAS means Special Air Service. It is an airborne unit, but here in Vietnam jump for pay only. SAS was started in June 1957. It started as a company and was expanded to a regiment based at Perth, Australia. Currently, three squadrons rotates duties in Vietnam. mission of SAS is Long Range Reconnaissance.

The squadron consists basically of 15 patrols, organized into three troops, commanded by a Lieutenant. The normal operating level is five or six patrols in the field at one time. The allocation of BAS within the Australian Army is one squadron per division. In Vietnam it is allocated as part of the task force.

The unit trains as a unit in Australia prior to employment in Vietnam. They also select new personnel at this time. The procedure is: the individual volunteering goes before a selection board. After selection, he attends a six-week patrol course. The standard of physical conditioning is nine miles in 90 minutes with full battle order. Subjects taught are communications, medical, explosives, demolitions, pioneering, small craft handling and others. All this training is completed 12 months before coming over here. The remaining 12 months is spent in team training, culminating in a two-month exercise in New Guinea. It is extremely rough country and quite a sorting out process. What this means is that a squadron is a fully trained organization when it gets here. All reinforcements come frorn the regiment in Perth.

The method of operation is basically the same as US operations with some minor differences. The basic communications means is the AN /PR C-64 and Morse code with the AN/PRC-25 to improve ground-to-air communica-tions. The LZ is photographed on the prior reconnaissance before every mission. This enables all the pilots and team members to be thoroughly familiar with the point where the team is to be inserted.

Stay behind patrols were used on two occasions after fire support bases were closed. VC were killed while digging in the garbage pit.

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AVHGB-P Synopsis of Presentation of the Special Air Service

Since 10 July 1966, 498 patrols have been inserted; 418 five-man patrols, 39 ten-man, and a few 3, IS, 20-man patrols. Four hundred and nine were air insertions, 89 were ground insertions, either walk-ins or using an APC. Extractions were by air 432 times and 66 times by foot. Total contacts were 124; our patrol fired first 112 times, the VC 12 time s. Total kills were 219 with 35 more possible. The regiment has a kill ratio of 219 to one; the squadron, 87 to zero for the last five months.

A nine-week school to train Vietnamese in long range patrol techniques is conducted here in Vietnam. The first six weeks are training, the last three are operations, which consists of two patrols. The course started with 40 Vietnamese of very high quality.

The XM 148 is used extensively by the Australians. The trigger arrangement is dangerous as issued--it catches on vines and fires unexpectedly--so it is cut off and the sear is used to fire the weapon. The sights are removed also. Since contact range is normally five to ten meters, the sights are not needed. One XM 148 is carried per patrol.

Another piece of equipment is an anchor device for the McGuire rig or for rappelling ropes. It can be fitted to the UH-l series helicopter in about five minutes and deploys six ropes, three on each side. A pull of a lever releases the rope in an emergency. The UH-IH can extract a six-man patrol with full equipment using this rig. The present McGuire rig lifts only three people and cannot be cut· away in an emergency.

I

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SYNOPSIS OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE 1st CAVALRY DIVISION (AM)

Captain Kukea, 1st Cavalry Division (AM): Company E, 52nd Infantry, LRp, is currently in general support of the division and direct support of the three brigades. To respond to this situation, the company is split into two locations. A Company minus is at the division base camp with six operational patrols and the administration personnel. With the brigade farthest from the base camp is a platoon - three teams run by the platoon leader. The company intelligence sergeant assists this lieutenant.

Missions are theoretically requested from the brigades to the G2, who sends them to the LRP CO. In actuality, the mission" come from the brigade directly to the control group supporting the brigade. If a conflict arises, the G2 resolves it.

Support for the LRP operations comes out of brigade assets. When a mission is requested, the LRP control gives support requirements. If they are not supplied, the mission is canceled. For artillery support, direct coordination is made with the direct support battalion. For reaction, direct coordination is made with the 1st of the 9th Air Cavalry troop supporting that brigade. The Air Cav Troop consists of scout ships, gunships and an infantry platoon with its own organic lift capability. This gives a ten-minute reaction capability. The reporting procedures are from the team to the LRP control through a liaison team to the brigade. This liaison team consists of an injured or "short" team leader and a Radio Telegraph Operator (R TO).

All missions at the present time are reconnaissance; it is up to the brigade to act on reports. A five to six-man team is employed on a six to ten-day mission. This extended time period is due to few LZs in the AO. When a team gets in, they have to be exploited to the utmost. After some initial resistance, this extended mission concept has worked well.

