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JOHN B. BURNHAM, TIM CONNOR KAREN DORN STEELE

"AN INSIDER LOOK FROM A NUCLEAR COMMUNITY"

SOUTHERN EDUCATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION

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SECA PRESENTS ®

FIRlnGLlne

HOST: WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY JR.

MODERATOR: ROBERT SHRUM

GUESTS: JOHN B. BURNHAM TIM CONNOR KAREN DORN STEELE

SUBJECT: "AN INSIDER LOOK FROM A NUCLEAR COMMUNITY"

FIRING LINE is produced and directed hy WARREN STEIBEL

This is a transcript of the Firing Line program taped at KWSU-TV in Pullman, Washington, on January 10, 1989, and telecast later by PBS.

SOUTHERN EDUCATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION

© Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University.

~ 1989 SOUTHERN EDUCATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION

MR. SHRUM: I'm Bob Shrum, a Democratic media consultant who's worked for some of Bill Buckley's least favorite senators including Howard Metzenbaum, Alan Cranston and Edward Ken~edy. Today on Firing Line we're focusing on an issue that has commanded powerful attention during this decade of Three Mile Isla~d and.Chernobyl: the risks and future of nuclear power. The issue is at the center of daily life here in the Tri­Cities area of Washington State, where the Hanford nuclear facility has produced nuclear weapons for the nation and where the WPPSS nuclear power system experienced one of the most stunning bankruptcies in U.S. history.

Can we afford the health risks of nuclear power, and over the long term, can we afford to live without it? At the same time the nuclear danger has been mitigated, at least in the minds of some, by the danger of the alternatives--the pollution from fossil fuels, the greenhouse effect, the health hazards of burning coal. A number of European nations are cutting back on nuclear power. New plants in this country have been at a standstill for years. Is this a pause or the beginning of the end?

Our first guest today is Tim Connor, the research director of the Hanford Education Action League, who has been reporting on contamination and health hazards from Hanford since 1980. Our second guest is a journalist, Karen Dorn Steele of the Spokane Spokesman-Review, who has written story after story about the nuclear power controversy in this center of the nation's nuclear production. Our other guest is an expert engaged in nuclear research for 37 years, John Burnham, who has grappled with the problem of nuclear waste disposal and who is currently vice president of the Hanford division of the Tri­City Industrial Development Council.

Now, as usual, we will start with a question for Bill Buckley. Bill, why is it that conservatives, who claim to be so risk­averse, or in Edmund Burke's words, so cautious, why do they seem so anxious to defend and promote nuclear power?

MR. BUCKLEY: I don't think that it is by any means distinctive of the American-styled conservative to be risk­averse. Here we have to make a distinction, once made by Whittaker Chambers, between the conservative and the capitalist. The American conservative is a capitalist and a capitalist lives with risk and indeed thrives from risk. Otherwise we wouldn't have had, among other things, the Industrial Revolution. But the question before the house, as I see it, is whether or not the accumulation of data since our

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© Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University.

experiment with nuclear energy, is sufficient to persuade us that in fact it's not going to work. Ms. Steele, you've written a lot about the subject in general. Do you have a categorical position about the potentiality of nuclear energy to give us safe energy in the future?

MS. STEELE: Much of the disaster of nuclear energy in the Northwest has been economic. In this area where we are doing this show in the 1970s was a boomtown: construction workers, five nuclear projects at various states of construction, and then came the early '80s and the largest bond default in U.S. history. So I don't have a categorical yes or no on the safety of future nuclear power plants, but I think the citizens of this region would be very leery before embarking on another major nuclear construction program.

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, with all due respect to the area, we can't assume from the failure of the complex here that complexes elsewhere are doomed to failure, unless you are saying something about the light water Reactor which is generally applicable. Do you want to touch on that subject, Mr. Burnham?

MR. BURNHAM: I certainly do. If you're risk-averse, you have to be in favor of nuclear energy. There's no technology known to the world--and that includes the bubblegum industry--that has a safety record that will approach that of nuclear energy. So I don't care whether you're liberal or conservative, if you're risk-averse, you're in favor of nuclear energy.

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, now, hold up. Hold on a minute. Chernobyl wasn't about bubblegum, was it?

MR. BURNHAM: You have to understand that Chernobyl was a Russian experiment in which they purposely bypassed three safety systems in order to run the experiment. In the second place, Chernobyl is a reactor that's totally unlike any reactor we have in the United States, including N-reactor, has no containment, and it has what's called, to use a little jargon, positive void coefficient. Chernobyl is a terrible example. Three Mile Island is a good example.

