Legislative (Not Mine - 25-32)

7/31/2019 Legislative (Not Mine - 25-32)

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GARCIA VS. MATA65 SCRA 517, 1975

FACTS:

Petitioner was a reserve officer on active duty with the AFP until his reversion toinactive status pursuant to the provisions of RA No. 2332. Petitioner filed acomplaint for mandamus and recovery of a sum of money, to compel the former toreinstate him in the active commissioned service of the AFP, to readjust his rank, andto pay all the emoluments and allowances due to him from the time of his reversionto inactive status.

Petitioner anchored his claim to reinstatement at paragraph 11 of the SpecialProvisions for the AFP in RA 1600 which was the Appropriation Act for the fiscalyear 1956-57 as reads:

THAT RESERVE OFFICERS WITH AT LEAST 10 YEARS OFACCUMULATED COMMISSIONED SERVICE WHO ARE STILL ON ACTIVEDUTY AT THE TIME OF THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT SHALL NOT BEREVERTED TO INACTIVE STATUS EXCEPT FOR CAUSE AFTER PROPERCOURT-MARTIAL PROCEEDINGS OR UPON THEIR REQUEST.

Respondent Judge Mata, declared paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions for the AFPin RA No. 1600 which was the Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1956-57unconstitutional and therefore invalid and inoperative.

ISSUE: Is the provision valid?

HELD:

The SC held that the said provision used by the petitioner as a basis was a RIDERbecause the Constitution provides that no provision or enactment shall be embracedin the general appropriations bill UNLESS it relates specifically to some particularappropriation therein (Art. VI, Section 25(2)).

RA 1600 appropriated money for the operation of the Government for the fiscal year1956-1957, the said paragraph 11 refers to the fundamental governmental policymatters of the calling to active duty and the reversion to inactive status of reserveofficers in the AFP. It clearly shows that the paragraph in question does not relate tothe appropriation.

DEMETRIA VS. ALBA148 SCRA 208, 1987

FACTS:

Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD No. 1177 states that the Pres ident shall have theauthority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus,offices and agencies of the Executive department, which are included in the GeneralAppropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau oroffice in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.

ISSUE: Is the provision valid?

HELD:

No. The court said that such was unconstitutional as it empowers the President toindiscriminately transfer funds from one department to any program, project, oractivity of any departments without regard as to whether or not the funds to betransferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken.

The purpose and conditions for which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e.transfer may be allowed (1) for the purpose of augmenting an item and (2) suchtransfer may be made only if there are savings from another item in the appropriationof the government branch or constitutional body.

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS. ENRIQUEZ1994

FACTS:

The General Appropriation Bill of 1994 was passed and approved by both Houses of Congress. It presented the bill to the president for the exercise of his veto power.

One of the special provisions vetoed by the President is with respect to therealignment of operating expenses. Each member of Congress is allotted for his ownoperating expenditures a proportionate share of the appropriation for the house whichhe belongs. If he does not spend for one item of expense, the questioned provisionallows him to transfer his allocation in said item of expense. Petitioners assail thespecial provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocations foroperational expenses to any other expense categorically claiming that this practice isprohibited by Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution. They argue that the

Senate President and Speaker of the House, not the individual member of Congress,are the ones authorized to realign the savings as appropriated.


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Another special provision vetoed by the President i s on the appropriation for debtservice. It provides Use of fu nds. The appropriation authorized therein shall be usedfor payment of principal and interest of foregoing and domestic indebtedness;provided that any payment in excess of the amount therein appropriated shall besubject to the approval of the President with the concurrence of the Congress of thePhilippines; provided further, that in no case shall this fund be used to pay for theliabilities of the Central Bank of Liquidators.

Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the special provision on theappropriations for debt service without vetoing the entire amount of P86B for saidpurpose.

In the appropriation for the AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund, the President vetoed thenew provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augmentpension and gratuity funds. According to the President, the grant retirement andseparation benefits should be covered by direct appropriation specially approved forthe purpose pursuant to Section 29 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover,he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in

Section 25 of Article VI of the Constitution. On the contrary, petitioners claim thatsaid provision is a condition or limitation, which is intertwined with the item of appropriation that it could not be separated therefrom.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners contentions are tenable.

HELD:

Petitioners contentions are without merit. Under the special provisions applicable tothe Congress of the Philippines, the members of the Congress only determine thenecessity of the realignment of the savings in the allotment for their operatingexpenses. They are in the best position to do so because they are the one who knowwhether there are savings available in some items and whether there are deficienciesin other items of their operating expenses that need augmentation. However, it is theSenate President and the Speaker of the House as the case may be who shall approvethe realignment. Before giving their stamp of approval, those two officials will haveto see to it that: (1) the funds to be aligned or transferred are actually savings in theitems of expenditures from which the same are to be taken and (2) the transfer onrealignment is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditure to which saidtransfer or realignment is to be made.

It is readily apparent that the special provision applicable to the appropriation for

debt service insofar as it refers to funds in excess of the amount appropriated in the

bill, is an inappropriate provision referring to the funds other than P8 6Bappropriated in the GAAA of 1994.

