Lesses 1998. Content, Cause, And Stoic Impressions

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1/26

Content, Cause, and Stoic Impressions

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2/26

Content,Cause,

and Stoic Impressions

GLENN LESSES

According o

the

Stoics, only physical stuff exists.'

To describe

t in

their

terms, the

world

consists

of

different ypes

of

an

airy substance,pneuma.

Some

of these

pneumatic

stuffs instantiate

psychological

properties

or

states. Thus, psychological attributes,

which

they

deny are completely

different n kind from bodily properties,can be studied as part of the

natural world.2 Within the context of

their

naturalism,

he Stoics also

carefullyattend

o

the character

f

psychologicalproperties.

Despitetheir

differences,

uch

states

as

sense-perceptions, motions,

and beliefs convey

information o an agent.

The complex physical organization f the under-

lying pneumatic states determineswhy such psychological

states have

content.

Thus,

the

Stoics aim to provide

a

unified

theoryof varied mental

phenomena.3

Accepted March

1997

' There are ontological complications since they also hold that

there

are

things

that

do not exist, such

as

sayables (lekta). See, e.g., Sextus M 10. 218.

2

Though the Stoics reject ordinaryversions of substance

dualism,

their

own

views

are

complicated

in

ways

I

shall

not

explore.

In

particular, hey

do not appear

to

accept

either

a

version

of

reductive

type-physicalism

in

which

psychological states

are

sim-

ply identified

with

physical ones, or eliminativist theories.

The

Stoics

are

committed

to

nothing

more than that

psychological properties

have a

physical basis sufficient for

their

real

existence

and their

explanation.

Accordingly,

all

that

can be

said

here

is

that

the

Stoics

endorse some

weak

version

of

non-reductive physicalism. One apparent

dissent from this view is Deborah Modrak, Stoics, Epicureans

and

Mental

Content,

Apeiron

26

(1993), p. 98,

which is

a

review-discussion

of

Julia

Annas,

Hellenistic

Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley: University

of

California Press,

1992).

Modrak

suggests

without argument that Stoic monism about the world provides a motive for a reduc-

tive physicalism. David Sedley, Chrysippus

on

psychophysical causality, Passions

and

Perceptions: Studies

in

Hellenistic

Philosophy of

Mind

(Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1993),

edd.

Jacques Brunschwig

and

Martha

C.

Nussbaum, pp. 313-

331, argues that it is

a

mistake

to

understandChrysippus o

distinguish distinctly phys-

ical

from

mental

descriptions

of

psychological

attributes.

The

basic

Stoic texts and

their fundamental arguments

on

behalf

of

their view are

clearly presented in Julia

Annas,

Hellenistic

Philosophy of Mind, pp. 3-6, 20-33, 37-70.

3

These

general remarks help to reveal the attractionof

Stoic philosophy of mind

for

many contemporary

scholars. The

Stoics are

thoroughgoing naturalists

who

con-

duct

a serious

inquiry

into the

ascription

of

propositional

attitudes. Their

analysis

of fundamental issues in

philosophy

of

mind

is

often subtle

and

serves

to

remind

?

Koninklijke

Brill

nv, Leiden, 1998 Phronesis

XLIIIII


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3/26

2 GLENN LESSES

It quickly becomes evident that the Stoic view about the nature and

extent

of the

propositional ontentof mentalstates

is puzzling.They deny

that humanyoung

or animals can entertainbeliefs

or have thoughts.The

existenceof

propositional ttitudesordinarily s held to involve the attri-

butionof some

thoughtor belief. So, it would follow that the Stoics deny

small childrenor animalshave mental states with

propositional ontents.

Yet,

there s

also

evidence to the contrary.Forinstance, n his well-known

example, Chrysippus

attributes

what

appears o be

reasoningby disjunc-

tive

syllogism

to a

dog. One might argue that

this

kind

of example

com-

mits the Stoics to the ascriptionof propositional ontentseven in the case

of animals.

Furthermore,

f the

mental states of non-rational nimals are

so

impoverished

as

to

lack

any propositional

content,

the

Stoics must

explain how

it is

possible for

such

animals

to

function

adequately

at

all.

Doesn't, say, a

mouse

see

that

a

cat is nearby?Recently, commentators

have debatedthe extent of

propositional

ontents n the

Stoic account

of

psychological states. The discussion

has

focused,

in

particular,

n

per-

ceptional

states

because

for

the

Stoics

perception

and

impulse

are what

distinguishanimal

life

from

other

living things

and

perception

has a

spe-

cial prominencen theirinquiry nto mental states.Two basic, competing

interpretations ave

emerged.

On

what

has

become

the

orthodoxreading,

the Stoics

sharplyseparate

he

psychological

states

of

non-rational

ni-

mals from those of

rationalanimals.According o advocates

of

the ortho-

dox

position,the mental

states of, say,

small

children

are too

simple

to

have

the

cognitive

structurenecessary

or

the attribution

f

propositional

attitudes

o

them.4Non-rational nimals can

perceive

only qualities

such

scholars of contemporarydiscussions. Hereare just two examples. While Julia Annas,

Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind,

does not discover the ancestor of any particular on-

temporary position

in Stoic thought, she does suggest, e.g., pp. 1-2, that the Stoics

construct the first philosophy

of mind that is recognizably contemporary. Richard

Sorabji, PerceptualContent

in the

Stoics, Phronesis 35 (1990), pp. 307-314, goes

much further. He argues

that the Stoics would endorse the basic views of Daniel

Dennett on propositional

attitudesratherthan those of Donald Davidson.

4

Michael Frede,

Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions,

The

SkepticalTradition Berkeley:University

of

California

Press, 1983),

ed.

Myles Burnyeat,

pp. 65-93,

is

among

the clearest and most forceful

proponents

of this view. Others

include Brad Inwood,

Ethics and Human Action

in

Early Stoicism (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1985), pp. 73-75, A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic

Philosophers, vol. I (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 239-241,

ChristopherGill,

Is there a concept of person

in

Greekphilosophy?, Companions

to

ancient

thought

2:

Psychology

(Cambridge:Cambridge


ed.

Stephen Everson, pp.

166-193, and Jean-Louis

Labarriere, De la 'naturephantastique'




4/26

CONTENT, CAUSE,

AND STOIC IMPRESSIONS 3

as sweetness or

whiteness.

According

he

second interpretation,

he Stoics

deny thatthe sensoryperceptions f animals

are

completely

devoid

of

pro-

positional contents.

On this alternativereading,

the

Stoics much more

liberally ascribe

propositional

content even in the case of non-rational

animals.5

In this essay, I argue that

the

Stoics

draw some distinctions

as

they

often

are

prone

to do

-

that,

as a

result,

enable

us to locate a solution

to

the

puzzle.

The

Stoics deny

that

there

are

any

raw

psychological

states

completelydevoid

of cognitive content

because theydiscriminate etween

a

conception

of more robustand more

narrowcontent.It follows that the

Stoics occupyan intermediate

osition,

ess severe thanwhat theorthodox

interpretation ttributes

o

them and less

generous than what the alterna-

tive account finds.Thus, the Stoics hold

that there is considerable

conti-

nuity

as

well

as

significant

differencesbetween the psychologicalstates of

rational

and

non-rational nimals.

I

Several basic

featuresof Stoic psychological

heory are relevant

o issues

about content.

The early Stoics speak of psuche in two senses

(Sextus

M

7.

