Liberalism and Republicanism Friends or Foes a Reply to Richard Dagger Michael J. Sandel

7/28/2019 Liberalism and Republicanism Friends or Foes a Reply to Richard Dagger Michael J. Sandel

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Liberalism and Republicanism: Friends or Foes? A Reply to Richard DaggerAuthor(s): Michael J. SandelReviewed work(s):Source: The Review of Politics, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Spring, 1999), pp. 209-214Published by: Cambridge University Press for the University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf of Review ofPolitics

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Liberalism and Republicanism:Friends or Foes?A Reply to Richard DaggerMichael J. Sandel

I am grateful to Professor Dagger for his insightful critique.He bringsout thecontinuitiesand differencesbetween Democracy'sDiscontentand my earlier work with subtlety and care. He writesin defense of liberalism, but not without sympathy for many ofthe ideals I invoke in the name of republicanism-civic virtue,encumbered selves, obligations of membership, the formativeproject.In fact, his republican sympathies are so expansive that Ifound myself unsure at times whether I could identity a funda-mental disagreement.ProfessorDagger's basic objection, as I understand it, is this:I overstate the opposition between liberalism and republicanism,between autonomy and civic virtue;in drawing these distinctionstoo sharply,I fail to acknowledge the elements of liberalism I im-plicitly affirm. Professor Dagger accepts the importance of civicvirtue and the formative project.But he considers it a mistake tooppose liberalism as vigorously as I do, and "particularlywrongtooppose republicanism oliberalism."nstead,he favorsa "hybrid"of liberalism and republicanismthatcombines autonomy and civicvirtue.Any republicanismworth defending must include "acom-mitment to liberal principles, such as tolerance, fair play, andrespect for the rights of others."Whether iberalismandrepublicanismarecompatibledoctrinesdepends on how they areconceived. At a certainlevel of general-ity, there is no necessary conflict: the liberal tradition stands fortoleration and individual rights, while the republican traditionstands for government by the people. Liberal rights support re-publican self rule by preventing the majorityfrom oppressing theminority,while the republican emphasis on civic virtue restrainsindividualsfromabusingtheirrightsandignoringthecommongood.This is the compatibilistaccount thatProfessorDagger favors,and it is unobjectionableas such. What, then, is the point of speci-fying the two traditions in a way that highlights the tension

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THE REVIEWOFPOLITICSbetween them? Why pick a fight with liberals "who otherwisemight be persuaded to see how their own commitments requirethemto accordgreatervalue andattention orepublicanprinciples"?

Procedural versus Perfectionist LiberalismAs Professor Dagger observes, my quarrel is not withliberalism as such but with the procedural liberalism prominent

in the academy and in the political discourse of our time. This isthe liberalism that insists government should be neutral towardcompeting conceptions of the good life, or, in the philosophers'parlance, the liberalism that asserts the priority of the right overthe good. My objectionto this liberalism is not that it emphasizesindividual rights but that it seeks to define and defend rightswithout affirming any particularconception of the good life.The reason for focusing on this version of liberalism is notthat it is weak and hence an easy targetbut that it is philosophi-cally attractive and politically influential. Its moral and politicalappeal can be understood in two ways: First,in pluralist societiessuch asours,people oftendisagreeon moral andreligious questions.It is therefore tempting to seek principles of justice that do notdepend for theirjustificationon any particularmoral or religiousconception. Second, for government to affirm in law some par-ticularvision of the good life seems a kind of coercion; it fails torespect personsas freeand independent selves, capableof choosingtheir own values and ends.Thevery features of procedural liberalism that make it attrac-tive call into question the formative project of the republicantradition. The formative project rejectsthe idea that governmentshould be neutral toward the values and ends its citizens espouse.It seeks social and political arrangementsthat cultivate in citizenscertainhabits and dispositions, or civic virtues. Ratherthan affirmabove all the capacity of persons to choose their own ends, therepublican tradition accords the political community an explicitstake in the moral character of its citizens. It makes character apublic, not merely private concern.Some (including Professor Dagger) might reply that the for-mative project is not necessarily inconsistent with liberal ideals.This defense of liberalism comes in two versions. One adheres tothe priorityof the right over the good, but allows for those virtues

