1. IN RE: AL C. ARGOSINO

FELICIANO, J.:

A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.

Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him.

Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993. 1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.

On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.

The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. 2 The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect:

In Re Farmer:

This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant's right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to make up such a character. It is something more than an absence of bad character. It is the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .

And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient ofunbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of justice. . . .

In Re Application of Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:

It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from the straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute examination to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and

has established himself therein, a far more difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his license.

In Re Keenan: 6

The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it.

Re Rouss: 7

Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past offense: an examination into character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.

Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8

Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only protect the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to courts could such agents give? They are required to be of good moral character, so that the agents and officers of the court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible consequence that both those who have not such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the administration of justice.

It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning:

. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):

The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of the law unless he covered an upright moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is more important, if anything, to the public and to the proper administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances are that his character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling — a curse instead of a benefit to his community — a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin. 9

All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment:

Re Stepsay: 10

The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.

Re Wells: 11

. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar the court cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's character as respects honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.

The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a general

perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we know it. 12

Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character.

Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to considerde novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.

Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.

2. OBLES V. DECIEMBRE

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Constituting a serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility was the malevolent act of respondent, who filled up the blank checks entrusted to him as security for a loan by writing on those checks amounts that had not been agreed upon at all, despite his full knowledge that the loan they were meant to secure had already been paid.

The Case

Before us is a verified Petition[1] for the disbarment of Atty. Victor V. Deciembre, filed by Spouses Franklin and Lourdes Olbes with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court. Petitioners charged respondent with willful and deliberate acts of dishonesty, falsification and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. After he had filed his Comment [2] on the Petition, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay, held several hearings. During those hearings, the last of which was held on May 12, 2003, [3] the parties were able to present their respective witnesses and documentary evidence. After the filing of the parties respective formal offers of evidence, as well as petitioners Memorandum,[4] the case was considered submitted for resolution. Subsequently, the commissioner rendered his Report and Recommendation dated January 30, 2004, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XV-2003-177 dated July 30, 2004.

The Facts

In their Petition, Spouses Olbes allege that they were government employees working at the Central Post Office, Manila; and that Franklin was a letter carrier receiving a monthly salary of P6,700, and Lourdes, a mail sorter,P6,000.[5]

Through respondent, Lourdes renewed on July 1, 1999 her application for a loan from Rodela Loans, Inc., in the amount of P10,000. As security for the loan, she issued and delivered to respondent five Philippine National Bank (PNB) blank checks (Nos. 0046241-45), which served as collateral for the approved loan as well as any other loans that might be obtained in the future. [6]

On August 31, 1999, Lourdes paid respondent the amount of P14,874.37 corresponding to the loan plus surcharges, penalties and interests, for which the latter issued a receipt,[7] herein quoted as follows:

August 31, 1999

Received the amount of P14,874.37 as payment of the loan of P 10,000.00 taken earlier by Lourdes Olbes.

(Sgd.) Atty. Victor V. Deciembre8-31-99P10,000.00

PNB Check No. 46241 8/15/99[8]

Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan, respondent filled up four (of the five) blank PNB Checks (Nos. 0046241, 0046242, 0046243 and 0046244) for the amount of P50,000 each, with different dates of maturity -- August 15, 1999, August 20, 1999, October 15, 1999 and November 15, 1999, respectively.[9]

On October 19, 1999, respondent filed before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal an Affidavit-Complaint against petitioners for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) 22. He alleged therein that on July 15, 1999, around one-thirty in the afternoon at Cainta, Rizal, they personally approached him and requested that he immediately exchange with cash their postdated PNB Check Nos. 0046241 and 0046242 totaling P100,000.[10]

Several months after, or on January 20, 2000, respondent filed against petitioners another Affidavit-Complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22. He stated, among others, that on the same day, July 15, 1999, around two oclock in the afternoon at Quezon City, they again approached him and requested that he exchange with cash PNB Check Nos. 0046243 and 0046244 totaling P100,000.[11]

Petitioners insisted that on the afternoon of July 15, 1999, they never went either to Cainta, Rizal, or to Quezon City to transact business with respondent. Allegedly, they were in their office at the time, as shown by their Daily Time Records; so it would have been physically impossible for them to transact business in Cainta, Rizal, and, after an interval of only thirty minutes, in Quezon City, especially considering the heavy traffic conditions in those places.[12]

Petitioners averred that many of their office mates -- among them, Juanita Manaois, Honorata Acosta and Eugenia Mendoza -- had suffered the same fate in their dealings with respondent.[13]

In his Comment,[14] respondent denied petitioners claims, which he called baseless and devoid of any truth and merit. Allegedly, petitioners were the ones who had deceived him by not honoring their commitment regarding their July 15, 1999 transactions. Those transactions, totaling P200,000, had allegedly been covered by their four PNB checks that were, however, subsequently dishonored due to ACCOUNT CLOSED. Thus, he filed criminal cases against them. He claimed that the checks had already been fully filled up when petitioners signed them in his presence. He further claimed that he had given them the amounts of money indicated in the checks, because his previous satisfactory transactions with them convinced him that they had the capacity to pay.

Moreover, respondent said that the loans were his private and personal transactions, which were not in any way connected with his profession as a lawyer. The criminal cases against petitioners were allegedly private actions intended to vindicate his rights against their deception and violation of their obligations. He maintained that his right to litigate should not be curtailed by this administrative action.

Report of the Investigating Commissioner

In his Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The commissioner said that respondents version of the facts was not credible. Commissioner Dulay rendered the following analysis and evaluation of the evidence presented:

In his affidavit-complaint x x x executed to support his complaint filed before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal respondent stated that:

2. That last July 15, 1999, in the jurisdiction of Cainta, Rizal, both LOURDES E. OLBES and FRANKLIN A. OLBES x x x, personally met and requested me to immediately exchange with cash, right there and then, their postdated checks totalingP100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by them in their business venture.

Again in his affidavit-complaint executed to support his complaint filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City respondent stated that:

2. That last July 15, 1999, at around 2PM, in the jurisdiction of Quezon City, M.M., both LOURDES E. OLBES and FRANKLIN A. OLBES x x x, personally met and requested me to immediately exchange with cash, right there and then, their postdated checks totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by them in their business venture.

