PRELIM EXAM COVERAGE - CASES

LAND TITLES and DEEDS (Atty. Jeffrey Jefferson Coronel)PRELIM EXAM COVERAGE - CASES

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LANDS OF PUBLIC DOMAINREPUBLIC v. VILLANUEVARepublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-55289 June 29, 1982REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Lands,petitioner-appellant,vs.JUDGE CANDIDO P. VILLANUEVA, of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Malolos Branch VII, and IGLESIA NI CRISTO, as a corporation sole, represented by ERAO G. MANALO, as Executive Minister,respondents-appellees.AQUINO,J.:Like L-49623, Manila Electric Company vs. Judge Castro-Bartolome, this case involves the prohibition in section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution that "no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area".Lots Nos. 568 and 569, located at Barrio Dampol, Plaridel, Bulacan, with an area of 313 square meters and an assessed value of P1,350 were acquired by the Iglesia Ni Cristo on January 9, 1953 from Andres Perez in exchange for a lot with an area of 247 square meters owned by the said church (Exh. D).The said lots were already possessed by Perez in 1933. They are not included in any military reservation. They are inside an area which was certified as alienable or disposable by the Bureau of Forestry in 1927. The lots are planted to santol and mango trees and banana plants. A chapel exists on the said land. The land had been declared for realty tax purposes. Realty taxes had been paid therefor (Exh. N).On September 13, 1977, the Iglesia Ni Cristo, a corporation sole, duly existing under Philippine laws, filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan an application for the registration of the two lots. It alleged that it and its predecessors-in-interest had possessed the land for more than thirty years. It invoked section 48(b) of the Public Land Law, which provides:Chapter VIII.Judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.xxx xxx xxxSEC. 48. The following-describedcitizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefore, under the Land Register Act, to wit:xxx xxx xxx(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under abona fideclaim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter." (As amended by Republic Act No. 1942, approved on June 22, 1957.)The Republic of the Philippines, through the Direct/r of Lands, opposed the application on the grounds that applicant, as a private corporation, is disqualified to hold alienable lands of the public domain, that the land applied for is public land not susceptible of private appropriation and that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have not been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land since June 12, 1945.After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the two lots, as described in Plan Ap-04-001344 (Exh. E), in the name of the Iglesia Ni Cristo, a corporation sole, represented by Executive Minister Erao G. Manalo, with office at the corner of Central and Don Mariano Marcos Avenues, Quezon City, From that decision, the Republic of the Philippines appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440. The appeal should be sustained.As correctly contended by the Solicitor General, the Iglesia Ni Cristo, as a corporation sole or a juridical person, is disqualified to acquire or hold alienable lands of the public domain, like the two lots in question, because of the constitutional prohibition already mentioned and because the said church is not entitled to avail itself of the benefits of section 48(b) which applies only to Filipino citizens or natural persons. A corporation sole (an "unhappy freak of English law") has no nationality (Roman Catholic Apostolic Adm. of Davao, Inc. vs. Land Registration Commission, 102 Phil. 596. See Register of Deeds vs. Ung Siu Si Temple, 97 Phil. 58 and sec. 49 of the Public Land Law).The contention in the comments of the Iglesia Ni Cristo (its lawyer did not file any brief) that the two lots are private lands, following the rule laid down in Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424, is not correct. What was considered private land in theSusicase was a parcel of land possessed by a Filipino citizensince time immemorial,as inCario vs. Insular Government,212 U.S. 449, 53 L. ed. 594, 41 Phil. 935 and 7 Phil. 132. The lots sought to be registered in this case do not fall within that category. They are still public lands. A land registration proceeding under section 48(b) "presupposes that the land is public" (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 10, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).As held inOh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. "InUy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508, it was noted that the right of an occupant of public agricultural land to obtain a confirmation of his title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Law is a "derecho dominical incoativo"and that before the issuance of the certificate of title the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.The lower court's judgment is reversed and set aside. The application for registration of the Iglesia Ni Cristo is dismissed with costs against said applicant.SO ORDERED.MANILA ELECTRIC v. CASTRO-BARTOLOMERepublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-49623 June 29, 1982

