Lessons Learned fromAccident Investigation ofLonger, Heavier Trains

International Heavy Haul Association

Jonathan Seymour, Board MemberTransportation Safety Board of Canada

Calgary, AlbertaJune 20, 2011

Outline

• TSB mandate• Watchlist: Critical Safety Issues• 2 Case Studies • Other investigation findings• Lessons learned• Progress• Looking ahead

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About the TSB

Mandate: To advance transportation safety in the air, marine, rail, and pipeline modes of transportation that are under federal jurisdiction by:

• conducting independent investigations• identifying safety deficiencies• identifying causes and contributing factors• making recommendations• publishing reports

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Fishing vessel safety

Emergency preparedness on ferries

Passenger trains colliding with vehicles

Operation of longer,heavier trains

Risk of collisions on runways

Controlled flight into terrain

Landing accidents and runway overruns

Safety Management Systems

Data recorders

WATCHLIST

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Watchlist (cont’d)

• Nine Watchlist issues underpinned by: 41 recommendations Many investigation findings

• “Inappropriate handling and marshalling can compromise the operation of longer, heavier trains.”

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Why This Is An Issue

Aerial photo of derailed cars, Cobourg. ON

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Case Study #1: Brighton

• Eastbound Train 137 cars (11 845 tons, 8850 feet) 3 head-end locomotives Over 50% cars – loads Majority of loads marshalled on rear

• Territory Undulating terrain Multi-track – passenger and freight trains

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Brighton: Train/Track Profile

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Brighton: Findings

• Broken knuckle at 107th car = emergency • Rear collided with head-end portion• Resultant in-train forces led to derailment• Bail-off of independent brake did not reduce

forces to a safe level• Simulation: Different marshalling would have

led to significantly reduced forces

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Case Study #2: Drummondville

• Eastbound Train 105 cars (10 815 tons, 7006 feet) 5 head-end locomotives 50-car block of loaded grain cars on rear end Broken knuckle at 75th car

• Territory Single track Freight and passenger train operations daily

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Drummondville: Train Profile

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Drummondville Findings

• Marshalling was a factor• Front portion was on ascending grade• Rear portion was on relatively flat segment• high buff forces from heavy rear marshalling

plus late bail off of independent brake• Simulation: Reverse marshalling would have

meant minor buff forces.

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Other Investigation Findings

• Inappropriate throttle, dynamic and automatic brake use

• Emergency braking initiated from head end only• Non-alignment control couplers• Long & Short car combinations• Use of distributed power• Technology can mitigate risks

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Lessons Learned

• Size and tonnage not sole factors• Key Lesson

Need to effectively manage in-train forces and how train interacts with track

• Systemic approach needed by operators

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Progress by Industry

• Both major players taking action• Computerized marshalling management

systems• Enhancement to train braking system• Greater use of distributed power• Enhanced training and job aids for locomotive

engineers• Growth in use of technology

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Progress – Regulator

• Transport Canada: Expressed support for TSB views Sponsored research (Train separation on Kingston

Subdivision) Sponsored research (How to improve handling longer

trains)

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Progress: a TSB Perspective

• Many safety communications, including:2004 Recommendation to TC 2007 Board Concern communicated2010 TSB Watchlist

• 2011: Significant advances

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What’s Next?

• Operators responsible for managing safety• Regulators responsible for overseeing safety

• TSB will continue to: monitor progress investigate occurrences publish our findings make appropriate recommendations advocate for necessary changes

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Summary

• TSB Watchlist, concerns about LHT• Key Lesson from Brighton, Drummondville

Need to effectively manage in-train forces and how train interacts with track

• Additional investigation findings• Progress:

major players are taking actionTC supports our views

• TSB will monitor, report publically, advocate for change to address safety deficiencies

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Questions?

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