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Hamas Khaled Meshal sets out his movements policy directions

August 2010

Afro-Middle East Centre

Contents:

1. Negotiations with Israel2. Recognising Israel3. Model of resistance4. International relations5. Alignments and axes6. On Jews7. On Christians8. On women9. Future of the Zionist project10. Future of the region

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Introduction

Since 1996, Khaled Meshal has been the Chairman of the Islamic

Resistance Movement (Hamas) Political Bureau. After the

assassination of Hamas leader Abdul Aziz Rantisi in 2004 by

Israeli forces, Meshal became the movements overall leader. He

lives in exile in Damascus, from where he oversees the

movements activities both within Palestine and outside.

The most recent interview with Meshal was conducted by the

Jordanian Arabic-language Al-Sabeel newspaper in July 2010. In it,

Meshal laid out the policy direction of Hamas on a number of

critical issues: negotiations with Israel, recognition of Israel,

resistance, Jews, Christians, women, among other issues. In the

Arab world, the lengthy interview is being viewed as highly

significant, and is regarded as a clear indication of positions that

Hamas wants to pursue, especially with regard to its future

attitude towards Israel. With Al-Sabeel s permission, the Afro-

Middle East Centre (AMEC) translated the interview into English

and publishes it here to make it accessible to a wider audience,

and to allow for greater understanding of the political and other

perspectives of a movement which has become one of the most

important role-players in the Middle East today. It is an important

piece articulating, in its own words, the perspectives of Hamas

leadership, and is critical reading for observers of the Middle East,

and policy-makers for whom the Middle East is important.

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On negotiations

Do you reject, in principle, negotiations with the enemy? If negotiations cannot be conducted withthe enemy, is it possible to do so with a friend? Does Hamas reject the principle of negotiationsoutright, or do you reject its form, conduct and results?

This is definitely a thorny and sensitive issue.Many people prefer to avoid any discussion of it,

and tend not to take any clear position on it for

fear of negative reactions or misinterpretations.

The sensitive and critical nature of this issue is

compounded by the dark shadows that are cast as

a result of the bitter experiences of Palestinian-

Israeli and Arab-Israeli negotiations. People are

influenced by these experiences, and are

extremely sensitive towards the idea of

negotiations, particularly with regard to the

collective mind and mood of the nation. There is

now, in many quarters, loathing for and aversion

to the concept of negotiations. This is quite

understandable and natural, but this does not

preclude us tackling the issue thoroughly, and

sorting through matters carefully, so as to set every detail into context, God willing.

It is indisputable that negotiating with the enemy is not rejected, either legally or rationally; indeed,

there are some stages during a conflict among enemies when negotiations are required and become

necessary. Both from a rational perspective and from legal logic, it is true that negotiations as a means

and a tool may be acceptable and legitimate at certain points in time, and rejected and prohibited at

other times; that is, it is not rejected in itself nor is it rejected all the time.

In Islamic history, in the era of the Prophet (peace be upon him), and in subsequent ages at the time

of Salahuddin [Saladin], for example negotiation with the enemy was conducted, but within a clear

framework and a specific philosophy, within a context, vision, rules and regulations governing this

negotiation. This is in stark contrast to the wretched approach taken by those negotiation professionals

who consider it a way of life, and regard it as the sole strategic option in the service of which all other

options are ruled out.

If resistance itself, honourable and esteemed as it is, is a means and not an end, does it make sense to

make negotiations an end, an only option and a constant approach, rather than being a means and a

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tactic to fall back on when necessary and when the context requires it?

The concept in the Quran is clear, when God Almighty says: And if they incline to peace, incline (you

also to peace), and trust in God. This implies that negotiation is acceptable, reasonable and logical for

us as advocates of a just cause when the enemy is forced to resort to it, when they come to us ready for

negotiation and for paying the price, and to respond to our demands. However, if we seek it

desperately and consider it our only option, then we will be the ones paying the price. Those who are

forced to negotiate are those who usually pay the price. Hence God Almighty says in another verse: Do

not weaken and call for peace when you have the upper hand.

We go back to the first verse: And if they incline to peace, incline (you also to peace), and trust in

God, which is preceded by God Almightys saying: Prepare for them what you can of power, including

steeds of war to terrify the enemy of God and your enemy. What does this mean? It means thatpossessing power and its means is what drives the enemy forcibly towards peace, and that the enemys

inclination to peace and negotiation is a result of jihad, resistance and the possession of power. Those

who consider negotiation without resistance and without any power cards are virtually heading for

surrender.

In the science of strategy and conflict management, negotiation is an extension to war, and a form of

war management. What you obtain by negotiating at the table is a product of your condition on the

ground, and an outcome of the balance of power in the battlefield. If you are vanquished in the

battlefield, you will certainly be defeated in the negotiations as well. Just as war requires a balance of

power, negotiations and peace each require a balance of power, for peace cannot be made when one

party is powerful and the other weak; otherwise, this will be surrender. The United States did not make

peace with Japan and Germany after World War II, but, rather, imposed surrender and a pact of

compliance and submission on them. In short, peace is made by the powerful and not the weak;

negotiations may serve the powerful but not the weak.

The conflict with Israeli occupation is different, as this is a case of a body alien to the region, which

came from outside and imposed itself on a land and a people, drove people away from their land, and

replaced them with an immigrant diaspora from all over the world. This is, therefore, a complex

situation which must be dealt with delicately.

When objective conditions and requirements for negotiation are available, especially the presence of

sufficient balance and relative equilibrium; when there is proven need for it at the appropriate time

without hurry or delay then it could be one of the options we resort to as a mechanism, means andtool, not as an objective or an end, not as a permanent condition or a strategic option. Negotiation is a

tactical instrument, and just as war is not a permanent condition and has its requirements and

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conditions, so too does negotiation.

With this clear view of negotiations, and when it is exercised with great caution and under strict rules at

the right time, it will be acceptable and useful in the context of conflict management; otherwise it will

lead only to surrender and submission to the enemys hegemony and conditions, and will result in the

neglect of rights and a continuous decline in the level of demands and political positions.

Unfortunately, the Arab and Palestinian condition regarding this issue is mostly very bad; it is a

vulnerable position, with no bargaining chips, support, manoeuvre or margin for ambiguity. The

Palestinian ranks are fully exposed, so they go to peace declaring it to be their only strategic option.

When your enemy is aware that you have no option but to negotiate, and you talk of nothing but

peace, and have no other option, what will force them to make concessions to you?

The Palestinian negotiators say: Negotiation is the option, the course and the only plan. They

coordinate security with the enemy and implement the Road Map and its security requirements

freely, with Israel offering nothing in return. What is there to force Olmert or Netanyahu to grant the

Palestinians anything?

Negotiation in the Palestinian case is out of its objective context; it is, merely from the perspective of

political logic, lacking resistance and not based on the necessary power balance. The Vietnamese for

instance negotiated with the Americans as the latter were retreating. Thus, negotiations were usefulfor turning the last page on American occupation and aggression. You are successful in negotiations and

in imposing your conditions on the enemy depending on the number of power cards you have on the

ground.

Hence, for negotiations not to be a risky and onerous process, you need to make clear to the enemy

not only in words, but in deed as well your message that you are open to all options. The negotiator

cannot succeed without basing his position on the multiplicity of options, meaning that, inasmuch as

you are ready for negotiations, you are also ready and able to go to war. If negotiations reaches a

deadlock, you must be prepared to go to war, attrition or resistance; otherwise negotiation will be

useless. We must remember that negotiations during the wars of old were often conducted on the

battlefield, and the negotiators would either reach a solution, or resume the war. Negotiation is a tool

and a tactic in the service of a strategy and is not a strategy in itself; it is not a substitute for a strategy

of resistance and confrontation with the occupation.