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY,petitioner-appellant,vs.JUDGE FLORENLIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch XV, and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondent-appellees.AQUINO,J.:pThis case involves the prohibition in section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution that "no private coporation or associaiton may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed on ethousand hectares in area".*That prohibition is not found in the 1935 Constitution.The Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation organized under Philippine laws, more than sixty percent of whose capital stock is owned by Filipino citizens, in its application filed on December 1, 1976 in the Makati branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, prayed for the confirmation of its title to two lots with a total area of one hundred sixty-five square meters, located at Tanay, Rizal with an assessed value of P3,270 (LRC Case No. N-9485, LRC No. N-50801).The Republic of the Philippines opposed theh application on the grounds that the applicant, as a private corporation,is disqualified to hold alienable public lands and that the applicant and its prredecessors-in-interest have not been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application (pp. 65-66,Rollo).After the trial had commenced, the Province of rizal and the Municipality of Tanay filed a joint opposition to the application on the ground that one of the lots, Lot No. 1165 of the Tanay cadastre, would be needed for the widening and improvement of Jose Abad Santos and E.Quirino Streetsin the town of Tanay.The land was possessed by Olimpia ramos before the Pacific war which broke out in 1941. On July 3, 1947, Ramos sold the land to the spouses Rafael Piguing and MInerva Inocencio (Exh. K). The Piguing sapouses constructed a house therereon. Because the Meralco had installed the "anchor guy" of its steel post on the land, the Piguing spouses sold the lot to the Meralco on August 13, 1976.The said land was included in the1968 cadastral survey made in Tanacy by the Bureau of Lands, Plan AP-04-000902 (Exh. F and H) and was divided into two lots, Lots Nos. 1164 and 1165, so as to segregate Lot No. 1165 which would be used to widen the two street serving as the land's eastern and southern boundaries.The land was declared for realty tax purposes since 1945 and taxes had been paid thereon up to 1977. It is residential in character as distinguished from a strictly agricultural land. It is not included in any military reservation. Since 1927, it has formed part of the alienable portion of the public domain.After trial, the lowre court rendered a decision dismissing the application because in its opinion the Meralco is not qualified to apply for the registration of the said land since under section 48(b) of the Public Land Law only Filipino citizens or natural persons can apply for judicial confirmationof their imperfect titles to public land. The Meralco is a juridical person. The trial court assumed that the land which it seeks to register ispublic land.From that decision, the Meralco appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440.In contends that the said land, after having been possessed in the concept of owner by Olimpia Ramos and the Piguing spouses for more than thirty years, had becomeprivate landin the hands of the latter, and, therefore, the constitutional prohibition, banning a private corporation from acquiring alienable public land, is not applicable to the said land.The Meralco further contends that it has invoke section 48(b) of the Public Land Law, not for itself, but for the Piguing spouses who, as Filipino citizens, could secure a judicial confirmation of their imperfect title to the land.In reply to these contentions, the Solicitor General counters that the said land is not private land because the Meralco and its predecessors-in-interest have no composition title from the Spanish government nor possessory information title or any other means for the acquisition of public lands such as grants or patents (Republic vs. Court of Appeals and De Jesus, L-40912, September 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 146, 157; Director of Lands vs. Reyes, L-27594, November 28, 1975, and Alinsunurin vs. Director of Lands, L-28144, November 28, 1975; 68 SCRA 177; 195; Lee Hong Hok vs. David, L-30389, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 372, 378-9; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals and Raymundo, L-29575, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 634, 639; Padilla vs. Reyes and Director of Lands, 60 Phil. 967, 969; Heirs of Datu Pendatun vs. Director of Lands, 59 Phil. 600, 603).The Public Land Law provides:CHAPTER VIII. Judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.xxx xxx xxxSEC. 48. The following describedcitizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:xxx xxx xxx(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under abona fideclaim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (As amended by Republic Act No. 1942, approved on June 22, 1957.)xxx xxx xxxSEC. 49. No person claiming title to lands of the public domain not in possession of the qualifications specified in the last preceding section may apply for the benefits of this chapter.We hold that, as between the State and the Meralco, the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.This conclusion is supported by the rule announced in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, 892, which rule is a compendious or quintessential precis of a pervasive principle of public land law and land registration law, that"all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest." (Cario vs. Insular Government, 212 U. S. 449, 53 L. ed. 594, 41 Phil. 935 and 7 Phil. 132).The Meralco relies on the ruling in Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424, that "an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain from time immemorial by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be public" and becomes private property.That ruling is based on theCariocase which is about the possession of land by an Igorot and his ancestors since time immemorial or even before the Spanish conquest. The land involved in theSusicase was possessed before 1880 or since a period of time "beyond the reach of memory". That is not the situation in this case. The Meralco does not pretend that the Piguing spouses and their predecessor had been in possession of the land since time immemorial.In theSusicase, this Court applied section 45(b) of Act No. 2874 which corresponds to what is now section 48(b). It was held that the long possession of the land under abona fideclaim of ownership since July 26, 1894 gave rise to the conclusive presumption that the occupant had complied with all the conditions essential to a Government grant and was thus entitled to a certificate of title.On the other hand, in Uy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508, 510-11, it was held that while occupants of public land, who have applied for the confirmation of their title, "teian asimismo a su favor la presuncionjuris et de jurede que habian cumplido con todas las condiciones necesarias para la concesion del titulo; pero hasta que el titulo se expida notenian el concepto juridico de ser los verdaderos dueos del terreno in este dejo de pertenecer a los terrenos publico del Estado susceptibles de enajenacion."That means that until the certificate of title is issued, a pice of land, over which an imperfect title is sought to be confirmed, remains public land. For that reason in theUy Uncase, it was held that if that land was attached by a judgment creditor of the applicant, while his application for confirmation of his imperfect title was pending in the Bureau of Lands, the levy and execution sald of the land were void.For that same reason, lands over which an imperfect title is sought to be confirmed are governed by the Public Land Law. Such lands would not be covered by the Public Land Law if they were already private lands. The occupants' right to the said lands is characterized in the Uy Un case, not as ownership in fee simple, but asderecho dominical incoativo.The Meralco in its concluding argument contends that if the Piguing spouses could ask for the confirmation of their imperfect title to the said lands, then why should the Meralco, as their transferee, be denied the same right to register the said land in its name, there being no legal prohibition for the Piguing spouses from selling the land to the Meralco? This Court is disposing of that same contention in the Oh Cho case said:The benefits provided in the Public Land Act (meaning the confirmation of an imperfect title under section 48[b]) for applicant's immediate predecessors-in-interest are or constitute a grant or concession by the State; and before they could acquire any right under such benefits, the applicant's immediate predecessors-in-interest should comply with the condition precedent for the grant of such benefits.The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which they had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894. This the applicant's immediate predecessors-in-interest (meaning the Piguing spouses in the instant case) failed to do.They did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to title which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors-in-interest, may be availed of by a qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified. (75 Phil. 890, 893.)Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has an imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b) "presupposes that the land is public" (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).The lower court;s judgment dismissing Meralco's application is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner-appellant.SO ORDERED.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. IACRepublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS,petitioner,vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC.,respondents.D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.NARVASA,J.:The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise:1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959;2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took place on October 29, 1962;5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from time immemorial.7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain;8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements were seen by the Court during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on September 18, 1982;9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on November 22, 1979.The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:xxx xxx xxx(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial court which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does not apply.In this regard, attention has been invited toManila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al,1where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning withCarinoin 19092thruSusiin 19253down toHericoin 1980,4which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite periodipso jureand without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what is the better and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,The main theme was given birth, so to speak, inCarinoinvolving the Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:It is true that the language of articles 4 and 55attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical language, inSusi:.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumptionjuris et de jureestablished in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susihad already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State,it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption,of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.6Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeofLacaste vs. Director of Lands,7Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza,8Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan,9Miguel vs. Court of Appeals10andHerico vs. Dar,supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:11.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest,title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land.Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. ....xxx xxx xxxAs interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired,by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of.The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.12Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself13that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would notoriginallyconvert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well put inCarino,"... (T)here are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.We hold that the said constitutional prohibition14has no retroactive application to the sales application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.xxx xxx xxxThe due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).xxx xxx xxxIn the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919).15The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling inMeralcomust be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period,ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent inMeralco:6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent inMeralco.While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, inMeralcorested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as essentiallyobiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance.SO ORDERED.