234).6 The

term

often

is

used

to

include many of

the

ways

in which

des animaux chez

les Stoiciens, Passions and Perceptions: Studies in

Hellenistic

Philosophy of

Mind



edd.

Jacques

Brunschwig and Martha

C.

Nussbaum, 225-249.

s

Richard

Sorabji

is

the

principal

advocate of

this

interpretation.

See his

Percep-

tual Content

in

the

Stoics, pp. 307-314,

Intentionality

and

Physiological

Processes:

Aristotle's Theoryof Sense-Perception, Essays on Aristotle'sDe Anima Oxford:Oxford

University Press,

1992), edd. Martha

C.

Nussbaum and Amelie Oksenberg

Rorty, espe-

cially, pp.

195-206, Animal Minds, Spindel Conference

1992:

Ancient

Minds,

ed.

John Ellis,

The

SouthernJournal of Philosophy 31

(1993), supplement,especially, pp.

1-12,

Animal Minds

and Human Morals: The Origins of the WesternDebate

(Ithaca,

New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp.

20-28, 40-44. Although Julia

Annas,

Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, pp. 75-87,

officially adopts

a

version

of

the orthodox

interpretation,

he

also

occasionally attributes

a kind

of content

to animal

perceptions,

pp. 57-64,

71-72.

At one

point, p. 64,

Annas

says:

Hence

there

is

a

division

of

kind

between animal and

human inner life. And hence

the

Stoics denied

to

animalsnot only

reasoning but

emotions and even desires; since animals cannot articulateand

interpret

in language the content of their experience.... Does she hold that non-rationalsen-

sory perceptions have

propositional contents

that animals

are unable to

verbalize? If

so,

her

position ascribes content

to the

impressions

of

non-rationalanimals and

appears

very close to what Sorabji formulates more

fully.

6

The

positions formulated by Zeno,

Cleanthes, and, especially, Chrysippus consti-




5/26

4

GLENN

LESSES

both rationaland non-rational nimals

unction.'

The

pneumatic ubstance

constituting he soul, understood his way, is intimately

blendedwith the

somewhat differentpneuma of a body to form a living

animal. Yet, in

another

sense,

the Stoics often refer to just one part of the soul, namely,

its ruling part (to hegemonikon).This part is restricted o those activities

we typically regard as mental

-

thinking,believing, perceiving,and so

forth

-

rather

han

the

entire

range

of

living functions.Bothrationaland

non-rational

nimals

have

a ruling part of

the

soul, though

non-rational

animals

cannot entertain houghts

or

desires. When another

part

of

the

soul

is

affected,

such as in the case of sense-perception,t

also produces

alterations

n

the rulingpart.8Since the ruling partof the soul

is

the

loca-

tion of

desire

and

reason

n

rationalanimals and activities such

as

sense-

perceptionalso affect it,9

it

is particularly asy for

the

Stoics to speak

loosely

-

as they often do

-

and identifythe

soul

with the

ruling part.

I

shall restrictmy use of soul o the notionof the soul's rulingaspect and

usually apply mind

or

mental to describe it.

Central o whether

the

Stoics

hold

that mental events

have content

is

their

view of

perception aisthesis). Ordinaryperceptual

vents have

two

conceptually

distinct

stages: phantasia

and

assent

(sunkatathesis).

Al-

thoughphantasia

is

often

translated

s

appearance,

he

term refers

to

a

basic, representational

ental

state,

which

includes

much more

thanvisual

appearances.'0

he

Stoic notion

of

phantasiaapplies

to other

mentalfunc-

tions

besides sense-perception.

or

instance,

the

hegemonikon

an

gener-

ate

non-perceptual hantasiai through

ts own

internal

operations

D.L.

7.

51). Something

more neutral

such

as

impression aptures

he

term's

wider

range.

tute orthodox

Stoicism. As

is well-known, later Stoics

such as Panaetius appear to

modify or reject several central

tenets of early Stoicism

about the soul.

I

Julia

Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy

of Mind, p. 54, points

out

that in

Stoic theory

some capacities of living

things such as

basic metabolism are not part

of the soul's

functions.

8 See

Calcidius

in

Tim. 220,

Aetius

4.

21. 1-3,

Plotinus

4.

7. 7.

See

Stobaeus

1. 368.

12-15,

Aetius

4. 23. 1.

10

It

is

helpful

to

survey the considerable

scholarship

about Aristotle's concep-

tion of phantasia. Two useful

sources are: Martha Nussbaum,

Aristotle's

De Motu

Animalium

(Princeton: PrincetonUniversity

Press, 1978),

pp. 221-269, for a general

discussion of Aristotleon phantasia, and Brad Inwood, Ethics and HumanAction in

Early Stoicism, for a

succinct account

of the general Aristotelian background

or the

Stoics, pp.

9-17.

Although

phantasia is,

of

course, legitimately

translated

as

appearance

ecause

it derives from the verb

to appear and

is

just

the

way

things appear

to one, this ren-




6/26

CONTENT, AUSE,AND STOIC MPRESSIONS 5

The Stoics often describea phantasiaas a kind of imprint

tup6sis).'2

Although this imprint s something physical, the Stoics debated exactly

how one should construe t:

(1) We shall know this if we first learn what impression is, according to them, and

what its specific d1fferentiaeare. So, according to them, an impression is an

imprint

tuposis)

in

the

soul. And

they

differed

mmediately

aboutthis.

For

Cleanthes

took

imprint

in

terms of depression and

elevation

-

just

like the

imprint

on

wax

made by seal-rings. But Chrysippus thought that such

a view

was absurd. For

first, he says, this will require that when

our

intellect has impressions at one time

of

a

triangle

and

a

tetragon,

the

same

body

will

have to

have in itself

at

the same

time

different

shapes

-

triangular

and

tetragonal together,

or even

round;

which

is

absurd. Next,

since

many imprints

exist in us

at

the same

time the

soul will

also

have

many configurations.

This

is

worse than

the first

problem.

[Chrysippus]

himself speculated, therefore, that imprintwas used by Zeno to mean alteration;

so that the definition becomes like this: impression s

an

alterationof

the

soul ;

for it is no

longer

absurd that

the

same

body

at one

and

the same time

(when

many impressions

exist

in

us)

should

receive

many

alterations.

For

just

as

air,

when

many people speak at once, receiving at

one time

an indefinite number

of

different

blows,

also

has

many alterations,

so too

the

ruling part

of the

soul

will

experience something

similar

when

it receives varied

impressions.'3

[Sextus,

M

7. 227-231]

Both

Cleanthes

and

Chrysippus

hare

the view

thatan

impression

s

some-

thing physical, namely,

a modification

of

some

pneuma. They disagree

about

how

to

explain

this

physical change,

but

both

rule out

treating

dering might misleadingly suggest that it

primarily

involves

visual

images

and

the

sense-modality

of

sight. Michael

Frede, Stoics and Skeptics on

Clear

and

Distinct

Impressions, and

A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The

Hellenistic

Philosophers,

vol.

1,

employ impression. Various other attemptsto renderthe term include:Julia Annas,

Hellenistic

Philosophy of Mind, and Richard Sorabji,

Perceptual Content in the

Stoics, use

appearance, Brad Inwood and L.P.

