Law on Natural Resources (Sixth Part)

8/3/2019 Law on Natural Resources (Sixth Part)

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Prohibition on Corporations/Associations

‘Private corporations or associations may not hold suchalienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not

exceeding twenty years, renewable for not more than twenty-five

years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the

Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire

not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or

grant.’

‘Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology,

and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform,

the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of the lands of the public

domain which may be acquired, developed, held or leased and theconditions therefore.’ (Sec. 3, Art. XII, Constitution).

The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973

Constitution banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of

alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the

1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of

the public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973

Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to private

corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of

the public domain is still CA No. 141 or the Public Land Act.

In Ayog vs. Cusi 118 SCRA 492, the Court explained the

rationale behind this Constitutional ban in this way:

“Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against

purchases of public agricultural lands by private corporations is to

equitably diffuse land ownership or to encourage ‘owner-cultivatorship

and the economic family-size farm’ and to prevent a recurrence of

cases like the instant case. Huge landholdings by corporations or

private persons had spawned social unrest.”

However, if the constitutional intent is to prevent huge

landholdings, the Constitution could have simply limited the size of

alienable lands of the public domain that corporations could



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acquire. The Constitution could have followed the limitations on

individuals, who could acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable

lands of the public domain under the 1973 Constitution, and not more

than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution.

If the Constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size

farms, placing the land in the name of a corporation would be more

effective in preventing the break-up of farmland. If the farmland is

registered in the name of a corporation, upon the death of the owner,

his heirs would inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided

parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-

up of farmlands into smaller and smaller parcels from one generation to

the next.

In actual practice, the Constitutional ban strengthens the

constitutional limitation on individuals from acquiring more than the

allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain. Without the

constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area

of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations

to corporations as his means would allow him. An individual

could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his

nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a

convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation of

acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.

The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions,

is to transfer ownership of only a limited area or alienable land of the

public domain to a qualified individual. This constitutional intent is

safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring

alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the



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constitutional intent is removed. The available alienable public lands are

gradually decreasing in the face of an ever-growing population. The

most effective way to insure faithful adherence to this constitutional

intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the public domain only to

individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical benefit arising from the

constitutional ban. (Chavez vs. PEA, supra)

However, in Natividad vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88233,

October 4, 1991, it is held:

“…open, continuous, adverse and publicpossession of a land of the public domain from timeimmemorial by a private individual personally andthrough his predecessors confers an effective titleon said possessor, whereby the land ceases to bepublic, to become private property.” In Director of

Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme Plywood

& Veener Co., Inc., 146 SCRA 509, this Court upheld the

doctrine that “open, exclusive and undisputedpossession of alienable land for the periodprescribed by law creates the legal fiction wherebythe land, upon completion of the requisite periodipso jure and without the need of judicial or othersanction, ceases to be public land and becomesprivate property.”

“Under the facts of this case and pursuant to the above

rulings, the parcels of land in question had already been

converted to private ownership through acquisitive

prescription by the predecessors-in-interest of TCMC when

the latter purchased them in 1979. All that was needed

was the confirmation of the titles of the previous owners or

predecessors-in-interest of TCMC. Being already private

land when TCMC bought them in 1979, the prohibition in

the 1973 Constitution against corporations acquiring

alienable lands of the public domain except through lease(Article XIV, Section 11, 1973 Constitution) did not apply

them for they were no longer alienable lands of the public

domain but private property.”



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Recent Jurisprudence for Readings

Philip Matthews vs. Benjamin and Joselyn Taylor, G.R. No.164584, June 22, 2009

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Court of Appeals (CA) December 19, 2003 Decision and July 14, 2004 Resolutionin CA-G.R. CV No. 59573. The assailed decision affirmed and upheld the June 30, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8,Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 4632 for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages.

On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), aBritish subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year oldFilipina. On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselynbought from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot (Boracayproperty) situated at Manoc-Manoc, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, forand in consideration of P129,000.00. The sale was allegedly financed byBenjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latter’s funds,constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted theproperty to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben BowInn. All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resortwere obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyn’s sister.

However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ranaway with Kim Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a SpecialPower of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter tomaintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contractwith third parties with respect to their Boracay property.

On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthewsas lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease (Agreement) involvingthe Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of P12,000.00. The agreement was signed by the parties and executedbefore a Notary Public. Petitioner thereafter took possession of theproperty and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort.

Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it wasentered into by Joselyn without his (Benjamin’s) consent, Benjamininstituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease withDamages against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that hisfunds were used in the acquisition and improvement of the Boracayproperty, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyn’s husband, anytransaction involving said property required his consent.

No Answer was filed, hence, the RTC declared Joselyn and thepetitioner in defeault. On March 14, 1994, the RTC rendered judgmentby default declaring the Agreement null and void. The decision was,however, set aside by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 34054. The CA alsoordered the RTC to allow the petitioner to file his Answer, and toconduct further proceedings.



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In his Answer, petitioner claimed good faith in transacting with Joselyn. Since Joselyn appeared to be the owner of the Boracayproperty, he found it unnecessary to obtain the consent of Benjamin.Moreover, as appearing in the Agreement, Benjamin signed as a witnessto the contract, indicating his knowledge of the transaction and,impliedly, his conformity to the agreement entered into by his wife.Benjamin was, therefore, estopped from questioning the validity of theAgreement.

There being no amicable settlement during the pre-trial, trial onthe merits ensued.

On June 30, 1997, the RTC disposed of the case in this manner:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment ishereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against thedefendants as follows:

1. The Agreement of Lease dated July 20, 1992consisting of eight (8) pages (Exhibits “T”, “T-1”,“T-2”, “T-3”, “T-4”, “T-5”, “T-6” and “T-7”) enteredinto by and between Joselyn C. Taylor and PhilipMatthews before Notary Public Lenito T. Serranounder Doc. No. 390, Page 79, Book I, Series of 1992is hereby declared NULL and VOID;

2. Defendants are hereby ordered, jointly and

severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of SIXTEEN THOUSAND (P16,000.00) PESOS as damagesrepresenting unrealized income for the residentialbuilding and cottages computed monthly from July1992 up to the time the property in question isrestored to plaintiff; and

3. Defendants are hereby ordered, jointly andseverally, to pay plaintiff the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS, PhilippineCurrency, for attorney’s fees and other incidentalexpenses.

SO ORDERED.

The RTC considered the Boracay property as community propertyof Benjamin and Joselyn; thus, the consent of the spouses wasnecessary to validate any contract involving the property. Benjamin’s

right over the Boracay property was bolstered by the court’s findingsthat the property was purchased and improved through funds providedby Benjamin. Although the Agreement was evidenced by a publicdocument, the trial court refused to consider the alleged participation of Benjamin in the questioned transaction primarily because his signatureappeared only on the last page of the document and not on every pagethereof.



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On appeal to the CA, petitioner still failed to obtain a favorabledecision. In its December 19, 2003 Decision, the CA affirmed theconclusions made by the RTC. The appellate court was of the view thatif, indeed, Benjamin was a willing participant in the questionedtransaction, the parties to the Agreement should have used the phrase“with my consent” instead of “signed in the presence of.” The CA notedthat Joselyn already prepared an SPA in favor of Benjamin involving theBoracay property; it was therefore unnecessary for Joselyn to participatein the execution of the Agreement. Taken together, thesecircumstances yielded the inevitable conclusion that the contract wasnull and void having been entered into by Joselyn without the consent of Benjamin.

Aggrieved, petitioner now comes before this Court in this petitionfor review on certiorari based on the following grounds:

4.1. THE MARITAL CONSENT OF RESPONDENTBENJAMIN TAYLOR IS NOT REQUIRED IN THE AGREEMENT OFLEASE DATED 20 JULY 1992. GRANTING ARGUENDO THATHIS CONSENT IS REQUIRED, BENJAMIN TAYLOR IS DEEMED TO HAVE GIVEN HIS CONSENT WHEN HE AFFIXED HISSIGNATURE IN THE AGREEMENT OF LEASE AS WITNESS IN THE LIGHT OF THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THECASE OF SPOUSES PELAYO VS. MELKI PEREZ, G.R. NO.141323, JUNE 8, 2005.

4.2. THE PARCEL OF LAND SUBJECT OF THEAGREEMENT OF LEASE IS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF JOCELYN C. TAYLOR, A FILIPINO CITIZEN, IN THE LIGHT OFCHEESMAN VS. IAC, G.R. NO. 74833, JANUARY 21, 1991.

4.3. THE COURTS A QUO ERRONEOUSLY APPLIEDARTICLE 96 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINESWHICH IS A PROVISION REFERRING TO THE ABSOLUTECOMMUNITY OF PROPERTY. THE PROPERTY REGIME

GOVERNING THE PROPERTY RELATIONS OF BENJAMIN TAYLOR AND JOSELYN TAYLOR IS THE CONJUGALPARTNERSHIP OF GAINS BECAUSE THEY WERE MARRIED ON30 JUNE 1988 WHICH IS PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVITY OF THEFAMILY CODE. ARTICLE 96 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THEPHILIPPINES FINDS NO APPLICATION IN THIS CASE.

4.4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE EXECUTION OFNOTARIAL DOCUMENTS.

4.5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TOPASS UPON THE COUNTERCLAIM OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS NOT CONTESTED AND DESPITE THEPRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING SAID CLAIM.

The petition is impressed with merit.



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In fine, we are called upon to determine the validity of anAgreement of Lease of a parcel of land entered into by a Filipino wifewithout the consent of her British husband. In addressing the matterbefore us, we are confronted not only with civil law or conflicts of lawissues, but more importantly, with a constitutional question.

It is undisputed that Joselyn acquired the Boracay property in1989. Said acquisition was evidenced by a Deed of Sale with Joselyn asthe vendee. The property was also declared for taxation purposesunder her name. When Joselyn leased the property to petitioner,Benjamin sought the nullification of the contract on two grounds: first ,that he was the actual owner of the property since he provided thefunds used in purchasing the same; and second , that Joselyn could notenter into a valid contract involving the subject property without hisconsent.

The trial and appellate courts both focused on the propertyrelations of petitioner and respondent in light of the Civil Code andFamily Code provisions. They, however, failed to observe the applicableconstitutional principles, which, in fact, are the more decisive.

Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no

private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except toindividuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquireor hold lands of the public domain.

Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualifiedfrom acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, by virtue of theaforecited constitutional provision, they are also disqualified fromacquiring private lands. The primary purpose of this constitutionalprovision is the conservation of the national patrimony. Ourfundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire lands of the public domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations at

least sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos. In Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, cited in Muller v. Muller, we had

the occasion to explain the constitutional prohibition:

Under Section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution,“natural resources, with the exception of public agriculturalland, shall not be alienated,” and with respect to publicagricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipinocitizens. But this constitutional purpose conservingagricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may

easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves whomay alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It ispartly to prevent this result that Section 5 is included inArticle XIII, and it reads as follows:

“Section 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no

private agricultural land will be transferred or assignedexcept to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified



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to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in thePhilippines.”

This constitutional provision closes the only remainingavenue through which agricultural resources may leak intoalien’s hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit thealienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all,they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming privateagricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. x x x

x x x x If the term “private agricultural lands” is to be

construed as not including residential lots or lands notstrictly agricultural, the result would be that “aliens mayfreely acquire and possess not only residential lots andhouses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and wholetowns and cities,” and that “they may validly buy and holdin their names lands of any area for building homes,factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools,health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses,playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses andpurposes that are not, in appellant’s words, strictlyagricultural.” (Solicitor General’s Brief, p. 6) That this isobnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution isbeyond question.

The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowedto acquire public or private lands in the Philippines, save only inconstitutionally recognized exceptions. There is no rule more settledthan this constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt tocircumvent the provision by trying to own lands through another. In along line of cases, we have settled issues that directly or indirectlyinvolve the above constitutional provision. We had cases where alienswanted that a particular property be declared as part of their father’sestate; that they be reimbursed the funds used in purchasing a property

titled in the name of another; that an implied trust be declared in their(aliens’) favor; and that a contract of sale be nullified for their lack of consent.

