Legislatures Ch13

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Ch. 13 Legislatures Presidential systems, like the one in the United States, have

a powerful chief executive who is elected separately from the legislature and

cannot be easily ousted, a "separation of powers." Parliamentary systems, like

the one in Britain, on the other hand, have the national legislature elect a prime

minister from its own ranks, a "fusion of powers." Parliaments can recall prime

ministers with a "vote of no-confidence," which usually happens when the

governing coalition has fallen apart. Federal systems need an upper house, like

/ the U.S. Senate, but unitary systems can be unicameral, although many are still

bicameral. In theory, legislatures formulate laws, but in practice they take their

cues from the executive and deliver "pork" to their constituencies. Supervision

and criticism of the executive is now perhaps their most useful function. Leg-

islatures have, perhaps unfortunately, declined in importance as executives

have grown.

Ch. 14 Executives and Bureaucracies The u .s . presidential system frequently

suffers from "deadlock," and parliamentary systems suffer from "immobilism."

These issues are normal for democracies; only authoritarian systems eliminate

executive-legislative difficulties, as Putin has done in Russia. Prime ministers

have tended to "presidentialize" themselves by gathering more power. Some

American scholars fear an overstrong president, one who prevails by projecting

a friendly personality. Within the executive branch power has been flowing to

bureaucrats because they are the only ones who understand complex situations

and policies. Japan's bureaucrats virtually rule the country. No political system

has succeeded in controlling its bureaucracy.

Ch. 15 Judiciaries Law plays an especially strong role in the U.S. system, which

makes the judiciary an equal branch; this isnot the case inmost countries. Common

law systems, like the one in the United States, feature "judge-made l~w" that

changes over time. Code law systems, like those ofEurope, feature relatively fixed

formulas, some ofthem tracing back to ancient Rome. Likewise the Anglo-American

accusatory and adversarial system is quite different from European inquisitorial

systems. Few other countries have a Supreme Court as important or interesting as

the American one,which decides issues related to the constitution, a power it gave

itself with Marbury v. Madison. The political impact of the Warren Court was

especially strong and controversial; it changed civil rights, criminal procedure, and

legislative districts.



L E G i s l A T U R E S

rI

.r: th e banks of the Thames in London, Westminster, mother of Parliaments, represents the slow, gradual march to

--ocracy over many centuries. (British Department of the Environment, Transport, and the Regions)



Political institutions, it is theorized, become

more specialized, complex, and differen-

tiated as they become more modern. Primi-

tive extended families had nothing more than

a single leader who decided most things.

Tribes added councils to debate major prob-

lems and adjudicate disputes. City-states such

asAthens had assemblies that combined leg-.I

islative, executive, and judicial functions. TheRoman senate combined several roles, and its

powers declined as Rome went from republic

to empire. In the Middle Ages, the prevailing<

feudal system was a balance among a

m.onarch,nobles, and leading churchmen, and

it is in feudalism that we first glimpse the

"balance of power."

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

1. How did parliaments first come

to be?

2. What is the difference betweenpresidential and parliamentary

systems?

3. Why does the U.S. Congress

overspend?

4. What is executive-legislative

"deadlock"?

5. What good is a bicameral legis-

lature in a unitary system?

6. Do legislatures originate the laws

they pass?

7. Isthe" pork barrel" necessary for

the system to work?

8. Have legislatures declined in

importance? Why?

Countries with limits on government have usually had feudal pasts, which

teach that dispersion of power is good and concentration of power is bad.

Countries with mostly absolutist traditions, such as China, have trouble found-

ing democracies. An example of this balancing of power is the oath the nobles of

medieval Aragon (in northeast Spain) pledged to a new king, "We, who are

as good as you, swear to you, who are no better than we, to accept you as our

king and sovereign lord provided you observe all our statutes and laws; and if

not, no."

Ambitious monarchs, who were often at war, desperately needed r.~venues.

Some of them started calling assemblies of notables to levy taxes. In return for

their "power of the purse," these assemblies got a modest input into royal poli-

cies. Such were the beginnings of the British Parliament, which had two houses

(Lords for peers and church leaders and Commons for knights and burghers),

and the Swedish Riksdag, which originally had four chambers (for nobles, cler-

ics, burghers, and farmers). The French Estates General, with three houses (for

nobles, clerics, and commoners), got off to a weak start and was soon forgotten

as French monarchs gathered more and more personal power in what became

known as absolutism.



In Britain, Sweden, and some other European coun-

tries, though, legislatures slowly grew in power and

were able to resist monarchs' absolutist demands.

In Britain in the sixteenth century, Henry VIII, who

broke with Rome over a divorce, developed a partner-

ship with Parliament because he needed its support in

passing laws to break England away from the RomanCatholic Church. By the seventeenth century, Parlia-

ment considered itself coequal with the monarch and

even supreme in the area of taxes. The English Civil

War was a quarrel between royalists and parliamen-

tarians over who had top power. In 1649, Parliament

decided the issue by trying and beheading Charles 1.

John Locke, the English philosopher who lived

through this momentous period, extolled the power

of the "legislative" as the most basic and important.

During the Age of Enlightenment in the eighteenthcentury, Montesquieu (see page 237)declared that liberty

could be secured only if government were divided into

two distinct branches, the legislative and the executive,

with the ability to check and balance the other. Modem

governments still have these two branches, but only in

the United States do they check and balance each other.

Theoretically, at least, the legislature enacts-Jaws that

allocate values for society, and the executive branch enforces the statutes passed by

the legislature. (A coequal judicial branch is rare; it is a U.S. invention found in few

other systems.) But these responsibilities often overlap, and the separation of powers

is rarely clear-cut.

2~4 CHAPTER 1~ LEGis lATURES

feudalism Systemof politicalpower dispersedamong layers.

parliament Nationallegislature;when capitalized,BritishParliament,specificallyHouseof Commons.