The above statements executed by respondent under oath are in direct contrast to his testimony before this Commission on cross-examination during the May 12, 2003 hearing, thus:

ATTY PUNZALAN: (continuing)

Q. Based on these four (4) checks which you claimed the complainant issued to you, you filed two separate criminal cases against them, one, in Pasig City and the other in Quezon City, is that correct?

A. Yes, Your Honor, because the checks were deposited at different banks.

Q. These four checks were accordingly issued to you by the complainants on July 15, 1999, is that correct?

A. I will consult my records, You Honor, because its quite a long time. Yes, Your Honor, the first two checks is in the morning and the next two checks is in the afternoon (sic).

COMM. DULAY:

Which are the first two checks?

ATTY. DECIEMBRE:

The first two checks covering check Nos. 46241 and 46242 in the morning. And Check No. 46243 and 46244 in the afternoon, Your Honor.

ATTY. PUNZALAN:

Q. Could you recall what particular time in the morning that these two checks with number 0046241 and 0046242 xxx have been issued to you?

A. I could not remember exactly but in the middle part of the morning around 9:30 to 10:00.

Q. This was issued to you in what particular place?

A. Here in my office at Garnet Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City.

Q. Is that your house?

A. No, its not my house?

Q. What is that, is that your law office?

A. That is my retainer client.

Q. What is the name of that retainer client of yours?

ATTY. DECIEMBRE:

Your Honor, may I object because what is the materiality of the question?

ATTY. PUNZALAN:

That is very material. I am trying to test your credibility because according to you these checks have been issued in Pasig in the place of your client on a retainer. Thats why I am asking your client

COMM. DULAY:

The name of the client is not material I think. It is enough that he said it was issued here in Pasig. What building?

ATTY. DECIEMBRE:

AIC Corporate Center, Your Honor.

COMM. DULAY:

What is the materiality of knowing the name of his clients office?

ATTY. PUNZALAN:

Because, Your Honor, the materiality is to find out whether he is telling the truth. The place, Your Honor, according to the respondent is his client. Now I am asking who is that client?

COMM. DULAY:

Your answer.

ATTY. DECIEMBRE:

A. It is AIC Realty Corporation at AIC Building.

Q. And the same date likewise, the complainants in the afternoon issued PNB Check Nos. 0046243 and 0046244, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So would you want to tell this Honorable office that there were four checks issued in the place of your client in Pasig City, two in the morning and two in the afternoon?

A. That is correct, sir.

Respondent was clearly not being truthful in his narration of the transaction with the complainants. As between his version as to when the four checks were given, we find the story of complainant[s] more credible. Respondent has blatantly distorted the truth, insofar as the place where the transaction involving the four checks took place. Such distortion on a very material fact would seriously cast doubt on his version of the transaction with complainants.

Furthermore respondents statements as to the time when the transactions took place are also obviously and glaringly inconsistent and contradicts the written statements made before the public prosecutors. Thus further adding to the lack of credibility of respondents version of the transaction.

Complainants version that they issued blank checks to respondent as security for the payment of a loan of P10,000.00 plus interest, and that respondent filled up the checks in amounts not agreed upon appears to be more credible. Complainants herein are mere employees of the Central Post Office in Manila who had a previous loan of P10,000.00 from respondent and which has since been paid x x x. Respondent does not deny the said transaction. This appears to be the only previous transaction between the parties. In fact, complainants were even late in paying the loan when it fell due such that they had to pay interest. That respondent would trust them once more by giving them another P200,000.00 allegedly to be used for a business and immediately release the amounts under the circumstances described by respondent does not appear credible given the background of the previous transaction and personal circumstances of complainants. That respondent who is a lawyer would not even bother to ask from complainants a receipt for the money he has given, nor bother to verify and ask them what businesses they would use the money for contributes further to the lack of credibility of respondents version. These circumstances really cast doubt as to the version of respondent with regard to the transaction. The resolution of the public prosecutors notwithstanding we believe respondent is clearly lacking in honesty in dealing with the complainants. Complainant Franklin Olbes had to be jailed as a result of respondents filing of the criminal cases. Parenthetically, we note that respondent has also filed similar cases against the co-employees of complainants in the Central Post Office and respondent is facing similar complaints in the IBP for his actions.[15]

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of Commissioner Dulay, as approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors. However, the penalty should be more severe than what the IBP recommended.

Respondents Administrative Liability

Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. [16] It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good moral character. [17] A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he [or she] has sworn to be a fearless crusader.[18]

By taking the lawyers oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice. [19] Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the publics faith in the legal profession. [20]

The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates the following:

Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.

x x x x x x x x x

Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

x x x x x x x x x

Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

A high standard of excellence and ethics is expected and required of members of the bar. [21] Such conduct of nobility and uprightness should remain with them, whether in their public or in their private lives. As officers of the courts and keepers of the publics faith, they are burdened with the highest degree of social responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor.[22]

The oath that lawyers swear to likewise impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor in their relationships with others. The oath is a sacred trust that must be upheld and kept inviolable at all times. Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in their professional or in their private capacity, if such conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the court.[23]

In the present case, the IBP commissioner gave credence to the story of petitioners, who said that they had given five blank personal checks to respondent at the Central Post Office in Manila as security for the P10,000 loan they had contracted. Found untrue and unbelievable was respondents assertion that they had filled up the checks and exchanged these with his cash at Quezon City and Cainta, Rizal. After a careful review of the records, we find no reason to deviate from these findings.

Under the circumstances, there is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion. Respondent does not deny the P10,000 loan obtained from him by petitioners. According to Franklin Olbes testimony on cross-examination, they asked respondent for the blank checks after the loan had been paid. On the pretext that he was not able to bring the checks with him,[24] he was not able to return them. He thus committed abominable dishonesty by abusing the confidence reposed in him by petitioners. It was their high regard for him as a member of the bar that made them trust him with their blank checks. [25]

It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously transgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and despite respondents full knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the checks had already been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for his material gain.

And he did not stop there. Because the checks were dishonored upon presentment, respondent had the temerity to initiate unfounded criminal suits against petitioners, thereby exhibiting his vile intent to have them punished and deprived of liberty for

frustrating the criminal duplicity he had wanted to foist on them. As a matter of fact, one of the petitioners (Franklin) was detained for three months[26] because of the Complaints. Respondent is clearly guilty of serious dishonesty and professional misconduct. He committed an act indicative of moral depravity not expected from, and highly unbecoming, a member of the bar.