In Ting Ho, Jr. v. Teng Gui, Felix Ting Ho, a Chinese citizen,acquired a parcel of land, together with the improvements thereon.Upon his death, his heirs (the petitioners therein) claimed the propertiesas part of the estate of their deceased father, and sought the partitionof said properties among themselves. We, however, excluded the landand improvements thereon from the estate of Felix Ting Ho, preciselybecause he never became the owner thereof in light of the above-

mentioned constitutional prohibition. In Muller v. Muller , petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and

respondent Helmut Muller were married in Germany. During thesubsistence of their marriage, respondent purchased a parcel of land inAntipolo City and constructed a house thereon. The Antipolo propertywas registered in the name of the petitioner. They eventuallyseparated, prompting the respondent to file a petition for separation of



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property. Specifically, respondent prayed for reimbursement of thefunds he paid for the acquisition of said property. In deciding the casein favor of the petitioner, the Court held that respondent was aware thatas an alien, he was prohibited from owning a parcel of land situated inthe Philippines. He had, in fact, declared that when the spousesacquired the Antipolo property, he had it titled in the name of thepetitioner because of said prohibition. Hence, we denied his attempt atsubsequently asserting a right to the said property in the form of a claimfor reimbursement. Neither did the Court declare that an implied trustwas created by operation of law in view of petitioner’s marriage torespondent. We said that to rule otherwise would permit circumventionof the constitutional prohibition.

In Frenzel v. Catito, petitioner, an Australian citizen, was marriedto Teresita Santos; while respondent, a Filipina, was married to KlausMuller. Petitioner and respondent met and later cohabited in acommon-law relationship, during which petitioner acquired realproperties; and since he was disqualified from owning lands in thePhilippines, respondent’s name appeared as the vendee in the deeds of sale. When their relationship turned sour, petitioner filed an action forthe recovery of the real properties registered in the name of respondent, claiming that he was the real owner. Again, as in the othercases, the Court refused to declare petitioner as the owner mainlybecause of the constitutional prohibition. The Court added that being aparty to an illegal contract, he could not come to court and ask to havehis illegal objective carried out. One who loses his money or propertyby knowingly engaging in an illegal contract may not maintain an actionfor his losses.

Finally, in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court, petitioner(an American citizen) and Criselda Cheesman acquired a parcel of landthat was later registered in the latter’s name. Criselda subsequentlysold the land to a third person without the knowledge of the petitioner. The petitioner then sought the nullification of the sale as he did not givehis consent thereto. The Court held that assuming that it was his

(petitioner’s) intention that the lot in question be purchased by him andhis wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land,vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution;thus, the sale as to him was null and void.

In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, we find and so hold thatBenjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselynand petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited fromacquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated “vendee” in the Deed of Sale of

said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamin’s claim that he provided the funds for suchacquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, noimplied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for hisexpenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that thesubject property was part of the conjugal/community property of thespouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality toquestion the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on



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the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theorywould countenance indirect controversion of the constitutionalprohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this wouldaccord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land,as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.

In fine, the Agreement of Lease entered into between Joselyn andpetitioner cannot be nullified on the grounds advanced by Benjamin. Thus, we uphold its validity.

With the foregoing disquisition, we find it unnecessary to addressthe other issues raised by the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the December 19, 2003Decision and July 14, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 59573, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one isentered DISMISSING the complaint against petitioner Philip Matthews.

SO ORDERED.

THE SECRETARY OF THE G.R. No. 167707

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAND NATURAL RESOURCES, THEREGIONAL EXECUTIVE Present:DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI,REGIONAL TECHNICAL PUNO, C.J.,DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, QUISUMBING,LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, YNARES-SANTIAGO, REGION VI PROVINCIAL CARPIO,ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, CORONA,*AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, CARPIO MORALES,

DIRECTOR OF LAND AZCUNA,REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, TINGA,DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM CHICO-NAZARIO,SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF VELASCO, JR.,PHILIPPINE TOURISM NACHURA,**AUTHORITY, REYES, Petitioners, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and

BRION, JJ.

- versus -

MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTADTALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, andANICETO YAP, in their behalf and Promulgated:in behalf of all those similarly situated,

Respondents. October 8, 2008

http://g/MSU-IIT%20College%20of%20Law/Natural%20Resources%20Law/NatRes%20Files/Jurisprudence/Boracay%20Lands.htm#_ftn1






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x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x DR. ORLANDO SACAY and G.R. No. 173775WILFREDO GELITO, joined byTHE LANDOWNERS OFBORACAY SIMILARLY SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST,ANNEX “A” OF THIS PETITION, Petitioners,

- versus -

THE SECRETARY OF THEDEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAND NATURAL RESOURCES, THEREGIONAL TECHNICALDIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDSMANAGEMENT BUREAU,REGION VI, PROVINCIALENVIRONMENT AND NATURALRESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,AKLAN,

Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N REYES, R.T., J.:

AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present

occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands.

There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707,a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals(CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan,which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay fortitling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition forprohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay intoreserved forest and agricultural land.

The Antecedents G.R. No. 167707

Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with itspowdery white sand beaches and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly apremier Philippine tourist destination. The island is also home to 12,003inhabitants who live in the bone-shaped island’s three barangays.



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On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources (DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey of BoracayIsland, which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed bynamed persons.

On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issuedProclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands,caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marinereserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority(PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants



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Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, andAniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo,Aklan.

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that ProclamationNo. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right tosecure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that theythemselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation inBoracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. Theydeclared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.

Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and itsimplementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptibleof private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA)No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right tohave the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered thatBoracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. Itformed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which wasnot available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of PresidentialDecree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code, as amended.

The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on PDNo. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No.705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable anddisposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.

During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated onthe following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently in

possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of landwere planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) thecoconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and wereplanted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimantsdeclared the land they were occupying for tax purposes.

The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution waspurely legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindranceor impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided toforego with the trial and to submit the case for resolution uponsubmission of their respective memoranda.

The RTC took judicial notice that certain parcels of land in BoracayIsland, more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered byOriginal Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of theHeirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos.5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan. The titles wereissued onAugust 7, 1933.



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RTC and CA Dispositions

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with a fallo reading:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Courtdeclares that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and thosesimilarly situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, inaccordance with the applicable laws and in the mannerprescribed therein; and to have their lands surveyed andapproved by respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself constitute atitle to the land.

SO ORDERED.

The RTC upheld respondents-claimants’ right to have their

occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that neither ProclamationNo. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracaywere inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition. The Circularitself recognized private ownership of lands. The trial court citedSections 87 and 53 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledgingprivate ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested areasin public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic then appealed to the CA.

On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto theRTC decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal

filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lowercourt.

The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudicedby a declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorialwere part of a forest reserve.

Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.

G.R. No. 173775 On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707,

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reservedforest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on



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each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-wayand which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protectionpurposes.

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,Wilfredo Gelito, and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court anoriginal petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation infringed ontheir “prior vested rights” over portions of Boracay. They have been incontinued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since timeimmemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developingtheir lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts ontheir lots.

Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for aproclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Beingclassified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemedagricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926,known as the first Public Land Act. Thus, their possession in theconcept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicialconfirmation of imperfect title.

Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimantsdo not have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island.Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island areinalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts,which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain intoalienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positivegovernment act in order to release the lots for disposition.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they principally involve the same issues on the landclassification of Boracay Island.

Issues G.R. No. 167707

The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, andall those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands inBoracay Island.

G.R. No. 173775

Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:



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I.

AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OFPETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIRRESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIALOR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997,WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLICAGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLICFOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?

II.

HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTEDRIGHT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIEDPORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATIONOF IMPERFECT TITLE?

III.

IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS ASALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN]INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TOOBTAIN TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?

IV.

IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22,2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATEOWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS INBORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.

V.

CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TOALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANSFOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THELANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY? (Underscoringsupplied)

In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants

(respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants inG.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupiedportions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws.

Our Ruling



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Regalian Doctrine and power of the executiveto reclassify lands of the public domain

Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their

bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Billof 1902 in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or superseded byAct No. 2874 and CA No. 141; (b) Proclamation No. 1801 issued by thenPresident Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 1064 issued by PresidentGloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their rights toapply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws andexecutive acts.

But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of theexecutive to reclassify lands of the public domain.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain intoagricultural, forest or timber. Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitutionprovided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial,residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands,and such other classes as may be provided by law, giving thegovernment great leeway for classification. Then the 1987 Constitutionreverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition:national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island hadnever been expressly and administratively classified under any of thesegrand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domainbelong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right toownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and1987 Constitutions.

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within privateownership are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands thathave not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or bygrant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the publicdomain will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, asthe agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the personain law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands,as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, notexcluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of whatotherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.

Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine.Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands,territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the SpanishCrown. The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippinesthrough the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid thefoundation that “all lands that were not acquired from the Government,either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.”



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The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the

Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for thesystematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims.

The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law partly amended theSpanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It establishedpossessory information as the method of legalizing possession of vacantCrown land, under certain conditions which were set forth in saiddecree. Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoriaor possessory information title, when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual,public, and adverse, from the date of its inscription. However,possessory information title had to be perfected one year after thepromulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, thelands would revert to the State.

In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime couldonly be founded on royal concessions which took various forms,namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or specialgrant; (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulode compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria orpossessory information title.

The first law governing the disposition of public lands in thePhilippines under American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902. By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islandswere classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural,mineral, and timber or forest lands. The act provided for, among others,the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant (freeholdsystem) and by lease (leasehold system). It also provided the definitionby exclusion of “agricultural public lands.” Interpreting the meaning of “agricultural lands” under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declaredin Mapa v. Insular Government :

x x x In other words, that the phrase “agriculturalland” as used in Act No. 926 means those public landsacquired from Spain which are not timber or minerallands. x x x (Emphasis Ours)

On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No.

496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The act establisheda system of registration by which recorded title becomes absolute,indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system.

Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commissionpassed Act No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act. The Actintroduced the homestead system and made provisions for judicial andadministrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or leaseof public lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of thepublic domain. Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and



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notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the nextten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicialconfirmation of imperfect title.

On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No.2874, otherwise known as the second Public Land Act. This new, morecomprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands toFilipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gaveFilipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title,possession and occupation en concepto dueño since time immemorial,or since July 26, 1894, was required.

After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amendedAct No. 2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, asamended, remains as the existing general law governing theclassification and disposition of lands of the public domain other thantimber and mineral lands, and privately owned lands which reverted tothe State.

Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under ActNo. 2874 of possession and occupation of lands of the public domainsince time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this provisionwas superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942, which provided for asimple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073, whichnow provides for possession and occupation of the land applied forsince June 12, 1945, or earlier.

The issuance of PD No. 892 on February 16, 1976 discontinuedthe use of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings.Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply forregistration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months fromthe effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, therecording of all unregistered lands shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.

On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PDNo. 1529, known as the Property Registration Decree. It was enactedto codify the various laws relative to registration of property. It governsregistration of lands under the Torrens system as well as unregisteredlands, including chattel mortgages.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable isrequired . In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, theCourt has time and again emphasized that there must be a positiveact of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying

inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or otherpurposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposablelands only to those lands which have been “officially delimited andclassified.”

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of Stateownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applyingfor registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land



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subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome thispresumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that theland subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain asalienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of anapplication for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish theexistence of a positive act of the government such as a presidentialproclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislativeact or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from thegovernment that the land claimed to have been possessed for therequired number of years is alienable and disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented tothe Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants weresubject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable anddisposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Courtcannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimantswere already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of landclassification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.

Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it, agricultural lands. Private claimants positthat Boracay was already an agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands (1919) and De Aldecoav. The Insular Government (1909). These cases were decided under theprovisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is astatement in these old cases that “in the absence of evidence to thecontrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until thecontrary is shown.”

Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa ismisplaced. These cases did not have the effect of converting the whole

of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It should bestressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merelyprovided the manner through which land registration courts wouldclassify lands of the public domain. Whether the land would beclassified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.

Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when thePresident of the Philippines had no power to classify lands of the publicdomain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courtswere free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or

were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon thepreponderance of the evidence. This was the Court’s ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. DePalanca v. Republic, in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna,viz.:

x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular

land need not be formally released by an act of the



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Executive before it can be deemed open to privateownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of Landsand Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.

x x x x

Petitioner’s reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands

and Ankron v. Government is misplaced. These cases weredecided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first PublicLand Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission onOctober 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provisionvesting in the Chief Executive or President of the Philippinesthe power to classify lands of the public domain intomineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts then werefree to make corresponding classifications in justiciablecases, or were vested with implicit power to do so,depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.

To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No.

926, it was then necessary to devise a presumption on landclassification. Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron that “the courts havea right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that ineach case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown.”

But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument that all lands of the public domain had beenautomatically reclassified as disposable and alienable agricultural lands.By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all lands of the public domain into agricultural lands.

If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would have automatically made all lands in thePhilippines, except those already classified as timber or mineral land,alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and

totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine. The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land

registration cases brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or morespecifically those cases dealing with judicial and administrativeconfirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to anapplicant for judicial or administrative conformation of imperfect titleunder Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such asprivate claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to availthemselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their landremained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued

to be owned by the State. In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not

absolute. Land classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for non-agriculturaluses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despitethe presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:



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In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra),the Attorney-General admitted in effect that whether theparticular land in question belongs to one class or another isa question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land hastrees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficientto declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineralland. There must be some proof of the extent and presentor future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, aswe have just said, many definitions have been given for“agriculture,” “forestry,” and “mineral” lands, and that ineach case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to saythat in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof mustshow that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineralwhich it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7,Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there existssome trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral.Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, byreason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, beclassified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, byreason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural today maybe differently classified tomorrow. Each case must bedecided upon the proof in that particular case, havingregard for its present or future value for one or theother purposes. We believe, however, considering thefact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands thatthe courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands areagricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whateverthe land involved in a particular land registrationcase is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be amatter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose orthe other is a question of fact to be settled by theproof in each particular case. The fact that the land is a

manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courtsto decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land.It may perchance belong to one or the other of said classesof land. The Government, in the first instance, under theprovisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide foritself what portions of public land shall be consideredforestry land, unless private interests have intervenedbefore such reservation is made. In the latter case, whetherthe land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have intervened, theGovernment, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148),

may decide for itself what portions of the “public domain”shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land.(Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs.Director of Forestry, supra) (Emphasis ours)

Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the

classification of lands from the facts of each case, except those thathave already became private lands. Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919



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and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the ExecutiveDepartment, through the President, the exclusive prerogative toclassify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral orforest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whetherexpress or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the publicdomain.

Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who wereissued their title in 1933, did not present a justiciable case fordetermination by the land registration court of the property’s landclassification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts thento resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming wereagricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been filedby private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts wereno longer authorized to determine the property’s land classification.Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.

We note that the RTC decision in G.R. No. 167707 mentionedKrivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila, which was decided in 1947when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole power to classifylands of the public domain was already in effect. Krivenko cited the oldcases Mapa v. Insular Government , De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government , and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.

Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved atotally different issue. The pertinent issue in Krivenko was whetherresidential lots were included in the general classification of agriculturallands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. ThisCourt ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935Constitution from acquiring agricultural land, which included residentiallots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domainare automatically deemed agricultural.

Notably, the definition of “agricultural public lands” mentioned in

Krivenko relied on the old cases decided prior to the enactment of ActNo. 2874, including Ankron and De Aldecoa. As We have already stated,those cases cannot apply here, since they were decided when theExecutive did not have the authority to classify lands as agricultural,timber, or mineral.

Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926does not create a presumption that the land is alienable. Privateclaimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No.926 ipso facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they

may apply for a title in their name. A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado

v. Court of Appeals. Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and NaturalResources,107-a ruled:







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“Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, waspassed in pursuance of the provisions of thePhilippine Bill of 1902. The law governed thedisposition of lands of the public domain. Itprescribed rules and regulations for thehomesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, andprescribed the terms and conditions to enablepersons to perfect their titles to public lands inthe Islands. It also provided for the “issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon publiclands,” for the establishment of town sites andsale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation orconfirmation of Spanish concessions and grantsin the Islands.” In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to publiclands in the Philippine Islands remained in thegovernment; and that the government’s title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The term “public land”referred to all lands of the public domain whosetitle still remained in the government and arethrown open to private appropriation andsettlement, and excluded the patrimonialproperty of the government and the friar lands.”

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue thatunder the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land ActNo. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the landsare alienable and disposable. (Emphasis Ours)

Except for lands already covered by existing titles,

Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior toProclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705. The DENR and the NationalMapping and Resource Information Authority certify that Boracay Islandis an unclassified land of the public domain.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassifiedlands of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705defines a public forest as “a mass of lands of the public domain whichhas not been the subject of the present system of classification for thedetermination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which

are not.” Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those inBoracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705,however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.

The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest landunder PD No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the present realitiesin the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forestcover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a premier



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tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears moreof a commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.

Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on the island; that the island has alreadybeen stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the island’s tourism industry, do notnegate its character as public forest.

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and theConstitution classifying lands of the public domain into “agricultural,forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks,” do not necessarilyrefer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by densegrowths of trees and underbrushes. The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry is particularly instructive:

A forested area classified as forest land of the publicdomain does not lose such classification simply becauseloggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually becovered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivatorsor other farmers. “Forest lands” do not have to be onmountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areascovered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other treesgrowing in brackish or sea water may also be classified asforest land. The classification is descriptive of its legalnature or status and does not have to be descriptiveof what the land actually looks like. Unless and untilthe land classified as “forest” is released in an officialproclamation to that effect so that it may form part of thedisposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the ruleson confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. (Emphasissupplied)

There is a big difference between “forest” as defined in a

dictionary and “forest or timber land” as a classification of lands of thepublic domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of whatappears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification forlegal purposes. At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legalstatus of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence,even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurantsand other commercial establishments, it has not been automaticallyconverted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.

Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 asbasis for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The

proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural land .However, private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued bythen President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay, among otherislands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a touristspot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.



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Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convertthe whole of Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing in thelaw or the Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. Thereference in Circular No. 3-82 to “private lands” and “areas declared asalienable and disposable” does not by itself classify the entire island asagricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only toprivate lands and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII,Section 3 provides:

No trees in forested private lands may be cut withoutprior authority from the PTA. All forested areas in publiclands are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public

lands merely recognizes that the island can be classified by theExecutive department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact,Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of ForestDevelopment’s authority to declare areas in the island as alienable anddisposable when it provides:

Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienableand disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development.

Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive

act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land.If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable anddisposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limitsof each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was notdone in Proclamation No. 1801.

The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain therationale behind the declaration of Boracay Island, together with otherislands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone andmarine reserve to be administered by the PTA – to ensure theconcentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the

development of the areas’ tourism potential with due regard forecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, theproclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism andecological purposes. It does not address the areas’ alienability.

More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only BoracayIsland, but sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in thePhilippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galerain Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, CoronIsland, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan, CamiguinIsland in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the

designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable anddisposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areasmentioned would likewise be declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of theproclamation.

It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable and opened the same to



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private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141 provide that it isonly the President, upon the recommendation of the proper departmenthead, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domaininto alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands.

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights.Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of theExecutive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts haveno authority to do so. Absent such classification, the land remainsunclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.

Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. TheProclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each sideof the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of wayand which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protectionpurposes.

Contrary to private claimants’ argument, there was nothinginvalid or irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the classificationof Boracay Island made by the President through Proclamation No.1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject toexisting vested rights.

Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate theComprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private claimants furtherassert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of theComprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barringconversion of public forests into agricultural lands. They claim thatsince Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo canno longer convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:

SEC. 4. Scope. – The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform

Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangementand commodity produced, all public and private agriculturallands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and ExecutiveOrder No. 229, including other lands of the public domainsuitable for agriculture.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by

the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program: (a) All alienable and disposable lands of the

public domain devoted to or suitable for

agriculture. No reclassification of forest ormineral lands to agricultural lands shall beundertaken after the approval of this Actuntil Congress, taking into accountecological, developmental and equityconsiderations, shall have determined bylaw, the specific limits of the public domain.



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That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No.705 did not bar the Executive from later converting it into agriculturalland. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of the publicdomain despite PD No. 705.

In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and SoterraneaRafols v. Republic, the Court stated that unclassified lands are publicforests.

While it is true that the land classification mapdoes not categorically state that the islands arepublic forests, the fact that they were unclassifiedlands leads to the same result. In the absence of theclassification as mineral or timber land, the land remainsunclassified land until released and rendered open todisposition. (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a

“reclassification” of land. If the land had never been previouslyclassified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibitedreclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the Department of Justice on this point:

Indeed, the key word to the correct application of theprohibition in Section 4(a) is the word “reclassification.”Where there has been no previous classification of publicforest [referring, we repeat, to the mass of the publicdomain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for purposes of determining whichare needed for forest purposes and which are not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no“reclassification of forest lands” to speak of within themeaning of Section 4(a).

Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of theCARL against the reclassification of forest lands toagricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to thoselands of the public domain, denominated as “public forest”under the Revised Forestry Code, which have not beenpreviously determined, or classified, as needed for forestpurposes in accordance with the provisions of the RevisedForestry Code.

Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither dothey have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect orincomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous,exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject landby himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fideclaim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and



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(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of thepublic domain.

As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, andProclamation No. 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay Island into anagricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of the publicdomain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered Stateproperty.

Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title,relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No.1801, must fail because of the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grantunder our present Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessedand applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is clear fromthe wording of the law itself. Where the land is not alienable anddisposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot conferownership or possessory rights.

Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those landswhich were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed toprove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notoriouspossession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.

We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition fordeclaratory relief that private claimants complied with the requisiteperiod of possession.

The tax declarations in the name of private claimants areinsufficient to prove the first element of possession. We note that theearliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants wereissued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are notsufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession andoccupation commenced on June 12, 1945.

Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay,having been in possession of the island for a long time. They haveinvested millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and investments give them avested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No.1064.

The continued possession and considerable investment of privateclaimants do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nordo these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are

presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to decidecases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As thelaw and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply fora judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracayeven with their continued possession and considerable investment inthe island.



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One Last Note

The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested forthe development of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local andinternational tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a numberof years, thousands of people have called the island their home. Whilethe Court commiserates with private claimants’ plight, We are bound toapply the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it shouldprevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral .

All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may notbe eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title underSection 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote theirautomatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas theypossess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.

For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faithas builders of improvements. They can take steps to preserve orprotect their possession. For another, they may look into other modesof applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead orsales patent, subject to the conditions imposed by law.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle privateclaimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them fromcertain requirements under the present land laws. There is one such billnow pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill or asimilar bill will become a law is for Congress to decide.

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken thestep necessary to open up the island to private ownership. This gesturemay not be sufficient to appease some sectors which view theclassification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That

the island is no longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud thevision to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthybalance between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is asimportant as economic progress.