DE OCSIO v. COURT OF APPEALSRepublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. L-44237 February 28, 1989VICTORIA ONG DE OCSIO,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and the RELIGIOUS OF THE VIRGIN MARY, represented by M.O. Leoncia Pacquing, R.V.M.,respondents.Elpedio N. Cabasan for petitioner.Padilla Law Office for private respondent.NARVASA,J.:From the adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals,1affirmingin totothat of the Trial Court,2the petitioner has come to this Court on an appeal by certiorari to plead for reversal of (1) the factual determination that she had sold the lot in controversy to private respondent, and (2) the legal conclusion that neither the 1973 nor the 1987 Constitution disqualifies the corporation known as the Religious of the Virgin Mary, from acquiring the land in question and registering it in its name. In light of the time-honored rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are generally final, and the doctrine lately laid down by this Court on the precise legal issue now raised by petitioner, her appeal must fail.The controversy at bar arose in connection with cadastral proceedings initiated by the Director of Lands, in behalf of the Republic, for the settlement and adjudication of title to a large tract of land measuring 261.5791 hectares, divided into 1,419 lots, situated in the City of Iligan.3Victoria Ong de Ocsio (herein petitioner) seasonably presented an answer to the petition. She alleged that she was the owner, by purchase, of two (2) parcels of land with specific boundaries comprehended in the cadastral proceeding: Lot No. 1272, measuring 256 square meters, and Lot 1273 a road lot, measuring 21 square meters; and that as owner, she had been in possession of both lots for fifteen (15) years, and her predecessors-in-interest, for sixty (60) years.4Title to the same parcels of land was however claimed by the Religious of the Virgin Mary.5In its answer, it averred that it had bought the lots from Victoria Ong de Ocsio and had been in possession as owner thereof for over four years, and its possession and that of its predecessors was immemorial.Evidence was received on these conflicting assertions after which the Cadastral Court rendered judgment, declaring that the evidence satisfactorily established that Victoria Ong de Ocsio had in truth sold Lot No. 1272 to the Religious of the Virgin Mary in virtue of a deed of sale dated April 12, 1956 (Exhibit 1), and Lot No. 1273 was a road right of way granted to the City of Iligan. The judgment contained the following dispositive portion,viz:6WHEREFORE, the court renders judgment adjudicating Cadastral Lot 1272, Iligan Cadastre, to the Religious of the Virgin Mary, a duly registered domestic religious corporation, the members of which are all Filipino citizens, with main office in the City of Manila, but the building existing thereon is hereby declared to be the property of claimant Victoria Ong de Ocsio who is hereby ordered to remove Said building out of the premises within 90 days from date hereof. The claim of Victoria Ong de Ocsio with respect to said cadastral lot is dismiss. No pronouncement is made as to costs.Let the corresponding decree issue 30 days after this decision shall have become final.As aforestated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the cadastral court's decisionin toto. So, too, will this Court.Both the cadastral Court and the Court of Appeals came to the conclusion, after analysing and weighing the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced by the parties, that Virginia Ong de Ocsio's version of the facts was not true-that it was another property, not Lot No. 1272, that she had conveyed to the religious corporation but that it was indeed Lot No. 1272 that was subject of the sale and had indeed been transferred to the latter. Now, findings of fact of this sort, contained in a decision of the Court of Appeals are by long and uniformly observed rule conclusive on the parties and on the Supreme Court, as well;7subject only to a few specified exceptions,8none of which obtains here, said findings may not be reviewed on appeal.As regards the issue of law raised by her, petitioner fares no better. CitingManila Electric Co. v. Castro-Bartolome,114 SCRA 799 (1982) andRepublic v. Villanueva,114 SCRA 875 (1982), in relation to Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, she asserts that as the private respondent is a religious corporation, it is disqualified to obtain judicial confirmation of an imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which grants that right only to natural persons. The cited rulings no longer control. Current doctrine, first announced by the Court en banc in Director of Lands v. I.A.C. 146 SCRA 509 (1986), is that open, continuous and exclusive possession of alienable public land for at least thirty (30) years in accordance with the Public Land Actipso jureconverts the land to private property, and a juridical person who thereafter acquires the same may have title thereto confirmed in its name. Virtually the same state of facts obtained in said case that now obtain here. A private corporation had purchased the land originally of the public domain from parties who had, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, possessed and occupied it since time immemorial. It had thereafter instituted proceedings for confirmation of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. In upholding its right to do so, the court held that the fact that the proceedings had been instituted by said purchaser in its own name and not in the name of the transferors was "xx simply xx (an) accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed." The ruling was reaffirmed in two later cases,Director of Lands v. Manila Electric Co.,153 SCRA 686 (September 11, 1987), andRepublic v. C.A.,156 SCRA 344 (October 30, 1987) where the same question of law was raised. In the latter it was expressly held that the prohibitions in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions against acquisition or registration of lands by or in behalf of private corporations do not apply to public lands already converted to private ownership by natural persons under the provisions of the Public Land Act. In the present case, Virginia Ong de Ocsio and her predecessors-in-interest having possessed Lot No. 1272 for the period and under the conditions prescribed by law for acquisition of ownership of disposable public land prior to the sale of the property to the Religious of the Virgin Mary, confirmation of title thereto in the latter's name is, under the precedents referred to, entirely in order.WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals subject of the petition for review on certiorari is AFFIRMEDin toto.Costs against the petitioner.PALOMO v. COURT OF APPEALSRepublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 95608 January 21, 1997SPOUSES IGNACIO PALOMO and TRINIDAD PASCUAL, and CARMEN PALOMO VDA. DE BUENAVENTURA,petitioners,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, FAUSTINO J. PERFECTO, RAFFY SANTILLAN, BOY ARIADO, LORENZO BROCALES, SALVADOR DOE, and other DOES,respondents.ROMERO,J.:The issue in the case at bar pertains to ownership of 15 parcels of land in Tiwi, Albay which form part of the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park." The facts of the case are as follows.On June 13, 1913, then Governor General of the Philippine Islands, William Cameron Forbes issued Executive Order No. 40 which reserved for provincial park purposes some 440,530 square meters of land situated in Barrio Naga, Municipality of Tiwi, Province of Albay pursuant to the provisions of Act 648 of the Philippine Commission.1Subsequently, the then Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District, United States of America, ordered the registration of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order No. 40 in the name of Diego Palomo on December 9, 1916;2December 28,3and January 17, 1917.4Diego Palomo donated these parcels of land consisting of 74,872 square meters which were allegedly covered by Original Certificates of Title Nos. 513, 169, 176 and 1735to his heirs, herein petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two months before his death in April 1937.6Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay on May 30, 1950.7The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953.8On July 10, 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park," under the control, management, protection and administration of the defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of the public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Law (CA 141) nor registrable under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496).The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real estate taxes thereon9and introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas,pandanand coconuts. On April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen vda. de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual mortgaged the parcels of land covered by TCT 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 to guarantee a loan of P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine Islands.In May 7, 1974 petitioner Carmen vda. de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual filed Civil Case No. T-143 before the then Court of First Instance of Albay for Injunction with damages against private respondents Faustino J. Perfecto, Raffy Santillan, Boy Ariado, Lorenzo Brocales, Salvador Doe and other Does who are all employees of the Bureau of Forest Development who entered the land covered by TCT No. 3913 and/or TCT 3914 and cut down bamboos thereat, totally leveling no less than 4 groves worth not less than P2,000.00.On October 11, 1974, the Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case No. T-176 for annulment and cancellation of Certificates of Title involving the 15 parcels of land registered in the name of the petitioners and subject of Civil Case T-143. Impleaded with the petitioners as defendants were the Bank of the Philippine Islands, Legazpi Branch and the Register of Deeds of Albay.The case against the Bank of Philippine Islands was dismissed because the loan of P200,000 with the Bank was already paid and the mortgage in its favor cancelled.A joint trial of Civil Case T-143 and T-176 was conducted upon agreement of the parties and on July 31, 1986, the trial court rendered the following decision:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:IN CIVIL CASE No. T-143, in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs, dismissing the complaint for injunction and damages, as it is hereby DISMISSED.Costs against the plaintiffs.In CIVIL CASE No. T-176, in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants:(1) Declaring null and void and no force and effect the Order dated September 14, 1953, as well as the Original Certificate of Titles Nos. 153,10169, 173 and 176 and Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. 