Good moral character is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. It is equally essential to observe this norm meticulously during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. [27] Good moral character includes at least common honesty.[28] No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness and candor.[29] The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior. [30] Lawyers must be ministers of truth. Hence, they must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.[31]

Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable; [32] they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct that merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws.[33]

Considering the depravity of the offense committed by respondent, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP of suspension for two years from the practice of law to be too mild. His propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is loathsome.

In Eustaquio v. Rimorin,[34] the forging of a special power of attorney (SPA) by the respondent to make it appear that he was authorized to sell anothers property, as well as his fraudulent and malicious inducement of Alicia Rubis to sign a Memorandum of Agreement to give a semblance of legality to the SPA, were sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law for five years. Here, the conduct of herein respondent is even worse. He used falsified checks as bases for maliciously indicting petitioners and thereby caused the detention of one of them.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is found guilty of gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby indefinitely SUSPENDED from the practice of law effective immediately. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is directed to append a copy to respondents personal record. Let another copy be furnished the National Office of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

3. DE GUZMAN V. DE DIOS

The case before the Court is a complaint [1] for disbarment against Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios on the ground of violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the code of Professional Responsibility, for representing conflicting interests, and of Article 1491 Civil Code, for acquiring property in litigation.

In 1995, complainant engaged the services of respondent as counsel in order to form a corporation, which would engage in hotel and restaurant business in Olongapo City.

On January 10, 1996, with the assistance of Atty. De Dios, complainant registered Suzuki Beach Hotel, Inc. (SBHI) with the Securities and Exchange Commission.[2] Complainant paid on respondent a monthly retainer fee of P5,000.00.

On December 15, 1997, the corporation required complainant to pay her unpaid subscribed shares of stock amounting to two million two hundred and thirty five thousand pesos (P2,235,000.00) or 22,350 shares, on or before December 30, 1997.

On January 29, 1998,[3] complainant received notice of the public auction sale of her delinquent shares and a copy of a board resolution dated January 6, 1998 authorizing such sale.[4] Complainant soon learned that her shares had been acquired by Ramon del Rosario, one of the incorporators of SBHI. The sale ousted complainant from the corporation completely. While respondent rose to be president of the corporation, complainant lost all her lifes savings invested therein.

Complainant alleged that she relied on the advice of Atty. De Dios and believed that as the majority stockholder, Atty. de Dios would help her with the management of the corporation.

Complainant pointed out that respondent appeared as her counsel and signed pleadings in a case where complainant was one of the parties.[5] Respondent, however, explained that she only appeared because the property involved belonged to SBHI.Respondent alleged that complainant misunderstood the role of respondent as legal counsel of Suzuki Beach Hotel, Inc. Respondent manifested that her appearance as counsel for complainant Diana de Guzman was to protect the rights and interest of SBHI since the latter was real owner of the land in controversy.

Respondent further said that the land on which the resort was established belonged to the Japanese incorporators, not to complainant. The relationship of the complainant and the Japanese investors turned sour because complainant misappropriated the funds and property of the corporation. To save the corporation from bankruptcy, respondent advised all concerned stockholders

that it was proper to call for the payment of unpaid subscriptions and subsequent sale of the delinquent shares. These lead to the auction of the unpaid shares of complainant and hence, the ouster of complainant from the corporation.

Meantime, Mr. Del Rosario transferred one hundred (100) shares to respondent in payment of legal services as evidenced by a Deed of Waiver and Transfer of corporate Shares of Stock.

On October 22, 1999, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a resolution [6] finding that the acts of respondent were not motivated by ill will as she acts in the best interest of her client, SBHI. The IBP found that complainant failed to present convincing proof of her attorney-client relationship with respondent other than the pleadings respondent filed in the trial court where complainant was one of the parties.

We disagree.

We find merit in the complaint. There are certain facts presented before us that created doubt on the propriety of the declaration of delinquent shares and subsequent sale of complainants entire subscription. Complainant subscribed to 29,800 shares equivalent to two million nine hundred and eighty thousand pesos (P2,980,000.00). She was the majority stockholder. Out of the subscribed shares, she paid up seven hundred forty-five thousand pesos (P745,000.00) during the stage of incorporation.

How complainant got ousted from the corporation considering the amount she had invested in it is beyond us. Granting that the sale of her delinquent shares was valid, what happened to her original shares? This, at least, should have been explained.

Respondent claims that there was no attorney-client relationship between her and complainant. The claim has no merit. It was complainant who retained respondent to form a corporation. She appeared as counsel in behalf of complainant.

There was evidence of collusion between the board of directors and respondent. Indeed, the board of directors nowe included respondent as the president, Ramon del Rosario as secretary, Hikoi Suzuki as chairman, Agnes Rodriguez as treasurer and Takayuki Sato as director.[7] The present situation shows a clear case of conflict of interest of the respondent.

Lawyers must conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.[8]

We said:

To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never be overemphasized. Considering that, of all classes and professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is imperative that they live by the law. Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath and engage in deceitful conduct have no place in the legal profession.[9]

Clearly, respondent violated the prohibition against representing conflicting interests and engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.[10]

As a lawyer, respondent is bound by her oath to do no falsehood or consent to its commission and to conduct herself as a lawyer according to the best of her knowledge and discretion. The lawyers oath is a source of obligations and violation thereof is a ground for suspension, disbarment,[11] or other disciplinary action.[12] The acts of respondent Atty. De Dios are clearly in violation of her solemn oath as a lawyer that this Court will not tolerate.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios remiss in her sworn duty to her client, and to the bar. The Court hereby SUSPENDS her from the practice of law for six (6) months, with warning that a repetition of the charges will be dealth with more severely.