26

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AVHGB-P Synopsis of Presentation of the 1st Ca.valry Division (AM)

Presently, insertion takes place at EENT with the normal three slicks and a LFT. However, in cases of areas that have been worked many times, the number of aircraft is modified to avoi.d recognition. Also, fake air assaults into a LZ with a LRP being inserted simultaneously on another LZ has worked well. The saturation insertion of four low flying helicopters with only one making the actual insertion is used also, as well as the stay behind and walk-in from the fire bases.

In the future, insertion by rappelling in thick canopy areas will be tried. Six people can exit a helicopter in one minute using a rappel ring - a solid ring already on the rope. The rappeller only has to hook his snaplink to the ring and he is ready to exit the helicopter.

Many extractions lately have been through the use of the McGuire rig due to the canopy and mountainous terrain. A modification of the rig has been made consisting of a sling rope around the chest snapped to an eight-foot endless sling.

Water is a problem in the mountains because when the patrols go down into areas where the water is, they lose com.munications. Therefore, the teams carry eight quarts of water.

The teams carry CS or WP for breaking contact and a small riot mask. There seems to be no replacements or parts for these masks. One ration per day is carried for up to six days and after that, a ra.tion and a half. Each man carries half a poncho liner but no poncho. The rest is standard equipment, except for special missions when a starlight scope, spotter scope or sniper rifle may be carried.

The bigger problem is the idea of selling each brigade on how the LRPs should be used. Many times they try to employ the LRPs as a maneuver unit with a very small AO. Another problem is employing the LRPs too close to friendly troops. The enemy knows where our troops are and are more alert. The most successful missions are out of 105 howitzer range, just on the edge of 155 range within eight-inch range.

Lately there has been a lack of trained team leaders as most of the present team leaders are rotating in August. To get the new NCOs and potential team leaders more experienced, team integrity is being broken in an effort to get these people as much experience as pos sible in the field before the others rotate.

27

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AVHGB-P Synopsis of Presentation of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM)

The company has the AN/PRC-64, which the Australians use, but not enough trained people to operate it. It may ease the communications problem if this can be resolved.

Presently, there is a plan to employ the LRPs at division level, but it is going to have to be approved by the incoming Commanding General.

Z8

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SYNOPSIS OF PRESENTATION OF THE 4th INFANTRY DIVISION

Major Pipia, 4th Infantry Division: The 4th Infantry Division presented a comprehensive briefing at the 28 Much 1968 LRP Conference; therefore, at the present conference their talk devoted to the integration of US and ARVN LRPe and the training of the ARV"N personnel.

Thirty AR VN LRP students from the 42nd AR VN Regiment of the 24th Special Tactical Zone received centralized tJraining at Camp Enari, followed by decentralized operational OJT deployment to US LRP platoons in the field. It was run by a training detachment wh:lch conducts a .regular pre-recondo course.

Some problems occurred during this course. The PT was too ambitious and resulted in considerable soreness during the first week. This PT is the same given to US personnel at the pre-recondo school. The ARVN had conducted no preliminary PT prior to the start of training. Some of the students were not physically qualified, as an example, one student had an acute case of myopia and did not have glasses. HE' could not participate in field operations. The language barrier was a problem, especially with four Montagnards who could not read or write. The ARVNe had no previous orientation and did not know what to expect, which caused friction to develop. As a result, only Z2 of the 30 participants graduated from this phase.

Certain recommendations were derived from this experience. With any nationality, all persons involved with LRPs should be volunteers and screened by their parent unit for motivation ar.,d fitness. They shoUld be oriented to what the program consists of and what to expect. A physical training program should be instituted before any LRP training and personnel not up to physical standards required should be elimina,ted from the program. An examination by a doctor should eliminate the physically unfit. If possible, the same interpreters should accompany each course.

During the second phase, the ARVN IItudents were deployed to the US LRP platoons in the field and fully integrated into the LRP teams. They were issued equipment and inserted on millsions as a member of the teams. Each student participated in three to five long range patrols, except for five individuals.

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AVHGB-P , Synopsis of Presentation of the 4th Infnntry Division

The language problem again was encountered. It was overcome by using signals. pigeon English and Vietnamese and using Rhade Montagnards who normally worked with the US elements and could translate. A pay problem arose and a man was finally sent back to get it for all unit members. The interpreters did not want to go on operations but the ARVN commander clearly established they were students and would participate.

There were no disciplinary problems with the AR VN students in the field or between the Vietnamese and Montagnal'ds. The students proved adept and capable. especially stealthy and quiet. It was felt the students were capable of independent LRP operations. The Held deployment phase ended with an AR VN conducted patrol with only a US' radio operator along to arrange liaison between friendly US units and air assets. The ARVN and US worked very well together •.

