A. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL (SEC. 7, ART. III)I. LimitationsRubi vs Provincial Board of MindoroFACTS: Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of very low culture.One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later caught and was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, which provides:With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board."With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board."was challenged.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes undue delegation. Whether or not the Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.

HELD:

I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the Administrative Code. Under the doctrine of necessity, who else was in a better position to determine whether or not to execute the law but the provincial governor. It is optional for the provincial governor to execute the law as circumstances may arise. It is necessary to give discretion to the provincial governor. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.

II. No. Among other things, the term non-Christian should not be given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term non-Christian it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this case, the Manguianes were being reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace and to arrest their seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down where they can adapt to the changing times.The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: . . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL v. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL

FACTS:Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25, 1918 beyond the womens consent and knowledge. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc, Manila. Thereafter the women were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers.The purpose of sending this women to davao is to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years.That when the women, its relative and lawyers filed for habeas corpus, the City of Manila Mayor and police moved to dismiss the case saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.

ISSUE /S: 1. Whether or not mayor lukban who is an officer of the state, to eradicate vices in its city have the right to deport said women of ill-repute?2. Whether or not the city of manila does not have a jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus to davao city to produce the body of the women since it is out of their jurisdiction and thus, disobeying the writ issued by the court to produce the body of the women?HELD:

The petition was granted. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court for not following the order of the court to produce the body of the women and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100)RATIO:1. On the first issue, the courts decision is based on the principle of Republicanism wherein Ours is a government of laws and not of menLaw defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed thatNo freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors2. On the second issue, the court believed that the true principle should be that, if the respondent (Mayor Lukban) is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.3. In other words, If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.NOTE:HABEAS CORPUS as defined by the Black Law DictionaryLiterally means- That you have the body- It is a writ employed to bring a person before a court, most frequently to ensure that the partys imprisonment or detention is not illegal.- In addition to being used to test the legality of the arrest or commitment, the writ maybe used to obtain review of (1) the regularity of the extradition process (2) the right to or amount of bail or (3) the jurisdiction of a court that has imposed a criminal sentence.- In other words, it is a writ which compel someone to produce the body of the person under the name of the law.

Manotoc vs. CA | May 30, 1986FACTS:Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management Inc. and the Manotoc Securities Inc. (stock brokerage house). He was in US for a certain time, went home to file a petition with SEC for appointment of a management committee for both businesses. Such was granted. However, pending disposition of a case filed with SEC, the latter requested the Commissioner of Immigration not to clear him for departure. Consequently, a memorandum to this effect was issued.There was a torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities Inc which was suspected to be fake. 6 of its clients filed separate criminal complaints against the petitioner and Leveriza, President and VP respectively. He was charged with estafa and was allowed by the Court to post bail.Petitioner filed before each trial court motion for permission to leave the country stating his desire to go to US relative to his business transactions and opportunities. Such was opposed by the prosecution and was also denied by the judges. He filed petition for certiorari with CA seeking to annul the prior orders and the SEC communication request denying his leave to travel abroad.According to the petitioner, having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts that granted him bail nor SEC, which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

ISSUE: WON petitioners constitutional right to travel was violated.HELD: NO. The court has power to prohibit person admitted to bail from leaving the country because this is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his constitutional right to travel. In case he will be allowed to leave the country without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of courts. Furthermore, petitioner failed to satisfy trial court and CA of the urgency of his travel, duration thereof, as well as consent of his surety to the proposed travel. He was not able to show the necessity of his travel abroad. He never indicated that no other person in his behalf could undertake such business transaction.Article 3 Sec6: The liberty of abode and of changing the same shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. According to SC, the order of trial court in releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the provision on right to travel.

PHIL. ASS. OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. vs. RUBEN D. TORRES, ET AL. G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992Facts:

Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI, for short), is the largest national organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA, to engaged in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino landbased workers, including domestic helpers.On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong".Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1991, dated July 10, 1991, providing GUIDELINES on the Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers.On August 1, 1991, the POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong. All Hong Kong recruitment agent/s hiring DHs from the Philippines shall recruit under the new scheme which requires prior accreditation which the POEA.On September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation

Issue:WON the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars.Ruling:No. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA, which was created by Executive Order No. 797 on May 1, 1982 to take over the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging.The assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino land based workers for overseas employment. A careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the "administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the respondents.Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987. The administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and implemented.

Ferdinand Marcos, et. al. vs. Honorable Raul ManglapusFACTS:After President Marcos was deposed from presidency via the People Power Revolution, he and his family was forced into exile. Now in his deathbed, the former President has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Aquino, considering the dire consequences on the nation on the return at a time when the stability of the government is threatened from various directions, stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.

ISSUE: Whether, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines insofar as the powers enumerated under scope of the Executive are concerned.

RULING:Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitation on the exercise of the specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of the executive power. Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Having sword to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for common good. The State, through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre-emptive action against threats to its existence if, though still nascent, they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct.Separate OpinionsCRUZ, J., dissenting:

Nothing important has happened to change my vote for granting the petition. The death of Marcos has not plunged the nation into paroxysms of grief as the so-called "loyalists" had hoped. By and large, it has been met with only passing interest if not outright indifference from the people. Clearly, the discredited dictator is in death no El Cid. Marcos dead is only an unpleasant memory, not a bolt of lightning to whip the blood.This only shows that if he was at all a threat to the national security when he was already moribund that feeble threat has died with him. As the government stresses, he has been reduced to a non-person (which makes me wonder why it is still afraid of him). His cadaver is not even regarded as a symbol of this or that or whatever except by his fanatical followers. It is only a dead body waiting to be interred in this country.This is a tempest in a teapot. We have more important things to do than debating over a corpse that deserves no kinder fate than dissolution and oblivion. I say let it be brought home and buried deep and let us be done with it forever.