To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nation’s survival. Their promotion and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politiciansand activists. These are needs that become more urgent as destructionof our environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptlyobserved by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v.Munoz :

The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but inadherence to public policy that should be followed withrespect to forest lands. Many have written much, and manymore have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing needfor forest preservation, conservation, protection,development and reforestation. Not without justification.For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's



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natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now thatabsence of the necessary green cover on our landsproduces a number of adverse or ill effects of seriousproportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; riversand lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. Aswaterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants.With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geologicalerosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods thatwreak havoc and destruction to property – crops, livestock,houses, and highways – not to mention precious humanlives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be writtendown in a lumberman’s decalogue.

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED andthe Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED ANDSET ASIDE.

2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED forlack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 157306Petitioner,

Present:

Panganiban, J.,

Chairman,- versus - Sandoval-Gutierrez,Corona,Carpio Morales, andGarcia, JJ

ANATALIA ACTUB TIU ESTONILOand ANDREA ACTUB TIU PO Promulgated:(in Substitution of NAZARIA BOMBEO), November 25, 2005

Respondents. _______________x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:



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To segregate portions of the public domain as reservations for the useof the Republic of the Philippines or any of its branches, like the ArmedForces of the Philippines, all that is needed is a presidentialproclamation to that effect. A court judgment is not necessary to makethe proclamation effective or valid. The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the February 21, 2003Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 66807. Theassailed CA Decision disposed as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, theruling of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.”[3]

The Facts

The antecedents were summarized by the CA as follows: “This case originated from an application for

registration of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 4318 of thecadastral survey of Cagayan de Oro consisting [of] an area of 357,866 square meters, filed by [the] original [a]pplicant,Nazaria Bombeo with the defunct Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental on July 22, 1954. In her application,Bombeo claimed that said parcel of land was previouslyowned and possessed by a certain Rosendo Bacas since1894 until it was sold to her by the heirs of Rosendo Bacas,represented by their attorney-in-fact and heir himself,Calistro Bacas by virtue of an Absolute Sale of Realty (Exhibit‘A’) on June 14, 1954.

“After due notice and publication of said application,

only the Provincial Fiscal of Misamis Oriental, in behalf of theChief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines [AFP]and the Director of [the] Bureau of Land[s] filed itsopposition thereto, alleging that Lot 4318 is not a registrableland pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 265, whichtook effect on March 31, 1938, and which declared Lot 4318reserved for the use of the Philippine Army, to wit:

‘PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 265.RESERVING FOR THE USE OF THE PHILIPPINEARMY THREE PARCELS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

SITUATED IN THE BARRIOS OF BULUA ANDCARMEN, MUNICIPALITY OF CAGAYAN,PROVINCE OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, ISLAND OFMINDANAO.

Upon the recommendation of the

Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce andpursuant to the provision of section eighty-three

http://g/MSU-IIT%20College%20of%20Law/Natural%20Resources%20Law/NatRes%20Files/Jurisprudence/Proclamation%20Segregation%20of%20Public%20Lands.htm#_ftn1








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of Commonwealth Act Number One Hundredand Forty-one, I hereby withdraw from sale of settlement and reserve for the use of thePhilippine Army, under the administration of theChief of Staff subject to private rights, if anythereby, the following described parcels of public domain, situated in the barrios of Buluaand Carmen, Municipality of Cagayan, Provinceof Misamis Oriental, Island of Mindanao, andparticularly described in Bureau of Lands SWO-15234, to wit:

Lot No. 4318. – x x x.

Containing an area of 354,377 square meters.’ “During the initial hearing set on February 12, 1955, an

Order of General Default was issued by the lower court. On July 29, 1959, Bombeo died and was substituted by herdaughter Cipriana Actub Tiu who eventually died onDecember 5, 1990. Thereafter, due to intervening deaths of the parties, the case literally went to slumber until it was re-raffled to the Regional Trial Court (Branch 17) of MisamisOriental on October 16, 1991 and was pursued anew by thedaughters of Cipriana Actub Tiu, namely, Anatalia Actub TiuEstonilo and Andrea Actub Tiu Po. On the other hand,Oppositors Bureau of Lands and Chief of Staff of the ArmedForces of the Philippines, in behalf of the Republic of thePhilippines; were represented by the Provincial ProsecutorFlorencia Abbu and Major Raul Llacuna of JAGO [JudgeAdvocate General’s Office]. On May 27, 1994, the trial courtconfirmed title over Lot 4318 to Nazaria Bombeo substitutedby her heirs Anatalia Actub Tiu Estonilo and Andrea Actub TiuPo and ordered registration thereof under the names of thelatter. Consequently, Oppositors Bureau of Lands and Chief

of Staff of Armed Forces of the Philippines, through theSolicitor General’s Office; filed an appeal to said decision x xx.

“During the pendency of the appeal, however,

Presidential Proclamation No. 330[4] took effect on June 20,2000, excluding Lot 4318 from the operation of PresidentialProclamation No. 265[.]

x x x x x x x x x

“In view of the aforesaid decree, x x x [respondentsurged the CA] to finally put to rest the controversy in theirfavor considering that the opposition of the Republic has nolonger any basis.”[5]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals







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The Court of Appeals ruled that Presidential Proclamation No. 265(Proc 265) failed to segregate effectively Lot 4318 as part of the militaryreservation. The CA said that the proclamation was “not self-executoryand self-adjudicating considering that there is a need to determineprivate rights of claimants over lands sought to be reserved.”

Moreover, the appellate court agreed with the trial court thatrespondents were able to establish with sufficient evidence their right tohave the land registered under their names. It acknowledged thatpossession by respondents’ predecessors-in-interest had ripened into animperfect title of ownership, subject to judicial confirmation. It addedthat ownership of the land would still be deemed vested in respondents,“in view of their almost half a century of open, continuous, adverse andpeaceful possession,” even if possession by their predecessors-in-interest were not taken into consideration.

Hence, this Petition.[6]

Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

“I. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holdingthat Presidential Proclamation No. 265 did not effectivelysegregate Lot 4318 from the public domain.

“II. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in findingthat respondents were able to establish that they havealready acquired private right over Lot 4318 which alreadyamounted to a title.

“III. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holdingthat the passage of Presidential Proclamation No. 330 whichexcludes from the operation of Presidential Proclamation No.265 Lot 4318 negates the claim of the AFP that the land indispute is actively possessed and used by it.”[7] In short, the main issue is whether respondents have duly proven

their title to the subject land and may thus register it under the Public

Land Act.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.







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Main Issue:

Validity of Respondents’ Title

The Public Land Act[8] requires applicants for confirmation of imperfect titles to prove (1) that the land is alienable public land;[9] and(2) that their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession andoccupation of the property has taken place either since timeimmemorial or for the period prescribed by law. When the legalconditions are complied with, the possessor of the land -- by operationof law -- acquires a right to a government grant, without necessitatingthe issuance of a certificate of title.[10]

After a meticulous review of the Decisions of both the trial and theappellate courts, as well as of the evidence on record, the Court findsthat respondents failed to satisfy the above legal requirements.

Nature of Lot 4318

It is not disputed that Proc 265 specifically reserved Lot 4318 forthe use of the Philippine Army. Respondents maintain, though, that theland was not effectively segregated as a military reservation by theProclamation. Relying on Baloy v. CA,[11] they allege that a petition forreservation or a court judgment declaring the reservation is necessaryto make Proc 265 effective. They maintain that the provision in theProclamation subjecting the reservation to private rights presumes thatnotice and hearing will be afforded to all persons claiming ownershiprights over the land. Otherwise, the reservation would amount to adeprivation of property without due process of law. They further allegethat the AFP failed to observe these requirements, thus causing thereservation to be ineffectual.

Petitioner, however, argues that the Public Land Act does notrequire a judicial order to create a military reservation. It contends thatthe proviso requiring the reservation to be subject to private rightsmeans that persons claiming rights over the reserved land are notprecluded from proving their claims. It contends further thatrespondents were afforded due process when their application forregistration of title to Lot 4318 was heard by the lower courts.

We agree with petitioner. The segregation of land for a publicpurpose is governed by the Public Land Act, the pertinent provisions of

which are as follows:

“SECTION 83. Upon the recommendation of theSecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, thePresident may designate by proclamation any tract or tractsof land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic of the Philippines or of any of its branches, orof the inhabitants thereof, in accordance with regulations











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prescribed for this purposes, or for quasi-public uses orpurposes when the public interest requires it, includingreservations for highways, rights of way for railroads,hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems, communalpastures or leguas comunales, public parks, public quarries,public fishponds, workingmen's village and otherimprovements for the public benefit.”

“SECTION 86. A certified copy of everyproclamation of the President issued under the provisions of this title shall be forwarded to the Director of Lands forrecord in his office, and a copy of this record shall beforwarded to the Register of Deeds of the province or citywhere the land lies. Upon receipt of such certified copy, theDirector of Lands shall order the immediate survey of theproposed reservation if the land has not yet been surveyed,and as soon as the plat has been completed, he shallproceed in accordance with the next following section.”

“SECTION 87. If all the lands included in the

proclamation of the President are not registered under theLand Registration Act, the Solicitor General, if requested todo so by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,shall proceed in accordance with the provision of Sectionfifty-three of this Act.”

“SECTION 53. It shall be lawful for the Director of

Lands, whenever in the opinion of the President the publicinterests shall require it, to cause to be filed in the properCourt of First Instance, through the Solicitor General or theofficer acting in his stead, a petition against the holder,claimant, possessor, or occupant of any land who shall nothave voluntarily come in under the provisions of this chapteror of the Land Registration Act, stating in substance that thetitle of such holder, claimant, possessor, or occupant is opento discussion; or that the boundaries of any such land which

has not been brought into court as aforesaid are open toquestion; or that it is advisable that the title to such landsbe settled and adjudicated, and praying that the title to anysuch land or the boundaries thereof or the right tooccupancy thereof be settled and adjudicated. The judicialproceedings under this section shall be in accordance withthe laws on adjudication of title in cadastral proceedings.”

Clearly, under the above provisions, only a positive act of thePresident is needed to segregate a piece of land for a public purpose. It

must be noted that while Section 53 grants authority to the director of lands -- through the solicitor general -- to file a petition againstclaimants of the reserved land, the filing of that petition is notmandatory. The director of lands is required to file a petition only“whenever in the opinion of the President public interest requires it.”

Inapplicable is the ruling in Baloy v. CA[12] requiring, after duenotice and hearing, a judicial declaration of reservation. The subject of





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the application for registration in Baloy was originally private land, asevidenced by a possessory information title issued in the applicants’favor during the Spanish era. As will be explained shortly, Lot 4318 inthe present case is unquestionably public land. The only issue iswhether respondents have acquired title to the property.

Moreover, the governing law in Baloy was Act 627.[13] Under theprovisions of that law, the private character of the land shall berespected absent any court order declaring that the property hasbecome public. In the case before us, Proc 265 was issued pursuant toCommonwealth Act (CA) No. 141. Accordingly, only a positive act of thePresident is required to create a government reservation.

Verily, the Proclamation successfully segregated Lot 4318 as amilitary reservation. Consequently, respondents could not have validlyoccupied it in 1954, because it was considered inalienable[14] since itsreservation in 1938.

Respondents’ Period of Possession

Notwithstanding the reservation in 1938 of Lot 4318 for militaryuse, respondents maintain their entitlement to have it registered undertheir names. They allege that their predecessors-in-interest werealready in adverse, open, peaceful and continuous possession of theproperty for over 30 years prior to 1938. Thus, they conclude that theirimperfect title had already attached long before the issuance of theProclamation segregating the land as a military reservation.

We are not convinced. As a rule, the factual findings of the trialcourt, when affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive and bindingon this Court. To this rule, however, there are settled exceptions; forinstance, when the judgment assailed is not supported by sufficientevidence or is based on a misapprehension of facts.[15] We find thatthese exceptions apply here.