Riksdag Sweden'sparliament.Estates General Old,unusedFrenchparliament.

absolutism Pos~feudalconcentra-tion of power inmonarch.

presidential systems Thosewith separate electionofexecutive(asopposed to symbolic)president.

president InU.S.-type,systems,hechief politicalofficial;inmanyother

systems,a symbolicofficial.

parliamentary systems Thosewithelectionof parliamentonly,whichiriturn electsthe primeminister.

prime minister Chiefpoliticalofficialin parliamentarysystems.

PRESidENTiAL ANd PARliAMENTARY SYSTEMS

I'

Presidential systems most clearly show the separation of power between the exec-

utive and legislative branches. These systems, a minority of the world's governments,

have a president who combines the offices of head of state witlu:[email protected]'lernmept.

He or she is elected more or less directly by the people (In the United States, the

quaint Electoral College mediates between the people and the actual election), isinvested with considerable powers, and cannot be easily ousted by the legislature.

In parliamentary systems, the head of state (figurehead monarch or weak president)

is an office distinct from the chief of government (prime minister, premier, or

chancellor). In this system, the prime minister is the important figure.

Notice that in parliamentary systems voters elect only a legislature (see

Figure 13.1);they cannot split their tickets between the legislature and executive. The

legislature then elects an executive from its own ranks. If the electoral system is

based on proportional representation (see Chapter 4), there will likely be several



PRESidENTiAL ANd PARliAMENTARY SYSTEMS 2 ~5

A Parliamentary System

elects and ousts

elect

Voters

A Presidential System

,(

elect

elect

Voters

guides

F i G U R E 1 ~ . 1

Parl ia m entary versus pre side ntia l syste m s.

Ministries

President

chooses

Cabinet

Ministries

or

Departments

parties in parliament. If no one party has a majority of

seats, two or more parties must form a coalition.

Whether one party or several, a majority of parliament

must support the cabinet; if not, it "falls." Usually a

monarch (as in Britain and Spain) or weak president (as

in Germany or Israel) "asks"-there's no real choice in

the matter-the head of the largest party to become

prime minister and "form a government." Cabinet and

government, used interchangeably, are what Americans

call an administration (the Brown government but the

Obama administration). The prime minister, after con-

sulting with the parties likely to support him or her,

names a team ofministers for the cabinet who are them-

selves members of the parliament. These ministers then

guide the various ministries or departments ofgovernment that form the executive

branch. The prime minister and cabinet are "responsible" (in the original sense of

coalition Multiparty alliance toform a government.

fall In parliamentary system, a

cabinet is voted out or resigns.

cabinet Top executives who head

major ministries ~ Sdepartments.

government In Europe, a givencabinet, equivalent to U.S.

"administration. "

administration Executives appoint-

ed by U.S. president, equivalent toEuropean" government."



the word, "answerable") to the parliament. (Prior to

democratization in the nineteenth century, ministers

were responsible only to the monarch.)

Presidents in presidential systems are not r~spon-

sible to legislatures. The close connection between the

legislative and executive branches is broken. Presidents are elected on their own and

choose cabinet ministers or department secretaries from outside the legislature.In the United States, of course, top executive and judicial officers must be confirmed

by the Sepate. The two branches of government cannot control, dissolve, or oust the

other, as happens in parliamentary systems. This gives presidential systems great

stability. Presidents may be unpopular and face a hostile Congress, but they can

still govern with the constitutional and statutory powers they already have.

2 ~6 C H A PT E R 1~ LE G isL A T U R E S

separation of powersL.egislati'{e

and executive branches checkinq and

balancing each other.

S E P A R A T IO N A N D F U S IO N O F P O W E R S

The United States takes great pride in its separation of powers, the famous "checks

,and balances" that the Founding Fathers insisted on. Having just won independencefrom George III and his executive dictatorship, they set one branch of government as

a check against the power of another. It was a clever arrangement and has preserved

America from tyranny. But it is slow and cumbersome, what political scientist Edward

S. Corwin called an "invitation to struggle" between the executive and legislative

branches. The two branches often stymie each other. Congress can fail to pass some-

thing the president wants, and the president can veto something Congress wants.

Some scholars think such an executive-legislative deadlock (see page 254) is common

for the U.S. presidential system.

Important questions, such as economic policy and tax reform, can get stuck

for years between the two branches of government. The president cannot dissolveCongress and hold new elections, which are set by the calendar. Congress cannot oust

/'

_Q!: CO~CEPIS:- ----,...-- --.

HEAD OF STATEVERSUS CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT

Two terms that sound almost alike often con-

fuse students, A head of state is theoretically

the top leader but often has only symbolicduties, such as the queen of England or king

of Sweden, These monarchs represent their na-

tions by receiving foreign ambassadors and giv-

ing restrained speeches on patriotic occasions,

In republics, their analogues are presidents,

some of whom are also little more than figure-

heads, The republics of Germany, Hungary, and

Israel, for example, have presidents as heads of

state, but they do little in the way of practical

politics, (They are also not well known, Can you

name them?)The chief of government is the real working

executive, called prime minister, premier, or chan-

cellor, They typically also head their parties, run

election campaigns, and guide government In

Br.itain, this is Prime Minister Gordon Brown, in

Germany Chancellor Angela Merkel. The United

Statescombines the two offices, for our president

is both head of state and head of government



a president except by the impeachment procedure. Only

two presidents, Andrew Johnson and Bill Clinton, have

ever been impeached, and the Senate did not convict

either of them. Richard Nixon resigned before the

House of Representatives could vote to impeach him.

The disputes between the Bush administration and aDemocrat-dominated Congress after 2006 are standard

in U.S. history. Some prefer this sort of "divided

government" because it holds down spending and foolish policies.

