Legal Ethics Cases

Eymard Moises M. Estalilla | DMMMSU CLAW |

LEGAL ETHICS CASES Sec 5(5), Art. VIII, 1987 Phil. Constitution In Re: Cunanan In the Matter of Haron S. Meling, BM 1154, June 8, 2004 Rolly Pentecostes vs Atty. Hemenigildo Marasigan, AM No. P-07-2337, August 3, 2007 Fr. Ranhilio Aquino vs. Atty. Edwin Pascua, AC No. 5095, November 28, 2007 Rodolfo M. Bernardo vs. Atty. Ismael Mejia, AC No. 2984, August 31, 2007 Velez vs. Atty. De Vera, AC No. 6697, July 25, 2006 Aguirre vs. Rana, BM No. 1036, June 10, 2003 Petition for leave to resume practice of law, Benjamin Dacanay, 540 SCRA 424 Cayetano vs. Monsod, GR No. 100113, September 3, 1991 Cruz vs. Cabrera, AC No. 5737, October 25, 2004 Lim-Santiago vs. Sagucio, AC No. 6705, March 31, 2006 In re: Argosino, 270 SCRA 26 Law Student Practice Bar Matter 730, June 13, 1997 Section 34, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court Public Officials and practice of law Integrated Bar of the Philippines Republic Act No. 6397 Membership and Dues (Sec. 9-10, Rule 139-A, Revised Rules of Court)

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© 2015 Eymard Moises M. Estalilla | DMMMSU CLAW |

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

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EN BANC

Resolution March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners. Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.

DIOKNO, J.:

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That

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for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected by this decision, as well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the following statistical data are set forth:

(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972 total 1,168, classified as follows:

1946 (August) 206 121 18 1946 (November) 477 228 43 1947 749 340 0 1948 899 409 11 1949 1,218 532 164 1950 1,316 893 26 1951 2,068 879 196 1952 2,738 1,033 426 1953 2,555 968 284 TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for reconsideration.

(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, but failed to obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in different subjects in previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.

(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually presented motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952,

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and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which are still pending because they could be favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, — although as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal profession and the administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.

We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the members of the bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in which the question may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have exhausted almost all Philippine and American jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation for a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a new member in order to place it as humanly as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.

Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:

The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation.

Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."

By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available to the public during those years and private enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette had been published continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised and enlarged editions have been printed locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.

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Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.

The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable principles, but the resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical case of similar background been picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been directly derived the judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States, and which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial history of more than half a century? From the citations of those defending the law, we can not find a case in which the validity of a similar law had been sustained, while those against its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guariña (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and which the postponement of the contested law respects.

This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed law.

To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been cited to us as a favorable precedent of the law — that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New York revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.

It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:

They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of them for any elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or the people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office. Any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to admission to practice in all the courts of this State. (p. 93).

According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:

Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously rested with the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they possessed. The convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been exercised, and with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon admission to practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was aimed directly at this power, and the insertion of the provision" expecting the admission of attorneys, in this particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with the object of this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any portion of their power over this subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from the use of the word `admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken of must be by the court; that to admit means to grant leave, and that the power of granting necessarily implies the power of refusing, and of course the right of determining whether the applicant possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.

These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)

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Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided that the possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution required of applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public or accessible private library in the country.

In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:

The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an institution of established reputation, and having a law department under the charge of able professors, the students in which department were not only subjected to a formal examination by the law committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of study before being entitled to a diploma of being graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this examination, together with the preliminary study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the court; and as rendering the latter examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study was essential, unnecessary and burdensome.

The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and for the mere purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the college for that of the court. It could have had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be given to its provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense with the plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate an intention that the authorities of the college should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students before granting a diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act admits is, that it was intended to make the college diploma competent evidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as a modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in connection with these statutes and with the Constitution itself in order to determine the present condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)

x x x x x x x x x

The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission, that has simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that question. (p.93)

From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly seen. Please note only the following distinctions:

(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in the bar examinations be admitted to the practice of law.

(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the admission of any lawyer.

(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on the matter of admission of the practice of law.

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In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.

We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had been undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of a legislative enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of this decision we quote the following paragraphs:

This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the English speaking people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate qualifications of attorney at law has been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of legislative power. (p. 444)

Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in character, the Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)

But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will serve the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other and further exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)

Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent, and coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty which properly belongs to its department. Neither department should so act as to embarrass the other in the discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme and thought of the people setting upon the form of government under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)

The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial department of our state government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from embarrassment or interference by any other department of government, the courts cannot escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to the judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)

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The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an attache of the courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no small degree upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the administration of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)

Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at least in the English speaking countries. (p. 445)

After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:

Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the adoption of our Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since the Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right of determining who should be admitted to the practice of law, which, as was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases 235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts and judicial power be regarded as an entity, the power to determine who should be admitted to practice law is a constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with assurance that it is either a part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of the judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign institution, but made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch of the government. They took this institution along with the power traditionally exercise to determine who should constitute its attorney at law. There is no express provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent that this traditional power of the judicial department should in any manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make the three great departments of government separate and independent of one another. The idea that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the judicial independent of the legislative department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in the absence of express constitutional provisions. While the legislature may legislate with respect to the qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power to protect the public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications required of attorneys at law in order that public interests may be protected, such qualifications do not constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class from which the court must make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by the course of the proper administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power to compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law. (p. 450)

Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely true that the legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to admit attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals, attorneys receive their formal license to practice law by their admission as members of the bar of the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.

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The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the power to determine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)

In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:

It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there be members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character. This arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the public be protected from incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for something more than private gain." He becomes an "officer of the court", and ,like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His cooperation with the court is due "whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys at law the judicial department of government would be hampered in the performance of its duties. That has been the history of attorneys under the common law, both in this country and England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost without exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made open and notorious by a decision of the court entered upon its records. The establishment by the Constitution of the judicial department conferred authority necessary to the exercise of its powers as a coordinate department of government. It is an inherent power of such a department of government ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and for what cause he ought to be removed." (p.727)

In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the legal profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:

In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath for attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has always been the general practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the parties. In this court the fact of the admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to which they, respectively, belong for, three years preceding their application, is regarded as sufficient evidence of the possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel moving their admission sufficient evidence that their private and professional character is fair. The order of admission is the judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the parties become officers of the court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office

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during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases. It was so held by the court of appeals of New York in the matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers of the court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing his duty, may very justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650-651).

We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:

Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this point. Admission to practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of the court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.

Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent power of the court. — A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.

On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government.

The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it is the province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to alteration or change either by legislative action or by judicial decree.

The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other departments of the government. — 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.

If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by settling aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry. — Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.

In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in question.

That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:

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Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. — Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.

It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.

Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These powers have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of justice.

The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guariña took examination and failed by a few points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a previous examination. The Government appointed Guariña and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province. This tribunal refused to give his license without previous examinations. The court said:

Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.

Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:

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Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows:

1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court.

The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed to pass the prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal learning upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the required percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he presented his former application for admission to the bar, we should grant him license to practice law in the courts of these Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability."

But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion before the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the object which the legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of the context generally and especially of the fact that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the original Act which specifically provides for the admission of certain candidates without examination. It is contented that this mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.

And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:

Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed to it by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above citation from Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the power conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid and void, as transcending its rightful limits and authority.

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Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions enumerated, and with particular emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court held:

In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the provisions of this statute have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But in all of those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.

In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not and never had been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.

In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think that his appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession of the necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this application for license to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.

In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short of the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since that time he has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province of Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the Government service by appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which will be given him by a committee of the court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule. — (In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer from the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.

In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until December 31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who began studying before November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diploma issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and would pass an examination, or to those who had studied for three years if they commenced their studies after the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being, among others, a class legislation. The Court said:

This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas from law schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899, under which the application is made, is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the law in relation to attorneys and counselors,"

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approved March 28, 1884, in force July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists in the addition to the section of the following: "And every application for a license who shall comply with the rules of the supreme court in regard to admission to the bar in force at the time such applicant commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law school or college, shall be granted a license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said rules". — In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.

. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under the laws of this state, whose regular course of law studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by the student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the student began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good moral character. The other branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law for two years in a law office, or part of such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law school," and whose course of study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory examination by the examining board in the branches now required by the rules of this court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges upon the persons named therein, and establishes rules of legislative creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)

Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation, prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit attorneys to practice in the courts and take part in the administration of justice, and could prescribe the character of evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive of the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could only be done by a general law, persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice law is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and confers upon him the right to appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates certain exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil process while attending court. The law conferring such privileges must be general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an enactment for that purpose, may classify persons so long as the law establishing classes in general, and has some reasonable relation to the end sought. There must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for different one, having no just relation to the subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.

The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may furnish a basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place where such physician has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the profession of the law, and plainly, any classification must have some reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into two classes — First, those presenting diplomas issued by any law school of this state before December 31, 1899; and, second, those who studied law for the period of two years in a law office, or part of the time in a law school and part in a law office, who are to be admitted upon examination in the subjects specified in the present rules of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for making application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions of the rules are dispensed with, and as between the two different conditions

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and limits of time are fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the law school, but a diploma granted upon the completion of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there be anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon the mere date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Those who began the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as well as those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend only two years in study, while those who commenced the next day must spend three years, although they would complete two years before the time limit. The one who commenced on the 3rd. If possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination before December 31, 1899, and without any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the prescribed course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification cannot rest upon any natural reason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)

In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards to its aspect of being a class legislation:

But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power to prescribe ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and license those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner here attempted. That power must be exercised through general laws which will apply to all alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling, business or profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and condition." This right may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every one on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study and great learning for their successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in them — that is, the right to continue their prosecution — is often of great value to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than their real or personal property can be thus taken. It is fundamental under our system of government that all similarly situated and possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of medicine, requiring medications to establish the possession on the part of the application of his proper qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been challenged, and courts have seriously considered whether the exemption from such examinations of those practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered such law unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.

This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law and to constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not material that he had once established his right to practice law and that one time he possessed the requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact in no matter affect the power of the Legislature to select from the great body of the public an individual upon whom it would confer its favors.

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A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to admit to the practice of law without examination, all who had served in the military or naval forces of the United States during the World War and received a honorable discharge therefrom and who (were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act." This Act was held |unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses of the constitution of that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.

A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:

The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid must rest upon material differences between the person included in it and those excluded and, furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any law that is made applicable to one class of citizens only must be based on some substantial difference between the situation of that class and other individuals to which it does not apply and must rest on some reason on which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such a difference between the situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation and circumstances of all other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural cause for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general because it operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and not generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)

Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by the abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none has been given, then the classification is fatally defective.

It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general average indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other means his right to an equal consideration.

To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing averages during those years were all that could be objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had been done — cancel the license that was issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so.

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Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the general average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the power exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not included in what the Constitution has granted to Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.

Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in the title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affect the entire law.

Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.

Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:

1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.

2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810 candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.

3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing rules.

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4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.

5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.

6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue in force.

R E S O L U T I O N

Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and impassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the debate among the members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of two of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced their decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same:

1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.

2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.

Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

ANNEX I

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

A resume‚ of pertinent facts concerning the bar examinations of 1946 to 1953 inclusive follows: August, 19461 Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo Florendo, Atty. Bernardino Guerrero, Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, Atty. Crispin Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Jose Perez Cardenas, and Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, members. Number of candidates 206 Number of candidates whose grades were raised 12

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73'S 6 72'S 6 Number of candidates who passed 85 Number of candidates who failed 121 Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 18 Percentage of success (per cent) 41.62 Percentage of failure (per cent) 58.74 Passing grade (per cent) 72 November, 1946 Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, except Hon. Jose Teodoro who was substituted by Atty. Honesto K. Bausan. Number of candidates 481 Number of candidates whose grades were raised 19 (72 per cent and above 73 per cent --- Minutes of March 31, 1947)

Number of candidates who passed 249 Number of candidates who failed 228 Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 43 Percentage of success (per cent) 52.20 Percentage of failure (per cent) 47.80 Passing grade (By resolution of the Court).

(per cent) 72

October, 1947 Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Antonio Araneta, Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la Costa, Atty. Celso B. Jamora, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Members. Number of candidates 749 Number of candidates whose grades were raised 43 70.55 per cent with 2 subject below 50 per cent 1 69 per cent 40 68 per cent 2 Number of candidates who passed 409 Number of candidates who failed 340 Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 972 Percentage of success (per cent) 54.59 Percentage of failure (per cent) 45.41 Passing grade (per cent) 69 (by resolution of the Court).

Note.--In passing the 2 whose grades were 68.95 per cent and 68.1 per cent respectively, the Court found out that they were not benefited at all by the bonus of 12 points given by the Examiner in Civil Law.

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August, 1948 Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor, Chairman Hon. Luis P. Torres, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus G. Barrera, Hon. Rafael Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Members. Number of candidates 899 Number of candidates whose grades were raised 64 71's 29 70's 35 Number of candidates who passed 490 Number of candidates who failed 409 Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 11 Percentage of success (per cent) 62.40 Percentage of failure (per cent) 37.60 Passing grade (per cent) 70 (by resolution of the Court). August, 1949 Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Fernando Jugo, Hon. Enrique Filamor, Atty. Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Federico Agrava, Hon. Mariano H. de Joya, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty. Emeterio Barcelon, Members. Number of candidates 1,218 Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 55 Number of candidates who passed 686 Number of candidates who failed 532 Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 164 Percentage of success (per cent) 56.28 Percentage of failure (per cent) 43.72 Passing grade (per cent) 74 (by resolution of the Court). August, 1950 Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo,2 Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Marcial P. Lichauco, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Francisco A. Delgado, Hon. Antonio Horrilleno, Members. Number of candidates 1,316 Number of candidates whose grades were raised 38

(The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by recommendation and authority of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco Delgado).

Number of candidates who passed 432 Number of candidates who failed 894 Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 26

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Percentage of success (per cent) 32.14 Percentage of failure (per cent) 67.86 Passing grade (per cent) 75 August, 1951 Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Vicente Albert, Atty. Arturo Alafriz, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Members. Number of candidates 2,068 Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 112 Number of candidates who passed 1,189 Number of candidates who failed 879 Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 196 Percentage of success (per cent) 57.49 Percentage of failure (per cent) 42.51 Passing grade (per cent) 75 August, 1952 Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Emilio P. Virata, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Members. Number of candidates 2,738 Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 163 Number of candidates who passed 1,705 Number of candidates who failed 1,033 Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 426 Percentage of success (per cent) 62.27 Percentage of failure (per cent) 37.73 Passing grade (per cent) 75 August, 1953 Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr., Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Jose S. de la Cruz, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Members. Number of candidates 2,555 Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 100 Number of candidates who passed 1,570 Number of candidates who failed 986 Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 284 Percentage of success (per cent) 61.04 Percentage of failure (per cent) 38.96 Passing grade (per cent) 75

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A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under Republic Act No. 972, grouped by the years in which they took the bar examinations, with annotations as to who had presented motions for reconsideration which were denied (MRD), and who filed mere motions for reconsideration without invoking said law, which are still pending, follows:

PETITIONER UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.

Av. MRD- 1. Agunod, Filemon L. 66 71 61 76 80 83 73 75 71.4 MRD- 2. Cunanan, Albino 76 72 74 75 70 70 65 72 71.45 MRD- 3. Mejia, Flaviano V. 64 64 65 68 83 74 68 80 69.85 1948 MRD- 4. Orlina, Soledad R. 71 68 66 75 63 75 70 88 69.9 MRD- 5. Vivero, Antonio Lu. 75 73 73 65 63 66 65 80 69.95 MRD- 6. Gatchalian, Salud 72 66 71 75 78 68 65 50 69.65 1949 7. Abaya, Jesus A. 69 79 75 75 71 89 55 75 70.8 MRD- 8. Advincula, David D. 76 80 62 86 81 72 60 65 70.5 9. Agraviador, Alfredo L. 63 85 70 77 80 81 65 80 71.8 10. Alacar, Pascual C. 61 63 83 79 71 85 65 80 72.05 11. Amog, Pedro M. 75 66 76 78 81 74 55 85 72.2 12. Apolinario, Miguel S. 75 84 78 78 70 70 60 75 71.95 13. Aquino, Maximo G. 82 77 71 77 76 77 60 75 73.15 14. Asinas, Candido D. 75 83 69 80 81 83 55 85 72.65 15. Baldivino, Jose B. 75 65 72 82 82 69 60 80 71.95 16. Balintona, Bernardo 75 80 64 78 74 67 65 70 70 17. Banawa, Angel L. 78 70 70 75 81 83 60 60 72.3 18. Bandala, Anacleto A. 66 80 66 71 93 72 55 70 69.6 19. Bandon, Alawadin L. 74 79 69 77 91 73 60 80 73.35 20. Baquero, Benjamin 76 79 64 77 85 72 65 75 72.5 21. Blanco, Jose 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.5 22. Buenaluz, Victoriano T. 75 71 72 78 67 82 60 75 70.85 23. Canda, Benjamin S. 75 72 75 82 76 77 65 75 73.55 24. Canon, Guillermo 77 86 67 88 75 69 70 85 73.9 25. Carlos, Estela S. 75 81 81 79 72 73 65 70 73.8 26. Cerezo, Gregorio O. 69 76 76 79 71 80 55 80 70.4 27. Clarin, Manuel L. 75 82 76 81 73 69 70 75 73.95 28. Claudo, Conrado O. 76 62 78 77 73 72 60 70 71.4 29. Condevillamar, Antonio V. 68 65 74 80 85 75 60 75 71.65 MRD- 30. Cornejo, Crisanto R. 72 75 69 82 83 79 65 80 73.4 31. Corona, Olvido D. 68 76 73 81 81 72 60 75 71.15 32. Dizon, Marcial C. 76 86 69 83 75 74 65 80 73.1

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33. Enriquez, Agustin P. 75 77 70 81 81 77 65 80 73.75 34. Espiritu, Irineo E. 80 88 69 75 76 77 65 75 73.8 35. Fernandez, Macario J. 63 82 76 75 81 84 65 75 72.95 36. Gallardo, Amando C. 78 79 67 77 76 75 60 65 70.95 37. Garcia, Freidrich M. 76 80 66 75 72 70 60 75 69.7 38. Garcia, Julian L. 64 77 68 82 89 77 65 75 72.15 39. Garcia, Leon Mo. 77 86 71 80 60 82 65 75 71.85 40. Garcia, Pedro V. 76 82 73 81 74 83 60 85 73.6 41. Garcia, Santiago C. 62 91 79 75 72 75 65 80 71.8 42. Genoves, Pedro 75 83 70 78 87 76 55 80 72.7 43. Gonzales, Amado P. 75 71 71 75 86 75 60 75 72.65 44. Guia, Odon R. de 77 76 66 81 74 76 60 75 70.9 45. Fernandez, Simeon 62 68 71 80 74 90 65 75 70.85 46. Jakosalem, Filoteo 82 83 73 82 61 87 65 70 73.6 47. Jesus, Felipe D. de 75 83 67 79 78 85 60 75 72.45 48. Jocom, Jacobo M. 77 77 74 77 74 64 55 85 70.65 49. Juares, Nicolas 77 84 56 76 73 82 60 85 70 50. Kalalang, Remigio 65 75 74 80 70 70 65 85 70.3 51. Layumas, Vicente L. 67 84 65 75 89 66 60 80 70.3 52. Leyson, Amancio F. 69 83 75 76 81 75 65 75 73.15 53. Libanan, Marcelino 71 83 61 77 80 81 65 85 71.75 54. Lim, Jose E. 77 77 72 76 72 64 65 70 71.15 55. Lim, Jose F. 70 75 62 83 80 71 65 80 70.4 56. Linao, Mariano M. 66 84 76 78 80 75 60 75 71.75 57. Lopez, Angelo P. 67 81 75 72 79 81 55 80 71 58. Lopez, Eliezar M. 77 75 60 75 77 85 60 75 70.7 59. Lopez, Nicanor S. 72 71 70 78 77 84 60 75 71.55 60. Manoleto, Proceso D. 72 70 65 78 81 90 60 80 71.95 61. Mancao, Alfredo P. 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95 62. Manera, Mariano A. 75 78 75 75 68 79 60 65 71 63. Mercado, Arsenio N. 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95 64. Miranda, Benjamin G. 76 81 67 82 74 77 65 80 72.55 65. Manad, Andres B. 77 75 68 82 69 72 65 75 71.15 1948 66. Orosco, Casimiro P. 72 84 69 81 70 82 65 75 71.9 67. Padua, Manuel C. 76 76 68 80 79 79 50 75 70.1 68. Palang, Basilio S. 71 75 82 71 55 87 55 75 69.6 69. Palma, Cuadrato 62 75 69 93 80 79 55 80 69.5 70. Pañganiban, Jose V. 67 83 61 81 91 74 60 75 70.6 71. Pareja, Felipe 66 71 75 81 67 74 60 70 68.75

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72. Patalinjug, Eriberto 73 77 78 73 78 71 55 75 71.25 73. Paulin, Jose C. 66 69 71 77 83 82 65 75 72.1 74. Pido, Serafin C. 72 78 63 80 71 85 70 80 72.05 75. Pimentel, Luis P. 77 75 76 81 76 68 55 80 71.6 76. Plantilla, Rodrigo C. 72 78 68 89 79 81 65 85 73.55 77. Regalario, Benito B. 72 80 64 80 75 81 55 80 69.55 78. Robis, Casto P. 62 77 74 73 68 80 70 80 70.9 79. Rodil, Francisco C. 68 69 70 81 76 75 65 75 70.75 80. Rodriguez, Mariano I. 80 75 69 80 72 80 65 80 73.35 81. Romero, Crispulo P. 78 75 66 77 76 83 65 75 72.85 82. Saez, Porfirio D. 75 75 72 81 69 77 60 75 71 83. Saliguma, Crisogono D. 79 79 74 78 69 65 65 70 71.8 84. Samano, Fortunato A. 75 84 72 77 70 82 60 75 71.9 85. Santos, Faustina C. 71 68 68 76 75 85 55 75 69.5 86. Santos, Josefina R. 68 69 76 71 77 82 65 75 72.3 87. Seludo, Ananias G. 75 80 69 79 77 82 65 75 73.25 88. Semilia, Rafael I. 68 85 55 83 89 79 65 80 71.25 89. Telan, Gaudencio 77 79 70 75 70 75 60 75 70.85 90. Tesorero, Leocadio T. 75 71 63 75 82 62 65 63 69.65 91. Torre, Valentin S. de la 85 81 71 76 69 65 55 70 70.4 92. Torres, Ariston L. 78 71 72 81 61 84 55 85 70.4 93. Veyra, Zosimo C. de 70 75 71 79 65 80 65 80 70.65 94. Viado, Jose 67 70 74 75 75 90 55 80 70.7 95. Villacarlos, Delfin A. 73 87 71 82 69 70 75 85 73.85 96. Villamil, Leonor S. 73 81 76 86 86 73 55 85 73.6 97. Zabala, Amando A. 76 70 67 75 76 76 60 75 70.6 1950 MRD-98. Cruz, Filomeno de la 70 71 78 81 76 72 64 96 73.4 99. Española, Pablo S. 71 78 55 76 85 69 65 93 70.2 100. Foronda, Clarencio J. 60 78 68 79 84 88 62 93 71.9 101. Hechanova, Vicente 59 76 75 75 69 68 75 96 71.3 MRD-102. Peñalosa, Osias R. 80 78 61 76 61 77 66 85 70.2 103. Sarmiento, Floro A. 65 86 63 82 89 72 60 72 70.15 MRD-104. Torre, Catalino P. 75 85 68 78 69 67 65 69 70.25 105. Ungson, Fernando S. 61 87 75 70 57 85 83 82 72.8 1951 106. Abasolo, Romulo 77 70 64 65 76 70 76 64 71.7 107. Adeva, Daniel G. 75 59 74 65 69 51 78 67 70.4 108. Aguilar, Vicente Z. 73 63 68 75 70 69 75 75 71.25 109. Amodia, Juan T. 75 76 66 75 76 60 77 76 72.35

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MRD-110. Añosa, Pablo S. 76 78 63 75 74 61 75 79 71.6 111. Antiola, Anastacio R. 68 76 75 70 71 70 81 66 73.05 112. Aquino, S. Rey A. 70 71 71 60 74 62 76 77 71.1 113. Atienza, Manuel G. 71 78 68 80 86 51 82 75 73.85 114. Avanceña, Alfonso 71 71 65 75 70 72 78 80 71.8 MRD-115. Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 73 75 70 72 65 75 76 73.25 116. Barinaga, Jeremias L. 68 69 73 70 74 50 80 79 71.2 MRD-117. Barrientos, Ambrosio D. 76 60 67 55 74 63 77 62 70.25 MRD-118. Benitez, Tomas P. 67 75 75 60 73 72 75 78 72.2 119. Biason, Sixto F. 73 82 67 65 66 72 77 68 71.25 MRD-120. Briñas, Isagani A. 71 69 74 70 76 52 79 72 71.95 121. Buela, Arcadio P. 72 77 61 70 71 58 79 71 69.75 122. Cabilao, Leonardo S. 73 50 75 75 75 60 71 79 71.25 123. Cabrera, Ireneo M. 75 66 70 65 72 81 70 79 72.4 124. Cacacho, Emilio V. 125. Calilung, Soledad C. 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 69.65 MRD-126. Calimlim, Jose B. 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 69.65 127. Calimlim, Pedro B. 66 82 69 60 69 52 83 75 70 128. Camello, Sotero H. 70 77 63 65 75 66 84 64 71.55 129. Campos, Juan A. 71 88 70 75 64 69 71 62 70.15 130. Castillo, Antonio del 78 78 70 60 79 67 69 76 72.65 MRD-131. Castillo, Dominador Ad. 75 61 72 75 74 71 67 66 71.1 MRD-132. Castro, Jesus B. 72 86 72 75 65 75 76 71 72.85 133. Casuga, Bienvenido B. 75 72 72 70 69 61 75 60 70.95 134. Cabangbang, Santiago B. 77 67 61 80 73 59 83 76 72.2 135. Cruz, Federico S. 69 74 75 75 68 65 76 70 71.65 136. Dacanay, Eufemio P. 70 73 62 75 72 69 85 71 72.05 137. Deysolong, Felisberto 66 62 72 75 70 62 83 62 70.85 MRD-138. Dimaano, Jr., Jose N. 78 79 63 75 73 75 81 59 73.5 139. Espinosa, Domingo L. 78 63 58 70 70 67 87 63 71.6 MRD-140. Farol, Evencia C. 80 78 66 75 81 72 62 73 72.25 141. Felix, Conrado S. 71 71 75 65 70 58 75 69 70.75 142. Fernan, Pablo L. 67 88 66 85 73 68 78 75 72.35 143. Gandioco, Salvador G. 64 58 66 65 76 70 89 75 72.1 144. Gastardo, Crispin B. 70 69 68 75 78 66 86 72 73.9 145. Genson, Angelo B. 75 57 73 65 67 54 78 56 69.55 146. Guiani, Guinald M. 68 60 75 65 74 67 75 77 71.5 147. Guina, Graciano P. 66 69 67 60 78 52 83 61 69.6 MRD-148. Homeres, Praxedes P. 74 74 75 75 71 69 75 71 73.35 149. Ibarra, Venancio M. 60 75 74 70 74 70 80 75 71.9