Gerson, Hellenistic

Philosophy:

Introductory

Readings (Indianapolis:Hackett

Publishing Co., 1988), presentation,

(which also has the virtue of

neutrality with respect to sense-modalities,

but doesn't

reflect the

definition of phantasia in

terms of tup6sis quite as well) and A.A.

Long,

Representation

and

the self

in

Stoicism, Companions

to

Ancient Thought2:

Psy-

chology



ed.

Stephen

Everson, pp.

102-120, uses representation.

A.A. Long, p. 107,

n.

6, changes

his

usage

from

his

earlier impression

o representation

ecause

he

worries

that

the Humean associa-

tions

of impression

might mislead.

12

See D.L. 7. 50, Sextus M 7. 227-231, 7. 372-373, Plut. Ad Col. 1122C, Comm.

not. 1084F.

1'

See

also

D.L.

7. 45-46,

50.

Unless

otherwise

indicated, translationsare based on

Brad Inwood and

L.P. Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy:

IntroductoryReadings, with

occasional

modifications.




7/26

6

GLENN LESSES

impressionsolely as a kind of image.'4Furthermore, oth Cleanthesand

Chrysippus ttempt o explainphantasia in terms

of

the complexityof

its

physicalstructure.Chrysippus ejectswhat he takes to be Cleanthes'view

that

an

adequate explanation of

an

agent's impressions must attribute

the

same qualitative features

to the

impression

as to

that

which

they

represent.

'1

The second stage involved in perception proper is assent (sunkata-

thesis). For perception o

occur,

an agent must not only be presentedwith

an impression,he

or

she

also

mustassentto it.'6

In

rationalanimals,assent

to an impression s a voluntaryact.'7The Stoics often speakof sunkata-

14

For discussions of this passage in Sextus, see Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy

of Mind, pp. 72-75, Deborah Modrak, Stoics, Epicureans,

and

Mental Content,

p. 99, A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The

Hellenistic

Philosophers, vol. 1, p. 239, and

David Sedley, Chrysippuson psychophysical causality, pp. 329-330. According

to

Modrak, the passage suggests that Chrysippus does not accept that an impression is

an imprint. But the text indicates that the dispute between Chrysippusand Cleanthes

over

what

Zeno meant is instead

a

matterof interpreting he natureof a tuposis. Both

appear to accept that an impression is an imprint of some kind.

's Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, pp. 74-75, points out Sextus might

not do justice to the dispute. It is possible that Chrysippussimply attempted o develop

furtherwhat he held to be the same fundamentalview as Cleanthes' position.

However, Chrysippus appears to criticize Cleanthes for accepting a naive view of

mental representation hat implies that perceptual mpressions are copies of the quali-

ties

that

the objects representedhave. For instance, on Cleanthes' account of impres-

sion,

when

we

perceive

a

triangularobject

the

impression

that we

ordinarily

have

is

triangular.Some commentators have taken the remarks of Chrysippus to entail that

impressions are propositional n form or articulable n linguistic form. E.g., Annas, pp.

74-75, concludes

that

Chrysippus analyzed perception

in

terms

of the

reception

of

content and its articulation n linguistic form. This conclusion is too strong. All that

seems to follow is that

the impression conveys information.Whetherwhat is conveyed

requires propositional content

is

less

clear. Why

is

it necessary that our perceptual

impressions of, say, squareness or redness, involve the proposition that something is

red

or square? As it stands, all Chrysippus

has to

accept

is

that the

qualities

that

impressions have are not necessarily similar to the characteristicsof their causes.

16

See

D.L. 7.

49, Cicero

Acad.

1. 40,

2.

145,

Plut. Ad

Col. 1122B-C,

Stobaeus

1. 349. 23-27.

'7

The

nature

of assent

for

non-rationalanimals

is

a vexed and

complicated ques-

tion.

Brad

Inwood,

Ethics and Human Action

in

Early Stoicism, p. 72,

denies

that non-

rational animals can assent. Jean-Louis Labarriere, De la 'nature

phantastique'

des

animaux chez les Stoiciens, especially, pp. 243-249, argues that the Stoic position

is

that

animals

can

exhibit

a

type

of assent to

impressions.

See

also Julia

Annas,

Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, pp. 72-75, 89-102, Christopher Gill,

Is

there

a

concept

of

person

in

Greek philosophy?, pp. 185-186,

A.A.

Long

and

D.N.

Sedley,

The

Hellenistic

Philosophers,

vol.

1, p. 322,

A.A.

Long, Representation

nd

the

self




8/26


9/26

8

GLENN

LESSES

What

is Frede's

mainevidence?

Text (2) leads

Frede

to hold that

any

impression

of

a

rational

being is

rational.

(2)

Of

impressions,

some

are

rational (logikai)

and some

are

non-rational

(alogoi).

The

rational are

those

of rational

animals,

the

non-rational

of non-rational.

The

rational,

then,

are thoughts

andthe

non-rational

have been

given no

special

name.

[D.L.

7.

51]

Because

the passage

identifiesrational

mpressions

with

thoughts,

he also

concludes hatonlyrationalmpressions ave propositionalontent.22 ther

texts also

sharply

distinguish

between

rationalimpressions

and impres-

sions

that are merely

perceptual:

(3)

Through

the senses

alone one is

not able

to

grasp

the

truth,

as

we

indicated

before23

and now

shall explain

briefly,

for

they [the

senses]

are

by

nature non-

rational,

and of

more than

being

impressed

by impressors

[i.e.,

the things

that

impress]

they are

not capable,

as

they are

completely

unsuitable

for discovering

the truth.

For

not only must

one

be

moved

to have

a sensation

of white

or sweet

for

one

to grasp

the truth

in the

underlying

things,

but one must

be brought

to

have an impressionof that thing that this is white and this is sweet. And so

the other like

things [i.e.,

the

other

senses].

But to grasp a thing

of

this kind

is

no

longer

the

work

of

perception.

For

color only

and taste and sound

is its

nature

to

grasp,

while

that this

is

white

or

this

is sweet, which

are neither

color

nor

taste,

is unsuspected

by

sense.24

Sextus M

7. 344-345]

Frede

identifies

the

results

of sense-perception

n this passage

with

what

are,

according

o (2),

non-rational

mpressions.

t follows

that

by

the

exer-

cise

of

sense-perception

lone

one

would

not be able

to

entertain mpres-

sions

with

propositional

ontent.

A statement

hat something

s

the case

this

point

is

generally

less

important

or

our

purposes,

it is worth

noting

that for

Frede

rational

impressions

can give rise

to distinct

thoughts

because otherwise

identical

im-

pressions

can be held

in different

manners.

Sameness

of content

does

not completely

determine

identity

of thoughts.

See also,

his The Stoic

doctrine of the

affections

of

the soul,

The Norms

of Nature:

Studies

in

Hellenistic

Ethics

(Cambridge:

Cambridge

University Press,

1986), edd.

Malcolm

Schofield

and Gisela Striker, especially

pp.

103-107.

22 Michael

Frede, Stoics

and Skeptics

on Clear and Distinct Impressions,

p.

67:

Rational impressions

have

a propositional

content, they

are

impressions

to the

effect

that

something

is

the

case

very

much in the sense in which we might say ordinarily,

'the impression,

which one gets,

if one looks

at the evidence,

is

that..

Frede

also

appeals

to Galen Def.

med.

126 for

additional support.

23 See

Sextus

M

7.

293.

24

The translation

s mine.