3911, T-3912, T-3913, and T-3914, all of the Register of Deeds of Albay and all transactions based on said titles.(2) Forfeiting in favor of the plaintiff Government any and all improvements on the lands in question that are found therein and introduced by the defendants;(3) Declaring Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 8, 9,10, 11 and 12, Plan II-9299 and Lots 1, 21,113 and 4 of Plan II-9205 as part of the Tiwi Hot Spring National Park;(4) and Finally, the Register of Deeds of Albay is hereby ordered to cancel the alleged Original Certificates of Titles Nos. 513, 169, 173 and 176, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-3911, T-3912, T-3913 and T-3914.Costs against the defendants.So Ordered.12The courta quoin ruling for the Republic found no sufficient proof that the Palomos have established property rights over the parcels of land in question before the Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish-American War at the end of the century. The court further stated that assuming that the decrees of the Court of First Instance of Albay were really issued, the Palomos obtained no right at all over the properties because these were issued only when Executive Order No. 40 was already in force. At this point, we take note that although the Geodetic Engineer of the Bureau of Lands appointed as one of the Commissioners in the relocation survey of the properties stated in his reamended report that of the 3,384 square meters covered by Lot 2, Plan II-9205, only 1,976 square meters fall within the reservation area,13the RTC ordered TCT 3913 covering the entire Lot 21 (sic) Plan II-9205 cancelled.The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmedin totothe findings of the lower Court; hence this petition raising the following issues:1. The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in affirmingin totothe decision of the lower court.2. The declaration of nullity of the original certificates of title and subsequent transfer certificates of titles of the petitioners over the properties in question is contrary to law and jurisprudence on the matter.3. The forfeiture of all improvements introduced by the petitioners in the premises in favor of the government is against our existing law and jurisprudence.The issues raised essentially boil down to whether or not the alleged original certificate of titles issued pursuant to the order of the Court of First Instance in 1916-1917 and the subsequent TCTs issued in 1953 pursuant to the petition for reconstitution are valid.Petitioners contend that the Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish-American War at the end of the 19th century recognized the property rights of Spanish and Filipino citizens and the American government had no inherent power to confiscate properties of private citizens and declare them part of any kind of government reservation. They allege that their predecessors in interest have been in open, adverse and continuous possession of the subject lands for 20-50 years prior to their registration in 1916-1917. Hence, the reservation of the lands for provincial purposes in 1913 by then Governor-general Forbes was tantamount to deprivation of private property without due process of law.In support of their claim, the petitioners presented copies of a number of decisions of the Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District of the United States of America which state that the predecessors in interest of the petitioners' father Diego Palomo, were in continuous, open and adverse possession of the lands from 20 to 50 years at the time of their registration in 1916.We are not convinced.The Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown by discovery and conquest in the 16th century. Before the Treaty of Paris in April 11, 1899, our lands, whether agricultural, mineral or forest were under the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. Hence, private ownership of land could only be acquired through royal concessions which were documented in various forms, such as (1) Titulo Real or Royal Grant," (2) Concesion Especial or Special Grant, (3) Titulo de Compra or Title by Purchase and (4) Informacion Posesoria or Possessory Information title obtained under the Spanish Mortgage Law or under the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889.Unfortunately, no proof was presented that the petitioners' predecessors in interest derived title from an old Spanish grant. Petitioners placed much reliance upon the declarations in Expediente No. 5, G.L.R.O. Record Decision No. 9820, dated January 17, 1917; Expediente No. 6, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9821, dated December 28, 1916; Expediente No. 7, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9822, dated December 9, 1916; Expediente No. 8, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9823, dated December 28, 1916 and Expediente No. 10, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9868, dated December 9, 1916 of the Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District of the United States of America presided by Judge Isidro Paredes that their predecessors in interest were in open, adverse and continuous possession of the subject lands for 20-50 years.14The aforesaid "decisions" of the Court of First Instance, however, were not signed by the judge but were merely certified copies of notification to Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the clerk of court.Moreover, despite claims by the petitioners that their predecessors in interest were in open, adverse and continuous possession of the lands for 20 to 50 years prior to their registration in 1916-1917, the lands were surveyed only in December 1913, the very same year they were acquired by Diego Palomo. Curiously , in February 1913 or 10 months before the lands were surveyed for Diego Palomo, the government had already surveyed the area in preparation for its reservation for provincial park purposes. If the petitioners' predecessors in interest were indeed in possession of the lands for a number of years prior to their registration in 1916-1917, they would have undoubtedly known about the inclusion of these properties in the reservation in 1913. It certainly is a trifle late at this point to argue that the government had no right to include these properties in the reservation when the question should have been raised 83 years ago.As regards the petitioners' contention that inasmuch as they obtained the titles without government opposition, the government is now estopped from questioning the validity of the certificates of title which were granted. As correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of Appeals, the principle of estoppel, does not operate against the Government for the act of its agents.15Assuming that the decrees of the Court of First Instance were really issued, the lands are still not capable of appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain.There is no question that the lands in the case at bar were not alienable lands of the public domain. As testified by the District Forester, records in the Bureau of Forestry show that the subject lands were never declared as alienable and disposable and subject to private alienation prior to 1913 up to the present.16Moreover, as part of the reservation for provincial park purposes, they form part of the forest zone.It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property,17unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.Neither do the tax receipts which were presented in evidence prove ownership of the parcels of land inasmuch as the weight of authority is that tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership in land registration cases.18Having disposed of the issue of ownership, we now come to the matter regarding the forfeiture of improvements introduced on the subject lands. It bears emphasis that Executive Order No. 40 was already in force at the time the lands in question were surveyed for Diego Palomo. Petitioners also apparently knew that the subject lands were covered under the reservation when they filed a petition for reconstitution of the lost original certificates of title inasmuch as the blueprint of Survey Work Order Number 21781 of Plan II-9299 approved by the Chief of the Land Registration Office Enrique Altavas in 1953 as a true and correct copy of the Original Plan No. II-9299 filed in the Bureau of Lands dated September 11, 194819contains the following note, "in conflict with provincial reservation."20In any case, petitioners are presumed to know the law and the failure of the government to oppose the registration of the lands in question is no justification for the petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots.Finally, since 1,976 square meters of the 3,384 square meters covered by TCT 3913 fall within the reservation, TCT 3913 should be annulled only with respect to the aforesaid area. Inasmuch as the bamboo groves leveled in TCT 3913 and subject of Civil Case T-143,21were within the perimeter of the national park,22no pronouncement as to damages is in order.WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that TCT 3913 be annulled with respect to the 1,976 square meter area falling within the reservation zone.SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS & BERNABESECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-40402. March 16, 1987.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Petitioner, v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and EMILIO BERNABE, SR., EMILIO BERNABE, JR., LUZ BERNABE, AMPARO BERNABE, and ELISA BERNABE,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PARAS,J.:

