DISPATCHES 1

DISPATCHES VOLUME 5, NUMBER 3February 1999

LESSONS LEARNED IN CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION (CIMIC)

Commander 1st Canadian Division

Foreword

All operations embarked upon by the army have a civil-military cooperation(CIMIC) aspect intrinsic to them. This has been the case in the past, and willcontinue in the future. In some instances, as might be typified by a warfightingscenario in the Middle East, the interaction between civilian organizations and themilitary may be largely limited to mitigating the impact of one upon the other, withthe military having the responsibility and authority to make this happen. In othercases, for example during a humanitarian or domestic operation, where the militaryis likely in a supporting role, this interaction may include numerous areas ofconcern, and involve several civilian agencies, all requiring constant and detailedconsultation. In all instances, there is the real and ongoing need for the military tobecome actively involved with civilian organizations as well as the population ingeneral, and for this contact to be effectively planned and implemented to facilitatemission success.

Many of you will have been previously involved in CIMIC, possibly withoutrealizing this fact. Probably, in most cases, you were able to accomplish yourmission without the benefit of much of the information or experience contained inthis document. This may have been more the result of good fortune than goodplanning and training. To be most effective, we must all have an understanding ofthe differences in the civilian and military cultures, the functions of various CIMICpersonnel, and the part that each of us plays in ensuring that interaction does notinhibit the achievement of the mission. As leaders, we must also ensure that thosecarrying out CIMIC functions receive the proper training. This issue of Dispatches,which is based on present doctrine and past experience, will help address thedeficiency in knowledge that exists in the area of CIMIC within the army.

Operations over the past several years, including those in the FormerRepublic of Yugoslavia and Haiti, at home during recent floods and the Ice Storm,and by contingents deployed on humanitarian operations, have all demonstratedthat we need to recognize and plan for the impact of civilians on our operations.Conversely we must be cognizant of the impact of our operations on civilians.Operation ABACUS, the CF Contingency Plan to mitigate the impact of Year 2000,will have major CIMIC implications, and many of you will find yourselves employedin a CIMIC role. Others will need to understand just what these personnel are doingto allow them to effectively carry out their tasks. I urge you to read and benefit fromthis document, as the understanding of the role CIMIC plays in operations may wellmake your particular job easier.

M.K. Jeffery

DISPATCHES 2

LESSONS LEARNED IN CIVIL-MILITARYCOOPERATION (CIMIC)

Table of Contents

PART 1 - INTRODUCTION

PART 2 - CIMIC DOCTRINE OVERVIEW

PART 3 - CIMIC ORGANIZATION

PART 4 - COMMAND AND CONTROL

PART 5 - CIMIC CONSIDERATIONS IN OPERATIONS

PART 6 - CIMIC TRAINING

PART 7 - CONCLUSION

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52.1 Understanding the CIMIC Environment 52.2 CIMIC in Operations 52.3 Types of Civilian Organizations 62.4 CIMIC Functions 7

93.1 General 93.2 The Staff 93.3 The Civil-Military Forum 113.4 Liaison Officers 14

164.1 General 164.2 Recent Aspects of Command and Control 164.3 CIMIC and Information Operations 174.4 Boundries 19

20

5.2 Equipment 235.3 “Fitting In” 255.4 Security 265.5 CIMIC Projects 285.6 CIMIC Negotiations 315.7 Legal Aspects of CIMIC 325.8 The Role of Interpreters in CIMIC 34

366.1 General 366.2 CIMIC Courses 366.3 Op ABACUS / Unit Training 37

38

5.1 Dealing with Civilian Organizations 20

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"Failure to appreciate the role of civilians (armed or otherwise) or to establish aproactive CIMIC program can lead to military problems. This is particularly true whenoperating in an area such as the Krajina which has a weak central government and apopulation who do not feel obligated to obey its edicts.”

Op HARMONY POR

resourcesarrangements support the relationship

commanders non-militaryagencies

PART 1 - INTRODUCTION

1.1 General

1.2 Aim

1.3 Understanding the Term

To state that "CIMIC" and "G5" aretwo of the more misunderstood terms in thelexicon of the Canadian Army would not bean exaggeration. In many cases, when onespeaks of CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation),the response is often a blank looksuggesting misunderstanding, or evenworse, no knowledge of the term. Somesoldiers believe CIMIC is only conducted oninternational operations, while others see alldomestic operations as CIMIC operations.This confusion persists despite an increasein CIMIC visibility on recent operations.

The purpose of this edition of DISPATCHES is to clarify some of themisconceptions about CIMIC by identifying CIMIC Lessons Learned from recentoperations and to demonstrate its utility during operations.

CIMIC has generally the samemeaning for both international and domesticoperations. It includes the and the

thatbetween and

in areas where CF elements are, orwill be, operating. In the case of internationaloperations, these agencies may include nationalauthorities, civil, and paramilitary organizationsas well as civilian populations. In the case ofdomestic operations, they may includeCanadian federal, provincial and municipallevels of government as well as civilian

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1.4 Background

UNPROFOR / UNCRO:

Op ASSURANCE

Op ASSISTANCE

Op PALLADIUM:

Op RECUPERATION:

To illustrate, here is a brief overview of CIMIC aspects on recent operations.

The tour presented a myriad of CIMICchallenges to CANBAT. The unit had to be able to productivelycooperate with several UN and non-governmental organizations(NGOs) with the key to mission success being the winning of the"hearts and minds" campaign.

J5 staff with the Multi-National Force HQ established early liaison withthe lead civilian agency, the United NationsDevelopment Program (UNDP). Workingthrough the UNDP-chaired UN Joint LogisticsCentre, the J5 staff coordinated the delivery ofclose to 200 tons of humanitarian relief suppliesby CC-130 to Rwandan refugees.

CIMIC was effected at all levels toensure CF plans meshed with those of the provincialand municipal authorities. Brigades and unitsestablished liaison with municipalities, while theLFWA Domestic Operations cell, and later the JFHQJ5 staff, dealt at the provincial level with the ManitobaEmergency Measures Organization (MEMO). Thesecontacts were critical in determining the appropriateresponses to the myriad of civilian requests for CFassistance.

Battle Group CIMIC liaison officersand personnel from the Combined Joint Civil-MilitaryTask Force have supported the mission in Bosnia bymonitoring displaced persons and refugee movements,conducting liaison with NGOs and UN agencies, andmanaging humanitarian reconstruction projects. Theseactivities have been key "force multipliers" inaccomplishing the SFOR mission.

Effective CF supportduring the ice storm was possible largely due toan extensive network of LOs established withcivilian agencies. A key lesson from thisoperation was the requirement for a G5 or CIMIC

:

:

DISPATCHES 5

PART 2 - CIMIC DOCTRINE OVERVIEW

2.1 Understanding the CIMIC Environment

2.2 CIMIC in Operations

"Differences in military and civilian methods of operation (staff structure, decisionmaking process, planning principles) can create friction until mutual understanding andconfidence are achieved. Domestic operations are further complicated when severallevels of government are involved. For Op ASSISTANCE, the Joint Force had to de-conflict the distinct agendas and authorities of each. The Joint Force Commanderidentified the achievement of effective and comprehensive civil-military cooperation asthe centre of gravity for OpASSISTANCE.”

Op ASSISTANCE POR

An elementary understanding of humanpsychology tells us that every person has hisown beliefs, customs and agenda. Militaryforces, however, normally operate under aguiding principle of obedience to lawful orders.We work within a set of guidelines (regulations,orders, policies, etc) towards a common goal(mission). On the other hand, the civilian world isdivided into groups, that on the surface, mayhave common interests but in many cases aredominated by numerous and sometimesdivergent agendas.

Past operations have indicated the best results are achieved when the staffdealing with civilian stakeholders is not directly involved in the conduct of operations,but rather acts as a liaison or mediator between the military and civilian worlds. Thisinterface is called . It requires specific knowledge and skills and anunderstanding of the civilian environment including the related behaviour of individualcivilian organisations or special interest groups. CIMIC personnel investigate,analyze and assess the civilian context to assist in the execution of military tasks.This is achieved through a combination of advising, communicating and co-ordinating towards the common goal. CIMIC efforts must ultimately support theachievement of the mission.

