FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 79560 :December 3, 1990.]191 SCRA 823ANDRES E. DITAN, Petitioner,vs.PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ASIAWORLD RECRUITMENT, INC., AND/OR INTRACO SALES CORPORATION, Respondents.D E C I S I O NCRUZ,J.:The petitioner had the rare experience of being taken hostage in 1984, along with a number of his co-workers, by the rebels in Angola. His captivity for more than two months and the events that followed his release are the subject of the present petition.Andres E. Ditan was recruited by private respondent Intraco Sales Corporation, through its local agent, Asia World, the other private respondent, to work in Angola as a welding supervisor. The contract was for nine months, at a monthly salary of US$1,100.00 or US$275.00 weekly, and contained the required standard stipulations for the protection of our overseas workers.Arriving on November 30, 1984, in Luanda, capital of Angola, the petitioner was assigned as an ordinary welder in the INTRACO central maintenance shop from December 2 to 25, 1984. On December 26, 1984, he was informed, to his distress, that would be transferred to Kafunfo, some 350 kilometers east of Luanda. This was the place where, earlier that year, the rebels had attacked and kidnapped expatriate workers, killing two Filipinos in the raid. Naturally, Ditan was reluctant to go. However, he was assured by the INTRACO manager that Kafunfo was safe and adequately protected by government troops; moreover and this was more persuasive he was told he would be sent home if he refused the new assignment. In the end, with much misgiving, he relented and agreed.: nadOn December 29, 1984, his fears were confirmed. The Unita rebels attacked the diamond mining site where Ditan was working and took him and sixteen other Filipino hostages, along with other foreign workers. The rebels and their captives walked through jungle terrain for 31 days to the Unita stronghold near the Namibian border. They trekked for almost a thousand kilometers. They subsisted on meager fare. Some of them had diarrhea. Their feet were blistered. It was only on March 16, 1985, that the hostages were finally released after the intercession of their governments and the International Red Cross. Six days later, Ditan and the other Filipino hostages were back in the Philippines. 1The repatriated workers had been assured by INTRACO that they would be given priority in re-employment abroad, and eventually eleven of them were taken back. Ditan having been excluded, he filed in June 1985 a complaint against the private respondents for breach of contract and various other claims. Specifically, he sought the amount of US$4,675.00, representing his salaries for the unexpired 17 weeks of his contract; US$25,000.00 as war risk bonus; US$2,196.50 as the value of his lost belongings; US$1,100 for unpaid vacation leave; and moral and exemplary damages in the sum of US$50,000.00, plus attorney's fees.All these claims were dismissed by POEA Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso in a decision dated January 27, 1987. 2 This was affirmed in toto by respondent NLRC in a resolution dated July 14, 1987, 3 which is now being challenged in this petition.Going over the record, we find that the public respondent correctly rejected the petitioner's claim for paid vacation leave. The express stipulation in Clause 5 of the employment contract reads:Should the Employee enter into a further 9 to 12 months contract at the completion contract, he will be entitled to one month's paid vacation before commencement of his second or subsequent contract.It appears that the petitioner had not entered into a second contract with the employer after the expiration of the first. Such re-employment was not a matter of right on the part of the petitioner but dependent on the need for his skills in another project the employer might later be undertaking.As regards the cost of his belongings, the evidence shows that they were not really lost but in fact returned to him by the rebels prior to their release. If he had other properties that were not recovered, there was no proof of their loss that could support his allegations. They were therefore also properly rejected.:-cralawWe find, though, that the claims for breach of contract and war risk bonus deserve a little more reflection in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case.The fact that stands out most prominently in the record is the risk to which the petitioner was subjected when he was assigned, after his reluctant consent, to the rebel-infested region of Kafunfo. This was a dangerous area. This same place had earlier been the target of a rebel attack that had resulted in the death of two Filipino workers and the capture of several others. Knowing all this, INTRACO still pressured Ditan into agreeing to be transferred to that place, dismissing his initial objection and, more important, threatening to send him home if he refused.We feel that in failing to provide for the safety of the petitioner, the private respondents were clearly remiss in the discharge of one of the primary duties of the employer. Worse, they not only neglected that duty but indeed deliberately violated it by actually subjecting and exposing Ditan to a real and demonstrated danger. It does not help to argue that he was not forced to go to Kafunfo and had the option of coming home. That was a cruel choice, to say the least. The petitioner had gone to that foreign land in search of a better life that he could share with his loved ones after his stint abroad. That choice would have required him to come home empty-handed to the disappointment of an expectant family.It is not explained why the petitioner was not paid for the unexpired portion of his contract which had 17 more weeks to go. The hostages were immediately repatriated after their release, presumably so they could recover from their ordeal. The promise of INTRACO was that they would be given priority in re-employment should their services be needed. In the particular case of the petitioner, the promise was not fulfilled. It would seem that his work was terminated, and not again required, because it was really intended all along to assign him only to Kafunfo.:-cralawThe private respondents stress that the contract Ditan entered into called for his employment in Angola, without indication of any particular place of assignment in the country. This meant he agreed to be assigned to work anywhere in that country, including Kafunfo. When INTRACO assigned Ditan to that place in the regular course of its business, it was merely exercising its rights under the employment contract that Ditan had freely entered into. Hence, it is argued, he cannot now complain that there was a breach of that contract for which he is entitled to monetary redress.The private respondents also reject the claim for war risk bonus and point out that POEA Memorandum Circular No. 4, issued pursuant to the mandatory war risk coverage provision in Section 2, Rule VI, of the POEA Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, categorizing Angola as a war risk took effect only on February 6, 1985, "after the petitioner's deployment to Angola on November 27, 1984." Consequently, the stipulation could not be applied to the petitioner as it was not supposed to have a retroactive effect.A strict interpretation of the cold facts before us might support the position taken by the respondents. However, we are dealing here not with an ordinary transaction but with a labor contract which deserves special treatment and a liberal interpretation in favor of the worker. As the Solicitor General observes in his Comment supporting the petitioner, the Constitution mandates the protection of labor and the sympathetic concern of the State for the working class conformably to the social justice policy. This is a command we cannot disregard in the resolution of the case before us.The paramount duty of this Court is to render justice through law. The law in this case allows two opposite interpretations, one strictly in favor of the employers and the other liberally in favor of the worker. The choice is obvious. We find, considering the totality of the circumstances attending this case, that the petitioner is entitled to relief.The petitioner went to Angola prepared to work as he had promised in accordance with the employment contract he had entered into in good faith with the private respondents. Over his objection, he was sent to a dangerous assignment and as he feared was taken hostage in a rebel attack that prevented him from fulfilling his contract while in captivity. Upon his release, he was immediately sent home and was not paid the salary corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract. He was immediately repatriated with the promise that he would be given priority in re-employment, which never came. To rub salt on the wound, many of his co-hostages were re-employed as promised. The petitioner was left only with a bleak experience and nothing to show for it except dashed hopes and a sense of rejection.In these circumstances, the Court feels that the petitioner should be paid the salary corresponding to the 17 unserved weeks of his contract, which was terminated by the private respondents despite his willingness to work out the balance of his term. In addition, to assuage the ordeal he underwent while in captivity by the rebels, the Court has also decided in its discretion to award him nominal damages in the sum of P20,000.00. This is not payment of the war risk claim which, as earlier noted, was not provided for in the employment contract in question, or indemnification for any loss suffered by him. This is but a token of the tenderness of the law towards the petitioning workman vis-a-vis the private respondents and their more comfortable resources.: nadUnder the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less privileges in life should have more privileges in law. That is why our judgment today must be for the petitioner.WHEREFORE, the challenged resolution of the NLRC is hereby MODIFIED. The private respondents are hereby DIRECTED jointly and severally to pay the petitioner: a) the current equivalent in Philippine pesos of US$4,675.00, representing his unpaid salaries for the balance of the contract term; b) nominal damages in the amount of P20,000.00; and c) 10% attorney's fees. No costs.