The veto power while exercised by the President is actually a part of the legislativeprocess. Hence, found in Article VI rather than Article VII.

As the constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in anappropriation bill must "relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein"and "be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates," it followsthat any provision which does not relate to any particular item or which it extends inits operation beyond an item of appropriation is considered an inappropriateprovision which can be vetoed separately from an item. Also to be included in thecategory of inappropriate provision are unconstitutional provisions and provisionswhich are intended to amend other laws because clearly those kinds of laws have noplace in an appropriation bill. These are matters of general legislation moreappropriately dealt with in separate enactments.

Doctrine of inappropriate legislations : The legislature cannot by location of a billgive it immunity from executive veto. Nor can it circumvent the Governor's vetopower over substantive legislation by artfully drafting general law measures so thatthey appear to be true conditions or limitations on an item of appropriation. When thelegislature inserts inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation bill, such

provisions must be treated as "items" for purposes of the Governor's item veto power over general appropriation bills.

Veto of the revolving funds of SUCs : Petitioners claim that the President acted withgrave abuse of discretion when he disallowed by his veto the "use of income" and thecreation of "revolving fund" by the Western Visayas State University and Leyte StateColleges when he allowed other government offices, like the National Stud Farm, to

use their income for their operating expenses (Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, pp. 15-16).

There was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said special provisionswhile allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some governmentagencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund for thatpurpose, it is because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before byvirtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the "one-fundpolicy"

Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance : The second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 brings to fore the

divergence in policy of Congress and the President. While Congress expressly laiddown the condition that only 30% of the total appropriation for road maintenance


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should be contracted out, the President, on the basis of a comprehensive study,believed that contracting out road maintenance projects at an option of 70% wouldbe more efficient, economical and practical.

The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be thesubject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on theother hand, it specified how the said item shall be expended 70% byadministrative and 30% by contract.

The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special provisions,conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately fromthe items to which they relate so long as they are "appropriate" in the budgetarysense (Art. VII, Sec. 25[2]).

Veto of provision on purchase of medicines by AFP : The Special Provision whichrequires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly comply with theformulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an"appropriate" provision. it is a mere advertence by Congress to the fact that t here isan existing law, the Generics Act of 1988, that r equires "the extensive use of drugswith generic names through a rational system of procurement and distribution." ThePresident believes that it is more prudent to provide for a transition period for thesmooth implementation of the law in the case of purchases by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as implied by Section 11 (Education Drive) of the law itself. Thisbelief, however, cannot justify his veto of the provision on the purchase of medicinesby the AFP.

Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment :The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the "Use of Fund" for the AFPmodernization program that the President must submit all purchases of military

equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the "congressional orlegislative veto." By way of definition, a congressional veto is a means whereby thelegislature can block or modify administrative action taken under a statute. It is aform of legislative control in the implementation of particular executive actions. Theform may be either negative, that is requiring disapproval of the executive action, oraffirmative, requiring approval of the executive action. This device represents asignificant attempt by Congress to move from oversight of the executive to sharedadministration

Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiringlegislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and

substantive bill. Therefore, being "inappropriate" provisions, Special Provisions Nos.2 and 3 were properly vetoed.

Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds : The SpecialProvision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pensionfund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation BenefitsSystem is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.

Under Section 25(5), no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, and under Section 29(1), no money shall be paid out of the Treasuryexcept in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. While Section 25(5) allows asan exception the realignment of savings to augment items in the generalappropriations law for the executive branch, such right must and can be exercisedonly by the President pursuant to a specific law

Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGUs : Impoundment refers to a refusal bythe President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It isthe failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type.

The proponents insist that a faithful execution of the laws requires that the Presidentdesist from implementing the law if doing so would prejudice public interest. Anexample given is when through efficient and prudent management of a project,substantial savings are made. In such a case, it is sheer folly to expect the Presidentto spend the entire amount budgeted in the law

We do not find anything in the language used in the challenged Special Provisionthat would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer orreduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehiclefor such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another lawconsidering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there areexisting laws on the creation of the CAFGU's to be amended. Again we state: a

provision in an appropriations act cannot be used to repeal or amend other laws, inthis case, P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758.

Condition on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc.: The conditions objectedto by petitioners are mere reminders that the implementation of the items on whichthe said conditions were imposed, should be done in accordance with existing laws,regulations or policies. They did not add anything to what was already in place at thetime of the approval of the GAA of 1994.

There is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures shall besubject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be

determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. The issuance of administrativeguidelines on the use of public funds authorized by Congress is simply an exercise


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by the President of his constitutional duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed.Under the Faithful Execution Clause , the President has the power to take"necessary and proper steps" to carry into execution the law. These steps are the onesto be embodied in the guidelines.

The President vetoed the entire paragraph one of the Special Provision of the item ondebt service, including the provisions that the appropriation authorized in said item"shall be used for payment of the principal and interest of foreign and domesticindebtedness" and that "in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators." These provisions are germane to and have adirect connection with the item on debt service. Inherent in the power of appropriation is the power to specify how the money shall be spent. The saidprovisos, being appropriate provisions, cannot be vetoed separately. Hence the itemveto of said provisions is void.