PARAS, J., dissenting on the Motion for Reconsideration:I find no reason to deviate from the dissenting opinion I have already expressed.Firstly, the former President, although already dead, is still entitled to certain rights. It is not correct to say that a dead man, since he is no longer a human being, has ceased to have rights. For instance, our Revised Penal Code prohibits the commission of libel against a deceased individual. And even if we were to assume the non- existence anymore of his human rights what about the human rights of his widow and the other members of his family?Secondly, up to now, the alleged threats to national security have remained unproved and consequently, unpersuasive. Our Armed Forces can easily control any possible uprising or political and military destabilization. In fact, the converse appears to be nearer the truth, that is, if we do not allow the remains to come, more trouble may be expected.Thirdly, reconciliation can proceed at a much faster pace if the petition for the return is granted. To refuse the request can mean a hardening of resistance against the well-intentioned aim of the administration. Upon the other hand, to grant the petition may well soften the hearts of the oppositionists; paving the way for a united citizenry.Finally, the entire world will surely applaud our government's act of mercy. As Shakespeare once wrote "the quality of mercy is not strained." Surely, compassion is the better part of government. Remove mercy, and you remove the best reason against civil strife, which if not abated can turn our country into a mainstream of fiery dissent and in the end, as one great man has put it, the question will no longer be what is right, but what is left.PADILLA, J., dissenting:The death of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, which supervened after decision in this case had been rendered, was pre-empted and foreseen in my original dissenting opinion. There I said that the first cogent and decisive proposition in this case is that "Mr. Marcos is a Filipino and, as such, entitled to return to, die and be buried in this country." I have only to add a few statements to that dissenting opinion.Respondents have succeeded in denying Mr. Marcos the first two (2) rights, i.e. to return to and die in this country, The remaining right of this Filipino that cries out for vindication at this late hour is the right to be buried in this country. Will the respondents be allowed to complete the circle of denying the constitutional and human right of Mr. Marcos to travel which, as stated in my dissenting opinion, includes the right to return to, die and be buried in this country? The answer should be in the negative if the Constitution is to still prevail; the answer should be in the negative if we are to avoid the completely indefensible act of denying a Filipino the last right to blend his mortal remains with a few square feet of earth in the treasured land of his birth.Those who would deny this Filipino the only constitutional and human right that can be accorded him now say that the constitutional and human right to be buried in this country would apply to any Filipino, except Mr. Marcos, because he was a dictator and he plundered the country. This is the most irrelevant argument that can be raised at this time. For, our democracy is built on the fundamental assumption (so we believe) that the Constitution and all its guarantees apply to all Filipinos, whether dictator or pauper, learned or ignorant, religious or agnostic as long as he is a Filipino.It is said that to accord this Filipino the right to be buried in this country would pose a serious threat to national security and public safety. What threat? As pointed out in my dissenting opinion, the second cogent and decisive proposition in this case is that respondents have not presented any "hard evidence" (factual bases) or convincing proof of such threat. "All we have are general conclusions of national security and public safety' in avoidance of a specific, demandable and enforceable constitutional and basic human right to return." Recent events have, to my mind, served to confirm the validity of such dissenting statement.If a live Marcos returning to this country did not pose a serious threat to national security, the situation cannot be any worse with a dead Marcos returning. For, a dead Marcos will return to be buried into mother earth, where there are no protests, "demos", or even dissents, where the rule that reigns, in the language of Mr. Justice Jackson in Barnette is the "unanimity of the graveyard."It is said that, while a dead Marcos has been rendered impotent to threaten national security, his supporters would pose that threat to national security. This argument is untenable as it is without merit. As I see it, Marcos' supporters pose a greater threat to peace and order, with Marcos deprived of his right to burial in this country. On the other hand, if the remains of Mr. Marcos are brought to the country and allowed the burial to which he is constitutionally and humanly entitled, Marcos' supporters would be deprived of an otherwise potent argumentso conducive to mass protests and even violencethat their Idol has been cruelly denied the right to be buried in his homeland.It is also said that Mr. Marcos, in cadaver form, has no constitutional or human rights, to speak of. This contention entirely begs the issue. In the first place, one cannot overlook that the right of Mr. Marcos, as a Filipino, to be buried in this country, is asserted not for the first time after his death. It was vigorously asserted long before his death. But, more importantly, the right of every Filipino to be buried in his country, is part of a continuing right that starts from birth and ends only on the day he is finally laid to rest in his country.This dissenting opinion does not pretend to deny the Philippine government the right to lay down conditions for the burial of Mr. Marcos in this country, but I submit that these conditions must, as a fundamental postulate, recognize the right of the man, as a Filipino, to be buried in this country NOW.The majority resolution, in effect, bans Mr. Marcos' burial in this country now. Without in any way affecting my respect and regard for my brethren and sisters in the majority, I am deeply concerned and greatly disturbed that, with their decision banning a dead Marcos from burial in this country, they have passed an opportunity to defuse a constitutional crisis that, in my humble assessment, threatens to ignite an already divided nation, Regrettably, they have ignored the constitutional dimension of the problem rooted in the ageless and finest tradition of our people for respect and deference to the dead. What predictably follows will be a continuing strife, among our people, of unending hatred, recriminations and retaliations. God save this country!My vote is for this Court to ORDER the respondents to allow the immediate return and burial in the Republic of the Philippines of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, subject to such conditions as the Philippine government may impose in the interest of peace and order.

SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting:The case has curious trappings of a deja vu, the shoe being on the other foot, yet, as I stated before, I cannot allow personal emotions to soften my "hardened impartiality" and deny, as a consequence, the rights of the ex-President's bereaved to bury his remains in his homeland, and for them to return from exile. As I had, then, voted to grant the petition, so do I vote to grant reconsideration.I have gone to lengths to locate in the four comers of the Constitution, by direct grant or by implication, the President's supposed "residual" power to forbid citizens from entering the motherland reiterated in the resolution of the majority. I have found none. I am not agreed, that:3.Contrary to petitioners view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power.It is a nice word game, but it is nothing else. For, if the Constitution has imposed limitations on specific powers of the President, it has, a fortiori, prescribed a diminution of executive power. The Charter says that the right may only be restricted by: (1) a court order; or (2) by fiat of law. Had the fundamental law intended a presidential imprimatur, it would have said so. It would have also completed the symmetry: judicial, congressional, and executive restraints on the right. No amount of presumed residual executive power can amend the Charter.It is well to note that the Bill of Rights stands primarily, a limitation not only against legislative encroachments on individual liberties, but more so, against presidential intrusions. And especially so, because the President is the caretaker of the military establishment that has, several times over, been unkind to part of the population it has also sworn to protect.That "[t]he threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased" (Res., 3) is the realm of conjecture, speculation, and imagination. The military has shown no hard evidence that "the return of the Marcoses" would indeed interpose a threat to national security. And apparently, the majority itself is not convinced ("has been viewed...").That Mrs. Marcos has referred to President Corazon Aquino as an illegitimate President, does not, so I submit, reinforce alleged fears of a massive destabilization awaiting the nation. The military has said over and over that Marcos followers are not capable of successful destabilization effort. And only this morning (October 27, 1989), media reported the assurances given to foreign investors by no less than the President, of the political and economic stability of the nation, as well as the Government's capability to quell forces that menace the gains of EDSA.I have no eulogies to say on the passing of Mr. Marcos. My personal impressions, however, are beside the point. I reiterate that the President has no power to deny requests of Marcos relatives to bury Marcos in his homeland. As for the former, let them get their just deserts here too. And let the matter rest.

B. FREEDOM OF RELIGION (SEC 5, ART. III)I. Separation of Church and StateEngel v. Vitale (the School Prayer case)FACTSA New York State law required public schools to open each day with the Pledge of Allegiance and a nondenominational prayer in which the students recognized their dependence upon God. The law allowed students to absent themselves from this activity if they found it objectionable. A parent sued on behalf of his child, arguing that the law violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

ISSUEWhether school-sponsored nondenominational prayer in public schools violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

RULINGYes REASONINGThe majority, via Justice Black, held that school-sponsored prayer violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The majority stated that the provision allowing students to absent themselves from this activity did not make the law constitutional because the purpose of the First Amendment was to prevent government interference with religion. The majority noted that religion is very important to a vast majority of the American people. Since Americans adhere to a wide variety of beliefs, it is not appropriate for the government to endorse any particular belief system. The majority noted that wars, persecutions, and other destructive measures often arose in the past when the government involved itself in religious affairs.CONCURRENCE

Justice DouglasIn his concurrence, Justice Douglas took an even broader view of the Establishment Clause, arguing that any type of public promotion of religion, including giving financial aid to religious schools, violates the Establishment Clause.

DISSENT

Justice StewartJustice Stewart argued in his dissent that the Establishment Clause was only meant to prohibit the establishment of a state-sponsored church, such as the Church of England, and not prohibit all types of government insolvent with religion. In particular, he found that the nondenominational nature of the prayer and the "absentee" provision removed constitutional challenges.

Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)Facts:A New Jersey statute authorized local school districts to make rules and contracts for the transportation of children to and from public and private schools. The Board of Education of Ewing Township authorized reimbursement to parents of money spent by them for the bus transportation of their children on regular buses operated by the public transportation system. A taxpayer brought suit claiming that reimbursement to the parents of parochial school students violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

Issue:Whether reimbursing parents for their childrens transportation to and from religious schools violates the Establishment Clause when it is part of a general transportation reimbursement scheme.

Holding:By a 5-4 vote, the Court held that the state does not violate the Establishment clause when it reimburses parents, as the money flows to the parents as part of a general secular policy designed to keep children safe while en route to and from school.Reasoning:The Court found that while the Establishment Clause requires that the state remain neutral among religions and between religion and non-religion, the New Jersey plan merely provided money to parents as part of a general government service that was not inherently religious in character, similar to providing sewer and police services to churches.Majority:"The establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect a wall of separation between church and State." (Justice Hugo Black)

Dissent:Although the Court was unanimous in affirming the principle of "neutrality" by the government toward religion, four Justices disagreed with the majoritys view that allowing reimbursement for bus transportation to parents of students in parochial schools was not a breach of church-state separation. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Wiley B. Rutledge defined "no establishment" this way: "The prohibition broadly forbids state support, financial or other, of religion in any guise, form or degree. It outlaws all use of public funds for religious purposes."Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)Facts:Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes provided state aid to church-related elementary and secondary schools. A group of individual taxpayers and religious liberty organizations filed suit, challenging the constitutionality of the program. They claimed that, since the program primarily aided parochial schools, it violated the Establishment Clause.Issue:Whether states can create programs that provide financial support to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools by way or reimbursement for the cost of teachers salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials in specified secular subjects (Pennsylvania) -- or pay a salary supplement directly to teachers of secular subjects in religious schools (Rhode Island).Holding:In a unanimous decision, the Court held that both programs violate the Establishment Clause because they create excessive entanglement between a religious entity and the state.Reasoning:The Court looked to three factors in determining the constitutionality of the contested programs, factors that would become known as the Lemon test. First, whether the legislature passed the statute based on a secular legislative purpose. The Court could find no evidence that the goal of the Pennsylvania or Rhode Island legislatures was to advance religion. Instead the Court relied on the stated purpose, that the bill was designed to improve "the quality of the secular education in all schools covered by the compulsory attendance laws." Second, the Court questioned whether the programs had the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. It bypassed this prong by examining the third prong and finding a violation there, thus obviating the need for analysis of this point. The third factor, and the point at which the Court found the constitutional defect, was over the issue of excessive entanglement. Here, the Court held that the states oversight and auditing requirements and the propensity for political divisiveness generated by this kind of aid program would entangle the state and the religious entity in unconstitutional ways.

Majority:"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'excessive entanglement with religion.'" (Chief Justice Warren Burger)

Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)Facts:Pennsylvania state law required that "at least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the opening of each public school on each school day." Two families sued, claiming this violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.Issue:Whether an official reading at the beginning of each school day of Bible passages, without further comment, violates the Establishment Clause.

