Liberia - Youth, Employment, Skills Project...

Document ofThe World Bank

Report No: ICR00003953

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT(IDA-H5940, TF-97110, TF17816)

ON A GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$10.0 MILLION FROM THE AFRICA CATALYTIC GROWTH FUND

AND A GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 4.0 MILLION (US$6.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT) FROM THE IDA CRISIS RESPONSE WINDOW

AND AN ADDITIONAL GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$3.4 MILLION FROM THE AFRICA CATALYTIC GROWTH FUND

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA

FOR A

LIBERIA YOUTH, EMPLOYMENT, SKILLS PROJECT

December 21, 2016

Social Protection and Labor Global PracticeAfrica Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS(Exchange Rate Effective December 5, 2016)

Currency Unit = Liberian Dollars (LRD) LRD 1.00 = US$ 0.011

US$1.00 = LRD 91

FISCAL YEARJuly 1 – June 30

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMSACGF Africa Catalytic Growth FundAF Additional FinancingAfT Agenda for TransformationCAS Country Assistance StrategyCF Community Facilitator CfWTEP Cash-for-Work Temporary Employment ProjectCLIP Community Livelihoods ProjectCPS Country Partnership StrategyDA Designated Account EVD Ebola Virus Disease FDI Foreign Direct InvestmentFM Financial Management FMC Farm Management CommitteeGDP Gross Domestic ProductGoL Government of Liberia GRM Grievance Redress Mechanism ICR Implementation Completion and Results ReportIEG Independent Evaluation Group ILO International Labour OrganizationKPI Key Performance IndicatorLACE Liberia Agency for Community Empowerment M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MFDP Ministry of Finance and Development PlanningMOU Memorandum of Understanding MYS Ministry of Youth and SportsNGO Nongovernmental OrganizationPDO Project Development Objective PFMU Public Financial Management Unit PMT Project Management Team POM Project Operational ManualPP Procurement Plan

PRS Poverty Reduction StrategyPSNP Productive Safety Net ProgramPST Project Support TeamTVET Technical and Vocational Education and TrainingYES Youth Employment Support YOP Youth Opportunities Project

LIBERIAYOUTH, EMPLOYMENT, SKILLS PROJECT

CONTENTS

A. Basic Information............................................................................................................iB. Key Dates.........................................................................................................................iC. Ratings Summary.............................................................................................................iD. Sector and Theme Codes................................................................................................iiE. Bank Staff.......................................................................................................................iiF. Results Framework Analysis.........................................................................................iiiG. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs.......................................................................viiH. Restructuring (if any)...................................................................................................viiI. Disbursement Profile...................................................................................................viii1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design...............................................12. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes...............................................73. Assessment of Outcomes...........................................................................................114. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome.........................................................175. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance......................................................176. Lessons Learned........................................................................................................207. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners...........22Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing..............................................................................23Annex 2. Outputs by Component......................................................................................24Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis......................................................................31Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes.................36Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results................................................................................37Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results.......................................................38Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR..........................39Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders............................61Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents...........................................................................62MAP..................................................................................................................................64

A. Basic Information

Country: Liberia Project Name:LR: Youth, Employment, Skills Project

Project ID: P121686 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-H5940, TF-97110ICR Date: 12/05/2016 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower:REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA

Original Total Commitment:

US$16.00 million Disbursed Amount: US$19.59 million

Revised Amount: US$19.40 millionEnvironmental Category: BImplementing Agencies: Liberia Agency For Community Empowerment Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:

B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s)

Concept Review: 09/21/2009 Effectiveness: 09/13/2011 09/13/2010

Appraisal: 02/03/2010 Restructuring(s):11/26/201206/19/201312/11/2014

Approval: 06/24/2010 Midterm Review: 10/01/2012 09/10/2012 Closing: 06/30/2013 06/30/2016

C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Unsatisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Significant Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately SatisfactoryC.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)

Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Moderately Unsatisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory

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Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies: Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Overall Borrower

Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance IndicatorsImplementation

Performance Indicators QAG Assessments (if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

NoQuality at Entry (QEA):

None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

NoQuality of Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Moderately Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Other social services 61 61 Public administration- Other social services 25 25 Vocational training 14 14

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Gender 16 16 Improving labor markets 56 56 Social Safety Nets/Social Assistance & Social Care Services

28 28

E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli K. EzekwesiliCountry Director: Henri Kerali Ishac DiwanPractice Manager/Manager:

Stefano PaternostroLynne D. Sherburne-BenzChristopher Thomas

Project Team Leader: Suleiman NamaraGiuseppe ZampaglionePeter Darvas

ICR Team Leader: Abu KargboICR Primary Author: Abu Kargbo/Peter Pojarski

F. Results Framework Analysis

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Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)To expand access of poor and young Liberians to temporary employment programs and to improve youth employability, in support of the Government of Liberia’s response to the employment crisisRevised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)No revision. (a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1: Direct project beneficiariesValue (quantitative or qualitative)

0 49,500 59,800 58,581

Date achieved 06/03/2010 (PAD date)06/30/2013

(original closing date)

12/31/2015 06/30/2016

Comments (including % achievement)

Target almost fully achieved. Revised during the restructuring in June 2013 and then during the Additional Financing (AF). Target increased.

Indicator 2: Female project beneficiariesValue (quantitative or qualitative)

0 48 48 47.5

Date achieved 06/03/2010 06/30/2013 12/31/2015 06/30/2016Comments (including % achievement)

Target substantially achieved at 99%.

Indicator 3: Beneficiaries of Community Livelihoods ProgramValue (quantitative or qualitative)

0 45,000 56,500 56,250

Date achieved 06/03/2010 06/30/2013 12/31/2015 06/30/2016


Target achieved. Revised wording during the second restructuring, from ‘community works’ to “community livelihoods.” New target of 47,500 was from June 2013 restructuring. However, the Project Paper for the AF already shows a target of 56,500.

Indicator 4: Net income gain of targeted participants in year of participation (%)Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 75 75 Not known


Target cannot be reported as achieved because of lack of data. This indicator was to be measured by an impact evaluation, which was not completed.

Indicator 5: Persons participating and completing skills development programs

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Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 4,500 3,300 2,331

Date achieved 06/03/2010 06/30/2013 12/31/2015 06/30/2016


Original and revised targets not achieved. Revised wording in June 2013, from original “persons participating and completing skills development programs and receiving certification.” Revised target from 4,500 to 3,300. Completion date further moved to 12/31/2015 with the AF Project Paper.

Indicator 6: Board of Certification and Accreditation for TVET is established (yes/no)Value (quantitative or qualitative)

No Yes — No

Date achieved 06/03/2010 06/30/2013 — —Comments (including % achievement)

Dropped in June 2013 restructuring at the request of the Government because establishment of a TVET Board would require a presidential mandate and therefore was beyond the control of this project.

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised

Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1: Work days createdValue (quantitative or qualitative)

0 1,800,000 2,275,000 2,337,500


Target achieved. Revised at AF. Original wording “Days of temporary employment created (number).” Target also revised.

Indicator 2: Women participation (%)Value (quantitative or qualitative)

46 50 50 42


Target not achieved. Target date revised to 12/31/2015 at the time of AF.

Indicator 3: Youth participation (under 35 years)Value (quantitative or qualitative)

46 50 50 79


Target surpassed. Target date revised to 12/31/2015 at time of AF.

Indicator 4: Beneficiaries below the poverty line

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Value (quantitative or qualitative)

80 85 85 Not known


Target date revised to 12/31/2015 at time of AF. Target cannot be reported as achieved because of lack of data. This indicator was to be measured by an impact evaluation, which was not completed because of the Ebola outbreak.

Indicator 5: Beneficiaries unemployed (or inactive) before project (%)Value (quantitative or qualitative)

76 80 80 Not known


Target date revised to 12/31/2105 at time of AF. Target cannot be reported as achieved because of lack of data. This indicator was to be measured by an impact evaluation, which was not completed because of the Ebola outbreak.

Indicator 6: Total costs allocated to participants’ wages (%)Value (quantitative or qualitative)

68 72 62 59.7

Date achieved 06/03/2010 06/30/2013 12/31/2015 06/30/2016


Revised target substantially achieved. The revision from 72% to 62% was done to reflect achievement of the 72% target for the original project funding (47,500 beneficiaries) with the revised target of 50% for the AF (7,500 beneficiaries). The revision in the AF to 50% reflects the increased allocation to investments in training and capital inputs.

Indicator 7: Public works schemes completed with satisfactory quality (%)Value (quantitative or qualitative)

n.a. 85 — 100

Date achieved 06/03/2010 06/30/2013 — 06/30/2016Comments (including % achievement)

Target surpassed.

Indicator 8: Public works schemes completed within a specific period of time (%)Value (quantitative or qualitative)

n.a. 85 — 97

Date achieved 06/03/2010 06/30/2013 — 06/30/2016Comments (including % achievement)

Target surpassed.

Indicator 9: Beneficiaries trained in basic life skillsValue (quantitative or qualitative)

0 45,000 56,500 56,250

Date achieved 06/03/2010 06/30/2013 12/31/2015 06/30/2016Comments (including %

Revised target achieved. Target increased with the AF.

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achievement)Indicator 10: Trainers educated in basic life skills training (number)Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 200 300 553


Target surpassed.

Indicator 11: Beneficiaries trained in business skills (#)Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 0 5,250 7,400

Date achieved 11/12/2014 — 12/31/2015 06/30/2016Comments (including % achievement)

Target surpassed. New indicator introduced with the AF on 11/12/2014.

Indicator 12: Trainers educated in business skills training (#)Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 0 50 116

Date achieved 11/12/2014 — 12/31/2015 06/30/2016Comments (including % achievement)

Target surpassed. New indicator introduced with the AF on 11/12/2014.

Indicator 13: Business owners participating and completing business development trainingValue (quantitative or qualitative)

0 250 250 240


Target substantially achieved.

Indicator 14: Women participation (%)Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 25 25 25


Target achieved. Target date revised to 12/31/2015 at time of AF.

Indicator 15: Youth participation (under 35 years) (%)Value (quantitative or qualitative)

75 75 75 75

Date achieved 06/03/2010 06/30/2013 12/31/2015 06/30/2016Comments (including %

Target achieved. Target date revised to 12/31/2105 at time of AF.

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achievement)Indicator 16: Trainers and institutional leaders for skills development providers trainedValue (quantitative or qualitative)

0 200 200 250


Target surpassed.

Indicator 17: Training providers meeting specified performance criteria (%)Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 80 80 100


Target surpassed.

Indicator 18: Employers satisfied with the quality of the students (%)Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 80 80 74


Target substantially achieved.

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived DO IP

Actual Disbursements(US$, millions)

1 12/22/2010 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.70 2 07/13/2011 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.82 3 03/15/2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 3.14 4 11/26/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 5.84 5 01/05/2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 6.20 6 09/02/2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 6.20 7 04/24/2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 6.20 8 12/18/2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 6.20 9 06/27/2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 6.20

H. Restructuring (if any) The project underwent three restructurings, and one AF that also included a restructuring.

1) November 26, 2012;2) June 19, 2013;3) November 12, 2014 – AF (P147967)

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4) December 3, 2014 – final extension as part of the AF package

I. Disbursement Profile

viii

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1. Context at Appraisal

1. At the time of appraisal, Liberia was at an inflection point, moving from transitional post-conflict recovery to laying the foundations for long-term development. The Liberian economy, institutions, and human capacity had suffered the gradual and deep destruction of a protracted civil war, the origins of which correlated with a spiraling pattern of bad governance, regional instability, and the marginalization of huge sectors of society. Young Liberians and the rural populace were hit especially hard.

2. Remarkable progress in the post-conflict economy and political process moved the country to a turning point. The 2005 elections ushered in a democratic government intent on redirecting the economy by creating broad ownership of the political structure. Since its election, the Government had set in motion a challenging reform agenda centered on its Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) as complemented by important reforms to improve economic governance, overall transparency, economic growth, and social development. Between 2005 and 2008, Liberia’s economy witnessed a steady uptrend with an average growth rate of 7.4 percent. Furthermore, foreign direct investments (FDIs) had increased, particularly, in the mining, rubber, and forestry sectors.

3. Despite this progress, the situation in Liberia remained fragile and exposed to the global financial crisis. As a result, growth was adversely affected, with gross domestic product (GDP) growth slowing to 4.9 percent in 2009. In 2009–2010, the per capita GDP was estimated at US$222 and an estimated 63.8 percent of Liberia’s 3.5 million people lived below the poverty line, with 47.9 percent living in extreme poverty. Furthermore, the main revenue sources of the cash-based budget of the Government of Liberia (GoL) were subject to the fluctuations of international markets, which were impacted by the crisis. Exports of natural resources were the main source of revenue for the GoL: international trade taxes accounted for 50 percent of Liberia’s tax revenue, but commodity prices had declined significantly because of the crises. Revenues from rubber exports, which accounted for nearly 80 percent of Liberian exports, were hit by a 60 percent decline in the international market price for rubber. Financing for FDIs, which accounted for 24 percent of GDP, became more difficult to secure because of the financial crisis, especially since they were targeted toward natural resource exports, which had seen a decline in international prices

4. The global crisis exacerbated existing youth vulnerabilities. With 75 percent of the population under 35 years, a large segment of the society came of age in the midst of a disrupted education system; lack of education and skills were likely to result in low productivity and low-wage jobs for these young people. The story of the young people who came of age during the war (in which there was no proper functioning education system), was likely made worse by the financial crisis, which was then followed closely by the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) crisis. The country suffers from chronic underinvestment in the education system.

5. Estimates on the rate of unemployment, underemployment, and unpaid work varied between 20 percent and 30 percent of the working-age population. The vast majority of the employed were engaged in very low-paying jobs, thereby underpinning the cycles of poverty or

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extreme poverty. The economic structure limited the creation of new, more productive jobs, given the prevalence of low-yield agriculture and the limited size of the formal sector. In addition, this sector was hit by the global financial crisis, in particular, by the fall in international demand for commodities and the slowdown in FDI. The creation of temporary employment opportunities for the youth in particular was seen as an emergency response to the repercussions of the financial crisis on the economic and social texture of the country.

6. Overall, the technical and vocational education and training (TVET) system was highly fragmented among several ministries, had no accreditation or certification system in place, and was cost prohibitive. The informal, private apprenticeship system was more aligned with demand; however, it lacked budget resources and clear formal standards and regulations. A comprehensive TVET reform was necessary to reorient public and private TVET providers into a sustainable, demand-driven system.

7. As a result, the project was constructed to try to address the issues of bridging short-term, temporary employment opportunities for the youth with the longer-term agenda on employability, skills development, and TVET system reform. Funding was secured from the Africa Catalytic Growth Fund (ACGF) (US$10 million, later supplemented by an additional financing of US$3.4 million), and from the IDA Crisis Response Window (US$6 million). The ACGF was seen as having the ability to act quickly, innovate, and address short-term issues within a longer-term program. The ACGF support for Liberia was based on Liberia’s qualification as a transformation country, on the project’s ability to contribute to shared growth and employment, and on the catalytic effect of the ACGF support. The Crisis Response Window, on the other hand, served as a mechanism to address short-term emergency issues, while also undertaking longer-term activities, such as improving employability though skills development.

1.2. Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)

8. The original project development objective (PDO) was to expand access of poor and young Liberians to temporary employment programs and to improve youth employability, in support of the Government of Liberia’s response to the employment crisis.

9. The original key performance indicators (KPIs) were:

(a) Direct project beneficiaries (number)

(b) Female project beneficiaries (percent)

(c) Beneficiaries of public works program1 (number)

(d) Net income gain of targeted participants in year of participation (percent)

(e) Persons participating and completing skills development programs and receiving certification (number)

(f) Board of Certification and Accreditation for TVET is established 1 The wording was revised during the June 2013 restructuring to ‘Beneficiaries of Community Livelihoods Program’.

2

1.3. Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

10. The PDO remained unchanged through the life of the project. However, certain revisions to the KPIs were applied through two of the three restructurings.

Table 1. Summary Revisions to Key Performance Indicators

# Project Outcome Indicators Date/Revision Comment

1 Direct project beneficiaries (number)

(i) June 19, 2013/revised target from 49,500 to 50,800(ii) December 1, 2014/revised target from 50,800 to 59,800

(i) Reflects reallocation(ii) Reflects AF

2 Female project beneficiaries (percent) No change

3 Beneficiaries of Community Works Program (number)

(i) June 19, 2013/revised target from 45,000 to 47,500(ii) December 1, 2014/ revised target from 47,500 to 56,500

(i) Reflects reallocation(ii) Reflects AF

4Net income gain of targeted participants in year of participation (percent)

No change

5Persons participating and completing skills development programs (number)

(i) June 19, 2013/revised wording(ii) June 19, 2013/revised target from 4,500 to 3,300

(i) Linked to the change in PDO indicator 6. Wording changed from “Persons participating and completing skills development programs and receiving certification” to “Persons participating and completing skills development programs.” The establishment of the TVET Board was a prerequisite for the certification of trainees upon completion of skills development programs.(ii) Reflects reallocation

6Board of Certification and Accreditation for TVET is established (yes/no)

Dropped/June 19, 2013

Dropped with the second project restructuring, at the request of the Government, with the argument that “TVET is not referenced in the Project Development Objective and the establishment of a TVET Board would require a presidential mandate and therefore is beyond the control of this project.”