It was recommended the program conHnue as a two-phase operation. (There is an after action report available on this training that was submitted to II CTZ Senior Advisor and I FFORCEV.)

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Captain Yearout, First Lieutenant Ma:rshall, 9th Infantry Oivision: The 9th Infantry Division moved last month to the Mekong Delta. There are problems in this area not encountered elsewherE', There is no cover and concealment except in the treelines. and that ie the people live. The population density is great •.

The rest of the terrain is open rice paddies. This dictates that a patrol moves between 2400 and 0600 hours to avoid detection, The canals in the area range from two feet wide to 50 meters and even up t6 several kilometers wide. This terrain makes helicopter insertion almost imp6ssible as the helicopter can be seen ten kilometers away. It is assumed that anybody seeing the insertion is hostile, which will cause an ambush or cessation of enemy activity in an area. False insertions do not seem to assiet but merely alert a larger area. Foot inserti6n m,eets with the same problem: the terrain is too open and a patrol can be spotted easily. The population density makes it difficult to move in without bEling seen, and they must be assumed hostile.

A night airborne insertion is being considered and has not been ruled out, but the most common means of insertion lright now is the Patrol Boat River (PBIt). The boats are 31 feet long, capable of 30 knots, have a twin 50 caliber MG forward and aft. a Mark 18 Honewell grenade launcher and two M-60s aft also.

The boats work in pairs: four men to a boat. In the Delta, it has been found the eight-man teams work best.

In the operation, one boat will cover the other while it moves to the bank. The team disembarks the inboard bow 1ander cover of the 50-caliber Mas. In case of a contact, the team can get right back on the boat.

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AVHGB-P Synopsis cif Presentation of the 9th Infantry Division

Another method, picked up from the SEAL teams, is the underway insertion. The boat does not stop but swings clclse to the bank and the team rolla off the side. This is especially effective in a.reas where the population is accustomed to the boats and would notice a change in RPM of the engine. However, this is extremely hazardous and the tElame must wear life vests since the depth of the water is unknown in those areas where the boats do not usually go.

The time of insertion is dependent on the tides since only high tide is suitable for insertion. The water drops up to 16 feet and the boats cannot operate at low tide, even to reinforce. In addItion, at low tide the banks on the side of the canals are high and the 50s eanllot get grazing fire.

The patrols are primarily one-night m.issions, sometimes longer. They are primarily ambushes, recon or "body Imatch".

The ambushes are normally on a canal to ambush sampans, the vehicle the enemy uses to transport his equipment and supplies. Other ambushes are set onltnown infiltration routes where the enemy moves in squad size or smaller elements. If intelligence 1s received on the whereabouts of a known ve, a team will be inserted to search a village. This has proven quite effective but it is neceseary to have n local national along to interpret.

The Army' Marksmanship Team is aSl!igned to 9th Infantry Divislon and teaches sniping to the LRPs. This is being used to shoot from one treeline to the next. sometimes a distance of 800 meters.

Brigades recommend targets for any type of LRP operation. These targets are screened by the G2 and G3. by the Commanding General and implemented as Boon a8 possible. Th.e LRPs generally know well in advance where they are going and why.

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tONFtMR riAL •

SYNOPSIS OF PRESENTATION OF THE AMERICAL DIVISION

Captain Clark, Americal Division: In the Americal Division the LRP teams are OPCON to the three brigades because of the lack of helicopter support at division level. Division c:ontrols the employment of these teams by requiring that each LRP mission hav'e the Commanding Generalis approval prior to execution.

The teams are employed on an individual-type basis with the mission of area reconnaissance. The AO is ab')ut nine square kilometers per team, or the team sets up a stationary OP. These are normally reconnaissance missions.

Insertion is made by helicopter but stay behind has been used with success.

The LRP company at Chu Lai servell as an administrative and logistical base and provides training for newly assigned personnel. These personnel are volunteers from the division in-country orientation course or are volunteers from line units in the field. The training given is a division Recondo course of ten-<1ays duration. Upon complef;ion they are integrated into teams for two or three weeks. If their performance proves satisfactory, they are sent to the MACV Recondo School for their final training.

In the past, AR VN recon elements Olr the 2nd AR VN Division have been trained and integrated into operations. A small Mobile Training Team (MTT) is going to the 2nd AR VN Division Headquarter!! to as slat at ,that location.