CIMIC, in some form or another, is present throughout the complete spectrum ofmilitary operations. In war, CIMIC ensures local civilian matters have a minimaleffect on operational plans (ie. refugees clogging supply routes). In domesticoperations, CIMIC maximizes unity of effort by providing a common interfacebetween civilian authorities and the military forces. In peacekeeping or peaceenforcement operations, CIMIC provides the crucial interface between the military,local civilian governments and international relief agencies. In any operation, CIMICcan also be a significant human intelligence (HUMINT) and psychological operations

CIMIC

New CF CIMIC doctrine has recently been published. Itis found in GG-005-004/AF-023, CIVIL MILITARYCOOPERATION IN PEACE, EMERGENCIES, CRISIS ANDWAR. This publication can be found on the LessonsLearned Information Warehouse (LLIW) Version 8.

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2.3 Types of Civilian Organizations.

"The role of the IOs and NGOs was clearly identified but not well understoodby any, including the organizations themselves".

Op PALLADIUM POR

To better understand CIMIC, it is useful to understand a few key definitionswith respect to civilian organizations. The level of cooperation shown by theseagencies and their willingness to accept military participation and co-ordination ofcivil-military tasks will be determined by the charter, mandate, functions andresponsibilities of each individual organization.

Organizations formed to operate underinternational or national government mandates, conventions and legislation.Examples are the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

- A wide variety of primarily non-profit organizations, both national and international, which are separate fromthe government or country in which they were founded. NGOs formthemselves and write their own charters and missions. Examples are WorldVision, CARE, OXFAM, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) and Save theChildren.

- A humanitarian agency that, due to its expertise andknowledge, has agreed to effect coordination between other agenciesparticipating and contributing to an emergency operation. This lead impliesno legal authority or command responsibility in regards to the volunteeragencies.

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International Organization (IO) -

Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)

Lead Agency

DISPATCHES 7

2.4 CIMIC Functions

The relevant functions carried out by CIMIC personnel are:

a. CIMIC assessments/formats (as per the reporting system establishedfor each operation), CIMIC estimates, OPLAN and/or Op O in co-ordinationwith J/G3 Plans and J/G3 Ops as well as other documentation relevant toCIMIC support for military operations.

b. on command responsibilities, and recommend appropriate actions toall levels of command to secure and maintain constructive civil-militaryrelationships, essential for the success of the mission.

c. CF formations and units, host nation (HN) civil and military authorities,other government departments (OGDs) and agencies, IOs and NGOs withdevelopmental, political and defence issues as part of the mandate, orreached through national MOU or agreements.

d. with HN civil and military authorities, OGDs, IOs and NGOs todetermine the best method of supporting civil tasks.

e. periodic meetings and keep channels of communication openwith host nation civil and military authorities, OGDs, non-governmentalnational or international organizations, agencies or authorities and paramilitaryleaders.

f. non-combatants interference with operations and the impact ofoperations on non-combatants.

g. to HN civil and military authorities and population byidentifying, planning and implementing assistance programs to sustain peacebuilding efforts in cooperation with OGDs, NGOs, IOs and local authorities.

h. civil-military operations and support to civil administration to ensureCIMIC objectives are being met. This is especially important when HN supportvaries from poor to non-existent and the international community assumesfunctions of a government in a failed or fragile state.

i. CIMIC activities to determine and enhance(measurement of results versus objectives stated) and(measurement of results versus resources expended).

j. actions by appropriate agencies. A military force cannot solve allcivil problems or satisfy all civil requests. Therefore, CIMIC centres serve ascontrol points to direct requests outside the unit mandate or capabilities tothose agencies capable of resolving the issue.

k. in the execution of CIMIC projects. In addition to organizingthe project in phases, periodic on-site inspections by military and NGOspecialists are mandatory to exercise quality control and compliance withcontractual requirements.

Prepare

Advise

Assist

Develop plans

Co-ordinate

Minimize

Provide training

Supervise

Evaluate

Facilitate

Exercise control

effectivenessefficiency

Monitoring of projects from conception to

DISPATCHES 8

FROM: OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED -1 PPCLI ON OP HARMONY ROTO 4

CIMIC Operations. 1 PPCLI formed a CIMIC detachment based on theLO team that was part of the OP HARMONY establishment. Commanded by OCHQ Company, this three officer team was active in the entire spectrum of CIMICmatters. PK ops are not purely military in nature. Everything from HN support (orthe lack of it) through cooperation with local civil police to carrying outhumanitarian tasks can have a direct bearing on the unit's mission. This isespecially true in areas where the population is heavily armed or may mistrust thePK force. Armed civilians can cause as many problems for the unit as the actualofficial belligerent forces. Their duties and activities included:

a. liaison with local civil police forces and UNCIVPOL;

b. coordination of PW exchanges;

c. coordination of exchanges of mortal remains;

d. documentation of apparent war crimes, especially grave desecration;

e. liaison with local government;

f. coordination of farming and other economic activity inside the ZOS;

g. coordination of village visits;

h. coordination of burials inside the ZOS;

i. special projects such as the restoration of the Kakma Pumping Station;

j. coordination and distribution of aid to local schools, including repairs andplayground construction;

k. coordination of the efforts of UN and other non-governmental aidorganizations in the 1 PPCLI AOR; and

DISPATCHES 9

PART 3 - CIMIC ORGANIZATION

3.1 General

3.2 The Staff

The CIMIC Staff Does …

CIMIC personnel generally fall into one of three categories:

- conduct the conceptual part of the CIMIC role- deal with requests from non-military organizations

- gather and communicate information

These staff categories will often overlap. A staff officer may spend half hisday as a LO meeting with a UN Agency before returning to his headquarters to prepareCIMIC plans. On Op PALLADIUM, Battle Group LOs cover all three categories.

Anyone can be trained to perform CIMIC functions and a CIMIC officer doesnot require any particular environmental background. There is a misconception thatdue to the requirements of CIMIC projects, engineers make the best CIMIC personnel.While some engineering expertise is certainly desirable within a CIMIC cell, it is by nomeans mandatory for all CIMIC personnel. Engineering is simply one skill that oftenproves useful.

Reports from operations indicate that the function of the G5 staff is poorlyunderstood. Clarification of this issue is eased by delineating those functions the G5staff will perform from those that they will not.

advise on all matters dealing with civilians withinthe Area of Operations. Specifically they:

Advise on our legal responsibilities IAW Canadian legislation and internationallaws regarding civilians;

Transform the commander's guidance into the CIMIC concept;

Produce the CIMIC aspects of the operation order;

Activate a Civil-Military Coordination Centre (CMCC) when needed andimplement and maintain as wide a CIMIC network ;

Acts as the POC for civilian requests and for CIMIC LOs;

Interpret, analyze, validate, track, prioritize and coordinate civilian requests (fromLO and CMCC input) within the HQ;

CIMIC StaffCIMIC OperatorsLiaison Teams

“CIMIC functions (within the HQ) were performed as a full time job (10-12hrs/day, 7 days/week) for three staff officers.”

Op ASSURANCE POR

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Inform the commander and staff of the evolving civilian environment;

as possible

DISPATCHES 10

The CIMIC Staff Does Not …

inall operations

JFHQ

Area HQs

brigade or unit level

battle group level

take precedence over the G3. Some believethat in humanitarian or domestic operations the G5 supersedes the G3. This is notthe case, as the principle of the primacy of operations must be maintained. Pastoperations have shown that confusion between the G3 and G5 areas of responsibilityleads to unnecessary duplication of staff effort. This must be avoided. Essentially,

, the G3 staff will plan and supervise the allocation of troops andmaterial to tasks, IAW the Commander's direction, based on information and analysisreceived from sources such as the G5 and G2 staffs.

A generic CIMIC staff chart for a is shown at Figure 1 Thisorganization was developed based on observations from Operations ASSURANCE,ASSISTANCE and RECUPERATION.

Lower level HQs will be organized with fewer staff; could probablyconduct limited domestic operations with a G5, G5 Ops and G5 Plans.

At a single G5 staff officer would be the minimumhowever, based on the situation, there may well be a need for more.

At the structure of the CIMIC staff will be entirely missiondependant. (Note that the LO structure for the Op PALLADIUM battle group (basicallythe BG's CIMIC staff) employs upwards of four personnel because of the significance

.

FIGURE 1

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3.3 The Civil-Military Forum

The CMCC (The Traditional CMOC)

"Most NGOs/IOs are without firm direction or leadership. They have atendency to turn to SFOR for guidance or support. If permitted, SFOR could easilylose scope of its mission.”

“It was at these (CMCC) meetings that procedures and priorities for airliftsupport were established…It was critically important and key to the success forhumanitarian ops.”

Op PALLADIUM POR

Op ASSURANCE POR

CIMIC operators will work out of a civil-military forum (a specific location) inthe form of a Civil-Military Coordination Centre or CMCC (formerly referred to as theCMOC), a CIMIC House or a CIMIC Centre. These locations are not the CIMICversion of an operations centre but rather are where CIMIC conduct theirco-ordination functions with civilians.