1.4. Main Beneficiaries

11. The main project beneficiaries are poor and young Liberians (between ages 18 and 35 years), with a special focus on women’s participation. The Project Operational Manual (POM) also suggested a focus on several key vulnerable groups, including pregnant women, women with small children, and people with disabilities.

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1.5. Original Components (as approved)

Component 1: Community Works (US$8.5 million)

12. Component 1 responded to the youth employment crisis by creating temporary employment through community-based public works activities. This intervention built and improved upon a project2 that was successfully ongoing at the time and included two subcomponents. The first subcomponent focused on the implementation of public works projects with the goal of engaging 45,000 (initially planned target, later increased) Liberians in temporary employment with a particular emphasis on targeting youth at risk. The second subcomponent aimed to build the Government’s capacity to undertake and coordinate similar activities.13. Subcomponent 1.1. Temporary Employment through Community-Based Public Works Activities (US$7.5 million). Subcomponent 1.1 scaled up the Cash-for-Work Temporary Employment Project (CfWTEP)—implemented by the Liberia Agency for Community Empowerment (LACE)—that provided direct short-term employment through public works projects. The CfWTEP was earlier supported by a US$3.0 million grant from the Food Price Crisis Response Trust Fund. Under that program, 17,000 temporary jobs were created in both urban and rural areas. The Youth Employment Skill (YES) Project, with some adjustments, retained the implementation approach and targeted 45,000 vulnerable persons throughout Liberia's 15 counties. Subcomponent 1.1 also planned to include a no cognitive skills module to reinforce basic life skills and workforce readiness behaviors provided by the overall experience of participating in the public works activities. It was also expected to strengthen the impact of temporary employment projects by focusing on community priorities and increasing work productivity through improved work supervision.

14. Subcomponent 1.2. Capacity Building for the Coordination and Monitoring of Public Works Activities (US$1.0 million). Subcomponent 1.2 provided technical assistance to the Government to coordinate better temporary employment activities. Subcomponent 1.2 was planned to help the Government improve coordination among government and donor programs by focusing on both policy and technical issues, such as level of salary, type of training, daily versus task-based wages, and medium- to long-term exit strategies from donor-financed projects. This subcomponent would also finance an independent impact assessment of the temporary employment activities conducted under Component 1 based on two studies (at midterm review and completion). In addition, this subcomponent would undertake a feasibility study to assess the possibility of and potential benefits from, including private contractors, trained in labor-intensive techniques, to implement some of the public works activities.

Component 2: Employment through Skills Training (US$7.5 million)

15. This component would finance formal and informal skills training programs with the purpose of improving youth employability and employment and would support institutional development for TVET—especially for policy development, institutional capacity building (including certification), and project management. Through these activities, this project was to support small businesses and stimulate demand for skills among these businesses, thus contributing to improved earnings and employment. Finally, through the TVET’s institutional development activities, the project would start developing the foundations of an efficient, 2 Cash-for-Work Temporary Employment Project (CfWTEP)

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sustainable, and demand-driven skills development program. Unlike Component 1, which built on existing program experience, Component 2 was exploring new areas to support youth, that involved cross-sectoral engagement (social protection and education), and pushed for new policies. As developing such a program takes at least a decade, the project was only expected to take the initial steps during the three-year operation.

16. Subcomponent 2.1 Skills Development Programs (US$6.0 million) would finance skills development activities toward enhancing employability and improving employment of youth through the provision of key skills in high demand, both in the micro and small enterprises and in the large industries. The program was designed to focus on sectors and businesses that have the economic potential to grow and provide additional employment in key pillars of the Liberian economy.

17. Subcomponent 2.2 TVET Institutional Development (US$1.5 million) would assist in the building of an institutional and policy framework with the long-term objective of creating an efficient demand-driven TVET system that integrates both public and private sector service providers within a certification system that recognizes competency and skills development linked to job demand. It would build capacities for (a) skills training providers and (b) the governmental agencies responsible for strategic planning, policy development, certification, monitoring, and assessment in the TVET sector to ensure that skills training is more relevant, efficient, and sustainable. During the three-year operation, the project was not expected to cover all aspects of TVET reforms. The subcomponent included the following three main activities:

(a) TVET policy development. This activity was to provide technical support to the policies that the Government had planned for TVET, including the establishment of a cross-sectoral TVET Commission to steer TVET programs across sectors and the TVET Fund, which was to provide demand-driven financing of skills development and the financing of public and private sector providers, as well as allow future donor financing to be efficiently channeled toward the long-term skills development strategy

(b) TVET institutional capacity building. This activity was to focus on the capacities of the Government and training providers. On the Government side, it was to enhance the capacity of the Agricultural Industrial Training Bureau to create a system of certification of a number of TVET skills and courses. The Agricultural Industrial Training Bureau was to receive support to improve its physical facility including equipment for running efficient testing and certification services. The training providers were expected to train trainers and to improve institutional management.

(c) Project management. Project management was expected to be the responsibility of a management agent to be selected by the recipient under a competitive bidding procedure, conforming with qualifying criteria and terms of reference agreed with IDA.

18. Theory of change. The theory of change of each of the PDO objectives is discussed in the next paragraphs.

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19. To expand access of poor and young Liberians to temporary employment programs. Component 1 (Community Works) would directly finance public work activities for vulnerable youth beneficiaries for short-term employment. The community works would provide income directly, in exchange for labor on labor-intensive subprojects. Implementation of the program would expand opportunities for poor and young Liberians to access more income opportunities.

20. To improve youth employability. The theory of change on improving youth employability is that the youth would be trained in market-relevant skills, thus making them more employable, and work is carried out with employers to make them more willing to hire those youth. Under both components, the project would strive to improve youth employability further by directly training beneficiaries. Component 1 would provide non-cognitive and life skills training for beneficiaries to make them more employable. Component 2 would increase access to skills development opportunities by training youth and attempting to ensure job placement of those trained. The project would also build the capacities of relevant organizations and institutions and undertake capacity-building initiatives for local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), also referred to as Community Facilitator (CFs), hired by LACE. It would provide business development support to business owners to improve productivity and strengthen the sustainability of the resulting increases in employment, improve quality and relevance of skills training through capacity building of trainers and training institutions, and establishing an institutional framework for TVET development, thereby setting the stage for future improvements in youth employability.

1.6. Revised Components

21. At the time of the additional financing (AF) (November 2014) the name of Component 1:‘Community Works’—was changed to ‘Community Livelihoods to reflect the proposed changes to the activities’. The AF was entirely allocated to Component 1, which was scaled up from US$9.4 million to US$12.8 million. Component 1 continued to focus on bridging the employment gap within Liberia through the increase of income generating opportunities for the poor, and youth in particular. Toward this goal, the AF aimed to expand the community-based public works subprojects with the adoption of an emphasis on productive activities, the piloting of business skills training, and the undertaking of an expanded impact evaluation to assess these revisions to the project cycle. The revised activities were placed within the existing two subcomponents of Component 1.

1.7. Other Significant Changes

Change of Implementation Arrangements for Component 2

22. At the time of the second restructuring (June 2013) the implementation arrangements for Component 2 were changed, as a result of the component’s underperformance. Initially, the Government outsourced the management of this component to an externally contracted agency, selected competitively. At the time of the second restructuring, and at the expiration of the outsourcing arrangement, the Ministry of Youth and Sports (MYS) assumed the responsibilities for the implementation of the remaining activities under Component 2. The main indicator3

3 ‘Persons participating and completing skills development programs’.

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target for Component 2 was reduced from 4,500 to 3,300, and US$907,000 was reallocated from this component to Component 1.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry

23. The design of the YES Project replicated the CfWTEP, which was still under way at the time of appraisal of the YES Project. The design of Component 1 was largely based on the CfWTEP. This decision was made based on the evaluation done by Backiny-Yetna et al (2012), which showed positive impacts of the CfWTEP and served as the basis of the decision to scale it up. The main difference was the introduction of the life skills training component. Component 2 added the elements to improve employability and provide a longer-term path out of poverty for the vulnerable youth. The project PAD claimed that the introduction of Component 2 followed “Liberian and global lessons”4. Component 2 was expected to utilize the principles of demand-driven skills development and its performance would be measured by the impact on creating employment, improving employability, and productivity.

24. The PAD analyzed a number of global and local lessons and tried to incorporate them into the design. These included the following:

(a) Targeting in countries with high poverty rates is challenging but can be done. Projects targeting the poorest, those most affected by recent crises who are unemployed or underemployed, require the use of a combination of factors, such as poverty indicators/criteria, wage rate, and community involvement, to promote effective targeting.

(b) Engaging employers and the private sector in defining skill competencies is key to success in training. Employers are best positioned to define and anticipate the skills needed by workers and are therefore consulted by training providers to determine the skills to be offered and the development of competency standards for guiding the design of curricula and instructional materials.

(c) Managing expectations is important in employment and skills programs. Communities and participants need to understand the constraints in creating long-term employment. Selection mechanisms need to be clear and mechanisms to address complaints coming from participants and nonparticipants must also be simple, transparent, and clearly explained.

(d) In countries with low productivity, a distorted labor market, and relatively low demand for skills, stimulating demand is as important as adjusting supply to meet demand.

(e) The creation of demand-driven services can only be achieved by targeting a selected number of skills and working through a limited number of service

4 During ICR interviews, some of the interviewees attributed the design of Component 2 to experience gained through the Economic Empowerment of Adolescent Girls and Young Women in Liberia (EPAG) project, as well as to activities financed by other donors.

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providers. Once the mechanisms are established, the key programs can be scaled up by moving to new regions and involving additional service providers.

(f) Competition among public and private training institutions promotes flexibility, cost-efficiency, and market-driven skills.

(g) Introducing non-cognitive skills alongside work opportunities and vocational and technical skills training is key to improving employability. Non-cognitive skills provide youth with the ability for effective skills in communication, knowledge of how to resolve conflicts peacefully, awareness of health risks, understanding of acceptable workplace norms and behavior, and knowledge of how to search for employment. Similarly, employability needs to involve work and practical experience to assist learning and to gradually eliminate a culture of dependency.

(h) Experience shows the importance of having a solid governance mechanism in place to manage the TVET system, ensuring a transparent decision-making process on funds allocation and a certification and quality control system.

2.2 Implementation

25. The project underwent three restructurings, including one AF that also included a restructuring.

(a) Restructuring on November 26, 2012 was mainly technical to (i) add specific reference to ‘subprojects and training and workshops’ in the category of eligible expenditure for Part 1 of the project; (ii) revise the legal definition of ‘subproject’, as contained in the appendix to the Legal Agreements, to specifically include wages of temporary workers and other constituent items that belong to the types of subproject activities normally being carried out under this component; and (iii) define ‘training and workshops’ in the Financing Agreement

(b) Restructuring on June 19, 2013 was substantive, aiming to improve performance and the measurement of outcomes, and was done to (i) reallocate US$907,000 of proceeds between the categories of expenditure for the ACGF Grant Number TF097110; (ii) drop one PDO level indicator and revise the wording of one PDO level indicator; (iii) change the implementing agency of Part 2 of the project; and (iv) extend the project closing date from June 30, 2013 to December 31, 2014

(c) AF (P147967) with Restructuring 3 from November 12 to December 3, 2014 to (i) include an additional grant of US$3.4 million from the ACGF to finance the expansion of the project’s Component 1; and (ii) extend the closing date from December 31, 2014 to June 30, 2016. (The Project Paper is dated November 12, 2014, and the Letter of Extension is dated December 3, 2014. The World Bank approval date shown in World Bank systems is December 1, 2014)

26. The AF maintained the original PDO. The AF also maintained the project’s key performance indicators, although revisions of the target values were made to reflect the scaled-up

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activities. The additional grant from the ACGF of US$3.4 million would finance the expansion of the project’s Component 1 to continue providing direct short-term employment through community-based public works subprojects. The AF proposed to: (a) target an additional 9,000 project beneficiaries between September 2014 and December 2015; (b) revise the public works project cycle with a focus on productive community subprojects; (c) add a new enterprise training activity to encourage selected beneficiaries to use their public works income toward productive livelihood opportunities; and (d) expand the impact evaluation of Component 1. At that point, Component 1 name was changed from ‘Community Works’ to ‘Community Livelihoods’ to reflect the proposed changes to the activities.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation, and Utilization

27. M&E was planned as part of the project implementation and adequate resources were allocated under both components to ensure regular monitoring of activities and to undertake periodic impact evaluations of projects components and outcomes. The M&E responsibilities and activities rested with LACE, the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, and the Public Financial Management Unit (PFMU) in the Ministry of Finance (later renamed the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning [MFDP]) for Component 1, and the MYS for Component 2. The project indicators were designed to allow monitoring and disaggregation of data.

28. Local partners (CFs) contracted by LACE conducted regular monitoring of implementation activities of subprojects at the community level while LACE and the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs conducted quarterly field visits to subprojects. The plan to strengthen the routine monitoring of subprojects through electronic data collection and upload to a central database for near real time review of project activities was not successful because of the lack of infrastructure and inadequate technical capacity to use the technology. One wave of impact evaluation (baseline) was conducted between September 2012 and March 2013. However, due to methodological and technical reasons, the evaluation did not provide relevant information on the indicators.5 A second wave of the impact evaluation was planned for later in the life of the project, but its implementation was prevented by the Ebola outbreak.

29. The M&E Framework and Plan for Component 2 was originally expected in June 2011, but was postponed until May 31, 2012. Its development was delayed in part due to a disagreement between the MYS and the management contractor, regarding the definition of employment. As a result, the framework was not included in the POM and the Year 1 work plan. The MYS submitted the M&E Framework to the World Bank on August 13, 2012. Two semi-annual progress updates (submitted in December 2011 and on August 28, 2012) were delayed.

30. Three surveys were conducted in 2012 to inform the implementation of Component 2:

(a) Youth and Employer Attitude towards Vocational Training in Liberia, which identified the gaps in the vocational training market and assessed the youth and employer attitudes toward vocational training and education in Liberia

5 Reasons included poorly designed questionnaires and inadequacies in conducting the studies that invalidated the data.

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(b) The Employer and Labor Demand survey, which collected in-depth information concerning the labor market situation of young men and women and quantified the relative ease or difficulty with which young people entered the labor market as they exited school; and

(c) Labor Market Transition of Young Women and Men in Liberia, which focused on the transition of youth from school-to-work and to employers. A tracer survey conducted in 2016 indicated that 74 percent of employers were satisfied with the level of skills acquired by youth trained under the project.

31. One key challenge in M&E revolves around post-project follow-up. This is part of the broader issue of sustainability, although it has some specific features. For example, following the project closure, project managers were able to undertake sporadic visits to ex-project sites as part of other supervision missions in nearby areas. This signals the high level of commitment and dedication of management on projects, but cannot be deemed to be an effective strategy for ongoing monitoring. Similarly, in a number of project sites it was observed that community members kept working on the project’s assets even after its official completion (that is, with no remuneration). While this shows a commitment to the community, a more systematic approach to post-project completion will help shed light on a number of relevant issues, such as (a) the use of cash earned by beneficiaries; (b) the activities commenced under the project being continued by communities, including for example, basic maintenance of roads that connect to markets; and (c) other complementary interventions (for example, by the Ministry of Agriculture or the Food and Agriculture Organization) being planned and rolled out.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

32. The overall safeguards rating remained Satisfactory through the life of the project. The project operated under an approved Environmental and Social Management Framework, and a Resettlement Policy Framework. LACE had the responsibility of ensuring that environmental issues, where applicable, were identified and made known to the beneficiaries, and that the communities were trained in monitoring environmental safeguards. Safeguards were supervised regularly, but there was no full evaluation of the safeguards during project implementation to assess the availability of documentation, and more specifically of the Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) for all lands voluntarily donated and the status of all land plots (e.g. whether temporary land plots acquired had been returned to owners or were still in use by the youth). The ICR spot checks and anecdotal evidence confirmed availability of the MOUs between beneficiaries and landowners for three-year land use, as well as that of environmental mitigation plans.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

33. The project strengthened the Government’s institutional capacity to develop, coordinate, supervise, monitor, and evaluate youth programs. The YES Project enhanced LACE as the implementing agency with capacity to implement the project and the MYS to coordinate youth-related projects on behalf of the GoL. Both institutions have received government funding to support its operating costs.

