Lcd strategy for ua final

The consulting company of DIW Berlin

Concept of a Low Carbon

Development Strategy

for Ukraine

Agenda for investment and economic modernisation

Draft version!

A low carbon development strategy for Ukraine

Agenda for investment and the modernisation of the economy

DIW econ GmbH

Dr. Lars Handrich

Mohrenstraße 58

10117 Berlin

Germany

Phone +49.30.20 60 972 - 0

Fax +49.30.20 60 972 - 99

[email protected]

www.diw-econ.de

DIW econ GmbH

Dr. Ferdinand Pavel

Mohrenstraße 58

10117 Berlin

mailto:[email protected]

http://www.diw-econ.de/



i

Table of Contents

Agenda for investment and economic modernisation .............................................................. i

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................... v

1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1

2. In search of a new economic model (The problem that needs solving) ................ 3

2.1 Exhaustion of the past economic growth model ................................................... 3

2.2 Energy – the Achilles' heel of the Ukrainian economy ......................................... 5

2.3 The outdated capital stock .................................................................................. 6

2.4 Poor investment climate ...................................................................................... 7

2.5 Credit rationing and limited access to finance...................................................... 8

2.6 Summary ............................................................................................................10

3. Lowering investment barriers (Purpose and timeframe of the concept

realization) .........................................................................................................11

3.1 Higher energy efficiency as future growth engine ...............................................11

3.2 Reform to stimulate investments ........................................................................13

4. Determining the impact of increased energy efficiency investments on

economic growth in Ukraine (Expected results) ..................................................15

4.1 Strategy of the simulation analysis .....................................................................16

4.2 An empirical assessment of investment opportunities in energy efficient

technologies .......................................................................................................19

4.2.1 Potential to boost economic growth ............................................................................ 22

4.2.2 Relevance of structural or temporary investment barriers ....................................... 25

4.2.3 Summary of simulation results ..................................................................................... 28

5. Towards an Ukrainian Investment Fund (Ways and means of solving

problems) ...........................................................................................................30

5.1.1 Objective and Mandate ................................................................................................. 31

5.1.2 Governance ..................................................................................................................... 31

5.1.3 Targeting.......................................................................................................................... 31

5.1.4 Instruments...................................................................................................................... 32

5.1.5 Funding ............................................................................................................................ 33

6. Time frame and amount of financial resources (Amount of financial, material,

technical and human resources) ........................................................................34



ii

List of Tables

Table 1: GDP of Ukraine (2007-2015), National Accounts ..................................................... 3

Table 2: GHG abatement volume and incremental investments in Ukraine by activity ..........20

Table of Figures

Figure 1: Capital stock depreciation in Ukraine ...................................................................... 4

Figure 2: Prices for gas imports and energy demand in Ukraine ............................................ 6

Figure 3: Country-specific learning curves of energy efficiency ............................................12

Figure 4: Composition of the required energy efficiency investments (total net present

value of aggregate investments until 2050, in bln UAH of 2011) ...........................21

Figure 5: Dynamics of key indicators (EEI relative to BAU scenario in each year) ................23

Figure 6: GDP impact of alternative measures (relative to BAU, in % of GDP in 2011).........24

Figure 7: GHG emission impact of alternative measures (relative to BAU, in % of total

GHG emissions in 2011) ......................................................................................24

Figure 8: Impact of alternative measures on GVA by sector (relative to BAU, in % of

GVA in 2011) ........................................................................................................26

Figure 9: Profits by sector under the EEI scenario (net present value of incremental

profits compared to BAU) .....................................................................................27

Figure 10: Profits of key manufacturing sectors with implemented measures in industry

(net present value of incremental profits, compared to BAU) ................................28

Figure 11: Results of the simulation analysis ........................................................................29



iii

Table of Boxes

Box 1: Energy Efficiency Potential of the Metal Industry in Ukraine ....................................... 7

Box 2: Credit rationing ........................................................................................................... 9

Box 3: A Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model for Ukraine ....................................17

Box 4: Business as Usual (BAU) as counterfactual scenario ................................................18



iv



v

Executive Summary

The Ukrainian economy was in a poor condition as of the end of the year 2014. Western

emergency rescue programmes for the Ukrainian government have helped to cushion the

shocks of the economic decline. However, the ongoing military conflict in Eastern Ukraine

strains the country’s public finances and clouds the prospects of a near-term recovery of the

Ukrainian economy and the efficacy of Western assistance.

Beyond emergency measures, the government needs to address the fundamental long-term

change. This Low Carbon Development Strategy addresses the issue of structural change

and the need for investments and capital stock modernisation.

Ukraine has exhausted its past economic growth model, in which profits from production and

the export of metal and other energy-intensive base commodities were funnelled into the

consumer economy. In the past, the success of Ukrainian exports depended crucially on

cheap energy inputs, with a considerable share imported from the Russian Federation. With

increasing prices of imported Russian gas, the economy’s reliance on imported fuels has

become a decisive burden for the economy. Energy imports are the main reason for the

persistent overall trade deficit.

Regulatory interventions and subsidies strongly distort energy prices, drain public finances

and stimulate excessive use of energy. By international standards, Ukraine remains one of

the most inefficient users of energy due a large share of energy-intensive sectors, outdated

inefficient technologies, and a heavily depleted capital stock, including inefficient district

heating systems and poor quality building stock. Correspondingly, with this high energy

intensity, Ukraine has a very high level of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions.

Western support has been provided conditional on structural reforms in the energy sector

and, in particular, increases in energy prices. This may trigger a vicious circle wherein

stabilization requires price shocks that, in turn, undermine economic growth and—

eventually—stabilisation.

International experience shows that in market economies, higher energy prices are key to

stimulate investments in energy-efficient technologies that increase productivity levels and,



vi

thus, stimulate economic growth. In Ukraine, capital stock depreciation has reached

disastrous levels, urging furthermore for immediate investments. However, investments

remain weak, due to significant investment barriers that are distinguished as:

Structural investment barriers, which comprise the factors that are responsible for the

country’s poor investment climate. This includes serious deficiencies, such as an

insufficient regulatory environment and weak property rights, as well as corruption and

red tape.

Temporary barriers to investments, which are caused by the current political crises

and, in particular, uncertainty with respect to the economic and the political future of the

country, as well as security concerns.

Significant improvements in the investment climate are key for sustainable economic

development, but difficult to implement, and positive results can be expected only over the

medium and long term.

In the short term, economic policies have to address temporary barriers to investment in

order to immediately kick-start economic growth through investments in capital stock

modernisation. Since temporary barriers are caused by uncertainty, and uncertainty leads to

lack of funding, public support is needed to provide the funds required for selected

investment projects. Such publicly-supported investment projects have to satisfy two main

conditions:

First, investment projects must be capable of delivering the intended impact of GDP

growth, i.e., the potential to boost economic growth

Second, investment projects must not be heavily distorted by structural constraints, i.e.,

by structural or temporary investment barriers

The short-term policy agenda must focus on initiating investments in areas that otherwise

would have been profitable in the absence of the current political crises (under the otherwise

current market conditions).

In view of the pivotal role of higher energy efficiency through capital stock modernisation, the

potential impact of investments has been assessed in four different areas:



vii

Industry: Energy-saving measures in the manufacturing sectors, focus on Metallurgy,

Chemicals, Minerals, Mining

Utility supply: Heat generation and networks waste management

Housing: Increasing energy efficiency of buildings

Transport: Increasing energy efficiency of transport

The results of the Energy Efficient Investment (EEI) scenario are compared to a

counterfactual scenario that simulates future economic developments under the assumption

that the Ukrainian economy continues to follow its existing trajectory without extra efforts

aimed at capital stock modernisation and the implementation of the Low Carbon

Development Strategy.