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea,JJ.,concur.Endnotes1. Rollo, p. 47.2. Ibid., pp. 46-54.3. Id., pp. 65-69.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 97945 October 8, 1998PRIME MARINE SERVICES, INC.,petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, R & R MANAGEMENT SERVICES INTERNATIONAL, and NAPOLEON CANUT,respondents.MENDOZA,J.:This is a petition forcertiorarito set aside the decision, dated February 21, 1991, of the National Labor Relations Commission, dismissing the appeal of petitioner Prime Marine Services, Inc. from the decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration in POEA Case No. (L) 88-10-850, as well as the resolution, dated March 26, 1991, of the NLRC, denying reconsideration.Private respondent Napoleon Canut was recruited to work as a Tug Master for Arabian Gulf Mechanical Services and Contracting Co., Ltd. (Arabian Gulf) by R & R Management Services International (R & R Management) for a period of 18 months, commencing June 15, 1988. Private respondent's employment was, however, preterminated allegedly on the ground that he was incompetent. He was repatriated to the Philippines on September 26, 1988.1When private respondent reviewed his employment papers, he discovered that while R & R Management had acted as recruitment agency in processing his application, it was actually petitioner Prime Marine Services, Inc., as deployment agent, which had processed his papers and facilitated his going abroad. Further investigation showed that R & R Management was not licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment. Accordingly, private respondent filed a complaint before the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency for illegal dismissal, underpayment of salaries, and recruitment violations against petitioner, R & R Management, and Arabian Gulf.2Petitioner denied that there was any employer-employee relationship between it and private respondent. It pointed out that private respondent admitted he had applied with and paid his placement fee to R & R Management. Petitioner likewise denied that it had any part in the processing of private respondent's papers and argued that only Arabian Gulf and R & R Management should be held liable to private respondent. For this reason, petitioner filed a cross-claim against R & R Management seeking reimbursement for any amount which petitioner may be held liable for to private respondent.3R & R Management, on the other hand, averred that it referred private respondent to petitioner in order for the latter to facilitate private respondent's employment abroad and consequently worked in conjunction with petitioner in processing private respondent's deployment.4On October 13, 1989, Deputy Administrator Cresencio M. Siddayao of the POEA rendered a decision disposing of the case as follows:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Prime Marine Services, Inc., R & R Management Services, Int'l and Arabian Gulf Mechanical Services and Contracting Co. Ltd., are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay complainant the following in Philippines Currency at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment:SR 33,750.00 representing salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract for 15 months at SR 2,250.00 a month;350.00 representing salary differential;5% percent Attorney's fees of the award.Furthermore, R & R Management Services International is referred to the Anti-illegal Recruitment Branch of this Office for appropriate action.Finally, the cross claim of Prime Marine Services, Inc. against R & R Management Services International is dismissed for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the National Labor Relations Commission which the latter created as an appeal. In its decision, dated February 21, 1991, the NLRC affirmedin totothe POEA's decision. On March 26, 1991, it denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition containing the following assignment of errors:I. Public respondent NLRC and/or POEA committed grave abuse of discretion when they ignored existing jurisprudence.II. Dismissal of the cross-claim (against private respondent R & R Management) constitutes also grave abuse of discretion.As to its first assignment of error, petitioner contends that the ruling of the NLRC goes against this Court's decision inIlas v. NLRC.5The contention has no merit. The case ofIlassimply held that a recruitment agency cannot be found liable for unpaid wages and other claims of overseas workers who have been recruited by its agent without its knowledge and consent. The Court's ruling denying liability against the recruitment agency (All Seasons Manpower International Services) was based on the following factual findings of the POEA and the NLRC, which the Court affirmed:All evidence indicate that private respondent [All Seasons Manpower International Services] cannot be held liable for the claims of petitioners.Firstly, petitioners applied for overseas deployment with CBT/Shiek International through spouses Francisco and Corazon Ngoho, Eddie Sumaway and Erlinda Espeno. They never transacted their business with the office of private respondent.Secondly, when they worked at Doha, Qatar, their employer as CBT/Shiek International who failed to pay their wages.Thirdly, in the TEPSprovided by Espeno to enable them to travel, it was made to appear that private respondent was their agency/contractor of petitioners and Yacoub Trading Est. is their foreign employer. They were signed by petitioners knowing that private respondent was not their recruiter. Apparently, Espeno conspired with petitioners and Ngoho to enable petitioners to travel to the Middle East, ostensibly under the name of private respondent as agent/recruiter.Fourthly, it turned our that petitioners were recruited for Mabeco Trading and Contracting Establishment, as the foreign principal and not Yacoub Trading Est., which is the principal of private respondent.Fifthly, in the very compliant filed by petitioners against private respondent they admitted that they applied for overseas employment with the CBT/Shiek International under the management of the Ngohos.6In contrast, both the POEA and the NLRC found that petitioner and R & R Management acted jointly in recruiting and deploying private respondent abroad, to wit:This contention cannot be sustained.The records show that while complainant applied with respondent R & R, he was however deployed by herein movant Prime Marine and this was not rebutted during the proceedings below. Consequently, We find no sufficient reason to disturb the questioned decision. We, therefore, quote with approval and adopt as Our own the following findings of the POEA Deputy Administrator.We find respondent R & R and prime Marine jointly and severally liable with complainant's foreign employer, Arabian Gulf Mechanical Services and Contracting Co. Ltd. R & R is the recruiting agency while Prime Marine is the deploying agency.Complainant alleged that he applied with R & R and the latter admitted that it"has facilitated and contributed efforts in conjunction with Prime Marine in sending the applicant complainant abroad under a contract."Prime Marine did not rebut this allegation. It did not even explain or touch on the matter why it appeared as the deploying agent in the Crew Agreement exhibited by complainant. The foregoing leads us to the inevitable conclusion that there is a collusion between R & R and Prime Marine with respect to complainant's application and deployment. Thus, its cross claim against R & R must necessarily fail because it is held jointly and severally liable with R & R and the foreign employer.7Although petitioner denied before the POEA and the NLRC any part in the processing of private respondent's papers, it now admits that its general manager after all took part in the