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150. Imperial, Monico L. 72 78 75 75 72 56 82 77 73.7 MRD-151. Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 71 70 63 85 71 60 85 53 70.85 152. Inandan, Fortunato C. 77 77 67 53 73 75 79 57 72.5 153. Jimenez, Florencio C. 75 70 70 75 72 61 75 78 72.05 154. Kintanar, Woodrow M. 70 83 72 65 76 73 75 69 72.95 155. Languido, Cesar V. 63 71 63 85 70 61 85 79 70.55 156. Lavilles, Cesar L. 61 89 75 55 73 63 75 78 70.55 157. Llenos, Francisco U. 64 70 65 60 72 65 92 75 71.75 158. Leon, Marcelo D. de 63 73 60 85 75 75 90 70 72.75 159. Llanto, Priscilla 72 68 60 65 76 67 84 68 71.35 160. Machachor, Oscar 68 59 78 70 67 57 75 75 70.15 MRD-161. Magsino, Encarnacion 77 66 70 70 76 71 75 61 72.75 MRD-162. Maligaya, Demetrio M. 70 61 75 65 75 50 91 51 72.3 163. Manio, Gregorio 67 67 69 80 71 67 75 75 70.65 164. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 82 60 60 69 70 68 72 62.05 MRD-165. Marcial, Meynardo R. 66 75 74 70 75 67 81 75 73.15 166. Martin, Benjamin S. 68 72 63 75 69 63 84 62 70.1 MRD-167. Monterroyo, Catalina S. 70 80 75 80 76 66 82 51 73.95 MRD-168. Montero, Leodegario C. 73 67 66 80 81 65 81 75 73.75 169. Monzon, Candido T. 70 72 74 75 67 70 77 69 72.05 170. Natividad, Alberto M. 73 79 68 65 73 69 75 79 72.2 MRD-171. Navallo, Capistrano C. 70 72 68 85 81 66 71 74 72.1 172. Nisce, Camilo Z. 66 66 75 65 79 68 85 62 73.5 MRD-173. Ocampo, Antonio F. de 75 81 76 65 74 67 75 69 73.75 174. Olaviar, Jose O. 72 70 69 55 66 70 77 75 70.5 MRD-175. Perez, Cesario Z. 75 76 66 80 72 63 82 69 72.95 176. Pogado, Causin O. 70 66 65 70 75 64 75 70 69.95 177. Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 75 73 62 65 78 59 75 66 70.2 178. Recinto, Ireneo I. 73 76 68 75 74 68 80 53 72.3 MRD-179. Redor, Francisco K. 62 77 73 75 69 64 76 69 70 MRD-180. Regis, Deogracias A. 76 74 68 65 65 65 88 75 73.35 181. Rigor, Estelita C. 67 78 61 80 71 77 79 65 70.9 MRD-182. Rimorin-Gordo, Estela 70 72 62 60 88 66 67 79 70.15 183. Rosario, Prisco del 70 64 70 70 72 73 85 57 72.65 184. Rosario, Vicente D. del 75 91 65 75 68 68 79 62 72.2 185. Saavedra, Felipe 73 80 63 75 76 73 68 62 70.35 186. Salazar, Alfredo N. 66 72 73 75 67 68 77 69 70.85 187. Salem, Romulo R. 77 81 72 65 73 60 76 75 73 188. Foz, Julita A. 75 72 75 75 65 70 76 64 72.5 189. Santa Ana, Candido T. 77 69 65 75 81 75 70 75 73

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190. Santos, Aquilino 72 66 69 65 68 70 81 71 71.7 191. Santos, Valeriano V. 76 72 75 75 68 62 76 79 73.1 192. Suico, Samuel 73 79 72 75 71 59 84 65 73.3 193. Suson, Teodorico 74 68 66 80 66 59 79 67 70.35 194. Tado, Florentino P. 64 76 67 65 76 72 76 53 69.7 195. Tapayan, Domingo A. 69 72 69 70 76 73 82 79 73.75 MRD-196. Tiausas, Miguel V. 67 60 71 75 79 67 84 60 72.7 197. Torres, Carlos P. 68 71 71 70 70 63 82 71 71.6 198. Tria, Hipolito 69 72 75 60 69 54 78 66 70.05 199. Velasco, Avelino A. 65 72 75 75 71 67 78 76 72.1 200. Villa, Francisco C. 65 80 73 75 68 79 65 75 70.2 201. Villagonzalo, Job R. 78 67 74 65 72 51 69 71 70.25 202. Villarama, Jr., Pedro 75 74 75 55 75 66 67 75 71.45 1952 203. Abacon, Pablo 75 72 78 81 78 72 64 55 72.7 MRP-204. Abad, Agapito 73 76 73 85 75 63 62 75 70.95 MRP-205. Abella, Ludovico B. 70 81 76 81 70 66 77 58 72.7 MRP-206. Abellera, Geronimo F. 75 79 79 87 76 51 63 70 71.7 MRP-207. Abenojar, Agapito N. 71 72 78 84 70 75 69 70 72.9 208. Alandy, Doroteo R. 64 83 93 91 68 59 60 60 71.2 209. Alano, Fabian T. 70 83 61 83 72 87 72 70 71.9 MRP-210. Alcantara, Pablo V. 71 79 80 81 73 70 72 62 73.65 211. Arcangel, Agustin Ag. 75 85 71 73 76 65 68 65 71.85 212. Acosta, Dionisio N. 75 81 78 87 56 65 77 70 72.8 MRP-213. Abinguna, Agapito C. 66 85 80 84 75 58 76 75 73.65 214. Adove, Nehemias C. 76 86 78 77 66 78 69 62 73.55 215. Adrias, Inocencio C. 75 83 61 88 76 67 79 75 73.4 216. Aglugub, Andres R. 75 83 73 88 72 62 72 62 72.65 217. Andrada, Mariano L. 76 85 66 87 63 77 75 77 73. MRP-218. Almeda, Serafin V. 72 72 75 81 61 67 73 65 70.75 219. Almonte-Peralta, Felicidad 73 71 72 91 75 67 65 53 70.7 MRP-220. Amodia, Juan T. 75 79 68 85 62 64 75 78 71.4 MRP-221. Antonio, Felino A. 71 76 81 83 79 52 72 70 73.3 MRP-222. Antonio, Jose S. 75 92 90 68 65 64 68 60 73.75 223. Añonuevo, Ramos B. 71 87 78 81 64 63 74 76 72.7 224. Aquino, S. Rey A. 67 77 57 78 69 70 69 80 67.7 225. Arteche, Filomeno D. 78 83 50 89 76 77 70 70 70.8 MRP-226. Arribas, Isaac M. 75 78 70 81 73 70 67 78 72.2 MRP-227. Azucena, Ceferino D. 72 67 78 89 72 67 77 65 73.95 228. Atienza, Ricardo 72 87 70 79 66 55 75 75 70.85

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229. Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 78 89 75 70 54 66 75 73.3 MRP-230. Baclig, Cayetano S. 77 84 83 80 69 70 61 65 73 231. Balcita, Oscar C. 75 77 79 90 64 60 67 50 70.65 232. Barilea, Dominador Z. 71 67 82 77 64 61 65 80 70.5 MRP-233. Banta, Jose Y. 75 80 77 81 75 63 71 75 73.95 MRP-234. Barrientos, Ambrosio D. 76 70 67 80 67 65 70 81 70.7 235. Batucan, Jose M. 66 76 78 88 62 76 67 78 71.2 236. Bautista, Atilano C. 70 82 84 85 58 61 71 62 71.25 237. Bautista, Celso J. 71 68 63 87 80 67 80 70 72.75 238. Belderon, Jose 76 81 76 92 70 66 67 62 72.65 MRP-239. Belo, Victor B. 76 77 64 73 75 71 76 76 72.85 MRP-240. Bejec, Conceso D. 79 80 73 82 63 77 75 50 73.15 MRP-241. Beltran, Gervasio M. 72 75 81 73 75 57 75 80 73.95 MRP-242. Benaojan, Robustiano O. 74 84 77 84 75 63 68 62 72.85 MRP-243. Beriña, Roger C. 70 80 79 79 68 72 64 78 71.85 MRP-244. Bihis, Marcelo M. 75 86 65 92 64 64 84 75 73.45 MRP-245. Binaoro, Vicente M. 73 69 78 83 73 59 70 82 72.75 MRP-246. Bobila, Rosalio B. 76 86 76 83 68 59 71 78 73.05 247. Buenafe, Avelina R. 78 80 75 75 70 55 72 80 72.75 248. Bueno, Anastacio F. 73 78 71 78 71 67 71 60 71.15 249. Borres, Maximino L. 67 85 62 91 72 63 76 80 70.9 MRP-250. Cabegin, Cesar V. 72 71 76 75 74 70 71 60 72.2 MRP-251. Cabello, Melecio F. 72 78 78 89 58 70 67 71 70.5 MRP-252. Cabrera, Irineo M. 79 88 53 91 71 85 75 76 73.3 253. Cabreros, Paulino N. 71 79 83 84 60 62 71 50 70.85 254. Calayag, Florentino R. 69 79 66 88 69 75 68 76 70.6 MRP-255. Calzada, Cesar de la 76 72 80 67 62 71 66 62 70.85 256. Canabal, Isabel 70 82 81 77 78 51 75 75 73.7 MRP-257. Cabugao, Pablo N. 76 87 69 80 58 64 78 75 71.8 258. Calañgi, Mateo C. 73 93 71 87 70 66 69 62 71.8 259. Canda, Benjamin S. 72 71 77 90 62 75 66 82 71.95 260. Cantoria, Eulogio 71 80 71 89 70 55 72 75 71 261. Capacio, Jr., Conrado 67 78 71 90 65 75 72 60 70.65 262. Capitulo, Alejandro P. 75 70 53 87 78 63 76 91 71.2 MRP-263. Calupitan, Jr., Alfredo 75 93 81 76 64 75 68 56 73.15 MRP-264. Caluya, Arsenio V. 75 86 70 87 77 52 77 82 73.9 MRP-265. Campanilla, Mariano B. 80 75 78 77 73 71 63 76 73.65 MRP-266. Campos, Juan A. 66 85 83 84 67 61 80 57 73.25 267. Cardoso, Angelita G. 78 71 73 76 79 56 69 60 71.8 268. Cartagena, Herminio R. 71 72 65 89 64 73 80 70 71.65

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MRP-269. Castro, Daniel T. 65 75 77 76 85 60 75 69 73.15 270. Cauntay, Gaudencio V. 70 78 72 73 77 69 64 80 71.2 271. Castro, Pedro L. de 70 68 69 87 76 75 72 70 73.35 272. Cerio, Juan A. 75 82 75 86 60 54 76 75 71.75 273. Colorado, Alfonso R. 68 75 80 74 77 66 67 80 72.6 274. Chavez, Doroteo M. 73 65 79 84 73 69 66 84 73.1 275. Chavez, Honorato A. 77 76 79 86 74 53 71 75 73.65 MRP-276. Cobangbang, Orlando B. 69 81 74 82 76 61 78 80 73.85 277. Cortez, Armando R. 78 60 88 86 60 66 69 64 73.1 278. Crisostomo, Jesus L. 76 87 74 76 62 55 76 66 71.45 MRP-279. Cornejo, Crisanto R. 68 87 78 86 79 50 80 60 73.7 MRP-280. Cruz, Raymundo 75 81 79 85 72 57 68 75 72.95 MRP-281. Cunanan, Jose C. 78 92 63 83 76 72 68 65 72.4 282. Cunanan, Salvador F. 70 82 64 92 67 75 73 76 71.45 283. Cimafranca, Agustin B. 71 76 76 80 70 71 75 71 73.35 284. Crisol, Getulio R. 70 91 78 85 68 55 71 50 70.8 MRP-285. Dusi, Felicisimo R. 76 82 69 82 66 62 80 71 72.85 MRP-286. Datu, Alfredo J. 70 75 72 86 80 55 68 79 71.5 287. Dacuma, Luis B. 71 67 87 83 71 50 65 70 71.25 MRP-288. Degamo, Pedro R. 73 80 82 74 80 67 67 57 73.65 289. Delgado, Vicente N. 70 84 82 84 77 52 73 50 72.65 MRP-290. Diolazo, Ernesto A. 75 83 86 73 54 54 75 75 72.25 291. Dionisio, Jr., Guillermo 73 84 64 89 71 78 75 66 72.8 MRP-292. Dichoso, Alberto M. 71 77 71 81 69 75 80 70 73.65 MRP-293. Dipasupil, Claudio R. 70 76 82 73 79 70 72 56 73.9 MRP-294. Delgado, Abner 75 84 63 67 64 60 70 72 68.35 MRP-295. Domingo, Dominador T. 70 69 81 82 68 63 71 75 72.2 296. Ducusin, Agapito B. 70 78 53 88 75 77 62 76 68.05 MRP-297. Duque, Antonio S. 75 77 78 86 76 72 64 75 73.9 298. Duque, Castulo 75 80 73 83 66 67 65 66 70.65 299. Ebbah, Percival B. 70 80 85 76 66 63 76 75 73.95 300. Edisa, Sulpicio 65 77 75 89 75 62 75 65 72 301. Edradan, Rosa C. 70 75 84 84 71 59 69 86 73.4 MRP-302. Enage, Jacinto N. 66 70 88 93 72 67 65 75 73.2 MRP-303. Encarnacion, Alfonso B. 75 86 73 81 63 77 69 75 72.65 304. Encarnacion, Cesar 65 78 58 68 66 64 75 78 67.1 305. Estoista, Agustin A. 78 76 74 86 58 67 70 76 71.7 MRP-306. Fabros, Jose B. 66 75 80 82 80 71 67 70 73.05 MRP-307. Fajardo, Balbino P. 77 69 82 83 65 60 75 75 73.9 308. Fajardo, Genaro P. 70 79 77 79 79 50 73 75 72.5

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309. Evangelista, Felicidad P. 75 75 72 87 63 63 77 70 72.15 310. Familara, Raymundo Z. 68 75 87 83 64 65 68 65 71.85 311. Fariñas, Dionisio 70 78 89 66 65 75 70 50 72.75 312. Favila, Hilario B. 71 84 74 70 75 67 73 59 72.2 MRP-313. Feliciano, Alberto I. 71 69 70 85 69 81 72 70 72.25 MRP-314. Fernando, Lope F. 73 77 86 79 70 76 64 50 73 MRP-315. Flores, Dionisio S. 78 72 77 83 67 60 68 73 72.05 MRP-316. Fortich, Benjamin B. 70 82 70 70 78 65 64 75 70.35 MRP-317. Fuente, Jose S. de la 76 88 72 74 60 71 79 79 73.55 318. Fohmantes, Nazario S. 72 79 71 77 68 61 76 60 70.9 MRP-319. Fuggan, Lorenzo B. 76 81 74 69 71 71 73 60 72.85 320. Gabuya, Jesus S. 70 83 82 83 70 63 75 65 73.75 321. Galang, Victor N. 69 83 84 76 70 57 71 60 71.95 322. Gaerlan, Manuel L. 73 87 77 90 67 61 72 75 73.15 323. Galem, Nestor R. 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05 324. Gallardo, Jose Pe B. 75 88 75 75 63 70 70 65 71.85 MRP-325. Gallos, Cirilo B. 70 78 84 91 80 51 65 70 72.85 326. Galindo, Eulalio D. 70 89 87 65 78 71 62 62 73.4 327. Galman, Patrocinio G. 72 72 80 85 71 56 70 53 71.15 328. Gamalinda, Carlos S. 76 79 81 86 67 63 69 55 72.55 329. Gamboa, Antonio G. 71 67 70 72 76 60 75 68 70.95 330. Gannod, Jose A. 69 80 75 81 68 62 73 68 71.25 MRP-331. Garcia, Matias N. 67 78 74 90 79 59 76 65 72.8 MRP-332. Ganete, Carmelo 75 87 77 82 74 57 68 81 73.3 333. Gilbang, Gaudioso R. 75 67 80 82 67 57 64 70 70.5 334. Gofredo, Claro C. 68 78 72 86 78 52 70 76 70.9 335. Gomez, Jose S. 71 76 71 81 76 63 69 62 70.85 MRP-336. Gosiaoco, Lorenzo V. 68 93 85 78 64 69 70 54 72.35 MRP-337. Gonzales, Rafael C. 77 75 71 89 55 70 70 60 70.05 MRP-338. Gracia, Eulalia L. de 66 68 90 84 77 59 69 65 73.3 339. Grageda, Jose M. A. 70 85 72 67 70 60 73 73 70.75 340. Guzman, Juan de 75 86 69 84 64 79 75 76 73.6 MRP-341. Guzman, Mateo de 76 79 79 73 72 69 68 80 73.9 342. Guzman, Salvador B. 71 61 74 72 61 66 78 75 70.75 343. Guzman, Salvador T. de 75 84 64 81 74 61 78 58 71.75 344. Habelito, Geronimo E. 71 76 71 87 73 60 67 55 69.65 345. Hedriana, Naterno G. 75 68 84 76 66 58 76 60 72.9 346. Hernandez, Quintin B. 67 75 72 81 72 72 66 76 70.6 1952 347. Homeres, Agustin R. 73 84 65 86 70 77 63 76 70.7

L e g a l E t h i c s 2 0 1 5 | 32


348. Ines, Leonilo F. 65 88 71 88 77 73 61 70 70.55 349. Jamer, Alipio S. 68 75 83 89 80 61 65 50 72 MRP-350. Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 75 65 68 85 76 70 83 54 73.8 MRP-351. Jardinico, Jr., Emilio 73 86 72 78 82 67 67 64 72.8 MRP-352. Jaen, Justiniano F. 76 75 78 84 71 66 70 77 73.85 353. Jaring, Antonio S. 72 77 79 70 72 57 71 50 70.75 MRP-354. Javier, Aquilino M. 75 84 79 78 77 61 66 66 73.05 355. Jomuad, Francisco 75 75 72 88 78 58 76 43 72.4 MRP-356. Jose, Nestor L. 78 61 64 73 68 76 64 80 69.7 357. La Q, Jose M. 75 71 75 72 70 67 81 59 73.5 358. Leon, Brigido C. de 67 75 78 91 78 51 72 80 72.55 359. Leones, Constante B. 68 81 79 84 73 60 77 60 73 360. Liboro, Horacio T. 72 69 80 87 73 62 70 61 72.4 361. Llanera, Cesar L. 77 81 80 78 64 59 75 63 73 362. Lomontod, Jose P. 75 76 69 70 73 76 74 75 73.2 363. Luna, Lucito 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 68.4 MRP-364. Luz, Lauro L. 76 90 78 88 64 58 75 77 73.95 MRP-365. Macasaet, Tomas S. 73 81 72 83 66 75 72 70 72.5 366. Magbiray, Godofredo V. 80 67 84 76 70 62 65 68 73.05 367. Majarais, Rodolfo P. 70 62 64 82 88 75 71 79 72.85 MRP-368. Makabenta, Eduardo 75 90 77 83 59 71 72 78 73.3 MRP-369. Malapit, Justiniano S. 74 83 74 89 58 60 72 76 71.1 370. Maloles, Iluminado M. 70 87 73 76 77 50 76 76 72.3 371. Maniquis, Daniel R. 75 80 73 91 69 71 65 70 72.1 372. Maraña, Arsenio 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.9 373. Marasigan, Napoleon 75 71 83 75 69 62 69 70 72.75 MRP-374. Marco, Jaime P. 75 67 74 76 64 75 75 57 71.9 MRP-375. Martir, Osmundo P. 70 86 76 78 72 71 75 53 72.95 MRP-376. Masancay, Amando E. 73 87 75 77 72 50 78 80 73.2 MRP-377. Mati-ong, Ignacio T. 62 87 72 79 73 76 69 77 71.3 378. Mara, Guillermo L. 70 78 78 89 75 67 66 65 72.35 MRP-379. Mercado, Felipe A. 73 77 82 82 78 52 69 85 73.9 MRP-380. Miculob, Eugenio P. 70 82 73 86 77 52 79 65 72.8 381. Mison, Rafael M. Jr., 79 78 73 75 71 68 69 53 71.95 MRP-382. Monponbanua, Antonio D. 79 79 68 88 64 78 69 83 73.1 MRP-383. Montero, Leodegario C. 72 89 69 89 70 68 70 75 72.15 384. Morada, Servillano S. 75 76 67 71 65 66 75 76 70.9 385. Mocorro, Generoso 78 84 78 84 60 73 68 70 73 MRP-386. Mosquera, Estanislao L. 75 78 75 85 72 55 77 66 73.15 387. Motus, Rodentor P. 80 78 70 94 72 75 70 57 73.75

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388. Macario, Pedro R. 70 67 74 86 78 63 72 66 72.15 MRP-389. Nadela, Geredion T. 72 64 64 81 73 50 75 75 69.15 MRP-390. Nazareno, Romeo P. 67 70 71 76 76 79 75 57 72.05 391. Nieto, Benedicto S. 69 79 77 77 72 62 76 76 72.9 MRP-392. Noguera, Raymundo 71 86 81 80 73 56 72 70 73.15 MRP-393. Nodado, Domiciano R. 70 70 69 73 57 37 64 72 63.6 394. Nono, Pacifico G. 67 77 78 67 75 59 71 76 71.35 MRP-395. Nuval, Manuel R. 78 72 67 90 72 68 78 67 73.65 396. Ocampo, Augusto 75 90 77 72 69 55 65 67 60.7 397. Oliveros, Amado A. 72 75 68 72 84 50 75 79 71.9 398. Opiña, Jr., Pedro 76 77 74 67 73 66 68 70 71.85 MRP-399. Olaviar, Jose O. 70 62 85 81 74 50 68 79 71.8 MRP-400. Olandesca, Per O. 70 91 76 87 72 66 70 79 73.45 401. Orden, Apolonio J. 72 65 84 86 66 50 72 68 71.45 402. Ortiz, Melencio T. 71 75 78 81 66 67 70 78 72.1 MRP-403. Pablo, Fedelino S. 72 64 76 86 72 61 76 75 72.95 404. Pacifico, Vicente V. 76 79 69 80 76 52 72 80 71.95 MRP-405. Paderna, Perfecto D. 75 69 72 75 78 58 75 70 72.6 406. Padlan, Crispin M. 71 66 76 79 68 67 74 66 71.65 407. Padilla, Jose C. 70 65 67 82 78 75 78 75 73.3 408. Padilla, Jr., Estanislao E. 71 88 78 86 59 75 78 50 72.95 MRP-409. Palma, Bartolome 67 81 80 82 71 75 69 75 73.25 MRP-410. Papa, Angel A. 75 72 85 85 77 59 63 71 73.45 MRP-411. Parayno, Mario V. 71 88 74 89 69 66 76 73 73.65 412. Pariña, Santos L. 70 87 85 77 64 67 63 76 71.85 MRP-413. Pasion, Anastacio 63 80 68 81 82 79 76 58 72.55 414. Pastrana, Rizal R. 69 76 71 76 68 63 77 83 71.65 MRP-415. Paulin, Jose O. 70 66 80 87 75 50 65 80 70.9 MRP-416. Pelaez, Jr., Vicente C. 79 87 73 83 69 71 68 65 73.2 417. Peña, Jesus 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4 418. Perez, Toribio R. 71 64 81 92 69 58 67 70 71.25 419. Pestaño, Melquiades 77 81 74 87 59 68 76 75 73.2 MRP-420. Pido, Serafin C. 77 81 72 82 69 71 60 75 71.15 421. Pinlac, Filemon 67 76 74 86 65 79 65 72 70.55 422. Poblete, Celso B. 72 79 82 76 66 64 74 50 72.15 MRP-423. Piza, Luz 68 70 75 87 74 67 64 75 70.8 424. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 80 81 69 72 53 67 70 71.05 425. Quetulio, Josefina D. 75 90 60 93 64 78 76 83 72.9 MRP-426. Quipanes, Melchor V. 69 88 79 82 65 62 71 66 71.55 MRP-427. Quietson, Bayani R. 73 75 76 77 70 81 71 53 72.85

L e g a l E t h i c s 2 0 1 5 | 34


428. Racho, Macario D. 68 75 81 82 78 53 66 54 70.55 429. Ramirez, Sabas P. 71 80 73 87 62 62 75 80 71.65 MRP-430. Raffiñan, Jose A. 80 83 79 79 62 72 68 65 73.25 MRP-431. Ramos, Patricio S. 75 87 76 75 72 72 61 75 72.25 MRP-432. Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 78 84 76 90 48 75 80 65 73.45 MRP-433. Raro, Celso 75 81 76 67 75 77 55 77 71.4 MRP-434. Rayos, Victor S. 75 86 79 91 71 67 67 70 73.9 435. Revilla, Mariano S. 75 78 81 90 70 54 69 81 73.35 436. Reyes, Abdon L. 72 64 81 78 76 73 69 53 72.85 437. Reyes, Domingo B. 72 87 78 83 72 75 62 70 72.7 438. Reyes, Francisco M. 75 85 84 68 75 71 68 50 73.9 439. Reyes, Lozano M. 80 57 78 79 78 65 64 79 73.35 MRP-440. Reyes, Oscar R. 75 75 82 82 76 64 68 60 73.65 441. Rigonan, Cesar V. 71 85 65 86 75 70 76 70 72.7 442. Rivera, Honorio 71 56 70 90 71 65 75 71 71.2 MRP-443. Rivero, Buenaventura A. 72 88 72 94 68 73 66 80 72.6 MRP-444. Robles, Enrique 75 77 75 77 82 64 69 70 73.7 445. Rodriguez, Orestes