MR. BUCKLEY: At Three Mile Island you would make the point that, after all, it wasn't a ~eltdown and therefore what?

MR. BURNHAM: It was an economic disaster, but it was a technical wonder. Everything went wrong. Everybody pulled the wrong levers, and no one was hurt. That's sensational.

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MR. BUCKLEY: Well, presumably when Ms. Steele talks about risk-averse, she is also talking about the economic factor, and the prairies are littered with the bones of people who have invested in nuclear energy and have gone broke for their pains. So there is certainly risk somehow to find there, isn't there?

MR. BURNHAM: Couldn't argue with that, but Duke Power, Commonwealth Edison, very big in nuclear--their stock's up about 60 percent.

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, but you don't deny that in fact there has been a stultification of the whole industry.

MR. BURNHAM: No question. No question.

MR. BUCKLEY: And that's on account of something. Now, is that something hysteria and if so, has Mr. Connor contributed to it?

MR. BURNHAM: Well, he's done his bit. [laughter) But I would say that it's a combination of a slowdown in the economy that came at the same time the industry was overbuilding, which has slowed down the number of large plants total completed, coal, nuclear, what have you. A combination of that, a combination of costs, a combination of, I don't like to say the word--but over-regulation, shall we say. I'll be polite about it. And also what's called rate lag. This basically--

MR. BUCKLEY: thinking of.

Tell us what the impolite word is that you were [laughter)

MR. BURNHAM: I tend to get a little nasty, but "unthinking." Because any time you have a large machine that is three quarters built, and they say, "Hey guys, let's start o~e: again. We've got a new idea. The last one that was fin~shed worked great, but this one, we've got a better idea, so it will cost $500 million, but let's add that."

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, let's hear from Mr. Connor. You take a rather cheerful view, I assume, from the slowdown, for instance in Shoreham and Seabrook, neither of which is now operating. Is this the accumulation, as ~ou see it, of a general wisdom about the danger of operating them?

MR. CONNOR: I don't think I'd characterize it that way. I

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© Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University.

think first I have to preface whatever I say in a sense that our organization is not an anti-nuclear power group. Our primary focus over the years has been the Hanford reservation as it involves the production of nuclear weapons. We do not get involved in intervening in nuclear power cases. In terms of.the general malaise afflicting the nuclear industry, I thin~ you really do have to look not only at economics, which I think John would agree was a real big problem in the WPPSS s~tuation. Very capital-intensive projects that sometimes simply overheat, the . corporations like the supply systems form to 7u~p~rt them. The other thing institutionally is we've got a civilian pr~gram that is still working, which has never really f:eed itself from the nuclear weapons program. Even though Eisenhower, try as he might with his "Atoms for Peace" speech before the United Nations, tried to set up that line ~e've.had--you know, with the Atomic Energy Commission being in 7xistence from 1946 to 1973, we have both these programs 7oming out of the same house, even to the point where the AEC itsel~, because of the credibility hemorrhage that it e xperienced had to go out of existence so that nuclear power could get a fresh start with a new institution called the Nuclea: ~egu~atory Commission. That shadow, which is really exem~lified in the . Hanford experience, where people were put at risk perh~ps griev~usly show, in tha~ risk not being shared ~nd the public not being brought in, in a democracy, to be informed ~f that risk and be a part of the decision making based on it.

MR. ~UCKLEY: Are you saying they were put at risk because the nuclear regulatory agency didn't confide in the people in this area the nature of the hazard of operating their facilities? Was that the risk you're talking about?

~R. ~ONN?R: Yes, at that time, understand it was the same institution. You had the Atomic Energy Commission both charged under statute to providing the nation's se~urity through the production of nuclear weapons, and then eventually charged under statute the same agency for promoting nuclear power. And also charged--well, not perhaps charged but 't came t~ bei~g vested with over half the health rese~rch i effe7tive with the exposure to low level ionizing radiation. I think you h~ve t~ ~oo~ at this institutional history and understand this crisis in this context. There is a genuine lack of trust between the great unwashed public in America and the people that want to advance nuclear power. And I think John, you have to deal with that. You really have to go ba~k t~ ~age one, not really in your technology so much as in your civics, and do your work there. Otherwise the trust that we

4

need for any technology that invo lves risk, such as this does, is not going to go ver y far . That' s my opinion.