Under the EEI scenario, the total investment required across the four areas outlined above is

estimated at the level of 73 bln UAH (measured as the total net present value of aggregate

investments until 2050, in bln UAH of 2011). The composition across the four areas is shown

below (Figure 4):

Figure: 4: Composition of the required energy efficiency investments (total net present value of aggregate investments until 2050, in bln UAH of 2011)

+13

+73

+29

+11

+20

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Measures inindustry

Measures in utilitysupply

Measures inhousing

Measures intransport

All measures

Source: DIW ECON



viii

Next, EEI measures will trigger higher GDP growth and consumer welfare, while GHG

emissions will be reduced (Figure 5), suggesting a corresponding increase in energy

efficiency. Starting from a common level in 2011, GDP grows faster under the EEI scenario

and exceeds its benchmark level by up to 7.4% in 2050. The impact on households’

consumption (i.e., consumer welfare) is even bigger, 8.4% higher than in a Business As

Usual (BAU) scenario. These improvements do not come at the cost of a higher

environmental burden. GHG emissions are projected to be 7.8%, lower than under BAU.

Figure 1: Dynamics of key indicators (EEI relative to BAU scenario in each year)

-10%

-8%

-6%

-4%

-2%

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046

Real GDP Real consumption Total emissions

Source: DIW ECON

In the EEI scenario, the total impact on GDP accounts for a +36% increase in GDP (relative

counterfactual scenario, in % of GDP in 2011), of which 28% is generated through measures

in industry (Figure 6), while GHG emissions will be reduced by 21%, of which the largest

reduction is generated due to measures in industry (Figure 7).



ix

Figure 6: GDP impact of alternative measures (relative to BAU, in % of GDP in 2011)

+28%

+36%

+3%

+4%+1%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

Measures inindustry


Measures inhousing


All measures

Source: DIW ECON

Figure 7: GHG emission impact of alternative measures (relative to BAU, in % of total GHG emissions in 2011)

-12%

-21%

-3%-1%

-5%

-25%

-20%

-15%

-10%

-5%

0%

Measures inindustry


Measures inhousing


All measures

Source: DIW ECON



x

Overall, the simulation results of the EEI scenario suggest that the implementation of the

proposed measures in industry will require funds of 13 bln UAH and will lead to a 28%

increase in GDP and a 12% reduction of GHG emissions (and a corresponding increase in

energy efficiency) relative to the respective levels in the baseline scenario. Investments in

utility supply will require 29 bln UAH and stimulate GDP growth (+3%) and reduce GHG

emissions and, thus, energy consumption (-3%). Investments in energy efficiency of

residential buildings, i.e., measures in housing, will require 11 bln UAH and will have a

relative stronger impact on GDP growth (+4%) than on reducing GHG emissions (-1%).

Finally, investments in modern transportation infrastructure will need 20 bln UAH and will

have a minor impact on GDP (+1%) and a large impact on reduction of GHG emissions (-

5%).

The attractiveness of investments from the perspective of an investor is assessed based on

its impact on the value added and profits at the sector level. With the exemption of the mining

industry, which stands to lose due to reduced demand for coal in manufacturing and heat

supply, all the other industries are expected to gain in terms of the gross value added.

To assess the corresponding incentives for investments in capital stock modernisation by

industry and measure, additional capital income is compared with investment expenditures.

The resulting impact on the discounted profit flows of the aggregate sectors shows that for

measures in manufacturing, profits increase in manufacturing—the investing sector—as well

as in the other industries (mainly construction and services). Apparently, investments in

manufacturing are least affected by structural distortions and it can be expected that these

measures would be implemented absent the current economic crises. Measures in

manufacturing are thus highly suitable for providing the intended short-term stimulus.

On the contrary, measures in utilities and in transport induce losses due to the substantial

investment volumes and structural distortions, e.g. caused by an insufficient regulatory

framework.

Figure 2: Profits by sector under the EEI scenario (net present value of incremental

profits compared to BAU)



xi

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

Agriculture Mining Manufacturing Construction Utilities Transport Services

NP

V o

f in

cre

me

nta

l pro

fits

, b

ln U

AH

Source: DIW ECON

In conclusion, measures in industry are most suitable for kick-starting economic growth since

they are highly profitable and provide a large stimulus for GDP growth. Measures in housing

are found to be profitable as well, although not as much as the measures in industry.

Moreover, these activities provide a much smaller stimulus to GDP growth. On the contrary,

measures in utility supply and transportation are less suitable for kick-starting economic

growth, as they clearly suffer from structural investment barriers, such as an insufficient

regulatory framework.

Policies aiming at providing a short-term stimulus for economic growth through investments

in capital stock modernisation must address temporary investment barriers by reducing

existing uncertainties and establishing the trust needed. Thus, providing the necessary

stimuli for economic growth requires focussing on public support for private investments.

Against this background the Ukrainian Investment Fund needs to be established with the

objective of initiating and supporting investments in capital stock modernisation in order to

increase GDP growth through improved energy efficiency. The Fund’s initial mandate must

be temporary and needs to be limited to a clear period, e.g. until 2020. A transparent and

accountable governance structure will be very important for the success of a Ukrainian

Investment Fund.



xii

The fund must target support for investments in areas where improvements in energy

efficiency have a strong impact on economic growth and where the incentives are least

distorted by structural barriers to investments. The Ukrainian Investment Fund has to rely on

a mix of different instruments and provide financial support through financial intermediaries.

Initial funding needs to be supplied by the international community. Until 2020, incremental

investments need to be fully financed by public funds. Assuming that investments start in

2015, the required funds until 2020 amount to:

70.65 bln UAH or 6.4 bln EUR1 for measures in industry (top priority); and

40.37 bln UAH or 3.6 bln EUR for measures in housing.

1 Estimated investment costs are based on prices for 2011. The respective exchange rate (annual average) for the year 2011 is 11.09 UAH/EUR.



1

1. Introduction

The Ukrainian economy is in a sorry condition as the end of the year 2014, with a bleak

outlook for the short term. The IMF Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) and European emergency

rescue programmes for the Ukrainian government have helped to cushion the shocks of the

economic decline. However, the ongoing military conflict in Eastern Ukraine strains Ukraine’s

public finances and clouds the prospects of a near-term recovery of the Ukrainian economy,

as also the efficacy of the Western assistance. Further and beyond all these emergency

measures, the government needs to address the fundamental long-term change of Ukraine’s

economic model. This requires that the government develops a reform agenda with the

priorities shifting from economic stabilisation towards medium- and long-term objectives.

The fundamental structure of the Ukrainian economy so far remains heavily flawed, with a

strong reliance on industry exports, coupled with a pronounced dependence on energy

imports. Until now, Ukraine has been one of the most energy- and emission-intensive

countries of the world, with emissions per unit of GDP more than three times higher than the

average level in OECD Europe.

Today, Ukraine faces many simultaneous challenges, including long-term energy security

and the need to re-invigorate its aging industrial heritage and substantially upgrade its

infrastructure. Ukraine’s agricultural capacity is under developed, although it is well placed to

develop the regional markets for good quality agricultural products. Ukraine’s population is

highly literate and skilled and has the capacity to develop and market new technologies in

multiple sectors throughout the region, but it is also shrinking and aging.

The Ukrainian leadership is committed to closer integration with the European Union. This

implies that Ukraine will be part of the international efforts to mitigate climate change through

the reduction of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions. Given the current dire economic

outlook, it seems safe to expect that Ukraine will obtain a special status in the UNFCCC

negotiations, particularly for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol leading up

to 2020. However, Ukraine will need to stay committed to the post-Kyoto mechanisms that

will operate from 2020 and potentially to 2050 and beyond, as well as to its 2050 pledge

under the Copenhagen Accord.



2

This long-term Low Carbon Development Strategy will demonstrate how the Ukrainian

government can comprehensively address the challenges it is facing and the required drastic

modernisation of key infrastructure and production technologies based on energy-efficient

technologies.

The remainder of the Low Carbon Development Strategy for Ukraine is structured as follows:

In Chapter 2, the main problem that the Government of Ukraine needs to solve is

explained, i.e., the change towards a new economic model for Ukraine. We discuss

the unsustainable situation in the energy sector, the urgent need for capital stock

modernisation and the main barriers to investment in Ukraine.

Chapter 3 presents, as the purpose of this strategy, the need for lowering investment

barriers and the need for improved energy efficiency.

In Chapter 4, the impact of energy efficiency investments is determined against the

background of the potential to boost economic growth and different investment

barriers.