Arellano 76 75 76 63 69 77 65 78 72.25

446. Roldan, Jose V. 67 80 79 83 73 71 75 70 73.9 447. Rosario, Adelaida R. del 80 75 65 70 68 72 80 70 73.15 448. Rosario, Restituto F. del 75 75 79 90 68 65 66 63 72.1 MRP-449. Sabelino, Conrado S. 71 81 69 75 77 71 75 70 72.95 450. San Juan, Damaso 77 86 72 89 59 76 65 72 71.6 451. Sañiel, Felix L. 72 93 76 80 67 75 66 62 72.1 452. Samaniego, Jesus B. 75 80 76 72 60 67 68 70 70.6 MRP-453. Sandoval, Emmanuel M. 75 83 70 83 77 67 77 60 73.95 MRP-454. Sanidad, Emmanuel Q. 71 75 81 90 62 64 76 68 72.95 455. Santiago, Jr., Cristobal 75 76 84 93 63 65 59 70 71.8 456. Santillan, Juanito Ll. 76 89 83 83 63 58 65 52 71.25 MRP-457. Santos, Rodolfo C. 75 75 78 82 73 76 66 70 73.7 MRP-458. Santos, Ruperto M. 67 54 69 76 63 64 71 60 66.75 MRP-459. Santos, Aquilino C. 72 71 73 79 73 79 71 85 73.8 MRP-460. Santos, Rufino A. 75 81 79 85 74 72 66 54 73.3 461. Suanding, Bantas 75 67 67 92 79 59 76 76 73.1 MRP-462. Sulit, Feliz M. 76 79 76 78 72 75 68 67 73.5 463. Songco, Felicisimo G. 70 68 82 84 60 69 76 65 73.35 464. Soriano, Aniceto S. 64 79 77 80 80 53 70 65 70.7 465. Suarez, Pablo D. 73 85 70 87 76 70 64 70 71.9 MRP-466. Sybico, Jesus L. 79 70 70 72 75 75 72 60 73.05

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467. Tabaque, Benjamin R. 69 68 77 79 74 68 72 60 71.85 MRP-468. Tan Kiang, Clarita 81 79 72 80 62 75 73 80 73.95 MRP-469. Tando, Amado T. 71 82 78 83 71 61 71 60 72 470. Tasico, Severo E. 71 69 75 89 70 75 67 63 71.65 471. Tiburcio, Ismael P. 73 82 72 93 76 57 68 54 71.15 MRP-472. Tiongson, Federico T. 70 70 76 84 77 75 75 50 73.45 MRP-473. Tolentino, Jesus C. 75 89 63 84 85 73 73 50 73.4 474. Torrijas, Alfredo A. 77 66 67 83 68 75 71 63 71.3 MRP-475. Tobias, Artemio M. 69 58 74 81 71 55 65 57 67.55 MRP-476. Trillana, Jr., Apolonio 76 86 76 86 70 68 75 50 73.8 MRP-477. Trinidad, Manuel O. 66 91 83 75 63 66 67 65 70.8 478. Trinidad, Pedro O. 66 78 78 85 78 51 64 75 70.8 MRP-479. Udarbe, Flavio J. 80 82 77 82 67 56 68 75 72.6 480. Umali, Osmundo C. 68 75 81 80 71 69 68 60 71.7 481. Umayam, Juanito C. 77 75 87 85 56 56 66 60 71 MRP-482. Usita, Gelacio U. 75 72 75 74 73 76 71 70 73.55 483. Valino, Francisco M. 72 81 80 84 62 78 71 75 73.7 484. Varela, Dominador M. 67 75 81 86 72 57 81 70 73.85 485. Vega, Macairog L. de 78 62 79 87 70 70 71 65 73.8 MRP-486. Velasco, Emmanuel D. 71 80 74 85 60 66 76 76 71.85 487. Velez, Maria E. 73 70 89 80 56 50 72 67 71.05 MRP-488. Venal, Artemio V. 78 91 58 67 76 55 75 73 73.65 489. Venus, Conrado B. 69 81 74 85 62 66 72 77 77.05 MRP-490. Verzosa, Federico B. 75 79 72 88 76 68 74 59 73.7 MRP-491. Villafuerte, Eduardo V. 75 83 70 76 64 64 75 65 71.2 MRP-492. Villanueva, Cecilio C. 75 85 79 88 66 77 67 70 73.95 493. Villar, Custodio R. 73 69 70 88 76 66 69 50 70.75 MRP-494. Villaseñor, Leonidas F. 80 85 67 77 62 75 76 73 73.15 495. Viterbo, Jose H. 80 77 65 93 70 65 65 65 70.65 496. Yaranon, Pedro 70 77 76 85 72 50 75 75 71.85 MRP-497. Yasay, Mariano R. 75 75 72 76 63 77 70 60 71.1 MRP-498. Ygay, Venancio M. 73 80 83 84 62 59 72 77 72.65 499. Yulo, Jr., Teodoro 73 82 78 75 60 81 75 75 73.95 500. Zamora, Alberto 70 65 76 79 62 77 69 82 71.3 501. Rigonan, Felipe C. 70 79 69 89 76 62 71 64 71.2

A list of those who petitioned for the consolidation of their grades in subjects passed in previous examinations, showing the years in which they took the examinations together with their grades and averages, and those who had filed motions for reconsideration which were denied, indicated by the initials MRD, follows:

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 72

L e g a l E t h i c s 2 0 1 5 | 36


Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen. Av.

1. Amao, Sulpicio M.

1946 68 67 76 76 73 73 49 50 66.5

1950 59 80 67 77 62 80 71 57 67.4

2. Baldo, Olegario Ga.

1951 65 76 58 55 59 63 75 72 64.9

1952 65 68 75 84 72 59 73 57 69.75

1953 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7

3. Blanco, Jose B.

MRD-1949 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.15

1951 64 71 58 65 68 70 75 71 66.95

4. Condeno, Mateo

1950 71 80 62 75 75 81 55 92 69.3

1951 70 60 61 65 77 64 67 81 67.85

5. Ducusin, Agapito B.

MRD-1949 69 70 76 73 76 71 55 60 68.65

1950 60 71 55 67 67 75 56 89 68.1

6. Garcia, Manuel N.

MRD-1949 60 70 82 79 70 69 60 80 69.25

1950 57 65 51 69 54 85 56 84 60.3

7. Luna, Lucito A.

1946 63 53 69 76 75 76 57 69 66.55

1952 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 68.4

8. Maraña, Arsenio s.

1949 72 68 68 75 75 72 60 75 69.35

1952 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.9

9. Montano, Manuel M.

1951 61 60 58 60 70 63 75 64 64.8

1952 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 66.4

1953 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65

10. Peña, Jesus S.

1950 25 75 45 75 45 52 46 71 46.2

1951 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 66.4

1952 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4

11. Placido, Sr., Isidro

1950 68 78 70 75 69 70 58 69 67.75

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1951 65 62 75 60 73 57 75 71 66.8

12. Rementizo, Filemon S.

1949 65 75 72 75 60 75 55 85 66.65

1951 68 57 48 60 91 66 55 75 64.05

1952 68 53 68 67 58 56 75 64 65.7

13. Amao, Sulpicio M.

1952 67 80 51 69 69 77 73 53 66.35

1953 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9

14. Rodulfa, Juan T.

1951 67 60 70 65 68 56 75 66 67.75

1952 70 71 67 78 67 75 71 70 70.1

15. Sanchez, Juan J.

1948 39 69 82 75 76 72 55 50 63.5

MRD-1949 67 56 69 75 72 77 60 75 68

1951 70 59 55 60 68 57 78 67 65.8

16. Santos, Constantino

1952 62 76 54 82 72 77 66 65 66.65

1953 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4

17. Santos, Salvador H.

1951 60 64 55 70 68 52 70 75 62.85

1952 75 64 70 81 76 55 61 75 69.1

1953 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70

18. Sevilla, Macario C.

MRD-1948 50 64 76 66 66 69 60 52 63.1

MRD-1949 47 66 78 64 71 86 65 85 68

1950 35 65 40 75 63 57 27 49 45

MRD-1951 68 59 72 55 69 65 75 75 69.3

1953 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.05

Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, while some candidates--85 in all--presented motions for reconsideration of their grades, others invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 972. A list of those candidates separating those who filed mere motions for reconsideration (56) from those who invoked the aforesaid Republic act, is as follows:

1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.

Av. 1. Acenas, Calixto R. 73 70 68 62 82 51 67 77 73.45 2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8

L e g a l E t h i c s 2 0 1 5 | 38


3. Alejandro, Exequiel 67 72 71 75 80 76 75 77 73.4 4. Andres, Gregorio M. 70 73 86 58 79 50 71 78 72.7 5. Arnaiz, Antonio E. 66 80 76 58 79 68 77 81 73.4 6. Asis, Floriano U. de 66 78 75 81 77 55 73 69 71.25 7. Bacaiso, Celestino M. 71 65 76 68 76 50 75 70 70.95 8. Bala, Florencio F. 64 82 47 70 82 58 75 82 67 9. Baldo, Olegario A. 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7 10. Barrios, Benjamin O. 65 71 76 75 80 62 83 73 73.95 11. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35 12. Burgos, Dominador C. 72 80 89 61 66 37 69 68 70.05 13. Cariño, Eldo J. 79 81 60 75 74 74 76 74 73 14. Casar, Dimapuro 67 73 84 79 77 61 71 74 73.35 15. Castañeda, Gregorio 70 73 80 71 75 70 73 78 73.95 16. Estrellado, Benjamin R. 67 79 64 73 82 62 71 74 70.2 17. Fabunan, Edilberto C. 70 72 68 69 77 60 76 74 71.1 18. Feril, Domingo B. 75 71 84 65 70 60 65 70 71.6 19. Fernandez, Alejandro G. 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8 20. Gapus, Rosita S. (Miss) 76 80 86 77 64 74 66 69 73.9 21. Garcia, Rafael B. 70 86 70 75 73 63 73 75 71.65 22. Gracia, Miguel L. de 73 68 75 59 80 51 72 71 71 23. Gungon, Armando G. 68 76 76 84 77 57 77 83 73.6 24. Gutierrez, Antonio S. 68 77 66 70 72 59 71 74 69.1 25. Ilejay, Abraham I. 77 70 76 77 81 62 70 68 73.7 26. Leon, Benjamin La. De 66 66 75 70 77 55 71 82 70.35 27. Lugtu, Felipe L. 62 70 78 65 78 56 69 81 69.9 28. Lukman, Abdul-Hamid 76 64 67 69 73 59 73 75 70.45 29. Maloles, Jr., Benjamin G. 77 76 68 68 71 51 75 78 70.85 30. Maloles, Julius G. 77 71 60 71 79 62 68 72 69.75 31. Mandi, Santiago P. 65 76 70 61 79 68 75 72 71.1 32. Margete, Rufino C. 70 76 66 75 85 73 71 75 72.75 33. Melocoton, Nestorio B. 70 81 73 78 83 52 72 75 72.35 34. Molina, Manuel C. 75 78 70 61 75 63 66 85 70.95 35. Muñoz, Mariano A. 75 80 86 67 74 57 68 76 73.75 36. Navarro, Buenaventura M. 80 75 65 75 83 55 73 79 73 37. Nodado, Domiciano R. 60 67 67 50 70 50 56 75 61.7 38. Papas, Sisenando B. 65 62 71 61 70 56 66 67 66 39. Pagulayan-Sy, Fernando 63 75 71 62 83 67 70 72 70.4 40. Padula, Benjamin C. 70 77 54 62 74 78 75 68 69.05 41. Pasno, Enrique M. 78 72 66 54 71 58 72 78 69.85 42. Peña, Jr., Narciso 70 95 81 78 67 66 67 73 72.55

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43. Peralta, Rodolfo P. 70 70 52 81 68 63 59 69 63.7 44. Pigar, Leopoldo R. 76 75 78 61 72 72 71 79 73.75 45. Publico, Paciano L. 68 69 76 76 70 59 74 67 70.6 46. Radaza, Leovigildo 75 78 76 61 77 50 71 86 72.2 47. Ramos, Bernardo M. 64 62 75 93 81 52 66 80 70.1 48. Rabaino, Andres D. 68 72 75 73 78 55 69 76 70.65 49. Ravanera, Oscar N. 70 77 80 71 82 62 69 78 73.6 50. Renovilla, Jose M. 65 75 80 68 79 52 62 78 69.5 51. Sabaot, Solomon B. 69 73 80 69 82 69 69 79 73.85 52. Sumaway, Ricardo S. 66 76 69 76 74 56 72 68 69.1 53. Torrefiel, Sofronio O. 70 77 74 75 73 50 68 72 69.55 54. Vera, Federico V. de 60 61 47 77 69 50 67 77 60.9 55. Viray, Venancio Bustos 65 67 67 52 73 64 71 65 67.15 56. Ylaya, Angela P. (Miss) 63 70 56 75 68 54 70 77 64.5

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972 Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.

Av.

1. Ala, Narciso 70 71 73 59 73 74 81 77 73.5 2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8 3. Arellano, Antonio L. 74 66 73 60 78 63 78 72 72.9 4. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35 5. Calautit, Celestino R. 71 78 84 75 75 61 68 72 73.2 6. Casuncad, Sulvio P. 61 73 82 69 81 68 71 84 73.05 7. Enriquez, Pelagio y

Concepcion 84 69 76 75 82 50 58 79 72.05

8. Estonina, Severino 80 74 64 89 81 56 68 82 72.4 9. Fernandez, Alejandro Q. 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8 10. Fernandez, Luis N. 70 75 77 75 78 67 72 73 73.35 11. Figueroa, Alfredo A. 70 75 87 78 75 50 68 68 72.3 12. Formilleza, Pedro 65 75 89 68 83 51 70 75 73.25 13. Garcia, Manuel M. 69 68 83 83 73 62 62 70 71 14. Grospe, Vicente E. 68 75 78 66 79 61 69 82 71.6 15. Galema, Nestor R. (1952) 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05 16. Jacobo, Rafael F. 76 76 75 74 76 50 72 76 72.3 17. Macalindong, Reinerio L. 67 77 79 79 74 72 68 77 72.75 18. Mangubat, Antonio M. 70 70 78 61 80 74 62 70 71.45 19. Montano, Manuel M. 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65 20. Plomantes, Marcos 73 67 74 58 68 70 76 71 71.6 21. Ramos, Eugenio R. 70 80 76 67 72 69 72 79 72.6

L e g a l E t h i c s 2 0 1 5 | 40


22. Reyes, Juan R. 71 73 77 76 81 59 72 74 73.2 23. Reyes, Santiago R. 65 78 83 60 76 75 70 70 72.9 24. Rivera, Eulogio J. 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9 25. Santos, Constantino P. 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4 26. Santos, Salvador H. 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70 27. Sevilla, Macario C. 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.05 28. Villavicencio, Jose A. 78 75 70 67 69 77 64 77 73.2 29. Viray, Ruperto G. 76 73 76 73 80 58 68 83 73.25

There are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 directly affected by this resolution. Adding 490 candidates who have not presented any petition, they reach a total of 1,094.

The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972

As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing general average in the bar examination of august and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949; maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but raising to 75 per cent those who obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused the introduction in 1951, in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, concerning the admission of attorneys-at-law to the practice of the profession. The amendments embrace many interesting matters, but those referring to sections 14 and 16 immediately concern us. The proposed amendment is as follows:

SEC. 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject. In determining the average, the foregoing subjects shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration and Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political Law, 10 per cent; International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful candidates shall not be required to take another examination in any subject in which they have obtained a rating of 70 per cent or higher and such rating shall be taken into account in determining their general average in any subsequent examinations: Provided, however, That if the candidate fails to get a general average of 70 per cent in his third examination, he shall lose the benefit of having already passed some subjects and shall be required to the examination in all the subjects.

SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — Any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without falling below 50 per cent in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).

With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us being:

It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be compelled to repeat even those subjects which they have previously passed. This is not the case in any other government examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been amended in this measure to give a candidate due credit for any subject which he has previously passed with a rating of 75 per cent or higher."

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Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the President requested the comments of this Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was signed by seven Justices while three chose to refrain from making any and one took no part. With regards to the matter that interests us, the Court said:

The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment provides that if a bar candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in any subject, although failing to pass the examination, he need not be examined in said subject in his next examination. This is a sort of passing the Bar Examination on the installment plan, one or two or three subjects at a time. The trouble with this proposed system is that although it makes it easier and more convenient for the candidate because he may in an examination prepare himself on only one or two subjects so as to insure passing them, by the time that he has passed the last required subjects, which may be several years away from the time that he reviewed and passed the firs subjects, he shall have forgotten the principles and theories contained in those subjects and remembers only those of the one or two subjects that he had last reviewed and passed. This is highly possible because there is nothing in the law which requires a candidate to continue taking the Bar examinations every year in succession. The only condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan, must pass the examination in no more that three installments; but there is no limitation as to the time or number of years intervening between each examination taken. This would defeat the object and the requirements of the law and the Court in admitting persons to the practice of law. When a person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and presupposed that he possesses the knowledge and proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law subjects required in bar examinations, so as presently to be able to practice the legal profession and adequately render the legal service required by prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the candidates who may have obtained a passing grade on any five subjects eight years ago, another three subjects one year later, and the last two subjects the present year. We believe that the present system of requiring a candidate to obtain a passing general average with no grade in any subject below 50 per cent is more desirable and satisfactory. It requires one to be all around, and prepared in all required legal subjects at the time of admission to the practice of law.

x x x x x x x x x

We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment provides that any application who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office. In other words, Bar candidates who obtained not less than 70 per cent in any examination since the year 1946 without failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite their non-admission to the Bar by the Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a passing general average in any of those years, will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only prospective but retroactive in its effects.

We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding amendment that we are not exactly in favor of reducing the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent to govern even in the future. As to the validity of making such reduction retroactive, we have serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of the fact that after every bar examinations, the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a passing general average grade, but also rejecting and denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The present amendment would have the effect of repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of those who may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or more but less than the general passing average fixed for that

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year. It is clear that this question involves legal implications, and this phase of the amendment if finally enacted into law might have to go thru a legal test. As one member of the Court remarked during the discussion, when a court renders a decision or promulgate a resolution or order on the basis of and in accordance with a certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final decision, order, or resolution already promulgated, in the sense of revoking or rendering it void and of no effect.

Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of the bar are officers of the courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to the Bar, the Supreme Court impliedly regards him as a person fit, competent and qualified to be its officer. Conversely, when it refused and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate who in any year since 1946 may have obtained a general average of 70 per cent but less than that required for that year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally and impliedly considered and declared that he was not prepared, ready, competent and qualified to be its officer. The present amendment giving retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general average runs counter to all these acts and resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically and in effect says that a candidate not accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its officer because he was unprepared, undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless and in spite of all, must be admitted and allowed by this Court to serve as its officer. We repeat, that this is another important aspect of the question to be carefully and seriously considered.

The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:

I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of the legal profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved, however, by admitting to practice precisely a special class who have failed in the bar examination, Moreover, the bill contains provisions to which I find serious fundamental objections.

Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribed the corresponding oath of office. This provision constitutes class legislation, benefiting as it does specifically one group of persons, namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar examinations.

The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the Supreme Court made in accordance with the law then in force. It should be noted that after every bar examination the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a passing general average but also rejecting and denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The provision under consideration would have the effect of revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of those who may have failed to obtain the passing average fixed for that year. Said provision also sets a bad precedent in that the Government would be morally obliged to grant a similar privilege to those who have failed in the examinations for admission to other professions such as medicine, engineering, architecture and certified public accountancy.

Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was not repassed by 2/3 vote of each House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:

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AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO AND INCLUDING 1953

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to the August 1951 Bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; 74 per cent in 1955 bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar; Provided, however, That 75 per cent passing general average shall be restored in all succeeding examinations; and Provided, finally, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar examination after July 4, 1945 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.

With the following explanatory note:

This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to afford another opportunity to those who feel themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946 to 1951 when those who would otherwise have passed the bar examination but were arbitrarily not so considered by altering its previous decisions of the passing mark. The Supreme Court has been altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In order to cure the apparent arbitrary fixing of passing grades and to give satisfaction to all parties concerned, it is proposed in this bill a gradual increase in the general averages for passing the bar examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar examination, 71 per cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination, 73 percent; and for 1955 bar examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be restored with the condition that the candidate shall not obtain in any subject a grade of below 50 per cent. The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade, is the tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation. It is believed that by 1956 the preparation of our students as well as the available reading materials will be under normal conditions, if not improved from those years preceding the last world war.

In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed the supervision as well as the administration of the study of law which was objected to by the President in the Bar Bill of 1951.

The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that the bill would admit to the practice of law "a special class who failed in the bar examination". He

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considered the bill a class legislation. This contention, however, is not, in good conscience, correct because Congress is merely supplementing what the Supreme Court have already established as precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the passing mark of those who took the Bar examination in 1947. These bar candidates for who this bill should be enacted, considered themselves as having passed the bar examination on the strength of the established precedent of our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the insurmountable difficulties and handicaps which they were unavoidably placed. We believe that such precedent cannot or could not have been altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court, without giving due consideration to the rights already accrued or vested in the bar candidates who took the examination when the precedent was not yet altered, or in effect, was still enforced and without being inconsistent with the principles of their previous resolutions.

If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative act or corrective statute which Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of a "valid classification" as against class legislation, is very expressed in the following American Jurisprudence:

A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the class, all who possess a common disability, attribute, or classification, and there must be a "natural" and substantial differentiation between those included in the class and those it leaves untouched. When a class is accepted by the Court as "natural" it cannot be again split and then have the dissevered factions of the original unit designated with different rules established for each. (Fountain Park Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).

Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new conditions which must be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of a class. If so, the correcting statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect only a few. If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The constitution does not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It permits them when there are special evils with which the general laws are incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will sustain the special form. . . . The problem in the last analysis is one of legislative policy, with a wide margin of discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there be revision by the court. (In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932)

This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroacts to the extent of the care of correction only as in this case from 1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated from the rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of Court.

For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended. (Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID Senator

Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above transcribed. The President again asked the comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:

Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the information that, with respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the Court are taking the same views they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951, contained in the first indorsement of the undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to the Assistant Executive Secretary.

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(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS

The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass without vetoing it, by virtue of which it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered 972 (many times erroneously cited as No. 974).

It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both the President and the author of the Bill were candidates for re-election, together, however, they lost in the polls.

Separate Opinions

LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:

The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this Court, because lawyers are members of the Court and only this Court should be allowed to determine admission thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit is judicial in the sense that discretion is used in is exercise. This power should be distinguished from the power to promulgate rules which regulate admission. It is only this power (to promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in the Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise of the discretion to admit or not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of examination, the qualifications of applicants, the passing grades, etc. are within the scope of the legislative power. But the power to determine when a candidate has made or has not made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely with this Court.

I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond the scope of the congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that candidates who obtain a general average of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be considered as having passed the examination, is to mean exercise of the privilege and discretion judged in this Court. It is a mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for different years with grades lower than the passing mark. No reasoning is necessary to show that it is an arrogation of the Court's judicial authority and discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as discriminatory. Why should those taking the examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to have the privilege of a lower passing grade, while those taking earlier or later are not?

I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the rule-making power of Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power of this Court to admit members thereof, and because it is discriminatory.

PARAS, C.J., dissenting:

Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate "may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject.' This passing mark has always been adhered to, with certain exception presently to be specified.

With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list of successful candidates included only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more. Upon motion for reconsideration, however, 12 candidates with general averages ranging from 72 to 73 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18, 1946. In the examinations of November, 1946 the list first released containing the names of successful candidates covered only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon motion for reconsideration, 19 candidates with a general

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average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of March 31, 1947. This would indicate that in the original list of successful candidates those having a general average of 73 per cent or more but below 75 per cent were included. After the original list of 1947 successful bar candidates had been released, and on motion for reconsideration, all candidates with a general average of 69 per cent were allowed to pass by resolution of July 15, 1948. With respect to the bar examinations held in August, 1948, in addition to the original list of successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, were allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus, for the year 1947 the Court in effect made 69 per cent as the passing average, and for the year 1948, 70 per cent; and this amounted, without being noticed perhaps, to an amendment of section 14 of Rule 127.

Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent to 1948, whose general averages mostly ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for reconsideration invoking the precedents set by this Court in 1947 and 1948, but said motions were uniformly denied.

In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and professors, practising attorneys, presidents of bar associations, and law graduates appeared and argued lengthily pro or con, approved a bill providing, among others, for the reduction of the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent, retroactive to any bar examination held after July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by the President mainly in view of an unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the Congress passed another bill similar to the previous bill vetoed by the President, with the important difference that in the later bill the provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court of the study of law, (2) the inclusion of Social Legislation and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the publication of the bar examiners before the holding of the examination, and (4) the equal division among the examiners of all the admission fees paid by bar applicants, were eliminated. This second bill was allowed to become a law, Republic Act No. 972, by the President by merely not signing it within the required period; and in doing so the President gave due respect to the will of the Congress which, speaking for the people, chose to repass the bill first vetoed by him.

Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; and 74 per cent in the 1955 bar examinations, without obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said Act also provides that any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any examination after July 4, 1946, shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing in any subsequent examinations.

Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the approval of Republic Act No. 972 and failed to obtain the necessary passing average, filed with this Court mass or separate petitions, praying that they be admitted to the practice of law under and by virtue of said Act, upon the allegation that they have obtained the general averages prescribed therein. In virtue of the resolution of July 6, 1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a hearing on said petitions, and members of the bar, especially authorized representatives of bar associations, were invited to argue or submit memoranda as amici curiae, the reason alleged for said hearing being that some doubt had "been expressed on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 972 in so far as it affects past bar examinations and the matter" involved "a new question of public interest."