Negotiation needs to be based on unity at a national level. If one party sees benefit in a certain step

towards negotiation, and pursues such a decision alone and without referring to the people, they will

be placing themselves in a difficult situation and will grant the enemy an opportunity which it will

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certainly use against them. This could also cause the negotiators to make significant concessions for

fear that they might later be forced to acknowledge the failure of their negotiation option. Thus they

prioritise their own interest over the national one in order not to be exposed in front of their people

and others.

Negotiation has its specific spaces and domains and is not an absolute option in all matters. There are

issues such as critical constants that should not be negotiated. Negotiation is a mechanism and a

tactic within specific margins and domains; no one in their right mind would negotiate on everything,

especially not on the principles. In business, negotiation is often on profits and not on business assets.

Unfortunately, the current experience, especially of the Palestinian negotiations, is that all these rules

have been abandoned.

In all honesty and courage I say: negotiation is not absolutely prohibited or forbidden, be it from a legalor political perspective, or in view of the experiences of the nation and humanity, or the practices of

the resistance movements and revolutions throughout history. However, it must be subject to

equations, regulations, calculations, circumstances, contexts and proper management, for without

these it becomes a negative and destructive tool.

Regarding the Palestinian case, we say that negotiation with Israel today is the wrong choice. A

proposal was put forward to Hamas directly to negotiate with Israel but we refused. Some from among

the Hamas leadership received a proposal to meet with a number of Israeli leaders, some of them in

power, such as [Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Shas Party leader] Eli Yishai, and others belonging to

the peace camp. Hamas has rejected these offers.

Negotiations today under the current balance of power is in the service of the enemy, and does not

serve the Palestinian side. The conflict on the ground has not developed in a manner that has forced

the Zionist enemy to resort to negotiation; it refuses to this day to withdraw from the land, and does

not recognise Palestinian rights. Thus negotiations in such conditions is a fruitless gamble.

In light of our weakness and the imbalance of power, Israel is using negotiations as a tool to improve its

relations and polish its image before the international community, and using it to gain time so as to

create new facts on the ground through settlement-building, expelling people, the Judaising of

Jerusalem, and the demolition of its neighbourhoods. It also uses negotiations as a cover to distract

attention from its crimes and to water down Palestinian demands. Israel is exploiting negotiations to

normalise its relations with the Arab and Islamic world, to penetrate it, and to distort the nature of the

conflict; Israel is the sole beneficiary of the negotiations as they stand.

Negotiations under the existing imbalance of power is a subjugation of the Palestinian side to the

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requirements, conditions and dictates of the Israeli occupation. This is not an equal process, for just as

there is currently no parity in the field of confrontation, there is also no parity around the negotiating

table.

On recognising Israel

The issue of recognising the Zionist entity raises much debate. There is also talk of legal recognition incontrast to realistic or pragmatic recognition. What is the position of Hamas on this issue?

Our position regarding the acknowledgement of the occupations legality is clear and settled, and we do

not hide or conceal it. Recognising Israel has been laid down as a condition for the international

community opening up to Hamas, and so this has become an obstacle in our way. But we did not care,

and we showed determination to withstand this challenge. Recognition means legitimising the

occupation and conferring legitimacy upon Israels aggression, settlement, Judaisation, murders, arrests

and other crimes and atrocities against our people and our land. This is unacceptable according to

international law and human values, not to mention our religion.

It is unacceptable to legitimise occupation and theft of land. Occupation is a crime, theft is a crime, and

should not be legitimised under any circumstances. These are uncontroversial concepts in the common

human understanding, and so is the conception of the Palestinian victim whose land was usurped. This

is an issue tied to our human existence, and it contrasts with recognising the legitimacy of occupationand usurpation, not to mention the patriotic and religious feelings, cultural affiliation and historical

presence, which all link us to this land.

Others have fallen into this trap due to their ineffectiveness and submission to external pressures, and

they thought that bowing to these conditions and pressures may make it easier for them to advance in

their political agenda. However, it was practically demonstrated that they have paid an exorbitant price

for an illusion. They were wrong in their logic of interests, and wrong in their logic of principles.

We reject recognition in both legal and pragmatic senses. There is a difference between saying there is

an enemy called Israel on the one hand, and acknowledging its legitimacy on the other; the former is

not really recognition. In short, we refuse to recognise the legitimacy of Israel because we refuse to

recognise the legitimacy of occupation and theft of land. For us, this principle is clear and definitive.

Are you not surprised at the Israeli and international insistence on your recognising Israel? Is this not,in some way, a sign of weakness, as Israel sounds like it is questioning its own existence, and demanding that others recognise the legitimacy of this existence?

Without a doubt, the enemy is concerned about the future of its entity, particularly in light of the latest

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developments. Its psychology is that of a thief and a criminal who ultimately feels like an outlaw lacking

legitimacy, no matter how strong he may become. The demand for recognition is certainly a sign of

weakness, an expression of an inferiority complex, lack of confidence in the future of this entity, a

feeling that it is illegitimate and still rejected by the peoples of the region as alien, and that the mere

presence of a steadfast Palestinian people is a practical expression of the rejection of the Zionist entity.

Yet, there is another dimension, which is the feeling of superiority. This is the logic by which Western

nations deal with third world countries. The Zionists adopt the same logic based on military supremacy,

and feel that they are the party that has the right to dictate terms to others, including dictating

preconditions for any negotiations.

Some Palestinian and Arab parties have, unfortunately, responded to this logic. This is unacceptable

imbalance. In our dialogues with foreign delegations, we hear them constantly talking about theconditions of the Quartet; some of them introduce revised conditions to make it easier for us to accept

them. We refused all conditions on principle, and refused discussing them even in the context of

seeking revised formulas. We reject the principle of conditions, for it suggests that there are two levels

of human beings, and one party can dominate the other, one party having the upper hand and the

other the lower. Our humanity, dignity and self-respect state that we are on par with others even if

they are militarily stronger; hence we refuse to be dealt with through preconditions.

Unfortunately, one of the mistakes causing them to persist in this approach is that some people have

accepted these conditions, including the issue of recognition. They then made another mistake by not

exchanging the recognition of Israel for the recognition of Palestinian rights, but preferred, rather, to be

recognised themselves. This is a significant flaw added to the original one, namely recognition! It is

preposterous to recognise Israel in return for its recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organisation or

another movement instead of recognising the Palestinian people or state or rights. This implies that you

have swapped public interest for personal interests, and have swapped the grand national objective for

a petty partisan one. As we say this, we emphasise our rejection of the issue of recognition, regardlessof the price.

Therefore, in our conversations with those Western delegations [who ask us to recognise Israel], we tell

them: Although we are eager to communicate with you and open up to the world, we are not begging

or looking for Western recognition of Hamas. This does not concern us. Our legitimacy stems from the

Palestinian people; the ballot boxes; Palestinian democracy; the legitimacy of struggle, sacrifice and

resistance; and our Arab and Islamic depth. We are not looking for legitimacy from abroad; what we are

seeking to achieve and obtain is recognition of Palestinian rights and the right of our people to

freedom, deliverance from the occupation, and the right to self-determination. This will not be in

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exchange for recognition, because recognition is ultimately an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of

occupation, aggression and land theft.

In your opinion, why do the international community and the Israelis reject the long-term truce proposed by Hamas?

This rejection by the Zionist entity, the US administration, and other international parties is due to

several reasons.

The first reason: the logic of power, superiority and hegemony of these parties. They believe that their

superior power allows them to impose what they want on us, and to consider us Arabs and Palestinians

as the defeated party which has no choice but to sign the instrument of surrender in the same way as

Germany and Japan did in the aftermath of World War II, and not to provide solutions and ideas such as

the truce.

The second reason: they see Arab and Palestinian parties making more enticing offers. So how would

they respond to a truce offer when others offer to recognise Israel in return for a solution based on the

borders of 1967, with a willingness to negotiate on the details of that solution, namely: borders,

Jerusalem and the right of return?

