WCCUSD FACILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE

Lessons Learned – Korematsu Neighborhood Challenges

During Construction PRE-READING MATERIAL

Meeting Agenda Item 7/19/2016

REFERENCES

1. “Learning Look Back” Simplified [3-pages, incl cover/summary sheet]

2. Examples of Actual “Learning Look Backs”, including a Working Biography for Gregg

Visineau, presenter & resident. [4-pages, incl cover/summary sheet]

3. Setting the Stage: Detailed Facts & Descriptions [7-pages, incl cover/summary sheet]

4. Contributing to Your Lessons Learned: April 15th, 2016 letter from the neighborhood to

the WCCUSD and to the City of El Cerrito. [8-pages, incl cover/summary sheet]

5. March 6th, 2013 Community Update: flyer from the WCCUSD to the neighborhood.

The presentation of this Agenda Item urges a “learning look back” at Korematsu construction, comprising 2 main cost categories: “Time- and Money-Wasters” and “Trust-Busters”. Reference material (above) is provided to aid a “look back” and to well-document these 2 main cost categories. A case for action is presented. The benefits of action and the risks of inaction are laid out.

“Learning Look Back” Simplified

The “Look Back” Piece

What went right?

What went wrong?

The “Learning” Piece

Root Cause Analysis

Implementation: The Call to Action

Accountability: Maximize the Benefits

“Learning Look Back” Simplified

The “Look Back” Piece

1. What went right? These need to be captured, well-documented, widely disseminated and held onto for future projects. You want the benefits to spread far and wide in your system.

What met or exceeded your expectations for the project? Your expectations (“What will success look like”?) should always be set in advance of the project; and actual results should then be measured against those upfront expectations. Otherwise, you run the risk of performing only up to a set of ever-changing expectations which diminish over time to meet the actual final (poor) results. [NOTE on “Raising the Bar”: Expectations which you increase over time can help foster ever-improving performance for future projects.]

2. What went wrong? These need to be captured, fixed and continuously improved upon. You want these to end right now; and to not pop up elsewhere within your system.

What took longer than expected? What cost more than expected? What caused safety issues (e.g., injuries or insurance claims) on-the-job? What increased your liability or resulted in litigation? What failed to perform as designed once operations were up and running?

The “Learning” Piece

3. Root cause analysis: What caused the timeline to shorten (or to lengthen)? The cost to come in under (or exceed) your budget? What caused your safety measures to improve (or decline)? What caused facility operations to over- (or under-) perform once the project was up and running?

“Outcome” means any result, whether a good one that needs to be retained for future projects; or a bad one that needs to be fixed for future projects.

“Action” means any activity – be it spec review; facility design; engineering; construction; decision-making; contracting; procurement; legal review; supervision and oversight; data-gathering and analysis; operations; maintenance & repair; etc etc etc – which contributed (directly or indirectly) to the resulting “Outcome”.

“Root Cause” means:

• “If Action B caused Outcome A to happen (whether good or bad), what caused B to happen?”

• “If Action C caused Action B to happen, what caused C to happen”?

• And so on, until you can honestly say, “Ah ha, Action F (and maybe G and/or H, too,

simultaneously with F) is what initiated all the other events to occur, which resulted in the final (good or bad) Outcome on-the-ground”.

• Then: Action F (and maybe G and/or H) are the root causes of Outcome A.

Getting to these “root causes” should be a rigorous process involving all the right people, in-house & third parties, across all disciplines and job grade levels. It is NOT a “blame game” for bad Outcomes; or a “credit battle” for good Outcomes. Nor should it jump immediately to “root cause” Actions F, G and/or H – and thereby bypass any intermediate Actions – as that may result in precluding valuable Action Items for fixing (or supporting) the final Outcome on-the-ground. It MUST be “activity-focused”, NOT “person-focused”.

Implementation: The Call to Action

4. Action items: What can be done to encourage (or fix) the root causes (F, G and/or H)? What will it take to implement them (manpower, time, money or other resources)? And what will it benefit us to reinforce (or fix) them so that our project performance is continuously improving? And so that we don’t repeat the same mistakes in the future?

5. These fixes may include (but are certainly not limited to) things such as work process improvements and/or documentation; refocused supervisorial oversight and/or further delegations of authority (including but not limited to “stop work” authority); rewritten (or new) job descriptions; accountability (with real consequences) for good, bad or indifferent performance on-the-job; contracting and/or procurement improvements; active contract management; economic analyses of changes; adding manpower and/or expertise on-the-job; reorganizing to optimize efficiency on-the-job; training and/or education; tools and/or equipment; IT systems, software and/or support; etc etc etc. The sky’s really the limit here. And “simple, to-the-point” is always best if it can deliver the most impact for project improvement: Look for the Biggest Bang for the Buck.

Accountability: Maximize the Benefits

6. A single person (not a committee or a team) should be accountable for implementation. A team or work group may actually develop the implementation plan; put it in place; and “make it go”; but a single person should be accountable (with consequences, + or -) for seeing that the planning and implementation takes place and is completed successfully.