Land that has not been acquired from the government, either bypurchase or by grant, belongs to the State as part of the public domain.[16] For this reason, imperfect titles to agricultural lands are subjectedto rigorous scrutiny before judicial confirmation is granted.[17] In thesame manner, persons claiming the protection of “private rights” inorder to exclude their lands from military reservations must show byclear and convincing evidence that the pieces of property in questionhave been acquired by a legal method of acquiring public lands.[18]

In granting respondents judicial confirmation of their imperfecttitle, the trial and the appellate courts gave much weight to the tax

declarations presented by the former. However, while the taxdeclarations were issued under the names of respondents’predecessors-in-interest, the earliest one presented was issued only in1954.[19] The Director, Lands Management Bureau v. CA[20] held thus:

“x x x. Tax receipts and tax declarations are not

incontrovertible evidence of ownership. They are mere



















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indicia of [a] claim of ownership. In Director of Lands vs.Santiago:

‘x x x [I]f it is true that the original owner

and possessor, Generosa Santiago, had been inpossession since 1925, why were the subjectlands declared for taxation purposes for the firsttime only in 1968, and in the names of Garciaand Obdin? For although tax receipts anddeclarations of ownership for taxation purposesare not incontrovertible evidence of ownership,they constitute at least proof that the holder hada claim of title over the property.’”[21]

In addition, the lower courts credited the alleged prior possession

by Calixto and Rosendo Bacas, from whom respondents’ predecessorshad purportedly bought the property. This alleged prior possession,though, was totally devoid of any supporting evidence on record.Respondents’ evidence hardly supported the conclusion that theirpredecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since “timeimmemorial.”

Moreover, as correctly observed by the Office of the SolicitorGeneral, the evidence on record merely established the transfer of theproperty from Calixto Bacas to Nazaria Bombeo. The evidence did notshow the nature and the period of the alleged possession by Calixto andRosendo Bacas. It is important that applicants for judicial confirmationof imperfect titles must present specific acts of ownership tosubstantiate their claims; they cannot simply offer general statementsthat are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession.[22]

It must be stressed that respondents, as applicants, have theburden of proving that they have an imperfect title to Lot 4318. Eventhe absence of opposition from the government does not relieve them

of this burden.[23] Thus, it was erroneous for the trial and the appellatecourts to hold that the failure of the government to dislodgerespondents, judicially or extrajudicially, from the subject land since1954 already amounted to a title.

In this connection, the Court reiterates the following ruling inDirector of Lands v. Agustin:[24]

”x x x. The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to have

the land registered under the Torrens system simply becauseno one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the

registration of his land. He must show, even though there isno opposition, to the satisfaction of the court, that he is theabsolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justified inregistering property under the Torrens system, simplybecause there is no opposition offered. Courts may, even inthe absence of any opposition, deny the registration of theland under the Torrens system, upon the ground that thefacts presented did not show that the petitioner is the owner,











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in fee simple, of the land which he is attempting to haveregistered.”

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decisionof the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The segregationof Lot 4318 as part of a military reservation is declared VALID. Nopronouncement as to costs.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 126316. June 25, 2004]REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OFAPPEALS, HON. JOSE D. AZARRAGA AND ANGEL T. YU,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment filed before itby the petitioner.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On June 22, 1994, respondent Angel T. Yu filed a petition for registrationof a parcel of land, designated as Lot 524, Cad. 633-D, EstanciaCadastre, Ap-063019-005139, with an area of 1,194 square meters,more or less, situated at the Poblacion, Zone 1, Municipality of Estancia,Province of Iloilo. The case was docketed as LRC Case No.1000, LRA

Rec. No. N-64463 and raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Sixth JudicialRegion, Iloilo City, Branch 37. The petition was later amended to includethe adjoining lots and the corresponding owner’s name.

Initial hearing was scheduled on February 9, 1995 at 8:30 a.m. For thepurpose, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered itsappearance on January 18, 1995 and at the same time deputized theCity Prosecutor of Iloilo City to appear for and in behalf of the SolicitorGeneral under the latter’s supervision and control. Except for theopposition filed by the Solicitor General, no one else appeared to opposethe application/petition. The case was then set for reception of

applicant’s evidence on February 16, 1995 which was again set toanother day.

On February 22, 1995, the RTC received a letter from the LandRegistration Authority (LRA) requesting the court to require the LandManagement Bureau, Manila and the Community Environment andNatural Resources Office (CENRO) at Barotac Viejo, Iloilo to report on



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the status of the subject land considering that a discrepancy was notedafter plotting the land.

Thus, on March 6, 1995, the RTC issued an Order to the effect.

On March 31, 1995, the RTC received a certification from the LandManagement Bureau, Department of Environment and NaturalResources (DENR), Manila stating that “according to the verification of our records, this Office (formerly Bureau of Lands) has no record of anykind of public land application/land patent covering the parcel of landsituated in Estancia, Iloilo, identified as Lot No. 524, Cad. 633-D, Ap-063019-005139, …”

Based on this certification and after reception of evidence, the RTCrendered judgment on May 3, 1995, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, ratifying the Order of general default previously entered inthis case, and after considering the evidence adduced and finding thatpetitioner Angel T. Yu had sufficient title proper for the registration inhis name of the land subject of the application, JUDGMENT is herebyrendered confirming the title of the applicant/petitioner ANGEL T. YU,Filipino, of legal age, married and a resident of Estancia, Iloilo, over aparcel of land (Lot 524, Cad. 633-D, Estancia Cadastre, AP-063019-005139) situated in the Poblacion Zone 1, Municipality of Estancia,Province of Iloilo, Island of Panay, identified in the Plan, Exhibit “E” andtechnically described in Exhibit “F”.

As soon as this Decision becomes final, let an order for the issuance of the permanent decree and the corresponding certificate of title beissued in accordance with law.

No motion for reconsideration was filed by the City Prosecutor on behalf of the Solicitor General. Hence, the said decision became final andexecutory on June 14, 1995, and entry of judgment was duly made on July 7, 1995. An order was consequently issued by the RTC directing the

issuance of the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title to respondent Angel T. Yu.

On May 29, 1995, the OSG received a copy of the supplementary reportand findings of Land Management Officer Myra B. Rosal dated April 12,1995 (Rosal Report), which was submitted to the trial court incompliance with the court’s Order dated March 6, 1995. The report wasworded, thus:

The Honorable Judge JOSE AZARRAGA

Regional Trial CourtSixth Judicial RegionBranch 37, Iloilo CityApril 12, 1995

SUBJECT: LAND REGISTRATION CASE NO.N-1000 LOT NO. 524, CAD,CAD-633-D, ESTANCIA CADASTRE



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ANGEL TILOS YU – APPLICANT ___________________________________

In compliance with the Order of March 6, 1995, received by this Officeon March 15, 1995, attached for your ready reference is the amendedreport in three (3) pages of Land Management Officer III Fabio O.Catalan, Jr., of this Office, which was sent to Office of the Regional Technical Director, Land Management Bureau, DENR Masonic Temple,Iloilo City, in a cover memorandum dated September 24, 1994, dulyendorsed by the CENR Officer of CENRO, Sara, Iloilo, Edgardo J. Himatay.

This supplementary report of the undersigned is prepared with therequest that the additional findings be made on record when theundersigned repaired on the premises of the land on April 7, 1995, inthe morning to conduct an ocular inspection. The following facts wereascertained and found;

1. [That] the Cadastral lot in question and subject of a LandRegistration Case at bar, is Lot 524, Cad 633-D, EstanciaCadastre, containing an area of 1,194 square meters,approved on October 21, 1980, located at Zone 1, PoblacionEstancia, Iloilo. Again, Engr. Rogelio Santome, adopting thecadastral survey of the then Bureau of Lands, prepared anAdvance Plan and subsequently approved as Ap-063019-005139 on May 25, 1994.

2. That Lot No. 524, Cad-633-D is covered by a ForeshoreLease Application (FLA No. (VI-I)78) applied for by Angel Tilos Yu on July 1, 1977, with the then Bureau of Lands, MNR,Ministry of Natural Resources, NRD (VI-7) Barotac Viejo, dulyratified by Land Investigator Antonio L. Luis. An amount of P775.00 each had been paid in the year 1982 and the year1983, (please see certification hereto attached) datedFebruary 6, 1995, of CENR Officer Edgardo J. Himatay.

3. That Lot No. 524, Cad-633-D is declared public land and is

Alienable and Disposable per L.C. Map 1020, Project 44dated July 26, 1933.

4. That the improvements found on the land are as follows:

a) A commercial complex built of strong materials(concrete steel and galvanized iron with 18-20 feetstructure in depth, as foundation of the building,occupying around 600 square meters of the wholearea of Lot 524. The building itself houses 14commercial concrete stalls of 14 x 5 meters which is

offered for rent as boutiques and dry goods stalls.

b) On the second floor now undergoing are bowlinglanes (6 alleys) for recreational purposes which willsoon open to the public in 3 months time.

5. That Lot No. 524, Cad-633-D is not an agricultural land. That out of the total area of 1,194 square meters, only



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around 850 square meters is dry land and that an area of 334 sq. meters which used to be covered and uncovered bywater during high tide is now a reclaimed area, since wayback 1977 when applicant Angel Tilos Yu applied for aForeshore Lease Application with [the] then Bureau of Lands.

Respectfully submitted,

(signed) MYRA B. ROSAL

On June 22, 1995, the OSG received a letter from Regional ExecutiveDirector Jose P. Catus of the DENR, stating that an investigation wasconducted on the instant case, and it was found that there weregrounds for opposition to the respondent’s land application. LandInvestigator Fabio O. Catalan, Jr., who conducted an ocular inspection of the subject land, found the same to be a reclaimed foreshore area.Attached therein was the Amended Report of Land Investigator Catalan, Jr.(Catalan Report); the 1977 Foreshore Lease Application of Angel T. Yu;the November 16, 1983 Visitation and Examination Report of LandInvestigator Antonio L. Luis over Lot No. 524; and a blueprint plan of Lot524 (formerly Lot 2) of the Estancia Cadastre.

After discovering the actual status of Lot 524, the Republic filed apetition for the annulment of judgment with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals on July 20, 1995.

On February 5, 1996, respondent Angel T. Yu filed a motion with the CA,praying that he be allowed to submit to the Land Registration Authoritythe corrected technical description and the republication in the OfficialGazette of the corrected technical description of Plan Ap-063019, Lot524, Cad. 633-D dated January 15, 1996. The OSG filed its objection

thereto.On September 10, 1996, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition forannulment of judgment. It also ruled that since the RTC decision hadalready become final and executory, the technical description could nolonger be modified to include the increased area as prayed for by theprivate respondent. The CA held as follows:

Lot 524 is not a foreshore land.…. The CENRO report is proof that Lot 524, Cad-633-D, is an agriculturalland. Out of the total area of 1,194 square meters, around 850 squaremeters is dry land. That an area of 334 sq. meters which used to be

covered and uncovered by water during high tide is now a reclaimedarea, since way back 1977.(underlining supplied)…WHEREFORE, the petition for annulment of judgment is herebyDISMISSED. The motion of private respondent dated January 15, 1996 isDENIED.



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Finding no relief from the CA, the Republic filed the instant petition,raising the issue that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE REPUBLIC’S PETITIONFOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT ON THE MERE SUPPOSITION THAT LOT524 IS NOT FORESHORE LAND, BUT AGRICULTURAL LAND.

We find merit in the petition.

At the outset, there is a need to take a closer look at the true nature of the land in question.

The petitioner asserts that Lot 524 is foreshore land.

Foreshore land is that strip of land that lies between the high and lowwater marks and is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of tide. It is that part of the land adjacent to the sea, which is alternatelycovered and left dry by the ordinary flow of tides. It is part of thealienable land of the public domain and may be disposed of only bylease and not otherwise. Foreshore land remains part of the publicdomain and is outside the commerce of man. It is not capable of privateappropriation.

