HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ v. PICOPRESOURCES, INC.G.R. No. 162243, December 3, 2009Chico-Nazario, J.:

Doctrine:A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause.

Facts:PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43converted into an IFMA.PICOP filed before the (RTC) City a Petition for Mandamusagainst then DENR Sec Alvarez forunlawfully refusing and/or neglecting to sign and execute the IFMA contract of PICOP even as the latter has complied with all the legal requirements for the automatic conversion of TLA No. 43, as amended, into anIFMA. The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus with the trial court is clear: the government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos, to enter into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP.

Issue:Whether the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause by which the government may be bound (for the issuance of the IFMA)

Held:NO. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause is edifying. We declared:Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the dueprocess clause ofthe Constitution.Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." cannot be invoked. The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, beconstrued as acontractual undertaking assuring PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an interpretation would result in the complete abdication by the State infavor ofPICOP of thesovereign power to control and supervise theexploration, development andutilization of thenatural resources in thearea.

Amodia vda de Melencion vs. Court of Appeals (534 SCRA 62) Registration Under Art. 1544 of the New Civil Code; Registration of Sale of Titled Land Under Act 3344

The registration under Art. 1544 of the New Civil Code refers to registration under the torrens system which considers the act of registration as the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land.If a parcel of land is registered under the Land Registration Act and has a torrens certificate of title and is sold and the sale is registered not under Land Registration Act but under Act 3344, such sale is not considered registered as the term is used under Article 1544 of the New Civil Code.The loss of a certificate of title of a titled land does not convert the land into unregistered land.

REPUBLIC VS. HEIRS OF FRANCISCA DIGNOS-SORONOG.R. No. 171571, March 24, 2008

FACTS:2 were adjudicated by the then Court of First Instance of Cebu in favor of the following in four equal shares:a) Francisca Dignos, married to Blas Sorono share in the two lots;b)Tito Dignos share in the two lots;c) predecessors-in-interest of the respondents share in the two lots;andd) predecessors-in-interest of the respondents share in the two lotsIt appears that the two lots were not partitioned by the adjudicatees.It appears further that the heirs of Tito Dignos, who was awarded share in the two lots, sold theentire two lotsto the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) via a public instrument entitled Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale without the knowledge of respondents whose predecessors-in-interest were the adjudicatees of the rest of the portion of the two lots.

In 1996, CAAs successor-in-interest, the Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA), erected a security fence one of the lot and relocated a number of families, who had built their dwellings within the airport perimeter, to a portion of said lot to enhance airport security.

MCIAA later caused the issuance in its name of a Tax Declarations of the 2 lots.Respondents soon asked the agents of MCIAA to cease giving third persons permission to occupy the lots but the same was ignored.

Respondents thereupon filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title, Legal Redemption with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against MCIAA before the RTC of Lapu-lapu City. Respondents further alleged that neither they nor their predecessors-in-interests sold, alienated or disposed of their shares in the lots of which they have been in continuous peaceful possession. Respondents furthermore alleged that neither petitioner nor its predecessor-in-interest had given them any written notice of its acquisition of the share of Tito Dignos.The Republic, represented by the MCIAA in its Answer with Counterclaim, maintained that from the time the lots were sold to its predecessor-in-interest CAA, it has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession thereof; through acquisitive prescription, it had acquired valid title to the lots since it was a purchaser in good faith and for value; and assumingarguendothat it did not have just title, it had, by possession for over 30 years, acquired ownership thereof by extraordinary prescription. At all events, petitioner contended that respondents action was barred by estoppel and laches.The trial court found for respondents. The CA affirmed the trial courts decision. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari

ISSUE:1. WON the sale of the entire 2 lots by the heirs of Tito binding to the respondents2. WON estoppel and laches should work against respondents