The biggest problem is lack of helic1)pter support. On one occasion the LRPs operated with an air cavalry troop, which proved extremely successful. Adequate helicopter support was available and did not interfere with the aeroscout mission of the Air Cavalry.

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Captain Dawson, 25th Infantry Division: Mission aseignxnent in the 25th Infantry Division is done by the 02. When the company receives the mission, coordination is made with D Troop, 3/4 Cavalry. After the mission is Bet up and coordinated, the patrols involved are then placed OPCON to the brigade which controls the target area. this brigade provides support for the opera-tion. Normally, three teams per mission are assigned. The company can support two of these missions simultaneously.

Insertion by walk-in and stay behind have been used successfully. Helicopter insertion is used also, normally in early morning operations. It can be performed without detection due to low clouds continually in the area. Also, the teams have time for reinforcements or extraction in an emergency.

The insertion should be planned at least 24 hours in advance and the heli-copter pilots should be included in the prior air recon of the LZ. In the "Crescent" area, the teams have beer, continually discovered and attacked even though every type of insertion has been tried. Early morning insertion has proved the least compromising.

Moving is done in the pre-dawn hours" in the late afternoon or at night. Movement should be reduced during hours of reduced visibility. During the noon hours, movement is dangerous because the enemy is relaxing in one spot and is still alert to movement. Emphasis is placed on quiet, careful movement while patrolling.

CS or WP grenades have been found v,ery useful in breaking contact. When gunships are in the area, they can be used with smoke to indicate enemy locations.

When evading the enemy while returning to an LZ, the claymore with a time pencil is useful. They are set for om, or two minutes. The team is extracted, the enemy moves in and the claymore goes off with the desired results. These

34

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AVHGB-P Synopsis of Presentation of the 25th Infantry Division

claymores are set up waist high on tree or bush sO the dense underbrush does not disturb the working of the device.

A recent mission was performed on Nui Ba Den Mountain near Tay Ninh. The company was to locate base camps, supply routes, and water points on the mountain.

The plan was to move as a companyll.nd then cloverleaf the patrols. but it was detected the first night and resulted in a fire fight. It was decided to lend three teams from the top to t:he bottom in sectors, 200 to 400 meters apart. In this way they could each other in case of trouble. A ruction force was not readily aVailable, and the helicopters could not be relied on due to the steep terrain and downdrafts in the area.

Two teams arrived at the bottom. They successfully located a large VC/NVA base camp, inclUding the water points, and observed enemy personnel with AK.47e and machinegun8. A third hlam was restricted by a canyon and ran directly into the enemy base camp. They could not move. The first two teams attempted to go to their aid but: were detected, engaged and finally extracted under fire.

The next day, a strong pOint was set up in a pagoda, which was detected and attacked. D 'troop, 3/4 Cavalry, ructed and provided suppressive fire. There were .e'leral wounded, but thel medevac helicopter could not come in due to enemy fire. An air .trike WAIl put in at this time. The team in tr cuble was finally extracted using an l.OH which put one skid on a ledge of rock. The point is that close cooperation b'ltween air and gr011nd is essential to the LltP operation.

Many times normal brigade assets will not have a working knowledge of the long range patrol operation and cannot adequately support it. An arrangement should be made to use the same assets repeatedly. if p08sibl,e.

The old AR belt is a very useful item of equipment. It has numerous pouches for ammunition or grenades, which distributes the weight and does not have to be taped. The wrist compass could replace the lensatic if it had a sighting device on it. It is accurate and handy, and is immediately available not in a pocket. Light weight web gear made from CS cannisters i8 being experi-mented with at the present time and lLiao the M-16 noise suppressors. The new face camouflage made by Elizabnth Arden that is used by the SEAl.s seems better than our issue camoufhLge. The time pencils are very useful but hard to get.

35

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AVHGB-P Synopsis of Presentation of the 25th lnfantry Division

Very often S2s or S3s have their own ideas of how LRP operations should be conducted and cause unsuccessful operations. A USARV or MACV seminar involving these people might ease this problem. Also an individual at the division level who can directly reprMent the LRPs would assist in this problem of misutilization and lack of support at lower echelons.

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LtORFIDEI}JAL -----1-·-

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SYNOPSIS OF PRESENTATION OF THE Wist AIRBORNE DIVISION (AM)

Lieutenant Williams. Wist Airborne Division (AM.ll The LRP company receives its mission directly from the division GZ, the Commanding General authorizes each mission, and G3 provides the assets. The six-man team is used and inserted by helicopter. The three-day mission is preferred as indications show there is a drop in personal efficiency toward the end of the five-day patrol. Some ten-day missions are presently being planned. All the reconnaissance missions have a secolldary mission of taking prisoners.