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34. The YES Project contributed to a number of social protection initiatives and allowed the World Bank to open a broader dialogue with the Government on social protection policies and programs. This included the designing of the US$10 million Youth Opportunities Project (YOP) funded by the World Bank, which will be jointly implemented by the MYS, LACE, and the Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Protection. The PDO of YOP is to improve access to income generation opportunities for targeted youth and strengthen the Government’s capacity to implement its Cash Transfer program. The project has taken on board lessons from the YES Project and includes three components: (a) Pre-employment Social Support and Household Enterprises for Urban Youth; (b) Productive Public Works and Life Skills Support for Rural Youth; and (c) Capacity and Systems Building. The project became effective on September 30, 2016 during the preparation of this ICR.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

35. This ICR chose to apply the split evaluation methodology to the assessment of the outcomes before and after the June 2013 restructuring (when some PDO indicators were modified). Achievements before and after restructuring were evaluated separately to provide a clearer and more structured framework for the evaluation (sections 3.1 to 3.4 below). It can also be noted that if Component 1 and Component 2 were to be assessed separately, the evaluation would get the same before/after restructuring ratings, and the same overall evaluation result.

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

Relevance of Objectives

36. The relevance of the PDO at the time of appraisal was high. The project addressed issues of youth employment and income generation and improved employability, which was consistent with the Government’s PRS and with the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS)6 at the time of appraisal. The PRS recognized that the lack of immediate income opportunities, inadequate skills, and high unemployment are key challenges in building the foundation for rapid, inclusive, and sustainable growth. Providing skills to the displaced and marginalized was essential to sustain peace. Furthermore, rapid private sector-driven growth required skilled laborers who could apply modern technologies, as well as maintain and service the rehabilitated infrastructure. The joint CAS of the World Bank and the African Development Bank was fully aligned to the PRS and pursued three strategic themes: (a) rebuilding core state functions and institutions; (b) rehabilitating infrastructure to jump-start economic growth; and (c) facilitating pro-poor growth. The strategy also pursued the cross-cutting objective of capacity development.

37. Following the Ebola outbreak, youth, in particular, faced larger employment shocks than the broader population with implications for peace and stability. The crisis occurred in the midst of the implementation of the AF, and therefore this project contributed to stabilizing incomes and livelihoods particularly in areas that were affected directly and indirectly by EVD and to the population group that was most affected.

38. At the time of closing, the PDO continued to be highly relevant for the country. It linked to the cross-cutting issues (Pillar V) and Human Development (Pillar III) pillars of Liberia’s

6 Joint CAS for the Republic of Liberia for the period FY09–FY11, Report No. 47928-LR

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Agenda for Transformation (AfT). The project also contributed directly to the World Bank Group’s twin goals of ending extreme poverty by 2030 and boosting shared prosperity among the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution. It also continues to be aligned to the World Bank Group’s Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for Liberia FY13–FY17 that focuses on increasing resilience among poor and vulnerable households. The CPS cites youth underemployment, in particular, as a conflict driver that warrants prioritization. This emphasis responds to the guidance of the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Report on the Country Strategy of Liberia (2004–2011) that emphasized “the need to create job opportunities, especially among youth who also need skills development, to address the pervasive unemployment or underemployment problem”.

Relevance of Design

39. The design at the time of appraisal was based on available information and was assessed as realistic. It was seen as responding to a specific situation of need and fragility in the country. The choice of a Specific Investment Loan was appropriate in the situation, because the needed (and government-requested) intervention was concrete, required discrete investments, and was trust fund-financed. The project design supported the PDO clearly and logically and continues to remain relevant in the Liberian context. The rationale for piloting a productive public works model using a community-driven development approach reflected requests by the GoL to include a more productive, sustainable approach to safety nets. The geographical targeting eventually covered vulnerable people in all 15 counties, and the targeting methodology, albeit having some issues, was overall appropriate for the job. Small adjustments were made at operational level throughout project implementation to keep the targeting adequate.

40. However, the design did not fully account for the post-conflict situation and the low capacity for implementation in the country. While Component 1 extended a successful, simple pilot Public Works scheme that worked well, some elements of the design proved to be overambitious – especially Component 2 and the activities related to improving employability, and the TVET policy framework. There were implementation issues with the decision to outsource implementation of Component 2 to an external contractor under MYS’ supervision. That is why at a certain point during implementation it was restructured, and its outputs were reduced. Insufficient supervision capacity by the recipient and the lack of good coordination between the implementing partners were the reasons for the poor performance of the component. The project was also designed as a cooperative effort between the education and the social protection sectors, both on the side of the World Bank, and of the recipient. While intentions were quite appropriate, the actual collaboration could have worked better. As a result, the social protection side (Component 1) and the education side (Component 2) remained as two more or less disconnected activities within a single project.

41. In all fairness, the World Bank and the recipient had to respond fast to two important Government priorities under the Government’s policies for youth in 2009 through two separate development programs, to be established in two different Government agencies. A lot of the value of the World Bank response was placed on the speed of providing the assistance, on cross-sectoral partnership, and on innovation. At the same time, while high returns were expected, there were high risks involved, especially on the employability/training side. These related to the capacity needs on the Government side for managing systemic reform; the difficulties of

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reforming a government training system; and the need for building understanding in the Government on engaging private training providers to create a more competitive training environment.

Relevance of Implementation

42. Relevance of implementation was Modest before the restructuring and Substantial after the restructuring.

43. During the initial period the project took time to unfold, and there were management issues, especially with Component 2. Later on, despite the difficult environment and the challenges brought about by the Ebola outbreak, the project picked up and marked a number of achievements by focusing on improving community livelihoods in agriculture and including a newly designed business skills curriculum targeted for illiterate learners. In particular, the project implemented the relatively new concept of a community-driven safety nets program over the 18-month duration of the AF in a fragile, low-capacity environment. The project faced several implementation challenges, including (a) inadequate linkages with the Ministry of Agriculture and (b) inconsistency in the amount of community land cultivated by beneficiary youth.

44. In spite of these challenges, anecdotal evidence suggests that some communities have continued productive activities after the support from the project, while others have been able to harness the profits into the formation of village savings and loan cooperatives. The project also introduced an innovative mechanism of youth farming in the AF, where a group of youth (usually 25 people) were brought together and connected to work on an agriculture business initiative. This approach was reported to have had positive social cohesion effects.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

45. The PDO has two parts: (a) to expand access of poor and young Liberians to temporary employment programs and (b) to improve youth employability. PDO indicators 3 and 47 directly measure achievement of Part 1 of the PDO, and indicators 5 and 68—of Part 2. However, the measurement of Part 2 of the PDO was challenging because of issues with data collection and assessment (see section 2.3 on M&E).

46. Before the restructuring of June 2013, the progress toward meeting Part 1 of the PDO was slow, with delays in implementation. The progress toward meeting Part 2 was even less pronounced, with slow implementation of the trainings and slow preparation of annual work plans and M&E Framework, and little progress on the institutional front toward setting up the TVET certification system. The indicators on the numbers of beneficiaries were lagging behind, and so were the indicators on improving employability. There were supervision and communication issues between the MYS and the externally hired management agency for Component 2, which resulted in the discontinuation of the management agency’s contract. Therefore, the efficacy before the restructuring is assessed as Modest.

7 PDO indicator 3 - Beneficiaries of Community Livelihoods Program; PDO indicator 4 - Net income gain of targeted participants in year of participation (percent);8 PDO indicator 5 - Persons participating and completing skills development programs; PDO indicator 6 - Board of Certification and Accreditation for TVET is established (yes/no);

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47. After the restructuring,9 the already improved implementation of Component 1 helped demonstrate progress on the expanded access side. At the time of this ICR, all LIPW subprojects were successfully completed and commissioned in all 4 regions and 15 counties in Liberia. Additionally, under Component 1, 79 percent of beneficiaries were youth exceeding the target of 50 percent, and net income gain per youth was recorded as US$150. Additional income is expected to be gained through the harvest and consumption or sale of crops produced through their Community Livelihoods Project (CLIP) activities. However, it is not possible to make an exact calculation of these additional gains without a detailed beneficiary assessment.

48. The removal of the TVET certification indicator helped clarify the actual potential of Component 2. Adjusted implementation mechanisms were adopted (giving MYS direct control over implementation) and allowed Component 2 to advance, albeit not as much as what was initially planned, however the TVET policy was developed. The adjusted target for PDO indicator 5 (3,300 persons completing skills development programs) could not be achieved. While some final impact evaluation work was not completed because of the Ebola outbreak, using intermediate outcome indicators data as proxy for achieving outcomes demonstrates some achievements. For example, the project created 2,337,500 work days under the public works program, which is higher than the revised target by 62,500 work days. Similarly, the target for youth participation was significantly surpassed at 79 percent, as compared to the target of 50 percent. Efficacy after restructuring is therefore assessed as Substantial.

49. The overall achievement on the number of direct project beneficiaries is 98 percent (58,581 out of the target of 59,800). This includes 56,250 out of 56,500 beneficiaries under the Community Livelihoods component (99.6 percent of set target) and 2,331 under Component 2 (71 percent of set target). Of the beneficiaries, 42 percent were females, representing 88 percent achievement of this target.

3.3 Efficiency

50. Both before and after the restructuring, Efficiency is assessed as Modest. There is little data allowing comparison with other programs and information is insufficient. The targeting method used by the project was broadly described as ‘self-selection’. To improve the targeting, the POM attempted to use additional poverty and vulnerability criteria to screen those members of the community who had come forward to participate in a subproject. However, these criteria were not mandatory and were provided only as guidance to LACE and the CFs in an attempt to minimize the inclusion of participants who were not classified as poor. Local committees (set up by LACE and the CFs) were short-listing candidates, and in cases where the final lists had more applicants than the allotted number for the particular community, a lottery would be conducted. The targeting design was silent on criteria and guidance to replace beneficiaries who dropped out of the project, so replacement of beneficiaries was done at the discretion of the CFs. The targeting assessment that anticipated to test the targeting efficiency was not conducted. Therefore, there cannot be any specific claims for efficiency gains from the application of this targeting methodology. Given that the project was responding to crisis, all activities were time-critical. Thus the delays in the commencement of Component 2 and the prolonged time to complete the project is an evidence of suboptimal efficiency.

9 All mentions of restructuring in this section refer to the borderline restructuring of June 2013.

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51. The amount spent on administration by the project was US$2.45 million, which means that the administrative cost as a proportion of total project cost at closing was 12.9%. This is within the norms for fragile and weak-capacity environment. For example, a similar project in Sierra Leone evaluated recently had administrative ratio of 13.5 percent. The Community Works component had labor intensity of 72 percent. The follow-up Community Livelihoods component therefore set an original target of 50 percent labor intensity. In reality, the actually-reached labor intensity was 40 percent due to necessary increases in investments for tools and planting materials for beneficiaries. However, the larger portion of the project funds was used before AF (e.g. before the change from Community Works to Community Livelihoods) and since 72 percent of the cost of subprojects before the AF went directly to beneficiary wages, the estimated effect on the beneficiaries is relatively substantial but limited potential to create durable assets

52. As regards spending per participant, the YES Project appears to be relatively efficient compared to other similar programs. The YES Project spent approximately US$5.3 per person day of work created, which is slightly better than the Sierra Leone Youth Employment Support Project (at U$5.7 per person day), and quite below a similar United Nations program that planned a target of U$9 per person day created, but achieved close to U$32 per person day. According to another study of youth employment programs, in neighboring Sierra Leone, the average investment per beneficiary (of the reviewed programs) was U$394, and the Sierra Leone Youth Employment Support Project itself had an average investment of U$275 per public works beneficiary. Compared to that, the Liberia YES Project is doing well, with US$222 per beneficiary.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome RatingRating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

53. By June 19, 2013 (the date of the restructuring that changed the outcome indicators), the project had disbursed the equivalent of US$12.74 million, or 65 percent of the total amount disbursed at closing, which stood at US$19.59 million. Applying the split evaluation methodology (see tables 2 and 3) puts a proportionally higher weight on the period before the restructuring since a larger amount of the project had already been disbursed by then. The end result is an overall Moderately Unsatisfactory rating for outcome, dominated by the modest efficacy rating before the restructuring. However, the higher efficacy rating after the restructuring is fragile. This is largely due to the fact, that the M&E system had challenges and a lot of data on indicators was missing or was unreliable. Nevertheless, this ICR preserved the split evaluation methodology to add clarity to the assessment and demonstrate areas where the restructuring brought some improvements.

Table 2. Split Evaluation of Relevance, Efficacy, and Efficiency

Category

RelevanceOverall

Relevance Efficacy Efficiency Overall Outcome

of Objectiv

e

of Design

of Implementatio

nRating before the

High Modest Modest Modest Modest Modest Moderately Unsatisfactory

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RestructuringRating after the Restructuring

High Modest Substantial Substantial Substantial Modest Moderately

Satisfactory

Table 3. Weighted Rating of Outcome

Against Original PDO Indicators

Against Revised PDO Indicators Overall

1 Rating Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory —

2 Rating value10 3 4 —

3Weight (% disbursed before/after PDO indicators change)

65 35 100

4 Weighted value(row 2 x row 3) 1.95 1.40 3

(rounded) 3.35

5 Final rating (rounded)

— — Moderately Unsatisfactory

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

54. Although the intended waves of impact evaluations were not met, the project appears to have had a positive impact on poverty, gender dynamics, and social development. The project’s benefits include increased access to better basic services, improved economic infrastructure and employment opportunities, and benefits accrued to the intended target groups, which originally had limited access to basic social services. The youth participation was 79 percent and exceeded the target and the beneficiaries below the poverty line who were targeted also exceeded the target. However, in the absence of an impact evaluation, it is impossible to measure the impact on household income gain, which was a project outcome indicator.

55. The gender impact appeared to be moderately achieved. Of a target of 48 percent, 42 percent of women participation was achieved. One of the possible reasons for not reaching the target could have been the subproject typology – most of the subprojects implemented under Component 1 were related to roads rehabilitation, which involved heavy labor and were not conducive to the participation of women. However, with the AF the project introduced an innovative mechanism of youth farming, where a group of youth (usually 25 people) were brought together and connected to work on an agriculture business initiative. This approach was reported to have had positive social cohesion effects.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

56. At both the national and local levels, the positive institutional impact of the YES Project was considerable. LACE emerged as a relatively effective implementing agency, evidenced by its continued funding from both the World Bank and the Government. Community-level 10 Values to be assigned for each rating: Highly Satisfactory = 6, Satisfactory = 5, Moderately Satisfactory = 4, Moderately Unsatisfactory = 3, Unsatisfactory = 2, and Highly Unsatisfactory = 1. (OPCS Guidelines)

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implementing capacity was also strengthened through the support to local partners such as CFs, which were able to provide technical and implementation support to beneficiaries’ subprojects. Even though there is no evidence suggesting that CFs will continue providing implementation support to beneficiaries, they have enhanced the communities’ ability to stay organized and function as agents of economic and social development and operate in a transparent, accountable, and participatory manner.

57. The project provided the opportunity for capacity and institutional building of participating institutions and their staff. It funded the preparation of the TVET policy that is expected to guide the implementation of TVET initiatives in the country. The establishment of a TVET policy was a significant achievement in the Liberian institutional context.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

58. The public works subprojects turned out to be a ready tool on the ground to absorb additional funds and so provided timely support to the response effort for the Ebola outbreak. The public works component of the YES Project teamed up with other donors and government efforts to cushion the impact of the Ebola crisis.

59. In addition, the project, especially the productive public works under the AF, stimulated local business by procuring materials locally. Field observations and anecdotal evidence suggest that there is a range of small-scale economic activities mushrooming around the YES Project sites (that is, food and beverage vendors, and so on). A number of participants reported having been able to invest parts of the received cash into small businesses. Capturing these dynamics may further the understanding of the program’s local economic multipliers.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

60. See annexes 5 and 6.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Significant

61. The risk to the development outcome as determined at the time of the ICR evaluation is Significant. Continuing the project activities for both Component 1 and Component 2 will require considerable funding, which the country may not be able to afford. Some policy actions—for example, allocation of funds for technical and vocational training—will be needed to enable the rollout of the TVET policy. A possible economic downturn or public health threat like Ebola also adds to the risk.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

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(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

62. The World Bank team worked closely with the Government to prepare the project under tight timelines. The World Bank’s preparation team had a good skill mix, adequately supporting the technical needs of the project. A nine-month period from concept to approval is normal for this type of project, although a slightly faster pace could have been expected because of the nature of the assistance needed, and because the team built on a successful pilot project for public works, addressing lessons that had arisen from the pilot.

63. However, there were some shortcomings in ensuring quality at entry. The design was done under pressure to respond to a crisis, and ended up being overambitious, especially in Component 2. Although the project formally only has two components, some of the activities were hard to implement. The readiness for implementation was weak and that was not entirely accounted for in the timeline and disbursement projections. Key performance indicators, required some mid-course adjustment, with some targets needing refinement, and some definitions in need of clarification.