HELD:the petition is denied1. NO. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.Aproposis the following pertinent portion of this Courts decision inBailon-Casilao v. CA:As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale willaffect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consenttothesale.Thisis because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common.From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is NOT null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.Petitioners predecessor-in-interest CAA thus acquired only the rights pertaining to the sellers-heirs of Tito Dignos, which is only undivided share of the two lots.2. NO. Registered lands cannot be the subject of acquisitive prescription. Petitioners insistence that it acquired the property through acquisitive prescription, if not ordinary, then extraordinary, does not lie. It bears emphasis at this juncture that in the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale forged by CAA and Tito Dignos heirs the following material portions thereofvalidate the claim of respondentsthat thetwo lots were registered: x x x xThat since theOCTof Title of the above-mentionedproperty/ieshas/have been lost and/or destroyed and the VENDEE hereby binds itself to reconstitute saidtitle/sat its own expense and that the HEIRS-VENDORS, their heirs, successors and assigns bind themselves to help in the reconstitution oftitleso that the said lot/s may be registered in the name of the VENDEE in accordance with law x x x xNOTES:As for petitioners argument that the redemption price should be of the prevailing market value, not of the actual purchase price, since, so it claims, (1) the respondents received just compensation for the property at the time it was purchased by the Government; and, (2) the property, due to improvements introduced by petitioner in its vicinity, is now worth several hundreds of millions of pesos, the law is not on its side.Thus, Article 1088 of the Civil Code provides:Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaserby reimbursing him for the price of the sale,provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor. The Court may take judicial notice of the increase in value of the lots.

As mentioned earlier, however, the heirs of Tito Dignos didnotnotify respondents about the sale. At any rate, since the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale stipulates, thus:That the HEIRS-VENDORS, their heirs, assigns and successors, undertake and agree to warrant and defend the possession and ownership of the property/ies herein sold against any and all just claims of all persons whomsoeverand should the VENDEE be disturbed in its possession, to prosecute and defend the same in the Courts of Justice.Petitioner is not without any remedy. This decision is, therefore, without prejudice to petitioners right to seek redress against the vendors-heirs of Tito Dignos and their successors-in-interest.

REPUBLIC VS. CA AND NAGUITG.R.No.144057January17,2005Tinga, J.

FACTS:CorazonNaguitfiledapetitionforregistrationoftitlewhichseeksjudicial confirmation of her imperfect title over a parcel of land in Nabas, Aklan. It was alleged that Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the government until she filedher application for registration. The MCTC rendered adecision confirming the title in the name of Naguit upon failure of Rustico Angeles to appear during trial afterfiling his formal opposition to the petition. The Solicitor General, representing the Republic of the Philippines, filed a motion for reconsideration on the grounds that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Naguit could not have maintained a bonafide claim of ownership since the subject land was declared as alienable and disposable only on October 15, 1980. The alienable and disposable character of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

ISSUE:Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicants possession under abona fide claim of ownership could even start.

RULING:Section14(1)merelyrequiresthatthepropertysoughttoberegisteredasalready alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed.There are three requirements for registration of title,(1) that thesubject property is alienable and disposable; (2) that the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest have been inopen, continuous, andexclusive possession and occupation, and; (3)that the possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.There must be a positive act of the government through a statute or proclamation stating the intention ofthe State toabdicate its exclusive prerogative overthe property, thus, declaring the land as alienable and disposable. However, if there has been none, it is presumed that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property and the possession of the land no matter how long would not ripen into ownership through acquisitive prescription. To follow the Solicitor Generals argument in the construction of Section 14 (1)would render the paragraph 1 of the said provision inoperative for it would mean that all lands of public domain which were not declared as alienable and disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length ofunchallenged possession by the occupant.In effect, it precludes the government from enforcingthesaidprovisionasitdecidestoreclassifylandsasalienableanddisposable.The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, ithaving been planted with coconut trees now over fifty years old. The inherent nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the application of Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing tothe continuous possession byher andher predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945.

Business Organization Corporation Law Corporations are not Filipino Citizens Registration of Public Lands

In 1978, Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) purchased a parcel of land from one Carmen Racimo in Ilocos Norte. In 1979, INC sought to register said land under its name pursuant to Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law. The Director of Lands opposed the application as it averred that the said parcel of land is part of the alienable public land; that INC cannot register said land because it is not a Filipino citizen. INC argues that it is a private land because Racimo, its predecessor-in-interest has been in possession thereof for more than 30 years; that the Constitutional prohibition does not apply to INC, a corporation sole (solely incorporated by one man, Erao Manalo, a Filipino citizen), hence it can acquire said property.

ISSUE:Whether or not INC can register said parcel of land under its name.

HELD:No.The disputed land has never lost its public character. Racimo, though occupying said land for more than 30 years, never applied for confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title over said land. Under the law, all lands that were not acquired from the Government either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. As exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law allows the registration of alienable public lands but only by Filipino citizens. INC is not a Filipino citizen. There is no basis on the contention that as a corporation sole, INC is not prohibited from holding said land. The benefit only applies to Filipino citizens not to a corporation sole which has citizenship.NOTE:60% rule: Corporations and Partnerships of which at least 60% of their capital belong to Filipinos may acquire real property.