West Europeans consider the American system inefficient and unintelligible, and

they actually have more modem systems that evolved after the U.S. Constitution was

devised. Their parliamentary systems have a fusion of power that does not set the

branches against each other. In fact, it's hard to distinguish between legislative and

executive branches, for the top executives are themselves usually members of parlia-

ment. In the British, German, Japanese, and Dutch systems, prime ministers must

be elected to parliament, just like ordinary legislators, before they can become chief

of government. As leaders of the biggest parties, they are formally called on (by themonarch or figurehead president) to form a government. The individuals forming

this government or cabinet have both their seats in parliament and offices in the

executive departments. They report back often to parliament. At any time, about a

hundred British MPs (members of Parliament) also serve in the executive ministries

and departments. Legislators are also executives. The cabinet, in effect, is a commit-

tee of parliament sent over to supervise the administration of the executive ministries.

When Britain's parliament is in session, the cabinet members show up to answer

questions from their fellow MPs. Britain's House of Commons holds a Question

Hour most afternoons. The members of the two main parties sit facing each

other across an aisle on, respectively, the "government benches" and "opposition

benches." The front bench of the former is reserved for cabinet ministers, the front

PRESidENTiAL ANd PARliAMENTARY SYSTEMS 2} 7

, fusion of power Executive as an

offshoot of the legislature.

MP Britishmember of Parliament.namely, the House of Commons.

opposition Those parties in parlia-

ment not supporting the government.

C:LAssic~o~ks~ _

WHERE DID THE U _ S _ SYSTEM ORIGINATE?

The U .S . system of checks and balances origi-

nated with a French nobleman, the Baron de

Montesquieu (1689-1755), who traveled all overEurope to gather material for one of the classics

of political science, The Spirit of the Laws. In

trouble with the king of France, Montesquieu

spent some years in England and admired its

liberties, which he thought came from the

mutual balancing of the king (the executive) and

Parliament (the legislative). The French par-

liament, the Estates General, was unused for

generations; French kings ran everything on an

absolutist basis. ~

Actually, by the time Montesquieu wroteabout English checks and balances, they had

been overturned, and Parliament was supreme

over king. Montesquieu was describing an ide-

alized version of the English mixed monarchy

that had slid into the past. The U .S . Founding

Fathers, however, read Montesquieu literallyand

attempted to construct his theory of checks and

balances. Fewother countries have done this.



2 ~8 C H A P T E R 1~ L E G isl A T U R E s

backbencher Ordinary member

of par l iament w ith no lea der ship or

execu ti ve res ponsib il ities .

National Assembly L ower , more

important chamber of Fre nchpar l iament.

Bundestag L ower, more im port an t

ch amber of G erman parl iament.

bicameral P ar liaril .fnt having tw o

ch ambers, upper and lower.

unicameral P ar liam ent w ith one

chamber.

Bundesrat Uppe r, wea ker chamberof G erman parliam ent.

bench of the latter for the opposition's "shadow

cabinet," the MP s who would become m iniste rs if their

party were to w in the nex t election. M P s w ith no ex ec-

u ti ve responsibi l i ties s it behind the cabinets and are

called backbenchers. M ost ques tions to the prim e' m in-

ister and his or her cabinet come from the opposition

benches-fi rs t written questions and then ora l foll ow -ups. T he answer s ar e cr iticiz ed, and the oppositi on tries

to embarras s th e government w ith an eye to w inning

th e next election. M ost par liam entary systems oper ate

in a sim ilar fashion.

In the u.s. system , w ith i ts separation of power s,

committees of the S enate or H ouse can summon

cabinet members an d other officials of the executive

branch to com mittee hea ri ngs. But appearing before a

KEY Co CERTS::....- --.

BICAMERAL OR UNICAMERAL?

S ome two-thirds of parliam ents in th e worl d

have two ch ambers, an upper house (the U .S .

S en ate , B ri tis h H ouse of L ord s, F rench S enat ,

G erman Bundesrat) plus a lower house (th e U .S .

H ouse of R epresentat ives, B ritish H ouse of C om -

mons, French National Assembly, or G erman

Bundestag). T hese are called bicameral (two

chambers) leg is latu res. Des pite i ts name, th e

upper house usual ly has much les s power than

the lower house. T ypica ll y,i f the upper house ob-

je cts to something passed by the lower house,

th e lower house can overr ide th e upper house's

obje cti ons, often by a simple majori ty. Only th e

two houses of the U .S . C o ngress are coeq ual and

must pass identical ly worded versions of a b il l.

A smalle r number of parliaments are

unicameral (o ne chamber), such as C hin a's Na-

t ional Peoples C on gress, Sweden's R iksdag, andIsrael 's Knesset. Yugoslavia once experimented

w it h a fi ve-chambered parl iament. S ou th A frica

had a curi ous an d short-lived three-ch ambered

parliam ent w ith one house each fo r whites ,

m ixed -ra ce peoples, an d E ast In dians. T he ma-

jori ty blac k populat ion was unrepres ented.

(S ince 1994, S ou th A fri ca has had a bicameral

parl iament w ith a bla ck majo ri ty .)

T he re as on for tw o chambers is clea r in fed eral

system s (s ee C hapter 4). T he upper house re pre-

sents the component parts , and th e lower house

represents d istri cts bas ed on popu lation. T his was

th e great comprom ise incorporated in the U .S .

C onstitu tion: T he S enate represented the sta tes

and the H ouse the people. A fe deral system re -

qu ires an upper chamber. G ermany's Bundesrat,

for example, re pre sents the 1 6 Lander and is

co equal to th e lower house on consti tu tional

ques tions. On other issues, however, it can be

overridden by the Bundes tag .