It is very useful for a force to establish a fixed location where the civil-militaryinterface can occur. Experience has shown that local civilians will have matters theydeem of import to discuss with the military in their area. There will be complaints andrequests for information or support. When these matters go beyond the capability ofthe section commander on patrol (likely the initial point of contact) to deal with, it isimportant that there be some place he/she can direct the civilian. This place is oftenin the form of a CMCC, but as outlined below, can also take other forms.

The CMCC is an area establishedjust "outside the wire" of a HQ where CIMIC operators (or other staff, commandersetc) meet with civilians. It stems from US doctrine and the location is designed tokeep civilian eyes away from sensitive materials within the HQ proper, while stillenjoying the advantages in terms of security and convenience of co-location with theHQ.

The classic example of the CMCCcomes from the US experience in Somalia.The Americans wanted to get a handle on allthe aid workers in their AO, but the difficultywas getting their attention. Eventually, theydevised a poster with graphic photos ofinjuries caused by land mines. The captionstated something to the effect that to learnabout land mines and avoid becoming acasualty, the CMOC was the place to go forinformation. In this way, the Americansestablished contact with the aid communityand subsequently established a forum withthe relief effort.

The closest Canadians have come to establishing a CMOC or CMCC camein Uganda, during Op ASSURANCE. The UN Joint Logistics Centre/CMOC met atthe Kampala Fairgrounds where the Canadian HQ was established. For securityreasons the meetings were held in a separate building from that which housed theJOC and JIC.

operators

.

DISPATCHES 12

ADVANTAGES OF A CMCC

DISADVANTAGES OF A CMCC

CIMIC House.

ADVANTAGES OF A CIMIC HOUSE

DISADVANTAGES OF A CIMIC HOUSE

Security

Image

Location.

Location

Availability

Security

Facilities

- A secure and convenient place to interface with civilians.

- A forum at a military camp suggests a degree of military controlthat may alienate other officials.

Due to their physical requirements, HQs are often establishedon the peripheries of the urban centres. It may be inconvenient or evenimpossible for civilians to reach the CMCC.

An alternative to the CMCC is the CIMIC House. ACanadian member of the CIMIC Task Force in Bosnia ran the Multi-National DivisionSouthWest CIMIC House on Op PALLADIUM. Based in a rented civilian townhousein the centre of Banja Luka, it was manned by six to eight personnel and was openduring business hours for the public to come to with complaints, queries, or requestsfor assistance. Civilians who went to other locations with these matters werereferred to the CIMIC House.

. The chief advantage of the CIMIC house is location. If foundcentrally in the city, it is normally easily accessible to the majority of locals(many of whom may not have vehicles). In an environment wherecommunication by telephone may be unreliable, it is important that keycivilian players can "drop in" quickly.

. Locals will always know where they could find militarypersonnel (even after the House is closed for routine matters), as it isalways occupied.

. In a less permissive environment it might be unwise to leave ahandful of personnel out on their own. It may be necessary to reinforce theCIMIC House with other troops.

. A domestic residence may lack facilities (e.g. a briefing room)required for any civil-military planning and coordination. Important matters

In some instances, there may be no requirement for a CMCC. Forexample, upon arriving in Winnipeg for Op ASSISTANCE, the JFHQ J5 soonrealized that civilian organizations had their own locations up and running, wheresuch interface could occur (ie. MEMO). Consequently, rather than establishing aCMCC, LOs were dispatched to these organizations. Let us now look at the variousoptions that can be utilized to facilitate civil-military interface.

DISPATCHES 13

The third option for a civil-military forum is the CIMIC Centre.This is basically a "light" variation on the CIMIC House. On Op PALLADIUM, theCanadian Battle Group has established several CIMIC centres. These are smallerthan CIMIC Houses, based on rented commercial property (possibly a storefront witha backroom). The CIMIC Centre is only manned part-time (during business hours,on specified days of the week) where local demand for its services is insufficient tojustify a 24/7 CIMIC House.

Like a CIMIC House, a well-sited CIMIC Centre will beconvenient for civilians.

It should be cheaper to rent than a CIMIC House.

If not manned at night there may be less of a security concern.

One team can man more than one CIMIC Centre, openingthem on different days of the week.

The main drawback of the CIMIC Centre is that mattersarising after business hours may take some time to be dealt with.Civilians may revert to going straight to a local military camp forassistance if they perceive a local CIMIC Centre as always beingclosed.

The small size of a CIMIC Centre makes it an inappropriatevenue for important meetings.

The forums outlined above have a degree of utility, particularly in dealingwith local civilians. However, none are ideal for conducting CIMIC with local leaders,NGOs, IOs or UN Agencies. This problem leads us to the third category of CIMICOrganization.

CIMIC Centre

ADVANTAGES OF A CIMIC CENTRE

DISADVANTAGES OF A CIMIC CENTRE

Location.

Cost.

Security.

Economy.

Availability.

Facilities.

DISPATCHES 14

3.4 Liaison Officers

Who Should Receive CIMIC LOs?

Who should the LO report to

"[There is] was a need to rapidly deploy competent, self-sufficient liaisonteams with the various organizations we are called upon to support" -

“During this tour, the only officer assigned to purely military liaison wasthe LO to MND (SW). All other LOs were performing more of a CIMIC function.”

"Liaison teams provided the only source of Canadian HUMINT to theMNFHQ in Entebbe/Kampala and acted as an invaluable link.”

Op RECUPERATION POR

Op PALLADIUM POR

IN ANY OPERATION

Op ASSURANCE POR

Sending CIMIC personnel tokey civilian (or military) organizationsis often more effective than trying topersuade them to come to themilitary's location. Op ASSURANCE,ASSISTANCE, PALLADIUM andRECUPERATION all share a commonfeature; the military element was (is) insupport of the civil element. Thismeans that the military plan must bedesigned to support the civil plan.

liaison mustbe established with the major civilian players (provincial Emergency MeasuresOrganizations, lead agencies, etc). The key civilian organizations should beidentified for a military force as part of its strategic direction. In the case of naturaldisasters the provincial authorities have jurisdiction, and the CF acts in support ofthem. Thus, the provincial governments' emergency measures organizations werethe key civilian bodies for Ops ASSISTANCE and RECUPERATION (MEMO andDGSP respectively). For Op PALLADIUM, the Dayton Peace Accord identifies theUNHCR and OHR as two of the lead organizations, and consequently it isincumbent upon SFOR to coordinate its plans with these two bodies. Dependingon the operation, it may be advisable to establish liaison with other organizationsas well. During Op RECUPERATION, Hydro-Quebec's critical role meant itreceived separate LOs from QG FIRM.

LOs attached to civilian organizationsshould report to the G5. This ensures information is collated and analyzed with allother information concerning non-military activities. The G5 must ensure thatrelevant information is passed to the appropriate stakeholders (G2, G3, PAffO) asCIMIC gathered information is of use to more than one branch.

,

?

LO Mission and Tasks. LOs are attached to organizations tocommunicate and transfer information in both directions. They need to have clear

DISPATCHES 15

Co-located with the main stakeholders, LOs must:

- understand the organization and functions of civilian structures- understand the complete picture of all organizations and authorities- appreciate the different civilian agendas and their impact on the mission- create and maintain a confident climate through reciprocal exchanges- inform the organization of the military mission, tasks and role- participate in the civilian planning, and verify its conformity with military

possibilities- assess needs or foreseen problems- gather information- deliver the "Forces" key message as established by the PAffO and/or the

information operations working group

Generally, the higher the level of headquarters, the moreliaison personnel it is likely to have. Consequently, at formation level, it is oftenpossible to provide full time LOs to several organizations while unit LOs may beresponsible for more than one organization.

Liaison to a particular organization's office or sub-office isbest effected by the military organization whose boundaries correspond most closelyto those of the civilian one. In Op PALLADIUM, SFOR HQ maintained liaison with thehead offices of the OHR and UNHCR. MND (SW) in turn provided liaison to theregional offices of these organizations, while individual Battle Groups covered off thesub-offices in their AO.

There are rarely sufficient resources for a commander to meet all tasks withease. Given shortages, the most important CIMIC category is the staff. CIMIC staffcan (and have) performed the roles of the other two categories on an as requiredbasis. Similarly, troops on the ground and commanders can perform many of thetasks of both the CMCC and LO. There must, however, be the capability at the HQ,regardless of the level, where the information provided by these sources can besynthesized.