This is a petition for review oncertiorariseeking a reversal of the decision of Respondent Court of Appeals 1 dated February 5, 1975 in CA-G.R. No. 50076-R, entitled "EMILIO BERNABE, SR., Et. Al. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES," affirming the order of the Court of First Instance of Bataan dated August 14, 1971 in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097, which dismissed petitioner Republics petition for review of the decrees of registration issued pursuant to the decision rendered on December 17, 1968 adjudicating in favor of the private Respondents herein, the lots applied for by them, and the Resolution of Respondent Court dated March 19, 1975 denying herein Petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The undisputed facts are as follows: Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land in a decision rendered before the last war in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097.

On July 6, 1965, Lot 622 was segregated from the forest zone and released and certified by the Bureau of Forestry as an agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act (Record on Appeal, p. 7).On April 26, 1967, Respondents filed in the Court of First Instance of Bataan a petition to reopen Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097, under Republic Act 931, as amended by Republic Act 2061, concerning a portion of Lot No. 622 Lot Nos. 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798 and a portion of Lot No. 324 Lot Nos. 791 and 799 more particularly identified and delineated in the segregation plans of Sgs-3343, Sgs-3440, Sgs-3340, Sgs-3341, Sgs-3342 and Sgs-3339, approved by the Director of Lands, to perfect their rights and register their titles to said lots, having allegedly acquired ownership and possession of said parcels of land by purchase from the original owners thereof, whose possession of the same including that of the herein Respondents, has always been continuous, open, active, exclusive, public, adverse, and in the concept of owners thereof for more than 30 years (Record on Appeal, pp. 3-5 and 11).On May 17, 1967, the lower court issued an Order setting the petition for hearing and directing that the Republic of the Philippines be notified thereof by furnishing the Solicitor-General, the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, a copy of said Order together with Respondents petition by registered mail (Record on Appeal, p. 6).On August 24, 1967, the Director of Forestry filed an opposition to the petition praying for the denial of the petition once the area involved is found to be within the timberland and therefore inalienable under the Constitution (Record on Appeal, p. 7). Upon verification, however, the Director of Forestry found the area to be the portion of the timberland already released by the government from the mass of public forests and promptly withdrew his Opposition (Record on Appeal, p. 8).On September 1, 1967, the Acting Provincial Fiscal of Bataan, for and in behalf of the Director of Lands, filed his opposition to the petition alleging that the land is still, in truth and in fact, public land and as such cannot be the subject of a land registration proceeding under Act 496.