7. A single person (not a committee or a team) should be assigned long-term ownership of the improvement, once it’s in place, to assure its sustainability, including “recycling the look back” to foster continual improvement. The more senior the Owner (commensurate with the cost and benefit of the implementation), the better. Visible and active leadership is a key to ongoing success from a good “learning look back”.

Examples of Actual “Learning Look Backs”

Working Biography for Gregg Visineau

Some Personal “Learning Look Back” Examples

Excerpts from Some Real-Life “Learning Look Backs”

NASA’s “Challenger”

Three Mile Island

Tylenol

A Short Catalog of Other Examples

Tacoma Narrows Bridge

New Coke

Takata Air Bags

Volkswagen Emissions

Tesla Contractors

Gregg Visineau July 2016

1428 Lawrence Street El Cerrito, CA 94530

510 236 0761 gvisineau@gmail.com

Working Biography Chevron Shipping Company, 1981 - 2000

Design & Construction Engineer (1)

Tanker Planning & Economics Analyst (2)

London Area Chartering Manager (1988 – 1993)

Strategic Planning & Analysis, Senior Staff Analyst (3, 4)

Commercial Manager (5)

Global Procurement, 2000 – 2005

Category Management, General Manager (6)

Global Downstream, 2005 – 2008

Refinery Procurement, Global Manager (7) (8)

Operational Excellence (9) (10)

Some Personal “Learning Look Back” Examples

1. Accommodation vibrations during sea trials (1982) 2. Repair yard alliance (1986) 3. Sale leaseback strategy (1992 - 95) 4. LPG carrier acquisition (1996) 5. Korean shipyard construction (1998) 6. IT system + software consolidation (2002) 7. El Segundo refinery upgrade (2005) 8. Hurricane Katrina emergency response (2005) 9. Loss Prevention System (LPS©) (2007) 10. Hurricane Ike emergency response (2008)

EXAMPLES OF ACTUAL

“LEARNING LOOK BACKS”

Excerpts from Some Real-Life “Learning Look Backs” “How the Challenger disaster changed NASA” [Courtesy of CNN, January 28th, 2016]

It was later determined that cold weather, combined with a design flaw, led to the accident. A seal on one of the solid rocket boosters was not working properly. The disaster grounded NASA’s space shuttle program for nearly three years. “But look at how we flew after,” says Robert Cabana, former NASA astronaut and director of the Kennedy Space Center. Cabana says scientists made over 100 changes to the shuttle to make it safer and more reliable. NASA also changed its culture, he says, after learning engineers had raised concerns about the Challenger’s launch before it happened. “We could have prevented that from happening,” Cabana says. “That’s why it’s really important that we always, always ask questions and listen.” “What did we learn from Three Mile Island?” [Courtesy of ANS Nuclear Café, March 25th, 2014]

On some levels, the accident known as TMI (Three Mile Island) was a wake-up call and an expensive learning opportunity for both the nuclear industry and the society it was attempting to serve. Some people woke up, some considered the event a nightmare that they would do anything to avoid repeating, and some hard lessons were properly identified and absorbed. Unfortunately, some people learned the wrong lessons and some of the available lessons were never properly interpreted or assimilated. “What we can learn from the Tylenol Crisis” [Courtesy of the National Law Review, March 10th, 2010]

First, tell all the bad news yourself. The drip, drip, drip of bad facts is never good. Getting out all the facts as soon as you know them is critical and adds to the company’s trustworthiness. Second, creating good facts can counteract the bad. In the Tylenol case, Johnson & Johnson quickly created “tamper-proof” packaging to prevent such incidents in the future. The fact that the company cared so much about product safety that it went the extra mile to create new safeguards also had a “halo” effect. Customers perceived it to mean that if the company was this serious about safety in this area, then it must have strict controls in others, too.

A Short Catalogue of Other Examples [with References] Don’t Forget Your History Tacoma Narrows Bridge Failure [See, for example, “TNB History” from the Washington State Department of Transportation]

Don’t Lose Sight of Your Customers “New Coke” Marketing Blunder Key words: “enduring lessons”

[See, for example, “The enduring lessons of New Coke”, from the Coca-Cola Journey, April 23rd, 2015; and “What we can learn from Coca-Cola’s biggest blunder”, Time Magazine, July 10th, 2015]

Remember the Tylenol Crisis [See “real-life example”, above] Takata Air Bag Recalls Key words: “5 lessons”, “fiasco”, “root cause”

[See, for example, “Takata airbag recall – Everything you need to know”, from Consumer Reports, May 27th, 2016; and “5 lessons from the Takata airbag recall fiasco”, from The Toronto Star, May 22nd, 2015]

“The National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (the NHTSA) has determined the root cause (*) of the problem: Airbags that use an ammonium nitrate-based propellant without a chemical drying agent. As postulated early on, environmental moisture, high temperatures and age are associated with the defect that can improperly inflate the airbags and even send shrapnel into the occupant.” *NOTE: A more in-depth “root cause analysis” – which is underway by the NHTSA – would want to determine how AND why the “ammonium nitrate-based propellant without a chemical drying agent” was selected over other possible alternatives. And what air bag deployment techniques do other manufacturers use instead?