Holding:By a vote of 8-1, the Court held that state-sponsored devotional Bible readings in public schools constitute an impermissible religious exercise by government.Reasoning:The Court found that state-sponsored devotional exercises violate the Establishment Clause. The Constitutional defects are not corrected by allowing an opt-out provision. The Establishment Clause constrains government from involving itself in religious matters. Therefore, government action that promotes or inhibits religion violates the Constitution. The state may not draft or conduct religious prayers in schools filled with captive audiences of children.Majority:"In addition, it might well be said that ones education is not complete without a study of comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of civilization. It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected [sic] consistently with the First Amendment. But the exercises here do not fall into those categories. They are religious exercises, required by the States in violation of the command of the First Amendment that the Government maintain strict neutrality, neither aiding nor opposing religion." (Justice Tom Clark)

Zorach v. Clauson

Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioners, Zorach and other taxpayers and residents of New York City (Petitioners), brought suit challenging the constitutionality of a released time program, which allowed children to leave school, with parental permission, for religious instruction.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. This case stands for the proposition that the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution) does not advocate hostility toward religion and mere acknowledgment of a religious program, without participation, is not unconstitutional.

Facts. The released time program allowed children, with parental permission, to be released from school for religious instruction. The instructions took place away from the school grounds and no school involvement was required, other than acknowledging the students participation. The Petitioners brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the program alleging that the prohibition against any laws respecting the establishment of any religion also prohibited this voluntary program. The Petitioners appealed from a judgment for the Respondents, Clauson and other member of the Board of Education of the City of New York (Respondents) and the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) granted writs.

Issue. The issue is simply whether New York, through its acceptance of the released time program, has engaged in the respect of an establishment of religion, within the meaning of the First Amendment of the Constitution.

Held. Affirmed.The Supreme Court held for the Respondents, noting that because instruction occurred away from the schools and did not require school participation, no respect for a particular establishment had occurred.Additionally, the Supreme Court held that a philosophy of hostility toward religion cannot be read into the Bill of Rights. Just because the First Amendment of the Constitution prohibits the making of a law which will respect the establishment of religion, it does not necessarily follow that the government should be hostile toward the exercise of religion, which would also be an abrogation of the Free Exercise Clause of the same amendment.

Dissent. Justices Hugo Black (J. Black) and Robert Jackson (J. Jackson) wrote separate dissents, both standing for the proposition that the majority had blurred the line between the separation of church and state.Discussion. While the establishment clause prohibits governmental support of religion, it does not prohibit students from exercising their religions.

BOARD OF EDUCATION v. ALLENFacts of the Case A 1965 amendment to New York's Education Law required public school boards to lend textbooks to elementary and secondary school students enrolled in private and parochial schools. The Board of Education for New York Central School District No. 1, contending that the law violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, filed suit against James Allen, Commissioner of Education, requesting a declaratory injunction to prevent enforcement of the statute. The trial court agreed with the board and found the statute unconstitutional. The Appellate Division reversed the ruling, finding that the boards lacked standing. On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals ruled the boards did have standing, but also found that, because the law's purpose was to benefit all students regardless of the type of school they attended, the law did not violate the First Amendment.Question Do the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment forbid New York from requiring that public school boards loan textbooks to parochial school students without cost?Conclusion Decision: 6 votes for Allen, 3 vote(s) againstLegal provision: Establishment of ReligionNo. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Byron R. White, the Court applied the test constructed in Abington School District v. Schempp and found that, because the stated legislative purpose and necessary effects of the statute did not advance any one religion or religion in general, the law did not violate the First Amendment. Because the books were given to the students, rather than the parochial schools themselves, the Court reasoned, "the financial benefit is to parents and children, not schools."

AGLIPAY vs. RUIZFACTS: The 33rdInternational Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic Church took place sometime in 1936. In commemoration thereof. then Director of Posts, Juan Ruiz, initiated the production of certain stampsthe design of which would have in their center a chalice, with grape and stalks of wheat as border design. Eventually, the stamps were produced and some were sold pursuant to Act No. 4052, which provides for appropriation.Gregorio Aglipay, the head of the Philippine Independent Church, assailed the production and sale of such stamps. Aglipay contends that the funding of saidstamps commemorative to a particular religious event is in violation of Sec 13, Article 6 of the Philippine Constitution which prohibits the appropriation or usage of public money for the use or benefit of any church or denomination.ISSUE:Whether or not the production of the said stamps violate the Constitution.HELD:No. The sale of stamps is not in violation of the Constitution. In fact, what was emphasized on the stamps was not the religious event itself but rather the City of Manila as being theseatof such event. Act No. 4052 on the other hand did not appropriate any public money to a religious event. Act No. 4052 appropriated the sum of P60,000.00 for the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and merely authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in themannerindicated and as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government. The fact that the fund is being used for such is only incidental to the function of Director of Posts and under his discretion.On religious freedomThe Supreme Court notedhowever that the elevating influence of religion is recognized here as elsewhere. Evidence would be our preamble where we implored the aid of divine providence to establish an ideal government. If should also be further noted that religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not an inhibition of profound reverence to religion.

ANDRES GARCES vs. Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZOG.R. No. L-53487. May 25, 1981.FACTS:Pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City, a wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired by the barangay council with funds raised by means of solicitations and cash, duly ratified by the barangay assembly in a plebiscite, reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration of the feast day of the saint. As per Resolution No. 6, the image was brought to the Catholic parish church during the saint's feast day which also designated the hermano mayor as the custodian of the image. After the fiesta, however, petitioner parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea, refused to return custody of the image to the council on the pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were used for its acquisition until after the latter, by resolution, filed a replevin case against the priest and posted the required bond. Thereafter, the parish priest and his co-petitioners filed an action for annulment of the council's resolutions relating to the subject image contending that when they were adopted, the barangay council was not duly constituted because the chairman of the Kabataang Barangay was not allowed to participate; and that they contravened the constitutional provisions on separation of church and state, freedom of religion and the use of public money to favor any sect or church.ISSUE:Whether the barangay council's resolution providing for purchase of saint's image with private funds in connection with barangay fiesta, constitutional.HELD:Yes. Resolution No. 5 of the barangay council of Valenzuela, Ormoc City, "reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Seor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valenzuela", and providing for: (I) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer; and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's projects, funds for which would be obtained through the "selling of tickets and cash donations", does not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate money for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The construction of the waiting shed is entirely a secular matter. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion or interfering with religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.