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LIBERALISMAND REPUBLICANISM

that support it-such as toleration, civility, and respect for therightsof others.'Anotherabandonsproceduralliberalism for someversion of perfectionist liberalism. It gives up the aspiration toneutrality and promotes liberal virtues like autonomy and indi-viduality as comprehensive moral ideals, qualities of characterthat figure prominently in the good life.2Procedural liberalism contrasts more sharply with republi-canism than does perfectionist liberalism. The reason is thatproceduralliberalismimposes heavy restrictionson the formativeproject. It rejectsall civic virtues whose justification depends oncomprehensive moral ideals. Consider, for example, the case ofconsumerism. Republicans might seek to discouragepracticesthatglorify consumerism on the grounds that such practices promoteprivatized, materialistichabits, enervate civic virtue, and inducea selfish disregard for the public good. The republican traditionhas long regarded an excessive preoccupation with consumptionto be a moral and civic vice, inimical to self government. Forpro-cedural liberals, by contrast, policies designed to discourageconsumerism can only be justified insofar as the preoccupationwith material things undermines support for principles of jus-tice.Any attemptto regulateconsumerism or materialism on othergrounds would impermissibly infringe people's right to choosetheir values for themselves.The quarrelbetween perfectionist liberals and republicans isof a different kind. At issue is not whether to affirm in law aparticular conception of the good life, but what conception-orrange of conceptions-is most desirable. Given their emphasison autonomy and individuality as moral ideals, perfectionistliberals might join republicans in a campaign to reduce the holdof consumerism on the public culture. Their reasons might have

1. This view is present in John Rawls, A TheoryofJustice(Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press, 1971), and in Rawls, Political LiberalismNew York:Columbia University Press, 1993).For an illuminating discussion of this point,see Will Kymlicka, "LiberalEgalitarianismand Civic Republicanism:Friends orEnemies?," in Anita L. Allen and Milton C. Regan, Jr.,DebatingDemocracy'sDiscontent(Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1998),pp. 131-48.2. The liberalism of John Stuart Mill is perhaps the most familiar example.Contemporary examples include GeorgeKateb,TheInnerOcean:IndividualityndDemocraticCulture1992),andJosephRaz,TheMoralityofFreedomOxford:OxfordUniversity Press, 1986).

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nothing to with the effects of consumerism on justice and rights(as procedural liberalswould require),nor with its consequencesfor self-government (as republicans would emphasize), butinstead with the aim of combating conformity and complacencyas defects of character.One reason for posing the distinction between liberalism andrepublicanism as starkly as I do is to force liberals to choose be-tween their procedural and perfectionist impulses. It is not clearto me which version of liberalism ProfessorDagger favors,thoughhis willingness to jettison neutrality suggests the second. In anycase, perfectionist liberalism seems a more plausible candidatefor the liberalrepublican "hybrid"he hopes to fashion. Once char-acter formation for the sake of substantive moral and civic idealsis accorded legitimacy, citizens can debate which virtues theirpolitical community should cultivate and prize. Republicans andperfectionist liberals may agree on some virtues and disagree onothers, but they share the notion that political arrangementsshould be judged by the kind of citizens they produce.

Two Concepts of AutonomyAccording to Professor Dagger, the most important liberalcontribution to a liberal-republican hybrid is the ideal of

autonomy, a value he thinks I wrongly associate with proceduralliberalism and the unencumbered self.Autonomy and civic virtuemight seem to be opposites, he observes, because autonomypoints to individual claims and civic virtue to communal ones;but in fact they are complementary principles, since eachremedies the excesses of the other and together they remind us ofour interdependence.I do not agree that the concept of autonomy offers a necessarysupplement to republican ideals of liberty and independence.Contemporary liberals often invoke it, but there are two differentsenses of autonomy, and it is important to distinguish them. Onesense refersto individual choice.People aresaid tobe autonomouswhen they can live their lives as they please, according to theirown desires, without undue interference by the state or otheragencies of power. This is the sense of autonomy that ProfessorDagger seems to have in mind when he refers to "personalautonomy," with its "individualistic"bent. But there is another,