Culture is King (which isn’t always a good thing!) Volkswagen Emissions Scandal Keys: “learn from history”, “culture dictates behavior”

[See, for example, “Volkswagen emissions scandal: What we can learn from history”, from Forbes, October 6th, 2015; “The biggest lesson from Volkswagen: Culture dictates behavior”, from Entrepreneur, January 8th, 2016; and “The engineer’s dilemma”, IEEE Spectrum, December 30th, 2015]

Retain Your Moral Authority Tesla Contractors at Fremont Battery Plant [See, for example, “Tesla vows to probe findings” from the East Bay Times, May 17th, 2016]

Setting the Stage: Detailed Facts and Descriptions

“One Thing Leads to Another”: Time- and Money-Wasters

(1) A Single Point of Contact

(2) Unexpected Groundwater

(3) Unexpected Street-Side Shoring

(4) Athletic Field Rework

(5) Lawrence Street Delivery Zone

“The Trail of Promises Not Kept”: Trust-Busters

(7) Setting Customer Expectations

(8) Maintaining Customer Relations

(9) Health, Safety, Environment (HSE)

(10) Advance Notifications

(11) Truck Speed on Residential Streets

(12) Clean-Up of Private Property

(13) Sight Lines over the MPR

Facilities Subcommittee

Tuesday, July 19th, 2016, 4 p.m.

West Contra Costa Unified School District (WCCUSD) Field Operations Center 1400 Marina Way South Richmond, CA 94804

DETAILED FACTS & DESCRIPTIONS

The first broad category for possible “learning look backs” at Korematsu stems from what we’ll call “One Thing Leads to Another”, in a downward spiral of ever-more-troublesome problems. These become the “time- and money-wasters” that wreak havoc with your schedules and budgets.

1. A Single Point of Contact: To the extent that the continuity of senior on-site management is essential for a successful project – and it’s an industry best practice – a “learning look back” would examine why it did not occur at Korematsu. For example: On March 6th, 2013, the WCCUSD “Neighborhood Update” explicitly directed us to

1. Lew Brower (who was never once available to us on site, by phone or by e-mail); and to 2. Rene Barrera. Within 3-months, we found out (unofficially) that we were instead

supposed to deal with 3. Jose Chapa, who was teamed with 4. Ferdinand Vergeire. 5. Then we had no one at all for the first 6-months of 2015; and finally we found out (again,

unofficially) that 6. David Carey was our brand new point of contact as of July 2015.

A “learning look back” would seek to determine: Why this happened; why there was no effort to officially communicate any change to the neighborhood after March 6th, 2013; and how to mitigate a repeat of this adverse situation in the future.

2. Unexpected Groundwater: To the extent that this resulted in additional time and/or cost to the project, the main goal for a “learning look back” would be how to prevent such an outcome on future projects. For example, what might have been the upfront answers to questions like:

1. Was there previous periodic water damage at the pre-existing structures on the site? 2. Is there a natural drainage system of once-above-ground creeks and streams from the

hillside water shed directly behind the construction site1? 3. Are there streams & underground culverts still taking the natural drainage from the area? 4. Have the City and/or the neighborhood dealt with periodic flooding in the area, redirected

creeks, rerouted storm drains, etc over the past several decades?

1 Please see the public document entitled, “Map of the City of El Cerrito, Contra Costa County, Calif., Showing Drainage Area Waterways and Existing Culverts”, by R. R. Randall, R.E. 1113, circa 1950’s.

“Setting the Stage” by

Gregg Visineau, resident

1428 Lawrence Street El Cerrito, CA 94530

gvisineau@gmail.com 510 236 0761

A “learning look back” would seek to determine if answers to these (and other) questions – when compounded by the removal of 10-20’ of material below the pre-existing grade – could have been predictive of the groundwater problems which arose at Korematsu. Then, equally as important, what can be improved during project planning to prevent a costly repeat in the future.

3. Unexpected Street-Side Shoring: Again, to the extent that this resulted in additional time and/or cost to the project, the main goal for a “learning look back” would be how to prevent such an unexpected outcome on future projects. For example:

1. Hundreds of commercial tractor/trailer dump trucks made multiple trips on residential streets to remove material from a major excavation site;

2. They moved thousands of cubic yards (and tons) of dirt from the site during those trips; 3. They traveled on residential streets bounding the excavation (which were designed 7-

decades ago for simple car travel); and 4. The street-side clearance between this truck traffic and the newly excavated dirt wall at

the new upper yard site was only about 20-25 feet.

Many residential areas place weight limits on commercial vehicle traffic (if not outright bans) for safety reasons and to limit road damage and property damage. A “learning look back” would seek to determine if this situation at Korematsu could have been foreseen and thereby avoided altogether; or if it could have been designed for in advance; or if it could have been better mitigated after-the-fact. In all cases, there are lessons to be learned here for future projects.