In Chapter 5, the need for a temporary Ukrainian Investment Fund is discussed as a

way and means to solve the most urgent problem of kick-starting economic growth

through energy-efficient investments.

Chapter 6 discusses the timeframe and the estimated financial resources required for

the implementation of the temporary Ukrainian Investment Fund.



3

2. In search of a new economic model (The

problem that needs solving)

2.1 Exhaustion of the past economic growth model

Ukraine is experiencing a decade of dismal growth. On average, the real economic growth

rate for the years 2007-2013 was just plus-1.3%. If the period is extended to include the

estimate for 2014 and the current forecast for 2015, the average growth rate decreases to

zero growth for the whole period (Table 1). According to the current estimate, the Ukrainian

economy will face a steep decline of minus 7.6% in 2014. For the year 2015, a further

decline of minus 2.2% is forecasted.

Table 1: GDP of Ukraine (2007-2015), National Accounts

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014E 2015F avg 07-15

UAH bn 751,1 990,8 947,0 1079,3 1300,0 1404,7 1449,4 1464,2 1603,8

USD bn 148,7 188,1 121,6 136,0 163,1 175,7 181,3 126,2 123,4

% yoy 8,2 2,3 -15,2 7,5 5,5 0,2 0,2 -7,6 -2,2 -0,1

Private consumption, real % yoy 17,1 12,5 -15,6 7,1 15,7 8,4 7,7 -9,9 -0,8 4,7

State consumption, real % yoy 2,4 1,2 -1,9 4,0 -2,9 4,5 -2,8 -2,7 -3,2 -0,1

Fixed capital accumulation, real % yoy 23,5 -1,2 -49,7 3,9 8,5 5,0 -6,7 -29,6 1,1 -5,0

Exports, real % yoy 3,0 5,7 -22,0 3,9 2,7 -5,6 -9,3 -12,3 -6,6 -4,5

Imports, real % yoy 21,7 17,5 -39,4 11,3 15,4 3,8 -6,4 -24,9 -3,2 -0,5

0,0

Agriculture, real % yoy -6,2 16,9 -2,0 -2,0 19,4 -4,0 13,2 4,3 -2,1 4,2

Extractive industry, real % yoy 1,8 4,0 -11,7 4,5 9,3 0,2 0,8 -9,4 -1,0 -0,2

Manufacturing , real % yoy 9,7 -4,7 -21,6 9,0 3,3 -2,3 -8,3 -13,7 -2,0 -3,4

Production and distribution of electricity, gas

and water, real% yoy 1,3 -3,8 -7,7 7,0 6,0 -1,0 -2,8 -5,6 1,4

-0,6

Construction, real % yoy 14,5 -24,5 -38,8 1,2 -1,3 -10,1 -14,9 -22,5 1,0 -10,6

Trade, repair services, real % yoy 15,8 2,6 -17,7 7,6 6,4 0,7 2,7 -12,4 -4,5 0,1

Transport, real % yoy 9,1 10,2 -7,5 1,6 12,8 -6,3 3,2 -6,4 0,5 1,9

Education, real % yoy -2,0 -0,6 0,9 0,0 0,0 5,5 -0,9 -0,2 0,1 0,3

Health care, real % yoy 0,1 -1,0 6,0 0,8 0,7 5,0 1,4 0,5 0,9 1,6

Nominal GDP

Real GDP

GDP expenditure side components

GDP production side components

Source: IER (2014).Macroeconomic Forecast Ukraine: No.10 (85), October, own calculations

This “zero growth” period includes the booming years before the world financial crisis and the

deep recession the latter triggered in Ukraine, as also the quick post-crisis recovery. By

2012, economic growth slowed to a crawl and remained flat throughout 2013, as the country

exhausted its past economic growth model, in which profits from metal and other exports of

energy-intensive base commodities were funnelled into the consumer economy. The success

of Ukrainian exports depended crucially on cheap energy inputs, with a considerable share

imported from the Russian Federation. However, with increasing prices for imported Russian

gas, the economy’s reliance on imported fuels has become a decisive burden on economic

growth. In 2011, the last year of noteworthy economic growth, energy imports accounted for



4

about 20% of GDP and the overall energy trade balance was hugely negative, with around

minus 17% of GDP (while the overall trade deficit was about minus 7% of GDP). Hence, the

reliance on energy imports has become a decisive drag on economic growth.

At the same time, fixed capital accumulation has declined on average by minus 5% since

2007, with a particularly strong drop of minus 49%, following the global financial crises in

2009 (Table 1). As a result, the stock of installed capital in the country has become

increasingly outdated. The share of depreciated installations has, in particular, increased

continuously from about 45% in 2001 to even more than 75% by 2012 (Figure 3) and it is

safe to assume that the conflict in the industrialized East has accelerated this process even

further.

Figure 3: Capital stock depreciation in Ukraine

40%

45%

50%

55%

60%

65%

70%

75%

80%

Deg

ree o

f cap

ital s

tock d

ep

recia

tio

n

Source: UkrStat, Fixed Assets (2001 ff.)

Power generation provides an illustrative example of capital stock depletion. More than 70%

of thermal power plants are over 40 years old, and operate beyond their designed life span.

The most recent addition to thermal capacity was made over 27 years ago. As a result of

underinvestment and poor maintenance, only 20GW of the 30GW of thermal capacity is

available for generation with low levels of energy efficiency of 31% on average (NERA,

2012).



5

2.2 Energy – the Achilles' heel of the Ukrainian economy

By international standards, Ukraine is one of the most inefficient users of energy due a large

share of energy-intensive sectors, outdated inefficient technologies, and a heavily depleted

capital stock, including inefficient district heating systems and poor quality building stock.

Ukraine’s energy intensity—measured as the ratio of total primary energy supply (TPES) to

GDP—is ten times more than the OECD average. Adjusted by purchasing power parity

(PPP), Ukraine uses around 3.2 times more energy per unit of GDP than the OECD average.

Correspondingly, with this high energy intensity, Ukraine has a very high level of greenhouse

gas (GHG) emissions.

Concurrently, energy prices are heavily distorted by regulatory interventions as well as

subsidies. For example, gas price subsidies represented as much as 1.6 % of GDP in 20112.

In 2012, the overall energy subsidies, on- and off-budget amounted to 7.5% of GDP, of which

the larger share was captured by the relatively well off households3. Thus, the energy sector

drains public finances and provides false price signals to suppliers, distributors and

consumers. This stimulates excessive use of energy, fails to provide incentives for more

efficient use of energy and, in particular, leaves the economy vulnerable to future energy

price shocks.

In fact, Ukraine’s economy has already been exposed to energy price shocks. In particular,

prices for imported Russian gas have been increasing since the year 2005. However,

domestic demand has only slightly responded to higher gas prices (Figure 4). While import

prices have increased by factor four, residential gas consumption has remained almost flat

since 2001. Moreover, while industrial gas consumption dropped significantly between 2007

and 2009, it was increased again after 2009, despite further increases in import prices.

Overall, this pattern characterises Ukraine’s energy policy till until very recently wherein

households were shielded from market developments through populist regulation focussed

on low prices, while industries where supported through additional measures. For example,

the chemical industry, Ukraine’s largest natural gas consumer, has been exempt from value-

added taxes (VAT) on gas consumption (Cabinet Decree No. 880, 2009). In January 2014,

the Verkhovna Rada even prolonged such measures, allowing for the cancellation of VAT for

2IEA/OECD (2012). Ukraine 2012: Energy Policies Beyond IEA Countries. Paris: International Energy Agency.

3IMF (2014). Request for a Stand-By Arrangement: IMF Country Report Ukraine No. 14/10. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund



6

natural gas importers, resulting in a gap of about 60 billion Hryvnia in the government budget

in 2014 alone.

Figure 4: Prices for gas imports and energy demand in Ukraine

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

18000

20000

Thousa

nd tonnes

of

oil

evquiv

ale

nt

Industrial gas consumption Industrial coal consumption

Residential gas consumption Gas import prices

US

D/1

000m

³

Source: International Energy Agency (2001 ff.)