deployment of private respondent. However, it claims that its general manager was not authorized to do so and that she was in collusion with private respondent.8It is sufficient in order to dispose of this new contention to say that factual findings of administrative agencies are generally held to be binding and even final so long as they are supported by substantial evidence in the record of the case.9This is especially so where, as here, the agency and a subordinate one which heard the case in the first instance are in full agreement as to the facts.10This rule was, in fact, reiterated in theIlascase which petitioner invokes:No rule is more settled than that this Court is not a trier of facts and that the findings of facts of administrative bodies, as public respondent, shall not disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that it committed a grave abuse of discretion or otherwise acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction. In this case, petitioners failed to discharge their burden to warrant a departure from this rule.11It should be pointed out that petitioner belatedly claims that its general manager acted without authority and in collusion with private respondent apparently to bring this case within the ambit ofIlaswhich held that a recruitment agency is not liable for the unauthorized acts of its agents. This transparent effort to make the present case fit the ruling inIlasis done with out specifying the alleged evidence supporting such claim of collusion. Neither does petitioner even attempt to controvert the express finding of both the POEA and the NLRC that it failed to rebut R & R Management's allegation that both of these firms jointly processed private respondent's employment.As to petitioner's second assignment of error, such should be dismissed as its solidary liability with R & R Management and Arabian Gulf for private respondent's claims is founded on the fact that both petitioner and R & R Management, and not the latter alone, processed private respondent's recruitment and deployment abroad.There is no question that a private manning agency, such as petitioner, can be held liable for private respondent's claims. The Rules and Regulations of the POEA expressly provide that every applicant seeking a license or authority to operate a private employment, recruitment, or manning agency must submit, among others:d. A verified undertaking stating that the applicant:xxx xxx xxx(3) shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer for all claims and liabilities which may arise in connection with the implementation of the contract of employment;12WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.Regalado, Melo, Puno and Martinez, JJ., concur.Footnotes1 Rollo, p. 13.2 Ibid.3 Rollo, p. 14.4 Ibid.5 193 SCRA 682 (1991).6 Id., p. 685.7 Rollo, pp. 15 & 21 (emphasis added).8 Id., p. 6.9 International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 256 SCRA 124 (1996).10 Belaunzaran v. NLRC. 265 SCRA 800 (1996).11 193 SCRA 682, 684-685 (1991).12 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Rules and Regulations, Bk. II, Rule II, 1 d(3) (1985); now Bk. II, Rule II, 1 f(3) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment as Amended (1991).

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. Nos. 90394-97 February 7, 1991HERMINIGILDO ILAS, GLICERIO BELARMINO, MARIO BARBOSA and TEODORO ENRIQUEZ,petitioners,vs.THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ALL SEASONS MANPOWER INTERNATIONAL SERVICES,respondents.Cielo B. Pre for petitioners.Horacio R. Viola, Sr. for private respondent.GANCAYCO,J.:pCan a recruitment agency be liable for unpaid wages and other claims of certain overseas workers who appear to have been recruited by its agent without its knowledge and consent? This is the focal issue in this petition.Petitioners applied for overseas employment in Doha, Qatar, with CBT/Shiek International, an unlicensed recruitment agency, under the management of spouses Francisco Ngoho, Jr. and Corazon Ngoho. To enable them to leave, they were assisted by Eddie Sumaway and Erlinda Espeno, the latter being a liaison officer of private respondent All Seasons Manpower International Services, a licensed placement agency. Petitioners filed their application papers and paid their placement fees with the Ngohos. However, it was Espeno who processed their papers and gave them travel exit passes (TEPS). They were made to sign two-year contracts of employment but they were not given copies thereof. Subsequently, they were deployed to Doha, Qatar, where they worked for four (4) months without being paid. They sought the assistance of the Philippine Embassy and were able to come home to the Philippines with the help of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).Hence, they filed a complaint to recover their unpaid salaries and for wages covering the unexpired portion of their contracts against private respondent.On June 30, 1989, the POEA rendered a decision, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the respondent to refund to complainants Bonifacio Gagascas, Herminigildo Ilas, Diosdado Galang, Antonio Frias, Perfecto Lora, Jr., Rolando Ernacio, Emmanuel Padilla, Andres Lontabo, Juanito Cueto, Camilo Pastrana, Mario Barbosa, Romeo Muldong, Arnold Cresidio, Dominguez de la Cruz, Samuel Leao, Teodoro Enriquez and Jaime Ramos, the amount of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P2,500.00) each, representing placement fees.The claims for the salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of the complainant's contracts are hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of merit.The claims of Pedro Pabillonia, Glicerio Belarmino, Jaime Ramos, Rodolfo de Jesus, Romeo Toledo, Pedro Sagayap, Macario Valdez, Benjamin Julio, Ernesto Yadao, Severino Pilon are hereby ordered severed from the other complaints in view of settlement.SO ORDERED.1Both parties appealed to public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which in due course rendered a decision on September 23, 1988 modifying the appealed decision to the effect that petitioners were adjudged entitled to their four (4) months unpaid salaries to be paid by private respondent but the refund of placement fees was deleted.A motion for reconsideration thereof was filed by private respondent. On April 28, 1989, a decision was rendered by public respondent setting aside the decision dated September 23, 1988 and dismissing the case for lack of merit.2A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied in a resolution dated June 7, 1989.3Hence, the herein petition forcertiorariwherein it is alleged that public respondent committed a grave abuse of discretion in setting aside its decision dated September 23, 1988 and rendering the questioned decision dated April 28, 1989.The petition must fail.No rule is more settled than that this Court is not a trier of facts and that the findings of facts of administrative bodies, as public respondent, shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that it committed a grave abuse of discretion or otherwise acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction. In this case, petitioners failed to discharge their burden to warrant a departure from this rule.All evidence indicate that private respondent cannot be held liable for the claims of petitioners.Firstly, petitioners applied for overseas deployment with CBT/Shiek International through spouses Francisco and Corazon Ngoho, Eddie Sumaway and Erlinda Espeno. They never transacted their business with the office of private respondent.Secondly, when they worked at Doha, Qatar, their employer was CBT/Shiek International who failed to pay their wages.Thirdly, in the TEPS provided by Espeno to enable them to travel, it was made to appear that private respondent was their agency/contractor of petitioners and Yacoub Trading Est. is their foreign employer. They were signed by petitioners knowing that private respondent was not their recruiter. Apparently, Espeno conspired with petitioners and Ngoho to enable petitioners to travel to the Middle East, ostensively under the name of private respondent as agent/recruiter.Fourthly, it turned out that petitioners were recruited for Mabeco Trading and Contracting Establishment, as the foreign principal and not Yacoub Trading Est., which is the principal of private respondent.Fifthly, in the very complaints filed by petitioners against private respondent they admitted that they applied for overseas employment with the CBT/Shiek International under the management of the Ngohos.4It is true that the rules and regulations of the POEA provide that the private employment or recruitment agency is made to assume full and complete responsibility for all acts of its officials and representatives done in connection with recruitment and placement.5However, when as in this case the recruitment was actually made by Espeno in behalf of CBT/Shiek International, not the private respondent, and the name of private respondent was only used as a means to enable petitioners to be issued TEPS for travel purposes, obviously without the knowledge and consent of private respondent, the latter cannot be held liable for the claims of petitioners.The observation of public respondent that the documents used in the deployment abroad of petitioners were all fake and that petitioners knew about it is borne by the records. They did not come to court with clean hands. Thus, petitioners should suffer the consequences of their wrongful acts.WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.Footnotes1 Page 36,Rollo.2 Pages 19 to 29,Rollo; Annex A to Petition.3 Pages 30 to 31,Rollo: Annex A-1 to Petition.4 Pages 84 to 85, Original Records.5 Book II, Rule II, Section 1, Rules and Regulations of the POEA.