All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the admission to the practice of law is inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now governed by the Constitution which in Article VII, section 13, provides as follows:

The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or

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modify substantive right. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law, the Congress has the power to repeal, alter or supplement said rules. Little intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the Supreme Court and the Congress to regulate the admission to the practice of law is concurrent.

The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it covers bar examinations held prior to its approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final resolutions of the Supreme Court refusing to admit to the practice of law the various petitioners, thereby resulting in a legislative encroachment upon the judicial power. In my opinion this view is erroneous. In the first place, resolutions on the rejection of bar candidates do not have the finality of decisions in justiciable cases where the Rules of Court expressly fix certain periods after which they become executory and unalterable. Resolutions on bar matters, specially on motions for reconsiderations filed by flunkers in any give year, are subject to revision by this Court at any time, regardless of the period within which the motion were filed, and this has been the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar examinations and admission to the practice of law may be deemed as a judicial function only because said matters happen to be entrusted, under the Constitution and our Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. There is no judicial function involved, in the subject and constitutional sense of the word, because bar examinations and the admission to the practice of law, unlike justiciable cases, do not affect opposing litigants. It is no more than the function of other examining boards. In the second place, retroactive laws are not prohibited by the Constitution, except only when they would be ex post facto, would impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or would deny due process and equal protection of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post facto enactment, does not impair any obligation and contract or vested rights, and denies to no one the right to due process and equal protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere curative statute intended to correct certain obvious inequalities arising from the adoption by this Court of different passing general averages in certain years.

Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are being discriminated against, because we no longer have any record of those who might have failed before the war, apart from the circumstance that 75 per cent had always been the passing mark during said period. It may also be that there are no pre-war bar candidates similarly situated as those benefited by Republic Act No. 972. At any rate, in the matter of classification, the reasonableness must be determined by the legislative body. It is proper to recall that the Congress held public hearings, and we can fairly suppose that the classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative judgment derived from the facts and circumstances then brought out.

As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by the Legislative Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is any interference at all, it is one expressly sanctioned by the Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial adjudication prohibited by the Constitution is essentially aimed at protecting rights of litigants that have already been vested or acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for the empty purpose of creating appearances of separation and equality among the three branches of the Government. Republic Act No. 972 has not produced a case involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor of one and against the other. Needless to say, the statute will not affect the previous resolutions passing bar candidates who had obtained the general average prescribed by section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be objectionable and unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that those who have been admitted to the bar after July 4, 1946, whose general average is below 80 per cent, will not be allowed to practice law, because said statute would then destroy a right already acquired under previous resolutions of this Court, namely, the bar admission of those whose general averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.

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Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power conferred by the Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of Rule 127 by reducing the passing average to 70 per cent, effective several years before the date of the resolution. Indeed, when this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all candidates who obtained a general average of 69 per cent or more and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, it in effect amended section 14 of Rule 127 retroactively, because during the examinations held in August 1947 and August 1948, said section (fixing the general average at 75 per cent) was supposed to be in force. In stands to reason, if we are to admit that the Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent power to regulate the admission to the practice of law, that the latter may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing the passing general average.

Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, since this Court had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar examinations and 70 per cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire into the wisdom of the law, since this is a matter that is addressed to the judgment of the legislators. This Court in many instances had doubted the propriety of legislative enactments, and yet it has consistently refrained from nullifying them solely on that ground.

To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act 972 is against public interest, is to assume that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to the general public was not considered by the Congress. As already stated, the Congress held public hearings, and we are bound to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do the members of this Court, to their oath of office, had taken all the circumstances into account before passing the Act. On the question of public interest I may observe that the Congress, representing the people who elected them, should be more qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic Act No. 972 as an expression of the will of the people through their duly elected representatives.

I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its concurrent power to repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, may act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, in the same way that this Court may not do so. We are thus left in the situation, incidental to a democracy, where we can and should only hope that the right men are put in the right places in our Government.

Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given effect in its entirety.

Separate Opinions

LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:

The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this Court, because lawyers are members of the Court and only this Court should be allowed to determine admission thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit is judicial in the sense that discretion is used in is exercise. This power should be distinguished from the power to promulgate rules which regulate admission. It is only this power (to promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in the Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise of the discretion to admit or not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of examination, the qualifications of applicants, the passing grades, etc. are within the scope of the legislative power. But the power to determine when a candidate has made or has not made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely with this Court.

I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond the scope of the congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that candidates who obtain a general

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average of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be considered as having passed the examination, is to mean exercise of the privilege and discretion judged in this Court. It is a mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for different years with grades lower than the passing mark. No reasoning is necessary to show that it is an arrogation of the Court's judicial authority and discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as discriminatory. Why should those taking the examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to have the privilege of a lower passing grade, while those taking earlier or later are not?

I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the rule-making power of Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power of this Court to admit members thereof, and because it is discriminatory.

PARAS, C.J., dissenting:

Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate "may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject.' This passing mark has always been adhered to, with certain exception presently to be specified.

With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list of successful candidates included only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more. Upon motion for reconsideration, however, 12 candidates with general averages ranging from 72 to 73 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18, 1946. In the examinations of November, 1946 the list first released containing the names of successful candidates covered only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon motion for reconsideration, 19 candidates with a general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of March 31, 1947. This would indicate that in the original list of successful candidates those having a general average of 73 per cent or more but below 75 per cent were included. After the original list of 1947 successful bar candidates had been released, and on motion for reconsideration, all candidates with a general average of 69 per cent were allowed to pass by resolution of July 15, 1948. With respect to the bar examinations held in August, 1948, in addition to the original list of successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, were allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus, for the year 1947 the Court in effect made 69 per cent as the passing average, and for the year 1948, 70 per cent; and this amounted, without being noticed perhaps, to an amendment of section 14 of Rule 127.

Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent to 1948, whose general averages mostly ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for reconsideration invoking the precedents set by this Court in 1947 and 1948, but said motions were uniformly denied.

In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and professors, practising attorneys, presidents of bar associations, and law graduates appeared and argued lengthily pro or con, approved a bill providing, among others, for the reduction of the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent, retroactive to any bar examination held after July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by the President mainly in view of an unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the Congress passed another bill similar to the previous bill vetoed by the President, with the important difference that in the later bill the provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court of the study of law, (2) the inclusion of Social Legislation and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the publication of the bar examiners before the holding of the examination, and (4) the equal division among the examiners of all the admission fees paid by bar applicants, were eliminated. This second bill was allowed to become a law, Republic Act No. 972, by the President by merely not signing it within the required period; and in doing so the President gave due respect to the will of the Congress which, speaking for the people, chose to repass the bill first vetoed by him.

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Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; and 74 per cent in the 1955 bar examinations, without obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said Act also provides that any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any examination after July 4, 1946, shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing in any subsequent examinations.

Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the approval of Republic Act No. 972 and failed to obtain the necessary passing average, filed with this Court mass or separate petitions, praying that they be admitted to the practice of law under and by virtue of said Act, upon the allegation that they have obtained the general averages prescribed therein. In virtue of the resolution of July 6, 1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a hearing on said petitions, and members of the bar, especially authorized representatives of bar associations, were invited to argue or submit memoranda as amici curiae, the reason alleged for said hearing being that some doubt had "been expressed on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 972 in so far as it affects past bar examinations and the matter" involved "a new question of public interest."

All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the admission to the practice of law is inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now governed by the Constitution which in Article VII, section 13, provides as follows:

The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive right. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law, the Congress has the power to repeal, alter or supplement said rules. Little intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the Supreme Court and the Congress to regulate the admission to the practice of law is concurrent.

The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it covers bar examinations held prior to its approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final resolutions of the Supreme Court refusing to admit to the practice of law the various petitioners, thereby resulting in a legislative encroachment upon the judicial power. In my opinion this view is erroneous. In the first place, resolutions on the rejection of bar candidates do not have the finality of decisions in justiciable cases where the Rules of Court expressly fix certain periods after which they become executory and unalterable. Resolutions on bar matters, specially on motions for reconsiderations filed by flunkers in any give year, are subject to revision by this Court at any time, regardless of the period within which the motion were filed, and this has been the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar examinations and admission to the practice of law may be deemed as a judicial function only because said matters happen to be entrusted, under the Constitution and our Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. There is no judicial function involved, in the subject and constitutional sense of the word, because bar examinations and the admission to the practice of law, unlike justiciable cases, do not affect opposing litigants. It is no more than the function of other examining boards. In the second place, retroactive laws are not prohibited by the Constitution, except only when they would be ex post facto, would impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or would deny due process and equal protection of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post facto enactment, does not impair any obligation and contract or vested rights, and denies to no one the right to due process and equal protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere curative statute intended to

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correct certain obvious inequalities arising from the adoption by this Court of different passing general averages in certain years.

Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are being discriminated against, because we no longer have any record of those who might have failed before the war, apart from the circumstance that 75 per cent had always been the passing mark during said period. It may also be that there are no pre-war bar candidates similarly situated as those benefited by Republic Act No. 972. At any rate, in the matter of classification, the reasonableness must be determined by the legislative body. It is proper to recall that the Congress held public hearings, and we can fairly suppose that the classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative judgment derived from the facts and circumstances then brought out.

As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by the Legislative Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is any interference at all, it is one expressly sanctioned by the Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial adjudication prohibited by the Constitution is essentially aimed at protecting rights of litigants that have already been vested or acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for the empty purpose of creating appearances of separation and equality among the three branches of the Government. Republic Act No. 972 has not produced a case involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor of one and against the other. Needless to say, the statute will not affect the previous resolutions passing bar candidates who had obtained the general average prescribed by section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be objectionable and unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that those who have been admitted to the bar after July 4, 1946, whose general average is below 80 per cent, will not be allowed to practice law, because said statute would then destroy a right already acquired under previous resolutions of this Court, namely, the bar admission of those whose general averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.

Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power conferred by the Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of Rule 127 by reducing the passing average to 70 per cent, effective several years before the date of the resolution. Indeed, when this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all candidates who obtained a general average of 69 per cent or more and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, it in effect amended section 14 of Rule 127 retroactively, because during the examinations held in August 1947 and August 1948, said section (fixing the general average at 75 per cent) was supposed to be in force. In stands to reason, if we are to admit that the Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent power to regulate the admission to the practice of law, that the latter may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing the passing general average.

Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, since this Court had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar examinations and 70 per cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire into the wisdom of the law, since this is a matter that is addressed to the judgment of the legislators. This Court in many instances had doubted the propriety of legislative enactments, and yet it has consistently refrained from nullifying them solely on that ground.

To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act 972 is against public interest, is to assume that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to the general public was not considered by the Congress. As already stated, the Congress held public hearings, and we are bound to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do the members of this Court, to their oath of office, had taken all the circumstances into account before passing the Act. On the question of public interest I may observe that the Congress, representing the people who elected them, should be more qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic Act No. 972 as an expression of the will of the people through their duly elected representatives.

I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its concurrent power to repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, may act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, in the same way that this Court may not do so. We are thus

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left in the situation, incidental to a democracy, where we can and should only hope that the right men are put in the right places in our Government.

Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given effect in its entirety.

Footnotes

1 Designed as Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners vice Mr. Justice Roman Ozaeta, resigned.

2 In 1946 and 1947, the members of the Supreme Court were Hon. Manuel V. Moran, Chief Justice, Ho. Ricardo Paras, Hon. Felicisimo Feria, Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Hon. Gregorio Perfecto, Ho. Carlos Hilado, Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Hon. Manuel C. Briones, Hon. Jose Hontiveros, Hon. Sabino Padilla, and Hon. Pedro Tuason, Associate Justices. In 1948, Justices Marcelino R. Montemayor and Alex. Reyes took the place of Justice Hilado, resigned, and Hontiveros, retired. Justice Roman Ozaeta was returned to the Court and Justice Sabino Padilla was appointed Secretary of Justice. In June, 1949, Justice Padilla was returned to the Tribunal, as Justice Briones resigned. In October, 1950, Justices Fernando Jugo and Felix Bautista Angelo were appointed to t he Court, as Justice Perfecto Jugo and Felix Bautista Angelo were appointed to the Court, as Justice Perfecto had died, and Justice Ozaeta had resigned. In 1951, Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran resigned and Justice Ricardo Paras was appointed Chief Justice. In 1953, Justice Felicisimo R. Feria retired.

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EN BANC

B. M. No. 1154 June 8, 2004

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner.

R E S O L U T I O N

TINGA, J.:

The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the other has been rendered moot by a supervening event.

The antecedents follow.

On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition1 to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Court’s R E S O L U T I O N2 dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.

In his Answer,3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as "closed and terminated." Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his communications really contained the word "Attorney" as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.

In its Report and Recommendation4 dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:

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The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.

The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.

In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:

It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.

The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar."5

As regards Meling’s use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:

Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the explanation of Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as "attorney" whoever may have typed the letters.

Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is signing his communications as "Atty. Haron S. Meling" knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation "attorney" may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court.6

Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that Meling’s membership in the Shari’a Bar be suspended until further orders from the Court.7

We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.

On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate sanctions upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character.8 The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.9

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The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant to aver that he or she "has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her." Despite the declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the applicant.10 The nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.

Meling’s concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks of his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar.

Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use, cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,11 the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of the title "Attorney" by members of the Shari’a Bar who are not likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi City, used the title "Attorney" in several correspondence in connection with the rescission of a contract entered into by him in his private capacity. The Court declared that:

…persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counselors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.12

The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The solemn task of administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of service therein, from the highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only be competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything short of this standard would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.

In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application to take the Bar examinations and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice of law and suspended him therefrom until further orders from the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

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Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Shari’a Courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 2-25, with Annexes.

2 Id. at 27.

3 Id. at 28-32.

4 Supra, note 1 at 34-38.

5 Id. at 35-36, citing Bar Matter 1209, Petition to take the Lawyer’s Oath of Caesar Distrito and Royong v. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859.

6 Id. at 36-37, citing Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court and Bar Matter 1209, supra.

7 Id. at 38.

8 Tan v. Sabandal, Bar Matter No. 44, February 24, 1992, 206 SCRA 473.

9 Leda v. Tabang, Adm. Case No. 2505, February 21, 1992, 206 SCRA 395.

10 See In Re: Victorio D. Lanuevo, Adm. Cases No. 1162-1164, 29 August 1975, 66 SCRA 245, 281.

11 A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P, February 24, 1997, 268 SCRA 628.

12 Id. at 638-639.

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SECOND DIVISION

[ A.M. NO. P-07-2337 (FORMERLY A.M. OCA IPI NO. 04-2060-P), August 03, 2007 ]

ROLLY PENTECOSTES, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. HERMENEGILDO MARASIGAN, CLERK OF COURT VI, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, KABACAN, NORTH COTABATO, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Atty. Hermenegildo Marasigan (respondent), Clerk of Court VI of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabacan, North Cotabato, stands administratively charged with grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming a public officer for the loss of a motorcycle-subject matter of a criminal case which was placed under his care and custody. The administrative case against respondent stemmed from a sworn affidavit-complaint[1] filed on November 11, 2004 by Rolly Pentecostes (Pentecostes), the owner of a Kawasaki motorcycle, which was recovered by members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of M'lang, North Cotabato from suspected carnappers against whom a criminal case for carnapping, Criminal Case No. 1010, was lodged at Branch 22, RTC, Kabacan, North Cotabato. On the order of the trial court, the chief of police of M'lang, North Cotabato turned over the motorcycle to respondent who acknowledged receipt thereof on August 1, 1995. After the conduct of hearings to determine the true owner of the motorcycle, the trial court issued an Order[2] of November 15, 2000 for its release to Pentecostes. Pentecostes immediately asked respondent to release the motorcycle to him. Respondent, however, told him to wait and come back repeatedly from 2001 up to the filing of the complaint. In his Comment[3] filed on February 9, 2005, respondent gave the following explanation: After the motorcycle was delivered to him by the M'lang chief of police on August 1, 1995, he requested Alex Pedroso, a utility worker, to inspect the engine, chassis, and make, after which he issued an acknowledgement receipt thereof. He thereafter instructed Pedroso to bring the motorcycle to the Kabacan police station for which he (respondent) prepared a receipt.

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He and Pedroso visited and inspected the motorcycle every time a hearing on the criminal case was conducted. When the court finally ordered the release of the motorcycle to Pentecostes on November 15, 2000, the latter refused to receive it, claiming that it was already "cannibalized" and unserviceable. From that time on until 2003, Pentecostes harassed him, demanding that he be responsible for reconditioning the vehicle. During the latter part of 2004, upon the advice of the executive judge, he accompanied Pentecostes to the Kabacan police station only to discover that the motorcycle was missing. As no explanation could be offered by then Kabacan police chief Nestor Bastareche for the loss, he prepared a letter-complaint requesting for assistance in the recovery of the motorcycle and for the conduct of an investigation. Pentecostes refused to sign the letter, however. He later discovered that the turnover receipt attached to the record of the criminal case and the page of the blotter where the turnover was recorded were missing. Hence, he submitted the sworn statements of Pedroso[4] and SPO4 Alex Ocampo[5] who confirmed the transfer of the vehicle from his custody to that of the Kabacan chief of police. Belying respondent's averments, Pentecostes, in his "Rejoinder,"[6] contended as follows: The vehicle was in good running condition when it was delivered to respondent by police operatives[7] of M'lang. Respondent's act of passing the blame to the PNP of Kabacan was a clear case of hand washing as the records showed that respondent was responsible for the safekeeping of the motorcycle. It was for this reason that he (Pentecostes) refused to sign the letter to the chief of police of Kabacan protesting the loss. Moreover, the police blotter of PNP Kabacan has no entry or record of the alleged turn over. By Resolution of October 19, 2005,[8] this Court referred the case to the Executive Judge of RTC, Kabacan, North Cotabato, for investigation, report and recommendation. Then Executive Judge Francisco G. Rabang, Jr. of the RTC, Kabacan, North Cotabato submitted on January 16, 2006 his findings and recommendation for the dismissal of the administrative complaint against respondent.[9] In his report, Judge Rabang noted that Pentecostes denied any knowledge about the turnover of the motorcycle to the PNP of Kabacan. On the evidence for the defense, the investigating judge found that the motorcycle was delivered by the PNP of M'lang, North Cotabato to respondent who in turn transferred it to the PNP of Kabacan. To Judge Rabang, what remained an issue was the actual physical condition of the motorcycle when it was turned over to the PNP of Kabacan. The judge noted that there was no proof of Pentecostes' claim

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that the vehicle was "cannibalized" from the time it was under respondent's custody until its transfer to the PNP of Kabacan. In light of the peace and order situation in Kabacan in the late 1990s and in the early part of 2000 and the absence of a suitable courthouse then, Judge Rabang believed that respondent had made a wise decision in turning over the custody of the vehicle to the PNP of Kabacan. To Judge Rabang's report and recommendation, Pentecostes filed a Motion for Reconsideration[10] in which he assailed the conclusion that the motorcycle was no longer roadworthy and was already "cannibalized" when it was delivered to the office of the clerk of court from the M'lang police station. Moreover, Pentecostes maintained that the alleged turnover of the motorcycle to the police station of Kabacan was irrelevant because the proper custodian of the vehicle was respondent who should be held responsible for its eventual loss. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the investigating judge's recommendation to be sufficiently supported by the evidence.[11] The OCA thus concurred with Judge Rabang's recommendation for the dismissal of the complaint against respondent, subject to certain qualifications with respect to the physical condition of the vehicle upon its delivery to respondent and the latter's lack of authority for the turn over of the vehicle to the PNP of Kabacan. While the investigating judge found no evidence to show the actual condition of the motorcycle at the time it was turned over to respondent, the OCA observed that the evidence presented during the investigation supported a finding that the vehicle had missing parts when it was delivered to respondent. From the testimony of Pentecostes' witness SPO2 Servando Guadalupe, the OCA noted, the motorcycle was loaded into a service vehicle for delivery to respondent. This fact, according to the OCA, could only mean that the vehicle could not run by itself. Although the OCA agreed with the investigating judge that the evidence sufficiently proved that the vehicle was turned over to the PNP of Kabacan where it got lost, it noted that respondent failed to ask prior authority from the trial court to transfer its custody. Only when respondent was having problems with Pentecostes did he bring the matter to the attention of the executive judge, the OCA added. Accordingly, the OCA recommended that respondent be reminded to secure prior authority from the court before evidence is turned over to any authorized government office or agency and that he be warned to be more careful to prevent any similar incident from arising in the future. The finding of the OCA insofar as respondent's lack of authority to transfer the motorcycle is well taken, on account of which respondent is administratively liable for simple misconduct.

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It is the duty of the clerk of court to keep safely all records, papers, files, exhibits and public property committed to his charge.[12] Section D (4), Chapter VII of the 1991 Manual For Clerks of Court (now Section E[2], paragraph 2.2.3, Chapter VI of the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court) provides: All exhibits used as evidence and turned over to the court and before the case/s involving such evidence shall have been terminated shall be under the custody and safekeeping of the Clerk of Court. Similarly, Section 7 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, provides: SEC. 7. Safekeeping of property. - The clerk shall safely keep all record, papers, files, exhibits and public property committed to his charge, including the library of the court, and the seals and furniture belonging to his office. From the above provisions, it is clear that as clerk of court of the RTC, Kabacan, respondent was charged with the custody and safekeeping of Pentecostes' motorcycle, and to keep it until the termination of the case, barring circumstances that would justify its safekeeping elsewhere, and upon the prior authority of the trial court. No explanation was offered by respondent, however, for turning over the motorcycle. But whatever the reason was, respondent was mandated to secure prior consultations with and approval of the trial court. Moreover disconcerting is the fact that the acknowledgment receipt evidencing the turnover of the motorcycle from the trial court to the Kabacan police station was lost from the records of Criminal Case No. 1010,[13] with nary a lead as to who was responsible for it. This circumstance is viewed with disfavor as it reflects badly on the safekeeping of court records, a duty entrusted to respondent as clerk of court. With regard to the condition of the vehicle upon its delivery to respondent, the evidence indicates that it was still serviceable when it was delivered by the M'lang police to respondent and at the time it was turned over by respondent to the Kabacan police station. The Joint Affidavit[14] of SPO2 Guadalupe and Police Inspector Romeo Banaybanay categorically stated that the motorcycle was in "good running condition" when they delivered it to respondent. Later during his testimony, Guadalupe narrated that he was the "the driver of the service jeep while Chief Banaybanay was on board the motorcycle" when the vehicle was turned over to respondent on August 1, 1995.[15] Even respondent's following testimony that: "x x x when x x x [he] received the motorcycle for safekeeping, he immediately delivered together with Alex Pedroso [sic] because it could be noted that respondent do[es] not know how to drive a motorcycle, I requested x x x Alex Pedroso to accompany me and deliver [it] to [the] chief of police of Kabacan"[16] (Italics supplied) suggests that the vehicle was in running condition when respondent took and subsequently transferred its custody to the Kabacan police. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that clerks of court are essential and ranking officers of our judicial system who perform delicate functions vital to the prompt and proper administration of justice.[17] Their duties include the efficient recording, filing and management of court records and, as previously pointed

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out, the safekeeping of exhibits and public property committed to their charge. Clearly, they play a key role in the complement of the court and cannot be permitted to slacken on their jobs under one pretext or another.[18] They cannot err without affecting the integrity of the court or the efficient administration of justice.[19] The same responsibility bears upon all court personnel in view of their exalted positions as keepers of public faith.[20] The exacting standards of ethics and morality imposed upon court employees are reflective of the premium placed on the image of the court of justice, and that image is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of court personnel.[21] It becomes the imperative and sacred duty of everyone charged with the dispensation of justice, from the judge to the lowliest clerk, to maintain the courts' good name and standing as true temples of justice.[22] By transferring Pentecostes' motorcycle without authority, respondent failed to give premium to his avowed duty of keeping it under his care and possession. He must, therefore, suffer the consequences of his act or omission, which is akin to misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule of action; more particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the public officer.[23] The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple, as in this case. The Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999) classifies simple misconduct as a less grave offense, punishable by suspension of One Month and One Day to Six Months. Considering that this is respondent's first offense and no taint of bad faith has been shown by his actuations, a 15-day suspension without pay is deemed appropriate. WHEREFORE, respondent, Clerk of Court Hermenegildo Marasigan, is found guilty of Simple Misconduct. He is SUSPENDED for 15 days without pay, with a stern WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED. Quisumbing, Carpio, Tinga, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, pp. 2-3. [2] Id. at 6. [3] Id. at 9-11.

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[4] Id. at 14; Annex 3 of respondent's Comment. [5] Id. at 13; Annex 2 of respondent's Comment. [6] Id. at 15-16; should be REPLY. [7] SPO2 Servando V. Guadalupe and P/Insp. Romeo A. Banaybanay. Their Joint Affidavit was attached as Annex "A" to the Rejoinder. [8] Id. at 23. [9] Id. at 27-30. The report was received by the Office of the Court Administrator on January 30, 2006. [10] Id. at 100-101. The Motion for Reconsideration was dated February 3, 2006. [11] Id. at 102-107. [12] Office of the Court Administrator v. Sheriff IV Gabe, 389 Phil. 685, 696 (2000); Cruz v. Tantay, 364 Phil. 602, 605 (1999); Cañete v. Rabosa, 344 Phil. 9, 11 (1997). [13] Rollo, pp. 82-83; Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) dated December 21, 2005, pp. 22-23. [14] Id. at 18; Exhibit "B." [15] TSN, Dec. 21, 2005, p. 16. Id. at 76. [16] Id. at 79-80. [17] Vilar v. Angeles, A.M. No. P-06-2276, February 5, 2007; Ramirez v. Racho, 329 Phil. 1, 7 (1996); Basco v. Atty. Gregorio, 315 Phil. 681, 687 (1995); Angeles v. Bantug, A.M. No. P-89-295, May 29, 1992, 209 SCRA 413, 422-423. [18] Ramirez v. Racho, supra; Lloveras v. Sanchez, A.M. No. P-93-817, January 18, 1994, 229 SCRA 302, 307. [19] Salvador v. Serrano, A.M. No. P-06-2104, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 55, 73; Becina v. Vivero, A.M. No. P-04-1797, March 25, 2004, 426 SCRA 261, 265; Office of the Court Administrator v. Corpuz, 458 Phil. 571, 580 (2003). [20] Office of the Court Administrator v. Sheriff IV Gabe, supra note 12 at 698. [21] Vilar v. Angeles, supra note 17; Legaspi, Jr. v. Montero III, A.M. No. P-05-1986, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 137, 144.