II. Intramural Religious DisputeFONACIER VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Case was filed by Iglesia Filipina Independiente (IFI), represented by its supreme bishop Gerardo Bayaca, against Bishop Fonacier seeking to render an accounting of his administration of all the temporal properties and to recover the same on the ground that he ceased to be the supreme bishop of IFI. Isabelo De los Reyes Jr. had been elected as the Supreme Bishop. Petitioner claims that he was not properly removed as Supreme Bishop and his legal successor was Juan Jamias. He claims that the there was an accounting of his administration and was turned over to bishop Jamias. Also, that Isabelo De los Reyes and Bayaca have abandoned their faith and formally joined the Prostestant Episcopal Church of America. CFI rendered judgment declaring Isabelo De Los Reyes, Jr. as the sole and legitimate Supreme Bishop of IFI and ordered Fonacier to render an accounting of his admistrationCA affirmed the decision of the CFIIssue: Whether or not the petitioner should still be regarded as the legitimate supreme bishop of IFI.Held: Supreme Court affirmed CAs decision. The legitimate Supreme Bishop of IFI is Isabelo De los Reyes, Jr. The Supreme Court affirms the validity of the election of Bishop Delos Reyes as the Supreme Bishop based on their internal lawsTo finally dispose of the property issue, the Court, citing Watson v. Jones,368 declared that the rule in property controversies within religious congregations strictly independent of any other superior ecclesiastical association (such as the Philippine Independent Church) is that the rules for resolving such controversies should be those of any voluntary association. If the congregation adopts the majority rule then the majority should prevail; if it adopts adherence to duly constituted authorities within the congregation, then that should be followed.

Gonzales v. Archbishop of ManilaPetitioner wanted to collect income from certain properties located in Calle Rosario, District of Binondo. He contended that as having been assigned by the property owner as chaplain, he had the right to do so.

33 | Page

Facts:1. 2. Petitioner (Angel Gonzales) wanted to collect the income from certain properties situated in Calle Rosario, District of Binondo. He was assigned by the property owner (Petronila de Guzman) for the maintenance of a collative chaplaincy founded by her. The ownership dates back to June 20, 1901.3. Petitioner contends that as the chaplain, incumbent and beneficiary of the said chaplaincy, he had the right, by virtue of a title in perpetuity, from June 20, 1901, to receive and retain all the income and revenues of the said property. The property mentioned had been producing and yielding not less than Php 650/month. Thus, from June 20, 1901 to the time the action was instituted, the property in question is a sum of Php 12,500.00.4. Respondents are the Archbishop of Manila (Msgr. Harty) and the administrator of funds of the Sagrada Mitra (Thomas Hartigan).5. Going back to history, by virtue of the provisions contained in the will executed by Donya Petronila de Guzman on March 3, 1816, a collative chaplaincy was founded in this archdiocese. It entailed a certain obligation of a spiritual character and possessed a capital of Php 1,700. It was also provided that the first executor of the estate of the testatrix should act as administrator of the property subject to the chaplaincy during the minority of Esteban de Guzman, the first chaplain appointed for the foundation. Angel Gonzales, a descent of Petronila, was appointed chaplain on August 21, 1901.Ruling:1. Our attention has been invited to the fact that the property affected by the chaplaincy should have been administered by the chaplains and not by the administrators of the Sagrada Mitra inasmuch as clause 11 of the foundress will so provided. To refute this assertion, it suffices to say that the provisions of the said will set forth that the first testamentary executor of the estate of the testatrix should act as the administrator of the property during the minority of the first chaplain appointed in that document. This provision must be understood to be mandatory, except as otherwise provided by the canonical laws and as, pursuant therewith, the chief ecclesiastical authority may order for, after the latter had accepted the foundation of the chaplaincy, the administration of its property appertains to the authorities established by the Church, pursuant to the latters own laws, and this rule has been observed since 1863.2. The defendants in this case were absolved.

III. RELIGIOUS PROFESSION AND WORSHIPi. Freedom to Act on Ones BeliefWest Virginia v. BarnetteBrief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Barnette (Respondent), is a Jehovahs Witness who refused to pledge allegiance the United States flag while in public school. According to the Petitioner, the West Virginia State Board of Educations (Petitioner), rule, the Respondent was expelled from school and charged with juvenile delinquency.Synopsis of Rule of Law. The right to not speak is as equally protected under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) as the right to free speech.Facts. In 1942, the Petitioner adopted a rule that forced all teachers and pupils to pledge allegiance the nations flag each day. If the student refused he would be found insubordinate and expelled from school. He would not be readmitted to school until he conformed. Meanwhile, he was considered to be unlawfully absent and subject to delinquency hearings. The parents could be fined $50 per day with a jail term not to exceed 30 days. The Respondent asked for an exception for all Jehovahs Witnesses because this pledge goes against their religious belief. But he was denied an exception.

Issue. Does this rule compelling a pledge violate the First Amendment of the Constitution?Held.Yes. Compelling a salute to the flag infringes upon an individuals intellect and right to choose their own beliefs.

Dissent.This legislation is well within the states purview to encourage good citizenship.

Discussion.The majority focuses on the right of persons to choose beliefs and act accordingly. As long as the actions do not present a clear and present danger of the kind the state is allowed to prevent, then the Constitution encourages diversity of thought and belief. The state has not power to mandate allegiance in hopes that it will encourage patriotism. This is something the citizens will choose or not.Cantwell v. ConnecticutBrief Fact Summary.A Jehovahs Witnesses was convicted on a charge of breach of the peace for playing a phonograph record sharply critical of the Catholic religion to persons he encountered on the street.

Synopsis of Rule of Law.A State may proscribe speech if it amounts to a breach of the peace, which encompasses not only violent acts, but also acts and words likely to produce violence in others.