T he u til i ty of an upper hou se in unitary system s

is unclea r. B ri tain 's H ouse of L ord s-ref ormed in

1999 by kee ping life peers and excluding most

hereditary pee rs-i s sti ll m os tl y an el derl y d ebat-

in g society that sometimes catches erro rs in law s

passed too qu ickly and obediently by C ommons.Otherw ise, the C ommons overrides any objec ti on

from the H ouse of L ord s w ith a simple majori ty

vote . T his is al so tru e of the French S enat, an in-

dir ec tly el ecte d body th at l arg ely expres ses farm -

in g inte rests . N ew Zeal anders , Dan es , and

Swedes -al l w ith unita ry system s-co nclu ded

th at their upper houses served no purpose an d

abolished them in recen t dec ades .



committee is not the same as a grilling before the

entire legislative body. The president, of course, as

equal to and separate from Congress, cannot be called

to testify.

PRESidENTiAL ANd PARLiAMENTARY SYSTEMS 2} 9

The Finnish parliament is unicameral-with no upper chamber-and consists of 200

seats arrayed in a semicircle, the standard layout for parliaments. Also standard are the

buttons on each member's desk to register his or her vote, which is then electronically

tabulated and displayed instantly. (MichaelG. Roskin)

Lords Upper, weaker chamber of

British parliament.

life peer Distinguished Briton

named to House of Lords for his or

her life, not hereditary.

• A D V A N T A G E S O F PA R L I A M E N TA R Y S Y S T E M S

There are several advantages to a parliamentary system. The executive-legislative

deadlock, which happens frequently in the American system, cannot occur because

both the executive and legislative branches are governed by the same party. If the

British Conservative Party wins a majority of the seats in the House of Commons,

the leaders of the party are automatically the country's executives. When the

Conservative cabinet drafts a new law, it is sent to the House of Commons to bepassed, which is rarely difficult or delayed because the Conservative MPs obey the

party's leaders.

If members of the governing party disagree with their own leaders in the cab-

inet, they can withdraw their support and vote "no confidence" in the government.

This is rare. The government then falls and must be replaced by a new leadership

team that commands the support of a majority of the House of Commons. If a new

election gives the opposition party the numerical edge in parliament, the cabinet

resigns and is replaced by the leaders of the newly victorious party. Either way,



there cannot bea l ong disagreement between executive

and legislative branches; they are fused into one.

The prime minister and cabinet can be speedily

ousted in parliamentary systems.Any important vote in

parliament can be designated a vote of confidence.

If the prime minister loses-a "vote ofno confidence"-

the cabinet falls. There is no agony of impendingimpeachment of the sort that paralyzed Washington

under Presidents Nixon and Clinton. A new prime

minister and cabinet are voted in immediately. If the

government makes a major policy blunder, parliament

can get rid of the cabinet without waiting for its term to

expire. When Americans become unhappy with presi-

dents' policies, there is little the system can do to

remove them from the White House early.Parliamentary systems do not get stuck

with unpopular prime ministers.

Parliamentary systems have other difficulties, however. First, because

members ofparliament-supervised by their parties' whips-generally obey their

party leaders, votes in parliament can be closely predicted. The parties support-

ing the government vote for any bill the cabinet has drafted. Parties opposing

the government vote against it. Floor speeches and corridor persuasion have no

impact; the legislators vote the way their party instructs. MPs in such systems

have lost their independence, and their parliaments have become little more

than rubber stamps for the cabinet. The passage of legislation is more rational,

speedy, and efficient,but parliament cannot "talk back" to the executive or make

independent inputs. This makes European parliaments rather dull and less

important than Capitol Hill in Washington, where legislators often oppose

the president, even of their own party. Many European legislators are jealous

of the independence and separate resources that American representatives and

senators enjoy.

Second, depending on the party system and electoral system, parliamentary

democracies often have many parties, with no single party controlling a majority

of seats in parliament. This means the largest party must form a coalition with

smaller parties to command more than half the seats. In Canada's 2006elections,

Conservatives emerged as the largest party (125 out of 308 seats) but lacked a

majority of seats or coalition partners. The Conservatives formed a minority

government that depended on occasional support from other parties in key votes,

an unstable situation.In parliamentary systems, the head of the largest party becomes prime

minister, and the head of the second largest party becomes foreign minister. Other

cabinet positions, or portfolios, are assigned by bargaining. Italy and Israel are

examples of coalition governments, and they illustrate what can go wrong:

The coalition partners quarrel over policy, and one or more parties withdraws

from the coalition, bringing it below the required majority ill parliament. The

government then falls for lack of parliamentary support, with or without a formal

vote ofno confidence. This leads to instab.ili1.y-Jr.e_quenLcabinethan~.Jill<iloss-

240 CHAPTER 1~ LEG i s lATURES

vote of confidence Vote in parlia-ment to support or oust governm'ent.

whip Legislator who instructs

other party members when and how

to vote.

Capitol HillHome of US Congress.

(Note t.he spelling: -01.)

minority government Cabinet

lacking firm major'.jJ:yn parliament.

portfolio Minister's assigned

ministry.



WHAT LEG islATURES Do 241

0 £ .. . ecutive authority. Italy, for example, has had some sixty governments sinceWorld War II. ------..

This is not as bad as it sounds-remember, the" government" simply means

"cabinet" -and the cabinets are often put back together again after bargaining

among the same coalition partners. The trouble is that prime ministers must con-

centrate on not letting the coalition fall apart, and thus they hesitate to launch newpolicies that might alienate one of the member parties. Theproblem here is not one

of too much change but of too little: the same parties in the same coalitions getting

stuck over the same issues. Immobil ism (seeChapter 11),the inability to decide major

questions, is the danger ofmultiparty parliamentary systems. Notice how this par-

allels the problem of dead lock in presidential systems.