The SC is sustaining the veto of the Special Provision of the item on debt service canonly be with respect to the proviso therein requiring that any payment in excess of the amount therein, appropriated shall be the subject to the approval of the President

of the Philippines with the concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines.

SECTION 26

PHILCONSA VS. GIMENEZ1965

FACTS:

The Supreme Court was called upon in to decide the grave and fundamental problemof th e constitutionality of RA 3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuityand commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives and tothe elective officials of both houses (of Congress).

The constitutionality of the law is assailed on the ground that the provision for theretirement of the members and certain officers of Congress is not expressed in thetitle of the bill, in violation of the Constitution.

ISSUE: W/N RA 3836 violates the Constitutional provision that every bill passed by

the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the titlethereof.

HELD:

YES. Under RA 3836, amending CA 186, as amended by RA Nos. 660 and 3096,the retirement benefits are granted to members of the GSIS who have rendered atleast twenty years of service regardless of age. This provision is related and germaneto the subject of CA 186. On the other hand, the succeeding paragraph of RA 3836refers to members of Congress and to elective officers thereof who are not membersof the GSIS. To provide retirement benefits, therefore, for these officials wouldrelate to subject matter, not germane to CA 186.

TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD

FACTS:

PD NO 1987 is entitled An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board.Section 10 thereof imposes a 30% tax on gross receipts on video transactions. Thepetitioner argued that such tax impose is a RIDER and the same is not germane to

the subject matter thereof.

ISSUE: Is section 10 a RIDER?

HELD:

NO. The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the titleis satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects related to thegeneral purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. Such is the case here. Taxation issufficiently related to the regulation of the video industry.

The provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for theaccomplishment of, the general object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of thevideo industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in it s title.

The Supreme Court thus provided the following standards whether or not a provisionis embraced in the title:

seeks to achieve.

lated and germane to the subject matterexpressed in the title.

or foreign to the general subject to the title.


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such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the generalobject.

le legislative power

PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. PRADO

FACTS:

The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented bythe Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 9228. These measureswithdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, theRegional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, andthe Land Registration Commission and its Register of Deeds, along with certain

other government offices.

The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functionsas judges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The National LandRegistration Authority has taken common cause with them insofar as its ownactivities, such as the sending of requisite notices in registration cases, a ffect judicialproceedings. On its motion, it has been allowed to intervene.

The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the ground that i ts titleembraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7354 violates the Constitution for it was alleged toembraces more than one subject and does not express its purpose.

HELD:

NO. The franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficientand effective postal service system. Court ruled that, by virtue of its nature as arepealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of thesaid law.

The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as

comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if

the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisionsof the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there issufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.

To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the generalobjectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonablebut would actually render legislation impossible.

TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE

FACTS:

The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods andproperties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties sold, barteredor exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services.

Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system andenhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.

It was challenged for alleged constitutional infirmities (defects), among others:

It is claimed that the conference committee included provisions not found in eitherthe House Bill or the Senate Bill that these provisions were stealthily inserted bythe conference committee.

ISSUE: Whether or not there are constitutional defects in RA 7716, since theconference committee included provisions not found in either the House Bill or theSenate Bill.

HELD:

A third version of the bill may result from the conference committee, which isconsidered may result from the conference committee, which is considered anamendment in the nature of a substitute the only requirement being that the thirdversion be germane to the subject of the House and Senate bills.

As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emergency out of a ConferenceCommittee, it has been explained:

Under congressional rules of procedure, conference committees are not expected tomake any material change in the measure at i ssue, either by deleting provisions to


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which both houses have already agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this is adifficult provision to enforce. Note the problem when one house amends a proposaloriginating in either house by striking out everything following the enacting clauseand substituting provisions which make it an entirely new bill. The versions are nowaltogether different, permitting a conference committee to draft essentially a newbill.

The result is a third version, which is considered an "amendment in the nature of asubstitute," the only requirement for which being that the third version be germane tothe subject of the House and Senate bills.

TAN VS. DEL ROSARIO

FACTS:

Petitioner contends that Republic Act No. 7496 is a misnomer or, at least deficientf0r being merely entitled "Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For Self

Employed and Professionals Engaged in the practice of their Profession". It is thepetitioner's view that the said law should be considered as having now adopted agross income scheme, instead of having still deductions from gross income of singleproprietorships and professionals in the computation of their, taxable net income,petitioner argued that this violated the requirement for uniformity in taxation and dueprocess because single proprietorship and professional were taxed differently fromcorporations and partnerships.

ISSUE:

WON RA No. 7496 is in violation of Art. VI Sec. 26 and 28 of the 1987

Constitution.

HELD:

On the basis of the language of the said questioned law, it would be difficult toaccept the petitioner's view that the amendatory should be considered as now havingadopted a gross income, instead of as having still retained the net income, taxationscheme. The allowance of deductible items may have been significantly reduced bythe questioned law in comparison with that which has prevailed prior to theamendment, limiting, however, allowable deductions from gross income is neitherdiscordant with nor opposed to, the net income tax concept.