The third reason: the experience of the Americans, the Zionists and other parties in the region tempts

them to conclude that further pressure will drive us into a state of desperation as happened previously;

they tried the policy of pressure and extortion with others and it succeeded. This prompts them to say:

Let us try the same thing with Hamas, for it may submit like the others did. Add to that the fact that

some Arabs and Palestinians regrettably advise them: Surround Hamas, financially and politically,

and incite against them; do not open up to them directly, maintain your conditions, and do not hurry.

Hamas will ultimately succumb!

These reasons, and perhaps others, prompt them to reject the truce offer. In our conversations with

Western delegations, we tell them: Yes, the positions of others are easier, and ours is more difficult;

yet our advantage is that, when we make an offer or take a position, we strive to ensure its applicability

on the ground and its potential to win the confidence of the Palestinian people and the Arab and

Islamic public, and it is so only when it does not run counter to the national constants, rights and

interests of the people. As to the positions of others in the Palestinian arena, they are easy but lack

the approval of the majority of the Palestinian people, its national forces and intellectual elites. What is

the practical value of these positions, and the value of reaching agreements and finding solutions with

some leaderships that were rejected by the majority of the people? The Oslo Agreements were

imposed in the past, and they failed because they were unfair and did not meet the aspirations of our

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people, and thus remained alien to the Palestinian and Arab reality.

So we are aware that they will be forced finally to deal with the vision of Hamas and the vision of forces

and leaders committed to national constants. We tell them: If you think that you are able to achieve

success in the region through other schemes, try and you will reach a dead-end.

It might be easy for the major powers to incline towards easy solutions with certain leaders and rulers,

without considering the importance of these solutions being convincing and satisfactory to the people.

These powers overlook the fact that reconciliation with the leaders and governments alone is

temporary and short-lived, and does not create stability in the region no matter the extent of

pressure and oppression exercised against the people. However, the success of any enterprise is

realised only when the people are convinced and believe it to be satisfactory and equitable, even if

temporarily. Some in the West are beginning to realise the importance of this perspective and are,consequently, developing their positions albeit slowly in the direction of dealing with Hamas. There

are still obstacles in the effort to translate this limited development into real and serious steps. We, in

turn, are not in a hurry because what matters for us is not our role but our commitment to our peoples

rights and interests.

Hamas Model of Resistance

What contribution did Hamas make vis--vis jihad and the struggle? What distinguishes its model of resistance?

It must first be emphasised that Hamas as a movement of resistance against the Zionist occupation is a

natural and authentic part of the experience of the Palestinian struggle, an extension of it, and one of

its circles that is continuing from a hundred years ago, starting with the first revolution and the first

martyr and all its icons and leaderships and their great struggle despite adverse circumstances in their

time. These were people such as Izzeddine al-Qassam, Haj Amin al-Husseini, Farhan al-Saadi, Abdul

Qader al-Husseini, among others, up to the contemporary Palestinian revolution with all its factions,

forces, leaderships and icons of struggle. The march of the Palestinian struggle continues today, thanks

to God, and will continue until the goals of liberation, return and deliverance from Zionist occupation

are realised.

This means that Hamas, as a resistance movement, is not separate from this struggle, nor does it exist

without roots in a desert, but is rather a part of a whole. It is part of our peoples history of struggle and

its jihadi march full of sacrifices, challenges, creativity, patience, endurance, and determination to

continue the march and overcome all obstacles, challenges and adverse and unfavourable

circumstances until the ultimate goal is achieved, God willing.

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Second: For us, resistance is a means, and not an end, in the service of the aim and the objectives; it is

not resistance for the sake of resistance. The elaboration of the resistance concept to make it an end in

itself entails many errors in understanding, vision, and in the practical attitude and behaviour, as well as

a flaw in decision-making and interest assessment. Yes, resistance is very important, and a primary axis

to our project, but it is not the objective. It is the means and the way for achieving this goal, and astrategic tool for liberation.

Third: Hamas is not a military group, but an all-embracing national liberation movement, with

resistance as its main axis, its strategic means to liberation and the realisation of the Palestinian

national project. At the same time, the movement works in all fields and areas, and has its own aims

and political vision. It is a grass-roots movement conscious of the concerns of its people at home and

abroad, defending their interests, and seeking to serve them as much as possible in all aspects of daily

life.

Fourth: We have limited our resistance to be in opposition to the Israeli occupation alone. Our

resistance is against the enemy occupying our land and encroaching on our people and holy sites, and

not against anyone else. We did not use resistance even against those who supported our enemies and

provided them with all the means of force and the deadly weapons which kill our people. We also

adopted the policy of confining the resistance to Palestine and not conducting it outside Palestine. This

was done not out of powerlessness, but on account of an accurate estimation of interest, and a

balancing of various considerations.

Fifth: We clearly adopt the policy of using weapons and force only in the face of the occupier and the

external enemy attacking us; this is legitimate resistance. This means not using weapons and force

either in domestic affairs, or in addressing political and intellectual disputes. Addressing disputes within

national ranks must be through dialogue, consensus and arbitration by people, through democracy and

the ballot box.

The tragic events in the Gaza Strip a few years ago are not a departure from this policy, as this is an

entirely different case. There was a Palestinian party which rejected the election result and sought to

overturn it, that is, to overturn Palestinian legitimacy, and, unfortunately, they collaborated with the

Zionist enemy and the Americans and used weapons against us. It is our natural right to defend

ourselves when forced to do so, particularly considering that we did this from the position of a

legitimate government formed after fair democratic elections which were approved by the elected

Legislative Council.

On the other hand, when we were out of power from 1994 until 2006, and although the Authority had

arrested thousands of our members and severely tortured them, and pursued the resistance, its

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weapons and people, and coordinated (and continues to coordinate) security with the Zionist enemy,

we did not respond at that time by using weapons or force against it, and we restricted our resistance

to the Zionist enemy alone. We adopted a hands-off policy and restricted our opposition to the

Authority, and the management of our dispute with it, to peaceful political and popular means.

Six: We have adopted a policy of not engaging in turf battles in the region, contrary to what others had

done in the earlier stages. We never used force and weapons against any Arab state or party even if

they harmed and besieged us, or arrested and tortured our brethren, or stabbed the resistance in the

back, or incited against us. The Arabs are our brothers and family and they constitute our strategic

depth; so we cannot wrong them even if they did so to us. We have committed ourselves to this policy

over the past years, and will remain committed to it, God willing, because our battle is exclusively

against the Zionist enemy.

Seven: In building the resistance, we took pains to focus on building the resistance activist religiously,

educationally, psychologically, and intellectually, ensuring a high degree of organisational and

behavioural discipline, commitment to religious and ethical rules of resistance, and developing the

capacity for endurance and steadfastness in extreme circumstances, as well as building awareness and

clarity of vision in the fighters, sincerity of purpose and intention, and the blending of the religious and

national dimensions to develop a strong incentive in the course of jihad and the resistance. The fighter

struggles against the occupying enemy in defence of his homeland and holy sites, his people and

nation, and his family and honour.

As for the movements contribution to jihad and the struggle, it must be noted as a key and substantial

point that Hamas succeeded, thanks to God, in building and strengthening its resistance even though it

emerged at a difficult time, at a point when many factors and objective conditions for the success of

revolutions and liberation movements were vanishing. The most notable of these is the end of the Cold

War, the absence of an international ally, and the emergence of an international system based on the

uni-polarity of the United States of America, the foremost ally of the Zionist entity, followed by theentry of the world into the war on terror, and the pinning of the charge on Islam and resistance

movements.