Facts.Jesse Cantwell (Cantwell), a Jehovahs Witnesses, was convicted on the charge of breach of the peace for playing a phonograph record sharply critical of the Catholic religion to persons he encountered on the street. His intent was to proselytize his listeners. Prior to his arrest, there was no evidence that Cantwells deportment was noisy or offensive. Moreover, although the message on the record was offensive, it was only played to persons who voluntarily agreed to listen.

Issue.Did the arrest and conviction of Cantwell for violating the common law offense of breach of the peace violate his constitutional rights of free speech under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution)?Held.Yes. The lower court is reversed.Justice Owen Roberts (J. Roberts) stated that while it is obvious that the principles of freedom of speech and religion do not sanction incitement to riot or violence, it is equally obvious that a State may not unduly suppress free communication of views under the guise of maintaining desirable conditions. With these considerations in mind, we note that there was no evidence of assaultive behavior or threatening of bodily harm, no truculent bearing, no profane, abusive, indecent remarks directed to the person of the hearer. Thus, it cannot be said that Cantwells actions resulted in a breach of the peace or an incitement to a breach thereof.

Discussion.By ruling that the facts of this case, speaking to an audience hostile to ones message, does not amount to a breach of the peace, the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) gives insight into the degree of public disorder it requires to permit a government to regulate free expression on those grounds.

Marsh v. AlabamaBrief Fact Summary.The Appellant, Marsh (Appellant), distributed religious literature on the sidewalks of a company owned town in violation of the towns regulations. The Appellant claimed her freedom of religion and press were violated and brought suit under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution (Constitution).

Synopsis of Rule of Law.A state cannot, consistently with the freedom of religion and the press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, impose criminal punishment on a person for distributing religious literature on the sidewalk of a company-owned town contrary to regulations of the towns management, where the town and its shopping district are freely accessible to and freely used by the public in general.

Facts.The Appellant, a Jehovahs Witness, distributed religious literature on the sidewalk of a company owned town despite a sign forbidding this kind of conduct. The Appellant was warned she could not distribute the literature without a permit and that no permit would be issued to her. When the Appellant refused to leave, she was arrested and charged with violating a state statute that makes it a crime to enter or remain on the premises of another after having been warned not to do so. The Appellant contended that to construe the state statute, as applicagle to her activities, would abridge her right to free of press and religion. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) stated that since the facilities that the Appellant was upon were opened primarily to benefit the public and since their operation was essentially s public function, they were subject to state regulation. The fact that the town as privately owned did not mean the liberties of people could be curtailedinconsistent with the Constitution.

Issue.Can a company town deny freedom of press and religion to people in their town?Held.Reversed and remanded. The fact that the premises where the deprivation of liberty occurred, were held by others than the pubic, is not sufficient to justify the States permitting a corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties

Dissent.We cannot say the Jehovahs Witness can claim the privilege of a license merely because the owner has admitted the public to them for other limited purposes.

Discussion.State action is a prerequisite to the assertion of rights contained in the first eight amendments of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. State action will be found when a private actor has acted if (1) the state has delegated a traditional state function to a private entity or (2) because the state has become entangled with a private entity or because the state has approved, encouraged or facilitated private conduct.The privately owned town performs an exclusive public function and freedom of speech and religion cannot be totally banned in violation of the Constitution.Constitutional Law Keyed to Sullivan & Gunther (Fourteenth Edition)CHAPTER I.

American Bible Society v. City of ManilaThe acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila required the payment of a particular amount from petitioner. Respondent claims that petitioners Philippine agency had distributed and sold bibles and/or gospel portions throughout the country; thus, conducting business of general merchandise.Facts:1. Petitioners Philippine agency has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions throughout the country and translating the same into several Philippine dialects.2. On May 29, 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed petitioner that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since November 1945 without providing itself with necessary Mayors permit and municipal license in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and further required petitioner to secure the corresponding permit and license fees, together with compromise covering the period from 4th quarter of 1945 to 2nd quarter of 1953, within 3 days. Sum of said fees amounted to Php 5,821.45.Ruling:1. Article III, Section 1(7) of the Constitution guarantees the freedom of religious profession and worship. It has reference to ones views of his relations to His Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence to His being and character, and obedience to His Will. The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.2. It may be true that in the case at bar, the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that petitioner was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said merchandise for profit. To have the City Ordinance in question applied would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.

Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance (re validity of registration fee in the VAT law)FACTS: Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1streading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB. Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco [however] even signed the said Senate Bill.

ISSUE:Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR.

HELD:By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.Ebranilag v. Division SuperintendentFacts:

In 1989, DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the Jehovahs Witness, and enrolled in various public and private schools, which refused to sing the Phil. National Anthem, salute the flag and recite the patriotic pledge.

Division Superintendent of schools, Susana B. Cabahug of the Cebu Division of DECS and her Assistant issued Division Memorandum No. 108, dated Nov. 17, 1989, directing District Supervisors, High School Principals and Heads of Private Educational institutions to remove from service, after due process, teachers and school employees, and to deprive the students and pupils from the benefit of public education, if they do not participate in daily flag ceremony and doesnt obey flag salute rule.

Members of the Jehovahs Witness sect find such memorandum to be contrary to their religious belief and choose not to obey. Despite a number of appropriate persuasions made by the Cebu officials to let them obey the directives, still they opted to follow their conviction to their belief. As a result, an order was issued by the district supervisor of Daan Bantayan District of Cebu, dated July 24, 1990, ordering the dropping from the list in the school register of all Jehovahs Witness teachers and pupils from Grade 1 to Grade 6 who opted to follow their belief which is against the Flag Salute Law, however, given a chance to be re-accepted if they change their mind.

Some Jehovahs Witness members appealed to the Secretary of Education but the latter did not answer to their letter.

On Oct. 31, 1990, students and their parents filed special civil actions for Mandamus, Certiorari and prohibition, alleging that the respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due process, their right to free public education and their right to freedom of speech, religion and worship. Petitioners prayed for the voiding of the order of expulsion or dropping from the rolls issued by the District Supervisor; prohibiting and enjoining respondent from barring them from classes; and compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him to admit and order their(Petitioners) re-admission I their respective schools.