2.3 The outdated capital stock

The underlying causes for the lack of investments and the resulting capital stock depreciation

can be found in Ukraine’s adverse business climate, as well as a weak rule of law. In the

case of the energy market, the persistently artificially low levels of energy prices diminished

the incentives to invest in modernised and energy-efficient capital stock. Thus, interference in

the mechanisms of the energy market not only proved to be unsustainable, but also

inefficient.

In addition to the vulnerability to energy price shocks, considerations of resource productivity,

energy import dependency and climate change mitigation increase the importance of energy-

efficiency improvement vis-à-vis an ageing capital stock. Continuing capital stock

depreciation would increase the distance to the technological and productivity frontier further

and hinder economic progress.



7

Upgrading technology and improving productivity to the levels of a moderately contemporary

capital stock provides Ukraine with a large potential for economic growth and improvements

in energy efficiency (Box 1 exemplifies these potentials for the Metal Industry). Not only

would a closure of the technology gap result in lower energy intensity and operating costs,

but would furthermore lead to a lower vulnerability to energy and production price shocks,

positively contributing to economic growth and relief on climate change pressures. Despite

such expectations of economic gains from capital stock modernisation, the necessary

investments have not been made thus far. In the past, the erosion of, rather than investment

in, capital stock was the basis of the unsustainable, economic growth model in Ukraine.

Box 1: Energy-Efficiency Potential of the Metal Industry in Ukraine

DIW Econ* analysed the economic viability and environmental sustainability of the basic and

fabricated metal industry in Ukraine against an international benchmark. The analysis is based on

the concept of technical efficiency, which describes the ability to produce high levels of output with

low levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from a given set of inputs (labour, capital and

energy). The sectoral analysis showed that within a sample of 27 countries, only Brazil, the Czech

Republic and India have a lower technical efficiency level in the metal industry than Ukraine. Even

after taking into account the given production structure of Ukraine, i.e., its focus on highly energy

intensive products, Ukraine ranks among the countries with a poor performance in terms of technical

efficiency, and thus exhibits significant potential for GHG emissions.

* DIW Econ (2013). Benchmarking for sustainable and economically viable technology options

Selected industries in Ukraine, Low Carbon Ukraine - Technical Paper No. 2 (August 2013)

2.4 Poor investment climate

For a long time now, the economic development in Ukraine has been choked by a poor

business climate. In particular, a corrupt state bureaucracy, in combination with complex and

costly regulation of business, curbed entrepreneurial success and impeded firms making

investments and improving productivity. Even before the actual crisis, the Ukrainian economy

was characterised by high entry barriers for non-insiders, limited incentives for technology

adoption and high concentration on base commodities. The absence of market mechanisms,

such as in the energy market, characterises much of the Ukrainian economy. Generally,



8

interference in market institutions results in an economy-wide low degree of competition and

limited market development across sectors. This, in combination with a weak rule of law,

severely hampers the business environment and the Ukrainian economy4.

Ukraine’s poor record with respect to its business climate becomes especially obvious in

comparison with other countries. Since the World Bank started its “Annual ease of doing

business reports” in 2004, Ukraine has meandered in the lowest quarter of all the ranked

countries, scoring as low as rank 152 out of 183 countries in 2012. Despite being among the

economies improving the most in 2012-2013, Ukraine ranks 112th out of 189 evaluated

economies in the 2014 Doing Business Report. Within Transparency International’s

Corruption Perception Index (2013), the picture is similar—Ukraine ranks 144th out of 175

countries. Besides corruption and a high regulatory burden, the poorly developed and dismal

infrastructure (such as scheduled water supply and interrupted power supply) contributes

further to the poor investment climate. This is reflected and further aggravated be declining

fixed capital investments at an average level of minus 5% of GDP per year since 2007.

2.5 Credit rationing and limited access to finance

A serious weakness relating to investments in Ukraine is the low level of financial

intermediation. Before the financial crisis of 2008, Ukraine experienced very rapid growth in

its banking sector, albeit from very low levels. The banking sector development was driven

by a favourable external environment and soaring demand for banking services. Foreign

investors and lenders financed most of the banking and credit boom. The banking business

withered amid the global financial crisis, with an immediate drying up of foreign financing.

The sharp deleveraging was further accelerated by a reversal of funding flows back to

foreign parent banks. These reversed financial flows dealt a significant blow to the exhausted

past economic model in Ukraine.

The banking sector remains, for the foreseeable future, weak and continues to suffer from

poor corporate governance and inadequate banking supervision and high levels of non-

performing loans. Between 2009 and 2011, and under the guidance of the IMF and World

4There is a well-established body of literature linking domestic institutions to investment climate and eventually to investments and economic growth. See for instance WEF (2014). Scenarios for Ukraine. Reforming institutions, strengthening the economy after the crisis. World Scenario Series (April 2014). World Bank 2014, IMF 2014, EBRD 2014



9

Bank, the Government of Ukraine had to recapitalise five banks at a total cost equal to 4% of

GDP. Consequently, the steep reduction in the intermediation capacity between the real and

financial sectors, constrains investments. Increased costs of corporate borrowing and a

decline in outstanding loan amounts point towards credit rationing (See Box 2):

External shocks to the net worth of Ukrainian borrowers affect their cost of financing, spilling

over into potential expenditures and ultimately aggregating demand in Ukraine. As assets

serve as collateral for loans, a decline in asset prices diminishes borrowing capacity, which

lowers production and spending and, thus, depresses asset prices further. In turn, the sizable

credit risks of Ukrainian borrowers make banks reluctant to lend, while non-performing loans

erode the capital position of Ukrainian banks. A capital crunch or, more generally, an adverse

shock to banks’ balance sheets and squeezed liquidity, lowers their ability to provide credit.

This restrains expenditures and aggregates demand.

Box 2: Credit rationing

Credit rationing5 refers to a situation where lenders limit the supply of credit, even if potential

borrowers are willing to pay higher interest rates to gain access to such credits. Thus, the pricing

mechanism is inoperative, with credit demand exceeding credit supply at the prevailing high interest

rate, and loan applications of profitable projects being rejected. Banks insist upon this rate though,

as their profits are already maximised—despite excess demand.

High interest rates also change the composition of borrowers. With higher loan costs, borrowers with

low-risk, low-cost projects withdraw their loan applications, as higher costs render their projects

unprofitable. This development constitutes adverse selection to the borrower pool: the pool

changes for the worse regarding the riskiness of the projects to be financed. Higher costs

additionally incentivise the remaining loan applicants to increase the risks attached to their projects.

This is a case of moral hazard: the creditor’s actions admonish borrowers to adjust their behaviour

to the detriment of the creditor. As borrowers possess more information about their behaviour than

banks can possibly know, information about the level of risk is asymmetrically distributed. Banks are

unaware of debtors’ true risk affinity and unable to regulate the risks attached to their borrower pool.

Accordingly, banks decline an increase in interest rates, even with excess credit demand.

On a more general note, the economic actors in Ukraine have relied on external funding and

this has now to be repaid or restructured. Currently, however, external refinancing is

insufficient to carry out these measures. High leverage ratios and pronounced maturity

5Stiglitz, J., A. Weiss (1989) is the seminal paper, with Schmidt, R., I. Tschach (2001) contributing to a better understanding. Appendix A illustrates the central properties of credit rationing.



10

mismatches within banks are critical in disseminating such funding liquidity shocks to the

economy. Finally, the Ukrainian government, faced with fiscal pressures and a lack of access

to external markets, has heavily issued state debt, thereby crowding out private sector

borrowers.

2.6 Summary

Ukraine has exhausted its past economic growth model, wherein cheap energy inputs were

used to produce and export metal and other energy-intensive base commodities. At the

same time, the profits from exports were fuelled into the consumer economy and only small

shares invested in capital stock modernisation.

As a result, the country remains—by international standards—one of the most inefficient

users of energy, with a large share of energy-intensive sectors, outdated inefficient

technologies and a heavily depleted capital stock, including inefficient district heating

systems and poor quality building stock. Regulatory interventions, as well as subsidies, have

strongly distorted energy prices, drained public finances and stimulated the excessive use of

energy. Along with the high intensity of energy use in Ukraine, the country also has very high

levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.

With increasing energy prices, the economy’s reliance on imported fuels has become a

decisive burden on economic growth. Moreover, capital stock depreciation has reached

disastrous levels, requiring immediate investments. Investments have, however, remained

weak, due a poor business environment and the lack of access to finance.