A LRP platoon from the 1st AR VN DiV'ision hall been integrated into LRP activities. A nine-day training course was given and then they were integrated into teams, four US and two ARVN. 'rhis proved highly successful. Some of the AR VN individuals had been' workIng in reconnaissance lor up to eight years and were highly proficient. 1'he end result of this program is hoped to be all AR VN teams using US air support and other assets.

The use of CS dropped by helicopters has proven successful but required the team to take a gas mask along. This is deemed worth the extra effort.

Air support is preferred to artillery in the AO due to triple canopy vegetation. It is difficult to observe and adjust ar tillery and a LF1' can respond in 10 to 15 minutes.

The first light insertion is utilized most frequently. It allows reaction in case of contact on or near the LZ and an air relay, a U-lA Otter from Phu Bai. can standby during insertion or until the team establishes communica-tion with the base camp or ground rel.ay station. The teams do not move during the noon period or when another team is in contact because a team is less likely to be discovered when it is stationary.

The standard 65-foot Chinook suspension ladder cut in half and strung through a UH-l model helicopter so that about 1Z feet hangs down On each side is effective for insertion and extraction in stumpy areas, thickly vegetated areas, over uneven ground or where rotary clearance is needed. Rappelling is used also but its use makes McGuire rig extraction required, and this is avoided

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AVHGB-P Synopsis of Presentation of the lOlst Airborne Division (AM)

when possible. However, one McGuire rig wHh handcuffs on the riser is used to extract prisoners.

The company has three British Sten glms with silencers which are extremely quiet. They have not been fired in the course of an operation although they were taken along.

The air support for operations is OPCON to and collocated with the LRP company. This provides immediate response to every need: insertion/ extraction, overflights and contacts. During insertion, a FAC supports the company providing TAC air support. A reaction company is designated for every operation. When a reaction force is committed, its commander takes command of the LRP team in tho area. Preplanned artillery and on call artillery is arranged but artillery adjustment training is difficult to get; therefore, of the personnel in the company hesitate to use it. Ground communication relays are set up in fire bases nearest the AO. The company can put out up to four of thes e relays.

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SYNOPSIS OF PRESENTATION OF THE

l73rd AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEPARATE)

Captain Buczacki, l73rd Airborne Brigade: The only way to find the enemy when he is evading is through the use of a LRP team. Battalion sweeps are easily avoided SO the best way is for the LRP team to find them, then fix and destroy them with a reaction f4)rce.

The LRP must be a highly trained, motivated soldier. To mold a soldier into a LRP member takes a training and application stage which lasts about I liZ months. All the l73rd Airborne Brigade LRP members are volunteers who have been in a rifle company at least three months, pass a selection board, receive a week of training and then are integrated into an operational team. After a period of time, he the MAGV Rem ndo School and if he graduates, is again integrated in the unit or if he fails, is reassigned to another unit.

The detachment receives all missions from the brigade SZ. On occasion the team has been OPCON to a battalion but it was found to be undesirable due to lack of understanding of the LRP mission a.nd resources.

The detachment uses Navy Swift boats and three-man rubber rafts as an insertion means. They are highly desirable in that they are noiseless and difficult to detect at night. Helicopter insertions are made at least 1,000 meters from the objective area to enable the team to adjust to the terrain. False insertions are made and have pI' oven helpful. The doors on the helicopter are kept closed before and insertion. Stay behinds have been used, but this mission is a waste of talent as a rifle squad could perform the same mission.

A ground radio relay site,' not neceasa.rily in a fire base, is used when necessary. It is another team that pr4)vides a link between the reconnaissance teams and the base camp and performll a surveillance mission of its own. Also a balloon is used at the base station to extend the radio contact range.

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: .COIFIBERTllL-I--AVHGB-P Synopsis of Presentation of the 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate)

The teams will normally have a PW sIlatch miuion in addition to the primary reconnaissance mission. It would perhaps be better to have two or three specially trained teams for this mi88ion.

Many tinl.es insertion/extraction is delayed an hour or nl.ore due to the unavailability of aircraft. The teams 'b.aveto wait during this time period and the pilote are unfamiliar with the J:"Z and LRP procedures. This can be solved by attaching helicopters to the LRP unit or by putting an experienced man in the insertion ship who can dire,et the pilot to the correct point. '

Two groups of Alt VN Lll.Ps have been :lntegrated into the l73rd LRPs. In April, this consisted of 14 All. VNe and in June, a TOE recon platoon from the 2Znd All. VN Division. The All.VN tum members can help the US racon teams. They can understand the enemy speech and react to it. They are more familiar with 'the terrain and can piek up signs more readily. Language is a problem, The teams must have hltegrated c1auel using talk cards and hand signals. If thi. integrated operation i8 hereto stay, more language training ia needed, 8Ipecially basic ml,litary words and phrases. Alao. with their own leaders present, a. with the TOE reconri&iesance platoon, the AltVNs seem more effective.