10/26

CONTENT, AUSE,

AND STOIC MPRESSIONS 9

is required or us to determineruthor falsity.But Fredetakes(3) to deny

that sense-perceptiontself

can

supply

the

requisitepropositional

orm. At

most, the senses

can tell

us

about

the

qualities

of

things

-

their

whiteness,

say,

or sweetness

- when we are

causally

affected

by

external

hings.

This

is all that a tuposis, the imprint,

can

convey

in such cases.

In another mportantpassage, Cicero appears

o confirmFrede's read-

ing and also

adds something:

(4) Those characteristicswhich belong to the things we

describe as

being grasped

by

the senses areequally characteristicof thatfurther et of things said to be grasped

not

by

the senses directly

but

by

them

in

a

certain respect, e.g.,

that is

white,

this is

sweet,

that

is

melodious,

this

is

fragrant,

his

is

bitter. Our

grasp

of these

is

secured by the

mind,

not

the

senses.

Next,

that

is

a

horse,

that is

a

dog.

The

rest

of

the series

then

follows, connecting bigger

items which

virtually

include

complete grasp

of

things,

like if it is a human

being,

it is a

mortal,

rational

ani-

mal. From this class

conceptions

of

things

are

imprinted

on

us,

without which

there

can

be

no

understanding

or discussion of

anything.25

Acad.

2.

21]

For Frede, (3) indicatesthat the senses by

themselves are unable to pro-

duce impressionscontaining any propositionalcontent. This task, ac-

cording

to

(4), requires

certainoperations

of

the

mind.

Thus, rationaland

non-rational animals differ

in

the sorts

of

impressions of

which

they

are

capable.

Frede

explains

the

capacity

of

rational

animals to entertain

rational impressions n terms

of

their ability to

form concepts. Lacking

any conceptualapparatus,

non-rational nimalscannot entertain mpres-

sions having propositional

orm.

In

the

Stoic

account of psychological

development,concepts (ennoiai) arise later

than perceptual mpressions

(Aetius

4. 11.

1-5).

The Stoics separate onceptual hinking rom the mere

occurrenceof perceptual tates.

Although Frede's formulationof the Stoic account

has considerable

plausibility,

Richard

Sorabjirejects

the orthodoxreading. He challenges

both the

philosophical

underpinnings

f Frede's

interpretation

s

well as

its

textual support.Let

us

first consider Sorabji's

objectionto a philo-

sophical argumentemployed

by Frede and next describe his own fresh

interpretiveproposal.

Sorabji

s

unimpressedby the theoreticalargument

that

concepts

are

necessary

or

propositionalhought.

It

is a

controversial

matter

or

many

contemporary hilosophers

f

mindwhether n every case

the employmentof concepts is requiredfor propositionalattribution.26

2'

This translation

basically follows A.A. Long and D.N.

Sedley,

The

Hellenistic

Philosophers.

26

See Richard

Sorabji, PerceptualContent

in

the

Stoics,

pp. 308-309,

Animal




11/26

10

GLENN

LESSES

Some

argue that despite

the necessity of

concepts for

belief-attribution

there is no such

requirement or other sorts of

mental states.

Consider

a

typical

example:agents

can perceivea

structureas

ten-sidedwithout

having

a conceptof ten or

any otherrelevant

concepts.Perceptual on-

tent for

Sorabji

only demandsa sort of

predication i.e., one

thingbeing

another.27

lthough

his

conceptionof

propositional

ontentas predication

is

never fully explained, et

us defer our

discussionof it until

later.At this

point,

all we need to see is

Sorabji's

strategy for

underminingFrede's

argumentabout

concepts and propositional ontents.28

Sorabjialso addresses

Frede's textual

arguments.

First,Sorabjiargues

that it

is

consistentwith

text

(2)

that

non-rational

mpressions

have

prop-

ositional form.

Rational mpressions

can be

a subset of

impressions

hat

have

propositional ontent.29 he

passage

does

not

rule out that

other

m-

pressionsalso

have propositional ontent.

Sorabji

then

suggeststhat our

sources

give

us

reason

to

distinguish

between two

types

of

verbalizable

linguistic form

corresponding

o

impressions.Some

phantasiai

-

rational

impressions are

articulableby their

owners,

while

others

-

non-rational

impressions arearticulable

nly by

non-owners.

Although

ational

gents

can, in

principle,articulate he

content of

their rational

impressions,

n

contrast,

an

infant, say,

cannot verbalize the

content

of its

perceptual

impressions.30

Minds, p. 6, Intentionalityand Physiological Processes, pp. 200-210, and Animal

Minds and Human Morals, pp. 30-31.

He

refers

particularly

o

the work

of

Peacocke

and Evans who deny that concepts are required for propositional thought on every

occasion.

See

Gareth

Evans,

The

Varieties

of Reference (Oxford:

Oxford

University

Press, 1982), and Christopher

Peacocke, Analogue Content, Proceedings of the

Aristotelian Society (1986), supp. vol. 60, pp. 1-17.

27

Richard Sorabji, Perceptual

Content

in

the

Stoics, p. 307, Animal Minds

and

Human Morals, pp. 12, 21.

28

If the doctrine that content requires conceptual apparatus ails to be settled for

contemporaryphilosophy, then

Sorabji points

out

it

is

a mistake

to

regard it

as

incon-

trovertible for ancient authors.

In

any case,

how far can

Frede's objection

take us?

Although any interpretation

will be driven

by

a

principle

of

charity

to

attribute

as

plau-

sible an account as the evidence

allows,

it

is

always

worth

being reminded that

the

Stoics and other historical figures are

not

immune from adopting patently unjustified

positions. Hence, even

if

the

thesis that

concepts are required for propositionalcon-

tent turns out to be warranted, t still doesn't follow without considerable

additional

argument that the Stoics realized that it must be so.

29

Richard Sorabji, PerceptualContent

in

the

Stoics, p. 311,

Animal Minds and

Human Morals, p.

25.

1

For the moment,

let

it suffice

to

point

out

a more natural

reading

of

(2),

which

is

somewhat weaker

than

Frede's yet does

not

require

hat we endorse

Sorabji's strategy.




12/26

CONTENT,

CAUSE,

AND

STOIC IMPRESSIONS

11

Accordingto Sorabji,manyof Frede'sotherimportant ourcesshould

also be read

differently.

Sorabji

tentativelysuggests

that

text

(3), Sextus

M 7.

344-345, does

not reflect

genuineStoic

doctrine.3'But

even suppos-

ing the

passage is orthodox

Stoicism,

Sorabjiargues

that it together

with

(4), Cicero Acad. 2.

21, entail that

perceptual

mpressionshave content.

For,

he

argues,

if

it is true that the senses can

only

perceive

in a

way,

say,

that

something s white, then such

impressions n a

way

have

some

propositional content.

Accordingly, a

perceptual

impression

must be

as of

something's

being white

rather than an

impression

simply of

whiteness.32

On

Sorabji's

account,

the

impressionsof,

say,

a

newbornor a cat do

have

propositional ontent

n

the sense that their

impressions

presentone

thing

to be

predicated

f

another.Our sources also

only speak

of

impres-

sions as

verbalizable,

not

actually

verbalized.33 o be

sure,

non-rational

animalscannotarticulate r

conceptualize

what

they perceive.

But,Sorabji

argues,

it doesn't follow that non-rational

animals cannot have

impres-

sions with content

solely

because their

impressions

are not

verbaliz-

able

by them.