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 120095 August 5, 1996JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC., and KARY INTERNATIONAL, INC.,petitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MA. NIEVES CONFESSOR, then Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, HON. JOSE BRILLANTES, in his capacity as acting Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment and HON. FELICISIMO JOSON, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,respondents.KAPUNAN,J.:pThe limits of government regulation under the State's police power are once again at the vortex of the instant controversy. Assailed is the government's power to control deployment of female entertainers to Japan by requiring an Artist Record Book (ARB) as a precondition to the processing by the POEA of any contract for overseas employment. By contending that the right to overseas employment is a property right within the meaning of the Constitution, petitioners vigorously aver that deprivation thereof allegedly through the onerous requirement of an ARB violates the due process clause and constitutes an invalid exercise of the police power.The factual antecedents are undisputed.Following the much-publicized death of Maricris Sioson in 1991, former President Corazon C. Aquino ordered a total ban against the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other foreign destinations. The ban was, however, rescinded after leaders of the overseas employment industry promised to extend full support for a program aimed at removing kinks in the system of deployment. In its place, the government, through the Secretary of Labor and Employment, subsequently issued Department Order No. 28, creating the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC), which was tasked with issuing guidelines on the training, testing certification and deployment of performing artists abroad.Pursuant to the EIAC's recommendations,1the Secretary of Labor, on January 6, 1994, issued Department Order No. 3 establishing various procedures and requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the former. Performing artists successfully hurdling the test, training and certification requirement were to be issued an Artist's Record Book (ARB), a necessary prerequisite to processing of any contract of employment by the POEA. Upon request of the industry, implementation of the process, originally scheduled for April 1, 1994, was moved to October 1, 1994.Thereafter, the Department of Labor, following the EIAC's recommendation, issued a series of orders fine-tuning and implementing the new system. Prominent among these orders were the following issuances:1. Department Order No. 3-A, providing for additional guidelines on the training, testing, certification and deployment of performing artists.2. Department Order No. 3-B, pertaining to the Artist Record Book (ARB) requirement, which could be processed only after the artist could show proof of academic and skills training and has passed the required tests.3. Department Order No. 3-E, providing the minimum salary a performing artist ought to received (not less than US$600.00 for those bound for Japan) and the authorized deductions therefrom.4. Department Order No. 3-F, providing for the guidelines on the issuance and use of the ARB by returning performing artists who, unlike new artists, shall only undergo a Special Orientation Program (shorter than the basic program) although they must pass the academic test.In Civil Case No. 95-72750, the Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP), on January 27, 1995 filed a class suit assailing these department orders, principally contending that said orders 1) violated the constitutional right to travel; 2) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3) deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of law. FETMOP, likewise, averred that the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and "in gross violation of the constitutional right... to life liberty and property." Said Federation consequently prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the aforestated orders.On February 2, 1992, JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. Kary International, Inc., herein petitioners, filed a Motion for Intervention in said civil case, which was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 15 February, 1995.However, on February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an Order denying petitioners' prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint.On appeal from the trial court's Order, respondent court, in CA G.R. SP No. 36713 dismissed the same. Tracing the circumstances which led to the issuance of the ARB requirement and the assailed Department Order, respondent court concluded that the issuance constituted a valid exercise by the state of the police power.We agree.The latin maximsalus populi est surprema lexembodies the character of the entire spectrum of public laws aimed at promoting the general welfare of the people under the State's police power. As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually "extends to all public needs,"2this "least limitable"3of governmental powers grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the state, asparens patriaegives effect to a host of its regulatory powers.Describing the nature and scope of the police power, Justice Malcolm, in the early case ofRubi v.Provincial Board of Mindoro4wrote:"The police power of the State," one court has said... is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed "the law of overruling necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." Carried onward by the current of legislature, the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.5Thus, police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.A thorough review of the facts and circumstances leading to the issuance of the assailed orders compels us to rule that the Artist Record Book requirement and the questioned Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power.In 1984, the Philippines emerged as the largest labor sending country in Asia dwarfing the labor export of countries with mammoth populations such as India and China. According to the National Statistics Office, thisdiasporawas augmented annually by over 450,000 documented and clandestine or illegal (undocumented) workers who left the country for various destinations abroad, lured by higher salaries, better work opportunities and sometimes better living conditions.Of the hundreds of thousands of workers who left the country for greener pastures in the last few years, women composed slightly close to half of those deployed, constituting 47% between 1987-1991, exceeding this proportion (58%) by the end of 1991,6the year former President Aquino instituted the ban on deployment of performing artists to Japan and other countries as a result of the gruesome death of Filipino entertainer Maricris Sioson.It was during the same period that this Court took judicial notice not only of the trend, but also of the fact that most of our women, a large number employed as domestic helpers and entertainers, worked under exploitative conditions "marked by physical and personal abuse."7Even then, we noted that "[t]he sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers" compelled "urgent government action."8Pursuant to the alarming number of reports that a significant number of Filipina performing artists ended up as prostitutes abroad (many of whom were beaten, drugged and forced into prostitution), and following the deaths of number of these women, the government began instituting measures aimed at deploying only those individuals who met set standards which would qualify them as legitimate performing artists. In spite of these measures, however, a number of our countrymen have nonetheless fallen victim to unscrupulous recruiters, ending up as virtual slaves controlled by foreign crime syndicates and forced into jobs other than those indicated in their employment contracts. Worse, some of our women have been forced into prostitution.Thus, after a number of inadequate and failed accreditation schemes, the Secretary of Labor issued on August 16, 1993, D.O. No. 28, establishing the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC), the policy advisory body of DOLE on entertainment industry matters.9Acting on the recommendations of the said body, the Secretary of Labor, on January 6, 1994, issued the assailed orders. These orders embodied EIAC's Resolution No. 1, which called for guidelines on screening, testing and accrediting performing overseas Filipino artists. Significantly, as the respondent court noted, petitioners were duly represented in the EIAC,10which gave the recommendations on which the ARB and other requirements were based.Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to "high risk" destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.Moreover, here or abroad, selection of performing artists is usually accomplished by auditions, where those deemed unfit are usually weeded out through a process which is inherently subjective and vulnerable to bias and differences in taste. The ARB requirement goes one step further, however, attempting to minimize the subjectivity of the process by defining the minimum skills required from entertainers and performing artists. As the Solicitor General observed, this should be easily met by experienced artists possessing merely basic skills. The test are aimed at segregating real artists or performers from those passing themselves off as such, eager to accept any available job and therefore exposing themselves to possible exploitation.As to the other provisions of Department Order No. 3 questioned by petitioners, we see nothing wrong with the requirements for document and booking confirmation (D.O. 3-C), a minimum salary scale (D.O. 3-E), or the requirement for registration of returning performers. The requirement for a venue certificate or other documents evidencing the place and nature or work allows the government closer monitoring of foreign employers and helps keep our entertainers away from prostitution fronts and other worksites associated with unsavory, immoral, illegal or exploitative practices. Parenthetically, none of these issuances appear to us, by any stretch of the imagination, even remotely unreasonable or arbitrary. They address a felt need of according greater protection for an oft-exploited segment of our OCW's. They respond to the industry's demand for clearer and more practicable rules and guidelines. Many of these provisions were fleshed out following recommendations by, and after consultations with, the affected sectors and non-government organizations. On the whole, they are aimed at enhancing the safety and security of entertainers and artists bound for Japan and other destinations, without stifling the industry's concerns for expansion and growth.In any event, apart from the State's police power, the Constitution itself mandates government to extend the fullest protection to our overseas workers. The basic constitutional statement on labor, embodied in Section 18 of Article II of the Constitution provides:Sec. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.More emphatically, the social justice provisions on labor of the 1987 Constitution in its first paragraph states:The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.Obviously, protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone. Under the welfare and social justice provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the government's constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local or overseas. As this Court explained in Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI) v.Drilon,11in reference to the recurring problems faced by our overseas workers:What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home.We now go to petitioners' assertion that the police power cannot, nevertheless, abridge the right of our performing workers to return to work abroad after having earlier qualified under the old process, because, having previously been accredited, their accreditation became a "property right," protected by the due process clause. We find this contention untenable.A profession, trade of calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the right to work and right to make a living because these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong.12Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals. According to the maxim,sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use of his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.13In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly muchwider.14To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or professions. Professionals leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. Seamen are required to take tests determining their seamanship. Locally, the Professional Regulation Commission has began to require previously licensed doctors and other professionals to furnish documentary proof that they has either re-trained or had undertaken continuing education courses as a requirement for renewal of their licenses. It is not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process clause. So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists.Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the non-impairment clause of the Constitution to support their argument that the government cannot enact the assailed regulatory measures because they abridge the freedom to contract. InPhilippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc.vs.Drilon, we held that "[t]he non-impairment clause of the Constitution... must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government."15Equally important, into every contract is read provisions of existing law, and always, a reservation of the police power for so long as the agreement deals with a subject impressed with the public welfare.A last point. Petitioners suggest that the singling out of entertainers and performing artists under the assailed department orders constitutes class legislation which violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. We do not agree.The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.16We have held, time and again, that the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification for so long as such classification is based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation.17If classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to present and future conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee.In the case at bar, the challenged Department Order clearly applies to all performing artists and entertainers destined for jobs abroad. These orders, we stressed hereinfore, further the Constitutional mandate requiring government to protect our workforce, particularly those who may be prone to abuse and exploitation as they are beyond the physical reach of government regulatory agencies. The tragic incidents must somehow stop, but short of absolutely curtailing the right of these performers and entertainers to work abroad, the assailed measures enable our government to assume a measure of control.WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision sought to be reviewed, petition is hereby DENIED.SO ORDERED.Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.Footnotes1 EIAC, Res. No. 1.2 Noble State Bank v. Haskel, 219 US 112 (1911).3 Smith, Bell and Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil 136 (1919).4 39 Phil 660, 708 (1919).5 Id, at 708-709.6 Source: National Statistics Office, 1992.7 Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon 163 SCRA 386, 392 (1988).8 Id.9 Department Order No. 28 vests the EIAC with the following principal functions:a) recommend to the DOLE policies, plans and programs for the development of the entertainment industry, local and overseas, including but not limited to talent training and upgrading, employment standards and other internationally acceptable trade practices;b) promote ethical business standards and dignified workplaces;c) act as the coordinating body for all training programs and technical assistance to the entertainment industry;d) advise the DOLE on the institutionalization of an internationally acceptable system of manpower development, talent protection and welfare;e) assist the appropriate agencies, private or public in the implementation of a trainors training and upgrading program;f) review existing issuances on the industry including the system of training, testing and accreditation of performing artists/talents and recommend to the Secretary such measures of schemes as are deemed necessary for its proper compliance. . . .10 The EIAC is chaired by an Undersecretary of Labor and is composed of 3 representatives from the government, 2 representatives from the employers' sector, one representative from the talent developers, 2 representatives from the workers' sector and one representative from the Non-government Organizations.11 Id.12 Phil. Movie Workers' Assn. v. Premier Productions, Inc., 92 Phil 8423 (1953); National Labor Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 68 Phil 732 (1939).13 Case vs. Board of Health, 24 Phil 250, 280 (1913).14 Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators vs. City of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 (1967).15 Supra, note 6, at 397.16 Itchong, etc., et al, vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil 1155 (1957).17 Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA 272 (1978).

SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 131656.October 12, 1998]ASIAN CENTER FOR CAREER AND EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM AND SERVICES, INC. (ACCESS),petitioner, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IBNO MEDIALES,respondents.D E C I S I O NPUNO,J.:In this petition forcertiorari, petitionerASIAN CENTER FOR CAREER & EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM & SERVICES, INC.(ACCESS) seeks to modify the monetary awards against it in the Decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dated October 14, 1997, a case for illegal dismissal.The records disclose that petitioner hired respondentIBNO MEDIALESto work as a mason in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, with amonthly salary of 1,200 Saudi Riyals (SR).The term of his contract was two (2) years,from February 28, 1995 until February 28, 1997.OnMay 26, 1996, respondent applied with petitioner for vacation leave with pay which he earned after working for more then a year.His application for leave was granted.While en route to the Philippines, his co-workers informed him that he has been dismissed from service.The information turned out to be true.On June 17, 1996, respondent filed a complaint with the labor arbiter for illegal dismissal, non-payment of overtime pay, refund of transportation fare, illegal deductions, non-payment of 13thmonth pay and salary for the unexpired portion of his employment contract.On March 17, 1997, thelabor arbiterfound petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal.[1]Thedispositive portionreads:IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the illegality of complainants dismissal and ordering the respondent ACCESS and/or ABDULLAH LELINA to pay the complainant the amount ofSR 13,200 representing complainants payment for the unexpired portion of his contractand refund of the illegality deducted amount lessP5,000.00, the legally allowed placement fee.Respondent are further ordered to payattorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the judgment award or the amount of SR 1,320, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.All other issues are dismissed for lack of merit.SO ORDERD.(emphasis supplied)It is noteworthy, however, that in thebody of his decision, the labor arbiter applied Section 10 R.A. 8042,[2]the law relative to the protection of Filipino overseas-workers, and computed private respondents salary for the unexpired portion of his contract as follows: SR1,200 x 3 months =SR3,600.On appeal by petitioner, theNLRC affirmedthe factual findings of the labor arbiter but modified the appealed decision by deleting the order of refund of excessive placement fee for lack of jurisdiction.[3]Petitioner moved for reconsideration with respect to the labor arbiters award ofSR13,200in the dispositive portion of the decision, representing respondents salary for the unexpired portion of his contract.invoking Section 10 R.A. 8042. Petitioner urged that its liability for respondents salary is for only three (3) months.Petitioner claimed that it should pay onlySR 3.600(SR 1,200 x 3 months) for the unexpired portion of respondents employmentand SR360(10% of SR3,600) for attorneys fees.[4]TheNLRCdenied petitioners motion.Itruled that R.A. 8042 does not apply as respondents employment which started in February 1995 occurred prior to its effectivity on July 15, 1995.[5]Hence, this petition forcertiorari.In the case at bar, petitioners illegal dismissal from service is no longer disputed.Petitioner merely impugns the monetary awards granted by the NLRC to private respondent.It submits that although the unexpired portion of private respondents employment contract is eight (8) months,[6]it is liable to pay respondent only three (3) months of his basic salary, pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. 8042, or SR1,200 (monthly salary) multiplied by 3 months, for a total of SR3,600.Petitioner claims that the NLRC erred in ruling that as private respondents employment started only on February 28, 1995, R.A. 8042, which took effect on July 15, 1995, would not apply to his case.Petitioner argues that it is not the date of employment but the date of dismissal which should be considered in determining the applicability of R.A. 8042.Petitioner prays that the award in the NLRC Decision dated October 14, 1997, be changed to SR3,600 instead of 13,200 and that the award of attorneys fees be deleted.We affirm with modifications.As a rule, jurisdiction is determined by the law at the time of the commencement of the action.[7]In the case at bar, private respondents cause of action did not accrue on the date of his date of his employment or on February 28, 1995.His cause of action arose only from the-time he was illegally dismissed by petitioner from service in June 1996, after his vacation leave expired.It is thus clear that R.A. 8042 which took effect a year earlier in July 1995 applies to the case at bar.Under Section 10 of R.A. 8042, a worker dismissed from overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause is entitled to his salary for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,whichever is less.In the case at bar, the unexpired portion of private respondents employment contract is eight (8) months.Private respondent should therefore be paid his basic salary corresponding to three (3) months or a total of SR3,600.[8]We note that this same computation was made by the labor arbiter in thebodyof his decision.[9]Despite said computation in the body of the decision, however, the labor arbiter awarded higher sum (SR13,200) in thedispositiveportion.The general rule is that where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or thefalloand thebody of the decision, thefallocontrols.This rule rests on the theory that thefallois the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement ordering nothing.However,where the inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision is so clear as to show that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail.[10]We find that the labor arbiters award of a higher amount in the dispositive portion was clearly an error for there is nothing in the text of the decision which support the award of said higher amount.We reiterate that the correct award to private respondent for the unexpired portion of his employment contract is SR3,600.We come now to the award of attorneys fees in favor of private respondent.Article 2208 of the Civil Code allows attorneys fees to be awarded when its claimant iscompelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interestby reason of an unjustified act or omission of the party for whom it is sought.Moreover, attorneys fees are recoverable when there is sufficient showing ofbad faith.[11]The Labor Code,[12]on the other hand, fixes the attorneys fees that may be recovered in an amount which should not exceed 10% of the total amount of wages awarded.In the case at bar,petitioners bad faith in dismissing private respondent is manifest.Respondent was made to believe that he would be temporarily leaving Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, for a 30-day vacation leave with pay.However, while on board the plane back to the Philippines, his co-employees told him that he has been dismissed from his job as he was given only a one-way plane ticket by petitioner.True enough, private respondent was not allowed to return to his jobsite in Jeddah after his vacation leave.Thus,private respondent was compelled to file an action for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiterand hence entitled to an award of attorneys fees.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the public respondent National Labor Relations Commission, dated October 14, 1997, is AFFIRMED with modifications: petitioner is ordered to pay private respondent IBNO MEDIALES thepeso equivalent of the amounts of SR3,600for the unexpired portion of his employment contract,andSR360for attorneys fees.No costs.SO ORDERED.Regalado,(Chairman), Melo, Mendoza,andMartinez, JJ.,concur.