MS. STEELE: There is anothe r ana l ogy here too, with the weapons industry, and tha t is now we a r e seeing the legacy of not paying attention to the waste side o f the weapons industry. We are also s eeing the lega cy o f not dealing with the waste side of the commercia l nucl e ar industry. In the fiasco we have gone thr ough in the last couple of years, or last several years, t r ying t o c ite a nuclear waste repository, a commercial waste repos i tory, this area was a semi-finalist for awhile and now Nevada was more o r less ganged up on by the rest of the country and c haracterizat ion studies are going on there.

MR. BUCKLEY: Let me ask you a question which you may judge naive--in fact it may be n a i ve--a ll o f u s have read infinitely long essays and articles o n whet h e r we have come up with a reliable means of dispos i ng o f nuclear waste. Is this still an open question? Or is i t an open questio n only to people who still raise the question o f whet her two and two make four?

MS. STEELE: I think it's sti l l an op e n question. I think there is still-- The repos i tor y s tudies that have been done so far have raised many , many questio n s about whether it i s really safe to store nuclear waste--h i gh level nuclear waste--in a deep geological repos itory .

MR. BUCKLEY: Mr. Burnham, wou ld you s ay t hat the standards invoked in saying that there are rema ining doubts are simply too high to pay empirica l attention to?

MR. BURNHAM: That's really h a r d to say f o r one reason . You're talking about 10 , 000 yea r s in the future. So now, what can you point to that has last ed 10 , 000 years and has n't dropped any stones on anybody ' s head?

MR. BUCKLEY: There will always be a n England. [laughter]

MR. BURNHAM: All right. Th a t ' s where we'll put it . [laughter] So it's inherently diff i~u~t . . It' s also inherently difficult becaus e we 're l iving in, sha~l we s ay, the riskless society. Th is i s a v e ry p opular notion, that everything has to be tota l ly risk free. So I have to . guarantee everybody that 10, 000 y e ars from now, zero ri s k from these tons and tons o f radi oactive material.

MR. BUCKLEY: And y ou a re unwilling pro fessionally to say

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© Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University.

that.

MR. BURNHAM: Not really. Having worked on it for some 10 years, I am convinced that there are a dozen different geologic formations in this country in which nuclear waste, with the right attention to it, which it's getting, can be buried very safely. The problem is one percent technology and 99 percent political. Who around wants to have the sign over the interested town: "Welcome to Podunk Junction, Nuclear Graveyard of America." [laughter)

MR. CONNOR: Nobody wants that. I disagree with the idea that what people are about is risk free. I think what they want most of all is helping institutions that they can trust making those decisions. Our experience, particularly with Hanford and the repository program, has really been the opposite of that . We've had-- You know, seated to my right over here is a former NRC employee, who essentially lost his job because he got involved in what looked very much to be the cover-up by Hanford scientists of iodine 129 in the Hanford aquifers. Information that was essential to license the Hanford site as a repository, which was withheld from not only him but the public as well. And that, I think, is at the root of the problem. I tend to agree with you. I think high level nuclear waste can be stored safely in a repository. It's just who do you trust to make those decisions and to put the waste in the hole? I mean, that is the crisis that we have now.

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, but don't you think it's true that some people are predisposed to trust nobody?

MR. CONNOR: Yes, I would agree with that.

MR. BUCKLEY: Yes, I know the type who simply-- They're just not going to trust anybody. But let me ask you this, because I found it very arresting in reading up in preparation for this program. We all know that there are scientific anomalies. The Greeks, for all their finesse, never figured out the arch. So we had to wait for the Romans to make what we consider to be an absolutely primitive architectural discovery. By the same token, the Incas, who in some sense were highly civilized, never discovered the circle, the wheel. Now, Professor Lawrence Lidsky of MIT says, "We thought we had been having a great national debate over nuclear power. Instead, we've merely been discuss ing the acceptability of the light water reactor. But the light water reactor is no more a surrogate for the potential o f nuclear power than the Hindenburg was to the potential of air transportation." He

6

feels that not only the future but the past--i.e., we've had a prototype operating s ince 1967 and the so-called inherently safe fuel is the answer t o t he question. My question to Mr. Burnham is, why has t here been this rather reactionary refusal by scientists oriented to the future t o recognize the alternative, an apparently entirely safe form of making nuclear power?