During the current economic crises, an IMF-led intervention was key to re-establishing

economic stability. However, this support is conditional on structural reforms in the energy

sector and, in particular, increases in energy prices. Hence, the economy risks are locked

into a vicious circle, wherein stabilisation requires price shocks that, in turn, undermine

economic growth and—eventually—stabilisation.



11

3. Lowering investment barriers (Purpose and

timeframe of concept realisation)

The general purpose of this report is to develop a strategy to stimulate economic growth in

Ukraine, despite higher energy prices and the current political crisis. In fact, the strategy

describes how the vicious circle, wherein stabilisation requires price shocks that, in turn,

undermine economic growth and stabilisation, can be broken and growth be stimulated.

This section starts by highlighting the relevant international experience on the relationship

between energy consumption, energy prices and economic growth (section 3.1). It is argued

that higher energy prices are key to stimulating investments in energy-efficient technologies

that increase productivity levels and, thus, stimulate economic growth. The second part of

this section outlines the relevant barriers to investments in Ukraine and discusses how the

relevant barriers to investments should be addressed in order to kick-start economic growth

(section 3.2).

3.1 Higher energy efficiency as the future growth engine

While higher energy prices are expected to have a negative short-term impact on economic

growth, a comparison of economic development and energy efficiency by different countries

suggests that higher levels of GDP per capita are associated with lower levels of energy use

per GDP (or, in other words, economic growth is positively linked with higher levels of energy

efficiency). This suggests that reducing the intensity of energy consumption is crucial for

securing sustainable economic growth (Figure 3). In fact, energy price shocks can be an

important driver for such a development:

Countries such as Germany or the United States employ state-of-the-art technologies

and invest financial and human resources in research and development to shift

technological and energy-efficiency boundaries.

Countries that lag behind this technology frontier can cost-efficiently adopt innovative

technologies by providing investment-friendly conditions and competitive markets for new

technologies.



12

This can be further supported through appropriate technology standards, the stimulation

of public investment demand, and programmes for energy-efficient refurbishment of

building stock.

For Ukraine, the relation between GDP per capita and energy efficiency is not as clearly

defined as in similar countries, such as Poland or even the Russian Federation. The

economic crisis in 2008-2009 led to a contraction of GDP, which eventually caused energy

intensity to even increase in 2010. The development of energy efficiency in Ukraine, as

shown in Figure 5, is not only specific due to recent economic developments, it also exhibits

much higher levels of energy intensity than in other countries. However, whereas Ukraine’s

economy made strong advancements in energy efficiency until 2007, this trend has recently

been contradicted.

Figure 5: Country-specific learning curves of energy efficiency

0

0,25

0,5

0,75

1

1,25

1,5

1,75

2

500 5000 50000

Energ

y u

se (

kg o

f oil

equiv

ale

nt)

per

GD

P (

consta

nt

2005

US

D)

GDP per capita (constant 2005 USD)

Germany

United States

Poland

Russian Federation

China

Ukraine

2002

2011

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2010

20082009

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2013)



13

3.2 Reform to stimulate investments

Increasing energy intensity requires the modernisation of Ukraine’s depleted capital stock.

While private capital is potentially available in Ukraine as well as from abroad, investments

are constrained by significant barriers. These can be distinguished into structural and

temporary barriers:

Structural investment barriers comprise the factors that cause the country’s poor

investment climate. This includes serious deficiencies such as an insufficient regulatory

environment, weak property rights, as well as corruption and red tape.

Temporary barriers to investments are caused by the current political crises, in particular

uncertainty with respect to the economic and political future of the country, as well as

security concerns.

Stimulating investments requires addressing both types of barriers. With respect to structural

barriers, the need for reforms in areas such as property rights, corruption and red-tape is well

understood. The necessary key measures for improving the country’s investment climate

have been widely discussed already and are continuously addressed. For example:

International financial institutions have provided numerous analyses and policy

recommendations on how to improve the country’s economic institutions. Recent

examples include the EBRD’s 2013 transition report (See Chapter 3 on economic

institutions) or the World Bank report “Doing Business 2015: Going Beyond Efficiency”.

In October 2014, Ukraine signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Organisation

for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), seeking expertise to implement

economic and social reforms in Ukraine. The focus of collaboration with OECD will be on

anti-corruption, public governance and administration, regulation of selected economic

sectors, ensuring a level playing field for businesses, sector competitiveness, corporate

governance of state-owned enterprises, collection of taxes and tax administration issues,

and multi-dimensional development, as well as collection, processing and dissemination

of statistics.

The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement extends far beyond the Deep and

Comprehensive Free Trade Area. It stipulates extensive co-operation helping Ukraine to

achieve European standards by providing an external (i.e., European) framework for the

development of Ukrainian policies and economy. The ever closer association with the EU



14

might provide a reform anchor for Ukraine, similar to the experience of Ukraine’s

Western neighbouring countries that joined the EU a decade ago.

The World Economic Forum recently published “Scenarios for Ukraine” (2014),

discussing deep reforms and improvements in the institutional environment to enable the

modernisation of the Ukrainian economy.

Several donor-funded projects contribute to Ukraine’s reform debate. Among the most

active is the International Renaissance Foundations (IRF) financed by George Soros.

The IRF has just reactivated the so-called Strategic Advisory Groups, which will focus on

priority reform areas that were identified by the Government of Ukraine and independent

experts.

The recent Professional Government Initiative (PGI) unites over 2,000 Ukrainian

graduates from top Western Universities and Alumni Clubs. The PGI seeks to foster

opportunities and equal chances for graduates to get a job placement at the State bodies

(Ministries, Verkhovna Rada Committees, etc.), with the ultimate aim of supporting

structural reforms.

In a nutshell, reform programmes addressing structural barriers and how to improve the

business climate in Ukraine have already been drafted. Clearly, a policy agenda with the

focus on stimulating investments must embrace these measures. However, implementing

such reforms is difficult and requires firm political commitment. Moreover, significant

improvements in the investment climate can be expected only over the medium to long term.

In the short term, a policy agenda aiming at kick-starting economic growth through

investments in capital stock modernisation must also focus on removing temporary

investment barriers. Since temporary barriers are caused by uncertainty and uncertainty

leads to lack of funding, public support should aim at providing the required funds to selected

investment projects. These investment projects need to satisfy two main conditions. First,

they must be capable of delivering the intended impact of GDP growth. Second, they should

not be heavily distorted by structural constraints. In other words, the policy agenda must

focus on initiating investments in areas that would have been profitable in the absence of the

current political crises (under the otherwise current market conditions).

In the next two sections, these areas will be identified and appropriate policy instruments will

be proposed.



15

4. Determining the impact of increased energy

efficiency investments on economic growth in

Ukraine (Expected results)

In view of the pivotal role of higher energy efficiency through capital stock modernisation to

break the vicious circle in which Ukraine’s economy is locked, the potential impact of

investments in different areas must be assessed. In this section, evidence from an empirical

model of the Ukrainian economy is presented and discussed. The results show the expected

impact of alternative investment proposals in four different areas: manufacturing industries,

the utility sector, housing, and transportation. The discussions on the results focus on two

areas:

The impact of a specific measure on energy efficiency and GDP as an indicator of the

potential to boost economic growth;

The attractiveness of investments from the perspective of the investor (i.e., the specific

investment incentives) as an indicator of the relevance of structural or temporary

investment barriers.

The assessment of different measures, according to the first criterion, is straightforward: the

attractiveness of alternative investment measures increases with their impact on GDP

growth. The assessment with respect to the second criterion is more complex. The general

intuition is that temporary investment barriers, such as uncertainty with respect to the

economic and political future or security concerns, affect all investments alike, while the

relevance of structural barriers, such as insufficient regulation, differs by type of industry and

specific investment project.

Given the intention of this strategy to kick-start economic growth, investment opportunities

with a strong impact on GDP, as well as high attractiveness for investors, are of particular

interest. In fact, such projects have strong potential for kick-starting growth and suffer less

from systemically low investment incentives. In the absence of a political crises, it could be

expected that these investments would be implemented and generate the required stimulus.