Added to that, although this factor often has various outcomes and implications, is the fact that the

resistance in Palestine has been undergoing a suffocating siege for some time, and is deprived of a

friendly neighbourhood that can provide strategic and logistical depth, and of a secure rear base

allowing for freedom of movement and manoeuvre. All this led to extreme difficulty in the continuance

of the armed struggle as it was before, especially working from the outside [of Palestine] to the inside,

and the difficulty of providing logistical support to the resistance at home and abroad.

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In light of this great challenge, and in order to continue the project of resistance and to overcome

obstacles and blockades, the movement focused on a strategy of broadening the participation of the

Palestinian people at home, and broadening their involvement in the resistance and confrontation

[with the enemy]: starting from stone-throwing, introducing creativity to the first and second intifada in

which everyone took part (thus reflecting a new phase of the Palestinian struggle), and introducing newand innovative forms of resistance and open confrontation with the occupation.

Another strategy of movement-building at home was also adopted in terms of recruitment, training,

arming and manoeuvre, while making every effort to collect financial and technical support and arms

from abroad. When the blockade intensified further, the idea of manufacturing weapons inside, from

available raw materials, emerged.

So we accepted the task with these enormous challenges, siege and persecution, and faced it bravelyand resolutely through innovation, creativity, diversification, self-reliance, counting on God in all

circumstances, and continuously seeking friends, allies and available support. We thought to ourselves

that, even if we remained by ourselves in the field, and lost all support from others, we would persist in

our resistance and we would not give it up or end it, and we will continue urging our nation to support

us and take part in this honourable duty, quoting Allah Almightys statement to the Prophet (peace be

upon him): You shall fight in Gods cause; you are responsible only for your own self; and inspire the

believers to do the same. It may be that God will neutralise the power of those who reject faith. God is

much more powerful, and stronger in the ability to deter (Surah 4, Verse 84). We used to quote this

despite our conviction and confidence in our nations faithfulness and its commitment not to abandon

its responsibilities towards the central issue of Palestine and of confronting the Zionist enterprise. Our

nation clearly realises the essence of the Zionist enterprise and the danger it poses to the whole region

and the world.

Another addition by Hamas, in terms of jihad and the struggle, is innovation in resistance and its

methods, tactics and tools, such as expanding martyrdom operations and developing them to become alethal weapon against the enemy, and striking deep at its security. An innovation was the manufacture

of weapons locally and transforming this into an actual and real project that could be relied on, even if

temporarily, given the difficulty of obtaining weapons from outside. The most prominent example in

this regard is the manufacture of weapons which were initially dealt with lightly on account of their

simplicity and their limited range and effectiveness, but which have evolved to advanced stages and

have become a real nuisance to the enemy, with growing impact on its security.

Another important example is the development of the resistances capacities in the face of Israeli

incursions, and the success in defending Palestinian areas and towns following the distinctive model of

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Gaza and the heroic attempt in the Jenin camp, where all conventional methods were used and were

complemented by the use of tunnels on a large scale to defend and challenge. This went even so far as

to withstand a real war wherein the enemy was routed and its objectives thwarted like in the Zionist

enemys war on the Gaza Strip in 2008-2009, which actually was the largest war waged by Israel on

Palestinian land.

A further addition is the improvement of resistance to being able to achieve and liberate part of the

land. The Palestinian resistance, with its military wings and qualitative martyrdom operations, and with

the significant impact of our peoples second uprising, was able to force the Zionist enemy to leave the

Gaza Strip and dismantle its settlements for the first time in the history of the Zionist entity.

This clearly means that the Palestinian revolution, through the development of capacity, momentum

and tools, as well as innovation and diversification of methods and tactics, and through determinationand patience, has become a real and reliable option whose ability to withstand, defend and achieve,

even if step-by-step, can be trusted by the people despite the enormous difference in and the

continuing imbalance of power compared to the enemy.

The resistance was also concerned with an important aspect in its experience as a resistance

movement, namely, the alternation between escalation and abatement in line with the conditions and

circumstances of our people, serving the public interest, and sound political judgement. The calm could

be self-chosen or undeclared as was necessary, and as part of the resistances decision-making, or it

could be announced publicly by agreement of the resistance forces, in return for specific demands such

as discontinuation of Zionist aggression, lifting the siege, and so on.

We, along with other resistance factions, exercised this with all consciousness and courage and took

responsibility for our people and their interests. But, in all cases, we exercised this on the basis of

clinging to resistance and developing it further as our strategic option for liberation. In the battlefield

and on the path of resistance and liberation, the movement offered as did others from our people a

prominent galaxy of martyrs from its finest leaders, icons and cadres, led by Sheikh Ahmad Yassin,

founder of the movement; Abdul Aziz al-Rantisi; Jamal Mansour; Jamal Salim; Ibrahim al-Makadmeh;

Ismail Abu Shanab; Salah Darwazeh; Yousef Sarakji; Saed Siam; Nizar Rayyan; and thousands of other

noble martyrs.

The movement also offered illustrious figures in the history of Palestinian military activity, such as Imad

Akel; Yahya Ayyash; Salah Shehadeh; Mahmoud Abu Hannoud; and dozens of other martyrs who

cannot all be named here, though their names will remain in the Palestinian memory and history of struggle.

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Another aspect, and a very important addition, is the introduction of the Islamic religious dimension to

the battle alongside the national one, with all the significance of Islam in the life of the people and the

nation, and the spirit, strength and vigour it endows the strugglers with, as well as enhancing

motivation for resistance, the ability further to endure, persevere and withstand, and Islams ability to

mobilise the masses and stir their feelings in the face of the occupiers.

Furthermore, this essential dimension has increased the rallying of the Arab and Islamic nations masses

and their support for the Palestinian people and their resistance, especially during major events such as

the war and blockade on Gaza, and all matters relating to Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa Mosque. Islamic

sentiments are among the most important links between the masses of the nation and their elites and

Palestine. Thus, the forceful entry of Hamas with its clear Islamic identity onto the battlefield was a

decisive factor in raising the broad Arab and Islamic momentum, and invoking it for the cause and the

Palestinian resistance.

How do you see the issue of laxity in shedding blood?

There are strict established conditions regarding blood and the lives of people, stressed by the Quran

and the Sunnah [the Prophetic example]. The Prophet (peace be upon him) never stressed anything like

he stressed this issue. He repeatedly emphasised it, particularly in his Farewell Sermon, and so it

became central in the charter of the nation. There are also codes of ethics and national customs that

people subscribe to so as to establish internal peace in their societies, and everyone should abide by

these rules and not violate them.

We in the movement are keen to do this carefully, by instilling these constraints and legal, ethical and

national rules, sensitising the members of the movement, educating them, compelling them to abide by

these rules in their behaviour, and practising accountability for any infringements or violations.

Those who need emphasis on these issues are no doubt those in the military domain and the bearers of

weapons, so that the weapons are used only in their natural domain against the occupying enemy. For

those who carry weapons might be tempted by their feeling of self-power to use their weapons

needlessly. The more intense the environment of domestic tension in a society becomes, the more

likely will be indulgence and excess in the use of arms.

It should be noted here that the severity of the security experience with the Palestinian Authority in the

1990s, the poor performance of its security apparatus, corruption, harassment of people especially

the resistance movements, primarily Hamas, and the torture and insulting of its leaders, all created

feelings of indignation and severe pain, and wounded souls that will never heal as a result of that harsh

experience. This rendered the domestic environment in the Palestinian community unsound and

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unhealthy, tense and irascible, and increased narrow partisanship and partiality to the self and the

faction at the expense of the overall national interest. These are defects we must all work to address;

we must work together and take responsibility to get rid of them, because that would be in the interest

of the country, the cause and all of us, and because the prolonging of such defects and phenomena is

detrimental to all, and harmful to the cause and the national interest.