Let a copy ofthis decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as an attorney and as a member of the Bar, and furnish the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

4. MELEGRITO V. BARBA

VICKERS, J.:

These charges of malpractice filed by Felix Melegrito on behalf of himself and 230 other persons against Attorney Eusebio C. Barba were referred in due course to the Solicitor- General for investigation and report. As the complainants were residents of the

Province of Tarlac, the Solicitor-General entrusted the investigation to the fiscal of that province. At the instance of the respondent the investigation, after being transferred several times, was set for April 4, 1933, but the respondent did not appear on that date. The complainants, accompanied by an attorney, appeared and presented their evidence, consisting of the testimony of Felix Melegrito and various exhibits. The provincial fiscal found the respondent attorney guilty of serious malpractice committed by defrauding the complainants of P8,226, and recommended that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law and ordered to return said amount to the complainants. The Solicitor-General in submitting his report to this court said:

After a careful consideration of the evidence, oral as well as documentary, presented by the complainant in the case, the undersigned has found that the conclusions of the provincial fiscal are supported by the evidence of record, and, accordingly, concurs in his recommendation.

It appears from an examination of the record that Francisco Gonzales, the owner of the greater part of the "Hacienda Esperanza", transferred certain portions of it to his daughters Ramona, Guadalupe, Cristina, and Aurea Gonzales, and that in 1914 his daughters filed separate applications in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija for the registration of their respective portions of the hacienda. The registration was opposed by Felix Melegrito and more than 230 other persons. In due course the opposition was overruled and the registration of the lands in the name of the applicants was ordered. The cases were appealed to this court, which remanded them to the lower court for a new trial and for amendment of the plans. The four cases were then consolidated with cadastral case No. 22 of the Province of Nueva Ecija, which had been instituted in the meantime. After additional evidence had been presented, the lower court again decided in favor of the applicants. From that decision four groups of opponents appealed to this court, which affirmed the decision of the lower court on March 30, 1929 (G.R. Nos. 28875-79). 1

In February, 1930, the complainants engaged the respondent attorney to appeal their cases to the Supreme Court of the United States, and agreed to pay him P6,500. The respondent sailed for the United States in October, 1930, and returned in March, 1931. While in the United States he went to Washington and secured a letter of introduction from the Vice-President of the United States to the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands in the hope of being appointed a member of the Governor-General's staff. It does not appear that the respondent made any attempt, either in Manila or in Washington, to take the cases of the complainants to the Supreme Court of the United States, because, as the respondent states, the decision of this court had become final and unappealable, and the records had been returned to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. The only thing which the respondent did, after examining the record, before leaving for the United states, was to go to Tarlac and have the complainants sign affidavits respecting their claims to the land, for which he collected P2.50 from each of the complainants; seven months after his return from the United States, when the complainants had already demanded the return of the money which they had paid him, the respondent petitioned the Governor-General to order a survey of the boundary line between Nueva Ecija and Tarlac Provinces. The object of this petition, the respondent asserts, was to show that the lands claimed by Felix Melegrito et al., were not situated in Nueva Ecija Province, but in Tarlac. The complainants informed the Governor-General that they were not interested in having the boundary line between the two provinces surveyed, but in recovering the money which they had paid the respondent.lawphi1.net

Felix Melegrito testified at the investigation that he and the other complainants had paid the respondent or his agents a total sum of P8,226. Four thousand two hundred and twenty-eight pesos (P4,228) of this amount is supported by receipts signed by the respondent or his authorized agents. The respondent denies having received the sum of P8,226 or any such sum, but in his answer of December 29, 1932 he admitted that he had received P2,185.

The respondent alleges that after examining the records of the land registration cases, which had already been returned to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, he told the complainants that the decision of this court had already become final and could not be appealed, and that the amount involved in the different cases was not sufficient to entitle the claimants to a review in the Supreme Court of the United States, and that in case of an appeal it would be necessary for the appellants to file a supersedeas bond, which they said they were unable to do. Although the decision of this court appears to have been final and unappealable when the complainants consulted the respondent, we are satisfied that he never so informed them, but on the contrary led them to believe that the cases could be taken to the Supreme Court of the United States, and that to prosecute the appeal to the best advantage it was necessary for him to go to Washington. The respondent now maintains that he went to the United States for the purpose of revisiting his alma-mater in Kansas and securing the capital necessary for the development of a gold mine, and that he went to the United States at his own expense, but the receipts, Exhibits B, B-1 to B-6, show that the respondent collected at least P3,530 before he sailed for the United States; that in September, 1930, the respondent wrote a letter to Felix Melegrito, Exhibit F, inquiring whether the voyage was to be made or not, and urging Melegrito to advance P1,000 for the account of the respondent's compadre in order to make up the agreed amount. The respondent said that he wished to reach Washington by Christmas. After the respondent had sailed his wife and his agent, Benito Diaz, collected further sums from the complainants. Felix Melegrito went to the boat with the respondent when he sailed for the United States; and respondent's wife and his agent in their letters to the complainants refer to respondent's voyage and his arrival in Washington.

The respondent attorney is guilty of malpractice. He collected several thousand pesos from the complainants for the purpose of taking their cases to the Supreme Court of The United States, but he never removed said cases to that court or attempted to do so, because the decision of this court had already become final and unappealable, and he was guilty of deceit in concealing that fact from the complainants while collecting fees from them for the purpose of prosecuting the appeal.

Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as lawyer by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice of other gross misconduct in such office.

It appears from the testimony of Felix Melegrito that in April, 1931, he made a demand on the respondent for the return of the money which the complainants had paid him, and the respondent promised to repay the sum of P1,500 at once and the remainder at the rate of P50 a month, but that the respondent has never repaid any sum to the complainants.

For the foregoing reasons, the respondent is suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years from this date and until he shall have repaid to the complainants the sum of P4,228, payment thereof to be evidenced by receipts in due form, which shall be attached to the record of this case.

5. ANA CHUA V. MESINA

By a verified complaint[1] received by the Office of the Bar Confidant on May 5, 1998,[2] Ana Alvaran Chua and Marcelina Hsia administratively charged Atty. Simeon M. Mesina, Jr., for breach of professional ethics, gross professional misconduct, and culpable malpractice.

As related by complainants, the following facts gave rise to the filing of the complaint.

Respondent was, for years, Ana Alvaran Chua and her now deceased husband Chua Yap Ans legal counsel and adviser upon whom they reposed trust and confidence. They were in fact lessees of a building situated at Burgos Street, Cabanatuan City (Burgos property) owned by respondents family, and another property containing an area of 854 sq. m., situated at Melencio Street, Cabanatuan City (Melencio property), also owned by respondents family whereon they (spouses Chua) constructed their house. These two properties were mortgaged by the registered owner, respondents mother Felicisima Melencio vda. de Mesina (Mrs. Mesina), in favor of the Planters Development Bank to secure a loan she obtained.