MR. BURNHAM: Well, f i rst off, inherently safe is a very bad term. By inference t hen, all the other reactors are inherentl y unsa f e.

MR. BVCKLEY: Yes, he said you'd say that. [laughter)

MR. BURNHAM: Right on , a s they say. Let's say passably safe. A much better term. Basically it says, "The guys can screw up, they can pull the wrong valves, they can walk away, they can whatever, and a reactor will still be safe."

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, c an't you say that an airplane on the ground is inherently safe from falling?

MR. BURNHAM: Yes, but--

MR. BUCKLEY: And therefore - -

MR. BURNHAM: An airpl a n e , though, up in the sky, in which the pilot bails out and it st i l l flies is passably safe. [laughter]

MR. BUCKLEY: Yes, but peop l e like Mr. Connor and the people who closed down Shor e h a m and so on believe that this defense in depth, "If such and such happened at Three Mile Island, you should do this " and "If this else happens you should do this" and "If

1

this happens you should do this," and then ulti~ately you prev ent a meltdown. But it's im~ossib~e to conjure up all the va riables and come through wi~h this ta~le of contingencies that guarantees you total security. But if the fuel doesn't ar i s e t o an ominous temperature, as I understand it then the p roblem is never even faced. So why is there this ' sort o f dogmatic resistance to this so-called inherently safe alterna tive?

MR. BURNHAM: I woul d say it's far more tied up with economics than sa f ety, that light water reactors have an outstanding safety r ecord, they ' ve gone through all of the hoops, l i censing p r ocess--

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© Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University.

MR. BUCKLEY: But they're closing down all over the country.

MR. BURNHAM: Well, you mean construction is closing down. The reactors are not closing down.

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, they've closed down in Long Island, and they've never even opened in New Hampshire.

MR. BURNHAM: Well, that's thanks to some political problems.

MR. CONNOR: They're not political.

MR. BURNHAM: Oh yes, they are.

MR. BUCKLEY: So what you're saying really is that everything would be humming along if it weren't for a kind of political hysteria which is, in a sense, the trademark of the ages.

MR. BURNHAM: No, no, I was answering your question about technology. But undoubtedly new technologies out there for the future--the fast breeder has an infinite--! use that word advisedly--capacity.

MR. BUCKLEY: That's undeveloped. That's undeveloped.

MR. BURNHAM: We made power in 1951 when I was in Idaho Falls from a fast breeder.

MR. BUCKLEY: Why didn't we hang onto it?

MR. BURNHAM: Mr. Carter decided we didn't need this type of technology and it involved plutonium and all kinds of things.

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, we told Mr. Carter what we thought of him, didn't we? [laughter) [applause) Why isn't there a scientific lobby for the kind of architectural nuclear power plant that would soothe Mr. Connor?

MR. BURNHAM: I'm not sure I know the answer to that one, but the answer to why aren't we building something else, we might just as well not build any liquid metal reactors, gas cooled reactors as not building light water reactors, and that's exactly what we're doing today. We are not building nothing. [laughter)

MR. BUCKLEY: So this is sheer superstition, as far as you're concerned, this immobilization of the nuclear energy program.

8

f

MR. BURNHAM: Well, I don't like the notion that there is some magic panacea out there, this magic machine that is going to make everybody happy. There are a lot of myths around and unfortunately they're carefully nurtured by my friends here, and some of them are even created by my friends. [laughter) [applause) And as long as we have help like that, I don't think any machine will fly.

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, you must have a lot of friends, because they are certainly dominating the political question. [laughter)

MS. STEELE: You might read the Department of Energy's budget over the last eight years too. We've had almost a near reversal of-- In the '70s we spent--and I don't know the exact figure--but it was somewhere around 60 percent on energy research, and in the Reagan years that's been absolutely reversed to 60 percent for defense and the weapons buildup. That means, the way I read the U.S. Department of Energy budget, that we're not spending as much money on basic energy research. At least government sponsored research.

MR. BUCKLEY: But if I understand Mr. Burnham, a lot of research is redundant. I mean, you can only solve a problem x number of times before being satisfied you can solve it. And he says that we have a better record of safety in producing nuclear energy than we do bubblegum. Now, why should we re­research that if what he says is correct?

MS. STEELE: I would say that in response to Mr. Burnham, i t's sort of blaming the messenger for the problems of the industry, because, you know-- [applause) It's partly political and it's partly regulatory and it's partly what's happened in the last eight years.