The possession of arms, the sense of power, and large forces often cast on their owners vanity and self-

admiration, lure them into laxity in their use of weapons, and may cause them to make mistakes and

abuse the rights of others. By nature, man exceeds proper bounds when he becomes rich or strong, as

God Almighty says: But man transgresses all bounds, in that he looks upon himself as self-sufficient

(Surah 96, Verses 6-7). Preventing such transgression requires discipline and control through religious,

moral and patriotic commitment, and through the enactment of constraints, rules and penalties, and by

being held answerable for abuses and irregularities.

We in the movement exercise this approach with its two parts: the religious, moral and patriotic

deterrent; and checks, balances, accountability and penalty in the case of violation. These are issues

related to religion, national interest and peoples rights. We are also keen on the integrity of intentions

and purity of motives of the fighters, so that jihad, effort and behaviour are always purely for the sake

of God, and for the homeland and its interest, away from the passion for revenge or personal motives.

Despite all this, mistakes still occur; this is part of human nature.

Abuses and mistakes occur in the experiences of all nations and peoples, as with all armies of the world,

and as in the case of the ugliness we see practised against the vulnerable and occupied peoples in Iraq

and Afghanistan. However, as an Arab and Muslim nation, and by virtue of our religions principles, our

morals and cultural heritage, we need always to commit to the highest standards of ethical and

behavioural discipline, and firmness towards errors and abuses, for our morals are not to be practised

only among ourselves but are, rather, universal and human and should be practised with everyone,

regardless of their religion or race.

Even at the time of Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) there were excesses and errors, but

dealing with them was firm and fast. The Holy Quran addressed one of these cases in the verse: O you

who believe! When you go abroad in the cause of God, investigate carefully, and say not to anyone who

offers you a salutation: You are not a believer! while you covet the perishable goods of this life. With

Allah are profits and spoils abundant. You too were once in the same condition, till God conferred on

you His favours. Therefore carefully investigate. For God is well aware of all that you do (Surah 4,

Verse 94).

The Prophet (peace be upon him) was firm in addressing these violations, few as they were, and the

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prophetic traditions in this regard are well-known, as partiality towards principles, values and morals is

the basis of religion and the foundation of the nation.

From here, in compliance with Islamic rules and ethics, following the example of the Holy Quran and

the Sunnah (because we consider commitment to them a religious obligation and a source of goodness

and bliss) and in fulfilment of our peoples and nations national interest, our policy in the movement is

based on the non-endorsement of errors and violations, and in not legitimising them no matter where

they come from. We, rather, consider them to be at variance with the approach of the movement, its

thinking and commitment, and we penalise the offenders and abusers firmly.

Hamas and International Relations

Are you satisfied with your achievements in international relations? What is the position of theserelations in the thinking, programmes and priorities of Hamas?

International relations in the political thinking of Hamas has several dimensions.

The first dimension: conviction that the Palestine battle, in one of its aspects, is the battle of humanity

against Israeli injustice and oppression, and against the racist Zionist scheme targeting the world and

humanity as a whole and threatening the interests of peoples and nations, since its evil and dangers are

not limited to Palestine and the Palestinians and the Arabs and Muslims.

The second dimension: the necessity of promoting our just cause and winning more friends who

support our legitimate right to resist occupation and aggression. It has been shown that there is still

good in the human conscience, and that it could be awakened and moved in our favour if we present

our case well, and strive to reveal the truth of the Zionist entity. The case of breaking the Gaza

blockade, and the success in winning a large number of sympathisers with this issue through the

movement of ships to Gaza is an example of the importance of this dimension. We recall and

emphasise that the confrontation with the Zionist entity through the people and resistance, as wasthe case with the Gaza War, south Lebanon and the flotilla, is what exposes the ugly face of this entity,

and not negotiations and meetings with it as these polish its image and cover up its reality and crimes.

The third dimension: just as Israel encircles and haunts us on the international stage, we too must

follow it in all international forums, and not leave the stage to it. Unfortunately, the official Arab and

Islamic side has fallen far short of this objective, and its true role has been absent. However, what

mitigated this deficiency are the efforts of the Palestinian, Arab and Islamic communities who recently

moved more effectively on the international arena and scored significant results and important

breakthroughs. They helped win friends and supporters for the Palestinian cause and Arab and Islamic

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issues, and worked so as to expose the ugly and ruthless face of Israel, whose aggressive and brutal

behaviour has shocked human conscience and sentiments because it runs counter to the ethical values

of Western peoples and the peoples of the world. These communities have also contributed, through

their activities, to the pursuit of Israel legally and judicially.

The fourth dimension: we are interested in forging a network of relations, strong and effective at all

levels, international as well as Arab and Islamic. We have created in our group a special section for

international relations because we consider it a factor of strength, opening up and winning

international support for the cause and the movement.

The fifth dimension: the forging of international relations starts here, from within the region, for here is

the plant, and the harvest is there in the West, while hard work is required in both. This means that the

primary basis for achieving a breakthrough and success in international relations is strength on theground, and being ingrained in it, united around our people and our nation, practising resistance and

resoluteness. [With such a foundation], the world will respect us and realise that there will be no peace

or stability in the region unless they deal with us and accord us the consideration we deserve, respect

our interests, rights and legitimate demands, and retreat from their current policies of bias towards

Israel and disregard for the Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims.

We have scored successes in this field, thanks to God. Yet the road is long and we have a long way

ahead of us. We are relatively satisfied with the achievements, considering the scale of obstacles facing

us and being thrown in our path. It should not be forgotten that the level of the relations and the yield

achieved does not depend on us alone, but also on the other side. This is how political and human

relations take place.

If we are to measure the yield from the efforts we exerted, compared to the degree of Zionist

penetration and influence in the world, the gap will seem wide. Western policy which views Israel as

its natural extension and chooses to support it without limit, the weakness of Arab performance and

diplomacy, and the incitement by certain Palestinian and Arab parties against the movement have, no

doubt, impacted on the extent of success and achievement.

We currently have a host of official relations on the international level, such as the relations with

Russia, some Latin American countries and Asian and African nations. We also have other official

international relations (some are covert in view of the conditions of the other party) and indirect

relations through former officials who communicate with us with the knowledge of the officials in their

countries; this is the case with the United States of America and others. All of this is an importantdevelopment, and it will not be long, God willing, until this develops into open and consistent official

relations with the movement.

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We are not talking here about international relations from the viewpoint of eagerness, desperation,

urgency and a search for partisan glory. Rather, we are forging these relations and following up on

them with poise and self-respect, with the purpose of reaping gains for the Palestinian cause rather

than for narrow partisan ones.

Alignments and axes

In recent years, the Arab arena has witnessed a number of different axes and alignments. Hamas hasbeen classified by some as being within the axis of rejection. How do you view this situationdominating the Arab political scene, where do you see yourself with regard to it, and do you believe it to be in the interests of the nation?

I will answer this from three angles.

First angle: There is a reprehensible gathering, and another gathering which is praiseworthy. The

reprehensible gathering is an assembly, for example, on the basis of race or narrow national ideas in

opposition to other people; it invokes categorisation and internal alignment on the basis of the country

or the nation. But if people rally to do good, to support the Palestinian people, resist the Zionist enemy,

challenge normalisation, resist the efforts of enemies to infiltrate the nation, confront American

hegemony and the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, and stand in the way of attempts to rob the

nations wealth, all this constitutes a praiseworthy gathering, and cannot be equated with the other

one.

Therefore, when we say that we are for resistance, adherence to Palestinian rights, the right of return,

have a bias for Palestine, Jerusalem and the nations sacred places, and that we reject the Zionist

occupation and refuse to succumb to the dictates of the enemy, then this is something we are proud of

and do not hide. This is the duty of the nation. God Almighty says: Help one another in righteousness

and piety and do not cooperate in sin and aggression. Hence, coming together for such cooperation is

desired, and we should not be afraid of being accused of bias towards one of the axes in such a case.