It suffices for the attribution f

propositional ontent that

the verbalizablempressionsof non-rational nimalscan be articulated y

other animals that are

rational

namely,

US.34

He

concludes that animals

cannot articulate he content of

the

impressions

hat arise in

perception

and

in

other mental

functioning,

but their

impressions

have

articulable

content.35

The

passage only

establishes that not all

impressions are

to be identifiedwith

thoughts

or beliefs.

Rational

animals alone can

have

impressions

of the latter

sort,

but

the pas-

sage

simply

leaves

open whether the attributionof content

requires

that

impressions

are

thoughts.

31

Though most

commentatorsaccept

that

Sextus is describing a

Stoic position

here,

it is

difficult to determine

whether in this text

Sextus

refers to Stoic doctrine

because

there is no

explicit

attributionof

the view to a

particular

dogmatic

school.

Richard

Sorabji, Perceptual

Content in the

Stoics, pp.

311-312,

presents

no

argument

that it

cannot be a reference to

Stoicism. But

it is also not obvious that

Frede's inference

about the

passage

follows. The fact that

the senses can

only

grasp

color, flavor, and

sound

doesn't tell us

exactly what is

entailed

by such grasping.

32

Richard Sorabji,

Perceptual

Content

in

the

Stoics, p. 311.

33

See D.L.

7.

49, Aetius 4. 12.

1,

Sextus M 7.

244,

M

8. 70.

3

RichardSorabji,

Perceptual

Content in the

Stoics, p.

311, Animal

Minds and

Human

Morals, pp. 22-23.

3S

In supportof

his

interpretation,

Sorabji also appeals to

additionalsources,

which

our sketch of

his

position

can

only survey in

passing.

For

instance,

he refers to

Chrysippus'

well-known

example

of

the

dog

engaging

in

something analogous

to the

application

of

disjunctive

syllogism

(Sextus,

PH 1.

69).

Chrysippus

explicitly states




13/26

12

GLENN LESSES

Despite the considerableorce andeleganceof Sorabji's nterpretation,

we shouldhave reservations

bout t as well. Firstof all, obviously

much

dependson

an assumptionhat

underlies is

reading

f the Stoics.He accepts

the

principle

hat we oughtto ascribe

intentionality

o the

impressions

of

non-rational nimals

f

rational

animalscan articulate heircontent.In this

respect,

Sorabjiacknowledges hat

he is

following

Dennett.36Of

course,

one could have reasonabledoubts about

the success of Dennett's instru-

mentalism or the attribution

f propositional

ttitudes.37 et, regardless

of whetherwe find Dennett's

position plausible,

t has a certain lack of

fit with Stoic theory. Dennettis an anti-realistabout propositionalatti-

tudes.38On his view, we ought

to

acceptexplanations

of humanbehavior

that employ beliefs and desires

solely

because of their usefulness.

But,

although

his

metaphysical

ssue

will

not be discussed

ully

here, t is clear

that

the

Stoics

really

admit desires and beliefs into their

ontology. They

are robustrealists about propositional ttitudes.

Impulsesand perception

that the mental

activity

of the dog is only

in effect or

passes for (dunamei)

reasoning.

The Stoics deny that

a dog can have beliefs,

so it must grasp through perception that

one

or

more

of

the

paths ahead of

it does not have

any

scent.

Sorabji

also refers to

passages from Hierocles,

Seneca, and Chrysippusin which these authors

discuss the

early stages of an animal's

life. Self-awareness is necessary for self-preservation,

an

impulse which the Stoics

claim all animal life possesses from the very

start. The Stoic

analysis

of self-awareness requires that animals

are aware that they

have

particular

body parts, that their prey have weaknesses, and so forth. In PerceptualContent in

the Stoics, p. 312,

he holds that such instances of self-awareness can

only be under-

stood

by attributing

propositional attitudes.

In

addition,

he cites

passages

in Plutarch

and Sextus

(Plut. On

the E at Delphi 386F-387A,

Sextus M 8. 276) in which rational

and

non-rational

animals

are

distinguished

in terms of whether

they

are capable of

inferential

reasoning.

Sorabji says that only rational animals

can

draw

inferences.

Althoughthe Stoics are silent in these sources about the nature of animal perceptual

impressions,

the texts suggest to Sorabji that

the difference between rational and

non-rationalanimals has little to do with whether

or not their impressionshave propo-

sitional form. Consequently, these other sources

also lead Sorabji

to

deny

that non-

rational animals are only capable of impressions

completely devoid

of propositional

contents.

`6

See Richard Sorabji, Perceptual

Content in the

Stoics, p. 314, Intentionality

and Physiological Processes: Aristotle's Theory

of

Sense-Perception,

p. 206,

and

Animal Minds and Human Morals, p. 28. He cites,

in

particular,D. Dennett,

Condi-

tions of

Personhood,

n A.

Rorty, ed.,

The

Identities

of

Persons

(Berkeley: University

of California

Press),

pp.

175-196.

37

E.g., see Jeriy A. Fodor, Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation:The Intel-

ligent

Auntie's

Vade-Mecum,

A

Theory of

Content

and Other

Essays (Cambridge,

Massachusetts:The

MIT

Press, 1992), pp.

6-8.

38

See

Jerry

Fodor,

Fodor's Guide to Mental

Representation:

The

Intelligent

Auntie's

Vade-Mecum, p.

7.




14/26

CONTENT, CAUSE,

AND STOIC IMPRESSIONS

13

are whatdistinguishanimallife from otherkindsof living things.39When

they

speak

more

precisely,

the Stoics restrictdesire

(orexis),

which

they

define as a kind of

impulse

that

requires

belief,

to

rational

beings, though

some animal

impulses

can be

relatively

similar in

nature to human

desires.' In

any case,

impulses, desires, and beliefs are identifiedwith

movementsof the

soul. Thus, the Stoics take such

psychological

statesto

be instancesof

actuallyexisting physicalstates.

Sorabji tells us

very

little about his

predicationalnotion of

proposi-

tional

contents.His position

appears

o come

to this:there s a

weak sense

of propositional which means only that one thing is connected with

another.4'Animals have

impressions

hat a

is

related to b. On his

view,

we should

attribute

propositionalcontents to the

mental states of non-

rational

animals

because their

impressionscontain the

propositionthat

one

thing

is

predicatedof another.

Sorabji

commits himself to

nothing

more

than the

position that propositions

are what that-clauses

ntroduce.

As we

already

saw,

the orthodox

nterpretation

hares this core analysis

of

propositions.Sorabji also adds a

distinction

between

perceiving-that

and

perceiving-as.42

ccordingly,

one

might

hold

that animals can

per-

ceive, say, somethingas sweet even if one denies thatthey can perceive

that

something s sweet. If

we argue thatthe

impression hat

gives rise to

the

latter sort of perception

corresponds o lekta,

then non-rationalani-

mals cannot

entertain t.

However, it is unclear

what importanceSorabji

places

on this

distinction ince he

concedes that

neitherwe nor the Stoics

neatlydistinguish

n

this

way

between

as and that.43

A

more importantproblem

s that

Sorabji'sattribution f

propositional

contents s far from

restrictive.To

say

that

non-animalsperceive that a is

related o b or that

a is

predicated

f b is

to attribute hugeclass of what

the

Stoics must hold are

impressionsexpressing ekta. If the Stoics

deny

that animals can

entertain he

impressionthat

something

is

white,

it is

hardto see

why they

would

attribute

predicationalmental

contents o ani-

mals or what real

theoretical

advantage

ollows. On what basis is it rea-

39 D.L. 7.

86.