As Mrs. Mesina failed to meet her obligation to the bank, respondent convinced complainant Ana Chua and her husband to help Mrs. Mesina by way of settling her obligation in consideration for which the Melencio property would be sold to them at P850.00/sq. m.

Accommodating respondents request, the spouses Chua and their business partner, herein co-complainant Marcelina Hsia, settled Mrs. Mesinas bank obligation in the amount of P983,125.40.

A Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 19, 1985 [3] conveying the Melencio property for P85,400.00 was thereafter executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name appears therein as Felicisima M. Melencio, in favor of complainants.

As complainants were later apprised of the amount of capital gains tax they were to pay, they consulted respondent about it. Respondent thus suggested to them that another Deed of Absolute Sale should be executed, antedated to 1979 before the effectivity of the law mandating the payment of capital gains tax. As suggested by respondent, another Deed of Absolute Sale antedated February 9, 1979[4] was executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name again appears therein as Felicisima M. Melencio, in favor of complainants wherein the purchase price was also indicated to be P85,400.00.

After liquidating the advances made by the Chua spouses in the redemption of the MESINA properties, Mrs. Mesina was found to have an existing balance due the spouses in the amount of P400,000.00, on account of which they advised respondent about it. Respondent, by Affidavit of February 18, 1986, acknowledged such obligation to be his and undertook to settle it within two years.

Complainants were subsequently issued on January 21, 1986 a title over the Melencio property.

Not long after the execution of the February 9, 1979 Deed of Absolute Sale or in February 1986, one Juanito Tecson (Tecson) filed an Affidavit[5] dated February 20, 1986 before the Cabanatuan City Prosecutors Office charging respondents mother, the spouses Chua, Marcelina Hsia and the two witnesses to the said Deed of Absolute Sale, for Falsification of Public Document and violation of the Internal Revenue Code. In his complaint affidavit, Tecson alleged that he was also a lessee of the Melencio property and was, along with the Chua spouses, supposed to purchase it but that contrary to their agreement, the property was sold only to complainant and her co-complainant, to his exclusion. Tecson went on to relate that the February 9, 1979 Deed of Absolute Sale did not reflect the true value of the Melencio property and was antedated to evade payment of capital gains tax.

Tecson submitted documents showing that indeed the July 9, 1979 Deed of Absolute Sale was antedated.

Respondent thereupon hatched a plan to dodge the falsification charge against Mrs. Mesina et al. He proposed to complainants that they would simulate a deed of sale of the Melencio property wherein complainants would resell it to Mrs. Mesina.

Heeding the proposal of respondent, complainants executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 1, 1986 [6] conveying to Felicisima M. Melencio the Melencio property for P85,400.00.

A new title was accordingly issued on April 4, 1986 in the name of Felicisima M. Melencio, the owners copy of which was entrusted to complainants.

Tecson subsequently filed before the Cabanatuan City Prosecutors Office an Affidavit of Desistance dated September 5, 1986[7] alleging that his filing of the criminal complaint arose out of mere misunderstanding and difference with herein complainants and their co-respondents and he had no sufficient evidence against them.

Some years later or on May 2, 1990, respondent approached complainants and told them that he would borrow the owners copy of Mrs. Mesinas title with the undertaking that he would, in four months, let Mrs. Mesina execute a deed of sale over the Melencio property in complainants favor. In fact, respondent gave complainants a written undertaking[8] dated May 2, 1990 reading:

Received the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 4383 issued by the Register of Deeds, Cabanatuan City registered in the name of Felicisima Mesina, widow, consisting of about 854 square meters more or less located at calle Melencio, Cabanatuan City from Mrs. Ana Chua and Marcelina Hsia.

I promise to and undertake to have the Deed of Sale of the above-mentioned property in favor of Ana Chua and Marcelina Hsia to be signed by Mrs. Felicisima Mesina, within four (4) months from date hereof so that the above-mentioned property and title maybe transferred in the name of Ana Chua and Macelina Hsia. (Underscoring supplied)

In the meantime, Mrs. Mesina died in the early part of 1991.

Despite respondents repeated promises to effect the transfer of title in complainants name, he failed to do so. Complainants were later informed that the Melencio property was being offered for sale to the public.

The spouses Chua and complainant Marcelina Hsia thus filed on August 24, 1992 a Complaint [9] against respondent and his two siblings before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nueva Ecija in Cabanatuan City, for Declaration of Nullity of Sale and Reconveyance of Real Property.

As of the time of the filing of the present administrative complaint in 1998, the civil case against the Mesina siblings was still pending.

This Court, by Resolution of July 13, 1998,[10] directed respondent to file Comment on the complaint within ten days.

By Resolution of December 2, 1998,[11] this Court, noting that the copy of the Resolution of July 13, 1998 requiring respondent to comment on the complaint sent to him at his office address at S. M. Mesina Law Office, 30 Jupiter St., Paseo de Roxas, Bel-Air Subd., Makati City was returned unserved with the notation Moved, considered the Resolution of July 13, 1998 served on respondent by substituted service pursuant to Rule 13, Section 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent was accordingly deemed to have waived the filing of the required comment.

By the same Resolution of December 2, 1998, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety days.

The IBP, acting on the complaint, issued a notice of hearing on September 14, 2001, [12] copy of which was sent to respondent at his office address via registered mail, covered by Registry Receipt No. 2605 of the Meralco Post Office. [13] On the scheduled date of hearing, complainants personally appeared with their counsel. Respondent failed to show up.

Given the length of time that the case remained pending from its filing, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, by Order of October 12, 2001,[14] directed complainants to just file their position paper with affidavits and supporting documents in lieu of actual presentation of witnesses and to serve a copy thereof to respondent at his last known address.