Second angle: we do not consider our commitment to resistance and refusal to submit to the Quartets

and the enemys conditions and the American-Israeli vision of the settlement and relinquishment of

Palestinian rights to be undermining of Palestinian or Arab parties. Rather, [we consider it to be an

undermining] of the Zionist enemy. As for those whose agenda intersects with the enemys, or who

succumb to them and go along with them under pressure, and participate in besieging us or inciting

against us, those are the ones who are placing themselves against the mission of the resistance.

However, we do not antagonise anyone from our people and our nation, and we have not formed a

Palestinian, Arab or Muslim axis against another Palestinian Arab one. We continue to reach out to all,

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and are keen to communicate with everyone and establish relationships with everyone. If there is a

break or chill in relationships with someone, it is this person or group who chooses this break or chill

and not us. Everyone is aware of this fact, because we reach out to all Arabs some of them respond

positively, and others do not.

Third angle: if it was acceptable to disagree in our politics and analysis of the political situation when

the accord was being put to the test and when people were paying heavily for the resistance, is it

acceptable to disagree today after the accord has been proven a failure with an obstructive political

horizon and very heavy costs and consequences, much heavier than the costs of the resistance?

We call on all the nations states and forces to rally together with us in our natural environment as a

nation. When the nation undergoes occupation, our natural environment and our priority should be the

resistance. When we undergo aggression it is natural to unite in the face of aggression; and when thenation enters a stage of independence, then our natural environment and priority would be

reconstruction, economic advancement and cultural renaissance in all its dimensions.

Today, the nation should respond to the current challenges and place itself in its natural environment.

We hope that everyone would be in this environment, particularly considering that they have tried and

failed and found out that betting on the Americans and others is futile. The Americans have been tried

in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan, and were tried before that by the Shah of Iran, and the results were

dismal. We say to the Arab and Islamic regimes: The shortest way to maintain your regimes and even

your stay in power is by siding with your nation and the peoples choices.

The official Arab leaderships allowed themselves the opportunity to be engaged in many experiments

and attempts on the path of compromise and negotiations. The most recent of these was the Arab

Peace Initiative, through which they sent a clear and generous message that the Arab states were

willing to provide benefits in return for steps taken by the other party. Eight years have elapsed since

this proposal was mooted, without any respect being given either by the Zionist enemy, the US

administration, or the international community except for a few complimentary phrases.

During our meetings with many Arab officials and leaders, we continue to tell them: After this

experience, and after reaching a dead-end, is it not worthwhile to stop and look for alternative

options? We used also to say to them that withdrawing from the settlement plan and the Arab

Initiative did not mean entering into official wars which are not possible today with Israel. Another

option is to support the resistance, and thus the nation can rally behind a realistic and pragmatic option

which has proven able to withstand and able to score some achievements, an option that is boundsignificantly to develop in terms of its weight and influence in the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially if it

finds support.

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If official wars with the enemy are impossible today because of the imbalance of power, it is difficult for

the nation as things currently stand to engage on a programme of a regular Arab war against Israel.

So let the realistic and practical option be resistance, which we have tried and which has succeeded in

driving the occupiers out of southern Lebanon and Gaza, and whose effects are being seen clearly in

Iraq and Afghanistan.

Hence, we believe that calling on the nation and its forces to line up in their natural environment is not

an abstract or emotional theory but is, rather, based on a practical option that has been successfully

tried. The nation is capable of using this option on the official and popular levels, particularly since the

negotiation option has failed and in light of the contempt displayed by the enemy leaders towards us,

as well as successive US administrations betrayal of the Arabs and the Muslims even of their friends

and associates.

Hamas and Jews

Is the resistance of Hamas directed against the Zionists as Jews or as occupiers?

We do not fight the Zionists because they are Jews; we fight them because they are occupiers. The

reason behind our war with the Zionist entity and our resistance to it is the occupation, rather than

differences in religion. Resistance and military confrontation with the Israelis was caused by

occupation, aggression and crimes committed against the Palestinian people, and not because of the

differences in religion and belief.

We are well aware that Israel invokes religion to advance on the battlefield. They also employ historical

grudges, distorted texts, legends and myths, and religious sentiments in the battle against the

Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims. Even the leaders of secular Zionism had used religion since the

beginning of the Zionist movement and exploited it politically; and the Zionist entity was originally

based on religion and racism. Despite all this, our religious differences with them is not what created a

situation of war and resistance against them; we fight them because they are occupiers.

For us, religion is a cornerstone to our lives, belonging and identity, our culture and our daily actions; it

is the energy that promotes patience and steadfastness, and gives rise to more sacrifice and generosity.

This is a tremendous energy in the face of injustice, aggression and the powers seeking to harm our

people and our nation. But we do not make of religion a force for engendering hatred, nor a cause or a

pretext for harming and assaulting others, or grabbing what is not ours, or encroaching on the rights of

others.

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Hamas and Christians

What is the Hamas view of Christians and their role in the Palestinian cause?

Islam dealt with the Christians in a special manner compared to other religions, as in the [Quranic]

verse: You will surely find that, of all people, the most hostile to those who believe are the Jews and

those who are polytheists; and you will certainly find that, of all people, the nearest in friendship to

those who believe are those who say: We are Christians. The historical relations between Christians

and Muslims have had a special status since the conquest of Palestine, when the second caliph, Umar

ibn al-Khattab, received the keys to the city of Jerusalem. A special relationship between Muslims and

Christians was formed thereafter.

What is more, Palestine enjoys an exceptional status, being the land of prophets and messengers, the

birthplace of Jesus (peace be upon him), and the place of Muhammads (peace be upon him) night journey. Palestine is one of the foremost examples of coexistence and tolerance among all faiths. This is

a legacy carried by the Palestinians whether Muslims or Christians and has resulted in the evolution

of the historical relations we see.

In the past decades, since the 1930s when the late Haj Amin al-Husseini sponsored Christian and

Muslim conferences, Muslims and Christians have had mutual concerns, and have cooperated to face

mutual challenges. Palestinian Muslims and Christians were in the same boat against the Zionist

occupation. This was reflected in the role of our Christian brothers in the contemporary Palestinian

Revolution when all factions united as one people.

Since the formation of Hamas, the relationship with the Christian brothers has been normal and good,

and there were no problems between us and them. This despite the fact that some Palestinian forces

tried, unfortunately, to scare Christians with the idea of the new movement, reminding them that it is

an Islamic movement in order that they might promote the notion of an allegedly inevitable

contradiction between Hamas and Christians. However, these attempts at intimidation failed, and

Christians found the movement to be close to them, dealing with everyone with tolerance, openness

and respect. During the second Palestinian intifada, the movement took into consideration the

specificities of Christian festivals, and was careful that strike days did not coincide with Christian

festivals and events, just as it was also keen to protect Christian property. Not only this, but Hamas was

also keen on an active Christian role in Palestinian political life. The movements leaders, at home and

abroad, held several meetings with Christian national religious figures.

For these reasons, Hamas won broad support among Christians before and after the 2006 legislativeelections. There were many Christians who voted for Hamas, and we supported them in the West Bank

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and Gaza, too. For example, Dr Husam al-Tawil a Christian won [a seat] in Gaza owing to votes from

Hamas and its supporters. The number of Muslims who voted for him was several times the number of

Christian votes given that the number of Christians in the Gaza Strip is small.

I recall here, because of its symbolic significance, an incident that happened in an Arab airport. A

certain person approached me, introduced himself as a Palestinian, said that he was a Christian from

Beit Jala, and that he had voted for Hamas and still supported it. He was not obliged to say this, and

nobody pushed him to say it; he did it on his own, and expressed his feelings. This is a model of the

good relationship between the movement and the Christian brothers from among our people.