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LIBERALISMAND REPUBLICANISMmore demanding notion of autonomy that has nothing to do withacting according to one's own individual preferencesand desires.According to Kant, to act autonomously is to act according to alaw I give myself-to act, that is, according to the categoricalimperative. Kant emphasizes that, insofar as I act autonomously,Ido not act out of my particularpreferencesand desires but ratheras a participant in pure practical reason, as a universal subject.This is what guarantees that the moral law is not just up to us, asindividuals, to decide-one principle for you, another for me.Contemporary liberalsdraw sometimes on the Kantiansenseof autonomy, sometimes on the individualistic sense. The reasonI associate autonomy with procedural liberalism and the unen-cumbered self is that the claim for the priority of the right overthe good is a Kantianclaim. The idea that we should think aboutjustice from the standpoint of persons who abstract from theirparticularinterests and ends expresses the ideal of autonomy inthe Kantiansense.For the most part, Professor Dagger employs the concept ofautonomy in its individualistic sense. The "personal autonomy"of which he writes is, from a Kantianpoint of view, an oxymoron.Once personal considerations or particular circumstances deter-mine the will, the choice is not autonomous but heteronomous.Nor would Kant agree with ProfessorDagger that "it is possiblefor an autonomous person to act in a thoroughly selfish manner."To act out of selfish motivations is, forKant,to actheteronomously,not autonomously.A selfish act canbe an autonomous act only inthe non-Kantian, individualistic sense of autonomy.How, then, can the concept of autonomy cure the defects ofrepublicanism? It might be thought that autonomy in itsindividualistic sense can remedy the coercive, collectivisttendencies to which republicanism is prone; the idea thatindividuals should be free to act according to their preferenceswithin certain spheres of life might be seen as a sensible liberalrestraint on the formative project. But despite his frequentreferences to "personal autonomy," this is not the "hybrid"Professor Dagger has in mind. Instead, to establish the linkbetween autonomy and civic virtue, he turns to Rousseau, forwhom freedomis only possible when the generalwill of the citizentakes precedence over the particular will of the individual.Professor Dagger rightly notes the close connection between

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THE REVIEWOF POLITICSRousseau's idea of freedom and Kantian autonomy. Rousseau'sgeneral will, like Kant's autonomous will, locates freedom in amoment that abstracts from all particularity.Neither endorsesautonomy in the individualistic sense familiar amongcontemporary liberals.Even admirersof Rousseauworry about the coercion to whichthe generalwill is prone and especially his suggestion thatpeoplecanbe forced to be free. This darkside of Rousseau is often attrib-uted to an excess of republicanism. In fact,however, what makesRousseau's politics dangerous is not its republican commitmentto civic virtue but rather its assumption that the general will isunitary and undifferentiated; political deliberation is impossiblebecause, according to Rousseau, any disagreement signals thecorruption of the general will by particularinterests. The unitary,undifferentiated character of the general will is bound up withthe idea that moral freedom consists in abstractingfrom all par-ticularinterests, ends, and conceptions of the good. And this idealof unsituated freedom is preciselywhat Kanttakes from Rousseauand turns into the concept of freedom as autonomy.So a "hybrid" of civic virtue and autonomy in the Kantiansense does not diminish the dangers of the formative projectbutif anything compounds them. What, then, of autonomy in the in-dividualistic sense? Should the scope of public deliberation beconstrained in advance so that individuals may be free to act ac-cordingto their own preferencesand desires,at least within certainspheres of life? Theanswer, it seems to me, depends on the moralimportance of the preferences and desires in question comparedto the moralimportanceof thepublic purposesthatwould challengeor override them. This is no argument against individual rights.It is simply to insist that arguments for rights cannot be detachedfrom substantive moral judgments about the purposes and endsrights advance.

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Liberalism and Republicanism Friends or Foes a Reply to Richard Dagger Michael J. Sandel

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