4 Stobaeus 2.

86.

17

-

87. 6. For a

discussion of

Stoic distinctions

among

kinds

of

impulses, see

Brad

Inwood, Ethics

and Human

Action in Early

Stoicism, pp. 224-

242. See also

Julia

Annas,

Hellenistic

Philosophy of

Mind,

pp. 89-102.

41 Richard

Sorabji,

Perceptual

Content

in

the Stoics, p.

307,

Animal

Minds

and

HumanMorals, pp. 12, 17, 21.

42

See Richard

Sorabji,

Perceptual

Content

in the Stoics,

p. 309,

Animal

Minds

and

HumanMorals,

pp. 21-22.

41

Richard

Sorabji,

Animal Minds

and

Human

Morals, p.

22.




15/26

14

GLENN

LESSES

sonable to acceptthat animalscan have, for example,impressions hata

white

thingis to the

left of a blue

thing,

yet not

attribute

o themthe im-

pression

that something

s white?

Frede and other

proponents

of ortho-

doxy are

right to deny

that the Stoics would accept

so generous

a view

since

impressions

with predicational

ontents

also correspondo lekta

and

as such are accessible

only

to rationalanimals.

Finally, there

are also textual

reasonsto

be wary of Sorabji's

reading.

The sources to

which he

appealsoften

might reasonably

be read more

weakly. In particular,

cannot

findany passage

thatsupports

his

position

thatthe contentof the impressionsof non-rational nimalscan, in princi-

ple,

be articulated y

rationalanimals.

For instance,

D.L.

7. 49, one pas-

sage

on which

he

places

much importance,

distinguishes

between

two

mental operations:

i) the

occasion of having

an impression

and (ii) for-

mulating

n wordshow one

is affected hrough

having

it. The text is silent

aboutrational

animalshaving

the

capacity

to verbalize he

impressions

f

non-rational

nes. It is possible

to read

t simply as

asserting hatthe

agent

in

whom the

impression ccurs

has the

abilityto express

ts content.

More-

over,

some

passages

weigh against

Sorabji'spoint.

Consider

part

of Aetius

4. 12. 1, which statesof an impression: [giventhrough ight]we are able

to

say (eipein

ekhomen)

hat

thereexists something

white which moves

us

(hemas);

similarly

or touch or

smell. 44

In this

passage,

an

impression

s

linked to what the

agents

themselves

presented

with an

impression

are

capable

of

verbalizing.

ts contentscan

be

expressedby

the

same

subjects

in whom it occurs. Although

such

passagesindeed

show that the Stoics

distinguish

between what can

potentially

be

expressed

and what actually

is

verbalized,

no mention

s made of one

person's

mpression

being

artic-

ulableby anotheror

of an animal's

perceptual

mpression

being

verbaliz-

able by us. A morenaturaland straightforwardeading hanSorabji's s

availableto us. The Stoicsdo distinguish

betweenwhat

is articulable nd

what actually is articulated.

However,

this point applies

only

to rational

agents

presented

with

an impression.

Although

rational

agents

normally

can

express

the contentof some

of their

impressions,

hey

do not

always

actually

articulate

what these

impressions

convey.

In other

words,

the

Stoics

are sensitive to the difference

between

occurrent

verbalization

nd

I

Aetius

4.

12.

1

is part

of text (5) below.

See RichardSorabji, Perceptual

Content

in the Stoics,

p. 309,

for

his additional

citations.

Sextus M 7.

244 says

of certain

impressions

that it

is

possible

to make

a true

or false assertion

as a result

(the

true,

persuasive

ones, a true assertion,

the

false

persuasive ones,

a false

one).

Sextus

M

8. 70 similarly

says of rational

impressions

that

their content

can be expressed

in

words. See

also

Sextus M

8. 10, D.L. 7.

65, Sextus

M 9.

211.




16/26

CONTENT, CAUSE, AND STOIC

IMPRESSIONS 15

an agent's ability to verbalize.Thus,it is consistentwiththe evidencethat

the Stoics are making

a much

more

obvious

point

in

these passages

than

Sorabjisuggests.

III

The Stoics investigate the initial stages of animaldevelopment n terms

of their

doctrine

of oikeiosis.

In

the

process

that they describe, animals

come to have inclinations o act and

become

aware

of

themselves.45

ni-

mal life is distinguished rom other kinds of living and non-living things

in virtue

of

having impulses(hormai)

and

perception

aisthesis).4

For the

Stoics, perception

s

prior o impulsebecause

animals

must

perceive

hem-

selves

in order

for impulses to occur.47 Such impulses arise as a result

of

impressionswith which animals are presented.48 nimals

perceive them-

selves (aisthanesthai heautou, Hierocles 1, 34-9, 51-7) continuously from

birth (Hierocles

1.

37-50, 3. 52-4. 53, 4. 53-4. 58). Chrysippus states that

an

animal's initial inclination s based on the first

thing for every animal

belonging

to

it

-

its own

constitution sustasis) andthe self-consciousness

(suneidesis) of this (D.L. 7. 85).49 If self-perception

s a species of per-

ception,

then

self-perception

lso

requires he occurrenceof phantasiai.S0

D.L. 7. 85, Cicero Fin. 3.

16.

See Hierocles

1. 30-37, especially, and D.L. 7. 86. Hierocles'

arguments

are

dis-

cussed in Brad

Inwood,

Hierocles:

Theory

and

Argument

in the Second

Century

A.D.,

OxfordStudies in Ancient

Philosophy

2

(1984),

pp. 151-183, and

in A.A.

Long,

Hierocles on

oikeiosis and

self-perception,

Hellenistic

Philosophy,

vol.

1,

ed.

K.J.

Boudouris (International Center for Greek Philosophy and Culture, Athens, 1994),

pp. 93-104.

Long's essay is a

summary of more extended discussion

in

the

edition

of

Hierocles that he together with

Guido Bastianini have completed for the

series

Corpus

dei

Papiri

Filosofici

Greci

e

Latini (CPF) I, vol. 1**

(Florence, 1992).

47

See

Cicero

fin.

3.

16, Seneca Ep. 121. Cicero

actually

refers

to the

desires of

infants

ratherthan

their

impulses. When the Stoics speak

precisely, they typically dis-

tinguish desire

(orexis)

from

impulse

(horme)

and

deny that non-rational animals

including

human young can have

desire, which is a species of

impulse. Stobaeus

2. 86. 20

-

87.

6 indicates

that

orexis is

a kind of rational impulse.

See Brad

Inwood,

Ethics and

Human

Action

in

Early

Stoicism, pp. 225-230, 235-237,

A.A. Long

and

D.N. Sedley, The

Hellenistic

Philosophers, vol. I1, p. 318, note on

Stobaeus 2. 86.

17

-

87. 6, and Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, pp. 91-97.

48

See

Stobaeus

2.

86.

20

-

87.

6,

Origen, Prin.

3. 1. 2-3.

4

He

refers to self-consciousness

in

this

passage,

not

self-perception.

We

have no

sources

of

which

I am

aware where

Chrysippus speaks

explicitly

of

self-perception.