(b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Satisfactory

64. The World Bank conducted regular supervision missions and proactively addressed emerging issues. This is evidenced by the restructurings and the AF, which remedied technical issues and adjusted the results framework and the design. The findings of the implementation support and supervision missions focused on the performance of the implementing agencies in managing the project and the progress toward achieving the PDO and were reported in the various mission aide memoires.

65. During implementation, the World Bank provided the necessary support to facilitate and smooth disbursements. The World Bank also supported the development of the procurement capacity of the MYS through implementation support training provided by the World Bank’s procurement specialist. With the World Bank support, funds were made available for the training of procurement officers from the project staff.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank PerformanceRating: Moderately Satisfactory

66. The World Bank was proactive in its implementation support and guided implementation, as well as the process of the two restructurings and the preparation of the AF in a technically sound and efficient manner. However, despite the proactive approach during supervision and the multiple adjustments made to the project, some of the initial design issues remained unresolved until the end of the project implementation.

67. Still, despite the Moderately Unsatisfactory rating for Bank Quality at Entry, and the Moderately Unsatisfactory rating for Outcome, this ICR concludes that an overall Moderately Satisfactory rating for the Bank performance is justified. First, a lot of the value of the Bank’s participation was placed on the speed of response, and the Bank team did its best to design a working operation under tight timelines, and in a difficult country environment. Secondly, the

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Bank involvement was valued as driver of innovation. Innovation in development – as anywhere else – brings the expectation of a higher reward, but also bears a higher risk. On balance, the Bank was ready and willing to do the job when needed, and provided quick and meaningful support to Liberia in a difficult moment. Finally, the design was also put on a harsh test by the unexpected Ebola crisis. If it were not for Ebola, some of the project design flaws may have had a lesser overall importance on the impact. At the same time, the Bank reacted quickly to the Ebola crisis and, together with the Government and other partners prioritized the rollout of activities through this project that focused on immediate relief to poor households, which were in particularly dire need given the widespread social and economic impacts of the disease. During the hardest months of the Ebola outbreak, under conditions of quarantine and frozen functioning of many mainstream institutions and development partners, the Bank staff remained in the field and supported Liberia, including through this project.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government PerformanceRating: Moderately Satisfactory

68. The performance of the GoL is rated Moderately Satisfactory for both components. However, it is important to note that there were significant delays on the Government’s side in the approval and signing of funding agreements and this had implications in the execution of some project activities.

69. The GoL provided a supportive authorizing environment to the implementing agencies. For example, for all public works activities under Component 1, the GoL was fully involved. The GoL allocated funding to the communities, participated in the mobilization of beneficiaries, and provided support in conflict resolution among subproject groups. Local government authorities also provided free land for use by beneficiaries for their communal farm activities. Similarly, under Component 2, the GoL hired an international management agency to implement the training activities and anchored the fiduciary management at the PFMU. The PFMU was headed by an international financial management (FM) specialist, who demonstrated strong GoL commitment to achieving project objectives within a framework of fiduciary compliance and effective administration.

70. Some of the less successful aspects of the GoL intervention were related to the initial delays in ratification and signing, as well as the limited progress on the TVET policy implementation.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies PerformanceRating: Moderately Satisfactory

71. The two main implementing agencies were LACE (for Component 1) and the MYS (for Component 2). The overall project financial and logistics were handled by the PFMU at the MFDP.

72. Throughout implementation, the PFMU and LACE had satisfactory performance. LACE established and directly operated its own designated account (DA) because there was internal

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capacity to do so. LACE disbursed funds to vendors and service providers directly from its DA. The limited capacity at the MYS delayed the opening of its DA as late as February 2013.

73. Given that the MYS did not have any experience on World Bank-funded projects, the implementation under Component 2 was outsourced to a private management agency under MYS supervision. However, the MYS lacked the capacity to effectively supervise and monitor the management agency. The management agency had limited staff (two experts and six local staff) and the implementation of the activities under the component commenced nine months after project approval. This delay led to suboptimal achievement of the planned results. Besides, the management agency and the MYS seemed to have had a complex relationship and some communication issues. Eventually, all this led to the discontinuation of the contract with the management agency. The project was revised, and after a restructuring in June 2013, the MYS completely took over the implementation of Component 2. This change had a positive effect and enhanced the coordination among the MYS, LACE, and the PFMU.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower PerformanceRating: Moderately Satisfactory

74. Overall, the Government was involved and committed to project implementation and results. Although the groundwork had been laid, some of the policy elements needed further advancement. Despite some initial delays, the main implementing agencies, LACE and the MYS, performed relatively well. Certain issues with outsourced elements under Component 2 were resolved through restructuring during implementation.

6. Lessons Learned

Policy-level Lessons Learned

(a) Designing operations in difficult, fragile, and low-capacity environment should account for the capacity limitations in the country, and should avoid complex solutions. Including multiple tasks or side activities should be avoided. Even in emergency situations, sufficient design time should be allowed, or, alternatively, simple solutions should be used.

(b) Difficult political situations cause delays in implementation. The YES Project was implemented in a complex political space, which caused significant delays in the implementation of the project, thus affecting the achievements of key project deliverables, particularly on the skills development component.

(c) The integration of agriculture into a youth project enhanced youth participation in agriculture and resulted in the cultivation of a large acreage of land with high yield potential, which will contribute to reducing widespread food insecurity and rural poverty among youths. However, the farming intervention could be more beneficial and attractive to the youth when linked to market and value addition opportunities.

(d) In a fragile context like Liberia, ensuring basic integration and connection between interventions remains challenging, including at programmatic and administrative levels. This holds true for different public works programs, between public works

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and other types of safety nets (for example, unconditional transfers), or with other developmental programs (for example, trainings and microcredit). In other words, the fragmentation of programs and approaches significantly hinders the process of systems building among types of interventions, or for social protection more broadly. Interventions, such as the YES Project, provide a crucial source of short-term and temporary income, but if implemented in isolation, they may offer limited prospects for sustainable pathways out of poverty. Strategic opportunities should be used to unlock some of the synergistic potential among programs. For example, a process toward a common management information system could pay significant dividends in data harmonization (and cost savings) across interventions, including for targeting and various M&E functions.

(e) In building training systems, sufficient time needs to be allocated to allow the system “to learn” the lessons, collect evidence and apply the learning during scaling-up.

Implementation-level Lessons Learned

(a) The project components (the Community Works Component 1 and the Employment through Skills Training Component 2) operated independently of one another. A clear pathway of how beneficiaries could move from Component 2 to 1 (especially those trained in the agriculture and road maintenance areas) would have enhanced the overall design and coherence and further strengthened the value added of a service delivery focus. While the separation of the two components was acceptable from an administrative perspective, it would have been more appropriate from a beneficiary-focused perspective to create linkage for beneficiaries who received training in agriculture and road maintenance in Component 2, to participate in the agriculture and road maintenance subprojects of Component 1.

(b) The structure of payments under the Community Livelihoods component could be reviewed to suit better the agricultural productive subprojects. While payment per day is appropriate for traditional public works subprojects (like roads and others), there may be better mechanisms for the agricultural cycle of crops, and for the way farmers work on the community farm (for example, one or two days a week, rather than a full 20 or 40 days in a row).

(c) Component 2, which provided training for unemployed youth, did not meet its placement goals. Although the initial design in the PAD claimed to have taken into account the need for linking the supply side (the trainees) and the demand side (businesses that would potentially hire these trainees), the actual implementation did not fully provide that connection. There were no built-in incentives for the private sector to hire the trainees. At its core, Component 2 was an active labor market program, which required more concrete implementation mechanisms for linking demand and supply.

(d) Initial setup of the project took time, and additional preparation took place during implementation. The establishment of procurement and FM capacity, internal coordination mechanisms among agencies, and so on should have occurred earlier.

21

(e) The innovations introduced, like smartphones for targeting and monitoring, enhanced the real-time opportunity for fiduciary and other (for example, M&E) assurance and accuracy controls in the project implementation.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

(a) Borrower/implementing agencies

A draft of this ICR was introduced to representatives of the Recipient and the Implementing Agency at a dedicated meeting before the document was finalized and filed. The representatives of the client thanked the ICR team for the good job and confirmed agreement with all the findings of the ICR, including the ratings. The representatives of the Recipient and the Implementing Agency commended the usefulness of the lessons learnt from the YES ICR for the new (ongoing) Youth Opportunities Project.

(b) Cofinanciers

Not applicable

(c) Other partners and stakeholders

Not applicable

22

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (US$, millions equivalent)

Components Appraisal Estimate (US$, millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate (US$, millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

Component 1 8.50 12.47 146.70Component 2 7.50 6.58 87.70

Total Baseline Cost 16.00 19.05 119.00

Physical Contingencies 0.00

0.00

0.00

Price Contingencies 0.00

0.00

0.00

Total Project Costs 0.00 0.00Front-end fee Project Preparation Facility 0.00 0.00 0.00

Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00 0.00Total Financing Required 16.00 19.05 119.0

(b) Financing

Source of Funds Type of Cofinancing

Appraisal Estimate

(US$, millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(US$, millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

ACGF11 10.00 13.38 133.80 Borrower 0.00 0.00 0.00 IDA Grant 6.00 6.20 103.30

11The column “Actual/Latest Estimate” amount includes US$3.4 million Additional Financing (Grant) from ACGF.

23

Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Component 1: Community Works

1. This component focused on activities that created short-term employment for vulnerable youth. As a result, 95 subprojects were created temporarily employing 47,500 youth across the country. Additional outputs under this subcomponent included

recruiting 28 local NGOs, commonly referred to as CFs, to serve as local implementing partners in the 15 political subdivisions of the country to provide, among others, monitoring and supervision;

hiring 415 individuals (235 men and 180 women) as community trainers who participated in the training-of-trainers workshop; and

buying three cross-country vehicles for project monitoring

Component 1: Community Livelihood (AF)

2. The focus of this component under the AF was on communal farming by rural youth, which targeted 9,000 youth in rural Liberia. The following were achieved during implementation of this subcomponent:

238 subprojects were created involving 8,750 beneficiaries who received US$1,312,500.00 as labor subsidies

3,836.43 acres of land were cultivated by various farming groups around the country

8,750 beneficiaries received agro-inputs and technical knowledge intended to improve their farming activities

Hundreds of local planting material vendors received considerable amount of income from sale of their farm produce (cassava cuttings, planting suckers, seeds, and so on) to youth farming groups

3. Tables 2.1to 2.4 show details of the component outputs, with breakdown by county.

24

Table 2.1. Consolidated Summary of Beneficiaries per County

CountyNumber of Subproject

s

Number of Beneficiaries

Number of Male

Percentage of Male

Number of

Female

Percentage of Female

Number of Youth Total

Number of Youth

Percentage of YouthMale Femal

e

Montserrado (urban and peri-urban)

35 8,950 4,476 50 4,474 50 3,960 3,609 7,569 84

Margibi 19 3,200 1,413 44 1,787 56 1,228 1,584 2,812 88Grand Bassa 19 3,200 1,699 53 1,501 47 1,502 1,120 2,622 82Nimba 33 7,950 4,695 59 3,255 41 3,677 2,910 6,587 83Gbarpolu 21 1,950 943 48 1,007 52 822 638 1,460 75Bomi 22 2,450 1,313 53 1,137 47 945 890 1,835 75G. Cape Mount 23 2,950 1,532 52 1,418 48 1,248 1,480 2,728 92Lofa 27 4,950 2,433 49 2,517 51 1,439 1,480 2,919 59Bong 29 5,950 3,398 57 2,552 43 2,547 1,970 4,517 76Rivercess 16 1,700 809 47 891 53 689 763 1,452 85Sinoe 18 2,700 1,154 48 1,546 52 934 1,100 2,034 75River Gee 17 2,200 953 43 1,247 57 712 750 1,462 66Grand Gedeh 18 2,700 1,447 53 1,253 47 1,201 1,206 2,407 89Maryland 19 3,200 1,910 59 1,290 41 1,297 1,170 2,467 77Grand Kru 17 2,200 1,008 43 1,192 57 821 936 1,757 80Total

333 56,250 29,183 52 27,067 4823,02

2 21,606 44,628 79Source: LACE database.

Table 2.2. Consolidated Statistics of Community Trainers and Number of Beneficiaries who Received Life Skills and House Enterprise Trainings per County

No. County Number of Trainers Male Femal

eNumber of Beneficiaries whoReceived Life Skills Training

Number of Beneficiaries who Received Household Enterprise Training

1. Montserrado (rban and rural) 83 49 34 8,950 450

2 Grand Cape Mount 29 19 10 2,950 4503 Bomi 31 17 14 2,450 450

25

No. County Number of Trainers Male Femal

eNumber of Beneficiaries whoReceived Life Skills Training

Number of Beneficiaries who Received Household Enterprise Training

4 Bong 53 25 28 5,950 05 Gbarpolu 21 13 8 1,950 4506 Margibi 30 13 17 3,200 7007 Grand Bassa 30 11 19 3,200 7008 Nimba 69 38 31 7,950 09 Lofa 45 27 18 4,950 010 Rivercess 18 11 7 1,700 70011 Sinoe 26 17 9 2,700 70012 Grand Gedeh 26 20 6 2,700 70013 River Gee 28 18 10 2,200 70014 Maryland 36 25 11 3,200 70015 Grand Kru 28 18 10 2,200 700

Grand Total 553 321 232 56,250 7,400Source: LACE database.

Table 2.3. Total Beneficiaries and Person Days Achieved per County

County

Person Days under YES-CWP Each Person Working 40 Days Within the

Subproject Cycle of Wages Payment

Person Days under YES-CLIPEach Person Working 50 Days Within the

Subproject Cycle of Wages PaymentTotal Person Days per County

under Both YES-CWP and YES-CLIPNumber of Beneficiaries Total Person Days Number of Beneficiaries Total Person

DaysMontserrado (Urban and Rural)

8,500 340,000 450 22,500 362,500

Grand Cape Mount 2,500 100,000 450 22,500 122,500Bomi 2,000 80,000 450 22,500 102,500Gbarpolu 1,500 60,000 450 22,500 82,500Bong 5,500 220,000 450 22,500 242,500Margibi 2,500 100,000 700 35,000 135,000Grand Bassa 2,500 100,000 700 35,000 135,000Nimba 7,500 300,000 450 22,500 322,500Lofa 4,500 180,000 450 22,500 202,500River Cess 1,000 40,000 700 35,000 75,000Sinoe 2,000 80,000 700 35,000 115,000Grand Gedeh 2,000 80,000 700 35,000 115,000River Gee 1,500 60,000 700 35,000 95,000Maryland 2,500 100000 700 35,000 135,000

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Grand Kru 1,500 60,000 700 35,000 95,000Total 47,500 1,560,000 8,750 437,500 1,997,500Source: LACE database. Note: CWP = Community Works Program

Table 2.4. Quantitative Achievements of Subproject Activities by Category per County

County

Category of Subproject Activities and Quantitative Achievements

Regular Surface Works (Road Side

Brushing, Grubbing, and so on) (m2)

Regular EarthWorks

(Drainage Cleaning, and so on)

(m3)

Agriculture Activities (Food

Crops Production):Number of Hectares

Cultivated

Aquaculture

(Fish Pond):

Number of Ponds

Established

Road Rehabilitation in km and 44,800 m2 Construction

of Building

Montserrado County (Rural and Urban) 4,122,570.1 11,310.73 143.16 3 1 footpath bridge (517 m3)

and 3.2 km road —

Gbarpolu 2,186,290 2,568.4 123.3 — — 1 school building with 2 classrooms

Lofa 5,591,968.8 4,704.25 214.7 — 1 airstrip (44,800 m2)24 km road

2 buildings, 1community hall (900 m2); 1 community clinic (12 rooms); 10,000 bricks

Grand Cape Mount 4,229,842.3 4,428.75 177 — — —

Bong 5,943,087.33 4,306.05 84.4 2 52.9 km —

Margibi 3,153,464 2,483.5 80.8 — 1 footpath bridge (11.3 m3) —

Nimba 9,576,346 4,765.3 104.40 — 7.3 km —Grand Bassa 2,705,150 2,585.3 69.2 — 9.5 km —Bomi 2,856,600 1,056.4 166.0 — — —Rivercess 962,000 — 86.9 — — —Sinoe 2,188,250 1,220.5 175.0 — 3 km —Maryland 2,595,465 1,650.2 104.4 — — —Grand Gedeh 2,523,642 1,452.4 71.5 — 11.2 km 1 multipurpose hallGrand Kru 1,636,584 1,520.2 72.4 — 11 km —River Gee 1,876,426 986 61.3 — 1.71 km —

Total summary 45 ,838,825.43 31,159.15 1,734.56 5 fish ponds

121.1 km access road; 2 footpath bridges; and 1 district air strip rehabilitated (44,800 m2)

3 buildings, 1school; 2 community- multipurpose buildings; 10,000 bricks12

27

Source: LACE database.