Ideally, all three categories of CIMIC personnel should work together toprovide the commander with a clear view of what is happening from the civilianperspective. LOs and CIMIC operators collect information to be analyzed by CIMICstaff. The result should be a complete picture of the civilian situation, which in turn

"The battle group had approximately 10 teams that were dedicated to liaisonon a continuous basis.”

A good LO will empathize with the organization to which heis attached. In some cases, however, LOs have begun to identify too closely with thecivilian organization. In one case the term "we" in a LO's SITREP referred to he andthe civilian organization, rather than he and his parent formation.

Op PALLADIUM POR

“

This LO had "gonenative" and had to be removed.

J5 Observation

Provision of LOs

Affiliation of LOs.

.

Going Native"

DISPATCHES 16

PART 4 - COMMAND AND CONTROL

4.1 General

4.2 Recent Aspects of Command and Control

Op RECUPERATION

Op ASSISTANCE

Op ASSURANCE

“The JTFC identified the achievement of effective and comprehensive CIMICas the centre of gravity for Op ASSISTANCE"

Lessons Learned Staff Directive 19 Nov 97

The need for a separate CIMIC staff has at times been questioned

. This is critical, in light of the increasing prominence of civilians inoperations. A commander needs a staff that understands the significance of the oftenunique mandates and circumstances of different civilian organizations such as theICRC. A commander would not conduct warfighting operations without considering hisG2's analysis of the enemy. Similarly, a commander needs to be advised by CIMICstaff before conducting operations in support of civilians.

Once requests have been assessed, analyzed and coordinated, they can bepassed to the other staff branches for action. Only at the lowest levels should CIMICinformation be passed directly into the operations net (and then it is imperative that theinformation also go up the "tech net" to the CIMIC staff at the next higher level).

: CIMIC LOs were assigned tocivilian organizations such as Hydro-Quebec. The plan for dealingwith civilian requests was simple; Hydro-Quebec authoritiesidentified the tasks, which were relayed to QG FIRM by liaisonpersonnel. However, the senior LO to whom these requests weresent was embedded in the operations (G3) chain and wasconsequently too busy to validate each request. This meant thatLOs were sometimes told by the harried senior LO to go straight tounits themselves with the requests. Consequently, troops weretasked unnecessarily and resources were wasted. Moreover,DGSP had not established firm criteria for prioritizing requests thus,the validity of these requests were not confirmed by either civilianor military authorities.

: CIMIC was initiallyconducted through the local LFWA domesticoperations detachment. As the scope of the disastergrew, it became apparent that the limited resources ofthe domestic operations detachment would beinsufficient. Consequently the detachment wasincorporated into the J5 staff when the JFHQ stood up.

: Requests for humanitarian airlift were first screened bythe UNDP, as the lead agency, which then passed requests to the CMOC. Requestswere then evaluated by the CIMIC staff against priorities established by theCommander. As civilians and the military, using set priorities, had analyzed theserequests, it was relatively simple to assign air assets to the most important requests.This straightforward direction helped to make CIMIC, as the Force Commander noted,

. A CIMICstaff ensures matters pertaining to civilians are examined by specialists ratherthan generalists

DISPATCHES 17

‘The CF conducted the three operations discussed above, over the spaceof 14 months. In the latter two cases CIMIC personnel worked for the commanderthrough a J5, and CIMIC was identified in each case as a success. By contrast,during Op RECUPERATION there was no J5 or CIMIC staff. PORs identified theutilization of LOs (CIMIC) and the collection of information from civilianorganizations, as a weak point.“

"During the early stages of Op ABACUS preparation, both JTFHQ andLFWA reported disturbances in the LO net at strategic and tactical levels. Withoutany coordination, some operators from other HQs were trying to get directinformation from essential civilian stakeholders. In point of fact, one organizationreceived seven different requests in one week for the same information. The resultwas a sudden break in its relationship with the CF. [The Area HQ] initiated asevere management of their LOs through a unique point of contact and could thenpreserve their relationship with civil organizations.”

"The battle group created a specific cell that performed both CIMIC andliaison. This is a significant force multiplier and allowed entry into a number ofdifferent areas to gain information as well as to exert some leverage to achieve theoverall goals of the battle group."

[While such anapproach is probably not appropriate forCanada (both G5 and public affairs staffshave strongly resisted attempts atamalgamation), it illustrates the recognitionthat activities in these fields must be closelycoordinated.]

J5 Obsevation

Op ABACUS Observation

Op PALLADIUM POR

The aim in establishing a network of CIMIC LOs is to create a single POCfor each civilian organization. Civilians see the military as a monolithicorganization, and they do not normally distinguish between its parts.

CIMIC activities must be integratedwith the Information Operations plan. Highprofile CIMIC activities, such as projects, canbe very beneficial for a force if wellpublicized. The British led division in Bosniahas grouped G5, media operations andinformation operations (basicallypsychological operations) staffs under a fullcolonel "Chief CIMIC".

Canadian doctrine provides forthe use of passive psychological operations(PSYOP) in domestic operations. When tiedeffectively to public affairs (PAff) and CIMICthis can benefit both the military andcivilians.

4.3 CIMIC and Information Operations

DISPATCHES 18

CIMIC personnel can work with the PAff staff to ensure that, duringdomestic operations, all levels of government, and the various military HQs aresending out the same message. The Quebec Vice-Minister for DGSP noted recentlythat it is important to send a coherent message to the public regarding the Y2Kproblem. PAffOs will have the lead delivering this message on behalf of the CF.CIMIC LOs will obtain civilian authorities' plans that will allow the military to developplans of our own. The working group developing the military message shouldinclude reps from G2, G3, CIMIC, PAff and PSYOP (if appropriate).

The following are US examples of CIMIC and PSYOP working in concert:

" "

" "

"

GUNS FOR GOURDES

ADOPT-A-SCHOOL

PORT AU PRINCE FIRE TRUCKS REPAIRED”

- the arms buy back program. The basic plan wasdeveloped by Civil Affairs (CA). PSYOP provided products such as, leaflets,commercial radio spots, printed forms for gun turn in, in English and Creole, and the"chits" for the weapons. Site locations for turn-in of weapons was coordinated by CAwith CI and MP input. PYSOP units also provided "bumper stickers" and flyerspromoting the "Guns for Gourdes" program.

- a program whereby units volunteer their time to do minorrepairs to schools located in their area. CA developed the plan and PYSOP unitsprovided the products to support the plan. The CA concept was the "principle of one":One project per school. One squad per school. One day per school. $1,000.00 maxexpenditure per school. PSYOP provided book covers, book marks and printedmaterials for the program.

- The Fire Truck Repair projectwas coordinated by CA. An action officer from the CMOC oversaw the project. Thedivision maintenance support battalion repaired the vehicles. PYSOP provided radiospots telling Haitians about the project and the U.S. military's involvement in it.

DISPATCHES 19

4.4 Boundaries

"Military boundaries and AOs (for domestic operations) should coincide withcivilian boundaries. This facilitates co-ordination and liaison as the civilian authorityneeds to deal with only one DND representative for the area".

“SFOR, IPTF, UNHCR, OSCE, ICRC and OHR all had different boundarieswhich did not conform to each other. This resulted in a number of co-ordinationproblems as the Battle Group had to deal with a number of Regional Offices toeffectively cover the AOR.”

1 CMBG Lesson Learned Op ASSISTANCE

Op PALLADIUM POR

The provision of liaison is complicated by the question of boundaries. Thestructure of civilian organizations will generally follow political boundaries. An NGOor UN Agency will often establish its head office in a national capital and have sub-offices in regional capitals. Occasionally other criteria will be used, such an NGOsub-office established to cover the route of a refugee flow, regardless of politicalboundaries. However, military boundaries may be established along geographicfeatures or using other criteria that do not coincide with political boundaries. The netresult of conflicting boundaries can be confusion. There are two possible solutions tothe problem:

. This works best in domestic operations but isoften impractical unless all the civilian organizations share the same boundaries.In war, NGOs will conform to military boundaries.

. Again, this may be impractical, and couldprove more manpower intensive. Clearly if 75% of a battle group's AO iscovered by one NGO sub-office, with the remaining 25% covered by a secondsub-office, it makes little sense for the battle group to establish liaison with bothsub-offices.

1. Change military boundaries

2. Units or formations provide liaison to the offices of all significantorganizations working in its AO

DISPATCHES 20

PART 5 - CIMIC CONSIDERATIONS IN OPERATIONS

5.1 Dealing With Civilian Organizations

Differences in Organizational Culture

Military Organizational Culture

“Differences in military and civilian methods of operation can also createfriction until mutual understanding and confidence are achieved".