Not all parliamentary systems, to be sure, suffer from immobilism. In Britain,

the largest party has a majority of seats and governs alone. Some coalition cabinets,

as in Sweden, are cohesive and effective because their parties are in general agree-

ment. German and British governments have fallen on votes of no confidence only

once each since World'War II. In general, the more parties in a coalition, the less

stable it is. Israel's multiparty cabinet is often immobilized.

WHAT L EG i s l A TURE S Do

Consider the old high-school civics question: How does a bill become law? They

may have told you that individual members introduce proposals, but they usual-

ly cover small matters, such as getting a tax break for a constituent. Most important

bills originate in the government or administration. Typically,an executive agency

develops an idea, the cabinet drafts a proposal, and the largest party introduces it

to the legislature, which then debates and modifies it.

T H E C O M M IT IE E S Y S T E M

J Much power in modern legislatures resides in their committees, which can make

or break proposals. Democratic parliaments often hold public hearings to get expert

testimony and input from interest groups. If the bill is reported favorably out of

committee, it goes to "the floor," the full chamber, where it needs a majority vote

to pass. .

Virtually every legislature has a number of standing or permanent-commit-

tees and may from time to time create special ad hoc committees to study urgentmatters. The British House of Commons has five standing committees plus sev-

eral specialized committees. These committees are less important than their U.S.

counterparts, for the fusion of powers of the British system means that Parliament

is not' supposed to criticize or reject bills the cabinet has submitted. It may,

however, modify them. With separation of powers, the committees of the U.S.

Congress are most fully developed. The House of Representatives has 27stand-

ing committees-the Senate, 21-and they often make the news. Assignment to

the more prestigious of these committees, such as the House Ways and Means



Committee or Armed Services Committee, can help careers, for they give

members media exposure.

U'S. congressional committees screen the thousands of bills that are intro-

duced at every session and pick out the few that merit serious consideration.

A government bill in a parliamentary system is automatically important; "private

members' bills" may be quickly weeded out in committee. Second, legislatures

are so large that bills cannot be drafted by the entire membership; to work outan agreement on the precise wording and scope of legislation, proposals must be

referredto committees. The bulk of legislative work is not performed on the floor

but in cOmmittee rooms.

In the United States, each committee has several specialized subcommit-

tees; the two houses have a total of about 250 subcommittees. Changes in the

1970sweakened the sometimes tyrannical powers of committee chairpersons

by making it easier to establish subcommittees. Chairpersons are now weaker

than they used to be, but now subcommittees and their chairpersons have

decentralized and fragmented power too much, weakening Congress as an

institution. A cure for one problem produced new problems, the story of manypolitical reforms.

These same reforms of the 1970s broke the power of appointment of the

senior House and Senate leaders of both parties. Committee chairs and mem-

bership were generally assigned on the basis of seniority. Now, when the pa-rties

caucus at the beginning of a session in each house, members vote for committee

chairpersons by secret ballot, effectively breaking the seniority system. Party

committees in each house make committee assignments and usually try to take

members' interests and expertise into account. On the Hill, specialization is the

name of the game. The larger committees, such as the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee, may have a dozen subcommittees. Capitol Hill is now more open

and democratic than it used to be, but this has not enhanced its power vis-a-vis

the executive branch.

Standing committees in the U.S. Congress are balanced to represent both •

politicalparties and the states or geographic regions with the greatest interest in the

committee's work. ANebraskan is often on the Agricultural Committee and a New

Yorkeron the Education and Labor Committee. Each standing committee is bipar-

tisan, made up of Democrats and Republicans in proportion to each party's seats.

242 CHAPTER 1~ LEG i slATURES

A C L O S E R L O O K A T L E G IS L A T U R E S

The main purpose of legislative bodies, in theory, is to formulate laws. This, how-

ever, varies among political systems and is generally in decline. Ideally, legislatures

initiate laws, propose constitutional amendments, ratify treaties, control tax rev-

enues, and scrutinize government activities. In authoritarian systems, however,

legislatures are for show.

Lawmaking Although legislatures pass laws, few of them origin ate laws-which

is why we must take their "rule-initiation function" with a grain of salt. As we



noted, much legislation originates in government ,pork barrel Government projects

departments and agencies. In parliamentary systems, aimed at legislators' constituencies,

especially where one party has a majority of seats, also called earmarks.

the cabinet gets what it wants. Party discipline makes. I II' L' I t II. .. og ro mg egis a ors mutua y

sure that members of the rulmg parties will automat- supporting each other to get pork-

ically vote the way party leaders instruct. Votes in such barrel bills passed.

legislatures are highly predictable along party lines; -------------

some observers say such parliaments have become

rubber stamps for the executive.

In the U.S. Congress;where party discipline is more lax, members sometimes

buck their own party. But even here much of the legislative agenda is set by the

White House: economic initiatives, wars, and expanding or cutting programs. Even

the budget, the original "power of the purse" that gave legislatures their impor-

tance, is now an annual congressional reaction to the budget produced by the

White House budget office. Typically, Congress takes the president's budget, adds

its own pork spending, and passes it. Accordingly, "lawmaking" is not the only, or

perhaps even the most important, thing that legislatures do.

WHAT L E G islA T U R ES Do 24}

K~y- Co CE-pJ.S --.

PORK .....ARREL POLITICS

','

Legislators everywhere ensure their reelection

by looking after their districts. Projects that

bring improvements to or spend money intheir district are called pork barrel, after the

gifts of plantation owners to their slaves of a

barrel of pickled pork parts. Under the politer

label "earmarks," these programs include

b!.ghways, b!!dges, flood contro!, milita[Y.co -

...1@cts,and farm subsidies. The U.S. pork bar-

rel takes second place to the Japanese, whose

legislators are famous for delivering massive

(and often unneeded) public-works projects

to their districts and shielding farmers from

competition.Individual legislators support others' ear-

marks so their projects will get support, a

process called log rolling: "You help rollmy log,

and I'll help roll yours." Republicans long

denounced Democratic pork but could not resist

itwhen they had control of Congress. Legislators

do whatever gets them reelected, and that usu-

ally means earmarks. If the United States and

Japan wish to reduce their pork intake, they will

have to break the close connection between

elected representatives and home districts. Butthis connection is precisely what these democ-

racies prize. Would you want a system in which

congresspersons are distant and uncaring about

their districts?