It is for this reason that the petitioner persists in its action to revert thesubject land to the State. Thus, even if the decision of the RTC hasbecome final and executory, we find that the respondent court abusedits discretion in dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment filedbefore it which is impressed with public interest. There are valid andmeritorious grounds to justify such action. The State has to protect itsinterests and can not be bound by, or estopped from, the mistakes ornegligent acts of its officials or agents, much more, non-suited as aresult thereof. As held in Republic vs. Alagad :

…[T]he state as a persona in law is the judicial entity, which is thesource of any asserted right to ownership in land under the basic

doctrine embodied in the 1935 Constitution as well as the presentcharter. It is charged moreover with the conservation of suchpatrimony. There is need therefore of the most rigorous scrutiny beforeprivate claims to portions thereof are judicially accorded recognition,especially so where the matter is sought to be raked up anew afteralmost fifty years. Such primordial consideration, not the apparentcarelessness, much less the acquiescence of public officials, is thecontrolling norm…

The Catalan Report, which states that the subject land is foreshore land,was received by the OSG only on June 22, 1995, long after the RTC

rendered its judgment on May 3, 1995. Angel T. Yu had, in fact, filed aforeshore lease application in 1977 and paid the corresponding feesthereon. There is, therefore, doubt to the respondent’s claim that hehad been in actual, open, notorious, continuous possession , in theconcept of an owner.

Moreover, the Rosal Report dated April 12, 1995 was received by theOSG only on May 29, 1995. Although the report states that Lot No. 524,



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Cad-633-D is declared public land and is alienable and disposable perL.C. Map 1020, Project 44 dated July 26, 1933, the same reportbuttresses the contention that the subject land is foreshore land andcovered by a foreshore lease application filed by Angel T. Yu. Findingthe reports to be revealing and significant as to the real status of theland being foreshore, the petitioner lost no time in filing the petition forannulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals.

We can not fault the trial court for not having considered in its decisionthe Rosal Report dated April 12, 1995 which was apparently submittedto it. On March 15, 1995, the trial court issued an order where itconsidered the case submitted for decision “upon the submission to thiscourt by the Land Management Bureau, Manila and CENRO, BarotacViejo, Iloilo of the report as directed in the Order of this Court datedMarch 6, 1995, and after the Land Management Sector, Region 6, IloiloCity had duly verified the discrepancy of plan Ap-063019-005139 of thesubject land applied for.” In compliance with the order, the trial courtreceived a certification from the Land Management Bureau that “theoffice has no record of any kind of public land application/land patentcovering the parcel of land” and thereby approved the registration of the land in favor of respondent. The records reveal that the RosalReport, through a 1st Indorsement dated April 24, 1995, was received bythe RTC only on May 5, 1995, after the court had already rendered itsdecision on May 3, 1995. No motion for reconsideration was filed tocontrovert the said decision based on the report. The OSG’s receipt of the Rosal and Catalan Reports on the status of the land were alsobelated through no fault of theirs.

Finally, we can not uphold the respondent court’s finding regarding thecharacter of the land. The Rosal Report clearly states that the subject land is not an agricultural land . Despite such declaration, therespondent court continued to rule that the subject land is agriculturalon the basis that out of the total area of 1,194 square meters, 850square meters is dry land and that 334 square meters is now areclaimed area.

Clearly, there is a need to determine once and for all whether thesubject land is really foreshore land and/or whether the respondent hasregisterable title thereto. The classification of public lands is a functionof the executive branch of government, specifically, the director of lands(now the director of the Land Management Bureau). This Court is not atrier of facts. Thus, for a proper and conclusive classification of the landinvolved, the instant case has to be remanded to the trial court for thatdetermination.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of the Court of

Appeals and the Regional Trial Court are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Thecase is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, Branch 37 forfurther proceedings.SO ORDERED.



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FIRST DIVISION

ROGELIO, GEORGE, LOLITA, G.R. No. 159494ROSALINDA, and JOSEPHINE, allsurnamed PASIÑO, represented by Present:their father and attorney-in-fact JOSE PASIÑO, PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

Petitioners, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,*

CORONA, and- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

DR. TEOFILO EDUARDO F.MONTERROYO, substituted byROMUALDO MONTERROYO,MARIA TERESA MONTERROYO, Promulgated:and STEPHEN MONTERROYO,

Respondents. July 31, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 31 January2003 Decision and the 5 August 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appealsin CA-G.R. CV No. 63199. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decisiondated 2 February 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch6 (trial court), in Civil Case No. 06-3060.

The Antecedent Facts

This case originated from an action for recovery of possession anddamages, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order

or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Rogelio, George,Lolita, Rosalinda and Josephine, all surnamed Pasiño, represented bytheir father and attorney-in-fact Jose Pasiño (petitioners) against Dr. Teofilo Eduardo F. Monterroyo (Dr. Monterroyo), later substituted by hisheirs Romualdo, Maria Teresa and Stephen, all surnamed Monterroyo(respondents).

http://g/MSU-IIT%20College%20of%20Law/Natural%20Resources%20Law/NatRes%20Files/Jurisprudence/Non%20Registration%20Homestead%20Patent%20Functus%20Officio.htm#_ftn1

http://g/MSU-IIT%20College%20of%20Law/Natural%20Resources%20Law/NatRes%20Files/Jurisprudence/Non%20Registration%20Homestead%20Patent%20Functus%20Officio.htm#_ftn1



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Cad. Lot No. 2139 of Cad. 292, Iligan Cadastre (Lot No. 2139), withan area of 19,979 square meters, located at Panul-iran, Abuno, IliganCity, was part of a 24-hectare land occupied, cultivated and cleared byLaureano Pasiño (Laureano) in 1933. The 24-hectare land formed partof the public domain which was later declared alienable and disposable.On 18 February 1935, Laureano filed a homestead application over theentire 24-hectare land under Homestead Application No. 205845. On 22April 1940, the Bureau of Forestry wrote Laureano and informed himthat the tract of land covered by his application was not needed forforest purposes. On 11 September 1941, the Director of Lands issuedan Order approving Laureano’s homestead application and stating thatHomestead Entry No. 154651 was recorded in his name for the landapplied for by him.

Laureano died on 24 March 1950. On 15 April 1952, the Directorof Lands issued an Order for the issuance of a homestead patent infavor of Laureano, married to Graciana Herbito (Graciana). Laureano’sheirs did not receive the order and consequently, the land was notregistered under Laureano’s name or under that of his heirs. In 1953,the property was covered by Tax Declaration No. 11102 in the name of Laureano with Graciana as administrator.

Between 1949 and 1954, a Cadastral Survey was conducted inIligan City. The surveyor found that a small creek divided the 24-hectare parcel of land into two portions, identified as Lot No. 2138 andLot No. 2139.

Petitioners claimed that Laureano’s heirs, headed by his son Jose,continuously possessed and cultivated both lots. On 16 October 1962, Jose’s co-heirs executed a Deed of Quitclaim renouncing their rights andinterest over the land in favor of Jose. Jose secured a title in his namefor Lot No. 2138. Later, Jose alienated Lot No. 2139 in favor of hischildren (petitioners in this case) who, on 8 January 1994,simultaneously filed applications for grant of Free Patent Titles overtheir respective shares of Lot No. 2139 before the Land Management

Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources(DENR). On 22 August 1994, the DENR granted petitioners’ applicationsand issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-1322 (a.f.) in favor of Rogelio Pasiño, OCT No. P-1318 (a.f.) in favor of George Pasiño, OCT No.P-1317 (a.f.) in favor of Lolita Pasiño, OCT No. P-1321 (a.f.) in favor of Josephine Pasiño, and OCT No. P-1319 (a.f.) in favor of RosalindaPasiño. Petitioners alleged that their possession of Lot No. 2139 wasinterrupted on 3 January 1993 when respondents forcibly tookpossession of the property.

Respondents alleged that they had been in open, continuous,

exclusive and notorious possession of Lot No. 2139, by themselves andthrough their predecessors-in-interest, since 10 July 1949. They allegedthat on 10 July 1949, Rufo Larumbe (Larumbe) sold Lot No. 2139 toPetra Teves (Petra). On 27 February 1984, Petra executed a deed of sale over Lot No. 2139 in favor of Vicente Teves (Vicente). On 20February 1985, Vicente executed a pacto de retro sale over the land infavor of Arturo Teves (Arturo). In 1992, Arturo sold Lot No. 2139 in favorof respondents’ father, Dr. Monterroyo, by virtue of an oral contract. On



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5 January 1995, Arturo executed a Deed of Confirmation of AbsoluteSale of Unregistered Land in favor of Dr. Monterroyo’s heirs.

Respondents alleged that Jose was not the owner of Lot No. 2139and as such, he could not sell the land to his children. They alleged thatpetitioners’ OCTs were null and void for having been procured inviolation of the Public Land Act. They further alleged that the LandManagement Bureau had no authority to issue the free patent titlesbecause Lot No. 2139 was a private land.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In its 2 February 1999 Decision, the trial court ruled, as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of all the

defendants and against the plaintiffs:

1. Dismissing the complaint; 2. Declaring Lot No. 2139, Iligan Cadastre 292,located at Panul-iran, Abuno, Iligan City to haveacquired the character of a private land over whichthe Land Management Bureau has been divested of jurisdiction; 3. Declaring the defendants to be the ownersand possessors of the said lot;

4. Declaring OCT Nos. P-1322 (a.f.) of RogelioPasiño, P-1318 (a.f.) of George Pasiño, P-1317 (a.f.)of Lolita Pasiño, P-1321 (a.f.) of Josephine Pasiñoand P-1319 (a.f.) of Rosalinda Pasiño to be null andvoid for having been procured by fraud and for

having been issued by the Land ManagementBureau which has been divested of jurisdiction oversaid lot; 5. Declaring the defendants to be entitled to thesum of P6,000.00 deposited with the Office of theClerk of Court under O.R. No. 1487777; 6. Dismissing the defendants’ counterclaim forattorney’s fees.

Costs against the plaintiffs. SO ORDERED.

The trial court ruled that as of January 1994, Lot No. 2139 hadalready acquired the character of a private land by operation of law.Since Lot No. 2139 had already ceased to be a public land, the Land



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Management Bureau had no power or authority to dispose of it byissuing free patent titles.

The trial court ruled that respondents’ counterclaim stands on thesame footing as an independent action. Thus, it could not beconsidered a collateral attack on petitioners’ titles. The trial courtfurther ruled that respondents filed their counterclaim within one yearfrom the grant of petitioners’ titles, which was the reglementary periodfor impugning a title.

The trial court ruled that the order for the issuance of a patent infavor of Laureano lapsed and became functus officio when it was notregistered with the Director of Deeds. The trial court ruled that whileLaureano was the original claimant of the entire 24 hectares, he cededthe right to possession over half of the property, denominated as LotNo. 2139, to Larumbe sometime in 1947. The trial court found thatLaureano offered to sell half of the land to his tenant Gavino Quinaquin(Gavino) but he did not have money. Later, Gavino learned fromLarumbe that he (Larumbe) acquired half of the land from Laureano.Gavino then started delivering the owner’s share of the harvest toLarumbe. Laureano never contested Gavino’s action nor did he demandthat Gavino deliver to him the owner’s share of the harvest and not toLarumbe. When Lot No. 2139 was sold, Gavino and his successorsdelivered the owner’s share of the harvest to Petra, Vicente, Arturo, Dr.Monterroyo, and Dindo Monterroyo, successively. The trial court alsofound that the other tenants had never given any share of the harvestto Jose. The trial court ruled that petitioners had failed to presentconvincing evidence that they and their predecessors-in-interest were inpossession of Lot No. 2139 from 1947 to 1994 when they filed theirapplication for free patent. The trial court ruled that petitionerscommitted actual fraud when they misrepresented in their free patentapplications that they were in possession of the property continuouslyand publicly.