Art. VI Sec. 26 (I) of the Constitution has been envisioned so as (a) to preventlogrolling legislation intended to unite the members of the legislature who favoranyone of the unrelated subjects in support of the whole act; (b) to avoid surprise oreven fraud upon the legislature and (c) to fairly apprise the people, through suchpublications of its proceedings are as usually made, of the subjects of legislations.The above objective of the fundamental law appears to have sufficiently met.Anything else would be to require a virtual compendium of the law which could

have been the intendment of the constitutional mandate.The contention of the petitioner that RA No. 7496 desecrates the constitutionalrequirement that taxation shall be uniform and equitable is of no merit. Thecontention clearly forgets that such a system of taxation has long been the prevailingrule even prior to RA 7496.

Uniformity of Taxation merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxationsimilarly situated are to be treated both in privileges and liabilities. Uniform does norforefend classification as long as 1.) The standards that are used therefore aresubstantial and not arbitrary. 2.) The categorization is germane to achieve legislative

purpose. 3.) The law applies all things being equal, to both present and futureconditions, and 4.) The classification applies equally well to all those belonging tothe same class. Shifting the income taxation of individuals to the schedules system,this makes the income tax depend on the kind of taxable income, and maintaining forcorporations the global treatment which treats in common all kinds of taxableincome of the taxpayer.

TOBIAS VS. ABALOS

FACTS:

Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute Republic Act No. 7675, themunicipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislativedistrict. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of thislegislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675.Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held to asked thepeople whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyonginto a highly urbanized city as provided in the statute. The turnout at the plebiscitewas only 14.41% of the voting population where 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in

effect.


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Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specificallyArticle VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of threespecific provisions of the Constitution. First, that it contravenes the "one subject-onebill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to wit:

Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject whichshall be expressed in the title thereof.

Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject lawresulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressionaldistrict of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.

Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the Constitution. Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyonginto separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resultedin an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond thatprovided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitionerscontend that said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that thesubject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. Andfinally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 7675 is unconstitutional.

HELD:

No.Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional districtfor Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of itsconversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its

conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An ActConverting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated underSection 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district forMandaluyong.

Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has beeninvariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, inSumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutionalrequirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given apractical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with

such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions aregermane to that general subject."

The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been furtherelucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:

Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of anenactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the

contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purposeof the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested inthe subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of theproposed law and its operation" (emphasis supplied).

Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues, alleging that there is no mention inthe assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had eachattained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separationinto two legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through theregular congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislativedistricts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislaturemust contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws.

As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision,Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 membersis not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representativesshall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided bylaw." The inescapable import of the latter clause i s that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislativeenactment.

As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effec t preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurdsince petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted,deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof.Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.

ABAKADA


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- Clearly, the legislature may delegate to executive officers or bodies thepower to determine certain facts or conditions, or the happening of contingencies, onwhich the operation of a statute is, by its terms, made to depend, but the legislaturemust prescribe sufficient standards, policies or limitations on their authority Therationale for this is that the preliminary ascertainment of facts as basis for theenactment of legislation is not of itself a legislative function, but is simply ancillaryto legislation.

- It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcementand administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislaturehas made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon aspecified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12%rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive

- it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12%rate upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a dutywhich cannot be evaded by the President. Inasmuch as the law specifically uses theword shall, the exercise of discretion by the President does not come into play. It is aclear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the speci fied conditions arepresent. The time of taking into effect of the 12% VAT rate is based on thehappening of a certain specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certainfacts or conditions by a person or body other than the legislature itself.\

- In the present case, in making his recommendation to the President on theexistence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as thealter ego of the President or even her subordinate. In such instance, he is not subjectto the power of control and direction of the President. He is acting as the agent of thelegislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressedwill is to take effect.[56] The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by

which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that hepossesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broaderperspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statisticaldata and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid outby Congress is present. His personality in such instance is in reality but a projectionof that of Congress. Thus, being the agent of Congress and not of the President, thePresident cannot alter or modify or nullify, or set aside the findings of the Secretaryof Finance and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.

SECTION 27

GONZALES VS. MACARAIG191 SCRA 452

FACTS:

The veto of a particular section in the 1989 appropriations act was assailed for being

unconstitutional on grounds that the president may not veto provisions with regard toappropriation bills and if the president vetoes a provision in an appropriation bill thatthe entire bill should be vetoed. Further, item-veto power does not carry with it thepower to strike out conditions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the power to veto provisions with regard toappropriation bills.

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court held the following:

The President can veto an item or items in an appropriations bill BUT nothing lessthan an item or items.

o Item an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose that a distinct andseverable part of a bill maybe subject to a different veto.

Therefore, regard to the petitioners contention that if a provision in anappropriations bill is vetoed the entire bill must be vetoed cannot be sustained. Thesaid power to veto provisions has been carried over the previous constitutions andhas now been understood as broadened to include the item or items to which theprovision relates.