We are dealing with the Christians as a fundamental component of the people and homeland, and an

active part in the struggle against the occupation, without the consideration that this is a Muslim and

that a Christian. We are partners in the country, and everyone has rights and duties. When we recallreligious figures prominent in the struggle of the people of Palestine, we recall, among Muslims, Sheikh

Raed Salah, Sheikh Ikrima Sabri, and [among Christians] Bishop Atallah Hanna, Bishop Capucci, and so

on. We all share in defending Jerusalem and the cause.

Hamas may have surprised some liberals and secularists in the Palestinian arena who thought, or even

promoted the idea, that, by virtue of its Islamic identity, it will isolate itself and that a tenuous

relationship may develop between us and Christian Palestinians. They were surprised when their

expectations did not materialise. This is because religion is not about isolation and detachment; on the

contrary, faith motivates a person to be tolerant, to be respectful of others, and to recognise their

rights.

Hamas and women

Islamic movements are commonly accused of contempt towards women and marginalisation of their role in political and social life. How do you view these charges in light of your experience in Hamas?

Unfortunately, there is a gap between the true concepts of Islam regarding woman, and their more

recent practical application. There is an erroneous application and behaviour that results from

backwardness and does not come from the texts and spirit of the Shariah.

Even at the present time, however, and despite the good level of progress in the Arab and Islamic

countries, there are still errors in the application [of the Shariah] arising from many customs, traditions

and concepts which emanate from certain situations and specific environments, and do not arise from

the provisions of Islam itself.

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Women in the texts of the Quran and hadith (prophetic traditions) are charged with duties just as men

are, and when the Quran speaks about Shariah and its provisions, it mentions men and women

together because everyone is charged with and has individual responsibilities. This is evident in God

Almightys saying: The Believers, men and women, are protectors one of another: they enjoin what is

just, and forbid what is evil, and Never will I suffer to be lost the work of any of you, be you male orfemale. You are members, one of another. And, in the Prophets words: Women are the twin halves

of men. There are also other such Quranic verses and hadith in this vein.

Women in the Islamic concept of thought, jurisprudence, mandate and role are indeed one half of

society, and woman has been given her prestige and respect. However, there is a huge difference

between respect and appreciation for woman and her rightful role [on the one hand], and abusing her

and presenting her as a cheap commodity as is done in the Western civilisation [on the other]. There is

a difference between preserving womans chastity and modesty and safeguarding her rights while

according her a suitable role, and dealing with her as a commodity of lust and pleasure. These ethical

regulations are not just Islamic; they are innate and human.

We in Hamas are keen, as regards women, to invoke Islamic concepts and their unadulterated

application which are not marred by the ages of backwardness or the weight of social norms and

traditions that stem from the environment rather than the religious text, especially since the

environment of Palestine is not a closed one but a historically civilised one enjoying plurality and

openness to all religions, civilisations and cultures.

With this pure and original conception, and as a part and an extension of the Palestinian experience

and its legacy, Hamas assigned a distinctive role for women in its operations. The role of women was

highlighted during the intifada, in the resistance and all forms of struggle efforts, not only as mother,

wife and sister to the strugglers, but also as one herself, carrying out commando and martyrdom

operations, supporting her brothers and martyrs, and providing logistical assistance. There are also

sisters who drove fighters to the operation site, as happened in the Sbarro operation and others. In theZionist jails, there are tens of captive sisters enduring the suffering in prison and paying the toll of jihad

side-by-side with their brothers.

The role of women is significant in the Palestinian arena and in the movement, whether at work, jihad

and struggle, in the field of social charity and educational work, or political and syndicalist work. The

Palestinian woman is educated and cultured, and her activity in schools and universities is no less than

that of a man.

Proceeding from our Islamic terms of reference, Arab cultural identity and the distinctive Palestinian

environment, women in Hamas occupy an advanced position. In political action, and before the

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Legislative Council was created, women had significant activities in the Palestinian student movement

and in various unions; and when Hamas took part in the legislative elections, women enjoyed a strong

presence and a large share on our lists, as well as in the government formed by Hamas.

It is true that some Islamic movements and groups are criticised for neglecting the role of women, but

we find, on the other hand, cases of depravity and misdemeanour impinging on ethical concerns

with some secular parties and forces. Hamas was keen to develop a moderate vision which would grant

woman her authentic role, without breaking from Islamic principles, values and ethics, and at the same

time being free from isolation, seclusion and marginalisation. I believe we have succeeded in that,

thanks to God. Women also have an important role on the organisational level in Hamas, which seeks

better to develop their role and participation within the organisational structure of the movement.

Future of the Zionist project

Through your reading of the course of the Zionist project and its current reality, how do you see the future of this project? Is it moving towards realising Greater Israel, or is it in decline and regression?

Factual data reinforce the conviction that the Zionist project has no future in the region. There is a real

decline in this enterprise, for which expansion was an important characteristic, and it is no longer able

to continue in this way. The construction of the wall (while recognising its negative repercussions on

the Palestinian people), and the withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the Gaza Strip are but practical

examples of this decline and regression.

Israel which used to wage war on its neighbours and win easily was able to take the fight to its

enemy, and used to strike everywhere. Now, its heartland is a field of battle for the Palestinian

resistance. This is a repetitive phenomenon. The so-called Israeli home front is now threatened in

every war or confrontation and is paying the price for its leaders adventures. Moreover, the ruling class

in Israel today and on the level of many military, political and security leaders no longer has thecapacity of the first generation who built this entity, nor the will to fight that they had had, not to

mention rampant corruption in the ruling class, a growing number of suicides, the evasion of military

service, and the declining performance of its security institutions.

Israel has not won a real war since 1967, except for the invasion of Beirut in 1982. This is an important

indicator of the decline of the Zionist projects ability, and the fact that it has no future. In my

estimation, the Greater Israel project has come to an end, simply because the Zionist enemy is no

longer able to accomplish it, and because Israel continues on the same path as did apartheid South

Africa. This is a growing conviction for many neutral politicians and observers.

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After more than 60 years since the establishment of this entity, and when the question in the Israeli

street is not only about the security of Israel, but also about its future and destiny, this is an important

and serious development. When the Israeli community questions the basis of its existence and future,

and the feasibility of its enterprise, then the countdown must have begun, God willing.

Saying this is not enough, however; what is required is building on it. We are not calling for an

underestimation of the Zionist entitys strength and capabilities. It is the sensible who do not

underestimate their enemy, and the Zionist entity still has many elements of power. Nevertheless, this

realistic reading and vision, based on many facts and indicators, should prompt us not to succumb to

Israeli threats or conditions for political settlement, and not to deal with the Zionist project as an

inevitable destiny. The real option and alternative to the policy of submission and the state of

helplessness, waiting and getting bogged down in negotiations, is resistance. The Palestinian people are

able, God willing, to continue the resistance, but they need the backing and participation of the nation.

There is debate among many international groups as to whether Israel still constitutes a strategic asset for Western interests in the region. Do you think there is a chance that some international

parties might reconsider the usefulness of continued unlimited support to the Zionist entity?

One of Israels strong points was its ability to promote itself in the West as part of Western civilisation

and as an extension of it, carrying its values, way of life and political system of democratic governance.

It also used to present itself as a victim of Nazism in order to draw Western sympathy. Today, Israel is

no longer so especially after the Goldstone Report, its crimes in the war on Gaza and in Lebanon

before that, and its crime against the Freedom Flotilla, as its aggressions have affected hundreds of

nationals from dozens of countries, including Western ones. Today, Israel is living in a state of exposure,

and a situation where the moral rationale it earlier used to claim and promote is being shaken. Israel is

falling morally, and its true ugly face is being exposed. This is a very important development.