Petitioners appealed from the trial court’s Decision.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its 31 January 2003 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the

trial court’s Decision.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court did not err inallowing respondents’ counterclaim despite the non-appearance of Dr.Monterroyo, the original defendant, at the barangay conciliation

proceedings. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners themselves didnot personally appear. They were represented by their attorney-in-factalthough they were all of legal age, which was a violation of theKatarungang Pambarangay proceedings requiring the personalappearance of the parties. Hence, the Court of Appeals ruled that therewas never a valid conciliation proceeding. However, while this wouldhave been a ground for the dismissal of the complaint, the issue was



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and hence, a registrable possession, by present or previous occupants,by any proof that would be competent and admissible, the propertymust be considered to be private.

In this case, the trial court found that the preponderance of evidence favors respondents as the possessors of Lot No. 2139 for over30 years, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest. The question of who between petitioners and respondents had priorpossession of the property is a factual question whose resolution is thefunction of the lower courts. When the factual findings of both the trialcourt and the Court of Appeals are supported by substantial evidence,they are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewableby this Court. While the rule is subject to exceptions, no exceptionexists in this case.

Respondents were able to present the original Deed of AbsoluteSale, dated 10 July 1949, executed by Larumbe in favor of Petra.Respondents also presented the succeeding Deeds of Sale showing thetransfer of Lot No. 2139 from Petra to Vicente and from Vicente toArturo and the Deed of Confirmation of Absolute Sale of UnregisteredReal Property executed by Arturo in favor of respondents. Respondentsalso presented a certification executed by P/Sr. Superintendent Julmunier Akbar Jubail, City Director of Iligan City Police Command andverified from the Log Book records by Senior Police Officer BettyDalongenes Mab-Abo confirming that Andres Quinaquin made a reportthat Jose, Rogelio and Luciana Pasiño, Lucino Pelarion and Nando Aviloforcibly took his copra. This belied petitioners’ allegation that they werein possession of Lot No. 2139 and respondents forcibly took possessionof the property only in January 1993.

Considering that petitioners’ application for free patent titles wasfiled only on 8 January 1994, when Lot No. 2139 had already becomeprivate land ipso jure, the Land Management Bureau had no jurisdictionto entertain petitioners’ application.

Non-Registration of Homestead Patent Rendered it Functus Officio

Once a homestead patent granted in accordance with law isregistered, the certificate of title issued by virtue of the patent has theforce and effect of a Torrens title issued under the land registration law.In this case, the issuance of a homestead patent in 1952 in favor of Laureano was not registered. Section 103 of Presidential Decree No.1529 mandates the registration of patents, and registration is theoperative act to convey the land to the patentee, thus:

Sec. 103. x x x x. The deed, grant, patent orinstrument of conveyance from the Government to thegrantee shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind theland but shall operate only as a contract between theGovernment and the grantee and as evidence of authority tothe Register of Deeds to make registration. It is the act of registration that shall be the operative act to affect



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and convey the land, and in all cases under this Decree,registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies. The feesfor registration shall be paid by the grantee. After dueregistration and issuance of the certificate of title, such landshall be deemed to be registered land to all intents andpurposes under this Decree. (Emphasis supplied)

Further, in this case, Laureano already conveyed Lot No. 2139 to

Larumbe in 1947 before the approval of his homestead application. Infact, Larumbe already sold the land to Petra in 1949, three years beforethe issuance of the homestead patent in favor of Laureano. The trialcourt found that since 1947, the tenants of Lot No. 2139 had beendelivering the owner’s share of the harvest, successively, to Larumbe,Petra, Vicente and Arturo Teves, Dr. Monterroyo and Dindo Monterroyo. The trial court found no instance when the owner’s share of the harvestwas delivered to Jose Pasiño.

Hence, we sustain the trial court that the non-registration of Laureano’s homestead patent had rendered it functus officio.

A Counterclaim is Not a Collateral Attack on the Title

It is already settled that a counterclaim is considered an originalcomplaint and as such, the attack on the title in a case originally forrecovery of possession cannot be considered as a collateral attack onthe title. Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals issimilar to the case before us insofar as petitioner in that case filed anaction for recovery of possession against respondent who, in turn, fileda counterclaim claiming ownership of the land. In that case, the Courtruled:

Nor is there any obstacle to the determination of the

validity of TCT No. 10101. It is true that the indefeasibilityof torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. In theinstant case, the original complaint is for recovery of possession filed by petitioner against private respondent,not an original action filed by the latter to question thevalidity of TCT No. 10101 on which petitioner bases itsright. To rule on the issue of validity in a case for recoveryof possession is tantamount to a collateral attack. However,it should not [b]e overlooked that private respondent filed acounterclaim against petitioner, claiming ownership over theland and seeking damages. Hence, we could rule on the

question of the validity of TCT No. 10101 for thecounterclaim can be considered a direct attack on thesame. ‘A counterclaim is considered a complaint, only thistime, it is the original defendant who becomes the plaintiff...It stands on the same footing and is to be tested by thesame rules as if it were an independent action.’ x x x.



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As such, we sustain both the trial court and the Court of Appealson this issue.

Principle of Constructive Trust Applies

Under the principle of constructive trust, registration of propertyby one person in his name, whether by mistake or fraud, the real ownerbeing another person, impresses upon the title so acquired thecharacter of a constructive trust for the real owner, which would justifyan action for reconveyance. In the action for reconveyance, the decreeof registration is respected as incontrovertible but what is soughtinstead is the transfer of the property wrongfully or erroneouslyregistered in another’s name to its rightful owner or to one with a betterright. If the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whosename the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee, and the realowner is entitled to file an action for reconveyance of the property.

In the case before us, respondents were able to establish that theyhave a better right to Lot No. 2139 since they had long been inpossession of the property in the concept of owners, by themselves andthrough their predecessors-in-interest. Hence, despite the irrevocabilityof the Torrens titles issued in their names and even if they are alreadythe registered owners under the Torrens system, petitioners may still becompelled under the law to reconvey the property to respondents.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 31 January 2003 Decision and the 5 August 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63199. Costs against petitioners.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127060. November 19, 2002]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OFAPPEALS, FLORENTINO CENIZA, SANTIAGO CENIZA, ESTANISLAOCENIZA, ROMEO SIMBAJON, PABLO RAMOS, ATILANO BONGO,EDGAR ADOLFO, EMMA ADOLFO, JERRY ADOLFO, GLENNADOLFO, GINA ADOLFO, LORNA ADOLFO, CHONA ADOLFO,EVELYN ADOLFO, in her own behalf and as guardian of theminors HUBERT and AMIEL ADOLFO, and ELNITA ADOLFO in herown behalf and as guardian of minors DAVID and PRESTINE MAY

ADOLFO, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:



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Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of theSolicitor General opposed the application on the following grounds:

1. That neither the applicant/s nor their precedessors-in-interesthave been in open continuous exclusive and notorious possession andoccupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto(Sec. 48 [b], C.A. 141, as amended by P.D. 1073).

2. That the muniment/s or title and/or the tax declaration/s and taxpayment/s receipt/s of applicant/s if any, attached to or alleged in theapplication, do/es not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of abona fide acquisition of the lands applied for or of their open,continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner, since June 12, 1945, or prior thereto. Saidmuniment/s of title do/es not appear to be genuine and the taxdeclaration/s and/or tax payment receipts indicate pretendedpossession of applicants to be of recent vintage.

3. That the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanishtitle or grant can no longer be availed of by the applicants who havefailed to file an appropriate application for registration within the periodof six (6) months from February 16, 1976 as required by PresidentialDecree No. 892. From the records, it appears that the instantapplication was filed on October 25, 1996.

4. That the parcel/s applied for is/are portions of the public domainbelonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to privateappropriation.

In a decision dated February 28, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City granted the application. It held that since the applicants’possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years was continuous,peaceful, adverse, public and to the exclusion of everybody, the samewas “in the concept of owners.” Since the land was neitherencumbered nor subject to any other application for registration, the

trial court ordered that, upon the finality of its decision, the decrees of registration should be issued in favor of the applicants.

The Solicitor General interposed an appeal for petitioner Republic of thePhilippines before the Court of Appeals.

In a decision dated September 28, 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmedthe decision of the trial court. It held that the ruling in Director of Landsv. Court of Appeals, that before public land could be registered in thename of a private individual, it must first be established that the landhad been classified alienable and disposable, “refers to public lands and

not to those which have acquired the nature of a private property inview of the continuous possession thereof by its claimants.” The Courtof Appeals held:

In this case, it was sufficiently established by appellees that they havebeen in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of thesubject lots even before the year 1927, or fifty nine (59) years beforethe application was filed (TSN, April 13, 1989, pp. 3-4; February 6, 1989,



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p. 7-11; June 2, 1988, pp. 3, 8-9). This period more than sufficientlysatisfies the 30 years requirement of the Public Land Act for property tobe considered as private land. Significantly, Section 4, PresidentialDecree No. 1073 provides:

Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 4(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that theseprovisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of thepublic domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive andnotorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru hispredecessor-in-interest, under a bonafide claim of ownership, since June12, 1945.

Appellant was thus no longer required to prove that the property inquestion is classified as alienable and disposable land of the publicdomain. Clearly, the property no longer forms part of the publicdomain. The long and continuous possession thereof by appelleesconverted said property to a private one. This finds support in the rulingin Director of Lands vs. Bengzon, 152 SCRA 369, to wit:

“x x x alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or throughhis predecessor-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for theprescribed statutory period (30) years under the Public Land Act, asamended is converted to private property by the mere lapse orcompletion of said period, ipso jure.” The above is a reaffirmation of theprinciple established in the earlier cases of Cariño v. InsularGovernment, Suzi v. Razon, and Herico v. Dar, that open exclusive andundisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribedby law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or othersanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. x x xIn interpreting the provisions of Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No.141, this Court said in Herico v. Dar, “x x x when the conditions asspecified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor isdeemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a

government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title beingissued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain, andbeyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. Theapplication for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which doesnot affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by thepatent and the torrens title to be issued upon the strength of thepatent.”

The Court of Appeals then cited Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court . In that case, this Court ruled that “alienable public landheld by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,

openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period(30 years under the Public Land Act, as amended) is converted toprivate property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.” Moreover, appellant Republic’s claim that the property in questionremains to be “public land” under the Constitution, is “refuted” by thisCourt’s pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Intermediate AppellateCourt that “the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.”



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The Court of Appeals concluded its decision with the followingobservations:

Finally, we note that no opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Landsand Forestry to contest the application of appellees on the ground thatthe property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there anyshowing that the lots in question are forestal land, unlike the case of Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701, wherein theDirector of Lands questioned the petition for registration filed by theapplicant therein on the claim that the property applied for registrationin his favor was classified and proven to be forestal land.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in aresolution dated October 29, 1996. Traversing petitioner’s argumentthat under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, all lands of thepublic domain are owned by the State, the Court of Appeals stated thatsaid provision “further states that agricultural lands are excluded fromthose lands that may not be alienated.” It further ruled:

In the instant case, among the documents presented by appellees areReal Estate tax receipts that sufficiently show that the subject land ismainly utilized for agricultural purposes devoted to the planting of coconut, corn x x x and sugar cane x x x aside from using the same forresidential purposes x x x.

It is noticeable that appellant failed to present any proof to establish itsclaim that the land in question is not alienable. Although on July 10,1989, the court a quo issued an order “directing the Bureau of ForestDevelopment [BFD] to submit xx within thirty (30) days from its receiptof [said order] a report on the status of the land xx to determinewhether said land or any portion thereof is within the forest zone xxx”(Record, p. 63), the BFD failed to comply. Moreover, appellant nevercontested appellees’ application nor did it may (sic) any manifestationthat the land in question is not alienable. Likewise, the prosecutorrepresenting the Republic of the Philippines during the trial did not even

contest the classification of the land as stated in the evidence of appellees. Their belated objection should therefore not prejudiceappellees who openly and in good faith presented all the documentspertinent to their claims.

Presidential Decree No. 1073 extended the period within which aqualified person may apply for confirmation of an imperfect orincomplete title by judicial legalization to December 31, 1987. The filingof this case in October, 1986 was therefore seasonable. Under thedecree, this right is available to a person who has been in open,continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, by

himself and through his predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fideclaim of acquisition of ownership since June 12, 1945. We reiterate thatappellees have proven themselves to have been in possession of thesubject land even prior to June 12, 1945.