The unit is trying to obtain 80me of the, new leven pound, breath.inflated, four.man .rafts. The present three-mnn recon raft must be hidden well or destroyed on each miuion.

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SYNOPSIS OF PRES1:NTATION OF THE

36th MOBILE STRIKE FORCE COMMAND

Major Lunday, 36th Mobile Strike FONe Command: The 36th Mobile Strike Force Command is a newly formed unit in III CTZ. It consists of four battalions of mobile strike force commanded by USSF and staffed mostly with Cambodians and a company of Special Forces troops and Cambodians augmented by LRP personnel from the 1st Infantry Division, 9th Infantry Divi:!ion. 199th Light Infantry Brigade and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. During operations when the enemy situation is vague or unknown, a concept of combining reconnaissance teams and mobile strike force battalion is used: the reconnaissance teams are utilized to find the enemy so they may be engaged by the MSF battalions. An intermediate sized unit, the specia:: ac tion platoon, is employed to collect intelligence, reinforce or aid in extrac:tion of the reconnaissance team. It can also attack small targets, develop a situation, and fix an enemy to allow the employment of larger reaction and exploitatiorl forces. The MSF battalions are the reaction and exploitation forceli and possess the a.saets necessary to inflict maximum casualties on the enemy. These battalions are also utilized as a corps reserve unit by Company A, 5th Special Forces Group (Air bor ne).

Before an operation a prospective operational area is overflown. but only b1'iefly to avoid compromise. In case a. more detailed reconnaissance is required, the leader of the team to be lnserted will fly in the radio relay ai1'craft which orbits a general area about six hours. When a battalion is operating, any useable landing zonell that can be used by the 1'econ teams in case of an emergency are reported hY' the battalion commander.

The patrols carry one AN /PRC-25 radlo with two headsets per patrol (the headset has proven to be the most likely part of system to fail). Their base station has an R TT capability and single side band in addition to the AN/GRC-46 radios. The Americans a.re armed wi.th the CAR-IS and the Cambodians carry the M-16. There are Sten guns and two pistols, all with silencers, available in the unit. Three of the American members carry the Swedish K submachinegun. 41

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AVHGB-P Synopsis of Presentation of the 36th Mobile Strike l'orce Command

The MSl' are well trained and experie,nced troops: all are graduates of the airborne school at Dong :Sa Thin. The airborne qualification has two advantages: it increases their esprit de corps and provides the capability of rapid employment by parachute to act as a part ofa sweep or blocking force. The units use the operational'SOP developed at the MACV Recondo School. It has been tosted time after time in combat situations and has proven its worth. Found especially uuful is the establishment of a uniform place for oach item of equipment allowing a patrol member to quickly loeate equip,ment in an emergeney. This iI particularly helpful in finding materiill oil. a wounded or dead team mate. Attesting to their expei'ienee, tUining. and ability is the fact they have participated in many pitched battles in III CTZ that have ended with the enemy suffering an extremely high nu:rnber of casualties.

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SYNOPSIS OF PRESENTATION 0]' III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

Captain Stacey, Captain Hendricks, III Marine Amphibious Force: Patrolling in I Corps is conducted within the guidelines established by a letter called "Policy Guidance for Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols", published June 1967. In the letter General Cushman states the mission of LRPs is to gather information, prevent surprise, and destroy the enemy when required. Two types of patrols are employed, the Sting Ray.and Clandestine.

The Sting Ray is a patrol when the mi.ssion includes engaging targets of opportunity by artillery. naval gun and tactical air. The Clandestine patrol conducts pure reconnaissance, collects information on the enemy and reports this information.

There are two types of recon units: a Force Reconnaissance Company organic to Force Troops, Fleet Mari:<le Force, and the Reconnaissance Battalion organic to the Marine Divis:lon. The two Force Reconnaissance companies are attached to the Division Reconnaissance Battalions here in Vietnam. The battalion works directly for the division G2 and has priority on helicopter assets second only to medevacs. The total strength of the package is 700 men per company and battalion. They are divided into 88 . patrols and overhead. Fifty percent kept in the field at all times.