Op ASSISTANCE POR

To be effective, it is important a CIMIC network whoseparticipants have a common understanding of civilian methods/agendas, and whointeract in a coordinated manner to

.

The argument for training dedicated CIMIC personnel isbased on the premise that dealing with civilians isfundamentally different than dealing with other military staffs.It is important for a force to have CIMIC personnel whounderstand the differences in the organizational cultures ofthe various civilian authorities, UN agencies and other NGOs.Just as a lack of cultural awareness can poison relations withthe military of other nations, a failure to understand the civilianperspective may hurt civil-military relations.

The following discussion of the differences between the two cultures isvery generalized given the range of civilian organizations (ie. a municipalgovernment does not operate in the same manner as an NGO). Nonetheless,there are common traits.

The military is a conservative, hierarchical organization.Its members are legally bound to follow the direction of superiors.Decision-making authority is often retained at very high levels.On operations, the military is often deployed at the last minute and pulls out at theearliest opportunity.

to establish

achieve a high level of confidence andexchange

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DISPATCHES 21

Civilian Organizational Culture

Special Cases - Governments

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Tends to be more liberal than the military - in terms of appearance, attitudetowards authority etc.Leaders are often younger, and have more authority devolved from higher.Civilian organizations are generally in for the long haul; NGOs will be in amission area before the military and will remain long after the force departs.The same is obviously true of governments.Actions are based on experience rather than formalized doctrine.Within an organization sub-offices are not necessarily responsible to the headoffice. During Op ASSURANCE, the UNHCR sub-office in Goma didn't alwaysheed the regional office's direction.Civilian organizations tend to operate by consensus. A civilian-chaired meetingcan be extremely frustrating for military members accustomed to receivingmore direction.Civilians are less concerned about timings than the military (this is related totheir being there for the long haul).

A key to dealing with governments isaccepting that political disagreementsbetween various levels will occur. DuringOps ASSISTANCE and RECUPERATIONmilitary support was a bone of contentionbetween provincial and municipal authorities(the latter POR stated that "the politicalimperatives were paramount"). CIMICpersonnel must be cognizant of the localpolitical situation and they must ensure theircommander is updated accordingly.

The political context or media pressure may sometimes influencegovernment statements. A provincial government may not acknowledge errors andmay also refuse to request help from federal authorities for any problem theycould have solved prior to the crisis.

In some countries, it is natural for governments to seize, for their ownprofit, a portion of the proffered humanitarian aid. This constitutes a prerequisite toallow the entrance of NGOs. They may also tax personnel and material entering

"Domestic operations are further complicated when several levels ofGovernment are involved. The Joint Force interacted directly with federal,provincial and municipal authorities and had to de-conflict the distinct authoritiesand agendas of each."

Op ASSISTANCE POR

DISPATCHES 22

Special Cases - NGOs

Some NGOs will see military personnelas the personification of evil. This isunderstandable, given what they may havebeen through during a conflict. CIMICpersonnel must be able to evenwith these extreme cases. Understanding themotivation of each NGO will make workingwith them easier. Be wary that someorganizations may have atypical agendas(such as country destabilization, drug dealing,or other criminal activities) with nohumanitarian consideration at all.

Be aware that NGOs are in a competitivebusiness. While working to their mandate,they will also seek to be doing so. Themore publicity an NGO generates, the morerevenue they will accrue from donations.Consequently, NGOs may refuse to cooperatewith other stakeholders in order to promotetheir own position.

empathize

Early in a mission, NGOs and the military have a symbiotic relationshipwhere the military provides security while the NGOs provide humanitarian relief.Once the security situation stabilizes, NGOs will feel less dependant on the militaryand will be less likely to cooperate. Due to ideology, some NGOs will resist anyattempts by the military to protect them, even in a poor security situation.

seen

“A Canadian led team had arranged to halt SFOR- coordinatedhumanitarian aid to the town of Kotor Varos until the municipal leadershipdemonstrated a willingness to accept the return of displaced ethnic minorities. Theteam's efforts were undermined, several days later when an NGO announced amajor donation to the town. The NGO thought it was more important for them to be

providing aid to the town, than for the humanitarian stakeholders to present aunited front. With this NGOs' money the mayor was able to ignore pressure toaccept minority returns.”

seen

Op PALLADIUM Comment

DISPATCHES 23

"To achieve unity of effort, core values and beliefs must be strengthenedamongst stakeholders”

Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crises and War

Working with civilians presents a significant challenge to military personnelbecause of differences in organizational cultures.

Civilian organizations tend to be less hierarchical than the military, morefocused on the long-term and generally more liberal.

When working with government officials, political concerns must be borne inmind as these may be their prime motivators.

NGOs will ultimately work to their own goals and are unlikely to cooperateunless it is in their own best interests.

The military and its civilianpartners on a mission may share manycommon goals. A key task of CIMICpersonnel is to ensure these goals areemphasized while differences inapproach are minimized. EffectiveCIMIC personnel will recognize thatcivilians do not operate in the samemanner as does the military. Timelyadvice from CIMIC personnel mayenable a commander to conduct asuccessful meeting with civiliancounterparts, while avoiding the pitfallsstemming from culturalmisunderstandings.

The task of most military personnel involves communicating with othermilitary personnel and their equipment reflects this fact. By contrast, CIMICpersonnel will spend much of the time dealing with civilians and the list of requiredequipment must be modified accordingly. The equipment of CIMIC personnel mustprovide security and effective communications with both the military and civilianagencies.

In all but the most permissive environments, CIMIC personnelmust be provided with a weapon for personnel security. The primaryweapon should be a pistol. A rifle is considered obtrusive by some andoften tends to make many of the people with whom CIMIC personnel mustdeal with nervous. The best solution is for CIMIC LOs and operators to beissued both a rifle and pistol and to carry whatever is appropriate for thetactical situation. When using a vehicle, the driver should be issued a rifle,

Key Lessons Learned

5.2 Equipment

Weapons.

DISPATCHES 24

Radio

Cell Phones

ADP.

Internet

Business Cards

. There may be a risk in giving securecommunications to LOs or other travellingCIMIC personnel. CIMIC teams may have topark their vehicles in locations where 7/24security may not be feasible.

Besides a regular phone line,each staff cell, CMCC or LO should have a cellphone. These are insecure, but mostinformation discussed with civilians will beunclassified. CIMIC LOs spend considerabletime travelling and reliable communicationswith civilian agencies is as important ascommunications with the HQ. Mosthumanitarian relief flights during OpASSURANCE were coordinated via cellphone. In some cases CIMIC staff may alsorequire a MSAT.

Where possible, LOs should have laptop PCs for ease of portability.However, security must not be forgotten and no sensitive informationshould be stored on portable CIMIC PCs. Computers represent significant"black market" value and are attractive to thieves.

. CIMIC personnel require reliable Internet access. They shouldhave a HOTMAIL type account to allow access to e-mail from any Internetcomputer.

. CIMICpersonnel should carry businesscards. Cards are part of the civilianmind set. If you cannot give yours,you may not be registered as animportant stakeholder.

.

“During Op ASSURANCE, SITREPS from various relief agencies wereposted to the web, providing an excellent source of intelligence. Similarly, inBosnia, German CIMIC teams posted recce reports (covering municipalities acrossthe country) onto the web. For Op ABACUS, key civilian players in Quebec haveInternet sites with constantly updated data. Considerable official information wasalso available from UN web sites during Op CENTRAL.”

“Cell phones, Internet accounts and business cards may seem somewhatextravagant but one must remember the target audience, and the need to work onboth military and civilian sides. CIMIC is difficult enough without having to worryabout finding a common means of communication.”

J5 Obsevation

DISPATCHES 25

5.3 "Fitting In"

Dress

Weapons

Transport

"NGO attitudes towards weapons and uniforms does not necessarilydenote a hatred for all things military. For some NGOs it is a point of pragmatism.Having uniforms, weapons and military equipment in their compound may makethem a target to local belligerents. In addition, a visible military presence in theircompound may scare away legitimate refugees who have been displaced by theirown military. Notwithstanding, there are some NGOs who just do not like themilitary at all. Fortunately, they needed me more than I needed them. Therefore,they just had to get used to my uniform. However, my job would have been difficulthad the situation been reversed.”

UNMO Comment, Op PASTEL

Many civilian organizations (particularly NGOs) may be uncomfortabledealing with military personnel. This discomfort may stem from a philosophicalbelief or from a lack of education about the military. Where equipment isconcerned, it is incumbent upon CIMIC personnel to do what is possible to putcivilian counterparts at ease.