On November 27, 1990, Court issued a TRO and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, commanding the respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes until further orders.

On May 31, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the petitions defending the expulsion orders issued by the respondents.

Petitioners stressed that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in external acts or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.

Issue:

Whether or not the expulsion of the members of Jehovahs Witness from the schools violates right receive free education.

Held:

The expulsion of the members of Jehovahs Witness from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the state to protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education, and to make such education accessible to all (Sec. I, Art XIV). Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the Flag Ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. If they quietly stand at attention during flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any legitimate public interest that the state has a right and duty to prevent.

It is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our country in 1942-1944 when every Filipino, regardless of religious persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted the Japanese flag and bowed before every Japanese soldier, perhaps if petitioners had lived through that dark period of our history, they would not quibble now about saluting the Philippine Flag. The petitions for certiorari and prohibition are granted and expulsion orders are hereby annulled and set aside.German v. BaranganFACTS: One afternoon inOctober 1984, Reli German et al went to JP Laurel Sreet to pray and worship at the St. Luke Chapel. But they were barred by General Santiago Barangan from entering the church because the same is within the vicinity of the Malacaang. And considering that Germans group is expressively known as the August Twenty One Movement who were wearing yellow shirts with clench fists, Barangan deemed that they were not really there to worship but rather they are there to disrupt the ongoings within the Malacaang.ISSUE:Whether or not the bar disallowing petitioners to worship and pray at St. Lukes is a violation of their freedom to worship and locomotion.HELD:No.In the case at bar, German et al were not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in themannerby which they had attempted to translate the same into action. There has been a clear manifestation by Barangan et al that they allow German et al to practice their religious belief but not in themannerthat German et al impressed. Suchmannerimpresses clear and present danger to the executive of the state hence the need to curtail it even at the expense of curtailing ones freedom to worship.Dissenting OpinionsJ. Fernando It would be an unwarranted departure then from what has been unanimously held in the J.B.L. Reyes decision if on such a basic right as religious freedom -clearly the most fundamental and thus entitled to the highest priority among human rights, involving as it does the relationship of man to his Creator -this Court will be less vigilant in upholding any rightful claim. More than ever, in times of stress -and much more so in times of crisis -it is that deeply-held faith that affords solace and comfort if not for everyone at least for the majority of mankind. Without that faith, mans very existence is devoid of meaning, bereft of significance.J. Teehankee The right to freely exercise ones religion is guaranteed in Section 8 of our Bill of Rights. 7 Freedom of worship, alongside with freedom of expression and speech and peaceable assembly along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary -even more so than on the other departments -rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitously termed by Justice Holmes as the sovereign prerogative of judgment. Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy.J. Makasiar With the assurances aforestated given by both petitioners and respondents, there is no clear and present danger to public peace and order or to the security of persons within the premises of Malacaang and the adjacent areas, as the respondents has adopted measures and are prepared to insure against any public disturbance or violence.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSIONI. IMPORTANCE and SCOPEABRAMS vs. USBrief Fact Summary.The defendants convictions for distributing leaflets advocating strikes during the Russian Revolution were upheld because their speech was not protected by the United States Constitution (Constitution) based on the clear and present danger test.

Synopsis of Rule of Law.Men must be held to have intended and to be accountable for the effects, which their acts are likely to produce.

Facts.The Defendants, Abrams and others (Defendants) were Russian immigrants. The Defendant were self-proclaimed revolutionists and anarchists who wrote and distributed thousands of circulars advocating a general strike and appealing to workers in ammunitions factories to stop the production of weapons to be used against Russian revolutionaries. They were convicted under 1918 amendments to the Espionage Act that prohibited the curtailment of production of materials necessary to the prosecution of war against Germany with intent to hinder its prosecution. Issue.Whether the Defendants speech was protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution?Held.No. Men must be held to have intended and to be accountable for the effects which their acts are likely to produce. The plain purpose of Defendants propaganda was to excite, at the supreme crisis of war, disaffection, sedition, riots and as they hoped, revolution in this country for the purpose of embarrassing and if possible defeating the military plans of the Government in Europe. Therefore, their speech is not protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution.

Dissent.In this case, sentences of twenty years have been imposed for the publishing of two leaflets that the Defendants had as much right to publish as the Government had to publish the Constitution.

Discussion.Clear and present danger supposedly assures special attention to the time dimension. Speech may not be curtailed until there is an immediate risk of an evil. Speech with a remote tendency to cause danger may not be curtailed.II. ELEMENTSa. Freedom from CensorshipNEW YORK TIMES CO. V. UNITED STATESFacts: In 1971, during rising tensions over the undeclared Vietnam War, the New York Times attained top-secret articles based on the 1968 study, History of U.S. Decision Making Process on Viet Nam Policy. The New York Times analyzed the articles for several months, and on June 13, 1971, it began publication. After the third set of articles was published, the Department of Justice sought an injunction to halt any further publication. The next day, the United States obtained a restraining order prohibiting further publication until June 19.Shortly after, the District Court denied the governments request for a preliminary injunction, but a Circuit Court judge prolonged the restraining order to give the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia adequate time to consider the governments case. On June 22, the Circuit Court remanded the case to the trial court for determination of whether any of the future publications posed such grave and immediate danger to the security of the country as to warrant prior restraint and a continued stay of publication. The New York Times appealed the Circuit Courts decision to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Is the First Amendment violated when the United States, during wartime, prohibits a newspaper from publishing sensitive articles which may cause security concerns for the United States?Holding: Yes. [6-3; Majority: J. Black, J. Douglas, J. Brennan, J. Stewart, J. White, J. Marshall. Minority: C.J. Burger, J. Harlan, J. Blackman]Per Curiam Decision: The decision of the Court stated that the government carries a heavy burden of providing justification for restraining the freedom of expression granted by the Constitution. The lower courts held that the government had not met that burden, with which the Supreme Court agreed. Thus, the order of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was affirmed and the stays entered on June 25, 1971, were vacated.Majority Opinions: Justices Black and Douglas wrote joint concurring opinions in which they condemned the governments actions, calling it a flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the First Amendment. Black and Douglas stated that the language of the First Amendment is clear and supports the view that the press must be left free to publish news, whatever the source, without censorship, injunctions or prior restraints. They further concluded that to give the President the power to withhold certain articles from the press would wipe out the First Amendment and destroy the fundamental liberty and security of the very people the government hopes to make secure. Lastly, Black and Douglas discussed the issue of governmental secrecy, calling it anti-democratic, and noted that, open debate and discussion of public issues are vital to our nations health.