In relation still to veto of provisions, the principle that distinct and severable parts of a bill maybe the subject to a different veto is founded on Art. 6, Section 25(2)wherein provisions are limited to its operation to the appropriation to which itrelatesa distinct and severable part subject to a different veto. Therefore it doesntmean that if the president vetoes a provision in an appropriations bill hell need toveto the entire bill.

Besides, the said provisions are inappropriate in the first place because the provisionsshould relate to a particular appropriation in the general appropriations bill.


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That said sections of the appropriation bill cannot be subject to veto if such are madeto be conditions on the expenditure of funds cannot be sustained because suchconditions inappropriate. Restrictions or conditions in an appropriation bill mustexhibit a connection with money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditures. Said sections were in fact general law measures, there was nonecessary connection with the schedule of expenditures.

That in any case, the sections mentioned contravene the Constitution as it takes awaythe power of the President to augment any item in the appropriations law of theirrespective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations,since a statute has already authorized such power.

BENGZON VS. DRILON

208 SCRA 133, 1992

FACTS:

The case involved the General Appropriations Act of 1992. The law appropriated

500M Pesos For general fund adjustment fo r operational and special requirementsas indicated hereunder. Among the several authorized uses of the fund was theadjustment of pension of justices as authorized by an earlier law. The Presidentvetoed the use of such fund for the adjustment of the pension of justices.

The funds pertaining to the payment of the adjusted pensions of Retired Justices of the Supreme Court and CA was vetoed and assailed as being unconstitutional.

-A of RA 1797 was repealed by PD 644.

ISSUE: Whether or not the veto act of the President the use of such fund for theadjustment of the pension of justices is valid.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled:

item was the entire 500M peso allocation out of which unavoidable obligations notadequately funded in separate items could be met. What the President had vetoedwas the method of meeting unavoidable obligations or the manner of using the 500MPesos.

resident vetoed certain provisions of the 1992 General AppropriationsAct, she was actually vetoing RA 1797 since PD 644 never took effect which isbeyond the power to accomplish.

sidentifying funds and savings which may be used to pay the adjusted pensionspursuant to the Supreme Court Resolution. As long as retirement laws remain in thestatute book, there is an existing obligation on the part of the government to pay theadjusted pension rate pursuant to RA 1797 and AM-91-8-225-CA.

Neither may the veto power of the President be exercised as a means of repea ling RA1797. This is arrogating unto the Presidency legislative powers which are beyond itsauthority. The President has no power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by herpredecessors much less to repeal existi ng laws. The Presidents power is merely toexecute the laws passed by Congress.

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS. ENRIQUEZ235 SCRA 506. 1994

FACTS:

The General Appropriation Bill of 1994 was passed and approved by both Houses of

Congress. It presented the bill to the president for the exercise of his veto power.

One of the special provisions vetoed by the President is with respect to therealignment of operating expenses. Whereas each member of Congress is allotted forhis own operating expenditures, a proportionate share of the appropriation for thehouse which he belongs. If he does not spend for one item of expense, the questionedprovision allows him to transfer his allocation in said item of expense. Petitionersassail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocationsfor operational expenses to any other expense categorically claiming that thispractice is prohibited by Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution. They arguethat the Senate President and Speaker of the House, not the individual member of

Congress, are the ones authorized to realign the savings as appropriated.


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Another special provision vetoed by the President i s on the appropriation for debtservice. It provides Use of funds. The appropriation au thorized therein shall be usedfor payment of principal and interest of foregoing and domestic indebtedness;provided, that any payment in excess of the amount therein appropriated shall besubject to the approval of the President with the concurrence of the Congress of thePhilippines; provided further, that in no case shall this fund be used to pay for theliabilities of the Central Bank of Liquidators.


In the appropriation for the AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund, the President vetoed thenew provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augmentpension and gratuity funds. According to the President, the grant retirement andseparation benefits should be covered by direct appropriation specially approved forthe purpose pursuant to Section 29 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover,he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated inSection 25 of Article VI of the Constitution. On the contrary, petitioners claim thatsaid provision is a condition or limitation, which is intertwined with the item of appropriation that it could not be separated therefrom.


HELD:

Petitioners contentions are without merit. Under the special provisions applicable tothe Congress of the Philippines, the members of the Congress only determine thenecessity of the realignment of the savings in the allotment for their operatingexpenses. They are in the best position to do so because they are the one who knowwhether there are savings available in some items and whether there are deficienciesin other items of their operating expenses that need augmentation. However, it is theSenate President and the Speaker of the House as the case may be who shall approvethe realignment. Before giving their stamp of approval, those two officials will haveto see to it that: (1) the funds to be aligned or transferred are actually savings in theitems of expenditures from which the same are to be taken and to the transfer onrealignment is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditure to which saidtransfer or realignment is to be made.

It is readily apparent that the special provision applicable to the appropriation fordebt service in so far as it refers to funds in excess of the appropriation for debtservice in so far as it re fers to funds in excess of the amount appropriated in the bill,

is an inappropriate provision referring to the funds other than P68B appropriated inthe GAAA of 1994.