16

However, owing to the specific circumstances of the current crises, this is not the case.

Hence, public interventions to support those specific investments are needed to overcome

the depressing effect of the current crises on economic development.

As the results from an empirical model of the Ukrainian economy show, the strongest impact

on GDP growth—relative to the existing trajectory of the economy—can be expected from

investments in manufacturing industries. In this area, investments in energy-efficient

technologies induce growth in productivity and, thus, GDP. At the same time, these

opportunities are found to be fairly attractive to investors, absent the current political crises,

suggesting that the viability of these projects is less distorted by structural investment

barriers. In this section, the strategy and the key findings of the simulation analysis are

explained in more detail. The implications for economic policy which follow from the

discussion and the results presented so far are elaborated upon in the subsequent section.

4.1 Strategy of the simulation analysis

The analysis is based on a detailed model of the Ukrainian economy (See Box 3 for details).

To assess the potential of investments in capital stock modernisation on economic growth,

we run different scenarios that simulate the development of the national economy until 2050

(simulation period).

The assessment starts by simulating the impact of investments under an ENERGY

EFFICIENT INVESTMENT (EEI) scenario, wherein capital stock in selected industries is

modernised through investments in energy-efficient technologies. The specific assumptions

underlying in this scenario will be explained in Section 4.2 below. To identify the specific

contribution of these activities on relevant variables like GDP, simulation results of the EEI

scenario will be compared with a counterfactual scenario that simulates future economic

developments under the assumption that the Ukrainian economy continues to follow its

existing trajectory without extra efforts in terms of capital stock modernisation (See Box 4 for

details).



17

Box 3: A Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model for Ukraine

The CGE model for Ukraine covers the entire economy, including private households, production

(split into agriculture, four mining industries, ten manufacturing industries, four utility providers, two

transportation sectors, construction, and trade and services), the government (i.e., the consolidated

public budget), as well as the external sector (exports, imports, balance of payments and current

account). Specific emphasis is placed on the power sector to account for the impact of different

technologies and fuel types.

The model explicitly simulates the supply and demand of a total of 23 product markets, as well as the

markets for labour, capital, capital formation (investment) and foreign exchange. Special emphasis

has been placed on modelling the production process in different industries, including energy

consumption and the resulting emissions of Greenhouse Gases (GHG).

The database of the model has been compiled from the official statistics of the Ukrainian economy, in

particular national accounts, input-output tables, energy balance and the GHG emissions inventory.

The model is recursively dynamic and simulates the development of the national economy over the

period 2011 till 2050.

The comparison of the simulation results under the EEI scenario and the counterfactual BAU

scenario reveals the economic potential of capital stock modernisation in different areas. As

elaborated above, the presentation of the results focuses on the impact of specific measures

on:

Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions as a measure of energy intensity, GDP as an

economy-wide measure of national income, and real household consumption as a

measure of the wellbeing of private households;

Value-adds and profits at the sector-level as measures for the attractiveness of

investments from the perspective of specific investors.



18

Box 4: Business As Usual (BAU) as counterfactual scenario

The Business As Usual (BAU) scenario simulates the hypothetical development of the economy

without the implementation of investment projects. The key assumptions of the BAU scenario are:

Growth of GDP is consistent with macro-projections by the International Monetary Fund (IMF

Country Report No. 14/106, May 2014);

GDP growth after 2020 is determined by the continuation of historical developments in total

factor productivity;

Energy efficiency (i.e., energy input per output) increases in line with historical developments

over the past ten years;

Electricity generation capacity will be added in line with the growth in demand, while

generation mix and reliance on coal and nuclear generation remain;

Heat generation and distribution capacities will be renewed and extended so as to meet

increasing demand—half of the newly-added capacity will be coal-based;

Import prices of gas will develop as projected by the IMF (until 2019) and increase in line with

European import prices as projected by the International Energy Agency (IEA);

Energy prices for gas and heat will increase and quasi-fiscal subsidies in the energy sector

will phased out as required by the IMF support programme.



19

4.2 An empirical assessment of investment opportunities in

energy-efficient technologies

The objective of the EEI scenario is to simulate the impact of investments in energy-efficient

technologies on the Ukrainian economy. The scenario simulates investments in capital stock

modernisation in four different areas:

Industry:

Energy-saving measures in manufacturing sectors; focus on Metallurgy, Chemicals,

Minerals, Mining

Utility supply

Heat generation and networks

Waste management

Housing

Increasing the energy efficiency of buildings

Transport

Increasing the energy efficiency of transport.

In each area, specific investment opportunities have been selected based on their economic

viability for generating energy savings. As a result, the selected projects represent

opportunities with the most viable combination of energy-saving potential and costs. In

general, the required information on technical reduction potential and economic costs is

available for GHG emissions, rather than directly for energy consumption. Hence, this

information has been used as a basis for assessing the respective reduction in energy

consumption. The key indicators of abatement potential and marginal abatement costs for

different activities are listed in the following table:



20

Table 2: GHG abatement volume and incremental investments in Ukraine by activity

Abatement measures by sector and type:

Emissions reduction (by

2050 compared to BAU, in million

tons CO2e)

Marginal abatement cost (€ per ton CO2e)

Source of cost

data

Industry:

Oil refining (combustion) 0.1 61 NERA

Chemistry (combustion) 4.6 45 TR

Minerals production (combustion) 2.4 94 TR

Metallurgy (combustion) 33.7 31 TR

Utility Supply:

Heat and hot water supply (combustion) 12.6 325 TR

Waste management (process) 15.6 53 TR

Housing:

Heat use in buildings (combustion) 8.9 100 DIW econ

Transport:

Transport (combustion) 16.3 179 NERA

Source: Own assessment by DIW ECON6

Based on the available information, the impact of capital stock modernisation on the EEI

scenario is simulated by annual reductions in energy intensity (i.e., the amount of energy

used per unit of output):

Industry:

By 1.0% p.a. in metals production,

By 1.5% p.a. in minerals production,

By 3.0% p.a. in the food industry, textiles industry, machinery and equipment,

and other manufacturing.

Utility supply ->by 2% p.a. in heat supply

6 Energy efficiency potentials and incremental investments are mainly based on the results provided by Thomson Reuters (2013) on GHG mitigation potentials and abatement costs in Ukraine under alternative scenario assumptions. For some missing sectors, we made use of similar calculations provided by NERA et al. (2012). In addition, own efficiency analyses were made for the metal industry, the non-metallic mineral products industry (i.e., production of clinker, lime, glass and soda ash) and the chemical industry in Ukraine. See Thomson Reuters (2013). Assessment of the Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Potential of Identified Policies and Measures. Prepared for The United Nations Development Programme. NERA et al (2012). The Demand for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Investments: An Investors’ Marginal Abatement Cost Curve for Ukraine. Prepared for EBRD.



21

Housing ->by 2% p.a. in heat demand by residential sector (households) and service

sector

Transport ->by 1.0% p.a. in public and freight transport

Implementing these opportunities requires significant additional investments in addition to

expected investment volumes in the BAU scenario. Discounted into present values, the

overall volume of these incremental investments until 2050 amounts to 73 bln UAH or more

than 20% of aggregate gross fixed capital formation of the entire economy in 2011. Broken

down by the four key areas, the largest amount of investments will be required for the

modernisation of heat networks and transportation infrastructure, the smallest in housing

(Figure 6).

Figure 6: Composition of the required energy efficiency investments (total net present value of aggregate investments until 2050, in bln UAH of 2011)

+13

+73

+29

+11

+20

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Measures inindustry


Measures inhousing


All measures

Source: DIW ECON

Before turning to the quantitative results of the EEI scenario, it is important to reflect on the

different channels through which investments to increase energy efficiency impact the

domestic economy. Firstly, additional investment expenditures stimulate domestic demand.

Secondly, increasing energy efficiency allows: (a) private households to use less energy and



22

thereby save money for the consumption of other items; and (b) firms to increase productivity

(i.e., to produce the same amount of output with lower energy inputs, or to produce more

output from the same amount of energy inputs) and thereby cut the costs of production. In

turn, both channels result in a positive impact on domestic demand. Depending on the extent

to which goods in demand are produced domestically, this generates additional growth of

GDP.