The Western embrace of Israel has suffered a big shock, especially among the peoples of the West and

the elites, due to its heinous crimes and due to the Palestinian steadfastness which exposed it for what

it is, and highlighted the just Palestinian cause and its human face. Negotiations will result in Israel

polishing its image for public relations purposes. When Israel loses its international incubator, it inflicts

upon itself a heavy loss, because it is not an authentic part of the region, but rather survives on the

support of the international community, especially the West. The Western mind, on the other hand,

glorifies force, adores it and bases its policies upon it. Today, the Zionist entity no longer appears to the

West as being capable of imposing what it wants in the region, and this means that Western confidence

in the ability of this entity forcibly to impose its desires in the region is eroding. This has undoubtedly

changed the image of Israel and its functional role in the West from being a profitable investment to

becoming an onerous burden; this will gradually impact on Western interaction with the Zionist project

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in the future.

All these factors demonstrate the premature ageing of this enterprise. Usually, when senescence

appears early in any physical structure, it indicates a flaw in formation or immunity, as well as a

surrounding rejecting environment which brought about this ageing. Without the slightest doubt,

Palestinian steadfastness and resistance, and the steadfastness and support of the nation, as well as

the continuing confrontations with the [Zionist] project and nonconformity with its will, is what

exposed this enterprise and its flaws. Hence, the project aged early and is no longer able to carry out

the same adventures and score the same successes as in the past. In short, the Zionist project, like all

other enterprises of occupation, settler-colonialism and aggression throughout history, has no

legitimacy because it is alien to our region and lacks the elements of survival. It will, thus, end up like all

other similar projects.

Future of the Region

What is your vision of the regions future in the next five years?

The region today is in the throes of labour, and the next five years are likely to witness a continuation

and expansion of this labour. We hope it will ultimately result in positive changes and a promising fruit,

God willing, even if difficult. We have confidence and hope that the future will be to the benefit of the

nation and the Palestinian resistance and cause. No doubt the nation is today going through a stage of

advancement, but it is unavoidably a difficult one that might be accompanied by a lot of pain, and

so it requires more patience and determination, and the doubling of efforts on the one hand, and the

escalation of resistance and confrontation with the occupying enemy on the other.

Some people believe that this reading of yours is optimistic and unfounded. On what basis do youconstruct your expectations?

Our reading is not fanciful, and is certainly not defeatist. Our reading is realistic and based on numerousfacts, proofs and indicators. One of these is that the resistance endeavour in the region has evolved

significantly, and has proven its presence and effectiveness. Not only this, but the resistance endeavour

has endured and scored important successes, even though it is working under unfavourable conditions

and is facing major challenges, the most important of which is the regional and international imbalance

of power, and the state of weakness and division in the Arab and Islamic countries.

Those who view the reality of the resistance in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan will realise that

resistance has become the only real option on which the peoples of the region can depend to confront

the forces of hegemony and for resisting occupation, defending the land and interests and safeguarding

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their independence, and to repel aggression from any nation in the world, even if it is as powerful and

mighty as the United States of America.

Resistance in the region has not only held out and succeeded in accomplishing strides in liberation as

in Gaza and south Lebanon and held out in the face of large wars, but it also entangled the invading

forces who seek directly to control the region in such huge trouble and dilemmas that they are now

forced to reconsider their calculations. The people and the resistance of the region have thank God

forced these major powers and nations to accord some consideration to this nation, after being

tempted by the Arab governments weak policies into more greed and underestimation and disregard

for us when formulating their foreign policy and important decisions for the region.

The Zionist war on Gaza and the Freedom Flotilla incident have exposed something important in the

course of the conflict, which is that the nation still sees Palestine as its first cause, and that the nationspeople, however frustrated, are still able to recover and mobilise significantly in record time, facing real

issues and serious confrontations with the enemy. This inherent vitality in the nation, reflected in some

of the junctures and hot spots, was one of the factors and causes according to our information

which prompted Western countries to put pressure on Israel to accelerate the cessation of the recent

war in Gaza, fearing the repercussions of sweeping Arab and Islamic anger and its effects vis--vis the

current political reality in the region and Western interests therein.

There have also been important positive transformations in recent years in the positions of a number of

Arab and Islamic countries which, together with the resistance forces, created a situation of increasing

power and independence, bias for the resistance endeavour and the interests of the nation, and

rejection of external conditions and pressures. There are also rejectionist countries allied to the

resistance, and they have made remarkable progress in terms of their role in the region, along with

other Arab states which developed their position and honestly and courageously expressed their

support for the Palestinian resistance, the choice of the Palestinian people and the democratic choice

demonstrated by the 2006 elections.

We recently saw the emergence of the Turkish regional role, on a positive course towards the

independence of political decision-making and economic advancement, promotion of the democratic

experience, openness to the Arab and Islamic nation, remarkable and effective engagement on the

question of Palestine and other regional issues, and the adoption of strong and courageous positions,

all of which indicate a transformation in the region and across the nation, strengthening the trend

towards advancement and change for the better.

There is no doubt that there is a clear recognition by all, even those who stubbornly deny it, that the

strategy of settlement and negotiations has failed miserably and has reached an impasse, after nearly

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20 years of its adoption as the sole option for the overall Arab official policy based on so-called

moderation. [There is also a recognition] that all successive US administrations, on which the Arab

states counted for help in making this strategy successful, did nothing for them but embarrassed and

let them down, giving them mere talk and promises, and changing time-lines, while still giving the

Zionist entity political and practical support.

Although the advocates of this strategy are unwilling formally to admit failure, lest a vacuum should

form resulting in the call for an alternative, the work in this region must definitely drive everyone to

seek an alternate more serious and self-respecting strategy which will better be able to face the reality

posed by Israel everyday on the ground in defiance of everyone moderates and non-moderates. The

policy of waiting, marking time, sticking to the current policy, testing failed options and reproducing

them repeatedly is no longer feasible or possible.

In addition, the general Arab official policy seems, unfortunately, unable to keep pace with the changes

in the region, the rise of new players and the growing roles of other players, and the resulting

challenges facing the Arabs and their security, interests and regional roles especially those of the

major countries.

Although America continues to weigh influentially on several countries in the region, there is hidden

resentment starting to grow towards it in these countries. This includes even those who are friends

with the United States, simply because it lets them down and does not help with issues concerning the

Arab nation particularly with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict and indulges the Zionist entity and

other regional countries at their expense, something which increases their embarrassment in front of

their people, and weakens their ability to continue marketing and defending the political moderation

strategy based on settlement and negotiations.

One of the proofs that strengthen our confidence that the future of the region is in our favour is the

weakening position of the Zionist entity. It is true that it is still ahead militarily, and that the balance of

power still works for it, but it is currently encountering many failures. Yes, it is capable of waging war,

but it has long been unable to achieve victory.

All the facts mentioned above, and what they sometimes reflect of bitterness and sometimes of

promising signs, with a growing awareness among the peoples of the region especially the Arab

people, with the open media space and the inability to hide the facts, with a growing return of the

nations peoples to their authentic Arab-Islamic identity and cultural roots, and their increasing concern

about the current situation of the Arab nation and its destiny and future, national security and regionaland international roles and its major issues, at the forefront of which is the Arab-Zionist conflict... All

this, in my opinion, stimulates the nation into real and significant change that has become inevitable. It

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is this which makes me (and those who think similarly to me) confident that the coming years will be,

God willing, for the benefit of our nation, notwithstanding the current bitterness, pain and concerns.

This view is reinforced by the fact that this region, as evidenced by the facts of history, had always

eventually succeeded in regaining the initiative and defeating the forces of aggression.

We are a great nation, proud of ourselves, our religion, our land, our history, our culture and identity,

with Palestine and Jerusalem as our beating heart and an indicator of our life and survival. Therefore,

we will not tolerate the Zionist entity for long and we will defeat it just as we defeated the Crusades

and the Mongol advance in the past. For it is by turns that We apportion unto people such days (of

fortune and misfortune) (Surah 3, Verse 140).


PO Box 85011, Emmarentia, 2029,Johannesburg, South Africa

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