Besides, much good and important legisla-

tion would not pass if leaders could not use

pork as inducements to vote for it. Every U.s.

federal budget includes thousands of earmarks,

little bribes to every state and congressional dis-

trict to get legislators to support the White

HOUS8c budget. Even Republicans use pork toget things done. Earmarks are only about

0.5 percent of the U.S. federal budget, so no

much could be saved by eliminating them. Re-

turning to a theme of Chapter 1, do not qe:

angry at a fact like earmarks; instead, a naly ze

it. Why does it exist? What functions does _

serve? You may find that it is built into the _ ~

tem and cannot be fixed.



Constituency Work Legislatorsspend much time helping

constituents. Most have staffs to answer letters, make

sure people get their government checks, and generally

show that the elected representatives really care. Often

"lawmakers" are so busy with constituency casework

that they pay little attention to making laws. In effect,

elected representatives have partly transformed them-selves into ombudsmen, specialists who intervene with

government on behalf ofpeople with complaints. (Stan-

dard complaint: "Where's my check?")Is there anything

wrong with this? Is it not a perfectly valid and necessary

role for legislators to play? It is,but something gets lost:

the wider view that a representative should have in looking out for the good of the

whole country. A legislator immersed in constituency casework has no time for or

interest in bigger questions, so the initiative goes more and more to the executive

branch, and democracy grows a little weaker.

Constituency service ismainly how representatives keep getting reelected.Theyare in a position to do favors. They frequently visit their home districts to listen to

local problems and arrange for government help, something an out-of-office chal-

lenger cannot do. Thus,legislators in systems as different as the United States and

Japan can lock themselves into power.

244 CHAPTER 1~ LEG i s lATURES

constituency casework Attention

legislators pay to complaints of

people who elect them.

ombudsman Swedish for "agent";

lawyer employed by parliament to

help citizens wronged by government.

Question Hour Time reserved in

Commons for opposition to challengecabinet.

Supervision and Criticism of Government Potentially the most important role of

modern legislatures is keeping a sharp and critical eye on the executive branch.

Even if they originate little legislation, parliaments can powerfully affect the work

of government by monitoring government activity tomake sure it is in the nation's

interest, incorrupt, and effective.In Britain, the Question Hour allows members ofParliament to grill ministers,

sometimes with devastating results. Even if the British cabinet knows that it is

almost immune to a vote of no confidence-because it-controls the majority of

Commons-its members must answer questions carefully. A bad, unconvincing

answer or lie can hurt the ruling party in the next election.

Virtually every U.S. administration must modify its policies because Congress

raises difficult and sometimes embarrassing questions, even though it may pass

little legislation on these matters. Members ofboth parties on Capitol Hill criticized

the Bush administration for failing to anticipate terrorism, for saying Iraq had

dangerous weapons, and for mistakes in Iraq. No Child Left Behind and seniors'

drug benefits also caught Hill criticism. The Bush administration had to change its

policies because of congressional criticism. Keeping the government on its toes is

one of the best things a legislature can do, even if it passes few laws.

Education Legislatures also inform and instruct the citizenry on the affairs of

government; they create mass demands by calling public attention to problems.

In the mid-1960s, Senator J.William Fulbright (D-Ark.), chair of the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee, educated Americans about the Vietnam War by televising



W HAT LEG islA T UR ES Do 245

his committee's hearings. Democratic control of Con-

gress now allows Congress to hold critical hearings on

the Afghan War. All democratic countries carry exten-

sive press reports on parliamentary debate, and many

now televise them.

apartheid System of strict racialsegregation formerly practiced inSouth Africa.

longitudinal Studying how some-thing changes over time.

Representation The most elemental function of a legis-

lature is to represent people. Although legislators are elites, most legislators in democ-

racies consider the interests of their constituents; it gets them reelected. Even in the

U.S. South, now that African Americans are voting in considerable numbers, mem-

bers of Congress take care not to offend them. A large part of representation is

psychological; people need to feel they are represented. When they do not, they resent

government power, and the government loses legitimacy. "No taxation without rep-

resentation," chanted American colonials. The apartheid laws of South Africa, passed

by a whites-only legislature, evoked no support and much disobedience from the

black majority. Because of this, the apartheid system cracked.

The foregoing are some of the roles performed by legislatures. Notice that only

one of them is lawmaking, and that is usually just a follow-up on ideas initiated

by bureaucrats and executives. Still, if legislatures carry out the other functions

mentioned, they are doing a lot.

I:IOlli IO .

CONDUCT A LONGITUDINAL STUDY

One good way to study something isto see how

it changes over time, a longitudinal study. For

example, suppose you want to see if interest

groups headquartered in Washington have

grown in number. You could find a reliable sec-

ondary source (perhaps Common Cause) that

keeps track of these things. You might also

count the numbers of "National" and" Associ-

ations" in D.C. phone books over several years.

Then you would listthe numbers, probably with

most recent first, looking something like this:

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

1,827

1,779

1,654

1,628

1,607

1,592

For a longer-range study, you might take

every fifth or tenth year over many decades or

a century. Other longitudinal studies might take

a closer look at the behavior of one or several

interest groups, campaign spending, laws initi-

ated by Congress, or presidential votes by

states. You may be able to display such num-

bers graphically, which helps readability. (See

pages 262-263.) .