4. Athletic Field Rework: Since it was never intended for the Castro Park athletic fields to be completely out-of-service during the three summers of the project (2013, 2014 and 2015), then a “learning look back” would produce an action plan to eliminate such multiple rework on future projects. For example:

1. Summer 2013: Trench digging across the fields; pipe laying (storm drain and/or fire main); testing; trench filling; sprinkler system installation & testing; grading; resodding.

2. Summer 2014: Sod removal; retrenching; pipe repairs; trench filling; sprinkler system repairs & testing; regrading; resodding.

3. Summer and Fall 2015: Complete makeover of the field by the City of El Cerrito, including sod removal; sprinkler system repairs & upgrades; regrading; resodding.

A “learning look back” would examine the root causes for these multiple reworks: Drainage from the Castro Park athletic fields has been a known chronic problem for years; the site is the home of a major natural drainage system from the hillside area behind it [see “Groundwater” look back #2 above,

with reference to document in Footnote 1]; and there’s a known historic sink hole at the upper Park.

5. Lawrence Street Delivery Zone: A Short Case Study from Peggy and Gregg is attached for your reference.

The second broad category for possible “learning look backs” at Korematsu stems from what we’ll call “The Trail of Promises Not Kept”, which takes away from the community trust you need to help your construction program succeed. These “trust-busters” can only work to further sap the neighborhood support which is so important for any new bond funding necessary for future construction; and for any new parcel taxes required for ongoing operations.

6. Setting Customer Expectations: Please refer to the District’s neighborhood circular from March 6th, 2016. And also refer to the neighborhood’s reference letter of April 15th, 2016. To the extent that the circular was the main and only vehicle for setting customer expectations, then a “learning look back” would examine whether or not it was effective (or should have even been expected to be effective).

The “look back” should note that your own Construction Managers scoffed at the depiction of the Korematsu project as an “inconvenience” for the neighborhood. And they referred to it, several times, as a “major disruptive industrial project smack in the middle of a dense residential area”.

7. Maintaining Customer Relations: To the extent that customer relations are important to the success of a construction project – and to its subsequent successful operations – a “learning look back” here would also take into account any possible learnings from the Single Point of Contact (“look back” #1, above) and Customer Expectations (#6, immediately above).

The “look back” should note that no one who dealt with our neighborhood ever really treated customer relations as a necessary part of their job description, even though they all said it was. The proof of this was in the pudding: See many of our 12 neighborhood recommendations for possible “learning look backs” to develop ways to improve customer relations on future projects.

8. Health, Safety, Environment (HSE): To the extent that this is a top priority for any construction project, anytime, anywhere – be it private, commercial, industrial or public – then an “HSE mentality” should permeate the entire organization’s culture, its very “DNA” if you will. This is an industry best practice; failure to do so can be damaging at best and catastrophic at worst. Examples from Korematsu abound for how NOT to do it right. For example:

1. 2 Hazmat removal events, with full hair-to-toe gear, with no advance notice. 2. Increased lead levels immediately followed removal of the Special Ed portables at Castro. 3. Noxious tar and asphalt fumes filled homes, requiring windows & doors to be closed

against toxic vapors, with no advance notice. 4. Dust dust dust everywhere, continually, affecting breathing, allergies and personal

property & environment throughout the entire 3+ year project (dirt, mud, rocks, sawdust, tree sap, dry cement mix, concrete sawing & grinding dust, insulation fibers, etc).

5. And more often than not, only token or no effort at dust control at all. 6. We were unable to open our doors and windows for 1-1/2 years! And our yards were

unusable during that time because of constant accumulations from construction (which linger to the present, sans any intermediate and final cleanups by the District).

7. Et cetera: See, for example, 4 hit-and-runs (from the Lawrence Street Delivery Zone “look back”, #5 above); and Truck Speeds (“look back” #10, below).

A “learning look back” would recognize that you would never tolerate this risk to your own personal safety and health; and damage to your homes on an ongoing basis for a 3-year duration. Instead, it would seek to assure residential safety and health, and the “quiet enjoyment” of private property throughout the duration of future construction projects. There are many well-known industry best practices for accomplishing this result (see, for example, the Advance Notifications “look back” #9, immediately below).

9. Advance Notifications: 1. Hazmat activity; 2. Tarring & asphalting activity; 3. Paint overspray on vehicles & homes; 4. Street closures and lane blockages; 5. 6 a.m. jack hammering on weekends; 6. Dump truck loading (dust dust everywhere); 7. Cement truck unloading; 8. Pile-driving and mechanical dirt-tamping (noise & dirt); 9. Pine tree cutting with sap sawdust sticking to cars & homes; etc.