In compliance with the IBP Order, complainants filed on April 1, 2002 their position paper, [15] annexed to which were photocopies of: 1) a May 5, 1993 Certification[16] issued by the Metrobank Cabanatuan Branch certifying that it issued the demand drafts to the payees enumerated below, which were debited from the account of Mr. Chua Yap An under Savings Account No. 760:

D/D No. Payee Amount Date of Issue214597 Planters Dev. Bank P 805,299.54 12-19-85214760 Planters Dev. Bank 100,000.00 01-14-86214761 Atty. Simeon Mesina, Jr. 77,826.10 01-14-86;

2) Affidavit dated February 18, 1986[17] of respondent acknowledging a debt of P400,000.00 to complainant Ana Alvaran Chua and promising to pay interest thereon within 2 years to commence upon the signing thereof [February 16, 1998] and, in the event no partial or full payment of the principal is made within 2 years, Ana Alvaran Chua is under no obligation to pay any lease rentals over the lot situated in Burgos Avenue, Cabanatuan City where the Oceanic Hardware Bldg. is erected; 3) Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 19, 1985[18] and 4) Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 9, 1979,[19] both executed by Felicisima M. Melencio in favor of complainant; 5) TCT No. T-48114[20] issued by the Cabanatuan City in the name of complainants on January 21, 1986; 6) Affidavit of Juanito C. Tecson[21] dated January 20, 1986 charging complainants et al. for Falsification of Public Documents; 7) Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 1, 1986 executed by complainants in favor of Mrs. Mesina; [22] and 8) TCT No. T-48383issued on April 4, 1986 in the name of Felicisima M. Melencio;[23] and 9) Complaint of spouses Chua Yap An and Ana Alvaran Chua and Marcelina Hsia, for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale and Reconveyance of Real Property against respondent and his two siblings. [24]

A copy of complainants position paper was sent on March 18, 2002 to respondent at his office address by registered mail covered by Registry Receipt No. 5278.[25] There is no showing if respondent received this mail matter.

The IBP once more scheduled, by notice of December 13, 2002, [26] a hearing of the administrative case to January 15, 2003, copy of which notice was sent to respondent at his office address by registered mail covered by Registry Receipt No. 2953 issued by the Meralco Post Office.[27]

On the scheduled hearing on January 15, 2003, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, by Order of even date, [28] noted the presence of complainants, and the absence of respondent, copy of the notice of hearing to whom was returned unserved with the notation RTS-Moved. The case was thereupon deemed submitted for report and recommendation.

On June 21, 2003, the IBP passed Resolution No. XV-2003-342[29] adopting and approving the report and recommendation of Atty. Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, the Investigating Commissioner of the case.

In her March 3, 2003 Report and Recommendation,[30] Investigation Commissioner Maala observed as follows:

A lawyer should not engage or participate on any unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The moral character he displayed when he applied for admission at the Bar must be maintained incessantly. Otherwise, his privilege to practice the legal profession may be withdrawn from him (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility). On the basis of the uncontroverted facts and evidence presented, respondent Atty. Simeon M. Mesina has committed gross misconduct which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which his license and law confer upon him,

and recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of One (1) Year.

This Court finds that indeed, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

First, by advising complainants to execute another Deed of Absolute Sale antedated to 1979 to evade payment of capital gains taxes, he violated his duty to promote respect for law and legal processes,28 and not to abet activities aimed at defiance of the law;29 That respondent intended to, as he did defraud not a private party but the government is aggravating.30

Second, when respondent convinced complainants to execute another document, a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale wherein they made it appear that complainants reconveyed the Melencio property to his mother, he committed dishonesty.31

Third, when on May 2, 1990 respondent inveigled his own clients, the Chua spouses, into turning over to him the owners copy of his mothers title upon the misrepresentation that he would, in four months, have a deed of sale executed by his mother in favor of complainants, he likewise committed dishonesty.

That the signature of Felicisima M. Melencio in the 1985 document32 and that in the 1979 document33 are markedly different is in fact is a badge of falsification of either the 1979 or the 1985 document or even both.

A propos is this Courts following pronouncement in Nakpil v. Valdez 34

As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. The measure of good faith which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higherstandard that is required in business dealings where the parties trade at arms length. Business transactions between an attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to assure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorneys favor.35 (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent having welched on his promise to cause the reconveyance of the Melencio property to complainants, consideration of whether he should be ordered to honor such promise should be taken up in the civil case filed for the purpose, the issue there being one of ownership while that in the case at bar is moral fitness.37

In fine, respondent violated his oath of office and, more specifically, the following canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02. - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

CANON 15. A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness.

CANON 17. A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR. is, for gross misconduct, hereby DISBARRED.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

6. TOLEDO V. ABALOS

MELO, J.:

This is a case of a lawyer who borrowed money without paying it back.

On July 9, 1981, Atty. Erlinda Abalos obtained a loan of P20,000.00 from Priscila Toledo, payable within six months from date, plus interest of 5% per month. To guarantee the payment of said obligation, respondent executed a Promissory Note (Exhibit B). After the lapse of six months, and despite repeated demands, respondent failed to pay her obligation. Afraid that she will not recover her money, Ms.Toledo sought the help of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which referred the matter to the Commission on Bar Discipline.

On February 1, 1995, the Commission issued an order directing Atty. Abalos to file her Answer to the letter-complaint of Ms. Toledo. Despite receipt of said order, respondent did not answer the complaint.

On August 17, 1995, Investigating Commissioner Benjamin B. Bernardino, issued an order setting the case for hearing on September 29, 1995 at 2 p.m. Despite due notice, respondent failed to appear. Accordingly, complainant was allowed to present her evidence ex-parte after which, the case was considered submitted for resolution. Respondent received this order as shown by the registry return. However, she again did not do anything about it.

On June 19, 1999, the Commission passed a resolution recommending the suspension from the practice of law of respondent for a period of six months for her flouting resistance to lawful orders of the Court and illustrating her despiciency of her oath of office as a lawyer. The Commission, however, declined to discipline her for failing to meet her financial obligation, the same having been incurred in her private capacity.

We agree with the Commission that respondent may not be disciplined either by the IBP or by this Court for failing to pay her obligation to complainant. Complainants remedy is to file a collection case before a regular court of justice against respondent. The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him, for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 569 [1923]; Lizaso vs. Amante, 198 SCRA 1 [1991]).

We, however, find the recommendation to suspend respondent from the practice of law for six months to be grossly disproportionate to the act complained of , i.e., her failure to appear before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. With her legal knowledge and expertise, respondent may have known all along that the Commission has no jurisdiction over a complaint for collection of a sum of money which she borrowed in her private capacity. Hence, her adamant refusal to appear before said body.