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[22] Re: Withholding of all the Salaries and Allowances of Mr. Datu Ashary M. Alauya, Clerk of Court, 4th Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, A.M. No. 02-4-03-SDC, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 202, 210; Biag v. Gubatanga, 376 Phil. 870, 876 (1999). [23] Miñoso v. Pamulag, A.M. No. P-05-2067, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 407, 418; Office of the Court Administrator v. Bucoy, A.M. No. P-93-953, August 25, 1994, 235 SCRA 588, 595.

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EN BANC

[ A.C. NO. 5095, November 28, 2007 ]

FATHER RANHILIO C. AQUINO, LINA M. GARAN, ESTRELLA C. LOZADA, POLICARPIO L. MABBORANG, DEXTER R. MUNAR, MONICO U. TENEDRO, ANDY R. QUEBRAL, NESTOR T. RIVERA, EDUARDO C. RICAMORA, ARTHUR G. IBAÑEZ, AURELIO C. CALDEZ AND DENU A. AGATEP, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. EDWIN PASCUA, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the letter-complaint dated August 3, 1999 of Father Ranhilio C. Aquino, then Academic Head of the Philippine Judicial Academy, joined by Lina M. Garan and the other above-named complainants, against Atty. Edwin Pascua, a Notary Public in Cagayan. In his letter-complaint, Father Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified two documents committed as follows: (1) He made it appear that he had notarized the “Affidavit-Complaint” of one Joseph B. Acorda entering the same as “Doc. No. 1213, Page No. 243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated December 10, 1998”. (2) He also made it appear that he had notarized the “Affidavit-Complaint” of one Remigio B. Domingo entering the same as “Doc. No. 1214, Page 243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated December 10, 1998. Father Aquino further alleged that on June 23 and July 26, 1999, Atty. Angel Beltran, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao, certified that none of the above entries appear in the Notarial Register of Atty. Pascua; that the last entry therein was Document No. 1200 executed on December 28, 1998; and that, therefore, he could not have notarized Documents Nos. 1213 and 1214 on December 10, 1998. In his comment on the letter-complaint dated September 4, 1999, Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized the two documents on December 10, 1998, but they were not entered in his Notarial Register due to the oversight of his legal secretary, Lyn Elsie C. Patli, whose affidavit was attached to his comment. The affidavit-complaints referred to in the notarized documents were filed by Atty. Pascua with the Civil Service Commission. Impleaded as respondents therein were Lina M. Garan and the other above-named complainants. They filed with this Court a “Motion to Join the Complaint and Reply to Respondent’s Comment.” They maintain that Atty. Pascua’s omission was not due to inadvertence but a clear case of falsification.[1] On November 16, 1999, we granted their motion.[2] Thereafter, we referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report and recommendation.

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On April 21, 2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued its Report and Recommendation partly reproduced as follows: A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must observe the utmost care to comply with the formalities and the basic requirement in the performance of their duties (Realino v. Villamor, 87 SCRA 318). Under the notarial law, “the notary public shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument, xxx xxx. The notary shall give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument the page or pages of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries” (Sec. 246, Article V, Title IV, Chapter II of the Revised Administrative Code). Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law is a ground for revocation of his commission (Sec. 249, Article VI). In the instant case, there is no question that the subject documents allegedly notarized by Atty. Pascua were not recorded in his notarial register. Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional but due to oversight of his staff. Whichever is the case, Atty. Pascua cannot escape liability. His failure to enter into his notarial register the documents that he admittedly notarized is a dereliction of duty on his part as a notary public and he is bound by the acts of his staff. The claim of Atty. Pascua that it was simple inadvertence is far from true. The photocopy of his notarial register shows that the last entry which he notarized on December 28, 1998 is Document No. 1200 on Page 240. On the other hand, the two affidavit-complaints allegedly notarized on December 10, 1998 are Document Nos. 1213 and 1214, respectively, under Page No. 243, Book III. Thus, Fr. Ranhilio and the other complainants are, therefore, correct in maintaining that Atty. Pascua falsely assigned fictitious numbers to the questioned affidavit-complaints, a clear dishonesty on his part not only as a Notary Public, but also as a member of the Bar. This is not to mention that the only supporting evidence of the claim of inadvertence by Atty. Pascua is the affidavit of his own secretary which is hardly credible since the latter cannot be considered a disinterested witness or party. Noteworthy also is the fact that the questioned affidavit of Acorda (Doc. No. 1213) was submitted only when Domingo’s affidavit (Doc. No. 1214) was withdrawn in the administrative case filed by Atty. Pascua against Lina Garan, et al. with the CSC. This circumstance lends credence to the submission of herein complainants that Atty. Pascua ante-dated another affidavit-complaint making it appear as notarized on December 10, 1998 and entered as Document No. 1213. It may not be sheer coincidence then that both documents are dated December 10, 1998 and numbered as 1213 and 1214.

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A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession (Maligsa v. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 409). As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, Atty. Pascua is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. A member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred for any misconduct in his professional or private capacity. The Court has invariably imposed a penalty for notaries public who were found guilty of dishonesty or misconduct in the performance of their duties. In Villarin v. Sabate, Jr. (325 SCRA 123), respondent lawyer was suspended from his Commission as Notary Public for a period of one year for notarizing a document without affiants appearing before him, and for notarizing the same instrument of which he was one of the signatories. The Court held that respondent lawyer failed to exercise due diligence in upholding his duties as a notary public. In Arrieta v. Llosa (282 SCRA 248), respondent lawyer who certified under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendors were dead was suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that another infraction would be dealt with more severely. In said case, the Court did not impose the supreme penalty of disbarment, it being the respondent’s first offense. In Maligsa v. Cabanting (272 SCRA 409), respondent lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, after being found guilty of notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. The Court considered the seriousness of the offense and his previous misconduct for which he was suspended for six months from the practice of law. It appearing that this is the first offense of Atty. Pascua, a suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months may be considered enough penalty for him as a lawyer. Considering that his offense is also a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be imposed upon him. PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully recommended that the notarial commission of Atty. EDWIN V. PASCUA, if still existing, be REVOKED and that he be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.”[3] After a close review of the records of this case, we resolve to adopt the findings of facts and conclusion of law by the Office of the Bar Confidant. We find Atty. Pascua guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to register in his Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio B. Domingo. “Misconduct” generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.[4] The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent.[5]

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The penalty to be imposed for such act of misconduct committed by a lawyer is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court. In Arrieta v. Llosa,[6] wherein Atty. Joel A. Llosa notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendors were already dead, this Court held that such wrongful act “constitutes misconduct” and thus imposed upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months, this being his first administrative offense. Also, in Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,[7] we revoked the notarial commission of Atty. Mario G. Ramos and suspended him from the practice of law for six months for violating the Notarial Law in not registering in his notarial book the Deed of Absolute Sale he notarized. In Mondejar v. Rubia,[8] however, a lesser penalty of one month suspension from the practice of law was imposed on Atty. Vivian G. Rubia for making a false declaration in the document she notarized. In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascua’s first offense, we believe that the imposition of a three-month suspension from the practice of law upon him is in order. Likewise, since his offense is a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be imposed upon him. WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. His notarial commission, if still existing, is ordered REVOKED. SO ORDERED. Ynares-Santiago, Acting C.J., Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, and Reyes, JJ., concur. Puno, C.J., and Quisumbing, J., on official leave.

** Designated Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 478 dated November 23, 2007. [1] Rollo, pp. 18-20. [2] Id., p. 22. [3] Records, pp. 34-38. [4] Salazar v. Limeta, A.M. No. P-04-1908, August 16, 2005, 467 SCRA 27, citing Loyao, Jr. v. Caube, 402 SCRA 33 (April 30, 2003); Words and Phrases, Vol. 27, p. 466; Sewell v. Sharp, La App., 102 So 2d 259, 261. [5] Salazar v. Limeta, id., citing State Ex Rel Asbaugh v. Bahr, 40 N.E. 2d 677, 680, 68 Ohio App. 308. [6] A.C. No. 4369, November 28, 1997, 282 SCRA 248.

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[7] Adm. Case No. 5645, July 2, 2002, 383 SCRA 498. [8] A.C. Nos. 5907 and 5942, July 21, 2006, 496 SCRA 1.

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EN BANC

[ ADM. CASE NO. 2984, August 31, 2007 ]

RODOLFO M. BERNARDO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ISMAEL F. MEJIA, RESPONDENT. RESOLUTION NACHURA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with plea for reinstatement in the practice of law filed by Ismael F. Mejia (Mejia) who is already seventy-one years old and barred from the practice of law for fifteen years. The antecedent facts that led to Mejia's disbarment are as follows. On January 23, 1987, Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his retained attorney, Ismael F. Mejia, of the following administrative offenses: 1) misappropriating and converting to his personal use: a) part of the sum of P27,710.00 entrusted to him for payment of real estate taxes on property belonging to Bernardo, situated in a subdivision known as Valle Verde I; and b) part of another sum of P40,000.00 entrusted to him for payment of taxes and expenses in connection with the registration of title of Bernardo to another property in a subdivision known as Valle Verde V; 2) falsification of certain documents, to wit: a) a special power of attorney dated March 16, 1985, purportedly executed in his favor by Bernardo (Annex P, par. 51, complainant's affidavit dates October 4, 1989); b) a deed of sale dated October 22, 1982 (Annex O, par. 48, id.); and c) a deed of assignment purportedly executed by the spouses Tomas and Remedios Pastor, in Bernardo's favor (Annex Q, par. 52, id.); 3) issuing a check, knowing that he was without funds in the bank, in payment of a loan obtained from Bernardo in the amount of P50,000.00, and thereafter, replacing said check with others known also to be insufficiently funded.[1] On July 29, 1992, the Supreme Court En Banc rendered a Decision Per Curiam, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES the [sic] respondent, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia, guilty of all the charges against him and hereby imposes on him the penalty of DISBARMENT. Pending finality of this judgment, and effective immediately, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law. Let a copy of this Decision be spread in his record in the Bar Confidant's Office, and notice thereof furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the Court Administrator who is DIRECTED to inform all the Courts concerned of this Decision.

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SO ORDERED. On June 1, 1999, Mejia filed a Petition praying that he be allowed to reengage in the practice of law. On July 6, 1999, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a Resolution denying the petition for reinstatement. On January 23, 2007, Mejia filed the present petition for review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with a plea for reinstatement in the practice of law. No comment or opposition was filed against the petition.[2] Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court. The action will depend on whether or not the Court decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will continue to be preserved even with the applicant's reentry as a counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character, a fit and proper person to practice law. The Court will take into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.[3] In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his indiscretions in the law profession. Fifteen years had already elapsed since Mejia's name was dropped from the Roll of Attorneys. At the age of seventy-one, he is begging for forgiveness and pleading for reinstatement. According to him, he has long repented and he has suffered enough. Through his reinstatement, he wants to leave a legacy to his children and redeem the indignity that they have suffered due to his disbarment. After his disbarment, he put up the Mejia Law Journal, a publication containing his religious and social writings. He also organized a religious organization and named it "El Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of Heart and Mind." The Court is inclined to grant the present petition. Fifteen years has passed since Mejia was punished with the severe penalty of disbarment. Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejia's disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age of the petitioner and the length of time during which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Obviously, he has learned his lesson from this experience, and his punishment has lasted long enough. Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose. After all, penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders. We reiterate, however, and remind petitioner that the practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the continuing requirements for enjoying the privilege to practice law.[4]

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WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys by Ismael F. Mejia is hereby GRANTED. SO ORDERED. Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur. Quisumbing, J., on leave.

[1] Contained in the Decision of this Court dated July 29, 1992 in Administrative Case No. 2984, entitled "Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. v. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia." [2] In a Resolution dated February 13, 2007, the Court En Banc required complainant Rodolfo M. Bernardo (Bernardo) to file comment on the petition. However, it was returned unserved with the notation "RTS-Unknown" appearing on the envelope. Resolutions dated February 20, 2007 and February 27, 2007, were sent to Bernardo reiterating the requirement to file comment. Both Resolutions, however, were returned unserved with the notation "RTS-Refused to Receive; Unknown" appearing on the envelope. Thus, the Court dispensed with the filing of the comment and, thereafter, gave due course to the petition. [3] Cui v. Cui, 120 Phil. 725, 731 (1964). [4] Tolentino v. Mendoza, Adm. Case No. 5151, October 19, 2004, 440 SCRA 519, 532-533; Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro, Adm. Case No. 6408, August 31, 2004, 437 SCRA 209, 219; Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, April 7, 1993, 221 SCRA 132, 135.

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EN BANC

[ A.C. NO. 6697, July 25, 2006 ]

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, RESPONDENT. [BAR MATTER NO. 1227] RE: OATH-TAKING OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, INCOMING PRESIDENT OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES IN THE MATTER OF THE REMOVAL OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA FROM THE IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS AS EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND GOVERNOR

[A.M. NO. 05-5-15-SC] IN THE MATTER OF THE LETTER-COMPLAINT OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA DATED MAY 18, 2005 TO FORTHWITH DENY/DISAPPROVE THE IBP RESOLUTION UNJUSTLY, ILLEGALLY, ARBITRARILY, AND ABRUPTLY REMOVING HIM FROM THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE IBP FOR ABSOLUTE LACK OF BASIS AND FOR FLAGRANT DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.

D E C I S I O N PER CURIAM:

Before Us are three consolidated cases revolving around Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Governor and Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de Vera. The first pertains to a disbarment case questioning Atty. de Vera's moral fitness to remain as a member of the Philippine Bar, the second refers to Atty. de Vera's letter-request to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President, and the third case concerns the validity of his removal as Governor and EVP of the IBP by the IBP Board. The resolution of these cases will determine the national presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007. A.C. No. 6697 The Office of the Bar Confidant, which this Court tasked to make an investigation, report and recommendation on subject case,[1] summarized the antecedents thereof as follows: In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the following grounds:

1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar of California; and 2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation rule" enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).

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Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds due his client, was found to have performed an act constituting moral turpitude by the Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing Department - San Francisco, State Bar of California in Administrative Case No. 86-0-18429. Complainant alleged that the respondent was then forced to resign or surrender his license to practice law in the said state in order to evade the recommended three (3) year suspension. Complainant asserted that the respondent lacks the moral competence necessary to lead the country's most noble profession. Complainant, likewise, contended that the respondent violated the so-called "rotation rule" provided for in Administrative Matter No. 491 when he transferred to IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter. He claimed that the respondent failed to meet the requirements outlined in the IBP By-Laws pertaining to transfer of Chapter Membership. He surmised that the respondent's transfer was intended only for the purpose of becoming the next IBP National President. Complainant prayed that the respondent be enjoined from assuming office as IBP National President. Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005, respondent stated that the issues raised in above-mentioned Complaint were the very issues raised in an earlier administrative case filed by the same complainant against him. In fact, according to him, the said issues were already extensively discussed and categorically ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2005 in Administrative Case No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard De Vera). Respondent prayed that the instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the principle of res judicata. On 15 June 2005, both parties appeared before the Office of the Bar Confidant for presentation of evidence in support of their respective allegations. Subsequently, in a Memorandum dated 20 June 2005, complainant maintained that there is substantial evidence showing respondent's moral baseness, vileness and depravity, which could be used as a basis for his disbarment. Complainant stressed that the respondent never denied that he used his client's money. Complainant argued that the respondent failed to present evidence that the Supreme Court of California accepted the latter's resignation and even if such was accepted, complainant posited that this should not absolve the respondent from liability. Moreover, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar. He asserted that the first administrative case filed against the respondent was one for his disqualification. x x x. Bar Matter No. 1227 A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC As earlier adverted to, Bar Matter No. 1227 refers to Atty. de Vera's letter-request to this Court to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President. A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, on the other hand, is a letter-report dated 19 May 2005 of IBP National President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (IBP President Cadiz) furnishing this Court with the IBP's Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, removing Atty. De Vera as member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP, for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP in general.[2]

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The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC arose from the regular meeting of the IBP Board of Governors held on 14 January 2005. In said meeting, by 2/3 vote (6 voting in favor and 2 against), the IBP Board approved the withdrawal of the Petition filed before this Court docketed as "Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, et al. - Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, SC-R165108." The Petition was intended to question the legality and/or constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9227, authorizing the increase in the salaries of judges and justices, and to increase filing fees.[3] The two IBP Governors who opposed the said Resolution approving the withdrawal of the above-described Petition were herein respondent Governor and EVP de Vera and Governor Carlos L. Valdez.[4] On 19 January 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed this Court of the decision taken by the IBP Board to withdraw the afore-mentioned Petition. Attached to his letter was a copy of the IBP Board's 14 January 2005 Resolution.[5] On 15 April 2005, Bar Matter No. 1227, pertaining to Atty. de Vera's request for oathtaking as National President, was filed. The same was subsequently consolidated with A.C. No. 6697, the disbarment case filed against Atty. de Vera.[6] On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the 10th National IBP Convention at the CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center, Baguio City. It was at this forum where Atty. de Vera allegedly made some untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in connection with the IBP Board's Resolution to withdraw the Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227.[7] On 10 May 2005, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining Atty. de Vera from assuming office as IBP National President.[8] On 12 May 2005, IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP National President Cadiz a letter wherein he prayed for the removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board for having committed acts which were inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP.[9] On 13 May 2005, in the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board held at the Waterfront Hotel, Cebu City, the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board of Governors and as IBP Executive Vice President.[10] Quoted hereunder is the dispositive portion of said Resolution: NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that Governor Leonard S. de Vera is REMOVED as a member of the IBP Board of Governors and Executive Vice President for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP, to wit:

1. For making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in public about the Supreme Court and members of the IBP Board of Governors, during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of Lawyers, held at CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center on 22 April 2005,

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making it appear that the decision of the IBP Board of Governors to withdraw the PETITION docketed as "Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. The Senate of the Philippines, et al., Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer for the Issuance of A Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, S.C.-R. 165108", was due to influence and pressure from the Supreme Court of the Philippines;

2. For making said untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies that brought the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP as a whole in public contempt and disrepute;

3. For violating Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers which mandates that "A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others", by making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of Lawyers in Baguio City;

4. For instigating and provoking some IBP chapters to embarrass and humiliate the IBP Board of Governors in order to coerce and compel the latter to pursue the aforesaid PETITION;

5. For falsely accusing the IBP National President, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, during the Plenary Session of the 10th National Convention in Baguio City of withholding from him a copy of Supreme Court Resolution, dated 25 January 2005, granting the withdrawal of the PETITION, thereby creating the wrong impression that the IBP National President deliberately prevented him from taking the appropriate remedies with respect thereto, thus compromising the reputation and integrity of the IBP National President and the IBP as a whole.[11]

On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the then Hon. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter captioned as "Urgent Plea to Correct a Glaring Injustice of the IBP Board of Governors; Vehement Protest to the Board Resolution Abruptly Removing Atty. Leonard de Vera from the Board of Governors in Patent Violation of Due Process; Petition to Deny/Disapprove the Completely Unjustified and Highly Arbitrary Resolution Precipitately Ousting Atty. de Vera from the Board of Governors in Less Than Twenty Four (24) Hours from Notice and Judgment Without Formal Investigation."[12] In the said letter, Atty. de Vera strongly and categorically denied having committed acts inimical to the IBP and its Board. He alleged that on the basis of an unverified letter-complaint filed by IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP Board voted to expel him posthaste, without just cause and in complete disregard of even the minimum standards of due process. Pertinent portions of his letter read: It is evident that the Board of Governors has committed a grave and serious injustice against me especially when, as the incumbent Executive Vice President of the IBP, I am scheduled to assume my position as National President of the IBP on July 1, 2005. x x x I was denied the very basic rights of due process recognized by the Supreme Court even in administrative cases:

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1. The denial of the right to answer the charges formally or in writing. The complaint against me was in writing.

2. The denial of the right to answer the charges within a reasonable period of time after receipt of the complaint.

3. The denial of the right to a fair hearing.

4. The denial of the right to confront the accuser and the witnesses against me. I challenged Gov. Rivera to testify under oath so I could question him. He refused. I offered to testify under oath so I could be questioned. My request was denied.

5. The denial of my right to present witnesses on my behalf.

6. The denial of my right to an impartial judge. Governor Rivera was my accuser, prosecutor, and judge all at the same time.

7. Gov. Rivera's prejudgment of my case becomes even more evident because when his motion to expel me was lost in a 5-3 votes (due to his inhibition to vote), Gov. Rivera asked for another round of voting so he can vote to support his own complaint and motion to expel me.[13] (Emphasis and underscoring in original.)

On 27 May 2005, the IBP Board responded to the 18 May 2005 letter of Atty. de Vera.[14] In their Reply, the IBP Board explained to this Court that their decision to remove Atty. de Vera was based on valid grounds and was intended to protect itself from a recalcitrant member. Among the grounds cited and elucidated by the IBP Board were the following:

(i) Atty. de Vera engaged himself in a negative media campaign and solicited resolutions from IBP Chapters to condemn the IBP Board of Governors for its decision to withdraw the PETITION, all with the end in view of compelling or coercing the IBP Board of Governors to reconsider the decision to withdraw the PETITION.

(ii) Atty. de Vera embarrassed, humiliated and maligned the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP National President in public or during the Plenary Session at the 10th National Convention of Lawyers.

(iii) Rather than pacify the already agitated "solicited" speakers (at the plenary session), Atty. de Vera "fanned the fire", so to speak, and went to the extent of making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies about the Supreme Court and some members of the IBP Board of Governors. He deliberately and intentionally did so to provoke the members of the IBP Board of Governors to engage him in an acrimonious public debate and expose the IBP Board of Governors to public ridicule.

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(iv) Atty. de Vera uttered untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies, e.g., that some of the members of the IBP Board of Governors voted in favor of the withdrawal of the petition (without mentioning names) because "nakakahiya kasi sa Supreme Court, nakakaawa kasi ang Supreme Court, kasi may mga kaibigan tayo sa Court." He made it appear that the IBP Board of Governors approved the resolution, withdrawing the petition, due to "influence" or "pressure" from the Supreme Court.[15]

The IBP Board explained that Atty. de Vera's actuation during the Plenary Session was "the last straw that broke the camel's back." He committed acts inimical to the interest of the IBP Board and the IBP; hence, the IBP Board decided to remove him. On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with copies of resolutions and a position paper coming from various IBP Chapters all condemning his expulsion from the IBP Board and as IBP EVP.[16] On 15 June 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed Chief Justice Davide that in a special meeting of the IBP Board held at the EDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13 June 2005, the IBP Board took note of the vacancy in the position of the IBP EVP brought about by Atty. de Vera's removal. In his stead, IBP Governor Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was formally elected and declared as IBP EVP.[17] On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the election of Atty. Santiago.[18] On 20 June 2005, Atty. Santiago voluntarily relinquished the EVP position through a letter addressed to the IBP Board.[19] Thus, on 25 June 2005, during its last regular meeting, the IBP Board elected a new EVP in the person of IBP Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar to replace Atty. Santiago. On 28 June 2005, IBP National President Cadiz, through a letter addressed to Chief Justice Davide, reported to this Court Atty. Salazar's election.[20] IBP National President Cadiz also requested, among other things, that Atty. Salazar's election be approved and that he be allowed to assume as National President in the event that Atty. de Vera is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law or should his removal from the 2003-2005 Board of Governors and as EVP is approved by this Court.[21] Also on 28 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested the election of Atty. Salazar.[22] In his Extended Comment[23] dated 25 July 2005, Atty. de Vera maintained that there was absolutely no factual or legal basis to sustain the motion to remove him from the IBP Board because he violated no law. He argued that if the basis for his removal as EVP was based on the same grounds as his removal from the IBP Board, then his removal as EVP was likewise executed without due notice and without the least compliance with the minimum standards of due process of law. Atty. de Vera strongly averred that, contrary to the utterly false and malicious charges filed against him, the speakers at the Plenary Session of the Baguio Convention, although undeniably impassioned and articulate, were respectful in their language and exhortations, not once undermining the stature of the IBP in general and the IBP Board of Governors in particular. He posited that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during the Convention's Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors; and the decision to remove him only shows

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that the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by the incumbent IBP Board. Anent the charges that he accused the National President of withholding a copy of this Court's Resolution granting the withdrawal of the Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227, Atty. de Vera avowed that he made no such remarks. As regards the election of a new IBP EVP, Atty. de Vera contended that the said election was illegal as it was contrary to the provisions of the IBP By-Laws concerning national officers, to wit: Section. 49. Term of office. - The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a term of two years from July 1 following their election until 30 June of their second year in office and until their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified. In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions and duties shall be performed by the Executive Vice President, and in the event of death, resignation, or removal of the President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President for the unexpired portion of the term. In the event of death, resignation, removal or disability of both the President and the Executive Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold office for the unexpired portion of the term or during the period of disability. Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other officers and employees appointed by the President with the consent of the Board shall hold office at the pleasure of the Board or for such term as the Board may fix.[24] To bolster his position, Atty. de Vera stressed that when both the President and the EVP die, resign, are removed, or are disabled, the IBP By-Laws only provides for the election of an Acting President and that no mention for an election for EVP was made. Thus, when such election for EVP occurs, such is contrary to the express provision of the IBP By-Laws. Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly removed as IBP EVP, his replacement should come from Eastern Mindanao and not from any other region, due to the Rotation Rule embodied in par. 2, Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws. In response to Atty. de Vera's averments, the 2003-2005 IBP Board, through its counsel, submitted a Reply dated 27 January 2006 and clarified as follows:

(i) The IBP Board of Governors is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect itself from an intractable member by virtue of Article VI, Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws;

(ii) Atty. de Vera was removed as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP not because of his disagreement with the IBP Board's position but because of the various acts that he committed which the IBP Board determined to be inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP as a whole;

(iii) Atty. de Vera cannot exculpate himself from liability by invoking his constitutional right to Free Speech because, as a member of the Bar, it is his sworn duty to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct by others;

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(iv) The IBP Board, in effecting the removal of Atty. de Vera, observed the fundamental principles of due process. As the records would bear, Atty. de Vera was duly notified of the Regular Meeting of the IBP Board held on 13 May 2004; was furnished a copy of Governor Rivera's Letter-Complaint the day before the said meeting; was furnished a copy of the said Meeting's Agenda; and was allowed to personally defend himself and his accuser, Gov. Rivera;

(v) Atty. de Vera was validly removed because the required number of votes under Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws to remove Atty. de Vera as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP was duly complied with;

(vi) Atty. de Vera's replacement as IBP EVP need not come from Eastern Mindanao Region because: (a) the rotation rule under Article VII, Section 47, par. 2 of the IBP By-Laws had already been complied with when Atty. de Vera, who hails from Eastern Mindanao, was elected IBP EVP; and (b) the rotation rule need not be enforced if the same will not be practicable, possible, feasible, doable or viable; and, finally, that -

(vii) Atty. Salazar was validly elected as IBP EVP and, thus, should now be allowed to take his oath as IBP National President.[25]

The Court's Ruling AC No. 6697 In his Memorandum[26] dated 20 June 2005, complainant tendered the following issues for the consideration of the Court:

I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) COMMITED MALPRACTICE WHICH AMOUNTED TO MORAL T[U]RPITUDE IN THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA AND IN THE PHILIPPINES, IN THE COURSE OF HIS PRACTICE OF LAW.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE OATH OF OFFICE AS LAWYER IS ATTACHED TO THE PERSON OF ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) WHEREVER HE MAY GO AND NOT NECESSARILY BOUND BY THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.

III. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE MORAL T[U]RPITUDE, AS BASIS FOR DISBARMENT OF RESPONDENT IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING.

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IV. WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THIS CASE, DUE TO ADMIN. CASE NO. [6052][27] The disposition of the first three related issues hinges on the resolution of the fourth issue. Consequently, we will start with the last issue. A.C. No. 6052 is not a bar to the filing of the present administrative case. In disposing of the question of res judicata, the Bar Confidant opined: To reiterate, the instant case for suspension and/or disbarment against respondent Leonard De Vera is grounded on the following: 1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar in California; and 2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation rule" enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (In the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections). It appears that the complainant already raised the said issues in an earlier administrative case against the respondent. Verily, these issues were already argued upon by the parties in their respective pleadings, and discussed and ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2003 in Administrative Matter No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera). As such, with respect to the first issue, this Court held that: "As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients when he was practicing law in California, which in turn compelled him to surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for the position he is aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no final judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge, as the records relied upon by the petitioners are mere preliminary findings of a hearing referee which are recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline which are subject to the review of and the final decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the complainant in the California administrative case has retracted the accusation that he misappropriated the complainant's money, but unfortunately the retraction was not considered by the investigating officer. xxx" "On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still practicing law in California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to pursue the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same. In this case, the petitioners have not shown how the administrative complaint affects respondent De Vera's moral fitness to run for governor. On the other hand, as regards the second issue:

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"Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in Parañaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule. The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice, thus: xxx It is clearly stated in the aforequoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic that a lawyer will become a member of the chapter where his place of residence or work is located. He has the discretion to choose the particular chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only when he does not register his preference that he will become a member of the Chapter of the place where he resides or maintains office. The only proscription in registering one's preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more than one chapter at the same time. The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section, transfer of IBP membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies with the conditions set forth therein, thus: xxx The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made not less than three months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer. In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a letter addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent de Vera's transfer and advising them to make the necessary notation in their respective records. This letter is a substantial compliance with the certification mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that de Vera's transfer was made effective sometime between 1 August 2001 and 3 September 2001. On 27 February 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers were simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as mandated by Section 29.a of the IBP By-Laws which provides that elections of Chapter Officers and Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February of every other year. Between 3 September 2001 and 27 February 2003, seventeen months had elapsed. This makes respondent de Vera's transfer valid as it was done more than three months ahead of the chapter elections held on 27 February 2003. In the case of Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco (Administrative Case No. 2995, 27 November 1996), this Court declared that:

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"The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the [Court's] administrative powers." In the said case, respondent Clerk of Court Cioco was dismissed from service for grave misconduct highly prejudicial to the service for surreptitiously substituting the bid price in a Certificate of Sale from P3,263,182.67 to only P730,000.00. Thereafter a complaint for disbarment was filed against the respondent on the basis of the same incident. Respondent, interposing res judicata, argued that he may no longer be charged on the basis of the same incident. This Court held that while the respondent is in effect being indicted twice for the same misconduct, this does not amount to double jeopardy as both proceedings are admittedly administrative in nature. This Court qualified that, in the first case, the respondent was proceeded against as an erring court personnel under the Court's supervisory power over courts while, in the second case, he was disciplined as a lawyer under the Court's plenary authority over membersof the legal profession. In subsequent decisions of this Court, however, it appears that res judicata still applies in administrative cases. Thus, in the case of Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera vs. Judge William Layague (Administrastive Matter No. RTJ-93-986), this Court ruled that: "While double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases, it would be contrary to equity and substantial justice to penalize respondent judge a second time for an act which he had already answered for." Likewise, in the recent case of Executive Judge Henry B. Basilia vs. Judge Amado L. Becamon, Lolita Delos Reyes and Eddie Delos Reyes (Administrative Matter No. MTJ-02-1404, 14 December 2004), this Court held that: "Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the present administrative case becomes dismissible. xxx Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and for the same cause. It provides that [a] final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. Res judicata is based on the ground that the party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated the same matter in the former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it again. This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over again the rigors of unnecessary suits and repetitious trials. At the same time, it prevents the clogging of court dockets. Equally important, res judicata stabilizes rights and promotes the rule of law." In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by the complainant had already been

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resolved by this Court in an earlier administrative case. The complainant's contention that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar as the first administrative case was one for disqualification while the instant administrative complaint is one for suspension and/or disbarment should be given least credence. It is worthy to note that while the instant administrative complaint is denominated as one for suspension and/or disbarment, it prayed neither the suspension nor the disbarment of the respondent but instead merely sought to enjoin the respondent from assuming office as IBP National President.[28] Contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No. 6052 entitled, "In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, From Being Elected IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the May 31 IBP Election" and promulgated on 11 December 2003 does not constitute a bar to the filing of Adm. Case No. 6697. Although the parties in the present administrative case and in Adm. Case No. 6052 are identical, their capacities in these cases and the issues presented therein are not the same, thereby barring the application of res judicata. In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential conditions must concur, namely: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or order on the merits, and (4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action.[29] In the absence of any one of these elements, Atty. de Vera cannot argue res judicata in his favor. It is noteworthy that the two administrative cases involve different subject matters and causes of action. In Adm. Case No. 6052, the subject matter was the qualification of Atty. de Vera to run as a candidate for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present administrative complaint, the subject matter is his privilege to practice law. In the first administrative case, complainants' cause of action was Atty. de Vera's alleged violation or circumvention of the IBP By-laws. In the present administrative case, the primary cause of action is Atty. de Vera's alleged violation of lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the complainants sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by complainant in his Memorandum, what is being principally sought is Atty. de Vera's suspension or disbarment. The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was resolved on the basis of the parties' rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We held therein that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from running as Regional Governor as there is nothing in the present IBP By-laws that sanctions the disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. Consequently, we stressed that the petition had no firm ground to stand on. Likewise, we held that the complainants therein were not the proper parties to bring the suit as the IBP By-laws prescribes that only nominees - which the complainants were not - can file with the IBP President a written protest against the candidate. The Court's statement, therefore, that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the ground that he was not morally fit was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow for pre-election disqualification proceedings; hence,

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Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the basis of the administrative findings of a hearing officer of the State Bar of California suspending him from the practice of law for three years. We held in that case that - There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each member's standard of morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the basic requirements under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude.[30] What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by the Supreme Court in a proper case declaring otherwise, every lawyer aspiring to hold the position of IBP Regional Director is presumed morally fit. Any person who begs to disagree will not be able to find a receptive audience in the IBP through a petition for disqualification but must first file the necessary disbarment or suspension proceeding against the lawyer concerned. And this is precisely what complainant has chosen to do in the instant case. As his petition is sufficient in form and substance, we have given it due course pursuant to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. And, considering that this case is not barred by the prior judgment in Adm. Case No. 6052, the only issue left for consideration is whether or not Atty. de Vera can be suspended or disbarred under the facts of the case and the evidence submitted by complainant. The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California, standing alone, is not proof of malpractice. In the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law In The Territory of Guam of Atty. Leon G. Maquera,[31] we were confronted with the question of whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney in a foreign jurisdiction and who was suspended from the practice of law in said foreign jurisdiction, can be sanctioned as member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction. We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de Vera who was admitted to the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of California, U.S.A.) and against whom charges were filed in connection with his practice in said jurisdiction. However, unlike the case of Atty. Maquera, no final judgment for suspension or disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three years as he surrendered his license to practice law before his case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California. In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not grounds for disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign court's action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or

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suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise held that the judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer. The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court which provides: Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows: x x x x (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. In Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc.,[32] we explained that "[a] foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum." In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing officer was based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law. There is substantial evidence of malpractice on the part of Atty. de Vera independent of the recommendation of suspension by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states: SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove

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enumerated. The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension.[33] Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court and to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.[34] The statutory enunciation of the grounds for disbarment on suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the court over its officers cannot be restricted.[35] Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term "Malpractice."[36] That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a business.[37] Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on ethical code of his profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession.[38] Now, the undisputed facts:

1. An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of California, docketed then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance case Atty. de Vera handled involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was authorized by the elder Willis (father of Julius who was given authority by the son to control the case because the latter was then studying in San Diego California) for the release of the funds in settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement of the case which he then deposited to his personal account;[39]

2. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera be suspended from the practice of law for three years;[40] and

3. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of California.[41]

Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he misappropriated his client's funds as the latter's father (the elder Willis) gave him authority to use the same and that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider this explanation notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis testified under oath that he "expected de Vera might use the money for a few days." By insisting that he was authorized by his client's father and attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty. de Vera has impliedly admitted the use of the Willis funds for his own personal use. In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainant's allegation in the latter's memorandum that he (de Vera)

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received US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that he deposited said amount in his personal account and not in a separate trust account and that, finally, he spent the amount for personal purposes.[42] At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[43] It means such evidence which affords a substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.[44] Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his client's funds is highly unethical. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic about this, thus: CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION. Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. In Espiritu v. Ulep[45] we held that - The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the client. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all money and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Accordingly, he shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Even more specific is the Canon of Professional Ethics: The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client. Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him. Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs the public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Those who are guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. (Emphases supplied.) In herein case, as it is admitted by Atty. de Vera himself that he used his client's money for personal use, he has unwittingly sealed his own fate since this admission constitutes more than substantial evidence of malpractice. Consequently, Atty. de Vera now has the burden of rebutting the evidence which he himself

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supplied. In his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized by the elder Willis to use the funds intended for the latter's son. Atty. de Vera also points out that he had restituted the full amount of US$12,000.00 even before the filing of the administrative case against him in the State Bar of California.[46] Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we cannot find anywhere in the records of this case proof that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the funds of his client. In Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera[47] we declared that - When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him. Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder Willis had indeed testified that he "expected de Vera might use the money for a few days." As Atty. de Vera had vigorously objected to the admissibility of the document containing this statement, he is now estopped from relying thereon. Besides, that the elder Willis "expected de Vera might use the money for a few days" was not so much an acknowledgment of consent to the use by Atty. de Vera of his client's funds as it was an acceptance of the probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use his client's funds, which by itself did not speak well of the character of Atty. de Vera or the way such character was perceived. In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his client's money without the latter's acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It is clear that Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in his own account and using the same for his own benefit is guilty of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical behavior. He caused dishonor, not only to himself but to the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants to the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the profession betrays their trust and confidence.[48] Respondent violated his oath to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his client. Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.[49] Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed. In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,[50] we imposed upon Atty. Pagatpatan two years suspension from his practice of law for depositing the funds meant for his client to his personal account without the latter's knowledge. In Reyes v. Maglaya;[51] Castillo v. Taguines;[52] Espiritu v. Atty. Cabredo IV,[53] the respondents were meted one year suspension each for failing to remit to their clients monies in the amounts of P1,500.00; P500.00, and P51,161.00, respectively, received by them for their clients without the latter's permission. In Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya,[54] we indefinitely suspended respondent for failure to remit to his client the amount of the measly sum of P4,344.00 representing the amount received pursuant to a writ of execution. Considering the amount involved here - US$12,000.00, we believe that the penalty of suspension for two (2) years is appropriate.

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Transferring IBP membership to a chapter where the lawyer is not a resident of is not a ground for his suspension or disbarment Complainant insists that Atty. de Vera's transfer of membership from the Pasay, Parañaque, Las Piñas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter is a circumvention of the rotation rule as it was made for the sole purpose of becoming IBP National President. Complainant stresses that Atty. de Vera is not a resident of Agusan del Sur nor does he hold office therein. In Adm. Case No. 6052, we held that Atty. de Vera's act of transferring to another IBP Chapter is not a ground for his disqualification for the post of IBP Governor as the same is allowed under Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws with the qualification only that the transfer be made not less than three months immediately preceding any chapter election. As it was perfectly within Atty. de Vera's right to transfer his membership, it cannot be said that he is guilty of unethical conduct or behavior. And while one may incessantly argue that a legal act may not necessarily be ethical, in herein case, we do not see anything wrong in transferring to an IBP chapter that --based on the rotation rule - will produce the next IBP EVP who will automatically succeed to the National Presidency for the next term. Our Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the Lawyer's Oath do not prohibit nor punish lawyers from aspiring to be IBP National President and from doing perfectly legal acts in accomplishing such goal. Bar Matter No. 1227 Administrative Matter No. 05-5-15-SC To resolve Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter No. 05-5- 15-SC, the following issues must be addressed:

I. Whether the IBP Board of Governors acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Atty. de Vera as Governor and EVP of the IBP on 13 May 2005.

i. Whether the IBP Board of Governors complied with administrative due process in removing Atty. de Vera.

ii. Whether the IBP removed Atty. De Vera for just and valid cause.

II. Whether Governor Salazar was validly elected as EVP of the IBP on 25 June 2005, and can consequently assume the Presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.

The IBP Board observed due process in its removal of Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor

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We start the discussion with the veritable fact that the IBP Board is vested with the power to remove any of its members pursuant to Section 44, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, which states: Sec. 44. Removal of members. - If the Board of Governors should determine after proper inquiry that any of its members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason become unable to perform his duties, the Board, by resolution of the Majority of the remaining members, may declare his position vacant, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the delegates from the region shall by majority vote, elect a successor from among the members of the Chapter to which the resigned governor is a member to serve as governor for the unexpired portion of the term. (Emphasis supplied) Under the aforementioned section, a member of the IBP Board may be removed for cause by resolution adopted by two-thirds (2/3) of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of this Court. In the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the Board of Governors on procedural and substantive grounds. He argues that he was denied "very basic rights of due process recognized by the Honorable Court even in administrative cases" like the right to answer formally or in writing and within reasonable time, the right to present witnesses in his behalf, the right to a fair hearing. Atty. de Vera protests the fact that he was not able to cross-examine the complainant, IBP Gov. Romulo H. Rivera (Atty. Rivera) and that Atty. Rivera voted as well for his expulsion which made him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera emphasized the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting on his own motion. However, when his inhibition resulted in the defeat of his motion as the necessary 2/3 votes could not be mustered, Atty. Rivera asked for another round of voting so he could vote to support his own motion. The IBP Board counters that since its members were present during the plenary session, and personally witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera's actuations, an evidentiary or formal hearing was no longer necessary. Since they all witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera, it was enough that he was given an opportunity to refute and answer all the charges imputed against him. They emphasized that Atty. de Vera was given a copy of the complaint and that he was present at the Board Meeting on 13 May 2005 wherein the letter-complaint against him was part of the agenda. Therein, he was given the opportunity to be heard and that, in fact, Atty. de Vera did argue his case. We are in agreement with the IBP Board. First, it needs stressing that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and property.[55] It cannot be said that the position of EVP of the IBP is property within the constitutional sense especially since there is no right to security of tenure over said position as, in fact, all that is required to remove any member of the board of governors for cause is a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining

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members of the board. Secondly, even if the right of due process could be rightfully invoked, still, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side.[56] At the outset, it is here emphasized that the term "due process of law" as used in the Constitution has no fixed meaning for all purposes due "to the very nature of the doctrine which, asserting a fundamental principle of justice rather than a specific rule of law, is not susceptible of more than one general statement."[57] The phrase is so elusive of exact apprehension,[58] because it depends on circumstances and varies with the subject matter and the necessities of the situation.[59] Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with "judicial process" for a trial in court is not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different principles. The due process clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and its requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character, the right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The constitutional requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly established administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making of a determination if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal before which all objections and defenses to the making of such determination may be raised and considered. One adequate hearing is all that due process requires. What is required for "hearing" may differ as the functions of the administrative bodies differ.[60] The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process.[61] Nor is an actual hearing always essential[62] especially under the factual milieu of this case where the members of the IBP Board -- upon whose shoulders the determination of the cause for removal of an IBP governor is placed subject to the approval of the Supreme Court - all witnessed Atty. de Vera's actuations in the IBP National Convention in question. It is undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against him and that he was present when the matter was taken up. From the transcript of the stenographic notes of the 13 May 2005 meeting wherein Atty. de Vera was removed, it is patent that Atty. de Vera was given fair opportunity to defend himself against the accusations made by Atty. Rivera. Atty. de Vera, however, additionally questions the fact that Atty. Rivera, who authored the complaint against him, also voted for his expulsion making him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera likewise laments the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting but when this resulted in the defeat of his motion for lack of the necessary 2/3 vote, he agreed to another round of voting and that, this time, he voted in favor of his motion. For the record, of the nine governors comprising the IBP Board, six voted for Atty. de Vera's expulsion (including Atty. Rivera) while 3 voted against it (including Atty. de Vera). Section 44 (second paragraph) of the IBP By-Laws provides:

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Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.) Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP Governor is done via a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members. The phrase "remaining members" refers to the members exclusive of the complainant member and the respondent member. The reason therefore is that such members are interested parties and are thus presumed to be unable to resolve said motion impartially. This being the case, the votes of Attys. Rivera and de Vera should be stricken-off which means that only the votes of the seven remaining members are to be counted. Of the seven remaining members, five voted for expulsion while two voted against it which still adds up to the 2/3 vote requirement for expulsion. The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor for just and valid cause All the concerned parties to this case agree that what constitutes cause for the removal of an IBP Governor has not been defined by Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws albeit it includes three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse. Thus, the IBP Board argues that it is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect itself from an intractable member whose removal was caused not by his disagreement with the IBP Board but due to various acts committed by him which the IBP Board considered as inimical to the IBP Board in particular and the IBP in general. Atty. de Vera, on the other hand, insists that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during the Convention's Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors and the decision to remove him only shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by the IBP Board. After weighing the arguments of the parties and in keeping with the fundamental objective of the IBP to discharge its public responsibility more effectively, we hereby find that Atty. de Vera's removal from the IBP Board was not capricious or arbitrary. Indubitably, conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity, if not animosity, are inherent in the internal life of an organization, but especially of the IBP since lawyers are said to disagree before they agree. However, the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other organization, is diluted if the conflicts are brought outside its governing body for then there would be the impression that the IBP, which speaks through the Board of Governors, does not and cannot speak for its members in an authoritative fashion. It would accordingly diminish the IBP's prestige and repute with the lawyers as well as with the general public. As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must thus be adjusted within the governing board itself so as to free it from the stresses that invariably arise when internal cleavages are made public. The doctrine of majority rule is almost universally used as a mechanism for adjusting and resolving

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conflicts and disagreements within the group after the members have been given an opportunity to be heard. While it does not efface conflicts, nonetheless, once a decision on a contentious matter is reached by a majority vote, the dissenting minority is bound thereby so that the board can speak with one voice, for those elected to the governing board are deemed to implicitly contract that the will of the majority shall govern in matters within the authority of the board.[63] The IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right in removing Atty. de Vera as the latter's actuations during the 10th National IBP Convention were detrimental to the role of the IBP Board as the governing body of the IBP. When the IBP Board is not seen by the bar and the public as a cohesive unit, it cannot effectively perform its duty of helping the Supreme Court enforce the code of legal ethics and the standards of legal practice as well as improve the administration of justice. In view of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness and unity, the expulsion of a member of the board who insists on bringing to the public his disagreement with a policy/resolution approved by the majority after due discussion, cannot be faulted. The effectiveness of the board as a governing body will be negated if its pronouncements are resisted in public by a board member. Indeed, when a member of a governing body cannot accept the voice of the majority, he should resign therefrom so that he could criticize in public the majority opinion/decision to his heart's content; otherwise, he subjects himself to disciplinary action by the body. The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal as EVP as well The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal as EVP as well. Section 47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP provides: SEC. 47. National Officers. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. x x x Thus, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of IBP Board of Governors. Atty. de Vera's removal from the Board of Governors, automatically disqualified him from acting as IBP EVP. To insist otherwise would be contrary to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws. The Court will not interfere with the Resolution of the IBP Board to remove Atty. de Vera since it was rendered without grave abuse of discretion While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an extensive power of supervision over the IBP,[64] it is axiomatic that such power should be exercised prudently. The power of supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP should not preclude the IBP from exercising its reasonable discretion especially in the administration of its internal affairs governed by the provisions of its By-Laws. The IBP

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By-Laws were precisely drafted and promulgated so as to define the powers and functions of the IBP and its officers, establish its organizational structure, and govern relations and transactions among its officers and members. With these By-Laws in place, the Supreme Court could be assured that the IBP shall be able to carry on its day-to-day affairs, without the Court's interference. It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and activities of the IBP has been vested in the Board of Governors. The members of the Board are elective and representative of each of the nine regions of the IBP as delineated in its By-Laws.[65] The Board acts as a collegiate body and decides in accordance with the will of the majority. The foregoing rules serve to negate the possibility of the IBP Board acting on the basis of personal interest or malice of its individual members. Hence, the actions and resolutions of the IBP Board deserve to be accorded the disputable presumption[66] of validity, which shall continue, until and unless it is overcome by substantial evidence and actually declared invalid by the Supreme Court. In the absence of any allegation and substantial proof that the IBP Board has acted without or in excess of its authority or with grave abuse of discretion, we shall not be persuaded to overturn and set aside the Board's action or resolution. There is no question that the IBP Board has the authority to remove its members as provided in Article VI, Section 44[67] of the IBP By-Laws. Issue arises only as to whether the IBP Board abused its authority and discretion in resolving to remove Atty. de Vera from his post as an IBP Governor and EVP. As has been previously established herein, Atty. de Vera's removal from the IBP Board was in accordance with due process and the IBP Board acted well within the authority and discretion granted to it by its By-Laws. There being no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the IBP Board, we find no reason to interfere in the Board's resolution to remove Atty. de Vera. The election of Atty. Salazar by the IBP Board as IBP EVP in replacement of Atty. De Vera was conducted in accordance with the authority granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws In the same manner, we find no reason to disturb the action taken by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors in holding a special election to fill-in the vacant post resulting from the removal of Atty. de Vera as EVP of the IBP since the same is a purely internal matter, done without grave abuse of discretion, and implemented without violating the Rules and By-Laws of the IBP. With the removal of Atty. de Vera from the Board, by virtue of the IBP Board Resolution dated 13 May 2005, he was also removed from his post as EVP; thus, there was a resultant vacancy in the position of IBP EVP. Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants to the Board the authority to fill vacancies, however arising, in the IBP positions, subject to the provisions of Section 8 of the Integration Rule,[68] and Section 11 (Vacancies),[69] Section 44 (Removal of members),[70] Section 47 (National officers),[71] Section 48 (other officers),[72] and Section 49 (Terms of Office)[73] of the By-Laws. The IBP Board has specific and

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sufficient guidelines in its Rules and By-Laws on how to fill-in the vacancies after the removal of Atty. de Vera. We have faith and confidence in the intellectual, emotional and ethical competencies of the remaining members of the 2005-2007 Board in dealing with the situation within the bounds of the IBP Rules and By-Laws. The election by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors of a new EVP, who will assume the Presidency for the term 2005-2007, was well within the authority and prerogative granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws, particularly Article VII, Section 47, which provides that "[t]he EVP shall automatically become President for the next succeeding term." The phrase "for the next succeeding term" necessarily implies that the EVP that should succeed Atty. Cadiz as IBP President for the next succeeding term (i.e., 2005-2007) should come from the members of the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors. Hence, in A.M. No. 05-7-19-SC, we restrained now IBP EVP Feliciano Bautista from assuming the position of Acting President because we have yet to resolve the question as to who shall succeed Atty. Cadiz from the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors. Accordingly, the elections of Governor Santiago on 13 June 2005 as IBP EVP, and thereafter, Governor Salazar on 25 June 2005, as the new IBP EVP, upon the relinquishment of Gov. Santiago of the position, were valid. Neither can this Court give credence to the argument of Atty. De Vera that, assuming his removal as IBP Governor and EVP was valid, his replacement as IBP EVP should come from Eastern Mindanao Region pursuant to the rotation rule set forth in Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws. According to Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws, the EVP shall be chosen by the Board of Governors from among the nine Regional Governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. This is based on our pronouncements in Bar Matter 491, wherein we ruled:

"ORDER x x x x

3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [9] IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.