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, we're all against blaming the messenger, but in fact the aphorism would never have been circulated if it happened that people don't do that, and in fact sometimes the messenger is to blame if he shouts fire in a crowded theater. And are some people doing that? I.e., you have a highly inflammable public, who are prepared to think that the day after tomorrow we are all going to die of cancer because of Hanford, right? And you inject a few data which in the coolness of the laboratory turned out to be exiguous in their meaning, but all of a sudden you have a massive movement , and isn't that what has happened?

MS. STEELE: Well, I think we're mixing two things. First of

9

© Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University.

all, a lot of the public outrage about Hanford has concerned weapons production and not the problem of the WPPSS consortium. And we're seeing, really, that the problems at Hanford are repeated at other nuclear weapons facilities around the country at government facilities, at savannah River, at Rocky Flats, at Fernald, Ohio. And so this is not something that is being made up but is something that is very, very real and very, very serious.

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, you deny it's being made up though, don't

you?

MR. BURNHAM: I think Karen is absolutely right. There is no question, though, when you talk about the defense production reactors, we're in deep, deep trouble. No question about it. I couldn't agree with you more.

MR. BUCKLEY: What George Bush would call deep do-do. [laughter]

MR. BURNHAM: Yes. And that is something that we are very interested in, and I know that both Karen and Tim are--they've written about it and spoken about it a great deal.

MR. BUCKLEY: Is Time magazine correct when it says, as it did six weeks ago, "No one knows how many people may have been needlessly afflicted with such ailments as cancer, birth deformities and thyroid deficiencies, and no one in relevant offices seems to care."

MR. SHRUM: Pardon me, Bill. Our time is up. Let me say that listening to all this, what disturbs me the most about nuclear power is its inherent fragility in a democratic society. Assume that we spend additional billions or trillions of dollars on nuclear power and then one plant in one place at one time experiences a meltdown or an American Chernobyl. The odds may be long, but I think that then the whole technology would be lost. Does anyone seriously believe that after such an accident the American people would stand for the continued operation of nuclear plants in their communities? Wouldn't there be a demand to close them all, and isn't that a bad risk, a bad investment? Now, a last word from Mr. Buckley.

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, American experience with finiteness is very abbreviated. For most of our history we could simply continue to march westward and get free land. And ·all of a sudden we ran into the Pacific Ocean. We have had no counterpart of that as far as I can see in science. As

10

recen~ly ~s 150 years ago, one doctor said that the human c~nstitution was not made to endure speed in excess of 15 miles per hour. [laughter) Now, given this all of a sudden we have an experience with finiteness, but w~ are willing to face the consequences of it. It was revealed this morning that.one CI';1arter of the world'.s supp~y of oil is owned by Saudi Arab7a. However many discoveries are in prospect, we know that in the next 10 or 15 or 20 or 25 years we are going to :u~ o~t of t~e stuff. The failure to look vi~orously and opti~istically into an a~ternative is, I think, a sign rather of disease than of technical and technological delinquency So I.think that science ought to be encouraged and the · A~e:ican people ought to be reminded of the fact of finiteness.

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January 13, 1989

Janua r y 20, 1989

Jim Powell Jan ua r y 27 , 1989 Rep. John Br yant (D -T x) Mod.: Micha e l Kinsl ey

Max Lerner Fe brua r y 3 , 1989 Walter Be rns Mod.: Michael Kinsl ey

Benjamin Fri edman Mod.: Mark Gree n

Feb r ua r y 10, 1989

Arthur Schlesinge r February 17, 1989 Jr. Mod.: Mark Green

Rev. Jerry Falwell February 24 , 1989 Harriet Pilpel Mod.: Michael Kinsl ey

Tom Bailie Mar c h 3, 1989 Karen Dorn Steele Michae 1 F. Fo x Mod.: Robert Shrum

Tim Connor March 10, 198 9 Karen Dorn Steele John B. Burnham Mod.: Robert Shrum

© Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University.

FIRING LINE NATIONAL UNDERWRITERS

Dow Chemical Company

Essex Chemical Corporation

Federal-Mogul Corporation

Great Northern Nekoosa Foundation, Inc.

Irby Construction Company

Kellogg Company

The Lauder Foundation

Mobil Corporation

Oberjuerg·e Rubber Company

John M. Olin Foundation, Inc.

Pfizer, Inc.

Rockwell International

Tandy Corporation/Radio Shack

Sundstrand Corporation Foundation

© Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University.

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© Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University.