Not all longitudinal studies n~ed to be quan-

tified. Some do not lend themselves to num-bers. A longitudinal study of Senator J . William

Fulbright, for example, might use quotes and

paraphrases from his speeches and writings

to show how he changed over time, from

supporting the administration on foreign affairs

to opposing it over the Vietnam War.



246 CI-IAPTER 1~ LEGislATURES

T J iE D E C l iN E O f L E G is lA T U R E S

Bythe late nineteenth century, observers were noticing that parliaments were not

working the way they were supposed to. Contrary to Locke's expectations, legis-

latures were losing power to the executive. Most political scientists would agree

that the trend has continued and grown. Some, however, hold that the original

Lockean expectations were too high and that parliaments provide useful checkson

the executive even though they do not originate much legislation. For better or

worse.sa high-tech age has shifted power away from legislatures .

. t : S TR U C TU R AL D IS A DV AN TA G ES

In parliamentary systems, party discipline is strong, and legislators obey party

whips. In European parliaments we can usually predict within a vote or two how

the issue will be decided: in favor of the government, because the government (or

cabinet) commands a majority of seats. In such systems, individual members dolittle and there is no special excitement in the press and public about parliamen-

tary affairs. Only when coalitions break up or when members of one party defect

to another do things get unpredictable and therefore interesting. The European

parliaments really are more rational and efficient than the U.S.Congress, but they

are also less powerful and less interesting. Efficiencyhas led to atrophy.

The U.S.Capitol Hill has no such problem with efficiency.Its near-feudal dis-

persion of power with weak party discipline and its tendency to deadlock with

the executive has made it most inefficient. But this is why Congress is lively and

important. In few other countries can the national legislature as a whole "talk

back" to the executive and even override a presidential veto. On occasion, mem-

bers change parties to show their displeasure. Nevertheless, even in the United

States power has drifted to the executive. The president speaks with one voice,

Congress with many. Congress is fragmented into committees and subcommit-

tees-with chairpersons vying for media attention-and this delays and often

prevents agreement. Congress expects and even demands presidential leadership

and usually gives presidents most of what they want after some controversy

and debate.

-(" ' L A C K O F E X P E R T IS E

Few legislators are experts on technical, military, economic, or social problems.

Of the 535 senators and representatives in both houses of Congress, nearly half

are lawyers. European parliaments have fewer lawyers and more schoolteach-

ers, journalists, and full-time party people. But hardly anywhere are technical

experts elected to legislatures, and few legislators are professionally equipped

to deal with such matters as intelligence estimates, medical care, reckless

lending, and environmental pollution. Accordingly, legislators must rely chiefly



TH E DE cliNE of L EG islA TU RES 247

on experts from the executive departments. Muchaggregate Thing or population

legislation originates with these specialists, and they considered as a whole.

are often called as witnesses to committee hearings.

The ensuing legislation usually grants these executive

specialists considerable discretion in applying the law.

Most parliaments have little or nothing in the way of independent research

support; their data come either from the government or from private interest

groups. Only the U.S. Congress-again, based on the idea of separation of pow-

ers-can generate its own data. The Government Accountability Office (GAO,

formerly the General Accounting Office), Congressional Research Service (CRS),

and Congressional Budget Office (CBO) are all part of the legislative branch. They

provide independent evaluations and data to lessen Congress's dependence on the

executive. No other legislature in the world has a fraction of this research capa-

bility, which still cannot counterbalance the massive information advantage of

the executive branch..I

udiES~ ~

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSPENDING

The tendency of most legislatures to overspend

is built into their situation. Inthe abstract, they

are all for a balanced budget. When it comes

to their pet interests-usually linked to getting

reelected-they like spending increases. New

bridges and highways, military hardware, and

farm subsidies often directly benefit their con-

stituents (see box on "Pork-Barrel Politics" on

page 243). ~:umQ.e.r

-MeEiifam-shmll!sthey hear the cries of senior

citizens.. Rationally, individual self-interests

drive the system as a whole to overspend,

allegedly something nobody wants. What's

good for the individual is not necessarily good

for the aggregate.

At various times, the U.S.Congress tries to re-strain itself.In 1985, Congress attempted to hand

the power to limitspending to an appointed con-

gressional official. The Supreme Court threw it

out as unconstitutional. Congress then attempt-

ed to hand the power to the White House

with the 1996 "line-item" veto, a major shift in

power from the legislative to the executive. The

Supreme Court threw it out; the Constitution

does not permit the veto of part of a bill. Itwas

almost as if Congress said, "We give up; we're

too divided. Sohere, Mr.President you take over

our constitutional duties." The astonishing thing

about the U.S. Congress, the last Mohican of

independent parliaments, is that it wants to sur-

render power to the executive.

The Republicans who took over both hous-

es in 1994 were determined to end deficits

(see page 302) by setting "spending caps."

The caps were evaded almost immediately, but

an economic boom provided unforeseen tax

revenues and budget surpluses by the turn of

the millennium. Quickly, the limits were for-

gotten as both Republicans and Democrats putforward their pet spending projects. With the

end of the boom, the 2001 tax cut, and the

mammoth financial bailouts of 2008 and

2009, revenues shrank and deficits soared. As

the baby boom generation retires, spending

will only go up. Is Congress inherently unable

to balance the budget?



TH E DEcliNE of L EG islA TU RES 249

go. If bills were up for grabs, some excitement and tension would return to floor

debate, and members would have an interest and incentive to show up and

participate. The trade-off would be that the passage of legislation would be more

chaotic and unpredictable.

L A C K O F T U R N O V E R '

In democraticparliaments, members tend tobecome career,lifetimelegislators.Once

elected, they usually get reelected as long as they wish to serve. This means little

fresh, young blood enters parliament with new ideas, and on average parliamen-

tarians are rather old, in their fifties.InU.S.House contests, more than 90percent of

incumbents win. Incumbency brings terrific advantages: gerrymandered districts,

name recognition, favors done for constituents, media coverage, and plentiful cam-

paign funds from PACs and interest groups. Unless representatives are tarred by

scandal, they almost cannot lose.Challengers are so discouraged that several dozen

House incumbents run unopposed. Inmany other contests, opposition is only token.