4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the

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presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.

x x x x (Emphasis Supplied)" In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is actually rotated among the nine Regional Governors. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is merely a result of the automatic succession rule of the IBP EVP to the Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule pertains in particular to the position of IBP EVP, while the automatic succession rule pertains to the Presidency. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is but a consequence of the automatic succession rule provided in Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws. In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the election of Atty. De Vera as IBP EVP, each of the nine IBP regions had already produced an EVP and, thus, the rotation was completed. It is only unfortunate that the supervening event of Atty. de Vera's removal as IBP Governor and EVP rendered it impossible for him to assume the IBP Presidency. The fact remains, however, that the rotation rule had been completed despite the non-assumption by Atty. de Vera to the IBP Presidency. Moreover, the application of the rotation rule is not a license to disregard the spirit and purpose of the automatic succession rule, but should be applied in harmony with the latter. The automatic succession rule affords the IBP leadership transition seamless and enables the new IBP National President to attend to pressing and urgent matters without having to expend valuable time for the usual adjustment and leadership consolidation period. The time that an IBP EVP spends assisting a sitting IBP President on matters national in scope is in fact a valuable and indispensable preparation for the eventual succession. It should also be pointed out that this wisdom is further underscored by the fact that an IBP EVP is elected from among the members of the IBP Board of Governors, who are serving in a national capacity, and not from the members at large. It is intrinsic in the IBP By-Laws that one who is to assume the highest position in the IBP must have been exposed to the demands and responsibilities of national leadership. It would therefore be consistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule for Governor Salazar to assume the post of IBP President. By electing the replacement EVP from among the members of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors, the IBP benefits from the experience of the IBP EVP of 2003-2005 - in this case, Governor Salazar - who would have served in a national capacity prior to his assumption of the highest position. It will also be inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule if the EVP for the term 2003-2005 will be elected exclusively by the members of the House of Delegates of the Eastern Mindanao region. This Court notes that the removal of Atty. De Vera in 13 May 2005 was about a month before the expiration of the term of office of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors. Hence, the replacement Governor would not have been able to serve in a national capacity for two years prior to assuming the IBP Presidency.

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In any case, Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase "as much as practicable" to clearly indicate that the rotation rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar exceptions in compelling and exceptional circumstances. It is in view of the foregoing that the argument advanced by Atty. De Vera that the IBP national presidency should be assumed by a nominee from Eastern Mindanao region from where he comes, can not hold water. It would go against the intent of the IBP By-Laws for such a nominee would be bereft of the wealth of experience and the perspective that only one who is honed in service while serving in a national post in the IBP would have. We therefore rule that the IBP Board of Governors acted in accordance with the IBP By-Laws, in electing Atty. Salazar as IBP EVP and in ensuring a succession in the leadership of the IBP. Had the Board of Governors not done so, there would have been no one qualified to assume the Presidency of the IBP on 1 July 2005, pursuant to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows: 1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS, effective from the finality of this Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts; 2) DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for the disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines removing him from his posts as Governor and Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the said Resolution having been rendered without grave abuse of discretion; 3) AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar as Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the remainder of the term 2003-2005, such having been conducted in accordance with its By-Laws and absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion; and 4) DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath of office and assume the Presidency of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the term 2005-2007 in accordance with the automatic succession rule in Article VII, Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of this Resolution. SO ORDERED. Puno, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, Garcia, and Velasco, Jr. JJ., concur. Panganiban, C.J., and Tinga, J., in the result Ynares-Santiago, J., no part.

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Azcuna, J., on sick leave.

[1] Records (A.C. No. 6697), Report and Recommendation, pp. 1-3. [2] Rollo (A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC), pp. 1-9. [3] Id. [4] Id. [5] Id. [6] Records (B.M. No. 1227), p. 3. [7] Rollo (A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC), pp. 1-9. [8] Records (A.C. No. 6697), pp. 177-178. [9] Rollo (A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC), pp. 8-9. [10] Id. at 2. [11] Id. at 5-6. [12] Id. at 16-21. [13] Id. at 19-20. [14] Id. at 35-204. [15] Id. at 36-37. [16] Id. at 205-248. [17] Id. at 307-309. [18] Id. at 281-306. [19] Id. at 344-346. [20] Id. at 356-358.

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[21] Id. [22] Id. at 393-396. [23] Id. at 489-524. [24] Id. at 516. [25] Id. Reply dated 27 January 2006. [26] Records of A.C. No. 6697, pp. 239-252. [27] Id. at 245. [28] Records, pp. 368-371. [29] Bachrach Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 483, 491 (1998). [30] Atty. Garcia v. Atty. De Vera, 463 Phil. 385, 413 (2003). [31] B.M. No. 793, 30 July 2004, 435 SCRA 417. [32] G.R. No. 137378, 12 October 2000, 342 SCRA 722, 734. [33] As amended by SC Res. dated 13 February 1992. [34] De Jesus Paras v. Vailoces, 111 Phil. 569, 572 (1961). [35] Royong v. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865, 875 (1963); Quingwa v. Puno, 125 Phil. 831, 838 (1967). [36] Act No. 2828, amending Sec. 21 of Act No. 190. [37] 2 R-CL. 1097 cited in In re Tagorda, 23 March 1929, 53 Phil. 37, 42; Malcolm, J., Jayme v. Bualan, 58 Phil. 422, 425 (1933); Arce v. National Bank, 62 Phil. 569, 571 (1935). [38] Note 14, 7 C.S.S. 743. [39] Records, pp. 38-39. [40] Records (A.E. 6697), pp. 292. [41] Id. at 276.

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[42] See complainant's Memorandum and compare the same with Atty. de Vera's Reply Memorandum (Records, pp. 239-240 and pp. 254-255). [43] Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635, 640 (1940). [44] Rubberworld (Phils.) Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 75704, 19 July 1989, 175 SCRA 450. [45] A.C. No. 5808, 4 May 2005, 458 SCRA 1, 8-9. [46] "Respondent's Manifestation," Records, pp. 302-303. [47] 392 Phil. 1, 17 (2000). [48] Busiños v. Atty. Ricafort, 347 Phil. 687, 694 (1997). [49] Alitagtag v. Atty. Garcia, 451 Phil. 420, 426 (2003). [50] A.C. No. 4562, 15 June 2005, 460 SCRA 99. [51] 313 Phil. 1 (1995). [52] 325 Phil. 1 (1996). [53] 443 Phil. 24 (2003). [54] 390 Phil. 1 (2000). [55] Section 1, Article III, Constitution - "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law." See also Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea, 346 Phil. 807, 828 (1997). [56] Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea, id. [57] W.W. Willowby, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Sec. 1113. [58] Turning v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78. [59] Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 534, 572 (1910), citing Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78. [60] See Juan F. Rivera, LAW OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, p. 822.

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[61] Guzman v.National University, 226 Phil. 596, 603 (1986). [62] Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea, supra note 55. [63] Gokongwei, Jr. v. Securites and Exchange Commission, G.R. No. L-45911, 11 April 1979, 89 SCRA 336, applicable by analogy. [64] As recognized in In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera on Legal and Moral Grounds, From Being Elected IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the May 31 IBP Election, Adm. Case No. 6052, 418 SCRA 27, 39-42. [65] Article VI, Section 37 of the IBP By-Laws. [66] Rule 131, Section 3 defines disputable presumptions as presumptions that "are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence." [67] Sec. 44. Removal of members. - If the Board of Governors should determine after proper inquiry that any of its members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason become unable to perform his duties, the Board, by resolution of the Majority of the remaining members, may declare his position vacant, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. x x x [68] Sec. 8. Delegates. - The President shall concurrently be the Delegate of the Chapter to the House of Delegates. The Vice President shall be his alternate, unless the chapter is entitled to have more than one Delegate, in which case the Vice President shall also be a Delegate. Additional Delegates and alternates shall in proper cases be elected by the Board. [69] Sec. 11. Vacancies. - Except as otherwise provided in these By-Laws, whenever the term of an office or position, whether elective or appointive, is for a fixed period, the person chosen to fill the vacancy therein shall serve only for the unexpired portion of the term. [70] Sec. 44. Removal of members. - If the Board of Governors should determine after proper inquiry that any of its members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason become unable to perform his duties, the Board, by resolution of the Majority of the remaining members, may declare his position vacant, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the delegates from the region shall by majority vote, elect a successor from among the members of the Chapter to which the resigned

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governor is a member to serve as governor for the unexpired portion of the term. [71] Sec. 47. National Officers. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex officio Vice President for their respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board. The Executive Vice President shall automatically become President for the next succeeding term. The Presidency shall rotate among the nine Regions. [72] Sec. 48. Other officers. - Other officers and employees as the Board may require shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board. Such officers and employees need not be members of the Integrated Bar. [73] Sec. 49. Terms of office. - The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a term of two years from July 1 following their election until June 30 of their second year in office and until their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified. In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions and duties shall be performed by the Executive Vice President, and in the event of the death, resignation, or removal of the President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President for the unexpired portion of the term. In the event of the death, resignation, removal or disability of both the President and the Executive Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold office for the unexpired portion of the term or during the period of disability. Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other officers and employees appointed by the President with the consent of the Board shall hold office at the pleasure of the Board or for such term as the Board may fix.

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EN BANC [B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003] DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent. D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.

The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.

On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a

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lawyer or represented himself as an attorney in the pleading.

On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government.

Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative case is motivated mainly by political vendetta.

On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.

OBCs Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.

On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.

Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies.

On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent as her counsel.

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On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.

All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.

In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,1 the Court elucidated that:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x

In Cayetano v. Monsod,2 the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.3

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust4 since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.5

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,6 a candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in

1 105 Phil. 173 (1959). 2 G.R. No. 100113, 3 September 1991, 201 SCRA 210. 3 Yap Tan v. Sabandal, 211 Phil. 252 (1983). 4 In the Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name Ozaeta, Romulo, etc., 30 July

1979, 92 SCRA 1. 5 Ui v. Bonifacio, Administrative Case No. 3319, 8 June 2000, 333 SCRA 38. 6 Bar Matter No. 139, 28 March 1983, 121 SCRA 217.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/june2000/ac_3319.htm

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contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.7

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law.8 Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.9

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning effective upon your acceptance.10 Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001.11 Thus, the evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

7 People v. Santocildes, Jr., G.R. No. 109149, 21 December 1999, 321 SCRA 310. 8 Diao v. Martinez, Administrative Case No. 244, 29 March 1963, 7 SCRA 475. 9 Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, B.M. No. 139, 28 March 1983, 121 SCRA 217. 10 Respondents Comment, Annex A. 11 Ibid., Annex B.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/dec99/109149.htm

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EN BANC

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO B.M. No. 1678

RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY,

Petitioner,

Present:

PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING,* YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, GARCIA,

VELASCO, JR.

NACHURA,

REYES and

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

Promulgated:

December 17, 2007

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

R E S O L U T I O N

CORONA, J.:

* On Leave.

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This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the

practice of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to

Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for

Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid program. His application was approved and he

became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition

Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.12 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance

as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned

to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether

petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine

citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule

138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of

Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the

disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of

12 As evidence thereof, he submitted a copy of his Identification Certificate No. 07-16912 duly signed by

Immigration Commissioner Marcelino C. Libanan.

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law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyers oath to remind him of his duties and

responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.13 It is so delicately affected with public

interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in

order to protect and promote the public welfare.14

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality,

faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal

education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are

the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to

practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and

confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional

privilege.15

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

13 In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Deliquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, 19

December 1980, 101 SCRA 612. 14 Heck v. Santos, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, 23 February 2004, 423 SCRA 329. 15 In re Atty. Marcial Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, 03 August 1978, 84 SCRA 554.

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Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the

statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an

applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good

moral character and a resident of the Philippines.16 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory

evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been

filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.17

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of

educational, moral and other qualifications;18 passing the bar examinations;19 taking the lawyers oath20

and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the

license to practice.21

The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a continuing

requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership

dues in the IBP;22 payment of the annual professional tax;23 compliance with the mandatory continuing

legal education requirement;24 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and

being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.25

16 Section 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court. 17 Id. 18 Sections 2, 5 and 6, id. 19 Sections 8 to 11 and 14, id. 20 Section 17, id. 21 Sections 18 and 19, id. 22 In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 09 January 1973, 49 SCRA 22; In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,

supra note 3. 23 Section 139, RA 7160. 24 Resolution dated August 8, 2000 in Bar Matter No. 850 (Rules on Mandatory Continuing Legal Education

for Members of the IBP). 25 Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., G.R. No. L-23959, 29

November 1971, 42 SCRA 302.

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Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the

Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to

Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.26 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for

admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the

privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure

terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to

foreigners.27

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of

another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because all Philippine citizens

who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship

under the conditions of [RA 9225].28 Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another

country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with

RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no

automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he

reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions (he) shall apply with the proper authority for a

license or permit to engage in such practice.29 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino

citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the

authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

26 See last paragraph of Section 14, Article XII. 27 In re Bosque, 1 Phil. 88 (1902). 28 Section 2, RA 9225. Emphasis supplied. 29 Section 5(4), id.

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(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is

specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and

update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and

responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to

maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine

bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to

compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar

Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice

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SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held

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out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-

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666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

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MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in

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courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.

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In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such

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matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-

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making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:

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Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

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since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such

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a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the

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President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

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Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

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NARVASA, J., concurring:

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.

As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2

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Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:

1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)

3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

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The following relevant questions may be asked:

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?

2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: 4

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.

To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review.

In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority to choose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.

If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.

Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.

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Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable."

The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.

The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.

I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the petition.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.

Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear

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stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.

There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there?

The professional life of the respondent follows:

1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the following:

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation

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3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated companies

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt — Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

b. Dataprep, Philippines

c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.

d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following:

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier

f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

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k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.

I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?

The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."

Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:

The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.

It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)

For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very

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seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)

xxx xxx xxx

... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)

In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):

xxx xxx xxx

... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been

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interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)

It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:

l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)

xxx xxx xxx

While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).

Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.

I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

Bidin, J., dissent

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring:

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I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.

Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.

As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been

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interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:

1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)

3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

The following relevant questions may be asked:

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?

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2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: 4

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.

To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review.

In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority to choose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.

If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.

Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.

Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities

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involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable."

The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.

The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.

I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the petition.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.

Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.

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There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there?

The professional life of the respondent follows:

1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the following:

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation

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4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated companies

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt — Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

b. Dataprep, Philippines

c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.

d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following:

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier

f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)

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There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.

I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?

The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."

Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:

The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.

It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)

For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he

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answered: "I don't recall exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)

xxx xxx xxx

... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)

In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):

xxx xxx xxx

... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)

It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:

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l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)

xxx xxx xxx

While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).

Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.

I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

Bidin, J., dissent

Footnotes

1 Webster's 3rd New International Dictionary.

2 14 SCRA 109

3 Commission on Appointments' Memorandum dated 25 June 1991 RE: WHAT CONSTITUTES PRACTICE OF LAW, pp. 6-7.

4 14 SCRA 109.

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SECOND DIVISION

[ A.C. No. 5737, October 25, 2004 ]

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, RESPONDENT. R E S O L U T I O N AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

In an administrative complaint dated July 7, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz charges Atty. Stanley Cabrera with misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of 2001, he instituted several actions against his neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf in his own cases; he met respondent who acted as the counsel of his neighbors; during a hearing on January 14, 2002, in one case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City, presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo, the following exchange transpired: xxx xxx So, may we know your honor, if he is a lawyer or not? The Court having been inhibited by the respondent from hearing the case, replied: You are asking for my inhibition and yet you want me to rule on his appearance xxx xxx. Thereafter, the respondent said: Because your honor, he (pertaining to the complainant) is misrepresenting himself to be a lawyer! To this the complainant remarked: “Your Honor, I’m not xxx xxx.” Respondent, this time engulfed with anger in a raising voice said: Appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna; x x x. Respondent’s imputations were uncalled for and the latter’s act of compelling the court to ask complainant whether he is a lawyer or not was intended to malign him before the public, inasmuch as respondent knew that complainant is not a lawyer, having appeared for and in his behalf as a party litigant in prior cases; respondent’s imputations of complainant’s misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently with malice to discredit his honor, with the intention to threaten him not to appear anymore in cases respondent was handling; the manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words “appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna!” were uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign, ridicule, incriminate and discredit complainant before the public.

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Complainant claims that respondent’s display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold in their dealings with society and corresponding appropriate penalty or sanctions for the said administrative violations should be imposed on the respondent. In his Comment, respondent contends that the complaint filed against him is a vicious scheme to dissuade him from appearing as counsel for the Mina family against whom complainant had filed several civil and criminal cases including him to further complainant’s illegal practice of law; complainant’s complaint occurred during a judicial proceeding wherein complainant was able to represent himself considering that he was appearing in barong tagalog thus the presiding judge was misled when she issued an order stating “[i]n today’s hearing both lawyers appeared;” because of which, respondent stated: “Your honor I would like to manifest that this counsel (referring to complainant) who represents the plaintiff in this case is not a lawyer,” to which complainant replied: “The counsel very well know that I am not yet a lawyer;” the reason he informed the court that complainant is not a lawyer was because the presiding judge did not know that complainant is not a lawyer and complainant did not inform the presiding judge that he is not a lawyer when he stated: “for the plaintiff your honor;” he stated “pumasa ka muna” out of indignation because of complainant’s temerity in misrepresenting himself as lawyer; it is surprising that the City Prosecutor of Pasay City filed a complaint for oral defamation against him considering that in a precedent case the Supreme Court stated: “It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged (Navarrete vs. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 540);” in another malicious prosecution being perpetuated by the complainant against the Mina family pending before Judge Priscilla Mijares of RTC Branch 108, Pasay City, they were able to prohibit the appearance of complainant as counsel for himself as authenticated by an Order of Judge Priscilla Mijares which allegedly stated among other; to wit: In connection with Ferdinand A. Cruz’s motion to appear as counsel, the motion is likewise denied, movant not having satisfied the requirements and conditions under Rule 138-A, Sections 1 and 2. Respondent alleges that when complainant filed an administrative case against Judge Priscilla Mijares when said Judge stated in Tagalog in open court “Hay naku masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes! OK?” the same was dismissed by the Honorable Court’s Third Division which stated among others: “That the questioned remarks of respondent were uttered more out of frustration and in reaction to complainant’s actuations and taking into account that complainant is not yet a lawyer but was already lecturing the court on a matter which is not even a point of discussion was sheer arrogance on the part of the complainant.” Respondent prays that the complaint against him be dismissed for lack of merit. The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In a report, dated March 4, 2004, IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for a period of three months for violating Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

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A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. In her report, Commissioner Navarro stated: After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, the undersigned noted that respondent’s averment that the utterances he made in open court is (sic) privileged communication does not hold water for the same was (sic) not relevant to the issue of the case in question under trial before the said court. Respondent did not refute the fact that the same utterances he made in open court against the complainant had been the basis for his indictment of Oral Defamation and later Unjust Vexation under Criminal Cases Nos. 02-1031 and No. 02-2136 respectively, pending trial before MTC Branch 45, Pasay City. Likewise respondent did not refute complainant’s allegation that in 1979 he was held in contempt and was not allowed to practice law for seven years by the Supreme Court in the administrative case filed against him by Emilia E. Andres on December 14, 1979 docketed as A.M. L-585 for his fondness in using contumacious language in his dealing with others. From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that the utterance hurled by the respondent in the manner, substance and tone of his voice which was not refuted by him “that appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna” in whatever manner it was uttered are in itself not only abusive but insulting specially on the part of law students who have not yet taken nor passed the bar examination required of them. Respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in informing the court if it was his purpose relative to complainant’s appearance in court; although the latter appeared only in his behalf but not for others if he had complied with the requirements of Rule 138 (Sections 1 and 3) of the Rules of Court. Respondent should have been more temperate in making utterances in his professional dealings so as not to offend the sensitivities of the other party as in this case On April 16, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution to annul and set aside the recommendation of the investigating commissioner and to approve the dismissal of the case for lack of merit. Prefatorily, we note that the IBP Board of Governors failed to observe the procedural requirements of Sec. 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on review and decision by the Board of Governors which states: SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. – (a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator’s report. (Emphasis supplied)

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In Teodosio vs. Nava,[1] the Court stressed the important function of the requirement that the decision of the Board of Governors state the facts and the reasons on which it is based, which is akin to what is required of the decisions of courts of record, thus: For aside from informing the parties the reason for the decision to enable them to point out to the appellate court the findings with which they are not in agreement, in case any of them decides to appeal the decision, it is also an assurance that the judge, or the Board of Governors in this case, reached his judgment through the process of legal reasoning.[2] In this case, the Board of Governors’ resolution absolving respondent of any misconduct does not contain any findings of facts or law upon which it based its ruling. Ordinarily, non-compliance with the rule would result in the remand of the case. Nonetheless, where the controversy has been pending resolution for quite sometime and the issues involved could be resolved on the basis of the records on appeal, the Court has opted to resolve the case in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of cases.[3] This case falls within the exception. We hold that respondent’s outburst of “appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna” does not amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Based on the facts of this case, such outburst came about when respondent pointed out to the trial court that complainant is not a lawyer to correct the judge’s impression of complainant’s appearance, inasmuch as the judge, in her Order of January 14, 2002, noted that complainant is a lawyer.[4] Such single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to warrant respondent’s suspension or reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an argument between them. It has been said that lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language.[5] Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his cases. A party’s right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. In Maderada vs. Mediodea,[6] this Court expounded on the foregoing provision, thus: This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its progress -- from its commencement to its termination. When they, however, act as their own attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded. Individuals have long been permitted to manage, prosecute and defend their own actions; and when they do so, they are not considered to be in the practice of law. “One does not practice law by acting for himself any more than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself.” The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or vocation

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usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others. Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows: x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x. Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.[7] On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly.[8] Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum.[9] WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Atty. Stanley Cabrera for misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility is DISMISSED for lack of merit. He is, however, admonished to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an officer of the court. SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

[1] 357 SCRA 406 (2001). [2] Id., p. 412. [3] Id., pp. 412-413. [4] Rollo, p. 9. [5] In re: Gomez, 43 Phil. 376, 377 (1922). [6] 413 SCRA 313 (2003). [7] Id., pp. 324-325.

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[8] Reyes vs. Chiong Jr., 405 SCRA 212, 217 (2003). [9] De la Rosa vs. Sabio, Jr., 407 SCRA 213, 220 (2003).

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EN BANC

[ A.C. NO. 6705, March 31, 2006 ]

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, RESPONDENT D E C I S I O N CARPIO, J.:

The Case This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor.

The Facts Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his estate.[1] Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc.[2] Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries, Inc.[3] until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992.[4] Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber concessions from the government. The Presidential Commission on Good Government sequestered it sometime in 1986,[5] and its operations ceased in 1997.[6] Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal complaint entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 ("criminal complaint").[7] Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997.[8] Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation.[9]

He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651 Informations[10] for violation of Article 288[11] in relation to Article 116[12] of the Labor Code of the Philippines.[13] Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:

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1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees.[14] Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the complaint.[15] 2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent received P10,000 as retainer's fee for the months of January and February 1995,[16] another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995,[17] and P5,000 for the month of April 1996.[18] Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor. Respondent refutes complainant's allegations and counters that complainant was merely aggrieved by the resolution of the criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her expectation.[19] Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat for more than five years.[20] Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his undivided loyalty to Taggat.[21] Respondent argues that it was his sworn duty to conduct the necessary preliminary investigation.[22] Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish lack of impartiality when he performed his duty.[23] Respondent points out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the criminal complaint[24] but instead complainant voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit without mental reservation.[25] Respondent states that complainant's reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her impression that respondent would exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from complainant's statement during the hearing conducted on 12 February 1999: x x x Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didn't think he would do it, Madam Witness? A. Because he is supposed to be my father's friend and he was working with my Dad and he was supposed to be trusted by my father. And he came to me and told me he gonna help me. x x x.[26] Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not representing Taggat employees or complainant. Respondent claims he was merely performing his official duty as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.[27] Respondent argues that complainant failed to establish that respondent's act was tainted with personal interest, malice and bad faith.[28]

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Respondent denies complainant's allegations that he instigated the filing of the cases, threatened and harassed Taggat employees. Respondent claims that this accusation is bereft of proof because complainant failed to mention the names of the employees or present them for cross-examination.[29] Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government prosecutor, of retainer fees from complainant but claims that it was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996.[30] Respondent contends that the fees were paid for his consultancy services and not for representation. Respondent submits that consultation is not the same as representation and that rendering consultancy services is not prohibited.[31] Respondent, in his Reply-Memorandum, states: x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily by Taggat without the respondent's asking, intended as token consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or for retainer fees. These payments do not at all show or translate as a specie of 'conflict of interest'. Moreover, these consultations had no relation to, or connection with, the above-mentioned labor complaints filed by former Taggat employees.[32] Respondent insists that complainant's evidence failed to prove that when the criminal complaint was filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent was still the retained counsel or legal consultant.[33] While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent to file 651 Informations against complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State Prosecutor of Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January 1999.[34] Hence, the criminal complaint was dismissed.[35]

The IBP's Report and Recommendation The Integrated Bar of the Philippines' Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas ("IBP Commissioner Abbas") heard the case[36] and allowed the parties to submit their respective memoranda.[37] Due to IBP Commissioner Abbas' resignation, the case was reassigned to Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa ("IBP Commissioner Funa").[38] After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 ("IBP Resolution") dated 4 November 2004 adopting with modification[39] IBP Commissioner Funa's Report and Recommendation ("Report") finding respondent guilty of conflict of interests, failure to safeguard a former client's interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor. The IBP Board of Governors recommended the imposition of a penalty of three years suspension from the practice of law. The Report reads: Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of this issue will require the test of whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict with his former position of Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.