A “learning look back” would determine why there were no advance notifications of these (and other) disruptive and damaging activities. We asked repeatedly from September 2013 for weekly advance schedules, to no avail. This is a very common & standard practice on construction projects embedded in neighborhoods, as it helps avoid damage to personal property, health and safety. So the “look back” here would want to uncover: Why didn’t it ever happen at Korematsu?

10. Truck Speed on Residential Streets: This one took Jose Chapa, standing in our house, watching a dump truck zoom by at 35 MPH before anything happened. Even then, the City of El Cerrito had to actively enforce the speed limit at the height of dump truck traffic. This is a significant safety issue. A “learning look back” would want to assess the Construction Manager’s or General Contractor’s influence on (and responsibility for) the drivers’ unsafe practices; and the sub-contractors’ accountability for their drivers continuing to speed ever-after.

11. Clean-Up of Private Property: To the extent that residents surrounding your projects are legally and morally due the “quiet enjoyment” of their property during construction, this “learning look back” would address a few simple remedies to a major impact on that enjoyment. For example: Regular street cleaning only started after the neighborhood complained to the City (after complaining, to no effect, to our multiple “single points of contact”). The “look back” should determine why this was necessary; and how to do it proactively on future projects.

To the credit of the Korematsu project, a commitment to regular house cleaning was made in November 2013 by the District; through Jose Chapa; with concurrence from Ferdinand Vergeire; and with the City as witness. A “learning look back” would seek to determine why this commitment was not completely fulfilled in practice; and how to make sure it is fulfilled on future projects where it is necessary to mitigate damage to neighborhood property. And it would recognize that you would never tolerate this level of damage to your homes and environment. Instead, it would seek to assure the “quiet enjoyment” of private property throughout the duration of future construction projects.

12. Sight Lines: A Short Case Study from Peter and Suzanne is available separately upon request, followed below by the “Lawrence Street Delivery Zone” case study.

Lawrence Street Delivery Zone: A Short Case Study from Peggy Wilcox and Gregg Visineau

[A short write up is available separately from Peggy Wilcox. It’s a transcript of two emails (including photos), dated March 25th (to the Board) and April 24th, 2016 (to the Board and to the CBOC)].

A brief litany of reference details follows below (many more are readily available):

• 4 hit and runs, 2 reported to the police, none volunteered to the residential victims by the at-least-3-times (proven) that project employees were at fault.

• At least 2 failed tests by WCCUSD “Food Services Department” trucks to traverse the sidewalk onto the ramp; both AFTER the concrete and asphalt were poured. During grading work, and before concrete and asphalt, where was this test work? Why test AFTER the work’s been completed? P S We know of at least two contractors who brought this steepness-of-ramp and height-of-sidewalk-hump issue to supervisors’ attention well prior to completion.

• Multiple scrapings & gougings by other delivery trucks, at least one of which had its drive shaft make contact and at least another one of which had its gas tank (!!) make contact.

• Frequent double & triple parking outside the ramp, restricting (or at times totally blocking) transit on Lawrence Street. Also causes unloading to occur onto the street rather than safely onto the ramp or at the entrance mouth to the MPR.

• Resulted in a new after-the-fact concrete drive being cut into the existing one at street level, on the north edge of the asphalt ramp’s concrete retaining wall. You can see where it adversely affects the asphalt ramp (where there’s now a yellow warning strip for, we guess, “Watch Your Step”). It also required a “compound miter joint” in the concrete between the new sidewalk and the new driveway (unprecedented in new construction). It was at least a full-day’s work (multiple “man-days”) to survey and frame this concrete pour. The finishing work is atrocious: Come see this retrofitted debacle for yourself!

• It also required a smooth “transition lip” to be ground out of the 2” driveway lip with the street to allow the WCCUSD “Food Services Department” trucks to get their hand wheeled carts from their trucks (now unloading onto the street) over that lip and down the ramp into the MPR. This is after at least one failed delivery attempt to “dead lift” the load over the lip.

• It also requires the longer WCCUSD “Food Service Department” trucks to park at a 45-90 degree angle to the driveway, blocking at least one lane (and in at least 3 known instances more than one lane) so that traffic could not pass safely through (or at all). This is so they can lower their hydraulic ramp onto the sidewalk for taking their powered carts down into the MPR.

Multiple Near Misses: In just 3 short months, at least one pedestrian has been seen (walking with a cane) nearly falling at the compound miter joint area. At least one WCCUSD “Food Services Department” worker has been seen stumbling backward down the asphalt ramp while wheeling down a fully-loaded stack of food trays (while walking backward to keep the cart from rolling away). At least one stack of empty food trays has been seen falling onto Lawrence Street while being mechanically lifted back onto the delivery truck.