. Military uniforms have manyadvantages (clearly identifying CIMICpersonnel as members of the CF) but insome circumstances commanders may wishto have CIMIC LOs in civilian dress. InBosnia, the Div LO to the UNHCR wore auniform to and from the UNHCR building, butchanged into civilian clothes in the building.Conversely, during Op ASSISTANCE, allCIMIC LOs wore uniforms as the municipaland provincial organizations they dealt withdid not have a negative perception of themilitary. Commanders must also keep thesecurity situation in mind - in extreme caseswearing civilian clothes might lead toaccusations of espionage.

Weapons can make it difficult for CIMIC personnel to fit in.During Op PASSAGE in Rwanda, MSF forbade the carriage of weapons intheir compound. During Op PALLADIUM, weapons were forbidden in theEuropean Community Humanitarian Organization (ECHO) offices, butECHO did not enforce the policy if weapons were not visible. A pistol canbe carried in the cargo pocket of the Gortex jacket or in a holster. Thiskeeps the weapon accessible but out of sight. In other cases, CIMICpersonnel may decide it is better to risk offence than to give up theirweapon.

. CIMIC LOs require dedicated transport. "Pooling" vehiclesnormally does not work. Ideally, these dedicated vehicles will be of acivilian pattern. Ops ASSURANCE, ASSISTANCE, RECUPERATION andPALLADIUM all used civilian vehicles to good effect. An advantage of

.

DISPATCHES 26

Providing the equipment described above will enable CIMIC personnel towork and communicate effectively in a civilian environment, while maintainingpersonal security.

There are two aspects ofsecurity that are of particular concernto CIMIC personnel: physical securityand information security.

The carriage of weapons by CIMIC personnel and the need for effectivecommunications have already been examined. There are other issues that areimportant for the security of CIMIC personnel:

If there is any threat, CIMIC personnel should operate in pairs. If businessmust be done with an NGO that insists weapons be left outside, then oneperson goes inside unarmed while the other stays with the vehicle andsecures the weapons.

Key Lessons Learned

5.4 Security

Physical Security

CIMIC personnel should be issued with both a pistol and rifle, to be carried asappropriate.

CIMIC personnel require cell phones, Internet access and business cards.

When working with some NGOs and IOs, there may be a negative connectionassociated with military uniforms, weapons and vehicles.

Civilian pattern 4x4 vehicles (where possible) should be dedicated to CIMICteams.

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CIMIC personnel must familiarize themselves with the ROEs pertaining tothe status of NGO/UN Agencies. They must know whether they areauthorized to defend these personnel.

CIMIC personnel will often travel off cleared or proven routes to visitprojects, attend meetings etc. They should seek to have an escort vehicleprecede them on such routes.

While CIMIC personnel may become involved in the provision ofhumanitarian relief supplies (providing transport, escorting convoys etc),they should become involved in the actual distribution of the aid. Thisnot

DISPATCHES 27

Information Security

“After careful examination, it was discovered that various humanitarianagencies and local officials were manipulating the press for their own informationcampaigns and political reasons. One must remember that these agencies aredependant on money and international public opinion and in some cases theseagencies are in competition with each other. To them, crisis means money andinfluence. In the case of Op ASSURANCE, there was so much manipulation of themedia, that to this day, there is still much confusion as to exactly how manyrefugees there were crossing the border and in eastern Zaire itself. Even the mediasuggested that there was a conscious effort to influence governments by inflatingintelligence estimates.”

ALLC ANALYSIS: Op ASSURANCE: LESSONS LEARNED FROM AMILITARY/GOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVE

CIMIC personnel will receive valuable information from their civiliancontacts. In return, civilian organizations will expect to be kept informed by themilitary of developments. The following are guidelines to safeguard everyone'sinterests.

When in doubt, the military oftenputs a security classification oninformation. This may mean civilianorganizations cannot get theinformation they require. CIMICpersonnel must strive to ensureinformation is not unnecessarilyclassified.

When possible, examine thebackgrounds of NGOs. Thepersonnel they recruit or theirsources of funding maycompromise their independenceand impartiality. This examinationshould also reveal any hiddenagenda that is at odds with themilitary mission.

Some civilian organizations will guard their independence from the military(the ICRC for example). CIMIC personnel must ensure they do not useinformation from these sources in a manner that compromises theorganization's impartiality. When important information is received, it isbest to ask if it may be passed to other military personnel.

While some civilian organizations may be trusted with sensitiveinformation, the means by which this information is transferred must beconsidered. Some material will have to be passed face-to-face, ratherthan via cell phone or the Internet.

Where possible, cross-reference information and verify it from more thanone source. Some NGOs will provide misleading information to support

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DISPATCHES 28

5.5 CIMIC PROJECTS

Civil-Action Projects (CAPs

The Premier of the Republika Srpska, Mme Plavsic, was asked how shecould stand having SFOR as an occupying force. She replied "Does an occupyingforce fix your bridges, roads and schools?”

Properly managed CIMIC projects can have a significant "force-multiplier"effect, particularly in peace support operations. The Canadian battle group on OpPALLADIUM has arrangements with both the Canadian International DevelopmentAgency (CIDA) and the British Department for International Development (DFID)that provides the battle group with funds for humanitarian projects. These projects,managed by battle group CIMIC personnel, range from rebuilding school boilers topurchasing equipment for the manufacture of biodegradable plastic bags. Eachbattle group receives up $600K (Cdn) in funding (by contrast, each Dutch battlegroup received close to $3 million). There are two main types of CIMIC projects:

). These are small projects (costing $100-1000) where the money is used to purchase supplies while local Canadiantroops and local inhabitants supply the labor. For example, the moneymight go towards concrete, wood, nails and paint to allow a company tobuild a playground for local children. The money may come from a formalarrangement (such as with CIDA or DFID), from a donor back in Canada, orthe troops may have raised it themselves. CAPs have the followingbeneficial effects:

They enhance the image of the battle group in the eyes of the localcommunity.

Well-built projects will continue to remind local inhabitants of Canadiangoodwill. This will pay dividends for both present and future units.

CAPs will boost the morale of troops by allowing them an opportunityto work together with locals to literally "rebuild" the country.

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On Op PALLADIUM, Canadian battle group CIMIC personnel coordinatedDFID funding for a electricity restoration project begun by the NGO Edinburgh DirectAid. The NGO ran out of money $20k short of completion, but through theintervention of the CIMIC personnel the project was completed and military-NGOrelations were strengthened.

J5 Observation

DISPATCHES 29

� Small-Medium Projects. Theseprojects will cost $5K-50K each andconsequently there is a greater burdenon CIMIC personnel to choose themwisely. Each donor agency will decidewhat nature of projects it will fund(some donors, for example, will not fundmicro-business projects) but thefollowing is a general list of categoriesfor CIMIC personnel to consider:

the provision of goods (food,tents, seeds) that fulfill basic human needs (food,shelter, clothing, medical care).

construction or repair ofbridges, schools, hospitals etc. A functioninginfrastructure is a critical ingredient if a society hopes toreturn to normality.

- the purchase ofequipment for small businesses. It is often impossible toget a loan in an economy recovering from war, andfunds providing additional machinery should increaseproductivity and boost employment. Economicregeneration projects will improve economic stability,promote normality and decrease dependence on aid.Overall, these projects are designed to build aneconomy from the ground up. Within a smallcommunity, a project which creates 8-10 new jobs(easily possible for an outlay of $40k) can have asignificant impact.

!

!

!

Humanitarian Projects

Infrastructure Projects

Economic Regeneration Projects

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-

CIMIC personnel should notseek to rebuild a country, butrather through a few, well-selected projects, enhance themilitary's image and fosterprogress in both the civil andmilitary plans in selected

DISPATCHES 30

PROJECT DOS AND DON'T'S

DO

DON'T

Conflicts with NGOs

Ensure projects are distributed evenly between different factions (includingvarious factions within the same ethnic group). Maintain a database, to be passed onto succeeding formations.

Ensure maximum publicity at project openings.

Use projects as a lever to gain compliance (eg. "keep your local militia on atighter leash and we'll put a new roof on your hospital")

Research projects carefully - you don't want to find out months later, that therecipient is a suspected war criminal or black marketer.

Involve NGOs/UN Agencies in your projects - this spreads the burden of thecosts and these organizations may have experience in project management.

Tie project strategy into the military strategy so their respective objectivescomplement each other.

Ensure you fully understand your donor's funding criteria.

Don’t commit to a project before you have approval from both the donor andyour higher headquarters.