On the other hand, financing additional investment expenditures requires public and private

households to forgo consumption, which reduces domestic demand and, thus, reduces the

growth of GDP. As before, the magnitude of this impact depends on the extent to which the

goods consumed are produced domestically.

Hence, the higher the energy savings, the more the resources that can be put to more

productive uses and, thus, the stronger the impact on GDP. On the other hand, the higher

the costs of additional investments, the more it is that (private and public) households have

to forego consumption and, thus, the weaker the impact on GDP. Overall, quantifying the net

impact of investments in energy efficiency through capital stock modernisation requires a

detailed empirical assessment, such as the one introduced here.

4.2.1 Potential to boost economic growth

In this section, the impact of the simulated investment measures on GDP, household income

and GHG emissions is given by the difference between the EEI and the BAU scenario. The

first finding is that capital stock modernisation (i.e., investments) leads to higher GDP growth

and consumer welfare as compared to BAU, while GHG emissions are considerably lower

(Figure 7) suggesting a corresponding increase in energy efficiency. Starting from a common

level in 2011, GDP grows faster under the EEI scenario and exceeds its benchmark level

under BAU by up to 7.4% in 2050. The impact on households’ consumption (i.e., consumer

welfare) is even bigger, 8.4% higher than in BAU. These improvements do not come at the

cost of a higher environmental burden. GHG emissions are projected to be 7.8% lower than

under BAU.



23

Figure 7: Dynamics of key indicators (EEI relative to BAU scenario in each year)

-10%

-8%

-6%

-4%

-2%

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046

Real GDP Real consumption Total emissions

Source: DIW ECON

The overall impact of the EEI scenario can also be broken down into measures in four

different areas:

Energy-saving measures in industry;

Modernisation of heating networks;

Increasing energy efficiency of buildings;

Increasing energy efficiency of transport.

Figure 8 and Figure 9 show the partial impact of alternative measures on GDP and GHG

emissions.



24

Figure 8: GDP impact of alternative measures (relative to BAU, in % of GDP in 2011)

+28%

+36%

+3%

+4%+1%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

Measures inindustry


Measures inhousing


All measures

Source: DIW ECON

Figure 9: GHG emission impact of alternative measures (relative to BAU, in % of total GHG emissions in 2011)

-12%

-21%

-3%-1%

-5%

-25%

-20%

-15%

-10%

-5%

0%

Measures inindustry


Measures inhousing


All measures

Source: DIW ECON



25

The simulation results suggest that implementation of the proposed measures in industry

leads to a 28% increase in GDP and a 12 % reduction in GHG emissions (and a

corresponding increase in energy efficiency) relative to the respective levels in the baseline

BAU scenario (both expressed in percentage of the respective levels in 2011, the starting

year of the simulation analysis).

Investments in utility supply also stimulate GDP growth (+3%) and reduce GHG emissions

and, thereby, energy consumption (-3%), while investments in the energy efficiency of

residential buildings (measures in housing) has a relative stronger impact on GDP growth

(+4%) than on reducing GHG emissions (-1%). Finally, investments in modern transportation

infrastructure have the smallest impact on GDP (+1%).

4.2.2 Relevance of structural or temporary investment barriers

The attractiveness of investments from the perspective of an investor (i.e., the specific

investment incentives) is assessed based on its impact on value added (i.e., aggregate

labour and capital income) and profits (i.e., the difference between gross operating surplus

and capital expenditures) at the sector level. Figure 10 shows the combined impact of the

different measures on gross value added by industry. With the exemption of the mining

industry, which stands to lose due to reduced demand for coal in manufacturing and heat

supply, no industry is expected to lose relative to the BAU scenario. The significant positive

effects on manufacturing and construction correspond to the results as shown in Figure 8

above.



26

Figure 10: Impact of alternative measures on GVA by sector (relative to BAU, in % of GVA in 2011)

-40%

-20%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

140%


Source: DIW ECON

To assess the corresponding incentives for investments in capital stock modernisation by

industry and measure, additional capital income is compared with investment expenditures.

The resulting impact on discounted profit flows of aggregate sectors relative to BAU (i.e.,

additional capital income minus incremental investment) is shown in Figure 11. Each

measure does not only have an impact on the profits of the investing industry, but on other

industries as well. For measures in manufacturing, profits in manufacturing—the investing

sector—as well as in other industries (mainly construction and services) increase. It appears

that investments in manufacturing are least affected by structural distortions and it can be

expected that these measures would be implemented absent the current economic crises.

Measures in manufacturing are thus highly suitable for providing the intended short-term

stimulus.

On the contrary, measures in heat and transport induce losses for the investing sectors—

heat and transportation—due to the substantial investment volumes. In these industries,

investment incentives are weak due to structural distortions, e.g. caused by an insufficient

regulatory framework. Implementing these measures requires additional incentives.

Increases in heating tariffs for households—as required by the IMF program—have already

been considered. Additional incentives may thus include further tariff increases, as well as

other market mechanisms like CO2 taxes. However, implementing these measures will take

time and investors will prefer to not invest in those areas until this is achieved. Hence, profits



27

for other industries—mainly construction—will also not materialise. Thus, measures in

heating and transport are not suitable for providing the intended stimulus in the short term.

Figure 11: Profits by sector under the EEI scenario (net present value of incremental profits compared to BAU)

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10


NP

V o

f in

cre

me

nta

l pro

fits

, b

ln U

AH

Source: DIW ECON

Finally, the specific impact on different manufacturing sectors is assessed. Figure 12 shows

the value of discounted profit flows for individual manufacturing sectors in a partial scenario,

where only the measures in manufacturing are simulated. In the EEI scenario, investments in

capital stock modernisation in manufacturing focus on metallurgy, chemicals and the

minerals sector (i.e., the manufacturing sectors with the largest GHG emissions in the

benchmark year 2011). As shown in Figure 12, profits in these sectors are positive

suggesting that investors benefit from these measures (as compared to the BAU scenario).

In particular, investments in energy-saving technology appear to be particularly beneficial in

chemicals and the minerals sector, while in metallurgy, the main beneficiary is machinery

and equipment. Nevertheless, the profits indicate that the metal industry stands to benefit

from additional investments in capital stock modernisation and energy efficiency.



28

Figure 12: Profits of key manufacturing sectors with implemented measures in industry (net present value of incremental profits, compared to BAU)

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

Food and beverages

Chemicals Minerals Metal production

Machinery and equipment

Other manufacturing

NP

V o

f in

cre

me

nta

l pro

fits

, b

ln U

AH

Source: DIW ECON

4.2.3 Summary of simulation results

The quantitative simulation in this section assesses the impact of alternative investment

projects in industry, utility supply, housing and transport. The results are evaluated based on

their contribution to GDP growth, energy efficiency and profitability (always relative to a BAU

scenario with no investments). By design, all projects contribute to increasing energy

efficiency, with the strongest impact identified for measures in industry and transport. With

respect to the projects potential to kick-start economic growth, it is argued that such

measures need to have strong impact on GDP growth, as well as profitability (where the

latter ensures that investment incentives are least distorted by structural barriers). The

resulting indicators for different groups of measures are shown in the figure below. Clearly,

measures in industry are most suitable since they are highly profitable and provide the

required stimulus for economic growth. Measures in housing are found to be profitable as

well, although not as much as measures in industry. Moreover, these activities provide a

much smaller stimulus to GDP growth. On the contrary, measures in utility supply and

transportation are less suitable for kick-starting economic growth, as they clearly suffer from

structural investment barriers, such as an insufficient regulatory framework. Hence, activities

under this strategy should focus on stimulating investments in industry and—to a lesser

extent—housing.



29

Figure 13: Results of the simulation analysis

Measures in industry

Measures in heat

Measures in housing

Measures in transport

-15.00

-10.00

-5.00

0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

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Impact on GDP (relative to BaU, in percent of GDP in 2011)



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5. Towards a Ukrainian Investment Fund (Ways

and means of solving problems)

As elaborated above, Ukraine’s economy is about to be locked in a vicious circle wherein

stabilisation requires energy price shocks that, in turn, undermine economic growth and—

eventually—stabilisation. Breaking the vicious cycle requires investments in capital stock

modernisation in order to increase the efficiency of energy use. In turn, this reduces the

economy’s vulnerability to energy price shocks, as it enables producers, as well as

consumers, to cope with higher prices. Overall, the key impact of these measures is kick-

starting and re-initiating GDP growth.