The basic size of the patrol is four men, but it is augmented with special skill personnel such as medics. The members of the unit are trained as surface swimmers, inflatable boat handlers, parachUtists and SCUBA divers.

Using Sting Ray techniques, the 1st R,lconnaissance Battalion has inflicted 3, 922 KIA while having only 111 friendly KIA. The enemy KIA have to be verified from two sources.

The size of the teams are from six to 25 men depending on the area and enemy situation. Pure reconnaissanc e patrols are four to six men. The Sting Ray patrols are heavily armed because the team must remain in place while employing supporting fires and the enemy will locate the team almost every time the indirect fire starts. ,,,.,..,,,,,!' I 43 •

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AL AVHGB-P Synopsis of Presentation of III Marin& Amphibious Force

One way of using CS is to employ it by fixed wing. A ton of it can be placed in the napalm tanks with sand to get it through the jungle canopy. It can saturate 4,000 square Iheters :in five minutes. It is a 'good technique for taking prisoners but an extra gl.s mask must be taken along for the prisoner or he will die.

The Sting Ray patrol i. less effective near friendly troops becau.e the enemy is more wary and on guard. It is mo.t effective in what the considers a secure area. It has a gr,&ater psychological effect and gives more opportunitie. to employ the .upportin.g fire. It i. e.pecially effective in areas not usually covered by artillerr or indirect weapons.

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SYNOPSIS OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF. G2; USARV

Major Hanke. G2 USARV: At USARY. the G2 is the primary staff section responsible for the Long Range Patrol. Staff actions on concepts and techniques of Long Range Patrols aro initiated here and staff actions from other sections on LRP must be submitted to the G2 for review. Contact is made with the 'individual LRP units through conferences, trip. to the units and the monthly LRP report. A recc,rd of their activitie. is maintained.

There are many differences in terrain. population and enemy situation which affect the statistics of each unit. Generally, the mountains and jungle, combined.with lesser population pressure enable units in I and II CTZ to employ longer patrols timewise. There are more manhours spent in longer patrols but it takes more assets to keep up a high number of shorter time length patrols. The reaction to an ellemy target used most frequently i. artillery, There is some sort of rea,ction, i. e., ground, air or artillery, to 56 percent of all enemy sightings.

The correct address for the LRP report is "Long Range Patrol Report -(RCS-AVHGB-5), ATTN: AVHGB·P," Paragraph "r" of the report is remarks, lessons learned and general description of what is currently happening within the unit. Some units have not been using this paragraph. It will assist GZ USARV if the units \l,tilize this paragraph and may result in publication of the information obtained from these remarks so others will benefit from your experiences.

New light weight equipment is presently being manufactured for future use in Vietnam. An attempt is being made to get advance shipments of this eqUipment.

ARVN or

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L AVHOB-P Synopsis of the Presentation of the Allsistant Chief of Staff, 02, USARV

reconnaissance teams. There is no why your unit cannot take their lead and utilize these personnel also.

There has been a noticeable improvement within the USARV units since the last conference- in operations and technique. But one area that has been neglected is educating staff officers i.nd commanders on LRP capabilities and employment techniques. This must be done in order to obtain the command emphasis required to utilize the LRP properly and tomake sure this emphasis is rewarded with solid intelligence data.

, SYNOPSIS OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, J2, MACV

Major Mattson, J2 MACV: Since mission of Long Range Patrols is the collection of information, J2 rather than J3 has been designated to assume staff monitorship of units and activities of US, Vietnamese and FWMAF that conduct LRP operation!!. The object of the monitoring is to facilitate the exchange of informal:ion and ideas while assisting the LRP and reconnaissance programs in Vietnam. Also, the surface reconnaissance and ground surveillance section advises the J2 MACV on matters pertaining to related activiti,es. The monitoring of the program includes the USARV Long Range Report. It is requested the units supply an information copy to MACV, ATTN: MACJ212. The information in the reports is presented to COMUSMACV on a monthly basis and to CINCPAC on a quarterly basis. Paragraph "r" is of special interest.

As the use of Kit Carson Scouts is more widespread, and their use is encouraged, LRP commanders should be aware of possible tion of the program by the enemy.

In monitoring research and development programs that affect surface reconnaissance, our office notifies USARV and III MAF of new items and is prepared to assist with the pUblicity and distribution of the items.

Specialized training, of a classified nature, is available to US LRP members and teams. Further information on I:his subject is available from the Plans and Programs Division, ACofS, 02, USARV. and J212 MACV. This training has been widely discussed with indiv:idual units.