Don’t support economic regeneration projects that involve the start-up of abusiness. People with no previous business experience make a very poor risk.

Don’t provide vehicles in a project. These are easily misused (a vehiclepurchased by CIDA ends up being used for smuggling).

Don't fund projects in the service industry (i.e. cafes or bars). These willspring up of their own accord as the economy develops.

Don’t forget to give credit to everyone who made a project possible. Donorsget very upset when a recipient thanks the military for a project and neglects tomention where the money came from.

Don’t emphasize the benefits to the military when proposing a projectpartnership. Instead, emphasize how working with the military will benefit the donorand allow funds to go farther. Generally donors will work with the military because themilitary will have extensive coverage of an area to identify projects (through patrolsetc), and because when CIMIC personnel manage a project the donor doesn't have topay someone else to do it.

Traditionally projects have been the preserve of NGOs. Whenthe military starts to do CIMIC projects it draws from the same finite pool of donorfunds that the NGOs rely upon. Consequently, NGOs may see the military as acompetitor. This unfortunate state of affairs may be avoided by emphasizing jointprojects with NGOs. Ultimately, CIMIC personnel should seek to limit the funds theysolicit from donors as CIMIC projects are subject to the law of diminishing returns.

.

DISPATCHES 31

5.6 CIMIC NEGOTIATIONS

"Although it was not a SFOR responsibility, the only effective coordinationthat took place was when SFOR took the lead."

“The onus must be on military commanders to make the necessaryadjustments and avoid acrimony, as the military is effectively joining a civilian-ledteam. The challenge is to do this without compromising military responsibilities andprinciples"

Op PALLADIUM POR

Op ASSISTANCE POR

Commanders at all levels have learned a great deal about negotiationsduring recent peacekeeping operations. In most cases, however, these have beenbi-lateral or tri-lateral negotiations between factions in a conflict. By contrast, CIMICnegotiations tend to be even more multi-lateral because of the proliferation ofNGOs. CIMIC personnel should seek to build consensus in bilateral discussionsbefore a more general meeting is held. Unless, the ground is well prepared,meetings of 30 or 40 different humanitarian stakeholders can be incrediblyfrustrating affairs.

It is not always possible to meet separately with other key players. Inthese cases, when entering a meeting "cold", care should be taken to avoid fulfillingnegative civilian stereotypes of the military. Although it will be tempting, it isultimately counterproductive to attempt to seize control of a meeting. A soundunderstanding of civilian cultural organization is crucial here.

Civilian organizations work by consensus and with numerous voices at thetable, consensus will likely be difficult to achieve. We must remember that theseother organizations are in for the long haul and, unlike the military, they feel nopressure to achieve something before their six-month tour is up. It is better to usethese meetings to feel out the positions of different organizations with a view tosubsequently advancing your position through bilateral negotiations. This isparticularly valid at meetings chaired by a lead civilian agency. This "lead" agencywill likely not be doing any "leading" in the military sense of the term but it is no usetrying to hijack their agenda. The trick is to prod the lead agencies forward withoutactually taking control out of their hands - the military will generally be there(wherever "there" is) in a supporting role.

DISPATCHES 32

Negotiation training teaches theimportance of discerning parties' "interests"from their "positions". Again, in a genericsense, a good understanding of the natureof civilian organizations will help. NGOswill almost always be looking for positivepublicity to generate more donations.Thus, while their position might be that acertain project must go ahead, they mightbe amenable to another solution that theycould claim (public) credit for. UN Agenciesor the ICRC might be persuaded tocompromise on their positions so long asthe reputation and prestige of theirorganization is preserved.

CIMIC personnel must have a sound grasp the Geneva Conventions,including the additional Protocols. Part IV which pertains to the treatment ofcivilians is particularly important. While many commanders will be familiar with theirlegal obligations concerning PWs or prohibited weapons, they may not be aware ofall their responsibilities towards civilians. CIMIC personnel may find theircolleagues on the staff are also unaware of these issues.

The CF CIMIC doctrine manual,

B-GG-005-004/AF-023, includes acomprehensive examination of negotiatingtechniques. Another useful training publicationis produced by 1 CMBGin 1994. Both documents can be accessed onLLIW Version 8.0.

CIMIC negotiations are most often "multi-lateral". Efforts should be made tobuild consensus away from the table so as to present a united front inmeetings.

When meeting with civilians, the military must avoid the temptation to "run"the meeting.

Pay attention to the nature of civilian organizations when trying to discerntheir true interests. These interests may often be obscured by rhetoric.

During domestic operations in particular, the essence of the CIMIC role is topush civilian stakeholders to lead, rather than replacing them.

Civil-MilitaryCooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis andWar,

Low Level Negotiation

Key Lessons Learned

5.7 LegalAspects of CIMIC

Legal Aspects of International Operations

In a more general sense, CIMICpersonnel are responsible to ensureeveryone understands that the militaryhas no legal authority to direct theactivities of UN Agencies and NGOs.This may sound like a no-brainer, butsome individuals in past operations havebecome very frustrated that they cannot"direct" civilian organizations, but insteadmust work on a consensual basis.

One of the most critical CIMIC legalissues concerning domestic operationspertains to the provision of services. Civilianauthorities are advised that "CF assistancewill be available only as a last resort".However, the CF's "can do'" attitude oftenmeans that our resources are provided whenother sources remain untapped. Too often,civilian authorities use the military because itis the cheapest option (soldiers employedeither as general laborers or as specialists donot have to be paid overtime). During OpRECUPERATION, the employment of soldiersto fix power lines caused resentment amongstHydro-Quebec employees who felt the militarywas doing their work (and consequentlydepriving them of overtime). During OpASSISTANCE, the military almost providedhelicopters to municipal councilors wishing tosee their constituencies. This request wasdenied when it was recognized that to providethis support would compete unfairly withcivilian helicopter operators.

Legal Aspects of Domestic Operations

“The direction contained within DNDP 55 (past and present versions) inaddition to the DCDS direction concerning support to Law Enforcement Agencies(LEAs) are generally not known or in some cases are misunderstood throughoutthe chain of command, including the Regular and Reserve Force. Tasks beingrequested of CF personnel from various agencies, including the OPP, in somecases, were not within these guidelines. By way of example, within SectorSOUTH, we were asked by the City of Kingston to provide "security" to the variousshelters within the city. Following some frank discussion, this task was deflectedto the local LEA/ security companies. In other cases, we were asked by the OPPand some local town police forces to conduct joint "security" patrols, with the intentof preventing looting, and to use untrained soldiers to conduct traffic control, toname a few. There is no doubt that some "well intentioned" support was provided,which is contrary to DNDP 55 and DCDS direction concerning support to LEAs.”

COMMANDER TF SOUTHOp RECUPERATION POR

DISPATCHES 33

DISPATCHES 34

“Although direction from civilian authorities did not conflict with CF orders,requests from civilian authorities for medical and MP support were not within thescope of what the military was authorized to provide. OPP and RCMP were happyto allow MPs to conduct patrols and traffic control without an accompanying civilianpeace officer and requested military assistance to guard generators on severaloccasions. Similarly, shelters and medical facilities requested Med A assistancethat was beyond the scope of what was authorized by NDHQ. A 2 CMBG requestfor authority to allow Med As to assist civilians was denied.”

Op RECUPERATION POR

CIMIC personnel must familiarizethemselves with the circumstancesunder which military assistance maybe provided. DCDS 2/98 goes a longway to clarifying this issue. Thedocument can be accessed on theLLIW Version 8.0 CD.

For International Ops, CIMIC personnel must have a thorough knowledge ofinternational humanitarian law, particularly as it pertains to civilians.

In Domestic Ops, CIMIC personnel must be very familiar with the regulationsconcerning provision of CF services, and the CF's role as a "last resort".

Unless we reinforce the concept of the CF as a "last resort", our "can doattitude" may do more harm than good in future domestic operations. It isessential to establish the desired "end state" that will mark the termination of themilitary's involvement. Other issues in domestic operations, such as the provisionof armed assistance, will be more properly the sphere of the Legal Staff. CIMICpersonnel employed as LOs may become involved in negotiations on these issuesbut only in a peripheral way. These should be monitored as they may have CIMICimplications.

During operations, CIMIC staffwill have to deal with civilians who willbe most comfortable in their mothertongue. In domestic operations, thishighlights the importance ofproficiency in both official languagesfor CIMIC personnel, particularly LOs.When deployed internationally, CIMICpersonnel will frequently have to workwith an interpreter. More than alanguage technician, interpreters havea very high value for their knowledgeof local customs and can also be agood source of HUMINT.