12 Needed for a 12-room building used as a community clinic.

28

Component 2: Employment through Skills Training

4. his component focused on skills development of youth to make them employable. Nearly 4,500 youth were targeted initially, but after the restructuring, the number to be trained in various vocational and technical skills was reduced to 3,300, with 60 percent of those trained placed in employment settings. The following were achieved:

2,331 youth trained and 2,077 placed in formal and informal job settings

240 business owners received business development skills training

205 participants from TVET institutions across the country received training to improve the relevance and quality of TVET training skills in the country

With funds from this subcomponent the MYS’ three-year strategic and operational plan document developed

A tracer study conducted to ascertain the employment of the YES Project graduates and the extent to which their employers were satisfied with their performances

Ten MYS staff and consultants received training in World Bank procurement guidelines and processes conducted by an international procurement specialist

Two senior staff of the MYS, sponsored by component funds, to undergo social protection and safety nets training in Washington DC

5. Institutional framework developed for TVET development. The TVET policy developed by the MYS, endorsed by the cabinet, and legislated by the Liberian Legislature.

6. The outputs of this component were as shown in tables 2.5 and 2.6 (shown by service provider and confirmed through monitoring visits by the client).

29

Table 2.5. Pre-Training Employment Earnings of the YES Project Graduates across Different Jobs

Monthly income

Graduates Pre-employment Earning Jobs

Farm

ers

Pett

y T

rade

rs

Tea

cher

s

Priv

ate

Secu

rity

Plan

tatio

n w

orke

rs

Cha

rcoa

l pr

oduc

er

Sear

ch a

nd

Res

cue

Cad

et

Off

ice

Ass

ista

nts

Cas

hier

s

Wai

tres

ses

Hea

vy d

uty

Dri

ver

Mot

orcy

clis

ts

Tot

al

LRD 1,000–LRD 2,000 % within monthly income 7 7 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 19Count 37 37 5.3 0 10.5 0 0 0 0 5.3 0 5.3 10

LRD 2,000–LRD 3,000 % within monthly income 7 4 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 17Count 37 21.1 0 10.5 10.5 0 0 0 5.3 5.3 0 0 10

LRD 4,000–LRD 5,000 % within monthly income 9 4 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 18Count 50 22.2 17 0 0 0 5.6 0 0 5.6 0 0 10

LRD 5,000–LRD 6,000 % within monthly income 14 5 0 0 5 3 0 3 1 1 1 3 36Count 37 13.2 0 0 13.2 9.9 0 7.9 2.6 2.6 2.6 7.9 10

Above LRD 6,000 % within monthly income 2 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 4 0 0 11Count 18 9.1 0 0 0 0 18 0 18 36.4 0 0 10

Total 39 21 4 2 9 3 3 3 4 8 1 4 101

Source: YES Project tracer study (2014).

Table 2.6. Monthly Income across Various Employment Groups of YES Project Graduates

Monthly incomeEmployed Graduates’ Area of Employment in Current Job by Monthly Income

Hotel Plantation Restaurant Road Maintenance Tailoring Others Total

LRD 1,000–LRD 2,000

Count 1 0 2 0 1 1 5

% within monthly income 20 0 40 0 20 20 100

LRD 2,000–LRD 3,000

Count 1 0 2 0 0 1 4

% within monthly income 25.0 0 50 0 0 25 100

LRD 4,000–LRD 5,000

Count 0 1 3 5 0 1 10

% within monthly income 0 10 30 50 0 10 100LRD 5,000–LRD 6,000 Count 1 2 3 34 5 46

30

Monthly incomeEmployed Graduates’ Area of Employment in Current Job by Monthly Income

Hotel Plantation Restaurant Road Maintenance Tailoring Others Total

% within monthly income 2.6 4.5 6.5 73.9 0 10.9 100

> LRD 6,000

Count 2 0 1 32 0 5 40

% within monthly income 5 0 2.5 80 0 12.5 100

Total

Count 5 3 12 71 1 15 105

% within monthly income 4.7 2.9 11.4 67.6 1 14.3 100.0Source: YES Project tracer study (2014).

31

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

1. The original project economic analysis included a number of untested assumptions some of which had limited information and thus could not allow proper economic analysis of the component.

2. For Component 1, the analysis assumed that it was difficult to accurately quantify the benefits of the temporary employment component, and that a full cost-benefit analysis was not applicable. Therefore, the analysis was limited to cost effectiveness. The basis for it was the performance of the then ongoing CfWTEP, which was used to provide estimates of actual project costs. The design of Component 1 was largely based on the CfWTEP. The main difference was the introduction of the life skills training component and operational and targeting improvements, which are meant to improve its overall cost effectiveness.

Program Impact on Households

3. The results, in table 3.1, of the quantitative assessment of the CfWTEP were considered encouraging regarding both the short- and long-term impact of the program on households. The results of how the project income was used indicated that as much as 30 percent of the income of participants was spent on education and 25 percent on various types of investments (see table 3.1). This implied that the program was not only achieving short-term impacts, but could also be expected to have some longer-term impact on the targeted households. The relatively high share of the income used for education and investments was thought to be possible because of the wage rate of US$3 a day, which was considered high for an emergency program aiming to address food insecurity. Yet, given that the program only provided one single episode of employment to participants, a relatively high wage rate was seen not only as an instrument for increased temporary consumptions, but also as a provision of savings/investment income.

4. The ICR analysis confirmed that the daily wage rate of the program remained set at US$3 per day for a five-hour workday (equal to US$0.6 per hour), which was double the prevailing market wage rate for unskilled labor at the beginning of the project (US$2.5 per day for an eight-hour workday, or US$0.3 per hour), and remained relatively high throughout. The option of reducing the wage rate to increase the coverage of the program was carefully considered in the design phase. Other programs including those funded by the Government provide similar wage rates of about US$3 per day. For example, the Liberia Youth Employment public works program provided US$4 per day for a five-hour workday for a full calendar year. While generally high, reducing the wage rate would have created a misalignment between the YES Project and other similar projects, possibly generating tensions at the community level. An expansion of beneficiaries yielded by a reduction in the wage rate will also possibly pose additional capacity and logistical challenges

Table 3.1. Monthly Income across Various Employment Groups of YES Project Graduates Relation to Head Gender All

Head of

HouseholdOther

Member Male Female TotalEducation 31.2 30.2 32.4 29.3 31.0Healthcare 8.5 8.3 8.1 8.8 8.4Living expenses 28.8 25.3 27.4 28.5 28.0

32

Relation to Head Gender AllFuneral 1.2 1.4 1.5 0.9 1.2Celebration 0.7 2.2 1.2 0.9 1.1Investment farm 8.3 8.1 7.3 9.4 8.2Investment, non-farm 6.5 4.3 7.3 4.5 6.0Debt repayment 2.3 8.0 2.7 4.7 3.6Transfer 1.1 2.2 1.4 1.3 1.3Repairing the house 8.8 6.2 7.9 8.6 8.2Acquiring household assets 2.7 3.6 2.7 3.1 2.9Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Quantitative assessment of the CfWTEP, 2011.

Cost-Effectiveness of the CfWTEP and Liberia YES Projects

5. The analysis further implies that the program would be ‘highly cost effective compared to international comparators’. This expectation was based on the high labor intensity of activities, the effective geographical and household level targeting, and the low foregone income from participation.

6. To estimate the ‘cost-effectiveness ratio’ or the relative efficiency of converting program funding to income benefits for the poor, the analysis adapted the methodology developed by Ravallion (1998).13 The calculation was based on only three variables, as other data on the benefits of the infrastructure outputs were not available. The three variables are discussed below.

7. Labor intensity (the share of all wages paid in total public works costs). Labor intensity of the CfWTEP was 68 percent. This was considered good by international standards. Other public works programs show rates of around 60 percent in India (National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme), 70 percent in Korea’s public works program, 85 percent in the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) in Ethiopia, 40 percent to 50 percent in Argentina’s Trabajar Program, and 60 percent to 70 percent in Bangladesh’s Food for Work Program. There were two caveats. The first was that these programs were of a much larger scale than the program in Liberia. The second was that there was no government contribution with regard to project management in Liberia. In most other programs, the cost of government officials managing the program would not be fully factored into the project costs, thus enabling higher labor intensity to be achieved.

8. Wage targeting performance (the proportion of wages paid out that goes to poor workers). By using different matching approaches for analyzing the results of the quantitative survey, it was found that between 71 percent and 85 percent of the households benefiting from the program were from the first three income quintiles. The findings of an earlier Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire Survey found that all those in the first three quintiles in Liberia were classified as poor, as 63 percent of the entire population was found to be living below the poverty line. When taking this into account, it was estimated that between 74 percent and 86 percent of program participants were below the poverty line. For the purposes of the assessment, the average value of 80 percent was used in the original analysis. This compared fairly well to the Ethiopian PSNP, for instance, where it was found that 87 percent of beneficiaries were among

13 Ravallion, Martin. 1998. “Appraising Workfare.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1995. World Bank, Washington, DC.

33

the target group. It was estimated that 70 percent to 80 percent of Argentina’s Trabajar Program beneficiaries were below the national poverty line.

9. The additional ICR analysis concluded that targeting criteria had been clearly designed within the program manuals. Protocols include a four-level process: the first layer includes geographical targeting. Districts are selected on the basis of the share of extreme poor in single districts, obtained by combining the poverty headcount from the 2007 Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire Survey with the results of county populations from the 2008 Census. Within the identified locations, a second layer of six conditions must be met to be considered in the selection process. These include the following: (a) being at least 18 years old, (b) being able to perform work, (c) living in the targeted community, (d) not having formal public or private employment, (e) not having participated in the program before, and (f) not having other household members participating in the program. A third level of targeting procedures includes five ‘poverty and vulnerability’ proxies: (a) belonging to a large household, (b) having dependents, (c) being between ages 18 and 34 (yet heading the household composed of younger siblings), (d) being illiterate, and (e) not owning land. Lastly, eligible individuals participate in a lottery and are randomly selected into the program.

10. Overall, the project performed adequately in reaching the intended beneficiaries. No substantial inclusion errors seem to have been reported. The use of lotteries as a vehicle for targeting has been widely perceived as bolstering a perception of fairness and minimizing possible social tensions. This review corroborates those findings. Yet the proportion of actual participants randomly selected from the lottery system is in the range of 1:5, leaving large sections of populations unreached by formal safety nets. The targeting method and quotas (at least 50 percent women, 75 percent youth, plus single-digit percentage reserved for people with disabilities) ensure broad participation of different groups of beneficiaries with largely different profiles. Lotteries were designed to take into account those quotas, while tasks are often calibrated to specific needs. For instance, the program implementation manual envisions a role for women that looks after each other’s children while rotating on worksites. People with disabilities are assigned lighter tasks, such as watching the tools as a security measure, while blind people are often recruited to sing while other participants work.

11. Net wage gain (share of the gross wages received by the poor after taking into account any foregone income). Because of the high wage paid, extreme poverty, and lack of other income opportunities in Liberia, the quantitative survey found that the net wage gain from the kind of public works funded by the project was high. Approximately 75 percent of the participants had no other income or employment before the program and so the foregone earnings were very low. The net wage gain was found to be 93 percent. In comparison, a finding from India estimated the net gain at 75 percent, and a study from Argentina found that the net wage gain was only 50 percent as there were more work alternatives available. Overall cost effectiveness of the wage transfer is thus:

Labor intensity (0.68) × wage targeting performance (0.80) × net wage gain (0.93) = 0.51.

12. The estimated cost effectiveness of the wage transfer in the previous CfWTEP was 0.51, so the total cost of transferring US$1 in net wage benefit to a food insecure person through the CfWTEP was US$1.96, which includes the US$1 in net wage. A 0.51 overall cost effectiveness

34

was somewhat lower than, for instance, Ethiopia’s PSNP where the cost effectiveness of the wage transfer was about 0.55. It was projected that despite the inclusion of training in the Liberia YES Project, the overall effectiveness would not be reduced because of anticipated operational improvements and improved targeting. Given the effective targeting and the fact that projects are generally located within the communities that the participants are from, it can be assumed that a fair amount of the benefits accrue to the poor. If it is assumed that the same program participants were beneficiaries of the infrastructure maintenance outputs, then a value of 0.80 can be retained as a measure of the effectiveness of the infrastructure benefiting the poor.

13. If a low benefit-cost ratio on the project activities of only 0.50 is assumed, then the cost-effectiveness ratio for the infrastructure program activities can be estimated at 0.80 × 0.50 = 0.40 implying that it takes US$2.50 to transfer US$1 of infrastructure benefit to the participants. The Ethiopia PSNP requires US$2.13 to transfer US$1 of infrastructure benefit to the poor. The cost-effectiveness analysis can be further developed by looking at the design of Component 1 in comparison with the key design features of public works programs. This is shown in table 3.2.

Table 3.2. Comparison of Key Design Features of Public Works ProgramsBest-practice Design Feature YES, Performance

Wage rates no higher than the prevailing market wage for unskilled manual labor

Poor - Wage rates are higher than the prevailing market wage rate. Yet, given the size and duration of the program and the Liberian conditions, the risks of negatively affecting the local labor market are very small.

Restrictions on eligibility should be avoided Fair - There are few restrictions for participation but given that the wage rate cannot be used as an effective targeting mechanism, screening processes to identify the most vulnerable are applied.

The program should be targeted to poor areas, as indicated by a credible ‘poverty map’

Good - The program is geographically targeted based on the number of extreme poor in all counties.

The labor intensity (share of wage bill in total cost) should be as high as possible

Good - The program will achieve 72% labor intensity, which compares well with other programs.

Assets created are of maximum value to poor people in those areas. Any assets that largely benefit the non-poor should require co-financing from the beneficiaries

Good - The program focuses on maintenance of assets but they were generally located within poor communities and work activities were generally identified by the communities themselves

Public works should be synchronized to the timing of agricultural slack seasons

Fair - There are practical difficulties with this approach as the slack season (hungry season as referred to in Liberia) coincides with the peak of the rainy season when project implementation is difficult.

Encourage female participation. Women can benefit from piece rates or task-based wages; sometimes wages in the form of food have attracted more women to work sites. Provision of childcare can improve female participation.

Fair - Female participation will be around 50%; current restrictions on the participation of pregnant women will be lifted and childcare services will be considered.

Transaction costs to the poor are kept low—one important means to accomplish this is through locating project sites close to villages.

Excellent - The projects are all located within walking distance of communities.

To ensure appropriate mediation of NGOs for protecting the rights of the poor in relation to program managers

Good - The program is implemented by strong local NGOs that have demonstrably paid adequate attention to the needs of the poor.

The program should focus on asset maintenance Good - The program focuses almost exclusively on the maintenance of assets.

35

Source: Ravallion (1999 and 2000) and Subbarao (1997) as compiled in “Systemic Shocks and Social Protection: Role and Effectiveness of Public Works Programs” by K. Subbarao. Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 302, January 2003, World Bank. Washington DC.

Fiscal Impact and Sustainability

14. Over six years, US$12.5 million was allocated to the temporary employment component of the Liberia YES Project. Based on the implementation period of six years, this represents approximately 0.12 percent of GDP (based on real nominal GDP for 2010–2015). Furthermore, this was roughly equivalent to about 7 percent of government expenditure. While it is not expected that the Government will sustain the program from its own revenue sources, it is encouraging that, through donor support, the program will essentially be able to continue as part of other projects.

15. The business owners who benefited from the project training sessions will be able to effectively manage their businesses and take the required business decisions on their human resources, financial, and marketing strategies even after the project is closed. With the training on human resources strategy, business owners would be in a better position to understand the human needs at work and provide employees with a qualitative working environment. The skills development enhanced business owners will gain access to loans from banks, microfinance institutions, and other banking institutions. Availability of a credit line will especially enable the small business holders to expand their business profitability.

36

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team MembersNames Title Unit Responsibility/

SpecialtyLendingSuleiman Namara Senior Social Protection Economist GSP07 Team LeaderDouglas Sumerfield Senior Operations Officer GEDGE Team LeaderCharles Taylor Consultant GCO01 Procurement Specialist

Saidu Dani Goje Financial ManagementSpecialist GGO31 Financial Management

SpecialistGloria Malia Mahama Social Development Specialist GSU01 Safeguards SpecialistHerbert Oule Environment Specialist GEN01 Safeguards SpecialistJillian A Larsen Consultant GSP01 Team MemberLemu Ella Makain Program Assistant AFMLR Team MemberLydie Anne Billey Program Assistant GSP07 Team MemberMack Capehart Mulbah Social Protection Specialist GSP07 Team MemberSekou Abou Kamara Environment Specialist GEN01 Safeguards SpecialistSupervision/ICRSuleiman Namara Senior Social Protection Economist GSP07 Team LeaderDouglas Sumerfield Senior Operations Officer GEDGE Team LeaderCharles Taylor Consultant GCO01 Procurement Specialist

Saidu Dani Goje Financial ManagementSpecialist GGO31 Financial Management

SpecialistGloria Malia Mahama Social Development Specialist GSU01 Safeguards SpecialistHerbert Oule Environment Specialist GEN01 Safeguards SpecialistJillian A Larsen Consultant GSP01 Team MemberLemu Ella Makain Program Assistant AFMLR Team MemberKhurshid Banu Noorwalla Program Assistant GSP07 Team MemberMack Capehart Mulbah Social Protection Specialist GSP07 Team MemberSekou Abou Kamara Environment Specialist GEN01 Safeguards SpecialistAbu Kargbo Operations Officer GSP07 Team MemberPeter Pojarski Consultant GSP07 Team Member

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project CycleStaff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of Staff Weeks US$, Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)

Lending 24.29 190,243.89

Total: 24.29 190,243.89Supervision/ICR 124.94 639,647.64

Total: 124.94 639,647.64

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Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results

A tracer study conducted in 2016 on the YES Project graduates assessed employment outcomes—that is, the employability of graduates from the project, on how relevant the job skills offered by the training were to secure jobs, and how satisfied employers were with graduates’ work performances. The study had the following results:

(a) Under Component 2 of the YES Project, 2,331 trainees underwent training in various fields, including food processing, fashion designing, road maintenance and construction, hospitality, agriculture, and tailoring.