Hence, this petition for review, alleging that the Court of Appeals erredin: (1) holding that private respondents have registerable title to the lotsin question, and (2) ordering the registration thereof in their names.



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The issues raised before us are: (a) whether there is a need for privaterespondents to establish that the land subject of their application wasalienable and disposable despite proofs showing their possessionthereof for more than 30 years; and (b) whether private respondentswere able to meet the period required by the Public Land Act, asamended.

Petitioner contends that before a public land can be registered in thename of a private individual, it must be shown first that (a) the land hasbeen classified alienable and disposable, and (b) the applicant, byhimself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in continuous,exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under abona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto.

Petitioner claims that private respondents failed to meet the saidrequirements. They did not cite any official proclamation or presentedthe land classification map covering the subject parcels of land to provethat they are alienable and disposable public lands. Neither did privaterespondents adduce evidence to show that they had been in possessionof the land since June 12, 1945. Although they were able to showpossession by Apolinar, their predecessor-in-interest, since 1948, andprivate respondents’ actual possession beginning in 1960, no proof waspresented to show possession prior to 1948. Consequently, privaterespondents are not entitled to have the subject parcels of landregistered in their names.

In their comment, private respondents cite Section 48(b), before it wasamended by PD No. 1073, and Section (50) of the Public Land Act as theapplicable law in this case. They maintain that the land subject of theirapplication is an agricultural land devoted to corn and other root crops.Further, they have been in possession of the land since 1927. EstanislaoCeniza, one of the children of Apolinar and who was already ten yearsold at that time, testified that his father was the one in possession of theland, appropriating its fruits and paying its realty taxes. When their

father died in 1947, Apolinar’s chidren took possession of the land. Theyalso appropriated the fruits and paid realty taxes therefor. In 1960,Apolinar’s heirs partitioned the property, declared their respectiveshares in their names for tax purposes and paid the realty taxes.

Apart from this, private respondents claim that the land in question haslong been a private one, it being a part of Hacienda de Mandaue deCebu, which in turn was recognized as a private land by the Court of First Instance of Cebu in several decisions dated February 27, 1934,March 27, 1935, May 6, 1937 and August 6, 1937.

Indeed, before one can be granted a confirmation of title to lands of thepublic domain, the Public Land Act “requires that the applicant mustprove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open,continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of thesame must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribedin the Public Land Act.” Only when these conditions are met may thepossessor of the land acquire, by operation of law, “a right to a grant, a



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government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title beingissued.”

Conclusively, the Court of Appeals erred when it held that mere adversepossession in accordance with law for a period likewise provided for bylaw would automatically entitle the possessor to the right to registerpublic land in his name. The applicant has to establish first thedisposable and alienable character of the public land. Otherwise, allpublic lands, regardless of their classification, can be subject of registration of private titles, as long as the applicant shows that hemeets the required years of possession. Worth noting is the case of Bracewell v. Court of Appeals, where the applicant had been inpossession of the property since 1908 but it was conclusively shown bythe government that the land was classified as alienable or disposableonly on 27 March 1972. The Court said:

x x x. Thus, even granting that petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest had occupied the same since 1908, he still cannot claim titlethereto by virtue of such possession since the subject parcels of landwere not yet alienable land at that time nor capable of privateappropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis of agrant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienableor disposable portions of the public domain. (Italics supplied)

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration isalienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executiveorder; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Landsinvestigators; and a legislative act or a statute.

In this case, private respondents presented a certification datedNovember 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the CommunityEnvironment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that thelots involved were “found to be within the alienable and disposable (sic)

Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-I555 datedDecember 9, 1980.” This is sufficient evidence to show the realcharacter of the land subject of private respondents’ application.Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in theabsence of contradictory evidence, which is true in this case. Worthnoting also was the observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:

…no opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry tocontest the application of appellees on the ground that the property stillforms part of the public domain. Nor is there any showing that the lotsin question are forestal land....

Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public land for the period required by law would entitle its occupant to aconfirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor of privaterespondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of the PublicLand Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of proving the alienability of the land subject of their application.



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As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents wereable to prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possessionof the subject land even before the year 1927. As a rule, we are boundby the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Although there areexceptions, petitioner did not show that this is one of them.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and thedecision, as well as the resolution, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CVNo. 31728 are AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. 168184

PHILIPPINES,Petitioner,

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,Chairperson, QUISUMBING,*

- versus - CARPIO,CORONA, andLEONARDO-DE

CASTRO, JJ.

RUBY LEE TSAI, Promulgated:

Respondent. June 22, 2009x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - -x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 30 January 2004 Decision and 12 May 2005 Resolution of theCourt of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 70006. The 30 January2004 Decision affirmed the 21 September 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18 (trialcourt) in LRC Case No. TG-788 which approved the application

http://g/MSU-IIT%20College%20of%20Law/Natural%20Resources%20Law/NatRes%20Files/Jurisprudence/Adverse%20Possesion%20Starting%20Period.htm#_ftn1

http://g/MSU-IIT%20College%20of%20Law/Natural%20Resources%20Law/NatRes%20Files/Jurisprudence/Adverse%20Possesion%20Starting%20Period.htm#_ftn1



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of respondent Ruby Lee Tsai for the confirmation andregistration of Lot No. 7062, described in plan Ap-04-010084,

Cad-355, Tagaytay Cadastre, with an area of 888 squaremeters (subject property). The 12 May 2005 Resolutiondenied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner Republicof the Philippines (Republic).

The Facts

On 3 December 1996, respondent filed an application

for the confirmation and registration of the subject property

under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529). Respondentalleged that she is the owner of the subject property and theimprovements thereon. Respondent stated that on 31 May1993, she purchased the subject property from ManolitaGonzales Vda. de Carungcong (Carungcong), through WendyMitsuko Sato, Carungcong’s daughter and attorney in fact.Respondent declared that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive andnotorious possession and occupation of the subject propertyfor more than 30 years.

Except for the Republic, there were no other oppositorsto the application. The Republic opposed respondent’sapplication on the following grounds: (1) that respondent andher predecessors-in-interest failed to present sufficientevidence to show that they have been in open, continuous,exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of thesubject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier as required bySection 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141), as

amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073 (PD 1073); (2) thatthe tax declarations and tax receipt payments attached to theapplication do not constitute competent and sufficientevidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land applied for orof respondent’s open, continuous, exclusive and notoriouspossession and occupation of the subject property in theconcept of an owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier; and (3)that the subject property forms part of the public domain andis not subject to private appropriation.

After establishing the jurisdictional facts, respondentpresented the following documents to support her application:

1. Deed of Absolute Sale dated 31 May 1993 betweenrespondent and Carungcong;



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2. Tax Declarations corresponding to different yearsshowing that the subject property has been

declared under the name of Carungcong for taxpurposes: Tax Declaration No. 02226-A for the year1948, Tax Declaration No. 010158-A for the year1960, Tax Declaration No. 013976-A for the year1965, Tax Declaration No. 07209-B for the year1974, Tax Declaration No. 016-0635 for the year1980, Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0735 for theyear 1985 and Tax Declaration No. GR-016-1610 forthe year 1992;

3. Tax Declaration Nos. GR-016-1776-R and 016-1084 for the year 1994 showing that the subjectproperty has been declared under the name of respondent for tax purposes;

4. Official Receipts corresponding to different yearsshowing the payment of real property taxes underthe name of Carungcong: Official Receipt No.4641772 dated 27 May 1991, Official Receipt No.2326477 dated 10 December 1992, Official ReceiptNo. 0535585 dated 10 June 1992, Official Receipt

No. 4879666 dated 28 May 1993 and OfficialReceipt No. 4879620 dated 3 June 1993;

5. Official Receipts corresponding to different yearsshowing the payment of real property taxes underthe name of respondent: Official Receipt No.4997840 dated 10 January 1994, Official ReceiptNo. 7304615 dated 15 February 1995 and OfficialReceipt No. 9115050 dated 31 March 1997; and

6. Certification of the City Treasurer of Tagaytay City

stating that the real property taxes for the years1994 to 1997 were paid.

On 21 September 1998, the trial court grantedrespondent’s application for registration. The dispositiveportion states:

WHEREFORE, this court hereby approves this applicationfor registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141,Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as PropertyRegistration Law, the land, Lot 7062 described in plan Ap-04-

010084, Cad-355, Tagaytay Cadastre, situated in the Brgy. of San Jose, City of Tagaytay, containing an area of Eight Hundred EightyEight (888) Square Meters in the name of RUBY LEE TSAI, marriedto Tsai Yu Lung, both of legal age and residents of Sun ValleySubdivision, Sta. Ana Drive, Parañaque, Metro Manila.

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, thecorresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.



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SO ORDERED.

The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals on theground that the trial court erred in granting the application forregistration despite respondent’s failure to prove open,continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subjectproperty since 12 June 1945 or earlier. According to theRepublic, it is not sufficient that respondent provedpossession of the subject property for more than 30 years.

In the assailed 30 January 2004 Decision, the Court of

Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration. The

Court of Appeals denied Republic’s motion.

Hence, this petition.

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

According to the trial court, respondent was able toestablish her title and interest over the subject property. Thetrial court found that respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have been in actual possession of the subjectproperty for more than 30 years. The trial court also declaredthat the subject property was residential and not within anyforest zone or the public domain.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s findingthat respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have beenin open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner for more than30 years. According to the Court of Appeals, respondent neednot prove that she and her predecessors-in-interest havebeen in possession of the subject property since 12 June 1945or earlier because Section 48(b) of CA 141 was alreadysuperseded by Republic Act No. 1942 (RA 1942), whichprovides for a simple 30 year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of title.

The Issue



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Thus, there are three requisites for the filing of an

application for registration of title under Section 14(1) of PD1529: (1) that the property in question is alienable anddisposable land of the public domain; (2) that the applicant byhimself or through his predecessors-in-interest have been inopen, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession andoccupation; and (3) that such possession is under a bonafide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.

The right to file the application for registration derives from abona fide claim of ownership going back to 12 June 1945 orearlier, by reason of the claimant’s open, continuous,

exclusive and notorious possession of alienable anddisposable land of the public domain.

A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of CA 141, asamended by PD 1073, which provides:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of thePhilippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming toown any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles havenot been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of FirstInstance of the province where the land is located forconfirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of

title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

x x x

(b) Those who by themselves or through theirpredecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agriculturallands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisitionof ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediatelypreceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title,except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall beconclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions

essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to acertificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasissupplied)

According to the Court of Appeals, respondent need not

prove possession of the subject property since 12 June 1945or earlier because Section 48(b) of CA 141 was amended byRA 1942, which provided for a simple 30-year prescriptiveperiod. The Court of Appeals appears to have an erroneous

interpretation of Section 48(b) of CA 141.

Through the years, Section 48(b) of the CA 141 hasbeen amended several times. The Court of Appeals failed toconsider the amendment introduced by PD 1073. In Republicv. Doldol, the Court provided a summary of theseamendments:



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Department of Environment and Natural Resources. InRepublic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., the Court said:

[T]he applicant for land registration must prove that the DENRSecretary had approved the land classification and released theland of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and thatthe land subject of the application for registration falls within theapproved area per verification through survey by the PENRO orCENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration mustpresent a copy of the original classification approved by the DENRSecretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove thatthe land is alienable and disposable.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDEthe 30 January 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 70006 and the 21 September 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in LRCCase No. TG-788. We DENY respondent Ruby Lee Tsai’sapplication for confirmation and registration of Lot No. 7062described in plan Ap-04-010084, Cad-355, Tagaytay Cadastre.

SO ORDERED.

Law on Natural Resources (Sixth Part)

Documents

Transcript of Law on Natural Resources (Sixth Part)