Whywaste time and money in a hopeless race?

What happens to democracy when elected representatives stay until death

or retirement? It loses some of its ability to innovate and respond to new cur-

rents in public opinion. It gets stodgy. The Founding Fathers made the House

term deliberately short, just two years, to let fresh views wash into the cham-

ber. Alexander Hamilton described the frequent elections to the House in this

way: "Here, sir, the people govern. Here they act by their immediate represen-

tatives." He could not imagine that turnover is actually higher in the Senate, a

chamber that was designed to be insulated from mass passions. All this raised

the question of limits on congressional terms, which some promised but few

practiced. Once in power, they discover they are the only ones who can servetheir constituents.

Parliamentary systems have similar problems. Few legislators are replaced by

elections and most consider their membership in parliament a career. In propor-

tional representation systems, the more senior party people are higher up on the

party list, ensuring their election. Youngnewcomers may be entered at the bottom

of their party lists with scant chance of winning. However, PR systems do have

the advantage of letting new, small parties into parliament with fresh faces and

new ideas. In the 1980s,the Greens (ecologyparties) entered several WestEuropean

parliaments, forcing the big, established parties to pay attention to envirolJ(llental

problems. "

T H E D IL EM M A O F P AR LIA M EN TS

What Russia has gone through recently illustrates the dilemma of parliaments. In

the 1990sRussia experienced a deadlock between President Boris Yeltsinand the

Russian legislature, the Duma. Toget things done, power must be concentrated in

the hands of a powerful executive. To keep things democratic, however, power

must be dispersed, that is, divided between an executive and a legislature. Russia



250 CHAPTER 1~ LEGi s lATURES

urgently needed vast reforms-the economy teetered on the brink of collapse-but

the Duma, dominated by Communists and nationalists who opposed Yeltsin,

disputed and blocked reforms. Putin solved the problem by founding his own party,

which now controls two-thirds of the Duma's seats. Putin owns parliament, but

Russia is no longer a democracy.

Even in the United States, Congress works as intended only when dominated

by the party opposed to the president, what is called" divided government," some-

thing many voters prefer. Locke was right: Parliaments are the foundation of democ-

racy,¥B~tworldwide their functions have atrophied and power is flowing to chief

executives,

MS

absolutism (p. 234)

administration (p. 23S)aggregate (p. 247)

apartheid (p. 24S)

backbencher (p. 238)

bicameral(p.238)

Bundesrat (p. 238)

Bundestag (p. 238)

cabinet (p. 23S)

Capitol Hill (p. 240)

coalition (p. 23S)

constituency casework

(p.244)

Estates General (p. 234)

fall (p. 23S)

feudalism (p. 234)

E

fusion of power (p. 237)

government (p. 23S)life peer (p. 239)

log rolling (p. 243)

longitudinal (p. 24S)

Lords (p. 239)

minority government

(p.240)

MP (p. 237)

National Assembly (p. 238)

ombudsman (p. 244)

opposition (p. 237)

parliament (p. 234)

parliamentary systems

(p.234)

Brady,W.David, and Craig Volden. Revo lvin g

Grid lock: Po li tics and Po licy from Jimmy

Carter to George W.Bush, 2nd ed. Boulder,

CO: Westview, 200S.

Copeland, Gary W., and Samuel C. Patter-

son, eds. Parli aments in the Modern World :

Changin g Insti tutions. Ann Arbor, MI:

University of Michigan Press, 1994.

Deering, Christopher J ., and Steven S. Smith.

Comm itt ees in Congress, 3rd ed. Washington,

DC: CQ Press, 1997.

pork barrel (p. 243)

portfolio (p. 240)president (p. 234)

presidential systems

(p.234)

prime minister (p. 234)

Question Hour (p. 244)

Riksdag (p. 234)

separation of powers

(p.236)

unicameral (p. 238)

vote of confidence

(p.240)

whip (p. 240)

/

Dodd, Lawrence c., and Bruce 1. Oppen-

heimer, eds. Congre ss R ec on sid ere d , 9th ed.

Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2008.

Hayes, Michael T., and Lou Frey [r., eds.

Inside the House : Former M embers Reve a l

How Congress Rea ll y W orks. Lanham, MD:

University Press of America, 200l.

King, Anthony. Running Scared : Why America 's

Po litic ia ns Campa ign Too Much and Govern

T oo L itt le . New York: Free Press, 1997.



Laver, Michael, and Norman Schofield.

Mult ip arty Government: The Po litic s o f

Coa lition in Europe . New York: Oxford

University Press, 1990.

Lijphart, Arend, ed. Parli amenta ry versus

Presidentia l Gove rnmen t. New York:

Oxford University Press, 1992.Mann, Thomas E., and Norman J. Oren-

stein. The Bro ken Branch: How Congress Is

Fa iling Americ a and How to Get It Back on

Track . New York: Oxford University

Press, 2006.

.I

FURTHER REfERENCE 25 1

Mayhew, David R. Congre ss : The E lec tora l

Connec ti on , 2nd ed. New Haven, CT:Yale

University Press, 2004.

Polsby, Nelson W. How Congress Evo lves:

Socia l Base s o f Inst itu ti ona l Cha nge . New

York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Suleiman, Ezra N., ed. Parli aments and Par-liamen tarians in D emocra tic Po litic s. New

York: Holmes &Meier, 1986.

Wolfensberger, Donald R. Congress and th e Peo -

ple : D elib erative Democ racq on Tria l.Baltimore,

MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000.

Legislatures Ch13

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