(b) 240 business owners were trained on business development services.

(c) The average monthly income of those trainees who were employed before undergoing training was estimated at LRD 4,124, while after undergoing training those employed earned on average LRD 5,930 per month although it is less than the official minimum monthly wage of LRD 9,600. On a similar scale, before joining training the employed worked, on average, 26 hours per week while their working hours increased to 40 hours a week after undergoing training.

(d) Most of the YES Project graduates were between their middle teens and 35 years of age.

(e) 47.5 percent of the YES Project graduates specialized in agriculture, 20 percent specialized in road maintenance, 4.9 percent in food processing, 8.1 percent in fashion design, 11.4 percent in hospitality, and 13.1 percent in tailoring.

(f) 25 percent of the YES Project graduates surveyed (the greatest number in absolute terms) had high school certificate education, and 23.7 percent possessed grades 10–12 level of education.

(g) Most of the graduates (71 percent) who completed the YES Project trainings did not have prior job skills training.

(h) 51.1 percent of the YES Project graduates were unemployed, and the majority of graduates was farmers or engaged in farming.

(i) 29.2 percent were in self-employment and 19.9 percent were in remunerative (wage) employment. Of those employed, 72 percent were men and 27.9 percent were women. The self-employed YES Project graduates consisted of more men (69.1 percent) than women (30.9 percent).

(j) 77.5 percent of YES Project graduates were employed as a result of their training.

(k) Community works life skills training conducted in July 2012 benefited 25 trainees in six core life skills modules.

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Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

1. The MYS held a stakeholder workshop in June 2014, which resulted in the development of the strategic plan for the MYS for 2014–2017. The workshop was attended by stakeholders from local communities, ministries, department, and agencies, the private sector, and development partners.

2. As part of the World Bank-funded YES Project for the Liberian MYS, Transtec, the management agency for Component 2 conducted a management development workshop for 30 TVET managers and educators across the country from October 22–26, 2012.

3. The YES community workshop held by LACE on April 4, 2014 resulted to 224 community trainers being trained and certified.

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Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

The following is a transcript of the main sections of the draft completion report, prepared by the GoL, on the YES Project. The transcript includes selected parts of the Government report, without changes or edits. The full Government report is available upon request from the Government’s implementing agency, LACE.

Republic of Liberia

Ministry of Youth and Sports&

Liberia Agency for Community Empowerment (LACE)

GOVERNMENT of LIBERIA

Liberia Youth, Employment, Skills (YES) Project

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (ICR)

2016

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

Project Context

1. After the first postwar election, the GoL instituted landmark reform programs to revitalize the economy including the PRS in 2009–2011, with four key pillars—governance, overall transparency, economic growth, and social development. The country, though fragile, recorded laudable progress in a very short time with an average growth rate of 7.4 percent with increased investment in mining, agriculture, and construction. Liberia attracted FDI in several non-traditional sectors including petroleum, oil palm, hotels, finance, industry, and infrastructure. In total, FDI was poised to reach roughly US$16 billion and create more than 100,000 jobs over the next several years (AfT 2013). The economic recovery was fast; access to justice, gender based violence, rule of law, and decreased police brutality have since improved considerably.

2. Yet, the incidence of unemployment among young people remained very high. Liberia is a youthful country with 79 percent of the total population of 3,476,608 below the age of 36 years.14 Liberia has been at peace for over a decade, but the high youth unemployment rate threatens the country’s stability. Since the end of the civil war, Liberian youth have had high expectations and demand jobs and improved livelihoods. However, these demands have largely remained unmet, despite impressive economic growth rates.15 A Labor Force Assessment conducted by the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 2010 found that formal employment remained extremely low, with 68 percent involved in the informal economy and 77.9 percent in ‘vulnerable employment’. More than half of the employed were without any form of education; they were self-employed and lived in rural areas. The percentage of people in wage employment was 16.5 percent and that in non-wage employment was 83.5 percent. The incidence of unemployment among young people remained very high.

3. At the time of project initiation and design, Liberia was recovering from a deadly 14-year civil conflict that devastated every fabric of the society and left youth vulnerable and unemployed without skills that would help them aspire for a better future. Although Liberia had been at peace for approximately a decade, the high youth unemployment rate threatened the country’s stability. The unmet demands of youth development constituted the motivation for the YES Project.

4. The YES Project evolved out of recommendations from the review of several coordinated documents that then sought to understand youth unemployment dynamics at play in postwar Liberia.16 As a result, in 2010, the GoL signed a US$16 million Financing Agreement with the World Bank to implement the three-year YES Project, with funding from the Crisis Response Window IDA Grant H5940 and the ACGF TF097119. The project was to be implemented from June 24, 2010 to June 30, 2013.

14 Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services Census Report (2008).15Dennis Zulu, chief program officer, ILO Office for Nigeria, Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. http://iloblog.org/2012/12/06/liberia-waging-war-on-youth-unemployment/16 Education and Fragility in Liberia, 2011.

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http://iloblog.org/2012/12/06/liberia-waging-war-on-youth-unemployment/

Project Development Objectives and Indicators

5. The PDO was to expand access of poor and young Liberians to sustainable employment and to improve youth employability, in support of the Government of Liberia’s response to the employment crisis. There are two distinct aspects of the PDO with one aspect focusing on increasing access to short-term employment opportunities and the other on improving employability of targeted youth through skills development activities. Finally, the project is expected to support the GoL’s PRS by providing employment support to about 40,000–80,000 vulnerable youth over a period of three years.

6. The Project Results Framework for the Community Works component included the following performance outcome indicators:

(a) Direct project beneficiaries (number), of which female (percent)

(i) Number of female project beneficiaries

(ii) Beneficiaries (number) of Community Livelihoods Programs

(iii) Women participation (percent) in Community Livelihood Programs

(iv) Net income gain of targeted participants in year of participation

(v) Youth participation (under 35 years) (percent)

(vi) Total costs allocated to participants’ wages (percent)

(vii) Public works schemes completed with satisfactory quality (percent)

(viii)Public works schemes completed within a specific period of time (percent)

(b) The output indicators were:

(i) Days of temporary employment created (number) (person-days)

(ii) Beneficiaries trained in basic life skills (number)

(iii) Community trainers educated in basic life skills training (number)

(iv) Beneficiaries trained in household enterprise skills (number)

(v) Community trainers educated in household enterprise skills training (number)

7. The Results Framework for the skills development component included the following performance outcome indicators:

(a) Direct beneficiaries of training program (number)

(i) Youth participation (under 35 years)

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(ii) Participants obtaining jobs six months after receiving training and employment support packages (number)

(iii) number of businesses that sustainably increase the number of employees

(iv) Employers satisfied with the quality of the students (percent)

(v) TVET Board of Certification and Accreditation is established

(vi) TVET Fund is established to mainstream and manage skills training programs started under the YES Project.

(b) The output indicators were:

(i) Business owners participating and completing Business Development Training (number)

(ii) Trainers and institutional leaders for skills development providers trained (number)

Revised PDO/Key Indicators/Targets/Strategies

8. The PDOs and the key performance indicators were not revised. However, a few changes were made and reflected in the management agency’s addendum contract dated January 7, 2013. For example, the number of targeted youth to be trained was changed from the original 4,500 to an accumulative target of 3,405. The management agency’s contract that was originally scheduled to end on June 30, 2014 was adjusted to end on June 30, 2013 instead, with unmet deliverables to be transferred to the MYS for completion. Formal classroom training sessions then ended on June 30, 2013 and the new focus was tracing youth already trained and placing them in employment settings or providing employment support.

9. With borrowed funding of US$907,000 from YES Project Component 2 following its restructuring in December 2012, YES Component 1 - Community Works planned to create short-term employment for additional 2, 500 beneficiaries in additional five counties in Liberia’s South Eastern Region. Under this arrangement, the number of subprojects increased from 90 to 95 and correspondingly the number of beneficiaries accessing short-term employment through public activities increased from 45,000 to 47,500.

10. The YES POM for Component 1 - Community Works was revised on September 29, 2015 during a World Bank supervision mission in Liberia. At the revision the original YES PDO “to expand access of poor and young Liberians to sustainable employment and to improve youth employability, in support of the Government of Liberia’s response to the employment crisis” and its core outcome indicators remained unchanged. However, the nomenclature ‘Community Works’ was changed to ‘Community Livelihoods Project (CLIP)’ under the AF from the World Bank. Unlike the YES Community Works, which focused on creating short-term employment opportunities through public works activities, the CLIP supported productive works such as community farms that helped to provide both short-term employment and also engender longer-term benefits for rural youth through crop production and increased agricultural knowledge and

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techniques. The CLIP was designed to provide the requisite support (technical, financial, and supplies/inputs) to kick start youth-led productive community investments that might provide more sustainable opportunities for income generation instead. The CLIP targeted additional 9,000 beneficiaries in rural communities across the 15 counties.

Project Design by Component

11. The project was organized into two components, namely, the YES Component 1 known as Community Works and Component 2 known as Employment through Skills Training. LACE was in charge of Component 1, Community Works, and Component 2 was implemented by the MYS.

YES, Component 1: Community Works (as approved)

12. Yes, Component 1 - Community Works aimed to increase access to short-term employment programs through implementation of public work activities, provide life skills training for beneficiaries and undertake capacity-building initiatives for implementing local NGOs also referred to as CFs hired by LACE. Community Works initially targeted 45,000 beneficiaries for short-term employment. Ninety subprojects were to be created with each subproject group comprising 500 beneficiaries. However, with an additional amount of US$907,000 received from YES Component 2, which was considered as surplus funds, following its restructuring in January 2013, LACE’s ongoing public works activities created additional five subprojects in Liberia’s South Eastern Region, thus providing short-term employment for additional 2,500 beneficiaries and increasing its original target from 45,000 to 47, 500 beneficiaries.

13. The beneficiaries carried out public work activities, including routine road maintenance, rehabilitation of feeder road bridges, cleaning up of cities, and weeding of fields at the Central Agriculture Research Institute in Bong County. Beneficiaries of community works were paid two categories of remuneration rates of US$3.00 and US$5.00 respectively for a period of 40 working days. Those receiving US$3.00 were unskilled beneficiaries and the others receiving US$5.00 were skilled individuals selected from the subproject workforce to function as supervisors of the subproject groups. Each subproject group of public work activities had a workforce of 500 beneficiaries, including the supervisors. In addition to cash benefits, the beneficiaries received life skills training delivered by individual consultants known as community trainers hired by LACE. There were a total of 380 community trainers for the public works activity, with 4 assigned to each subproject of 500 beneficiaries to deliver the training.

14. LACE did not carry out direct delivery of Component 1 project activities, but rather contracted the services of local NGOs and, in some cases, individual consultants to deliver the project activities. LACE contracted 15 local Liberia NGOs (referred to as CFs), one in each county, to implement most of the day-to-day activities of the project but under its direct supervision and coordination. In another words, the CFs and individual consultants directly implemented the YES Community Works including CLIP under the AF arrangement.

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Selection of Project Communities and Targeting of Beneficiaries of Public Works Activities

15. Local political leaders including county superintendents, district commissioners, and city mayors participated in the public work activities. They were responsible for mobilization and selection of project communities in their respective counties, ensuring that no community had more than one opportunity or chance to implement public work activities. Local community leaders also resolved conflicts among the subproject groups.

16. The project targeted 500 vulnerable people in the 15 counties with 75 percent being young people ages between 18 and 35 years and 25 percent above 35 years. The public activities aimed to promote equal participation of men and women and therefore targeted 50 percent participation for each category. The eligibility criteria for selection were that the participant must (a) reside in the beneficiary community or within 20–30 minutes’ walk of the project site; (b) be poor and vulnerable; (c) be 18 years and above; and (d) have good character and meet community endorsement.

Recruitment

17. Massive mobilization and sensitization preceded every recruitment event. The key recruitment method was lottery. Beneficiaries were prescreened using the established eligibility criteria to qualify for the lottery. Beneficiaries who qualified for the lottery from the prescreening exercise were arranged in their various categories and the lottery was conducted. For example, all women who were qualified by the prescreening had a different queue from that of the men and so on. Upon recruitment, every beneficiary was processed and enrolled in the project.

YES, Component 1: Community Livelihood (as at AF)

18. The YES Component 1 public works activities which should have ended on December 30, 2014 were extended for 18 months (January 2015 to June 30, 2016) with AF of US$3.4 million from the World Bank, but this time focused on community farming activities by rural youth. Hence, the nomenclature ‘Community Works’ was changed to Community Livelihood Project (CLIP). The CLIP targeted 9,000 beneficiaries in 15 counties.

19. Under the AF arrangements, communities received a community investment package. The package included technical support for agriculture, labor subsidy, agro-inputs (farming tools and local planting materials according to the budgeted amount), training on life skills, and household enterprises.

20. Community investments implemented by the project were decided on by the community and were productive in nature, such as agriculture, aquaculture, or other productive activities. Specific activities were community-driven, decided upon through a facilitated community discussion to ensure that the investment responded to community needs and desires, but were within the limits of available project resources and community contribution.

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Expected Benefits

21. The project provided youth the opportunity to begin a new community farm activity. Under the AF project, youth were supported with the necessary inputs and assistance to achieve a community farm. In Regions 1 and 2 under the modified investment, the package included (a) facilitation: by the CF for community project planning and implementation and (b) Agro-inputs: each subproject of 25 participants was provided US$1,300 to be used for (i) tools and (ii) planting materials. The community could decide how they would like to allocate these funds and develop a budget and list of inputs to procure. They were provided a price list for tools by LACE to help with the budget activities. For planting materials (seeds, seedlings, and so on), the Farm Management Committee (FMC), reviews the availability, type, quantity, cost, and suppliers of planting materials and works with the entire youth group to develop a local PP using the LACE voucher system.

22. Technical support. Local NGOs hired as CFs facilitated subproject groups to establish an FMC. CFs provided ongoing support and supervision of the community investment activities.

23. Life skills training. During the employment period, all beneficiaries were provided with 10 days of life skills training by community trainers under the supervision of the CF.

24. Household enterprise training. Participants were also to receive the opportunity to participate in a 15-day enterprise training.

25. Communities were also provided the opportunity to recruit and hire a ‘community agriculture technician’ to provide ongoing support on agriculture activities. It was expected that the agriculture technician would be hired from the community and have specific skills or technical expertise on the productive investment and provide technical extension services to the community.

26. Labor subsidy. Direct project participants received a small subsidy to support their labor contribution to the project. Each participant received two payments of US$75 (total US$150), which were paid based on the communal achievement of agreed upon farm milestones.

27. Land was provided by the local community leadership free of charge for use by the subproject groups over a period of three years. All land provided underwent an Environmental and Social Safeguard Assessment before signing of the Land Use Agreement MOU between the beneficiary youth group and the grantors. Each beneficiary was to cultivate 1 acre of land.

Summary of Implementation Arrangement

28. The CLIP activities under the YES Project Community Livelihoods component were an initiative of the GoL and as such, its implementation was the joint efforts of various stakeholders as described below.

(a) The MYS has the responsibility for oversight and coordination of all youth-focused activities and, thus, monitored the YES Project Community Livelihoods component.

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(b) LACE is the government agency that has the overall project implementation and fiduciary responsibility for the YES Project Community Livelihoods component. This responsibility was defined further in the Subsidiary Grant Agreement as signed between the Ministry of Finance and LACE. This included verification and approval of all subprojects and expenditures related to their implementation. To assist in this work, LACE contracted local NGOs in each county to work as CFs in the various counties where the project was implemented.

(c) CFs had the daily responsibility for community interaction and support, including facilitating the subproject generation, implementation, oversight of community livelihood investments and technical support, and implementation of the life skills and entrepreneurship trainings. They reported to LACE. LACE also contracted a commercial bank to make the cash payments to project participants.