As the constitution is explicit that the provision with the Congress can include in anappropriate to which it relates, it follows that any provision which does not relate to

any particular item or which it extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation is considered an inappropriate provision which be vetoed separatelyfrom an item. Also to be included in the category of inappropriate provision areunconstitutional provisions and provisions which are intended to amend other lawsbecause clearly those kinds of laws have no place in an appropriation bill.

The President vetoed the entire paragraph, one of the special provision of the item ondebt services including the provisos that the appropriation authorized in said itemshall be used for the payment of one principal and interest of foreign and domesticindebtedness and that in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of theCentral Bank Board of Liquidators. These provisos are germane to and have directconnection with the item of debt service. Inherent in the power of the appropriationis the power to specify how the money shall be spent. Said provisos are appropriateprovisions hence, cannot be vetoed separately.

The SC is sustaining the veto of the Special Provision of the item on debt service canonly be with respect to the proviso therein requiring that any payment in excess of the amount therein, appropriated shall be the subject to the approval of the Presidentof the Philippines with the concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines.

The special provision which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment thepension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and SeparationBenefits System is violative of Section 25 and Section 29 of Article VI of theConstitution.

SECTION 28 RULE ON TAXATION, TARIFF POWERS, EXEMPTIONS

KAPATIRAN VS. TAN163 SCRA 371, 1988

CASE:


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The VAT law or EO 273 is being assailed on grounds among others that taxationshall be uniform and equitable.

The Court overruled the contention holding that such was uniform because itoperates with the same effect and force in every place where the subject may befound. It is also equitable since it is imposed only on sales of goods or services bypersons engaged in business with an aggregate gross annual sale exceeding 200,000.

ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE VS. AQUINO162 SCRA 106, 1988

FACTS:

Petitioner filed suit to annul and declare void the "Notice of Seizure" and the "Noticeof Sale" of its lot and building for non-payment of real state taxes and penalties.

Petitioner contends that the primary use of the lot and building for educationalpurposes, and not the incidental use thereof, determines and exemption fromproperty taxes under Section 22 (3), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution. Hence, theseizure and sale of subject college lot and building, which are contrary

Private respondents counter that the college lot and building in question which weresubjected to seizure and sale to answer for the unpaid tax are used: (I) for theeducational purposes of the r college; (2) permanent residence of the President andDirector thereof, and his family including the in-laws and grandchildren; and (3) forcommercial purposes because the ground floor of the college building is being usedand rented by a commercial establishment, the Northern Marketing Corporation

ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building is question are used exclusively foreducational purposes thereby exempting petitioner from property taxes.

HELD:

NO. The lot and building are not used exclusively for educational purposes. It mustbe stressed however, that while this Court allows a more liberal and non-restrictiveinterpretation of the phrase "exclusively used for educational purposes" as providedfor in Article VI, Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution,reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemptions extends to facilitieswhich are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the mainpurposes. Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or lot for commercialpurposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. Thus, while the use

of the second floor of the main building in the case at the bar for residential purposesof the Director and his family, may find justification under the concept of incidentaluse, which is complimentary to the main or primary purpose - educational, the leaseof the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretchof the imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education.

Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the conclusion thatthe school building as well as the lot where it is built, should be taxed, not becausethe, second floor of the same is being used by the Director and his family forresidential purposes, but because the first floor thereof is being used for commercialpurposes. However, since only a portion is used for purposes of commerce, it is onlyfair that half of the assessed ta x be returned to the school involved.

SECTION 29 RULES ON PUBLIC MONEY

PASCUAL VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS110 PHIL. 331, 1960

FACTS:

The sum of 85,000 pesos was appropriated by Congress for the construction of afeeder road running through a private subdivision and over a property owned by aprivate individual. Subsequently, the feeder road is donated to the government.

ISSUE: Is the appropriation valid?

HELD:

The Supreme Court annulled this item, observing that the property sought to beimproved with public funds was private in nature at the time the appropriation wasmade. The circumstance that the roads were later donated to the government did notcure the basic defect of the appropriation as it was null and void ab initio.

AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ64 PHIL. 201, 1937

FACTS:


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The Philippine government authorized a special stamp issue on occasion of theobservance in Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress under thesponsorship of the Catholic Church. The petitioner, as head of the PhilippineIndependent Church, assailed the measure and contended that it violated theConstitution inasmuch as it benefited a particular region. The Supreme Court, onexamining the facts, discovered that the original design of the stamp featured apicture of a Catholic chalice, but this was later rejected in favor of a map of thePhilippines under which appeared the caption Seat, 33rd International EucharisticCongress, Feb. 3- 7, 1937.

ISSUE: Whether or not the stamp issue was valid.

HELD:

Yes. As the purpose of the stamp issue were not for the benefit of the RomanCatholic Church, nor money was derived from the sale of the stamps given to thatchurch but was evidently to focus attention not on the Eucharistic Congress but on itssite, the idea being to attract tourists to our country and not primarily the religiousevent, it was held that the stamp issue was not invalid.