Justices Stewart and White joined in concurring opinions. They held that an alert, aware, and free press most critically serves the purpose of the First Amendment. Further, they reasoned that in the absence of an informed and free press, there cannot be enlightened people. Finally, Stewart and White argued that while a need for secrecy exists in many national defense issues the responsibility must be where the power is. Since the Executive is given a large, unshared power in foreign affairs and national security, its duty must be to determine and preserve the degree of internal security necessary to exercise that power successfully.The majority clearly frowned on the actions of the Executive. The six concurring Justices in this case agreed that issuing an injunction, a prior restraint, would be a harsh violation of the First Amendment regardless of the secret nature of the proposed publishings.Dissenting Opinions: Chief Justice Burger wrote the first dissent, stating, the First Amendment right itself is not an absolute. He argued that the First Amendment does not protect situations where secret, stolen articles are published by a newspaper. He concluded that since First Amendment absolutism had never commanded a majority of the Supreme Court, it need not protect these types of cases involving stolen materials.Burger continued his opinion scorning the New York Times for its lack of responsibility in dealing with the illegally acquired materials. Burger contended that it would have not been unreasonable or inconvenient for the New York Times to consult with the government before publishing, especially since the newspaper could have easily anticipated the government's reaction. Burger found it hardly believable that a respected newspaper would fail to act upon one of the basic and simple duties of every citizen in regard to the discovery of possession of stolen property.IGLESIA NI CRISTO V. COURT OF APPEALS

THE FACTS

Several pre-taped episodes of the TV programAng Iglesia ni Cristoof the religious group Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were ratedX i.e., not for public viewing by the respondentBoard of Review for Moving Pictures and Television(now MTRCB). TheseTV programs allegedly offend[ed] and constitute[d] an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by lawbecause of petitioner INCs controversial biblical interpretations and its attacks against contrary religious beliefs.

PetitionerINC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board. The RTC ordered the respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV programs. But on appeal by the respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV programAng Iglesia ni Cristo,and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series ofAng Iglesia ni Cristoon the ground that the materials constitute an attack against another religion. The CA also found the subject TV series indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs. Dissatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme Court.

II.THE ISSUES

(1)Does respondent Board have the power to review petitioners TV program?

(2)Assuming it has the power, did respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioners religious program?

III.THE RULING

[The Court voted 13-1 to REVERSE the CAinsofar as the CA sustained the action of the respondent Boards X-rating petitioners TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121. It also voted 10-4 to AFFIRM the CA insofar as the CA it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review petitioners TV program entitled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.]

1.YES,respondent Board has the power to review petitioners TV program.

Petitioner contends that the term television program [in Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986 that the respondent Board has the power to review and classify] should not include religious programs like its programAng Iglesia ni Cristo.A contrary interpretation, it is urged, will contravene section 5, Article III of the Constitution which guarantees that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.

[The Court however] reject petitioners postulate. Petitioners public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule thatthe exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent,i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. Alaissez fairepolicy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country today. . .[T]he Court] shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.

2.YES,respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioners religious program.

[A]ny act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.

The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for attacking either religions, especially the Catholic Church. An examination of the evidence . . . will show that the so-called attacks are merecriticismsof some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986.This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion.xxx.

The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. . . In fine,respondent board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. In a State where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of duelling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.

In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner,the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. InAmerican Bible Society v.City of Manila, this Court held: The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is aclear and present dangerof any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. InVictoriano vs.Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we further ruled that . . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent animmediate and grave dangerto the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified,and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.

The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completelybereft of findings of factsto justify theconclusionthat the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion.There is no showing whatsoever of thetype of harmthe tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm.Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.

PRIMICIAS V FUGOSO

Facts: An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to issue a permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the government. The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." Giving emphasis as well to the delegated police power to local government. Stating as well Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; orcollectwith other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.

Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.

Held: Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for two constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored the second construction. First construction tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhapsin casesof national emergency.The Mayors first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state.

MUTUC VS. COMELEC

FactsThe petitioner, Amelito Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention (1970). His candidacy has been given due course by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) but the commission prohibited the petitioner from using "taped jingles" in his mobile units for campaign purposes because according to COMELEC, such act is a clear violation on the provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, which made it unlawful for candidates "to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and thelike,whether of domestic or foreign origin." It was COMELEC's argument that the jingle proposed to be used by the petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore atangiblepropaganda material, under the phrase"and the like".Mutuc protested and invoked his right to freedom of speech.

IssueWhether or not the said rule which is "prohibiting the use of taped jingles" denied petitioner of his freedom of speech. DecisionDoctrinally, courts always ruled in favor of the freedom of expression. Moreover, any act that restrains speech should be greeted with furrowed brows.COMELEC shall not exercise any authority in conflict with the law. It must also be remembered that there is no higher law than the Constitution.Regarding the petitioner's invocation of his right to free speech, the Court has constantly held that this preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect. What respondent Commission did, in effect, was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil aginst which this constitutional right is directed. Nor could respondent Commission justify its action by the assertion that petitioner, if he would not resort to taped jingle, would be free, either by himself or through others, to use his mobile units (loudspeakers). Precisely, the constitutional guarantee is not to be weakened by confining it to a speaker having his say, but not perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or other mechanical contrivances. If courts were to sustain respondent Commission, then the effect would hardly be distinguishable from a previous restraint. That cannot be validly done. It would negate indirectly what the Constitution i