Key Lessons Learned

5.8 The Role of Interpreters in CIMIC

Hints in Helping an Interpreter Help You

Key Lessons Learned

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Introduce the issues to be covered before you go to a meeting.

Cover the terms you expect to encounter - for example when looking ateconomic regeneration projects ensure the interpreter is familiar withgross and net profit.

Ensure the interpreter understands the concepts underlying the terms(eg the difference between the terms "displaced person" and "refugee").

Determine whether the terms have been used before and a standardterminology has been developed in multiple languages.

Avoid jargon.

Introduce acronyms along with their definitions and underlying concepts

Learn to speak in "blocks" of two or three sentences; this makes lifeeasier for the interpreter than if you ramble on for a minute.

An interpreter is not a "nice to have", but a "must have".

CIMIC personnel should have their own dedicated local interpreter.

The interpreter's understanding of the local area/customs is as important ashis/her language skills.

Interpreters should be taken on board as part of the CIMIC "team" andprotected accordingly.

CIMIC personnel should always be aware of any bias an interpreter mayhave.

DISPATCHES 35

DISPATCHES 36

PART 6 - CIMIC TRAINING

6.1 General

6.2 CIMIC Courses

“SUBJECT CIMIC TRAINING:

Op PALLADIUM POR

Op ASSISTANCE POR

Training has to be imaginative to simulateactual activities in theatre. The use of an in-theatre training team greatly assists inthe area, as would the involvement with local authorities. Some basic financialawareness, understanding of construction engineering and negotiating are usefulareas to focus on. The bottom line is that no expertise is required in these areas,rather a familiarity and common sense and maturity.”

“Op ASSISTANCE demonstrated that general purpose military trainingproduces capabilities which are relevant and applicable to domestic operations.These general purpose skills must be complemented by specialized training inseveral areas, including CIMIC.”

In the military it is universally accepted that training is required to completeeach and every task. CIMIC is no different. Although experience gained at theoperational and tactical levels is recognized as beneficial, personnel require propertraining to ensure that they are adhering to doctrine and more importantly, notcontravening national or international laws.

CIMIC training will dispel these myths and provide personnel with theknowledge that CIMIC has a role in any military operation where there is aninteraction with a civilian populace. It should be noted that Canada is one of the lastNATO nations to revamp its wartime CIMIC doctrine and CIMIC training has sufferedas a result.

Currently, CIMIC training can be obtained through international coursesincluding the following:

U.S. Army Civil Affairs Course, conducted by the US Army John F. KennedySpecial Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, NC;NATO CIMIC Course conducted in Oberammergau, Germany;UK CIMIC course; orPPC CIMIC Course, conducted in Cornwallis, NS.

In all cases, the loading agency remains G3 Training CTC, who is responsiblefor all course loading within the army. Unfortunately, these courses are costly, bothin tuition and ancillary costs. While not offering a uniquely Canadian militaryperspective, they do provide solid building blocks.

Many military personnel believe that…

CIMIC is public affairs;CIMIC does not have a role outside peace support or humanitarianassistance operations;andCIMIC expertise/training is not required below brigade level.

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DISPATCHES 37

“The mandates of the International Organizations are quite clear. Less sofor NGOs but not to a great degree. Understanding of the role of CIMIC is somewhatmore tenuous among the international community and even among some of themilitary contingents. More comprehensive training should be given to Snr NCOs andofficers during pre-deployment in order to enhance an understanding of their aimsand objectives prior to arrival in-theatre.”

Op PALLADIUM POR

6.3 Op ABACUS / Unit Conducted Training

With Op ABACUS and its inherentCIMIC implications looming, units may notbe able to find vacancies on CIMIC coursesfor all those they wish to train. Thefollowing checklist of topics is provided forunits wishing to conduct CIMIC training. Itwas developed for CIMIC training andseminars that will be coordinated by theJTFHQ for Op ABACUS. Not all the topicswill necessarily be relevant.

CIMIC roles, principles, organization and staff relations.Working with civilian organizations (the differences in cultural organization shouldbe discussed, as this will be central to the conduct of CIMIC).JSOPs, reports and returns, and information operations concepts.Negotiation and mediation techniques specific to domestic operations.Provision of Services (be familiar with the details of DCDS 2/98).Lessons learned for Op ASSISTANCE and Op RECUPERATION.Liaison duties.Public affairs overview.Review of COP (CIMIC-specific).Psychological operations overview.Overview of key civilian organizations (for domestic operations these would bethe provincial and municipal emergency measures organizations).Project management/evaluation if required.SOPs for the establishment/operation of a CMCC, CIMIC House, or CIMICCentre if required.

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In the absence of any otherformalized CF CIMIC training, the ALLC hasprovided access to over 100 Canadian, NATO,US, UK, French and UN doctrine manuals andSOPs that specifically deal with CIMIC. Thiscollection can be found on LLIW 8.0 CD.

DISPATCHES 38

PART 7 - CONCLUSION

Key Lessons Learned

The CIMIC role and its structures are mission dependent. They must beadapted to the situation as it is impossible to establish one organization whichcaters to all contingencies. CIMIC is an important piece of the military efficiencypuzzle and will undoubtedly be part of every mission. This very brief synopsis ofthe principle aspects and implications of CIMIC has been provided to assist yourunderstanding of the term as well as your role in CIMIC activities. It is through thiseducation that the army will improve in an area that to date has been largelyignored.

Past operations have shown that confusion between the G3 and G5areas of responsibility leads to unnecessary duplication of staff effort.This must be avoided. Essentially, , the G3 staff willplan and supervise the allocation of troops and material to tasks, IAW theCommander's direction, based on information and analysis received fromsources such as the G5 and G2 staffs.

CIMIC, public affairs, intelligence and psychological operations must beclosely integrated.

CIMIC personnel require cell phones, Internet access, business cardsand dedicated transportation. Civilian pattern 4x4 vehicles (wherepossible) should be dedicated to CIMIC teams.

When working with some NGOs and IOs, there may be a negativeconnotation associated with military uniforms, weapons and vehicles.

With respect to projects, CIMIC personnel should not seek to rebuild acountry, but rather through a few, well-selected projects, enhance themilitary's image and foster progress in both the civil and military plans in

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in all operations

DISPATCHES 39

CIMIC negotiations are most often "multi-lateral". Efforts should be madeto build consensus away from the table so as to present a united front inmeetings. When meeting with civilians, the military must avoid thetemptation to "run" the meeting.

Pay attention to the nature of civilian organizations when trying to discerntheir true interests. These interests may often be obscured by rhetoric.NGOs will ultimately work to their own goals and are unlikely to cooperateunless it is in their own best interests.

During domestic operations in particular, the essence of the CIMIC role isto push civilian stakeholders to lead, rather than the military replacingthem.

For International Ops, CIMIC personnel must have a thorough knowledgeof international humanitarian law, particularly as it pertains to civilians. InDomestic Ops, CIMIC personnel must be very familiar with the regulationsconcerning provision of CF services, and the CF's role as a "last resort".

In an international environment, CIMIC LOs should have their owndedicated local interpreter. An interpreter is not a "nice to have", but a"must have". The interpreter's understanding of the local area/customs isas important as his/her language skills. However, CIMIC personnel shouldalways be aware of any bias an interpreter may have.

Working with civilians presents a significant challenge to military personnelbecause of differences in organizational culture. Civilian organizations tendto be less hierarchical than the military, more focused on the long-term andgenerally more liberal.

When working with government officials, political concerns must be borne

Key Lessons Learned (continued)

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DISPATCHES 40

EDITORIAL

Contributors

Design

Production Co-ord

:LCol L de Chantal, J5 / JFHQLCol J Petryk, ALLCMaj F Aubin, ALLCCapt J MarkowCapt C CatryCapt J ReiffensteinCapt S MacEwen

:

:Capt R Kingsbury, ALLCCapt R Paquin, ALLC

, J5 / JFHQ, J5 / JFHQ

, J5 / JFHQ, J5 / JFHQ

Maj F Aubin, ALLCCapt R Kingsbury, ALLC

DIRECTOR ALLC COMMENT - Vol 5 No 2

The quote by Bgen J.A. Ross (a retiredofficer), found at Page 13 of the recentLeadership in a Mixed Gender EnvironmentDispatches, was included to highlight oneindividual’s thoughts on the problems associatedwith discipline in today’s Army. It should not beinterpreted as a negative comment on theemployment of women in the combat arms, norshould it be attributed to either of the GeneralRoss’ presently serving in the Land Force.

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