Presently the surface and ground surveillance branch is conducting a study for the purpose of determining the utilization of reconnaissance elements operating ill RVN. The study covers capabilities, concept of employment, intelligence obtained, equipment and personnel problems, and trends. The study will be completed about 1 September 1968. It is anticipated the study will be of definite future value to MACV and all elements supervising and conducting Long Range patrols.

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SYNOPSIS OF PRESENTATION OF THE MACV RECONDO SCHOOL

Major Stevens, MACV Recondo School: In September 1965, Detachment B-52, 5th Special Forces Group (Ai:rborne), 1st Special Forces, began a unit training program on long range reconnaissance patrol techniques to train their replacement personnel. The conventional units throughout the country learned of this program and requested they be permitted to send selected personnel to these courses" General Westmoreland directed that a study be made of long range reconnaissance patrol capabilities of US units in Vietnam and as a resull; of this study, he directed that a three-week course of instruction in long rimge reconnaiBSance patrolling be condu,cted. The Commanding Officer of the 5th BFG (Abn), 1st Special Forces, was tasked to organize and conduct the school and was designated as the Commandant. The school was officially opened by General West-moreland on 15 September 1966.

The word "RECONDO" was coined by General Westmoreland and is a derivative of three well known term" long aBSociated with soldiering -":Reconnaissance". "Commando". aad "Doughboy". The mission of the school is to train selected personnel. from US/FWMAF units in specialized techniques and skills necessary to conduct successfuliong range recon-naissance operations in South Vietna,m. The program of instruction lasts 20 days and consists of 286 hours of instruction and practical work. The course consists of two weeks of clas:sroom instruction intended to make the individual student proficient in every aspect of Long Range Patrolling, includ-ing such subjects as detailed map rE:ading, first aid, weapons, tactics, signal subjects, photography, survival, artillery adjustment, infiltration/ exiiltration methods and many others. The third week is an actual combat operation with ,8. Recondo School Insl:ructor accompanying the inserted team. Insertion is ruade by helicopters OPCON to the Recondo School into an enemy controlled area. Thus the eI:lemy acts as a training aid. the most realistic one available. Various types of reaction to a sighting are available, including gunships, a reaction force and/or artl.llery. The individua.l students are observed during the exercise to determine if the previous instruction has been assimilated to the point where the student can proficiently perform duties as a Long Range Patrol member and leader. A new course of 65

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AVHGB-P Synopsis of Presentation of the MAC" Recondo School

students starts every two weeks. The operations conducted by the Recondo School are of a type that is most gene1rally applicable for every type of terrain and situation. They are meant as examples, and it is understood that individual units will have to modlfy the operation somewhat. The SOP of individual equipment placement is a.lso in this category. It designates a specific, uniform location for each item of individual equipment so that in event of injury, other patrol members will know exactly where to find items of equipment to help him. Th., Recondo School developed this SOP to have the widest applicability. but it may have to be changed because of special equipment carried by certain units or in special terrain situations.

Some units consistently have a high n1.unber of people lIIucc.eufully completing the course, while other units consistttntly have a low number of gradUates. Emphasil at the unit level must be ghren to enforcing selection standards to eliminate the high failure rates .. The selectiQ:I1 criteria are published in USARV Regulation 350-2. U the stud<ent fails to meet these qualifications, he will eltperience difficulty in compl<eting the course and is wasting valuable time and effort of both the .chool and the Army, It is recommended that individual units conduct a course for who will attend the .chool, in an effort to prepare and familiariz.e the lltudent with the type of training he will be undertaking. This will assist the Recondo School in lowering the number of individuals· not graduating due to attitude problems.

Personal appearance is deemed by the Ichool. While a student is at school, the individual is required to maintain a high standard of personal hygiene and· appearance. Mustaches must be nearly trimmed, haircuts must be short, and the normal appearance ·of an elite l.RP trooper does not include rings in ears Qr bracelets. The scho'Dl i. a MACV Bchool and these standards must be maintained.

The arriving students should have an 'ldequate amount of money to defray expenses at the school. The minimUJlIl is $25, which does not provide any of the niceties of life. The money is lJsed to provide facilities such as maid service, ,haircuts, mess hall personn,el and to provide each graduate with six B.econdo patches and. a diploma. honor graduate receives a special knife purchased from the fund"

USAB.V Regulation 350-2 contains a lilit of equipment that the individual should bring to the school with him. Many sl;udents do not realize this and the school does not have enough facilities to provide this equipment for every student. Critical items are camouflage faUques and M-16 magazines. Failure to comply with the regulations may result in not accepting the student.

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