However, it is argued that the investments required are hampered by structural, as well as

temporary, investment barriers. Structural barriers are caused by well-known deficiencies in

Ukraine’s investment climate, such as an insufficient regulatory environment, weak property

rights, corruption and red tape. Addressing those barriers requires broad and ambitious

reforms, as well as firm political commitment. Moreover, significant improvements can be

expected only in the medium and long term. Hence, a policy agenda aimed at providing

short-term stimulus to economic growth through investments in capital stock modernisation

must address temporary investment barriers. Under normal circumstances and functioning

capital markets, private investors (domestic and foreign) would have sufficient incentives to

finance the investments required and thereby, provide the necessary stimulus. However, the

current political crises, the resulting uncertainty with respect to the economic and political

future of the country, as well as security concerns, prevent these investments. However,

Ukraine is facing extraordinary times and a post-conflict recovery is of utmost importance,

not only as an economic objective, but also from a political and social point of view. Thus,

providing the necessary stimuli for economic growth in Ukraine requires focussing on support

to private investments. In particular, public support for investments in the manufacturing

industries can help in reducing the existing uncertainties, establishing the needed trust and,

thus, work as a motor for capital stock modernisation and productivity advancements.

Against this background, the present strategy suggests establishing a temporary investment

fund—henceforth addressed as the Ukrainian Investment Fund—with the objective of kick-

starting capital stock modernisation through increased energy efficiency in order to initiate



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robust economic growth. For the Ukrainian Investment Fund to be successful, the following

issues need to be determined:

5.1.1 Objective and Mandate

The objective of the Ukrainian Investment Fund is initiating and supporting investments in

capital stock modernisation in order to increase GDP growth through improved energy

efficiency. The Fund’s initial mandate must be temporary and should be limited to a clear

period, e.g. until 2020. After 2020, it is envisaged that the Fund’s operations will continue, but

public funds have to be completely replaced by private capital. Hence, the Fund’s initial

activities until 2020 must be designed to provide the required initial stimulus with sufficient

intensity, while phasing out gradually as the regular markets begin to re-establish

themselves.

5.1.2 Governance

A transparent and accountable governance structure will be of very high importance for the

success of a Ukrainian Investment Fund. Within the Fund, it will be important to minimise the

influence of state control and rent without seeking to give preference to certain economic

sectors or regions by making access to funding especially favourable for them. Rather, the

Fund’s operations should be under independent and, preferably, international control. Even

registering and operating the Ukrainian Investment Fund from outside Ukraine should be

seriously considered, as this will improve governance and accountability, as also reduce

refinancing costs.

5.1.3 Targeting

As discussed above, the Fund’s activities must focus on supporting investments in areas

where improvements in energy efficiency have a strong impact on economic growth and

where incentives are least distorted by structural barriers to investments. In fact, this requires

prioritising specific sectors and investment areas, as well as the specification of minimum

criteria that each project has to meet.

As demonstrated above, the Fund’s activities should focus on supporting investments in

capital stock modernisation in industry. In this area, investments in modern technologies



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increase energy efficiency and induce growth in GDP. At the same time, these opportunities

are found to be fairly attractive to investors absent the current political crises, suggesting that

the viability of these projects is less distorted by structural investment barriers. Likewise, it is

shown that capital stock modernisation in housing is also capable of providing the necessary

stimulus, although to a lesser extent. Hence, the Fund’s initial priority should be on

supporting capital stock modernisation in these areas.

The relevant minimum criteria for supported projects must address the potential for energy

saving, for example by requiring energy efficiency standards of the European Union as a

minimum level.

Finally, it is emphasised that the Fund should not focus exclusively on supporting specific

structural clusters, such as SMEs. Rather, the Fund and supporting measures should be

available to a wider range of enterprises. Nevertheless, additional conditions should specify

thresholds for 100% financing to ensure a focus on enterprises that are more vulnerable in

distressed credit markets.

5.1.4 Instruments

Generally, the Ukrainian Investment Fund should rely on a mix of different instruments and

provide financial support through financial intermediaries. The Ukrainian Investment Fund’s

key instruments should include:

Loans to financial intermediaries at favourable terms, subject to focussing lending

activities on eligible projects and the transfer of financial advantage to the final

borrowers.

Guarantees to lower the risks for financial intermediaries, which could, in turn,

improve lending and increase investment activity further. Since the liability of the

Ukrainian Investment Fund might be limited, guarantees could be handled in co-

operation with other relevant institutions, such as EBRD, EIB or the World Bank.

Leasing facilities to further support capital stock modernisation. Possibly also in co-

operation with already existing funds operated by donor organisations.

A crucial precondition for the suggested choice of instruments is the availability of reliable

financial intermediaries—i.e., commercial banks—in Ukraine. While Ukraine’s banking sector



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is heavily distressed due to a sequence of financial crises that hit the country over the past

five years, there are two fundamental reasons why the Ukrainian Investment Fund should

seek to work in partnership with local financial intermediaries whenever possible:

First, well-functioning financial intermediaries are an essential pre-condition for

sustainable local business development. Bypassing them—i.e., by building up own,

dedicated institutions—will have a detrimental effect on the development of the local

banking sector. In turn, this will make it harder, or even impossible, to eventually replace

the Fund’s operations by regular market activities.

Second, embedding financial intermediaries in the intuitional network of the Fund’s

operations allows for building a decentralised network with different tasks and

obligations, wherein intermediaries can benefit from their specific knowledge of the local

conditions.

Under this setting, financial intermediaries are in charge of selecting specific investment

projects and assessing their overall viability, while the Fund’s primary concern is on the

eligibility of a specific project (i.e., it targets a manufacturing industry and complies with the

required energy efficiency standards). Moreover, the relationship between the Ukrainian

Investment Fund and the financial intermediaries must be such that there is no competition

between them, the conditions are the same for all the financial intermediaries and final

borrowers, and there are sufficient incentives for the financial intermediaries to transfer the

financial advantages to the final borrowers (i.e., sufficiently high on-lending margins).

5.1.5 Funding

Initially, funding will have to rely on amounts and the guarantees offered by the international

community. In addition to direct financial support, the international community can also

support the Fund by issuing guarantees that, in turn, will enable the fund to refinance itself on

the international capital markets. In terms of timing, initial support must be provided mainly

through direct financial support, while refinancing through guarantees, repayments and

capital markets will kick in and expand over time.

Overall, all the measures are capable of mitigating deficiencies in the capital markets by

improving access to finance and need to be supported by decisive reforms aimed at

structural improvements and vice versa.



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6. Time frame and amount of financial resources

(Amount of financial, material, technical and

human resources)

This Low Carbon Development Strategy provides an agenda to initiate economic growth by

fostering investments and modernisation. This agenda focuses on the need for public

support to private investment, including objective and mandate, targeting of all measures,

choice of instruments, governance and funding.

The timeframe of the proposed measures and policies—and, in particular, the period for

which public funds are required—covers the years ahead until 2020. Thereafter, it is

envisaged that the Fund’s operations will entirely rely on private funds. The overall impact of

the agenda is, therefore, estimated over a significantly longer period—against the year

2050—to reflect the full lifetime of different installations that are financed under this program.

Until 2020, it is expected that incremental investments—i.e., the volumes on top of regular

investment under BAU—are fully financed by public funds. Assuming that investments start

in 2015, the required funds until 2020 amount to:

70.65 bln UAH or 6.4 bln EUR7 for measures in industry (top priority); and

40.37 bln UAH or 3.6 bln EUR for measures in housing.

As argued above, Ukraine should consolidate financial assistance international donors to

finance the Ukrainian Investment Fund and kick-start economic growth by stimulating

investment to capital stock modernisation.

7 Estimated investment costs are based on prices for 2011. The respective exchange rate (annual average) for the year 2011 is 11.09 UAH/EUR.

Lcd strategy for ua final

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