We do not, of course, ignore the fact that by virtue of ones membership in the IBP, a lawyer thus submits himself to the disciplinary authority of the organization. However, as the complaint lodged against the respondent in the case at hand did not pertain to an act that she committed in the exercise of her profession, the IBP need not assume jurisdiction to discipline respondent. As the Commission on Bar Discipline correctly suggested, complainants remedy is to file the necessary collection case in court for her to recover the amount respondent owed her.

It was, however, still necessary for respondent to acknowledge the orders of the Commission in deference to its authority over her as a member of the IBP. Her wanton disregard of its lawful orders subjects her to disciplinary sanction. Thus, her suspension from the practice of law for one month is warranted.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Erlinda Abalos is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE MONTH from the date of the finality of this Resolution. Copies of this Resolution shall be furnished all courts of the land and the Office of the Bar Confidant. This Resolution shall likewise be spread on the personal record of respondent attorney.

SO ORDERED.

7. COJUANGCO V. LEO PALMA

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar, the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal. [1]

Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. filed with this Court the instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Leo J. Palma, alleging as

grounds deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, violation of his oath as a lawyer and grossly immoral conduct. The facts are undisputed: Complainant and respondent met sometime in the 70s. Complainant was a client of Angara Concepcion Regala & Cruz Law

Offices (ACCRA) and respondent was the lawyer assigned to handle his cases. Owing to his growing business concerns, complainant decided to hire respondent as his personal counsel.

Consequently, respondents relationship with complainants family became intimate. He traveled and dined with them

abroad.[2] He frequented their house and even tutored complainants 22-year old daughter Maria Luisa Cojuangco (Lisa), then a student of Assumption Convent.

On June 22, 1982, without the knowledge of complainants family, respondent married Lisa in Hongkong. It was only the

nextday that respondent informed complainant and assured him that everything is legal. Complainant was shocked, knowing fully well that respondent is a married man and has three children. Upon investigation, complainant found that respondent courted Lisa during their tutoring sessions. Immediately, complainant sent his two sons to Hongkong to convince Lisa to go home to Manila and discuss the matter with the family. Lisa was persuaded. Complainant also came to know that: (a) on the date of the supposed marriage, respondent requested from his (complainants) office an airplane ticket to and from Australia, with stop-over in Hong Kong; (b) respondent misrepresented himself as bachelor before the

Hong Kong authorities to facilitate his marriage with Lisa; and (c) respondent was married to Elizabeth Hermosisima and has three children, namely: Eugene Philippe, Elias Anton and Eduardo Lorenzo.

On August 24, 1982, complainant filed with the Court of First Instance, Branch XXVII, Pasay City a petition[3] for declaration of nullity of the marriage between respondent and Lisa, docketed as Civil Case No. Pq-0401-P. In the Decision[4] dated November 2, 1982, the CFI declared the marriage null and void ab initio.

Thereafter, complainant filed with this Court the instant complaint [5] for disbarment, imputing to respondent the following

acts:

a. In grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant and his family and taking undue advantage of his tutoring sessions with Maria Luisa, respondent secretly courted her. The great disparity in intelligence, education, age, experience and maturity between Maria Luisa and respondent gave the latter an overwhelming moral ascendancy over Maria Luisa as to overcome her scruples and apprehensions about respondents courtship and advances, considering that he is a married man with three (3) children;

b. Respondent courted Maria Luisa with persistence and determination and even pursued her in her

travels abroad under false pretenses that he was traveling on official business for complainant. To break down the final resistance of Maria Luisa and assuage her pangs of guilt, he made representations that there was no legal impediment whatsoever to his marrying;

c. With his moral ascendancy over Maria Luisa and his misrepresentation that there was no legal

impediment or prohibition to his contracting a second marriage, respondent succeeded in inducing and beguiling her into marrying him. Without complying with the requirements of Philippine law that he should first obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Elizabeth H. Palma and that the advice of Maria Luisas parents should first be obtained she being only twenty-two (22) years of age, respondent succeeded in contracting marriage with her in Hongkong on June 22, 1982 by falsely representing himself before the Hongkong authorities that he is a bachelor. x x x. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss[6] on the ground of lack of cause of action. He contended that the complaint fails to

allege acts constituting deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or violation of his lawyers oath. There is no allegation that he acted with wanton recklessness, lack of skill or ignorance of the law in serving complainants interest. Anent the charge of grossly immoral conduct, he stressed that he married complainants daughter with utmost sincerity and good faith and that it is contrary to the natural course of things for an immoral man to marry the woman he sincerely loves.

In the Resolution[7] dated March 2, 1983, we referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation,

report and recommendation. Former Assistant Solicitor General Oswaldo D. Agcaoili conducted the investigation. Meanwhile, on December 28, 1983, the First Division of this Court issued in G.R. No. 64538 [8] a Resolution[9] (a) setting aside

the CFI Decision dated November 2, 1982 in Civil Case No. Pq0401-Pdeclaring the marriage between respondent and Lisa null and void ab initio; and (b) remanding the case to the CFI for proper proceeding and determination. To this date, the records fail to disclose the outcome of this case.

On March 19, 1984, respondent filed with the OSG an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings [10] on the ground that the

final outcome of Civil Case No. Pq0401-P poses a prejudicial question to the disbarment proceeding. It was denied. Respondent sought refuge in this Court through an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Restraining Order. [11] In the Resolution

dated December 19, 1984, we enjoined the OSG from continuing the investigation of the disbarment proceedings. [12]

Thereafter, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline. On October 19,

1998, Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo issued the following order:

Considering the length of time that this case has remained pending and as a practical measure to ease the backlog of this Commission, the parties shall within ten (10) days from notice, manifest whether or not they are still interested in prosecuting this case or supervening events have transpired which render this case moot and academic or otherwise, this case shall be deemed closed and terminated. [13]

In his Manifestation,[14] complainant manifested and confirmed his continuing interest in prosecuting his complaint for disbarment against respondent.