[1]Decision,Rollo,pp. 11-20.[2]Entitled: Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.[3]NLRC Decision, dated August 18, 1997;Rollo,pp. 26-32.[4]Motion for Reconsideration,Rollo,pp. 33-35.[5]Decision, dated October 14, 1997;Rollo,pp. 36-38.[6]Respondent was dismissed from service in June 1996 (after his vacation leave), while his employment contract was supposed to end on February 28, 1997.[7]Erectors, Inc.vs.NLRC, 256 629, 637, [1996], citing Philippine-Singapore Ports. Corp.vs.NLRC, 218 SRA 77 [1993].[8]Computed as follows: monthly salary of SR1,200 x 3 months.[9]Supra.[10]Olac,vs.Court of Appeals, 213 SCRA 321, 328 [1992], citing Aguirrevs.Aguirre, 58 SCRA 461 [1974] and Magdalena Estate, Inc.vs.Calauag, 11 SCRA 333 [1964].[11]Tumbigavs. National Labor Relations Commission, 274 SCRA 338, 349 [1997].[12]Article 111, Chapter III, Title II, Book Three.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 160952 August 20, 2004MARCIAL GU-MIRO,petitioner,vs.ROLANDO C. ADORABLE and BERGESEN D.Y. MANILA,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:Before us is a petition for review oncertiorariof the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66131 dated May 29, 2003,1which modified the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) by increasing the incentive bonus awarded to petitioner from US$594.56 to US$1189.12.Petitioner Marcial Gu-Miro was formerly employed as a Radio Officer of respondent Bergesen D.Y. Philippines, which acted for and in behalf of its principal Bergesen D.Y. ASA, on board its different vessels. A Certification dated April 14, 1998 was issued by Bergesen D.Y. Philippines, Inc.'s President and General Manager Rolando C. Adorable showing that petitioner served in the company on board its vessels starting 1988.2The case before us involves an employment contract signed by petitioner to commence service on board the M/V HEROS, which stipulated a monthly salary of US$929.00 for a period of eight (8) months. It also provided for overtime pay of US$495.00 per month and vacation leave with pay in the amount of US$201.00 per month equivalent to six and a half days.3The contract of employment was signed on March 18, 1996 and petitioner commenced work on April 15, 1996.Record shows that respondent company traditionally gives an incentive bonus termed as Re-employment Bonus to employees who decide to rejoin the company after the expiration of their employment contracts. After the expiration of petitioner's contract in December 1996, the same was renewed by respondent company until September 9, 1997, as stated in the Certification issued by Bergesen D.Y. Philippines, Inc. In September 1997, petitioner's services were terminated due to the installation of labor saving devices which made his services redundant. Upon his forced separation from the company, petitioner requested that he be given the incentive bonus plus the additional allowances he was entitled to. Respondent company, however, refused to accede to his request.Thus, in June 1999 petitioner filed a complaint with the NLRC, Regional Arbitration Branch of Cebu, for payment of the incentive bonus from April 15, 1996 to September 15, 1997, 10% of the basic wage, unclaimed payment for incentive bonus from September 1993 to June 1994, non-remittance of provident fund from July 1992 to June 1994, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. On December 29, 1999, the complaint was provisionally dismissed by the NLRC due to the failure of petitioner to file the required position paper. Petitioner re-filed the complaint on March 2, 2000 accordingly.In a Decision dated June 6, 2000, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the case for lack of merit,4based on the following findings:x x x. "Incentive bonus" or reemployment bonus are benefits not found in the POEA approved contract. These are benefits which are specifically granted pursuant to an internal memorandum entitled "Employment Conditions for Filipino Seafarers serving on board vessels of Bergesen D.Y. ASA". As stated in the said internal memorandum, entitlement to the benefits therein (is) not automatic but (is) subject to some conditions. As clearly stated in the said memorandum, the reemployment bonus is an "incentive bonus system for reemployment upon signing for a subsequent period." x x x. In order that a seafarer, like the complainant, be entitled to reemployment/incentive bonus, he must satisfy all of the following requirements, to wit:1) He must be employed in a vessel under a principal who is a member of the reemployment bonus scheme;2) He must have been an officer of the principal member's vessel subject to the additional conditions stated in page 2 of the aforementioned internal memorandum; and3) After serving in a principal-member's vessel, he must be reemployed in another or the same principal-member's vessel.To avail of the benefits under this scheme, seafarers like the complainant has to prove that he met all the foregoing conditions. It is, thus, his burden to prove that he is entitled to the said benefit. Complainant, however, miserably failed to adduce evidence that he met all the foregoing conditions for entitlement to the benefit. He relied on his unsubstantiated allegation that a certain Captain D. Ramirez received an incentive bonus even if he did not sign up with the Company. x x x.x x x x x x x x xFor obvious reasons, complainant's claims for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees are denied. x x x.5Petitioner appealed to the NLRC, which set aside the Labor Arbiter's decision and ordered respondents to pay petitioner the amount of US$594.56 in a Decision dated March 5, 2001. The pertinent portion of the NLRC's decision states:The Contract of Employment entered into between the complainant and the respondents specifically set a term of eight (8) months which was supposed to be from April 15, 1996 up to December 14, 1996. The complainant's length of service from December 15, 1996 to September 9, 1997, or a period of nine (9) months, more or less, was an extended term of employment. A closer look at the facts shows that the extended term was even longer than the original term of the contract.x x x x x x x x x[W]e construe that the extended term of the contract of employment from December 15, 1996 up to September 9, 1997 was considered as re-employment of the complainant. And when there was re-employment, it is presumed that all the conditions set forth by the respondents in their established company written policy entitled "Employment Conditions for Filipino Seafarers Serving Onboard Vessels of Bergesen D.Y. ASA" are deemed complied with. The pertinent portion of the said company policy states:2. Re-employment bonusThe company has established an incentive bonus system for re-employment upon signing for a subsequent period.The conditions are as follows:x x x x x x x x xRadio Officers/Electricians Serving onboard bulk carriers- 8% of basic wage per month of actual service.To do otherwise, we would allow the respondent to circumvent its own established policy to merely extending the original contract of employment.6Petitioner and respondents filed separate Motions for Reconsideration which were both denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated April 24, 2001.Not satisfied with the monetary award, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals claiming that there was an error in computing the amount of the incentive bonus he is entitled to. Petitioner argued that he should be considered as a regular employee of respondent company and thus, entitled to backwages or, at the very least, separation pay.The Court of Appeals, on May 29, 2003, rendered the assailed Decision where it ruled:WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 5, 2001 is hereby MODIFIED increasing the award of incentive bonus from US$594.56 to US$1189.12.SO ORDERED.7In arriving at its decision, the appellate court made the following findings:It is uncontroverted that the company grants incentive bonus for re-employment upon signing for a subsequent period. For radio officers onboard bulk carriers, it shall be 8% of the basic wage per month of actual service. In this case, we find nothing in the record to show that the classification of the vessel to which the petitioner was deployed is a Gas/LPG Tanker, which would make him entitled to 10% instead of 8% of the basic wage as incentive bonus. Thus, the public respondent correctly applied the rate of 8% of the basic wage per month of actual service, the basic wage in this case being the amount stipulated in the contract of employment,i.e., US$929.00, and does not include the stipulated rate for overtime pay.The question now is the application of the provision of the memorandum with respect to the length of actual service. Record shows that after the expiration of the original eight-month employment contract on December 15, 1996, the petitioner was in fact re-employed when his service was extended for another nine (9) months or up to September 1997. This unquestionably entitled him to the incentive bonus for the 8-month period covered by the contract and which was correctly awarded to him by the public respondent NLRC. However, as to the succeeding period, although it was not covered by a written contract, it is unrebutted that the petitioner was actually made to suffer work during that period. Hence, there