GUINGONA VS. CARAGUE196 SCRA 221, 1991

FACTS:

PD 1177 is being assailed on its constitutionality. It is argued that the automaticreappropriation law for servicing foreign debts is invalid because it does notappropriate a fixed amount and is therefore an undue delegation of legislative power

ISSUE: Whether or not PD 1177 is constitutional.

HELD:

Yes. The amount is fixed by the parameters of the law itself which requires thesimple act of looking into the books of the Treasure.

OSMENA VS. ORBOS220 SCRA 703, 1993

FACTS:

The Oil Price Stabilzation Fund (OPSF) was created to minimize the frequent pricechanges brought about by exchange rate adjustments and/or changes brought aboutby changes in world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products. ATerminal Fund Balance deficit now aims to resolve the deficit by increasingpetroleum prices, contravening Section 29(3), Article VI where such fund shall bepaid only for the purpose for which it was created.

ISSUE: Whether or not the increase of petroleum prices to resolve the TerminalFund Balance deficit is valid.

HELD:

Yes. The Court held that it was a valid exercise of police power.

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS. ENRIQUEZ235 SCRA 506. 1994

FACTS:

The General Appropriation Bill of 1994 was passed and approved by both Houses of Congress. It presented the bill to the president for the exercise of his veto power.

One of the special provisions vetoed by the President is with respect to therealignment of operating expenses. Whereas each member of Congress is allotted forhis own operating expenditures, a proportionate share of the appropriation for thehouse which he belongs. If he does not spend for one item of expense, the questionedprovision allows him to transfer his allocation in said item of expense. Petitionersassail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocationsfor operational expenses to any other expense categorically claiming that thispractice is prohibited by Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution. They arguethat the Senate President and Speaker of the House, not the individual member of Congress, are the ones authorized to realign the savings as appropriated.

Another special provision vetoed by the President is on the appropriation for debtservice. It provides Use of funds. The appropriation authorized therein shall be usedfor payment of principal and interest of foregoing and domestic indebtedness;provided, that any payment in excess of the amount therein appropriated shall besubject to the approval of the President with the concurrence of the Congress of thePhilippines; provided further, that in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the

liabilities of the Central Bank of Liquidators.


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In the appropriation for the AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund, the President vetoed thenew provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augmentpension and gratuity funds. According to the President, the grant retirement andseparation benefits should be covered by direct appropriation specially approved forthe purpose pursuant to Section 29 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover,he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated inSection 25 of Article VI of the Constitution. On the contrary, petitioners claim thatsaid provision is a condition or limitation, which is intertwined with the item of appropriation that it could not be separa ted therefrom.


HELD:

Petitioners contentions are without merit. Under the special provisions applicable to

the Congress of the Philippines, the members of the Congress only determine thenecessity of the realignment of the savings in the allotment for their operatingexpenses. They are in the best position to do so because they are the one who knowwhether there are savings available in some items and whether there are deficienciesin other items of their operating expenses that need augmentation. However, it is theSenate President and the Speaker of the House as the case may be who shall approvethe realignment. Before giving their stamp of approval, those two officials will haveto see to it that: (1) the funds to be aligned or transferred are actually savings in theitems of expenditures from which the same are to be taken and to the transfer onrealignment is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditure to which saidtransfer or realignment is to be made.

It is readily apparent that the special provision applicable to the appropriation fordebt service in so far as it refers to funds in excess of the appropriation for debtservice in so far as it re fers to funds in excess of the amount appropriated in the bill,is an inappropriate provision referri ng to the funds other than P68B appropriated inthe GAAA of 1994.


As the constitution is explicit that the provision with the Congress can include in anappropriate to which it relates, it follows that any provision which does not relate to

any particular item or which it extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation is considered an inappropriate provision which be vetoed separatelyfrom an item. Also to be included in the category of inappropriate provision areunconstitutional provisions and provisions which are intended to amend other lawsbecause clearly those kinds of laws have no place in an appropriation bill.

The President vetoed the entire paragraph, one of the special provision of the item ondebt services including the provisos that the appropriation authorized in said itemshall be used for the payment of one principal and interest of foreign and domesticindebtedness and that in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of theCentral Bank Board of Liquidators. These provisos are germane to and have directconnection with the item of debt service. Inherent in the power of t he appropriationis the power to specify how the money shall be spent. Said provisos are appropriateprovisions hence, cannot be vetoed separately.

The SC is sustaining the veto of the Special Provision of the item on debt service canonly be with respect to the proviso therein requiring that any payment in excess of the amount therein, appropriated shall be the subject to the approval of the Presidentof the Philippines with the concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines. Thespecial provision which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment thepension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and SeparationBenefits System is violative of Section 25 and Section 29 of Article VI of theConstitution.

SECTION 30

DIAZ VS.COURT OF APPEALSG.R. NO. L-109698 DECEMBER 5, 1994

FACTS:

On 23 January 1991, Davao Light and Power Company, Inc. (DLPC) filed with theEnergy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for the approval of the sound valueappraisal of its property in service. The Asian Appraisal Company valued theproperty and equipment of DLPC at One Billion One Hundred Forty One MillionSeven Hundred Seventy Four Thousand Pesos (P1,141,774,000.00).