Contributing to Your “Lessons Learned”

Fred T Korematsu Middle School: A Neighborhood’s Perspective on Construction

April 15th, 2016 letter to the WCCUSD and the City of El Cerrito

- Introduction and Addressees

- TIMELINE: March 6th, 2013 – March 28th, 2016

- March 6th, 2013: Neighborhood Update

- MAJOR LESSONS LEARNED

- MAJOR DISRUPTIONS: EXAMPLES

- CONCLUSIONS

Friday, April 15th, 2016 Gregg Visineau Peggy Wilcox 1428 Lawrence Street El Cerrito, CA 94530

510 236 0761 gvisineau@gmail.com pwilcox00@yahoo.com

FRED T. KOREMATSU MIDDLE SCHOOL: A Neighbor’s Perspective on Construction We presume that, as an industry best practice, you will be conducting a post mortem on the Korematsu Middle School Project; and that a major part of that post mortem will be the capture of “lessons learned” for making future projects better. To that end, we pass along our ideas for improvement. None of these are earth-shattering. In fact, they are so simple and obvious that we wonder why they weren’t implemented on your projects long before this. Or if they were already in place, we wonder why they weren’t consistently in force on this Project.

We hope you take them seriously. These are clearly not trivial. At the very least, we expect a response acknowledging receipt of this; much better yet would be an improvement plan in response. The DISTRICT: West Contra Costa Unified School District (WCCUSD)

• Luis Freese, Chief Engineer • Lisa LeBlanc, Associate Superintendant for Operations • Fedinand Vergeire, Bond Regional Facilities Project Manager • David Carey, Construction Manager • Matthew Burnham, Principal • School Board Members • Citizens’ Bond Oversight Committee, Chair, Vice-Chair, Secretary • Hibser Yamauchi Architects, Inc, Marcus Hibser, Principal

The CITY: City of El Cerrito

• Scott Hanin, City Manager • Yvetteh Ortiz, Public Works Director/ City Engineer • Melissa Tigbao, Engineering Manager/ Senior Engineer • Saied Aminian, Engineering Division/ Engineering Technician • Sgt Shawn Maples, Police Department

Contributing to your LESSONS LEARNED

TIMELINE: March 6th, 2013 – March 28th, 2016

It has now been 3+ years from your first (and only) official “Neighborhood Update” (March 6th, 2013) to the first day of actual operations at the new Korematsu Middle School (March 28th, 2016).

This is important: Between those starting and end points, no one from the District – at their own initiative – has ever engaged the neighborhood directly (one-on-one), regularly and officially in any way2. Any outreach occurred only when prodded by the neighborhood itself, usually out of our own extreme frustration with events on the ground3.

Here’s a verbatim copy of the original flyer where you set our expectations for the Project:

March 6th, 2013: Neighborhood Update

QUOTE

Dear Neighbors,

The construction of the new Portola Middle School will begin early Summer 2013 and is scheduled to be completed by Winter 20154.

During the construction phase of the project, you may notice changes in your community.

We apologize for any inconvenience this may cause and we greatly appreciate your patience and support.

The WCCUSD will have a construction representative onsite throughout the duration of construction. Should you have any questions or concerns, please contact:

Lew Brower, Project Manager 510 307 4697 (office) lbrower@wccusd.net

Rene Barrera, Project Engineer 510 307 4698 (office) rbarrera@wccusd.net

UNQUOTE

2 Your Architects did host three “Community Meetings”: One on Saturday, May 31st, 2014 to a general audience at the Castro Clubhouse; and then a couple in mid-2015 (Tuesday, July 7th and Thursday, July 23rd) to show their Project update to neighbors first and then to parents & students, both at the El Cerrito High School Cafeteria. 3 At our invitation, Mr Chapa first visited our residence Wednesday, September 18th, 2013, accompanied by Mr Vergeire. After replacing Mr Chapa, Mr Carey first introduced himself Monday, July 20th, 2015. Periodically thereafter, both Mr Chapa and Mr Carey dropped off carwash vouchers at our request. 4 Completion was originally scheduled for December 2015.

MAJOR LESSONS LEARNED

1. Neighborhood Updates should continue regularly throughout construction.

We asked for these from our first visit with Jose Chapa (Wednesday, September 18th, 2013), your first Construction Manager (through December 2014). He promised them, but followed through only twice that we’re aware of (after a request from the City one year later, on Tuesday, September 16th, 2014). We mentioned it also to David Carey, Jose Chapa’s replacement in July 2015. He was a bit more proactive, but not at several key times (e.g., during paint overspray, hazmat removal and roofing tar application).

As you know, these are standard practices by other public entities during major construction projects, such as the Contra Costa Community College District (e.g., at Contra Costa Community College) and the WCCUSD charter schools (e.g., at Summit K2) during their major renovations.

Surely your projects work from timelines of activities, updated periodically as the projects progress. We never could understand why a weekly schedule could not be made available to us, e.g., on each Friday for the following week. Even a “short version”, modified just to show those activities impacting the neighborhood, would have been better than the nothing that we got. This would have allowed us to adjust our own schedules and protect our own assets prior to being adversely affected by construction activities. Our several requests for these updates were never acted upon.