The lower court found that the petitioners have complied with all the terms and conditions which would entitle them to a grant. Thus, the dispositive portion of its decision dated December 17, 1968 (Record on Appeal, p. 19), reads:"WHEREFORE, the segregation plans, Sgs-3340, Sgs-3339, Sgs-3341, Sgs-3342, Sgs-3343 and Sgs-3340 and their technical descriptions are hereby APPROVED, and pursuant to Sec. 11 of Act 2259, the court hereby adjudicates in favor of petitioners Emilio Bernabe, Sr., married; Emilio Bernabe, Jr., married; Luz Bernabe, single; Amparo Bernabe, single and Elisa Bernabe, single, all Filipinos and residents of Balanga, Bataan, the lots herein applied for as follows:Luz Bernabe Sgs-791 82,771 sq. m.

3339

Elisa Bernabe Sgs-793 71.596 sq. m.

3341

Amparo Bernabe Sgs-794 43,399 sq. m.

3342 795 100,439 sq. m.

Josefina Bernabe Sgs-796 69,355 sq. m.

3343 797 75,100 sq. m.

Emilio Bernabe, Jr. Sgs-798 100,183 sq. m.

Sgs-3440 Sgs-799 64,052. sq. m.

and upon this decision having become final, the Commissioner of Land Registration is hereby directed to issue the corresponding decrees of registration therefor."Pursuant to the aforecited decision, the Commissioner of Land Registration issued Decrees Nos. N-124813-124818, all dated May 7, 1969 (Record on Appeal, pp. 20-25).

On May 7, 1979, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, acting in its behalf and in behalf of the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, through the Solicitor-General, filed a petition for review of the decrees of registration under Section 38, of Act No. 496, as amended, and the corresponding decision of the lower court, on the grounds that the entire proceeding was vitiated by lack of notice to the Solicitor General of the subsequent hearings of the petition for re-opening of the cadastral proceedings; that the parcels of land subject matter of the petition to re-open cadastral proceedings are portions of the public domain, admittedly within the unclassified public forest of Mariveles, Bataan, opened for disposition only on or about July 6, 1965; that subsequently, respondents do not have a registerable title to the land subject matter of the proceedings; and the lower court, without jurisdiction to decree the confirmation of registerable title to respondents over portions of the public domain, as respondents do not qualify under the provisions of Section 48(b) of CA 141, as amended, and that under the circumstances, respondents employed actual fraud in procuring title over the parcels of land (Record on Appeal, p. 25).

On May 29, 1979, respondents moved to dismiss the Petition for Review on the grounds that: (1) The trial court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit as there is no fraud to justify the setting aside on review of a decree of registration. If the Solicitor General was not notified of the subsequent hearings, it was because he delegated his appearance to the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan. Besides the setting aside or review was filed out of time. (2) The petition states no cause of action, the parcels of land involved in the actions having been already transferred to innocent purchasers for value long before the Solicitor-General even filed the petition for review (Record on Appeal, pp. 27-40).

Their motion to dismiss having been held in abeyance until the hearing of the merits of the case which was set for August 16, 1970, respondents filed their answer to the Petition for Review on August 4, 1970. In their answer, respondents reiterated their grounds in their motion to dismiss (Record on Appeal, pp. 40-44).

On November 12, 1970, Petitioner filed an amended Petition for Review, with the additional allegation that after having fraudulently secured title over the parcels of land involved, the petitioners executed simulated deeds of sale purporting to convey various lots composing portions of the parcels involved to third parties for fictitious considerations in an obvious attempt to remove the parcels of land involved from the coverage of Section 38 of Act 496, but in truth, the aforementioned third parties are not innocent purchasers for value, being mere dummies of the petitioners, holding the parcels of land involved only in trust for the petitioners. On November 23, 1970, respondents filed their answer to the Amended Petition for Review (Record on Appeal, p. 56).

On August 14, 1971, the lower court issued its Order denying petitioners Amended Petition for Review (Record on Appeal, p. 56).On appeal to the Court of Appeals on September 20, 1971, the questioned Order of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch I was affirmed (Rollo, p. 33).

On February 25, 1975, Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals for lack of merit, in the Resolution of a special Division of Five, promulgated on March 19, 1975.

Hence this petition.Without giving due course to the Petition, the Court, through its First Division, resolved on May 5, 1975 to require the respondents to comment thereon. On May 30, 1975, respondents filed their comment, alleging that the decision of respondent Court and the questioned resolution were not rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction. Neither was the discretion exercised by respondent Court arbitrary or despotic.In its Resolution dated June 4, 1975, the Court resolved to give due course to the Petition and denied the urgent motion of respondents for leave to file a supplemental and/or amended comment. Petitioners filed its Brief on November 29, 1975; respondents, on March 2, 1976. Petitioner filed its Reply Brief on March 25, 1976 and on May 5, 1976, the case was deemed submitted for decision.