(d) Local government authorities (were involved in the YES Project Community Livelihood component to help select the districts and communities in which subprojects would take place and ensure coordination between this and other interventions, including the County Development Strategy.

(e) FMCs were formulated at the community level through elections and were composed of three members of the participant group. The FMCs were responsible for management and oversight of the livelihood investment project at the community level. In particular, they tracked participant attendance, helped determine distribution of work and training schedules, liaised with the CF, ensured that farming activities were carried out and each phase was met, oversaw storage and distribution of tools and other inputs, provided support on agro-input procurement, ensured that the harvest was apportioned according to the agreed upon plan, and helped identify a qualified community agriculture technician to provide support on the community livelihoods investment activities.

29. Commissioning of subprojects was the last contractual activity done by the CFs. This occurred when 100 percent of fields were completely planted with crops, thoroughly maintained, and after the second and final tranche of labor subsidy payment. Commissioning involved hosting a ceremony in the subproject communities and handing the subproject and farm tools over to the beneficiaries in the presence of local political leaders and other stakeholders. Speeches are made, recorded, and aired by journalists on both local and community radios and beneficiaries are certificated. Commissioning of subproject ends the CFs contractual obligation to LACE, as well as the subproject group.

Targeting and Recruitment

30. The total number of participants for the CLIP activities was 9,000, as outlined in the Project Paper. The project aimed to distribute these uniformly across the country. However, after the first phase of implementation in Region 4, the project learned that the investment in participants and communities needed to be enhanced to improve results at the community level. Therefore, a smaller number of participants would be enrolled in Regions 1 and 2 (relative to

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Regions 3 and 4). However, a larger investment would be made for each participating community, with the total number of participants remaining consistent with the PDO indicators.

31. County and district political leaders were involved in the selection of project districts and communities. County and district consultations were held involving the participation of stakeholders like county and district youth leadership, women groups, marketing association representatives, officials of the county administration (superintendents, mayors, district commissioners), representatives of line ministries such as Ministries of Agriculture, Youth and Sports, Gender, Children, and Social Protection, and Internal Affairs. The outcome of the county consultation was the selection of project districts by county authorities themselves using the project district selection criteria and that of the district consultation was the selection of project communities by the district political leadership in the district using the community selection criteria.

32. The main target group of the YES Project Component 1 was poor and vulnerable youth. The AF directly supported 9,000 participants. Participants were selected from all 15 counties. Recruitment of beneficiaries was done through prescreening and lottery. Nearly 80 percent of the CLIP beneficiaries were to be young people ages 18–35 years while 20 percent were those above 35 years. The component was to ensure 50 percent female participation.

YES, Component 2: Employment through Skills Training

33. In line with the project design, the MYS was not allowed to implement the activities of YES Project Component 2 directly but rather outsource it. The MYS hired the service of a management agency to deliver the component activities under its supervision and coordination. Under the arrangement, the management agency too would have the advantage to subcontract competent TVET NGOs to deliver the various skill development trainings. Under the assignment, the management agency was to increase access to skills development opportunities by training 4,500 youth and ensure job placement for 60 percent of those trained; provide business development support to business owners to improve productivity and to strengthen sustainability of the resulting increases in employment; improve quality and relevance of skills training through capacity building of trainers themselves and training institutions; and establish institutional framework for TVET development.

34. Targeting. The training targeted young people ages between 18 and 35 years. The training was to also achieve 25 percent female participation. The management agency hired seven service providers to deliver the skills training—Kasawa, KOSEO, Community Empowerment Project, AOAV, LEED, VOSIEDA, and HiFab. Youth were trained in hospitality, fashion design, tailoring, agriculture, food preservation, road maintenance, and tailoring.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes of the YES Project

35. Several factors affected the implementation and outcomes of the YES Project. These factors were in different categories. There were factors outside the control of the Government or the implementing agency. Factors are generally subject to government or implementing agency control.

Factors Outside the Control of the Government or the Implementing Agency

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36. Weather conditions, particularly the effect of the rainy season, which was beyond the control of the CF, affected the supervision of some projects. For example, during the heavy rains, roads already done during the dry season were washed away and bridges were damaged. Redoing such roads was hardly possible and where it was possible, it took longer than usual to even start.

37. Expectations of communities across the country for postwar development were higher than what the project provided. This was evidenced by the number of youth and older people who showed up at the recruitment centers. There was oversubscription at almost every recruitment center asking for the project to enroll everybody. Neither the GoL nor the implementing agency could ensure this, as there were budgetary implications to satisfy the demand of every one. However, both the GoL and the implementing agency were left with the burden of sensitizing communities in managing their demands and expectations.

Factors Subject to Government Control

38. Creating the enabling environment for the implementation of the project was very useful. The role of the Government’s local structure in harnessing support from communities was instrumental in ensuring the participation of communities in the project implementation. For example, local government authorities in the counties mobilized work force for the public work activities and mediated in conflicts arising in subproject groups. They also identified the communities for public work activities.

39. The GoL county officials were responsible for the selection of project districts. All the 238 project districts under CLIP AF were designated by local government authorities. In addition, local chiefs, elders, and district commissioners selected the project communities in their district and through their influence and interventions, youth were provided free land for community farm activities over a period of three years. The GoL’s local structure also maintained peace and tranquility in the project operational areas and took the necessary steps to address protection issues arising in the project areas.

40. Local planting material vendors were reluctant to provide subproject groups with planting materials on credit because of the uncertainty around receiving their payment from the youth farming groups. This accounted for untimely access to planting material by subproject groups. Again, the local town chiefs served as guarantors for the subproject groups and supported commitment letters submitted to the local vendors by LACE, affirming LACE’s promise to make the payment during labor subsidy payment to beneficiaries. The intervention of the local chiefs in this regard remedied the situation, particularly in Regions 1 and 2.

Factors Subject to Implementing Agency Control

41. Project supervision and monitoring was crucial to the success of implementation and this was the core responsibility of the CFs. They were responsible for ensuring that project implementation was in consonance with the dictates of the POM. The CFs had to ensure that FMCs were formulated and that each had two female members. They also had to manage the demands and attitudes of politicians who attempted, using their influence, to allocate subprojects to communities of their choices and went to the extreme of wanting to select project

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beneficiaries. The CF ensured that in addition to farm activities, the beneficiaries participated fully in the life skills and business management skills trainings. By extension, they were obliged to ensure that all participants received their labor subsidies and for this reason, the CF staff were present at every labor subsidy payment site, noted irregularities if any, and reported the same to LACE immediately for redress.

Implementation

42. Timeliness of the interventions was another factor that generally affected both Components 1 and 2 of the project. Component 2 of the project was approved to start on June 24, 2010 and scheduled to close on June 30, 2013. However, due to considerable delay in completing the project design and contract negotiations, the Component 2 effectiveness date started on March 29, 2011. Similar delay was experienced in Component 1 of the AF wherein the sub grant agreement, which should have been signed between LACE and the MFDP in December 2014 was not finalized until February 2015.

43. LACE persevered in its quest to remedy the situation by intensifying its lobbying drive with the MFDP and relevant authorities. Many visits were made to the ministry to follow up discussions held on the issue and even at one point in time; LACE documented and shared its experience with the World Bank through the task team leader, soliciting their intervention. This had implications for project activities as farm activities started late in Regions 3 and 4.

44. The POM did not provide clarity and guidance on substitution of beneficiaries who dropped out of the project. There was no definition of how many absences constituted a ‘dropout’. Moreover, the POM did not discuss anomalies like beneficiaries being sick and taken to a herbalist, death, chronicity of illness, and so on. As a result, FMCs used their discretion in addressing issues of dropouts and other anomalies.

Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation, and Utilization

45. Project monitoring was the responsibility of the CFs in each county. However, the LACE team undertook quarterly monitoring of project activities too to ensure that implementation activities were done on time and in consonance with the project documents, particularly the POM. The CFs documented findings from monitoring visits and reproduced that in their quarterly reports.

Restructuring of YES Project Components 1 and 2

46. CLIP underwent minor changes based on lessons learned in Regions 3 and 4. In Region 4, the investment per community group was smaller. Subproject groups of 50 participants were facilitated with US$785 for agro-inputs (US$600 in hand tools and US$185 for local planting materials). In Region 3, this was revised to US$1,300 per subproject group of 50 participants (US$600 for hand tools and US$700 for local planting materials.) In Regions 1 and 2, this was further increased to an investment of US$1,300 per subproject group of 25 participants (they could choose how to allocate this to tools or planting materials.) In Region 3, the field size at last measurement was only 13 acres on average (0.26 acres per participant.) In Regions 1 and 2 they were expected to reach a target of 1 acre per participant, thus the necessity for the higher investment in agro-inputs.

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47. To further strengthen CLIP interventions, two former consultants who supervised the implementation of YES Component 2 at the MYS were seconded to LACE. The two consultants were charged with the responsibility to provide technical implementation support and improve report generation. Each consultant had oversight responsibility for implementation over Regions 1 and 2.

48. By December 2012, the management agency (Transtec), had only trained approximately 25 percent of the targeted number of youth to be trained under Component 2 and had placed no trained youth in formal or informal employment either. The GoL, through the MYS, considered this gross underperformance under the contract assignment on the Transtec’s side. The GoL was therefore convinced of Transtec’s inability to successfully implement the assignment and achieve the project deliverables.

49. Consequently, the GoL decided to renegotiate the management agency contract. The management agency contract was successfully renegotiated and the parties thereto agreed to the following under the Addendum signed on January 7, 2013 between GoL and the management agency.

(a) The management agency contract, which should have ended on June 30, 2014, was shortened to end on June 30, 2013 instead.

(b) The management agency would now be responsible to train an accumulative total of 3,405 youth by June 30, 2013 instead on the one hand, and on the other, the GoL, through the MYS, would be responsible to train the remaining 1,095 youth.

(c) The management agency would transfer the funds for training the remaining 1,095 youth to the MYS to implement the training

(d) The GoL authorized the management agency to hire a consultant to produce the national TVET policy using US$90,000.00 of some of the unspent funds

50. Component 2 was restructured because the initial closure date of June 30, 2013 was reached with very little or no achievement of project deliverables. Under the restructuring of Component 2, the training of the additional 1,095 youth was transformed to job placement of the total number of youth trained because the MYS did not have the capacity to implement the training. Secondly, just 27 percent of the total number of youth trained had been placed, an achievement far below the 60 percent job placement target of the project, hence the MYS prioritized job placement over additional training activities.

51. The MYS then took over the job placement responsibility for the former management agency on June 30, 2013 to be supported by the conduct of a tracer study. The purpose of the tracer study was to gather information on the employment status of youth trained under the YES Project to inform the job placement strategy. Also under the restructuring arrangement, some funds from YES Component 2 were reallocated to YES Component 1 implemented by LACE. The funds were reallocated to LACE because Component 2 had ended and very little of the component objectives had been achieved. Therefore, US$0.9 million of the US$7.5 million allotment to Component 2 was given to Component 1 (LACE) to reach out and create short-term employment for an additional 2, 500 youths under its Community Works Program in five

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counties, Bomi, Rural Montserrado, River Gee, Maryland, and Grand Kru Counties, from June 30, 2013 to December 2014.

52. Ebola outbreak. The outbreak of Ebola threw the whole country into disarray. All government ministries were shut down except for key staff. This is the period that the project support team (PST) was monitoring the distribution of start-up kits and farm implements by select service providers. Though placement was 89 percent successful, EVD jeopardized the remaining part, as there was a state of emergency that restricted all PST field staff and service providers’ travel to the field thus leading to abrupt termination of all job placement activities.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

Relevance of Objectives, Design, and Implementation

53. Project preparation took place after a careful analysis of youth employment situation by the Liberian government and the development partners and appraisal in (June 2010). For the most part the sector background was diligently done except on the suitability of skills from the training and the job market needs, all issues around youth unemployment were well diagnosed through wide-ranging consultations with several key stakeholders from relevant government ministries and NGOs. The PAD (page 1) noted ‘with 75 percent of the population under 35 years, a large segment of the society came of age in the midst of a disrupted, if not destroyed, education system; lack of education and skills likely will relegate them to low- productivity, low-wage jobs’. To re-position and revamp all sectors of the country, ‘the President and the GoL have placed strategic priority on youth employment and TVET…’PAD (page 3) to reinvigorate the economy after nearly two decades of politico-economic instability. The project assessed the youth potential, their employment needs, and the general prevailing condition in postwar Liberia.

54. At the end of 2009, the World Bank management approved a US$6.0 million equivalent of AF to the YES Project from the recently established Crisis Response Window (PAD, page 5). Agreement for the grants was finally concluded in 2010 after much consultations, project design, and negotiation for a management agency and the development of the POM. The project was designed by the World Bank and the MYS in collaboration with the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Agriculture, and other relevant stakeholders for youth empowerment. The YES Project Component 2 was launched by the president of the Republic of Liberia on June 25, 2012 at the Klay Vocational Training Center.

YES, Component 1: Community Works

55. The YES Component 1 had two sub activities—public works and youth community farms. These activities led to increased access to income-generating activities by youth. The public works component created short-term employment and relieved some of the immediate economic burdens and strains on youth livelihood options. This aspect of Component 1 was properly aligned to the GoL’s PRS in which the GoL promised job creation as the first response to the global financial crisis. Under the PRS, the GoL prioritized governance, sector reforms, human development, economic reform and recovery, gender equity, agriculture, social protection, education, health, and so on.

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56. The activities were well aligned with the PDOs and indicators, as the interventions targeted the most vulnerable populations and poor households providing them with incremental resources needed to cope with prevailing situations. The investments in rural areas created jobs, increased food production, and provided income as part of the economic recovery. The public works activities created temporary work for 47,500 unemployed youths.

57. The support to youth community farm activities contributed immensely to increasing community food security and the reduction of the prevalence of malnutrition. Over 200 subprojects were created and more than approximately 4,000–5,000 acres of crop production were achieved throughout the 15 counties. The payment of labor subsidies to over 8,000 beneficiaries infused considerable amount of cash in the rural economy affording youth the opportunity to be involved in other investment adventures like establishment of trade and business links with neighboring communities. All the YES Project interventions promoted the participation of female beneficiaries. The YES Component 1 for example, ensured approximately 50 percent female participation in all its interventions.

YES, Component 2: Employment through Skills Training

58. The PDO for Component 2 is "Increased access to short term employment opportunities and improved employability of targeted youth". The indictors for this project development outcome are:

(a) Beneficiaries of training programs(b) Beneficiaries who are employed or self-employed in the field of training six months

after receiving skills development and employment support (percent)(c) Beneficiary completion rate for skills development and employment support

interventions (percent)

59. The GoL’s vision to improve the skill base of Liberian youth through the provision of quality TVET that make them employable remains its and this vision is consistent with the project objectives and design. For this purpose, the GoL places emphasis on TVET in its AfT and Vision 2030 development agenda. Thus, the objectives of the component remained relevant both with regard to the national government’s agenda and the need of the target youth population of Liberia.

4. Achievement of Project Development Objectives

60. The project achieved the following:

Component 1: Community Works/Community Livelihood

61. Generally, the project reduced economic and social pressure and the potential risk of reversing Liberia’s fragile peace and political stability in the following manner:

(a) Scale up of public works interventions to increase number of beneficiaries and expand geographic coverage from 9 counties to 15 counties. The number of beneficiaries in short-term waged employment was increased from 45,000 to 47,500. The duration of employment was 40 days with a remuneration rate of US$3.00 per

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day. This daily rate was consistent with the minimum rate the Labor Law of Liberia proposes for unskilled labor

(b) 8,750 rural youth were supported with technical knowledge, agro-inputs, and labor subsidies to establish 238 community farms across 15 counties. The same number of beneficiaries received life skills training. There was 80 percent youth participation and 42 percent female participation for this component.

Component 2 Employment through Skills Training

62. This component was to fulfill the following outcomes:

63. Outcome 1: Provision of business development support to improve productivity and to strengthen sustainability of the resulting increases in employment; Outcome 2: Increased access to skills development opportunities; Outcome 3: Quality and relevance of skills training improved; and Outcome 4: Institutional framework for TVET development established.

(a) The total number of trainees to be trained was 4,500 by the management agency. According to the agreement, 60 percent of this number was to receive job placement six months after training. The project formally closed on September 30, 2014. A total of 2,331 beneficiaries received skills training in various vocations and 2,077 were placed in formal and informal employment, indicating 89 percent of placement success.

(b) There was a 19 percent female participation instead of the targeted 25 percent and 45 percent youth participation instead of the targeted 75 percent. The change of focus from continuation of the skills training to job placement initiatives prevented the remaining beneficiaries from being reached.

(c) 240 out of 250 business owners participated in business development skills training and 10 of the businesses invited for the training did not show up.

(d) To improve the relevance and quality of skills training, 200 trainers and leaders from TVET institutions were targeted for training. However, 205 persons who showed up were trained.