2. “You may notice changes in your community”. This should be changed to represent the stark black-and-white truth, for example:

“There will be changes in your community. Some will be major disruptions which we will proactively work to minimize; and which we will retroactively work to mitigate on your behalf. Others will be minimal and we’ll work hard to eliminate them so that they don’t keep happening”. Do not downplay the impact of such a major project (which the original wording clearly does); it does not serve the best interests of anyone involved.

3. “We apologize for any inconvenience…and we greatly appreciate your patience”. This should be amended to drive home the more truthful statement in #2 above, for example:

“Any suggestions are appreciated and will be acknowledged and acted on as soon as possible”, or words to that effect. “Patience” does indeed wear thin without any corrective action in return.

4. “The WCCUSD will have a construction representative onsite throughout the duration of construction. Should you have any questions or concerns, please contact, etc”. This is important and has to be fully operational throughout the duration of the project. It never was for the Korematsu project:

In spite of our efforts to find and communicate with Mr Brower, we never succeeded even once. And Mr Barrera was removed very early on (we learned this first from a 3rd party, and only much later from a District official), without ever having a replacement contact officially named to the neighborhood.

Could you please tell us now (since the answers were missing during the 3+ year construction period): What positions Lew Brower and Rene Barrera ever actually filled with the Project? Who were they affiliated with? Where were they located (because “onsite” was never instructive)? What happened to them? When were they replaced? Who replaced them and in what capacity? And why was the entire neighborhood never officially notified of any of these many changes to your “representative onsite throughout the duration of construction”?

This clearly made it difficult, if not impossible for us to “please contact you should we have any questions or concerns throughout the duration of construction”.

Mr Ferdinand Vergeire (who was never officially named to us as your Project representative) did finally confirm to us that Mr Jose Chapa was actually our point-of-contact. And he also confirmed to us that Mr Chapa could speak to us with the full authority of the WCCUSD. We are not aware that this was ever communicated to the rest of the Project’s affected neighborhoods by flyer or other means.

To his credit, Mr Chapa did reach out to us at times – but always under the duress of neighborhood complaints. We were never notified of Mr Chapa’s departure in December 2014. And we were never notified of his replacement by Mr David Carey in July 2015. Mr Carey also reached out to us at times, but almost never proactively and usually in reaction to neighborhood complaints.

We do not believe this was your intent; but if it was, you need to make that clear when setting neighborhood expectations for the District liaison during these major construction projects.

In addition, Mr Carey failed to live up to commitments made to the neighborhood by Mr Chapa. One can only conclude that any commitments made by the District are in fact personality-based and not position-based; you’d have to agree that this is most distressing and is hardly complimentary of the District and its upper management’s instructions to onsite project management.

MAJOR DISRUPTIONS: EXAMPLES

What your March 2013 “Neighborhood Update” significantly understated as an “inconvenience”, Mr Chapa, Mr Carey and the City each told us, in person and more than once: “This is a major industrial construction project being built in a dense residential neighborhood on a cramped site. Anyone who told you it would only be a minor inconvenience was not telling you the truth or did not really know what they were talking about”.

What follows is not even remotely close to being an exhaustive list of major disruptions caused by the Project. These are real; they are not made up. Each and every one is fully documented and, in most cases, was shared at one time or another with the District and the City.

We would strongly recommend that you survey others in the several blocks surrounding all four sides of the Project to confirm these examples; we expect that you will be able to collect many other items to add to this list:

Major Health & Safety Issues in the Neighborhood

• Speeding dump trucks without attention from the Project until complaints from residents. • Four hit-and-run incidents (on Lawrence Street alone). In no case did the Project’s offenders

voluntarily come to the fore without witnesses forcing the issue. Ref: Dec 9th 2015 e-mail to D Carey. • Hazmat removal of asbestos without forewarning to residents. • Hazmat removal of asphalt without forewarning to residents. • Significant and unanticipated shoring work required on the Lawrence Street border due to excavation

activity at the site and subsequent risk of failure from vehicle traffic on the street. • There were (and continue to be) so many gross safety disruptions arising from design, construction

and operations at the MPR driveway/ramp site (what we affectionately refer to as the “Lawrence Street delivery zone”) that we can’t recap them here. Refer instead to: Our letter dated Wednesday, February 10th, 2016; and our e-mails dated Friday, March 25th, 2016 and Monday, April 11th, 2016.

Other Adverse Impacts on “Quiet Enjoyment” of our Property and Neighborhood

• Sap-laden sawdust stuck on vehicles and property without forewarning to residents of tree cutting in the area (“I didn’t even know it was going to happen”, Mr Chapa told us).

• Paint overspray stuck on vehicles and property without forewarning to residents of spray painting in the area (“You mean they didn’t wrap your cars in plastic?”, asked Mr Carey).

• PG&E jack-hammering at 6:30 am on Saturday morning without forewarning to residents (“It was an emergency request from the District”, said the PG&E worker. “I didn’t even know it was going to happen”, Mr Chapa told us).