On 6 December 1992, ERB approved the application of DLPC after deductingFourteen Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P14,800,000.00) worth of


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property and equipment which were not used by DLPC in its operation. Petitionersfiled a petition for review on certiorari before this Court assailing the decision of ERB on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack of jurisdiction.

In Supreme Courts resolution of 8 September 1992, it referred the case for proper disposition to the Court of Appeals which subsequently dismissed the petition.Among the grounds given was that the filing of the petition for review with theSupreme Court was a wrong mode of appeal.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the resolution of 8September 1992 was a directive for the Court of Appeals to disregard the abovecircular. They further claimed that E.O. No. 172 creating the Energy RegulatoryBoard to replace the Board of Energy provides under Sec. 10 thereof that "[a] partyadversely affected by a decision, order or ruling of the Board . . . may file a pe titionto be known as petition for review with the Supreme Court."

ISSUE: Whether or not, Sec. 10 of E.O. No.172 is constitutional.

HELD:

No. The predecessor of the Energy Regulatory Board was the Board of Energycreated under P.D. No. 1206. There under, appeals from the decisions of the Boardof Energy were appealable to the Office of the President. However, under the InterimRules Implementing the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, final decisions,orders, awards or resolutions of the Board of Energy were made appealable to theIntermediate Appellate Court (Sec. 9).

Furthermore, the 1987 Constitution, Sec. 30, Art VI provides: "No law shall bepassed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this

Constitution without its advice and concurrence."

It is very patent that since Sec. 10 of E.O. No. 172 was enacted without the adviceand concurrence of this Court, this provision never became effective, with the resultthat it cannot be deemed to have amended the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.Consequently, the authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases from the Boardof Energy, now ERB, remains (Cf. First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 110571, 7 October 1994).

On 27 February 1991, the Supreme Court promulgated Circular No.1-91, par. (1) of which specifically provides that the proper mode of appeal from any quasi-judicial

agency, including ERB, is by way of a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.

If the appeal is brought to either Court (Supreme Court or Court of Appeals) by thewrong procedure, the only course of action open to it is to dismiss the appeal. Thereis no longer any justification for allowing transfers of erroneous appeals from onecourt to another (Quesada v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93869, 12 November 1990).

Prior to Circular No. 1-91, the Supreme Court promulgated Circular No. 2-90 dated9 March 1990, Item No. 4 of which states that " [a]n appeal taken to either theSupreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall bedismissed". Also, paragraph (d) of said Circular No. 2 -90 also provides that "[n]otransfer of appeals erroneously taken to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals to whichever of these Tribunals has appropriate appellate jurisdiction willbe allowed; continued ignorance or willful disregard of the law on appeals will notbe tolerated."

Consequently, the Court of Appeals was correct when it held

Contrary to petitioners' stand, the Supreme Court's Resolution dated September 8,1992, referring "this case to the Court of Appeals for further disposition" was not adirective for this court to disregard the above circulars and precedents. Rather thesaid SC resolution could mean only that this court should dispose of the subjectpetition in conformity with, and not in violation of, those circulars and precedents(Rollo, p. 26).

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELECG.R. NO. 125416 SEPTEMBER 26, 1996

FACTS:

The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan (Sangguniang Bayan) passedPambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absoluteconcurrence to join the Subic Special Economic Zone.

Respondents Garcia, et al. filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan to annulPambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993. The Sangguniang Bayanpromulgated Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress toamend certain provisions of R.A. No.7227, particularly those concerning the matterscited in items of private resp ondents petition.


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Not satisfied, private respondents resorted to their power of initiative. RespondentCOMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subjectthereof was merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance.Thereafter, COMELEC issued a Resolution directing its Provincial ElectionSupervisor to hold action on authentication of signatures being solicited by privaterespondent.

COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2845, adopting a Calendar of Activities for local referendum on certain municipal ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Bayanof Morong, Bataan. It then promulgated said Resolution, providing for the rulesand guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repealKapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan.

Contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2428, petitioner instituted a petition forcertiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion inpromulgating and implementing its Resolution No. 2848 which govern the conductof the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan?

HELD:

Yes. COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating andimplementing Resolution No. 2848. The process started by private respondents wasan INITIATIVE but respondent COMELEC made preparations for aREFERENDUM only.

Based on the definitions given by the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160): LocalInitiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government

unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance; while Local Referendumis the legal process whereby the registered voters of the local government units mayapprove, amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the Sanggunian.

In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum isbegun and consented to by the law-making body. Initiative is a process of law-making by the people themselves without the participation and against the wishes of their elected representatives, while referendum consists merely of the electorateapproving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body.Hence, the process and the voting in an initiative are understandably more complexthan in a referendum where expectedly the voters will simply answer yes or noin the ballot.

In the case at bar, the exercise conducted is unquestionably an Initiative.

Legislative (Not Mine - 25-32)

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