was a monthly re-employment of the petitioner for the succeeding 9 months. Conformably, since the incentive bonus is given for re-employment upon signing for a subsequent period, for purposes of computing the same, the petitioner is deemed to have been re-employed not only for the 8 months covered by the contract but also for the succeeding 8 months preceding the last month when he was terminated. x x x.x x x x x x x x xAs for the claim for backwages or separation pay, we note that these claims were neither raised in the petitioner's position paper nor in the motion for reconsideration filed before the NLRC; hence, they can no longer be raised for the first time in this petition. x x x.8Hence, the instant petition forcertioraribased on the following grounds:I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT PLACED THE BURDEN UPON PETITIONER TO PROVE THAT M/V HEROS IS AN LPG/GAS TANKER.II. CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER HAD WORKED FOR BERGESEN D.Y. PHILIPPINES FOR AND IN BEHALF OF ITS PRINCIPAL BERGESEN D.Y. ASA FOR TEN (10) LONG YEARS ABOARD ITS DIFFERENT VESSELS, PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED AS A REGULAR EMPLOYEE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS.III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED WHEN IT SAID IN ITS DECISION THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF BACKWAGES AND SEPARATION PAY IN THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED WITH THE NLRC.9In this petition, we are called upon to resolve two basic issues: The firstconcerns what percentage to use in computing the incentive bonus which petitioner is entitled to. In the memorandum entitledEmployment Conditions for Filipino Seafarers Serving Onboard Vessels of Bergesen D.Y. ASA(Employment Conditions Memorandum), Radio Officers are entitled to re-employment bonus equivalent to a certain percentage of their basic wage per month of actual service. If the employee served onboard a bulk carrier, he is entitled to 8% of his basic wage per month of actual service. Alternatively, if service was done onboard a gas carrier tanker, the employee is entitled to 10% of his basic wage per month of actual service.The NLRC and the Court of Appeals both agree that petitioner failed to adduce concrete proof to show that M/V HEROS is a Gas/LPG Tanker and not a bulk carrier. Hence, the Court of Appeals upheld the use of 8% by the NLRC as multiplier to compute the incentive bonus. Respondent company argues that petitioner failed to allege the nature of M/V HEROS at the earliest opportunity, belatedly alleging this information in the Motion for Reconsideration with the NLRC. Petitioner insists that M/V HEROS is a Gas/LPG Tanker which entitles him to 10% of his basic wage as incentive bonus; and that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that it was petitioner's burden to prove the classification of M/V HEROS.We rule in petitioner's favor. The registration papers, which contain the vessel classification of M/V HEROS, are the conclusive evidence that petitioner needs to prove his allegation. However, these are in the custody of respondent company or its mother company, Bergesen D.Y. ASA. Interestingly, respondent company never presented the registration papers in evidence.We find that respondent company's failure to controvert the allegation, when it had the opportunity and resources to do so, works in favor of petitioner. Time and again we have held that should doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.10Moreover, the law creates the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.11Consequently, the amount of incentive bonus termed as re-employment bonus which petitioner is entitled to should be computed as follows:Salary per month = US$929.00No. of months of actual service = 16 monthsRate =10% of basic wageUS$929.00/month x 16 months x 10%= US$1,486.40The second and third grounds raised in this petition are related, based on petitioner's allegation that he should be considered a regular employee of respondent company, having been employed onboard the latter's different vessels for the span of 10 years. Hence, petitioner claims that he is entitled to backwages or at the very least separation pay, invoking our decision inMillares, et al. v. NLRC12where it was held that the repeated re-hiring of a Chief Engineer of a shipping company for 20 years is sufficient evidence of the necessity and indispensability of the employee's service to the employer's business or trade. Hence, applying the express provision of Article 280 of the Labor Code,13such an employee should be considered as a regular employee.Petitioner's argument is not well-taken. The decision ofMillares, et al. v. NLRCwas reconsidered and set aside in a Resolution14where it was held:[I]t is clear that seafarers are considered contractual employees. They can not be considered as regular employees under Article 280 of Labor Code. Their employment is governed by the contracts they sign every time they are rehired and their employment is terminated when the contract expires. Their employment is contractually fixed for a certain period of time. They fall under the exception of Article 280 whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the nature of the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and employment is for the duration of the season.x x x x x x x x xMoreover, it is an accepted maritime industry practice that employment of seafarers (is) for a fixed period only. Constrained by the nature of their employment which is quite peculiar and unique in itself, it is for the mutual interest of both the seafarer and the employer why employment status must be contractual only or for a certain period of time. Seafarers spend most of their time at sea and understandably, they cannot stay for a long and an indefinite period of time at sea. Limited access to shore society during the employment will have an adverse impact on the seafarer. The national, cultural and lingual diversity among the crew during the [Contract of Enlistment] is a reality that necessitates the limitation of its period.15Clearly, petitioner cannot be considered as a regular employee notwithstanding that the work he performs is necessary and desirable in the business of respondent company. As expounded in the above-mentionedMillaresResolution, an exception is made in the situation of seafarers. The exigencies of their work necessitates that they be employed on a contractual basis.Thus, even with the continued re-hiring by respondent company of petitioner to serve as Radio Officer onboard Bergesen's different vessels, this should be interpreted not as a basis for regularization but rather a series of contract renewals sanctioned under the doctrine set down by the secondMillarescase. If at all, petitioner was preferred because of practical considerationsnamely, his experience and qualifications. However, this does not alter the status of his employment from being contractual.With respect to the claim for backwages and separation pay, it is now well-settled that the award of backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement are reliefs that are awarded to an employee who is unjustly dismissed.16In the instant case, petitioner was separated from his employment due to the termination of an impliedly renewed contract with respondent company. Hence, there is no illegal or unjust dismissal.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66131 dated May 29, 2003 is MODIFIED in that the award of incentive bonus is increased from US$1189.12 to US$1,486.40. Petitioner's claim that he be declared a regular employee and awarded backwages and separation pay is DENIED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.,concur.

Footnotes1Rollo, pp. 25-33; penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Edgardo F. Sundiam.2Annex D, Court of AppealsRollo, p. 74.3Annex 1, Court of AppealsRollo, p. 46.4Court of AppealsRollo, p. 59.5Id., pp. 56-58.6Id., pp. 23-24.7Rollo, p. 33.8Id., pp. 31-32.9Id., pp. 16-18.10Asuncion v. NLRC, G.R. No. 129329, 31 July 2001, 362 SCRA 56, citingDizon v. NLRC,G.R. No. 79554, 14 December 1989, 180 SCRA 52; These policies are embodied in Articles 3 and 4 of the Labor Code, which read:ART. 3.Declaration of basic policy. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the relations between workers and employers. x x xART 4.Construction in favor of labor. All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.11Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3 (e).12G.R. No. 110524,14 March 2000, 328 SCRA 79.13Article 280.Regular and casual employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.14Millares, et al. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 110524, 29 July 2002, 385 SCRA 306.15Id., pp. 318-319.16Bustamante v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111651, 28 November 1996, 265 SCRA 61;Times Transit Credit Coop., Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117105, 2 March 1999, 304 SCRA 11;De Paul/King Philip Customs Tailor v. NLRC, G.R. No. 129824, 10 March 1999, 304 SCRA 448;Philippine Industrial Security Agency Corporation v. Dapiton and NLRC, G.R. No. 127421, 8 December 1999, 320 SCRA 124;Vinoya v. NLRC, G.R. No. 126586, 25 August 2000, 339 SCRA 65;Prudential Bank and Trust Company v. Reyes, G.R. No. 141093, 20 February 2001, 352 SCRA 316.