On the other hand, respondent sought several postponements of hearing on the ground that he needed more time to

locate vital documents in support of his defense. The scheduled hearing of December 4, 2001 was reset for the last time on January 24, 2002, with a warning that should he fail to appear or present deposition, the case will be deemed submitted for resolution.[15]Respondent again failed to appear on January 24, 2002; hence, the case was considered submitted for resolution. [16]

On March 20, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted a Report and Recommendation finding

respondent guilty of grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer. She recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years. Thus:

The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent committed the following acts

which warrant his disbarment: a) Grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant; b) His misrepresentation that there was no legal impediment or prohibition to his contracting a

second marriage;

c) The acts of respondent constitute deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer.

Respondent admits that he married Maria Luisa in Hongkong representing himself as a bachelor, however,

he claimed that the marriage certificate stated a condition no different from term spinster with respect to Luisa. There is no question that respondent as a lawyer well versed in the law knew fully well that in marrying

Maria Luisa he was entering into a bigamous marriage defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The respondent betrayed the trust reposed in him by complainant. He was treated as part of the family and was allowed to tutor Maria Luisa.

For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that respondent committed grossly immoral conduct and

violation of his oath as a lawyer, and it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years.

SO ORDERED.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the above Report and Recommendation, but it reduced respondents

penalty to only one (1) year suspension.

Except for the penalty, we affirm the IBPs Report and Recommendation. At the outset, it must be stressed that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards among its

members. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.[17] Thus, not only his professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.[18]

Respondent claims that he had served complainant to the best of his ability. In fact, the complaint does not allege that he

acted with wanton recklessness, lack of skill and ignorance of the law.While, complainant himself admitted that respondent was a good lawyer, [19] however, professional competency alone does

not make a lawyer a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral character is always an indispensable requirement.

The ringing truth in this case is that respondent married Lisa while he has a subsisting marriage with Elizabeth

Hermosisima. The Certification[20] from the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City shows that he married Elizabeth on December 19, 1971 at Cardials Private Chapel, Cebu City. On the other hand, the Certificate of Marriage[21] from the Deputy Registrar of Marriages, Hong Kong, proves respondents subsequent marriage with Lisa on July 9, 1982. That Elizabeth was alive at the time of respondents second marriage was confirmed on the witness stand by Atty. Victor P. Lazatin, Elizabeths classmate and family friend. [22]

Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes grossly immoral conduct, a ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of

the Revised Rules of Court. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.[23]

This is not the first occasion that we censure immorality. Thus, we have somehow come up with a common definition of

what constitutes immoral conduct, i.e., that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.[24] Measured against this definition, respondents act is manifestly immoral. First, he abandoned his lawful wife and three children. Second, he lured an innocent young woman into marrying him. And third, he misrepresented himself as a bachelor so he could contract marriage in a foreign land.

Our rulings in the following cases are relevant: 1) In Macarrubo vs. Macarrubo,[25] respondent entered into multiple marriages and then resorted to legal remedies to sever

them. There, we ruled that [S]uch pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. As such, there can be no other fate that awaits respondent than to be disbarred.

(2) In Tucay vs. Tucay,[26] respondent contracted marriage with another married woman and left complainant with whom he

has been married for thirty years. We ruled that such acts constitute a grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession, warranting respondents disbarment.

(3) In Villasanta vs. Peralta,[27] respondent married complainant while his first wife was still alive, their marriage still valid and subsisting. We held that the act of respondent of contracting the second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. Thus, lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, respondent was disqualified from being admitted to the bar.

(4) In Cabrera vs. Agustin,[28] respondent lured an innocent woman into a simulated marriage and thereafter satisfied his

lust. We held that respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the practice of law.

(5) In Toledo vs. Toledo,[29] respondent abandoned his wife, who supported him and spent for his law education, and

thereafter cohabited with another woman. We ruled that he failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar. For this, respondent was disbarred.

(6) In Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,[30] respondent abandoned his lawful wife and child and resumed cohabitation with his former

paramour. Here, we ruled that abandoning ones wife and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a married woman, constitute grossly immoral conduct warranting disbarment.

The circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of trust and abuse of confidence. It was respondents closeness to

the complainants family as well as the latters complete trust in him that made possible his intimate relationship with Lisa. When his concern was supposed to be complainants legal affairs only, he sneaked at the latters back and courted his daughter. Like the proverbial thief in the night, he attacked when nobody was looking. Moreover, he availed of complainants resources by securing a plane ticket from complainants office in order to marry the latters daughter in Hongkong. He did this without complainants knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure complainant that everything is legal. Clearly, respondent had crossed the limits of propriety and decency.

Respondent justified his conduct by professing he really loved Lisa and since he married her, he cannot be charged with immorality. His reasoning shows a distorted mind and a brazen regard on the sanctity of marriage. In such relationship, the man and the woman are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity.[31] How could respondent perform these obligations to

Lisa when he was previously married to Elizabeth? If he really loved her, then the noblest thing he could have done was to walk away.

Respondents culpability is aggravated by the fact that Lisa was just a 22-year old college student of Assumption Convent

and was under psychological treatment for emotional immaturity.[32] Naturally, she was an easy prey. Anent respondents argument that since the validity of his marriage to Lisa has not yet been determined by the court with

finality, the same poses a prejudicial question to the present disbarment proceeding. Suffice it to say that a subsequent judgment of annulment of marriage has no bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. As we held in In re Almacen,[33] a disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against him, [34] or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course,[35] then the judgment of annulment of respondents marriage does not also exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof --- clear preponderance of evidence --- in disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar is met, then liability attaches. [36]

The interdict upon lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is that they shall not engage

in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.This is founded on the lawyers primordial duty to society as spelled out in Canon 1 which states:

CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for

law and legal processes.

It is not by coincidence that the drafters of our Code of Professional Responsibility ranked the above responsibility first in the enumeration. They knew then that more than anybody else, it is the lawyers -- the disciples of law -- who are most obliged to venerate the law. As stated in Ex Parte Wall:[37]

Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their

sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.

Corollarily, the above responsibility is enshrined in the Attorneys Oath which every lawyer in the country has to take before he is allowed to practice.

In sum, respondent committed grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer. The penalty of one (1) year suspension recommended by the IBP is not commensurate to the gravity of his offense. The bulk of jurisprudence supports the imposition of the extreme penalty of disbarment.

WHEREFORE, respondent Leo J. Palma is found GUILTY of grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer, and

is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let respondents name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys immediately. Furnish the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines and all courts throughout the country with copies of this Decision. SO ORDERED.