Petitioner assigns the following errors:I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE LOTS CLAIMED BY HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS BECAME AGRICULTURAL ONLY ON JULY 6, 1965 WHEN THE SAME WERE RELEASED FROM THE FOREST ZONE AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY THEY LACK THE REQUISITE THIRTY (30) YEARS POSSESSION TO ENTITLE THEM TO A GRANT.II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ENTIRE PROCEEDING FOR REOPENING OF THE CADASTRAL CASE OVER THE LOTS IN QUESTION WAS VITIATED BY LACK OF NOTICE TO THE SOLICITOR-GENERAL.

III. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ALLEGED TRANSFER OF THE LOTS IN QUESTION BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO THIRD PARTIES WHEN THEIR TITLES WERE STILL SUBJECT TO THE ONE-YEAR PERIOD OF REVIEW CONSTITUTES FRAUD SCHEMED BY THE TRANSFERORS AS A MEANS OF FRUSTRATING ANY ACTION AIMED AT NULLIFYING THEIR TITLES THERETO.

The governments cause is meritorious.I

It is evident from the facts of the case at bar that private respondents did file a claim for Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre and in fact a decision was rendered before the last war in Cadastral Case No. 19 LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097, declaring the lot in question as public land. It must be stressed that said lot was declared public land by virtue of a court decision which has become final and as held by the Supreme Court aforesaid decision is res judicata. (Republic v. Estenzo, 120 SCRA 222 [1983]). It is therefore beyond question that the trial court has no jurisdiction to reopen the cadastral proceeding under R.A. 931 as amended by R.A. 2061 and the decision therein rendered is null and void ab initio.Furthermore, it is undisputed that aforesaid Lot No. 622 was released as an agricultural land for disposition under Public Land Act only on July 6, 1965. The lower court ordered the issuance of the corresponding decrees of registration for the lots, pursuant to Sec. 48(b), C.A. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, providing for the confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, which reads:

"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter." As pointed out by petitioner, the question is whether or not the lots claimed by respondents could legally be the subject of a judicial confirmation of title under the aforequoted provisions of the Public Land Act, as amended.

The answer is in the negative.Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded. They are incapable of registration and their inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued during the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of registration, nullifies the title (Li Seng Giap v. Director of Lands, 55 Phil. 693 [1931]; Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177 [1975]). Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Vano v. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable v. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]; Director of Forestry v. Muoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]; Director of Lands v. Abanzado, 65 SCRA 5 [1975]). A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648 [1979]; Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984].Thus, even if the reopening of the cadastral proceedings was at all possible, private respondents have not qualified for a grant under Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, the facts being that private respondents could only be credited with 1 year, 9 months and 20 days possession and occupation of the lots involved, counted from July 6, 1965, the date when the land area in sitio San Jose, barrio Cabcaban, Mariveles, Bataan, known as Bataan PMD No. 267, which includes the lots claimed by respondents, had been segregated from the forest zone and released by the Bureau of Forestry as an agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act. (Record on Appeal, p. 19). Consequently, under the above mentioned jurisprudence, neither private respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest could have possessed the lots for the requisite period of thirty (30) years as disposable agricultural land.

II

Petitioner argues that the government, being a necessary party in the cadastral case, as reopened, its counsel, the Solicitor-General, should have been furnished copies of all court orders, notices and decisions, as in ordinary cases, in order to bind the government. Failure to give such notice deprives the State of its day in Court, and renders the decision void. (Brief for Petitioner, pp. 16-17).The records show that the Solicitor-General was duly notified of the initial hearing on the petition to reopen Cadastral Case No. 19 but thereafter, notice of subsequent hearings as well as a copy of the decision itself promulgated by the lower court on December 19, 1968 was sent instead to the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan, admittedly the duly authorized representative of the Solicitor-General in the cadastral proceeding as shown in a telegram dated January 19, 1968. (Record on Appeal, p. 47).In the case of Republic v. Director of Lands (71 SCRA 426 [1976], the Supreme Court, applying the time-honored principle of agency ruled that the service of the questioned decision on the Provincial Fiscal must necessarily be service on the Solicitor-General, and added that technical transgressions relative to the filing and service may be brushed aside when the adverse party (this time the Director of Lands and Forestry and their counsel, the Solicitor-General) is aware of the matter which his adversary would want the court to act upon. Once it appears that the party is already informed by one means or another of what he is to be notified, the required service becomes an empty gesture and strict observance thereof is considered waived. (Citing Estrada v. Sto. Domingo, 28 SCRA 890 [1969]).In the case at bar, it does not appear that the Solicitor General was so apprised of the decision of the lower court in question as there is no proof that the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan ever sent the Solicitor-General a copy thereof. Furthermore, after the 3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal filed a notice of appeal from the decision of the trial court, the Provincial Fiscal on March 21, 1969 manifested that he was withdrawing the appeal upon the intervention of the District Forester. (Respondents Brief, p. 44).It will be observed however that later decisions of the Supreme Court tend to be more strict in the matter of giving notice to the Solicitor General. In a more recent case, Republic v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 161 [1985], it was established that the Solicitor-General is the only legal counsel of the government in land registration cases and as such, he alone may withdraw the Governments appeal with binding effect on the latter. He is entitled to be furnished copies of all court orders, notices and decisions and as held the reglementary thirty-day period for appeal should be reckoned from the time the Solicitor-Generals Office is apprised of the 1970 order of denial and not from the time the special counsel or the fiscal was served with that order. Thus, representatives of the Solicitor General in the case at bar, had no power to decide whether or not an appeal should be made. They should have referred the matter to the Solicitor-General and without copies of court orders, notices and decisions, having been provided by either the trial court or the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan to the Solicitor-General, the assailed decision has no binding effect on the government.