• Regular street sweeping began only after residents’ complaints to the City of El Cerrito. • The Castro Park sports field complex was completely out of service during all three summers that the

school was under construction (2013, 2014 and 2015). The Project was apparently unsuccessful in two consecutive efforts to fix & repair the complex’s grading, sod and sprinkler systems after trenching & laying storm drains and other water (fire control?) systems through the tract. The final (third and now at long-last complete) rehabilitation was ceded to the City.

• The sight lines from Lawrence Street are significantly degraded from those over the original Castro Elementary School MPR, in spite of constant assurances to the contrary from your Architects: Did any of your designers live here beforehand, with views over the Castro MPR? Do any of them live here now, with corrupted views over the new MPR? Lip service has been given to making the roofs’ mechanical equipment unobtrusive, but no corrective action has yet been taken.

Continuous Impacts

• Incomplete, inadequate, sometimes non-existent control of dust and debris throughout the Project: Dirt, sawdust, paint overspray, tree sap, mud, concrete dry mix, soil, grading dust clouds, etc. Both Mr Chapa and Mr Carey acknowledged that our section of Lawrence Street was “in a wind tunnel zone” from the Bay. Both witnessed, “up close and personal”, several egregious incidents. And yet both seemed incapable of assuring that our properties were protected. Green fabric on the fencing was often ineffective, defective or bypassed by contractors; the “water buffalo” for tamping down dust with a fine water spray was often not in use at all or was in use at other parts of the site.

• Property damage mitigation (or lack thereof): Mr Chapa (with Mr Vergeire) agreed to pursue neighborhood house cleaning at our in-home meeting on Wednesday, September 18th, 2013. It was officially agreed by the District on Friday, November 22nd, 2013. But the first cleaning was not actually done until Thursday, June 26th, 2014: Seven months later. On Tuesday, September 16th, 2014, Mr Chapa committed to further periodic house cleanings in the presence of a City representative. These were jointly expected to occur at roughly annual intervals (Winter/Spring 2015 and Winter/Spring 2016) to allow our summers to be somewhat more tolerable during construction. In July 2015, Mr Chapa’s replacement, Mr Carey, said he didn’t know of such a commitment (when 2015’s cleaning was already past due); but then he confirmed it and re-committed to it last November 2015 (four months later). We were even scheduled for cleaning in early November, but were then postponed “to the end of the Project” in March 2016. Finally, we were completely cancelled this year on Thursday, March 17th “because of all the rain” (which of course did not do anything compared to pressure washing and hand cleaning of the 2-years of dirt and grime from the Project since June 26th, 2014). Trust us: You all would NEVER tolerate this unmitigated damage to your homes.

CONCLUSIONS

Communicate regularly and officially, not just once at the start. Always forewarn the neighborhood of activities which will directly impact them and their properties.

Don’t sugarcoat the impact of the project on the neighborhood. This has been a bit more than an “inconvenience” for the past 3-years. Calling it anything other than a “major disruption” is extremely misleading if not completely disingenuous.

Build – and then work hard to maintain – a positive working relationship with the affected neighborhood. Lew Brower & Rene Barrera, Ferdinand Vergeire, Jose Chapa and then David Carey do not really comprise a very effective continuous working relationship with the neighborhood. This was unfair to them. And besides, beyond Mr Brower and Mr Barrera at the very start, no official notification was ever circulated to the neighborhood for who we should “contact with our questions and concerns throughout the duration of construction”.

Solve problems immediately: Do not hesitate, do not postpone. And please don’t just “say whatever you think it will take to make us go away”. That destroys your neighbors’ trust.

Live up to your commitments: If you make them, keep them. Please don’t backslide or disavow them if you change personnel. That’s a very poor excuse for not keeping your word.

Appoint, maintain and empower an actual single point-of-contact for the neighborhood, as you promised in March 2013. If your liaison to the neighborhood is really supposed to be the onsite Construction Manager, then officially and widely notify us all of that. And make sure his (or her) roles and responsibilities to that effect are clear (and consistent) to both us and the Construction Manager.

Mr Chapa and Mr Carey both told us from the start of their stints here that they considered “positive relations with the affected neighborhood to be of utmost importance”. It’s clear in hindsight that this was unfortunately not to be the case in actual practice, for whatever reason.

Clarity of roles and responsibilities from the get-go would surely benefit us all – the District and the neighborhood – “throughout the duration of construction”.

So, now it’s back to you. The ball is squarely in your court to let us know what you’ve learned that you didn’t know already. And what you plan to do in the future to assure your WCCUSD neighbors that they will not be disrupted anywhere close to the extent that we’ve been over the past 3-years. We repeat: You all would NEVER tolerate this unmitigated damage to your homes and to your neighborhood’s quality of life.

Gregg Visineau Peggy Wilcox

1428 Lawrence Street El Cerrito, CA 94530

Cc: Lawrence Street residents fronting Castro Park and Korematsu Middle School:

• Roy, 1440 Lawrence Street • Linda, 1436 Lawrence Street • Peter and Suzanne, 1424 Lawrence Street • John and Cathy, 1420 Lawrence Street • Jason and Stephanie, 1416 Lawrence Street