(e) The second subcomponent with a grant of US$1.5 million supported capacity-building activities and institutional development for TVET. The MYS was responsible for the technical oversight of this subcomponent. The MYS benefited from institutional development needed to deliver the TVET aspect and other youth programs for the Liberian youth in accordance with the mandate of this program. The project funds were used to sponsor the development of Liberia’s first postwar National TVET policy. The TVET policy was developed, endorsed by the Liberian Cabinet, and legislated by the National Legislature.

(f) An international procurement specialist was hired for 15 months under the project to build the capacity of the ministry’s Procurement Department. Seven procurement department staff, one HR department staff, and two members of the PST benefited

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from the five-month, in-house, hands-on procurement training conducted by the international procurement specialist. Following the training, the ministry promoted the deputy procurement director to procurement director because of his splendid performance. In addition, the project covered the cost of the TVET’s assistant minister and Liberia Youth Employment Program’s national coordinator participation in the World Bank’s social protection and safety nets training in Washington DC.

(g) The project funded a four-day retreat in Buchanan Grand Bassa County to develop the MYS’ three-year strategic and operational plans, copies of which are attached to the report. The project funds also sponsored the then youth programs support specialist of the MYS to attend program management and M&E trainings in the United States.

(h) In accordance with the revised POM, Component 1 was to establish and manage a Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM) system. The GRM was established late in February 2016 and only for the AF CLIP activities. Mobile phones from three Global System for Mobile communication companies operating in Liberia were purchased and used for receiving complaints from the field. Subsequently, GRM hotlines (0555-136-970/0776-6584/0880-395-84648) were established but without toll-free calls. The LACE administration appointed a volunteer to receive and document complaints and forward the same to the project management team (PMT) for action. From March 4 to March 30, 2016, common complaints or concerns that beneficiaries in region one raised included: (i) delay in their labor subsidies and (ii) the assistant commissioner from Gbarpolu County complained that the scratching hoes that were supplied were not appropriate and not as strong as the ones produced by a local blacksmith known as the ‘speared hoe’, which is traditionally used to scratch farms in the area. The PMT addressed these concerns in the following manner:

The PMT worked with the Gbarpolu CF to reassure all the beneficiaries that their labor subsidies were being processed and that payment would begin either at the end of April or mid-May 2016. Regarding the complaints about scratching hoes, the PMT and the CF jointly planned to identify a blacksmith in the communities that were involved in rice farming for the production of the traditional scratching hoes. During the PMT implementation support visit to project sites in Gbarpolu County, the blacksmith identified did not have adequate iron scraps to produce the quantity requested, so the team urged farming groups to use the ones that they have been using on their individual farms to complete scratching activities on their CLIP farms.

(a) Performance of the Borrower (GoL)

Component 1: Community Works/Community Livelihood

64. The performance of the GoL can be rated Satisfactory for both components. However, it is important to note that there were significant delays on the Government’s side in the ratification

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and signing of funding agreements and this had implications in the execution some of project activities. Notwithstanding, the GoL played significant roles in supporting implementing agencies to execute the activities of the project. For example, for all public works activities under Component 1, the GoL was fully involved. The GoL allocated the communities, participated in the mobilization of beneficiaries, and provided support in conflict resolution among subproject groups. Local government authorities also provided free land for use by rural youth for their communal farm activities.

65. One major challenge confronting beneficiary youth groups was obtaining adequate planting materials from local vendors on credit for payment later during the payment of labor subsidy as dictated by the POM. Local town and clan chiefs intervened and served as guarantors for youth groups assuring vendors of their payment at a later date by the project. This intervention allayed vendors’ fears and skepticism of the possibility of not receiving their money from the youth groups. This nature of support by the local authorities resulted into subproject groups getting adequate local planting materials for their fields in time.


66. At project appraisal, there was robust GoL commitment to get the project started. This was evidenced from the PAD (page 6) ‘that the YES Project was a catalyst to the larger PRS objectives’. Through creation of additional income opportunities, particularly for the youth and the active mobilization of communities, the project would provide many poor and young Liberians a second chance to be trained and acquire some basic and no cognitive skills and would also complement the PRS' reliance on private sector development. The GoL further envisaged that skills training programs initiated by the project would demonstrate how (a) to open up to new business opportunities and (ii) more active involvement of industries in training makes curricula more relevant.

67. Finally, in line with the National Capacity Development Strategy, the project would support the design and launching of a new institutional framework for TVET. With these in mind, the Government was ready to give the project all the necessary support to become successful. Indeed, the GoL demonstrated some level of commitment in support of the project. The GoL, through the MYS, established the PST and augmented its membership from two staff to ten, in support of improving the quality of monitoring of the project activities.

68. The GoL led the midterm project appraisal and discovered that the management agency was unable to successfully implement the project and achieve the project deliverables and therefore, ensured the renegotiation of the management agency contract duration and the restructuring of the project. The GoL led the management agency’s contract renegotiation process.

69. The GoL also critically reviewed the management agency’s final report and discovered that there were services that the management agency did not deliver. The GoL determined the cost of the unmet deliverables and deducted the monetary value from Transtec’s final payment, thus recouping US$260,000.00 from the management agency to augment the project-restructured budget without requesting for additional funds from the World Bank.

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5. Assessment of World Bank’s Performance

70. The performance of the World Bank was assessed in terms of disbursement of grant funds, procurement, supervision, and granting of ‘no objection’ to proceed with transactions and project activities that required the World Bank’s prior approval. The overall performance of the World Bank was Satisfactory, working with the MYS and MFDP. The World Bank provided strategic and effective supervision in the overall implementation of all the phases of the project with a no objection’ response to all their midterm reviews. In addition, the World Bank undertook periodic supervision missions in-country and provided technical support to the MYS’ PST.

71. Disbursement of grant funds. The World Bank remitted all grants funds for Component 2 of the YES Project through the PFMU, domiciled at the then Ministry of Finance, now MFDP. The MYS later disbursed funds from its DA through the PFMU to vendors and contractors of the YES Project, which earlier was done by Transtec. It is important to note that LACE established and directly operated its own DA because there was internal capacity to do so. LACE disbursed funds to vendors and service providers from its DA directly. This was not the case with the MYS whose DA was established as late as February 2013.

72. Procurement. The World Bank, in completing the project, bolstered the procurement capacity of the MYS through providing the fund for the hiring and maintaining the international procurement specialists. Component 2 of the YES Project was supported by the hiring of a seasoned international procurement specialist whose presence enhanced all procurement activities, including contract negotiation and documentation. Funds also were made available for the training of procurement officers among the project staff who helped in the project and improved the project’s internal capacity.

73. Supervision. The World Bank provided very satisfactory supervision for both components throughout the project cycle from monitoring of project implementation, disbursement of grant funds, following up deliverables timelines, midterm reviews, physical and web-based conferences, and intervention when the management agency and the MYS could not agree on some terms of the former contract.

Assessment of Risks

74. The PAD listed several risks associated with the projects with appropriate mitigation measures. The high-risk rating associated with the security situation of Liberia and implementation capacities, as well as the design were in order. At the time of appraisal, two risks were not identified, but were perhaps less unique given the nature of the government service: (a) the risk of implementation delays caused by the high turnover in high-level ministry officials, given the three-year life of the project, and by bureaucratic delays and (b) the risk associated with the Ebola outbreak toward the close of the project in the last quarter of 2014 that posed a challenge to monitoring of the job placement exercise.

75. Other issues that the risks assessment further considered were attrition of capacity built by the project; lack of political will and commitment to follow up with the TVET aspect, particularly allocating funds to continue the trainings the project initiated, assessment of project

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sustainability; and lack of a planned follow-up tracer study to monitor the progress of vocational trained graduates in the world of work, and ascertain their employment outcome because of skills acquired. These risks were beyond the control of the project, the PST, and the World Bank’s supervision team and the Project Management Unit diligently and candidly addressed, to the extent possible, these unforeseen risks during the regular supervision mission.

6. Safeguards and Fiduciary Compliance

Safeguard Compliance

76. Components 1 and 2 of the YES Project did not trigger any specific environmental concerns under the World Bank’s Environmental and Social Screening and Assessment Framework.

Fiduciary Compliance

77. Service providers who handled various aspects of training have rated the PFMU activities Satisfactory and placement of graduates, as well as the PST members. All FM services were carried out solely by the PFMU monitoring the financial activities of the management agency, Transtec, on behalf of the MOF. The PFMU staff were seen as people who did their job in the proper manner and were professionally consistent. There was no case of fraud, financial misdemeanor, or ineligible expenditure declared and reported for the project.

Procurement (Components 1 and 2)

78. At project start, owing to lack of capacity, which the PAD addressed, the procurement specialist hired particularly for LACE to help implement procurement activities in Component 1 of the project also provided procurement support to Component 2. In December 2012, an international procurement specialist was finally hired for the YES Project Component 2. All procurement was done by the management agency at the beginning of the project and later the MYS when they took over with express approval of the PFMU. By the end of first quarter of the project’s closure year, 2014, the international procurement specialist had left. By this time, the PST team had enough capacity to carry out procurement activities, including hiring of consultants, as the international procurement specialist had duly trained them.

79. The capacity of the MYS to effectively manage procurement for the YES Project Component 2 was feeble. This inadequate capacity added to the slow momentum of hiring consultants for various aspects of the implementation for project deliverables. Thus, procurement decisions could not be made by the MYS, until the World Bank hired an international procurement specialist, who took over the procurement arm. First, the procurement specialist for Component 1 of the YES Project managed by LACE was seconded to the MYS to partly provide procurement guidance and support. Under further arrangement between LACE and the MYS, the international procurement specialist later worked full time for Component 2. The hiring of the procurement specialist sped up the ‘no objection’ clearance from the World Bank for contract awards.

80. There were some procedural errors associated with two procurement activities under Component 1 that resulted in ineligible expenditures. The farm tools were to be purchased per

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county through National Competitive Bidding method as written in the approved PP, but LACE instead, consolidated the requests and purchased in bulk using the shopping method with the PP not being adjusted and approved to reflect the change. The cost of the tools (US$122,000) exceeded the threshold for goods and LACE neither requested nor obtained a ‘no objection’ from the World Bank for the transaction. In addition, when agro machines were procured, they were not delivered immediately upon payment but remained in the custody of the vendor until the last month for project closure. As a result, the World Bank declared the costs of both procurement activities (US$214,000) as ineligible expenditure.

81. Under World Bank Guidelines, ineligible expenditures are to be refunded by the borrower, so the Liberian government is supposed to repay the World Bank the amount for this ineligible expenditure. The World Bank pardoned the GoL (the borrower) because of its limited resource base and fragility and the representative of the borrower, in this case LACE, was seriously reprimanded.

Brief Narrative on Outputs by Component (Component 1)

YES, Component 1: Community Works

82. This component focused on activities that created short-term employment for vulnerable youth. As a result, 95 subprojects were created giving temporary employment to 47,500 youth across the country. Additional outputs under this subcomponent included

recruiting 28 local NGOs, commonly referred to as CFs, to serve as local implementing partners in the 15 political subdivisions of the country to also provide, among others, monitoring and supervision;

hiring 415 individuals (235 men and 180 women) as community trainers who participated in the training-of-trainers workshop; and

buying three cross-country vehicles for project monitoring.

YES, Component 1: Community Livelihood (AF)

83. The focus of this subcomponent was on communal farming by rural youth, which targeted 9,000 youth in rural Liberia. The following were achieved during implementation of this subcomponent:

238 subprojects were created involving 8,750 beneficiaries who received US$1,312,500.00 as labor subsidies.

3,836.43 acres of land were cultivated by various farming groups around the country.

8,750 beneficiaries received agro-inputs and technical knowledge intended to improve their farming activities.

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Hundreds of local planting material vendors received considerable amount of income from sale of their farm produce (cassava cuttings, planting suckers, seeds, and so on) to youth farming groups.


84. This subcomponent focused on skills development of youth to make them employable. Nearly 4,500 youth were targeted to be trained in various vocational and technical skills, with 60 percent of those trained placed in employment. The following were achieved.

2,331 youth trained and 2,077 placed in formal and informal job settings

240 business owners received business development skills training

205 participants from TVET institutions across the country received training to improve the relevance and quality of TVET training skills in the country

With funds from this subcomponent the MYS’ three-year strategic and operational plan document was developed

A tracer study was conducted to ascertain the employment of the YES Project graduates and the extent to which their employers were satisfied with their performances

Ten MYS staff and consultants received training in World Bank Procurement Guidelines and processes conducted by an international procurement specialist

Two senior MYS staff were sponsored by component funds, to undergo social protection and safety nets training in Washington DC

Institutional framework developed for TVET development. The TVET policy was developed, endorsed by the cabinet, and legislated by the Liberian Legislature.

7. Financial and Cost Analysis by Component

85. The financial and cost analysis by component outputs is contained in annex D of the report.

8. Rating and Justification

86. The below listed aspects of the projected are rated with respective justifications:

(b) Project design/relevance - Substantial, in PRS, Aft, and the CDS

(c) PDO - Satisfactory

(d) Implementation arrangements - Satisfactory, for example, project activities were completed within the time and budget

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(e) Project design/relevance - Substantial, in PRS, Aft, and the CDS

(f) Efficiency - Satisfactory. It was labor intensive and most of project funds were funneled into the payment of labor subsidies and procurement of tools and farm implements. The administrative cost was low compared to the stipend paid to beneficiaries, which improved their lives. Justification: PRS, AfT.

9. Lessons learned

(a) The splendid performance of the MYS after Transtec’s departure shows that capacity building and empowerment of a local PMT is critical to project management and ensures quality delivery of project activities. For example, the MYS PST took over from Transtec on July 1, 2013, ran the job placement aspect of the 24-month transition, and successfully closed the YES Project’s Component 2 on June 30, 2015, with 89 percent job placement and within budgets. The PST also had a successful external end of project financial audit.

(b) Implementing a project of this magnitude goes beyond the technical aspect. The proper navigation of the political space is a key issue of success. Most of the delays were partly due to political space management.

(c) Allocation of project communities needs detailed analysis. It was observed that subprojects located near concession districts did very little to achieve targeted acreage due to other engagements the youth had with concessions labor activities. This was evident in some areas in Margibi and Sinoe Counties for the CLIP.

(d) Some of the youth recruited for the training were illiterate, which posed challenges for their learning process. The literacy skill aspect of the program helped, but brought delays to timely completion of certain courses, as trainees had to adapt to reading and writing before they could assimilate their lessons.

(e) Project commissioning took place earlier. The commissioning marked the end of contractual engagement between LACE and the CFs, so it became difficult for the farms to be monitored after the project closed, and therefore impossible for LACE to determine whether the farms were abandoned by the youth groups or not. As a result, the GoL’s ICR will most often capture the project outputs and not outcomes.

(f) The involvement of local political leadership remains critical in the execution of all aspects of project activities as such participation promotes community confidence and resolution of some implementation issues.

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Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

Not applicable

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Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

Inter-Agency Social Protection Assessment (SPA) Initiative. 2014. Liberia Youth, Employment, Skills (YES) Project and Liberia Youth Employment Program (LYEP) Country Pilot Report

Andrews, Backiny-Yetna, Garin, Weedon, Wodon and Zampaglione. 2011. Liberia’s Cash For Work Temporary Employment Project: Responding to Crisis in Low Income, Fragile Countries.

Backiny-Yetna, Wodon and Zampaglione. 2012. Impact of Labor-Intensive Public Works in Liberia: Results from a Light Evaluation Survey.

Subah-Belleh Assoiciates. 2013. YES Project Data Collection for Community Works Impact Evaluation.

Bordewieck, Corinna. 2014. Impact Evaluation: Community Works Component, Youth, Employment, Skills (YES) Project.

IEG World Bank. 2014. ICR Review Community Empowerment II Project.

IEG World Bank. 2012. Youth Employment Programs: an Evaluation of World Bank and IFC.

World Bank, African Development Bank. 2009. Joint Country Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Liberia FY09-FY11. Report No: 47928-LR

Ministry of Education, Republic of Liberia. 2015. National Policy for Technical and Vocational Education and Training 2015-2020.

Ministry of Labor, Republic of Liberia. 2011. Report on the Liberia Labor Force Survey 2010.

———. 2014. Implementation Completion and Results Report – Second Community Empowerment Project (CEPII, P105683)

———. 2014. YES Additional Financing Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF)

———. 2014. YES Additional Financing Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF)

———. 2010. Youth, Employment, Skills Project Operations Manual for Component 1 – Community Works.

———. 2015. Youth, Employment, Skills Project Operations Manual for Component 1 – Community Livelihoods.

———. 2010. Project Appraisal Document: Youth, Employment, Skills Project. Report No: 53626-LR

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———. 2014. Project Paper: Additional Financing for the Youth, Employment, Skills Project. Report No: 87866-LR

———. 2010. Restructuring Paper. Report No: 73761-LR

———. 2013. Restructuring Paper. Report No: 74189-LR

———. All aide memoires and ISRs for the Youth, Employment, Skills Project (P121686)

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