III

The petition for review of Decrees Nos. N-124813 to N-124818 under Sec. 38 of Act No. 496 as amended was filed by the Solicitor General on May 7, 1970 in representation of the Republic of the Philippines, in the same Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097, exactly a year after the issuance of aforesaid decrees of registration, on the ground of actual fraud. (Record on Appeal, pp. 43-44).The basic elements for the allowance of the reopening or review of a decree, are: (1) that the petitioner has real or dominical right; (2) that he has been deprived thereof through fraud; (3) that the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree and (4) that the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser. (Libudan v. Gil, 45 SCRA 27 [1972]; Rubico, Et. Al. v. Orellana, 30 SCRA 513 [1969]). It has been held however that the action to annul a judgment, upon the ground of fraud would be unavailing unless the fraud be extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. (Libudan v. Gil, supra). Review of the decree demands a showing of actual (not constructive) fraud, i.e. actual malice. (Rublico v. Orellana, supra).In the case at bar, it cannot be said that private respondents employed actual fraud in procuring titles over parcels of land of the public domain as it is a matter of record that the land in question was opened for disposition and alienation only on July 6, 1965. The matter was threshed out in the lower court and the decision of the latter was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Actual malice is therefore absent.However, it has been held that, if a decree issued in pursuance of a valid decision, obtained by fraud, may be annulled within one (1) year from entry of said decree, there is more reason to hold that the same is true if entered in compliance with a decision suffering from a fatal infirmity, such as want of due process, (Vda. de Cuaycong v. Vda. de Sangbengoo, 110 Phil. 118 [1960] or lack of jurisdiction of the court that decided the cadastral case. (Republic v. De Kalintas, 25 SCRA 720 [1969]). Thus, on both counts, the case at bar can properly be the subject of review, it having been shown that the Solicitor-General was not properly furnished the requisite notices and copy of the assailed decision but more importantly, the lower court as previously stated had no jurisdiction to re-open the cadastral proceeding under Republic Act 931 as amended by R.A. No. 2061.

IV

As to whether or not the transferees of the lot in question are innocent purchasers for value, it is a well settled rule that a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor. (Leung Yee v. F.L. Strong Machiner Co., Et Al., 37 Phil. 651[1918]. Without the needed verification, he cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value in contemplation of law.

Moreover, it is well-settled that a certificate of title is void, when it covers property of public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled. (Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. Dumyung, 89 SCRA 540 [1979] underscoring supplied). In the case at bar, it will be noted that in granting titles to the land in dispute, the lower court counted the period of possession of private respondents before the same were released as forest lands for disposition, which release is tantamount to qualifying the latter to a grant on said lands while they were still non-disposable. Thus, under the foregoing rulings, even assuming that the transferees are innocent purchasers for value, their titles to said lands derived from the titles of private respondents which were not validly issued as they cover lands still a part of the public domain, may be cancelled.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals and the decision of the Court of First Instance are hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED, because the lots in question still form part of the public domain. The certificates of title issued over them are hereby ordered CANCELLED.

SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC v. DE GUZMANRepublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 137887 February 28, 2000REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner,vs.DAMIAN ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, DEOGRACIAS ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, ALICIA ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, SALVADOR ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, DOMINGA ERMITAO, NATIVIDAD ENCARNACION, MELBA E. TORRES, FLORA MANALO, SOCORRO DELA ROSA, JOSE ERMITAO, ESMERANDO ERMITAO, TRICOM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and FILOMENO ERMITAO,respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:Before us is a Petition for Review onCertiorariof a decision of the Court of Appeals1affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay, Branch 18, in LRC Cases No. TG-362 and TG-396.2The facts are simple:Conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect title were filed by Norma Almanzor and private respondent Salvador De Guzman over parcels of land located in Silang, Cavite. After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent De Guzman, to wit WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered by this Court as follows:(1) In LRC Case No. TG-362, this Court hereby denies the application for registration of the parcels of land mentioned therein by applicant Norma R. Almanzor for lack of factual and legal bases;(2) In LRC Case No. 396, this Court hereby approves the petition for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 946 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Law, the land described in Plan Psu-67537-Amd-2 and containing an area of 308,638 square meters, as supported by its technical descriptions now forming parts of the records of these cases, in addition to other proofs adduced in the names of petitioners Damian Ermitao De Guzman, Deogracias Ermitao De Guzman, Zenaida Ermitao De Guzman, Alicia Ermitao De Guzman and Salvador De Guzman, all married, of legal age and with residence and postal addresses at Magallanes Street, Carmona, Cavite, subject to the claims of oppositors Dominga Ermitao, Natividad Encarnacion, Melba E. Torres, Flora Manalo, Socorro de la Rosa, Jose Ermitao and Esmeranso Ermitao under an instrument entitled "Waiver of Rights with Conformity" the terms and conditions of which are hereby ordered by this Court to be annotated at the back of the certificates of title to be issued to the petitioners pursuant to the judgment of this Court.SO ORDERED.3As earlier mentioned, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, said judgment was affirmed and the petition for registration of private respondents over the subject parcels of land was approved.Hence, the instant Petition, anchored upon the following assignments of error ITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DE GUZMANS HAVE NOT SUBMITTED PROOF OF THEIR FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR POSSESSION IN THE MANNER AND FOR THE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED BY LAW TO JUSTIFY CONFIRMATION OF AN IMPERFECT TITLE.IITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE DE GUZMANS HAVE NOT OVERTHROWN THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LANDS ARE PORTIONS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.4We find merit in the instant Petition.It is not disputed that the subject parcels of land were released as agricultural land only in 19655while the petition for confirmation of imperfect title was filed by private respondents only in 1991.6Thus the period of occupancy of the subject parcels of land from 1965 until the time the application was filed in 1991 was only twenty six (26) years, four (4) years short of the required thirty (30) year period possession requirement underSec.14,P.D.29andR.A.No.6940.In finding that private respondents' possession of the subject property complied with law, the Court of Appeals reasoned out that (W)hile it is true that th