`0

One

way to understand he

continuous

self-perception

to

which

the Stoics

refer




17/26

16

GLENN

LESSES

What s thenatureof the initial mpressions f self-perception? nswer-

ing this

questionwill help determine he extent of the Stoic

attribution f

propositional

ontents.Since theseimpressionsoccur from the

momentof

birth, the

initial

impressionscannot be the

result

of

repeatedexperience.

Stoic

examplesof self-perception ftenrefer to specific animal

body parts

and functions.For

instance,

snails

perceive heir

flesh

and shells

and birds

perceive

their

wings

are

for

flying.5'Self-perception ometimes

s

said

to

involve

perceiving hat something

s

the case but since such

descriptions

are

far

from

typical

we

should exercise caution about

drawing

oo

much

from this evidence.52 he Stoics often seem to be searching or a way of

speakingthat

is less cognitively loadedand appear o

be

reluctant

o

at-

tribute oo muchcognitionto animals and human nfants.53n

any event,

these kinds of

examples

such

as

the bull

perceiving

hat

its

hornsare

for

self-defense

-

appeal

to

later

stages

of

oikeiosis.

But

self-perception

also occurs

during

the

initial

stages

of oikei6sis.

What about

the

original mpressions

hat

arise

in

self-perception

n

the

is that

animals have a steady disposition

to perceive

themselves. It is also

possible

that they

intend to make the stronger

claim that

animals are continuously

perceiving

themselves

occurrently.A.A. Long,

Hierocles

on

oikeiosis

and self-perception,

pp.

93-104, proposes an account

along

these lines of continuous

self-perception n terms

of proprioception,

.e., the notion of

self-monitoring.

51

See Hierocles 1.

51-2. 3, Seneca Ep. 121.

18-20.

52

See

Hierocles 3.

2-6

and Seneca Ep.

121.

21.

S3

For instance, Seneca, in a remark

reminiscent

of Chrysippus, ays that

every ani-

mal is aware

of its constitution or

physical makeup from birth

(Ep. 121. 5-6). Their

awareness

is

the developmental basis

for the other things that

they perceive

(Ep. 121.

12). But he also thinksthat it is a mistaketo take animals or humanyoung to be capa-

ble of explaining their makeup

or defining theirconstitution Ep.

121. 11-13).

Although

non-rational animals are

aware of their ruling part,

they cannot elucidate

or express

what it is (Ep. 121. 13).

Seneca makes

an

analogy

(Ep. 121.

12) between the aware-

ness that adult humans

have

of

their

souls and the awareness of non-rational

animals

of

their

constitution.

Though

we

perceive

our souls, this awarenessdoes not entail

that

we know the soul's nature

or even

its location. Similarly,

when non-rationalanimals

perceive themselves,

the impressions

that occur do

not

include enough information

to define what they perceive

or to

say anything clearly about

it. See also Seneca

Ira

1. 3.

7.

RichardSorabji, Perceptual

Content

in

the

Stoics, p. 312, is,

of

course,

cor-

rect

that

these texts

and similar ones where

the Stoics speak of the vagueness

or

lack

of clarity of the perception of non-rationalanimals underdeterminewhethertheir im-

pressions

are propositional.My point

here

is

simply

that Seneca

marks non-rational

animal perceptual mpressions

as somewhat weaker

than

the

perceptual mpressions

of

rational animals. Though Seneca

does not

say

exactly

what

is

ruled

out,

he

places

restrictions

on what

the initial

impressions

of

self-perception

can

contain.




18/26

CONTENT, AUSE,

AND STOIC MPRESSIONS 17

initial stages of oikei6sis? In the following passage, the Stoics refer to

basic sense impressions:

(5) Chrysippus says

that

these four

things

differ from each other.

Impression, then,

is an experience

(pathos)

which occurs in the soul and

which,

in

[the

pathos]

itself, also indicates that which caused it.

For

example,

when

we observe

some-

thing

white

by means

of

vision,

there is a

pathos

which has occurred n the

soul

by

means

of

vision;

and

this

pathos

we are able to

say

there

exists

something

white which

stimulates

us.

And

similarly

for touch and smell.

Impres-

sion

(phantasia) gets

its

name

from

light (ph6s);

for

just

as

light

reveals itself

and the other thingswhich are encompassedin it, so too impressionreveals itself

and that

which

caused

it. The

impressed thing

is

that which causes the

impres-

sion. For example, the impressed thing is

the white and the cold

and everything

which

is able

to

stimulate the soul. [Aetius

4.

12. 1-3]

In

conjunction

with

(5), consider also another

similar

text,

which

further

helps us to understand nd explain differences

n

mental content:54

(6)

And this

pathos

must

be indicative both of

itself

and of

the

phenomenon

which

produced it, which pathos is not other than the impression. Hence, we say that

an impressionis a pathos of an animal capable of presenting both itself and the

other

thing [i.e.,

its

cause]. For example, Antiochus says,

when we look

at some-

thing

we are

put

into a certain

condition

with

respect

to

sight and

we do

not have

our

sight

in

the

same

condition

as

before

we

looked.

In

this

sort of

alteration,

we

take hold

of

(antilambanometha) wo things, one, the alteration tself, which

is the

impression, and,

the

second,

that which

produced

the

alteration, which

is

the visible thing. And similarly in the case of the other senses. So, just as light

(phos)

reveals

both

itself and

everything

in

it, in

this

way the impression too,

which is the beginning of the animal's cognitive functions, like light, must make

apparentboth

itself

and the clear thing which is indicative of what produced it.

[Sextus,

M

7.

161-163]

Neither

of

these passagesprimarily oncerns he kinds of examplesof self-

perceptionprovidedby Hierocles such as the bull's awarenessof its own

horns

for

self-defense.The accountshere are general descriptionsof any

impressionof sense. In addition, ext (6) speaks of the impressionsas the

source of

any cognition,

which

strongly suggests that these descriptions

pertain

o

the

earliest

stages

of

oikeiosis.

First,

a

preliminaryquestion must be addressed. Do these passages

apply

to

both non-rational

nd rationalanimals?55 here is no reason to

I

The

language of (6) is so similar to

(5) that we should suppose that

Antiochus is

speaking

in

his

Stoicizing mode and that

the passage genuinely reflects Stoic

doctrine.

S5 This question is raised

by

Jean-Louis

Labarrire, De la 'nature

phantastique'

des




19/26

18 GLENN LESSES

think that these texts are restricted o a discussionof the beginningsof

cognition n rationalanimals. 5) speaksgenerallyof the

notionof impres-

sion and gives an account of its etymology. If these

sources mean to

include the impressionsof human newborns, hen they

are likely also to

refer to the impressionsof any non-rational nimal.

Furthermore,ext (6)

refers

very

broadly o the impressionsof an animal (to

z6on). Even more

significant s that in (6) we discoverthat impressionsare related to the

beginnings

of

an animal's cognitive functions. Thus, we should con-

clude that our sourceshere describe heoretical eatures

haredby impres-

sions generally.

An examinationof these generalfeaturesproduces

a relativelycircum-

scribed

notion of propositionalcontents.

First

of all,

we are told that

impressions

of

this sort

reveal

their causes.

The

Stoics

do not say that an

impressionhas featureswhich copy the characteristics

f its cause.As an

example, sight

is

said

to

perceive

the

white,

which

is

identified

as

the

cause of the

impression.