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I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors Office, Annex "B" of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being accused as having the "management and control" of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros. Office, supra). Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent undoubtedly handled the personnel and labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedly dealt with and related with the employees of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and related with complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240, are very much familiar with Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries pertain to the periods 1996-1997, the mechanics and personalities in that case are very much familiar with Respondent. A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client, the duty to "maintain inviolate the client's confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him" (Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.) Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not represent any client or any interest except justice. It should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to a former client with respect to matters that he previously handled for that former client. In this case, matters relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor relations that he previously handled as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was for "Violation of the Labor Code." Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it would have been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been labor-related, or if Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of Taggat. x x x x While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid salaries being sought in I.S. No. 97-240 were of the years 1996 and 1997, the employees and management involved are the very personalities he dealt with as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. Respondent dealt with these persons in his fiduciary relations with Taggat. Moreover, he was an employee of the corporation and part of its management. x x x x As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or "consultancy fees" from herein Complainant while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal consultancy work while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, this matter had long been settled. Government prosecutors are prohibited to engage in the private practice of law (see Legal and Judicial Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994 ed., p. 20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The act of being a legal consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts that are characteristic of the legal profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers any activity, in or out of court, which required the application of law, legal principles, practice or procedures and calls for legal

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knowledge, training and experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111; Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210). Respondent clearly violated this prohibition. As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat and instigating the filing of criminal complaints, we find the evidence insufficient. Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to safeguard a former client's interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor.[40] The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B[41] of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code"). However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful conduct.[42] Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713"). Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official duties."[43] A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition "not [to] represent conflicting interests."[44] However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship exists.[45] Moreover, considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.[46] Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x conduct." Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to "engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions."[47] Complainant's evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented conflicting interests In Quiambao v. Bamba,[48] the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests. One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment.[49] In essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the client's confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him.[50]

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In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992. In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any confidential information acquired through his previous employment. The only established participation respondent had with respect to the criminal complaint is that he was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. On that basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent used any confidential information from his previous employment with complainant or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint. The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests. A lawyer's immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer's employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client's interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated. Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations. Thus, respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.

Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as — x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."[51] "Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one's self to the public as a lawyer.[52] Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term "practice of law." Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while working as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the payments by Taggat were for

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"Retainer's fee."[53] Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713. However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of Professional Responsibility unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713 — the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees — unless the acts involved also transgress provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Here, respondent's violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Respondent's admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01. Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct when respondent stated in his Demurrer to Evidence: In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently and indefinitely suspended or disbarred from the practice of the law profession and his name removed from the Roll of Attorneys on the following grounds: x x x x d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of office and in his dealings with the public.[54] On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.[55] Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in unauthorized private practice of profession is suspension for six months and one day to one year.[56] We find this penalty appropriate for respondent's violation in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.

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Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, p. 153. [2] Id. at 128-129. [3] Id. at 10. [4] Id. at 1, 240. [5] Id. at 240. [6] Id. [7] Id. at 21. [8] Id. at 22. [9] Id. at 75. [10] 21 Taggat employees filed their Affidavits alleging that complainant failed to pay them 31 quincenas of their salaries and wages, thus 651 Informations were recommended for filing. [11] Article 288 of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides: "Penalties. — Except as otherwise provided in this Code, or unless the acts complained of hinges on a question of interpretation or implementation of ambiguous provisions of an existing collective bargaining agreement, any violation of the provisions of this Code declared to be unlawful or penal in nature shall be punished with a fine of not less than One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) nor more than Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than three months nor more than three years, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. x x x." [12] Article 116 of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides: "Withholding of wages and kickbacks prohibited. — It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly, to withhold any amount from the wages of a worker or induce him to give up any part of his wages by force, stealth, intimidation, threat or by any other means whatsoever without the worker's consent." [13] Rollo, p. 82. [14] Id. at 2.

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[15] Id. at 3. [16] Id. at 110-111. [17] Id. at 112-113. [18] Id. at 114. [19] Id. at 243. [20] Id. at 242. [21] Id. at 244. [22] Id. [23] Id. at 243. [24] Id. at 245. [25] Id. at 244. [26] Id. at 246, 483. [27] Id. at 247. [28] Id. [29] Id. at 249. [30] Id. at 247-248. [31] Id. at 350. [32] Id. [33] Id. at 248. [34] Id. at 155-157. [35] Id. [36] Id. at 84-89, 99-103, 232, 237-239, 268, 273, 276-279, 282-284, 294-296, 299-300.

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[37] Id. at 330-331. [38] Id. at 362. [39] The IBP Commissioner imposed a penalty of three months suspension from the practice of law. [40] Rollo, pp. 549-554. [41] Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. — x x x x (b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action. [42] Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01. — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. [43] Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 6. [44] Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 15.03. [45] R. Agpalo, Comments On The Code Of Professional Responsibility And The Code Of Judicial Conduct 165 (2001 ed.) [46] Berbano v. Barcelona, A.C. No. 6084, 3 September 2003, 410 SCRA 258. [47] RA 6713, Section 7(b)(2). [48] A.C. No. 6708, 25 August 2005, 468 SCRA 1. [49] Id. at 10-11. [50] Pormento, Sr. v. Pontevedra, A.C. No. 5128, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 167, 178. [51] Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, 3 September 1991, 201 SCRA 210, 214.

[52] Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc., 447 Phil. 750, 759 (2003).

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[53] Exhs. "B," "B-2," "B-3," rollo, pp. 110-114. [54] Id. at 241-242. [55] Endaya v. Oca, A.C. No. 3967, 3 September 2003, 410 SCRA 244, 255. [56] Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws as mandated by Section 12 of RA 6713.

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EN BANC

[ BAR MATTER No. 712, March 19, 1997 ]

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH R E S O L U T I O N PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. The criminal case which resulted in petitioner' s conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years. On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation. On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge from probation. On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case. On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

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In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that: a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery. b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident. c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death. d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court. The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration o f justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer' s oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable. The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and re-weighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inf1icted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for. In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated: "x x x participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character."[1] In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and

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anger directed at the cause of death. Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this cases, to find room for forgiveness. However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a lawyer. After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition: In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service. The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned. The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society. PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1] Resolution, p. 8.

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RULE 138-A

Law Student Practice Rule

Section 1. Conditions for student practice. — A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.

Section 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

Section 3. Privileged communications. — The Rules safeguarding privileged communications between attorney and client shall apply to similar communications made to or received by the law student, acting for the legal clinic.

Section 4. Standards of conduct and supervision. — The law student shall comply with the standards of professional conduct governing members of the Bar. Failure of an attorney to provide adequate supervision of student practice may be a ground for disciplinary action. (Circular No. 19, dated December 19, 1986).

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BAR MATTER NO. 730 June 13, 1997

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 10, 1997.

IN RE: NEED THAT LAW STUDENT PRACTICING UNDER RULE 138-A BE ACTUALLY SUPERVISED DURING TRIAL (BAR MATTER NO. 730).

The issue in this Consulta is whether a law student who appears before the court under the Law Student Practice Rule (Rule 138-A) should be accompanied by a member of the bar during the trial. This issue was raised by retired Supreme Court Justice Antonio P. Barredo, counsel for the defendant in Civil Case No. BCV-92-11 entitled Irene A. Caliwara v. Roger T. Catbagan filed before the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite.

The records show that the plaintiff in civil Case No. BCV-92-11 was represented by Mr. Cornelio Carmona, Jr., an intern at the Office of Legal Aid, UP-College of Law (UP-OLA). Mr. Carmona conducted hearings and completed the presentation of the plaintiff's evidence-in-chief without the presence of a supervising lawyer. Justice Barredo questioned the appearance of Mr. Carmona during the hearing because the latter was not accompanied by a duly accredited lawyer. On December 15, 1994, Presiding Judge Edelwina Pastoral issued an Order requiring Mr. Carmona to be accompanied by a supervising lawyer on the next hearing. In compliance with said Order, UP-OLA and the Secretary of Justice executed a Memorandum of Agreement directing Atty. Catubao and Atty. Legayada of the Public Attorney's Office to supervise Mr. Carmona during the subsequent hearings.

Justice Barredo asserts that a law student appearing before the trial court under Rule 138-A should be accompanied by a supervising lawyer. 1 On the other hand, UP-OLA, through its Director, Atty. Alfredo F. Tadiar, submits that "the matter of allowing a law intern to appear unaccompanied by a duly accredited supervising lawyer should be . . . left to the sound discretion of the court after having made at least one supervised appearance." 2

For the guidance of the bench and bar, we hold that a law student appearing before the Regional Trial Court under Rule 138-A should at all times be accompanied by a supervising lawyer. Section 2 of Rule 138-A provides.

Section 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed the by supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

The phrase "direct supervision and control" requires no less than the physical presence of the supervising lawyer during the hearing. This is in accordance with the threefold rationale behind the Law Student Practice Rule, to wit: 3

1. to ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a result of incompetence or inexperience of law students, who, not having as yet passed the test of professional competence, are presumably not fully equipped to act a counsels on their own;

2. to provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school clinic may be able to protect itself from any potential vicarious liability arising from some culpable action by their law students; and

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3. to ensure consistency with the fundamental principle that no person is allowed to practice a particular profession without possessing the qualifications, particularly a license, as required by law.

The matter of allowing a law student to appear before the court unaccompanied by a supervising lawyer cannot be left to the discretion of the presiding judge. The rule clearly states that the appearance of the law student shall be under the direct control and supervision of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by law schools. The rule must be strictly construed because public policy demands that legal work should be entrusted only to those who possess tested qualifications, are sworn to observe the rules and ethics of the legal profession and subject to judicial disciplinary control. 4 We said in Bulacan v. Torcino: 5

Court procedures are often technical and may prove like snares to the ignorant or the unwary. In the past, our law has allowed non-lawyers to appear for party litigants in places where duly authorized members of the bar are not available (U.S. vs. Bacansas, 6 Phil. 539). For relatively simple litigation before municipal courts, the Rules still allow a more educated or capable person in behalf of a litigant who cannot get a lawyer. But for the protection of the parties and in the interest of justice, the requirement for appearances in regional trial courts and higher courts is more stringent.

The Law Student Practice Rule is only an exception to the rule. Hence, the presiding judge should see to it that the law student appearing before the court is properly guided and supervised by a member of the bar.

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34 Rule 138 provides;

Section 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that a law student appearing before the Regional Trial Court under the authority of Rule 138-A must be under the direct control and supervision of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school and that said law student must be accompanied by a supervising lawyer in all his appearance.

Padilla and Francisco, J.J., on leave.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO

Clerk of court

Footnotes

1 Consulta, p. 2.

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2 Comment, p. 9.

3 Comment, p. 5.

4 Agpalo, Legal Ethics (Fourth Edition, 1989), pp. 39-40.

5 134 SCRA 252 (1985).

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RULE 138

Attorneys and Admission to Bar

Section 1. Who may practice law. — Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. — Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Section 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens of the United States of America. — Citizens of the United States of America who, before July 4, 1946, were duly licensed members of the Philippine Bar, in active practice in the courts of the Philippines and in good and regular standing as such may, upon satisfactory proof of those facts before the Supreme Court, be allowed to continue such practice after taking the following oath of office:

I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of may knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

Section 4. Requirements for applicants from other jurisdictions. — Applicants for admission who, being Filipino citizens, are enrolled attorneys in good standing in the Supreme Court of the United States or in any circuit court of appeals or district court therein, or in the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States, and who can show by satisfactory certificates that they have practiced at least five years in any of said courts, that such practice began before July 4, 1946, and that they have never been suspended or disbarred, may, in the discretion of the Court, be admitted without examination.

Section 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. — All applicants for admission other than those referred to in the two preceding section shall, before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied law for four years, and successfully completed all prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved and recognized by the Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the candidate, accompanied by a certificate from the university or school of law, shall be filed as evidence of such facts, and further evidence may be required by the court.

No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he has satisfactorily completed the following courses in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.

Section 6. Pre-Law. — No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college,

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requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history and economics.

Section 7. Time for filing proof of qualifications. — All applicants for admission shall file with the clerk of the Supreme Court the evidence required by section 2 of this rule at least fifteen (15) days before the beginning of the examination. If not embraced within section 3 and 4 of this rule they shall also file within the same period the affidavit and certificate required by section 5, and if embraced within sections 3 and 4 they shall exhibit a license evidencing the fact of their admission to practice, satisfactory evidence that the same has not been revoked, and certificates as to their professional standing. Applicants shall also file at the same time their own affidavits as to their age, residence, and citizenship.

Section 8. Notice of Applications. — Notice of applications for admission shall be published by the clerk of the Supreme Court in newspapers published in Pilipino, English and Spanish, for at least ten (10) days before the beginning of the examination.

Section 9. Examination; subjects. — Applicants, not otherwise provided for in sections 3 and 4 of this rule, shall be subjected to examinations in the following subjects: Civil Law; Labor and Social Legislation; Mercantile Law; Criminal Law; Political Law (Constitutional Law, Public Corporations, and Public Officers); International Law (Private and Public); Taxation; Remedial Law (Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence); Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (in Pleadings and Conveyancing).

Section 10. Bar examination, by questions and answers, and in writing. — Persons taking the examination shall not bring papers, books or notes into the examination rooms. The questions shall be the same for all examinees and a copy thereof, in English or Spanish, shall be given to each examinee. Examinees shall answer the questions personally without help from anyone.

Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that his penmanship is so poor that it will be difficult to read his answers without much loss of time., the Supreme Court may allow such examinee to use a typewriter in answering the questions. Only noiseless typewriters shall be allowed to be used.

The committee of bar examiner shall take such precautions as are necessary to prevent the substitution of papers or commission of other frauds. Examinees shall not place their names on the examination papers. No oral examination shall be given.

Section 11. Annual examination. — Examinations for admission to the bar of the Philippines shall take place annually in the City of Manila. They shall be held in four days to be disignated by the chairman of the committee on bar examiners. The subjects shall be distributed as follows: First day: Political and International Law (morning) and Labor and Social Legislation (afternoon); Second day: Civil Law (morning) and Taxation (afternoon); Third day: Mercantile Law (morning) and Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth day: Remedial Law (morning) and legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (afternoon).

Section 12. Committee of examiners. — Examinations shall be conducted by a committee of bar examiners to be appointed by the Supreme Court. This committee shall be composed of a Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall act as chairman, and who shall be designated by the court to serve for one year, and eight members of the bar of the Philippines, who shall hold office for a period of one year. The names of the members of this committee shall be published in each volume of the official reports.

Section 13. Disciplinary measures. — No candidate shall endeavor to influence any member of the committee, and during examination the candidates shall not communicate with each other nor shall they give or receive any assistance. The candidate who violates this provisions, or any other provision of this rule, shall be barred from the examination, and the same to count as a failure against him, and further disciplinary action, including permanent disqualification, may be taken in the discretion of the court.

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Section 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subjects. In determining the average, the subjects in the examination shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 15 per cent; Labor and Social Legislation, 10 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law; 10 per cent: Political and International Law, 15 per cent; Taxation, 10 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent.

Section 15. Report of the committee; filing of examination papers. — Not later than February 15th after the examination, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, the committee shall file its report on the result of such examination. The examination papers and notes of the committee shall be filed with the clerk and may there be examined by the parties in interest, after the court has approved the report.

Section 16. Failing candidates to take review course. — Candidates who have failed the bar examinations for three times shall be disqualified from taking another examination unless they show the satisfaction of the court that they have enrolled in and passed regular fourth year review classes as well as attended a pre-bar review course in a recognized law school.

The professors of the individual review subjects attended by the candidates under this rule shall certify under oath that the candidates have regularly attended classes and passed the subjects under the same conditions as ordinary students and the ratings obtained by them in the particular subject.

Section 17. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — An applicant who has passed the required examination, or has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office.

Section 18. Certificate. — The supreme Court shall thereupon admit the applicant as a member of the bar for all the courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be entered to that effect upon its records, and that a certificate of such record be given to him by the clerk of court, which certificate shall be his authority to practice.

Section 19. Attorney's roll. — The clerk of the Supreme Court shall kept a roll of all attorneys admitted to practice, which roll shall be signed by the person admitted when he receives his certificate.

Section 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an attorney:

(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines.

(b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers;

(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law.

(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law;

(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval;

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(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged;

(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;

(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed;

(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law.

Section 21. Authority of attorney to appear. — an attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorneys wilfully appear in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.

Section 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal. — An attorney who appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court.

Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. — Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash.

Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.

Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. — When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.

Section 26. Change of attorneys. — An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the advance party.

A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the contract between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable

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cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in the contract. However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the court, intervene in the case to protect his rights. For the payment of his compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case wherein his services had been retained by the client.

Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Section 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.

Section 29. Upon suspension by the Court of Appeals or Court of First Instance, further proceedings in Supreme Court. — Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or the Court of First Instance shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or extending the suspension, or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant.

Section 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. — No attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte.

Section 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants. — A court may assign an attorney to render professional aid free of charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it appears that the party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be the duty of the attorney so assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused therefrom by the court for sufficient cause shown.

Section 32. Compensation for attorneys de oficio. — Subject to availability of funds as may be provided by the law the court may, in its discretion, order an attorney employed as counsel de oficio to be compensates in such sum as the court may fix in accordance with section 24 of this rule. Whenever such compensation is allowed, it shall be not less than thirty pesos (P30) in any case, nor more than the following amounts: (1) Fifty pesos (P50) in light felonies; (2) One hundred pesos (P100) in less grave felonies; (3) Two hundred pesos (P200) in grave felonies other than capital offenses; (4) Five Hundred pesos (P500) in capital offenses.

Section 33. Standing in court of person authorized to appear for Government. — Any official or other person appointed or designated in accordance with law to appear for the Government of the Philippines shall have all the rights of a duly authorized member of the bar to appear in any case in which said government has an interest direct or indirect.

Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose, or with the aid

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an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Section 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. — No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients.

Section 36. Amicus Curiae. — Experienced and impartial attorneys may be invited by the Court to appear as amici curiae to help in the disposition of issues submitted to it.

Section 37. Attorneys' liens. — An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have the caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have the caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse paty; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 6397

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE INTEGRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR.

Section 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

Section 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.

Section 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved: September 17, 1971

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RULE 139-A

Integrated Bar of the Philippines

Section 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the "Integrated Bar of the Philippines," composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

Section 2. Purposes. — The fundamental purposes of the Integrated Bar shall be to elevate the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

Section 3. Regions. — The Philippines is hereby divided into nine Regions of the Integrated Bar, to wit:

(a) Northern Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Abra, Batanes, Benguet, Cagayan, Ifugao, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela, Kalinga-Apayao, La Union, Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, and Quirino.

(b) Central Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Bataan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Pangasinan, Tarlac, and Zambales;

(c) Greater Manila, consisting of the City of Manila and Quezon City;

(d) Southern Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Batangas, Cavite, Laguna, Marinduque, Occidental Mindoro, Oriental Mindoro, Quezon, and Rizal;

(e) Bicolandia, consisting of the provinces of Albay, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Catanduanes, Masbate, and Sorsogon;

(f) Eastern Visayas, consisting of the provinces of Bohol, Cebu, Eastern Samar, Leyte, Northern Samar, Samar, and Southern Leyte;

(g) Western Visayas, consisting of the provinces of Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Palawan, Romblon, and Siquijor.

(h) Eastern Mindanao, consisting of the provinces of Agusan del Norte, Agusan Del Sur, Bukidnon, Camiguin, Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur, Davao Oriental, Misamis Oriental, Surigao del Norte, and Surigao del Sur; and

(i) Western Mindanao, consisting of the cities of Basilan and Zamboanga, and the provinces of Cotabato, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Misamis Occidental, South Cotabato, Sulu, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur.

In the event of the creation of any new province, the Board of Governors shall, with the approval of the Supreme Court, determine the Region to which the said province shall belong.

Section 4. Chapters. — A Chapter of the Integrated Bar shall be organized in every province. Except as hereinbelow provided, every city shall be considered part of the province within which it is geographically situated.

A separate Chapter shall be organized in each of the following political subdivisions or areas;

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(a) The sub-province of Aurora;

(b) Each congressional district of the City of Manila;

(c) Quezon City;

(d) Caloocan City, Malabon and Navotas;

(e) Pasay City, Makati, Mandaluyong and San Juan del Monte;

(f) Cebu City; and

(g) Zamboanga City and Basilan City.

Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office, or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.

Each Chapter shall have its own local government as provided for by uniform rules to be prescribed by the Board of Governors and approved by the Supreme Court, the provisions of Section 19 of this Rule notwithstanding.

Chapters belonging to the same Region may hold regional conventions on matters and problems of common concern.

Section 5. House of Delegates. — The Integrated Bar shall have a House of Delegates of not more than one hundred twenty members who shall be apportioned among all the Chapters as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective members, but each Chapter shall have at least one Delegate. On or before December 31, 1974, and every four years thereafter, the Board of Governors shall make an apportionment of Delegates.

The term of the office of Delegate shall begin on the date of the opening of the annual convention of the House and shall end on the day immediately preceding the date of the opening of the next succeeding annual convention. No person may be a Delegate for more than two terms.

The House shall hold an annual convention at the call of the Board of Governors at any time during the month of April of each year for the election of Governor, the reading and discussion of reports including the annual report of the Board of Governors, the transaction of such other business as may be referred to it by the Board, and the consideration of such additional matters as may be requested in writing by at least twenty Delegates. Special conventions of the House may be called by the Board of Governors to consider only such matters as the Board shall indicate. A majority of the Delegates who have registered for a convention, whether annual or special, shall constitute a quorum to do business.

Section 6. Board of Governors. — The Integrated Bar shall be governed by a Board of Governors. Nine Governors shall be elected by the House of Delegates from the nine Regions on the representation basis of one Governor from each Region. Each Governor shall be chosen from a list of nominees submitted by the Delegates from the Region, provided that not more than one nominee shall come from any Chapter. The President and the Executive Vice President, if chosen by the Governors from outside of themselves as provided in Section 7 of this Rule, shall ipso facto become members of the Board.

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The members of the Board shall hold office for a term of one year from the date of their election and until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. No person may be a Governor for more than two terms.

The Board shall meet regularly once every three months, on such date and such time and place as it shall designate. A majority of all the members of the Board shall constitute a quorum to do business. Special meetings may be called by the President or by five members of the Board.

Subject to the approval of the Supreme Court, the Board shall adopt By-Laws and promulgate Canons of Professional Responsibility for all members of the Integrated Bar. The By-Laws and the Canons may be amended by the Supreme Court motu propio or upon the recommendation of the Board of Governors.

The Board shall prescribe such other rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of the Integrated Bar as well as the provisions of this Rule.

Section 7. Officers. — The Integrated Bar shall have a President and an Executive Vice President who shall be chosen by the Governors immediately after the latter's election, either from among themselves or from other members of the Integrated Bar, by the vote of at least five Governors. Each of the regional members of the Board shall be ex officio Vice President for the Region which he represents.

The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a term of one year from the date of their election and until their successors shall have duly qualified. The Executive Vice President shall automatically become the President for the next succeeding full term. The Presidency shall rotate from year to year among all the nine Regions in such order or rotation as the Board of Governors shall prescribe. No person shall be President or Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar for more than one term.

The Integrated Bar shall have a Secretary, a Treasurer, and such other officers and employees as may be required by the Board of Governors, to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board, and to hold office at the pleasure of the Board or for such terms as it may fix. Said officers and employees need not be members of the Integrated Bar.

Section 8. Vacancies. — In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his duties shall be performed by the Executive Vice President; and in the event of the death, resignation, or removal of the President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President during the remainder of the term of the office thus vacated. In the event of the death, resignation, removal, or disability of both the President and the Executive Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold office until the next succeeding election or during the period of disability.

The filling of vacancies in the House of Delegates, Board of Governors, and all other positions of Officers of the Integrated Bar shall be as provided in the By-Laws. Whenever the term of an office or position is for a fixed period, the person chosen to fill a vacancy therein shall serve only for the unexpired term.

Section 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collection from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.

Section 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

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Section 11. Voluntary termination of membership; re-instatement. — A member may terminate his membership by filing a written notice to that effect with the Secretary of the Integrated Bar, who shall immediately bring the matter to the attention of the Supreme Court. Forthwith he shall cease to be a member and his name shall be stricken by the Court from the Roll of Attorneys. Reinstatement may be made by the Court in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the Board of Governors and approved by the Court.

Section 12. Grievance procedures. — The Board of Governors shall provide in the By-Laws for grievance procedures for the enforcement and maintenance of discipline among all the members of the Integrated Bar, but no action involving the suspension or disbarment of a member or the removal of his name from the Roll of Attorneys shall be effective without the final approval of the Supreme Court.

Section 13. Non-political Bar. — The Integrated Bar shall be strictly non-political, and every activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election of appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof.

Section 14. Positions honorary. — Except as may be specifically authorized or allowed by the Supreme Court, no Delegate or Governor and no national or local Officer or committee member shall receive any compensation, allowance or emolument from the funds of the Integrated Bar for any service rendered therein or be entitled to reimbursement for any expense incurred in the discharge of his functions.

Section 15. Fiscal matters. — The Board of Governors shall administer the funds of the Integrated Bar and shall have the power to make appropriations and disbursements therefrom. It shall cause proper Books of Accounts to be kept and Financial Statements to be rendered and shall see to it that the proper audit is made of all accounts of the Integrated Bar and all the Chapters thereof.

Section 16. Journal. — The Board of Governors shall cause to be published a quarterly Journal of the Integrated Bar, free copies of which shall be distributed to every member of the Integrated Bar.

Section 17. Voluntary Bar associations. — All voluntary Bar associations now existing or which may hereafter be formed may co-exist with the Integrated Bar but shall not operate at cross-purposes therewith.

Section 18. Amendments. — This Rule may be amended by the Supreme Court motu propio or upon the recommendation of the Board of Governors or any Chapter of the Integrated Bar.

Section 19. Organizational period. — The Commission on Bar Integration shall organize the local Chapters and toward this end shall secure the assistance of the Department of Justice and of all Judges throughout the Philippines. All Chapter organizational meetings shall be held on Saturday, February 17, 1973. In every case, the Commission shall cause proper notice of the date, time and place of the meeting called to organize a Chapter shall constitute a quorum for the purpose, including the election of a President, a Vice President, a Secretary, a Treasurer, and five Directors.

The Commission shall initially fix the number of Delegates and apportion the same among all the Chapters as nearly as may be in proportion to the number of their respective members, but each Chapter shall have at least one Delegate. The President of each Chapter shall concurrently be its Delegate to the House of Delegates. The Vice President shall be his alternate, except where the Chapter is entitled to have more than one Delegate, in which case the Vice President shall also be a Delegate.

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The Board of Directors of the Chapter shall in proper cases elect additional as well as alternate Delegates.

The House of Delegates shall convene in the City of Manila on Saturday, March 17, 1973 for the Purpose of electing a Board of Governors. The Governors shall immediately assume office and forthwith meet to elect the Officers of the Integrated Bar. The Officers so chosen shall immediately assume their respective positions.

Section 20. Effectivity. — This Rule shall take effect on January 16, 1973.

Legal Ethics Cases

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Transcript of Legal Ethics Cases