There

is

no

indication hat

the

perception

of

the

white includes the impression hat something

s

white. According o (5),

the white,the cause of

the

impression,

s

the

impressedhing (phantaston)

and is indicated n the impressiontself. Recall thatin text (4) Cicerodis-

tinguishes between what

the

senses perceive

-

whiteness

-

and

what

is

actuallyperceivedby

the

mind,

not the senses

-

the

proposition

hat

some-

thing

is white. There

are

puzzles

about this

passage

to which we

will

return hortly,but

for

the

moment

at least it

is

reasonable

o

suggest

that

the

sense-impression

as

the

impressed hing, viz.,

the

white,

as

part

of its

contents

but does

not

have the

proposition

hat

something

s white as

part.

Passages (5) and (6) also stipulate

hat a

sensory mpression

s

capable

of

conveying

some

additionalcontent

for

we

are told

that

the

sense

impres-

sion reveals itself. Thus, provisionallywe can say thatsense impression

of

white

includes

the

following

contents:

(i)

the

white,

which

indicates

the cause

of

the

impression,

and

(ii)

the

occurrent

mpression i.e.,

of

the

white) itself. At this point,we do

not

have

to

commit ourselves

to

speci-

fying

that

these mental contents

are

propositional

n

form. But it

is

clear

that

the

proposition

hat

something

s

white

goes beyond

the

ascription

f

these

modest

contents.

According o (5), the impression

of

white

is

then

the basis

of

our

say-

ing that there xists something

white.

The

Stoics

are cautious

here

about

animaux

chez les Stoiciens,

pp. 238-243,

though in

the context of whether

animals

have any

self-consciousness.

As

a result, he

never directly

poses the question

about

the cases

of

self-perception

on

which

we

focus.




20/26

CONTENT, CAUSE,

AND

STOIC

IMPRESSIONS

19

the source of thatpropositionalnformation. s the propositionhatsome-

thing white

exists

alreadycontained

n

the impression?

f it

is, then

it

is

tempting o conclude

that

non-rational

minds

are

incapableof discerning

all the contents already contained

in

the impression.

But

an alternative

reading

is also

possible.

It must

be

conceded that

the

evidence underde-

termineseither interpretation, owever, the second reading

is

preferable

for

the

sake

of

consistency

with

our

earlier

analysis

of

(5)

and

(6).

These

sources

are

fairly specific

about

what

narrowcontentsare contained

gen-

erally

in

impressions.

n

addition,

4) tells

us

that rationalanimals bring

other mentaloperations nto play which affect their impressions.On the

preferredreading, a

rational mind

contributes

some

new

information,

which expresses

the

proposition

hat something s white, to the contents

of

the

originalsense-impression.56 propositional

mental

state

of

this

sort

might

well

be broadlydescribedas inferential.

A

rationalanimal

is

capa-

ble

of

inferring hat, e.g.,

if

a

white

thing

causes

my impression,

hen

it

is

the case that something

s

white.For the Stoics, any inferenceabout

the

cause

of

the impressionof whiteness

requiresan ability of which non-

rationalminds are incapable.

Even in the well-knownChrysippeanxam-

ple, the dog employing disjunctive syllogism is only said to simulate

reasoning.57One might plausibly

hold that inferential

reasoning,

how-

ever minimaland

automatic

he

inference,

requires

other

operations

of

the

mind besides perception.

Let

us

return o

text (4),

which

makes

some

distinction

about

content.58

The

senses are said

to

perceive

hings such as whiteness.Yet, Ciceroholds

that

the

senses

perceive only

in

a

way propositional laims

such

as that

something

s

white.

It is

not

altogetherobvious

how

to

unpack

this pas-

sage.59

f

we

read Cicero

rather

iterally here,

he

distinguishes

between

56

Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind,

pp. 82-84, discusses

a

parallel set

of interpretations or

kataleptic vs. non-kataleptic mpressions in rational animals.

S7

Sextus,

PH

1.

69

states

that

the

dog

in

effect

(dunamei)

is

reasoning.

Richard

Sorabji, Perceptual

Content in the

Stoics, p. 313,

takes this instance of

simulated

reasoning

to

be more

or

less a legitimate case of

reasoning.

58

I

am making a weaker point here than Frede, who

argues that

text

(4)

rules

out

the possibility of

non-rational mpressions having

content at

all.

59

We saw that

the passage, according to Sorabji,

PerceptualContent

in

the Stoics,

p. 311, commits

the Stoics to impressions having propositional form. He proposes

that

if

the senses

can

perceive in a way that

something

is

the

case

then

in a

way

such impressions can

have propositional form. He states that to be propositional n

a

way

when

the senses perceive that, say, this is

white

can

be understood as the

senses

present

a

non-verbalized appearanceas of

something's being

white.




21/26

20 GLENN LESSES

what the senses can perceiveonly in a way and what the mind- here,

referring to mental operations

in the hegemonikonother than

sense-

perception

perceives fully. Perception nvolves

assent so that in each

instance the

mind assents to what is presented.

On the orthodox view,

thereis simplyless

to

assent

to in the case of what is presented

only to

the senses.

There also appears o be a reading

consistentwith

Sorabji's

interpretation

f

what the mind contributes s an

articulation f the con-

tent that is already present

in the original impressionof sense.

Let me

suggesta thirdpossibility.If animal

minds areincapableof making

nfer-

ences fromwhat they do in fact perceive,thenCicero'sremarks hat the

mind

alone securesthat, say,

this

is white

appliesonly

to

rational

animals.

The senses of

rationalanimalsalone can grasp

in a way that something

is

white because

they alone can draw inferences

based on their

sensa-

tions.

Frede's orthodox

interpretation

s mistakenin

supposing

that

(4)

supports

he view that animals

perceivesonly qualities.

Sorabji'salterna-

tive is also incorrectbecause

non-rational

mpressions

are not the

issue

here.

The context

of

Acad.

2.

21

shows that

the

impressions

being con-

sidered

are

only those

of rational

animals. So Cicero's

discussion

applies

only to impressionsof rationalanimalsand has little to do with impres-

sions

of

sense

generally.Y0

In

texts (5)

and (6), we saw that the impressions

of

sense are

said to

reveal their causes.

In

the case of an impression

of

whiteness,

the cause

of

the impression

s

the

white,

which

is

the impressed hing (phantaston).

Thepassagesspeak

of

thewhite

to leukon)

or the

visible

(to horaton),

which could

refer,

of course,

either to the quality

of an object

or

to an

object

itself.

But

we do not need

to commitourselves to

either

alterna-

tive and so

will speakjust of qualities n

what follows. Additionally,

he

claim that the impression'scause, the white, is revealedmightbe taken

in two

ways.

First,

one

might hold

that

the

impression

reveals some-

thing, which,

as

it

happens,caused

it. In the case

of the

impression

of

a

white thing,what gets revealed

s just whiteness.

If

all

the

Stoics

mean

is

that

the perceiver

sees

whiteness,

then

nothing

more

is

contained

n

the

impression

han the rudimentary

erceptionof a quality, whiteness.

This

readingof the texts is consistent

with the orthodox interpretation.

ut,

according o

a

second possibleinterpretation,

hat

gets

revealed

when an

impression

eveals

its

cause

is

considerably

more content-laden.

he

white

is revealedas the cause of the impression.So, when these passage

Lesses 1998. Content, Cause, And Stoic Impressions

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Transcript of Lesses 1998. Content, Cause, And Stoic Impressions