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164 BioScience March 2013 / Vol. 63 No. 3 www.biosciencemag.org

BioScience63: 164175. ISSN 0006-3568, electronic ISSN 1525-3244. 2013 by American Institute o Biological Sciences. All rights reserved. Request

permission to photocopy or reproduce article content at the University o Caliornia Presss Rights and Permissions Web site at www.ucpressjournals.com/

reprintino.asp. doi:10.1525/bio.2013.63.3.5

Social Norms and Global

Environmental Challenges:

The Complex Interaction of

Behaviors, Values, and Policy

Ann P. Kinzig, PAul R. EhRlich, lEE J. Alston, KEnnEth ARRow, scott BARREtt, timothy g.

BuchmAn, gREtchEn c . DAily, BRucE lEvin, simon lEvin, michAEl oPPEnhEimER, ElinoR ostRom,

AnD DonAlD sAARi

Government policies are needed when peoples behaviors ail to deliver the public good. Those policies will be most eective i they can stimulatelong-term changes in belies and norms, creating and reinorcing the behaviors needed to solidiy and extend the public good. It is oten the short-term acceptability o potential policies, rather than their longer-term efcacy, that determines their scope and deployment. The policy process shouldinclude a consideration o both timescales. The academy, however, has provided insufcient insight on the coevolution o social norms and dier-ent policy instruments, thus compromising the ability o decisionmakers to crat eective solutions to the societys most intractable environmental

problems. Lie scientists could make undamental contributions to this agenda through targeted research on the emergence o social norms.

Keywords: behavioral science, sustainability, assessments, interdisciplinary science, ethics

i the minority is consistent and inexible in its belies

(Xie et al. 2011).

We agree that social norms are important, but socialnorms and values shit in complicated and oten unexpectedways (Ehrlich and Levin 2005) and respond to myriad

orces at both lower and higher levels o social organization

(Ostrom et al. 2002). I no tipping point is reached, a minor-

ity o the population potentially shoulders the burdens oproenvironment behavior; moreover, their eorts alone are

unlikely to have a suf cient impact on the types o emerging

environmental challenges that the world aces. Substantial

numbers o people will have to alter their existing behaviorsto address this new class o global environmental problems.

Alternative approaches are needed when education and per-

suasion alone are insuf cient.

Policy instruments such as penalties, regulations, andincentives may thereore be required to achieve signif cantbehavior modif cation (Carlson 2001, House o Lords 2011).

Policies apply to everyone in a particular jurisdiction and, as

a result, ensure that the burdens o proenvironment behav-

ior are widely shared, which increases the probability omeasurable positive outcomes.

The worlds people are conronted with a new class oenvironmental problems, unprecedented in their com-plexity and their spatial and temporal reach. These prob-lems involve interconnected ecological and social systemsoperating on multiple scales and include climate disruption,

ozone depletion, persistent organic pollutants, population

and species declines and extinctions, emerging diseases, and

antibiotic resistance.Some have argued that progress on these problems

can be made only through a concerted eort to change

personal and social norms. They contend that we must,

through education and persuasion, ensure that certainbehaviors (e.g., controlling ertility, reducing material

consumption, biking to work, eating locally grown oods)

become ingrained as a matter o personal ethics. I enough

people or certain people (e.g., those with disproportionatesocial inuence; see Christakis and Fowler 2009) adoptthese norms, there may be a tipping point (Levin et al.

1998, Gladwell 2000) such that the proenvironment norms

become widely shared and environmentally riendly behav-

iors become pervasive. Computer simulations show thatthis tipping point may be as low as 10% o the population,

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Articles

And yet, many policies are expensive, requiring, or

example, new inrastructure or enorcement eorts. Policies

can become more cost eective in the long run i they eed

back to inuence social norms, so that behaviors becomesel-reinorcing even in the absence o external regulations

or penalties. We know that values inuence behaviors.

What policymakers need to exploit is that behaviors can also

inuence values.This happens in part because peoples identities can be

inuenced by their own behaviors and those o the people

around them (Bem 1967). People can also learn to value

something through their experiences. Recycling provides asimple example. In many places, recycling programs began

with much grumbling, under the pressure o increased costs

or oversized garbage loads. Today, recycling is second natureor many people, who have come to view it as a normativebehavior. This has led to increased recycling even under

reduced enorcement. Prohibition provides an illuminating

counterexample: Short-term declines in the consumption o

alcohol in the ace o severe penalties did not lead to wide-spread or long-term temperance. Eective policies, then, are

ones that induce both short-term changes in behavior and

longer-term changes in social norms.

Some may object to an expanded governmental role ininuencing norms, but we eel strongly that our recom-

mendations can be carried out in a way that abides by the

principles o representative democracy, including trans-

parency, airness, and accountability (Norton et al. 1998).Furthermore, government is only one o many parties andinterests in democratic systems acting to inuence values and

social norms; other parties include, or instance, corpora-

tions, charitable organizations, neighborhood groups, orga-

nized religions, and public and private schools. Thereore,peoples behaviors, values, and preerencesand the social

norms to which they give riseare under continuous pres-

sure, but government is uniquely obligated to locate the com-

mon good and ormulate its policies accordingly. A centralrole o academics in this process would be to elucidate both

the intended and the unintended eects o governmental

policies and regulations on social norms, to help ensure

transparency and a ocus on the common good.

Scientists have made signif cant contributions to the

literature on collective action, elucidating the conditionsunder which it can emerge, spread, and persist. Additional

contributions are needed to evaluate the ways in which

higher-level institutionssuch as governmentscan alter

the environments in which agents make decisions andpotentially alter behaviors and social norms. Government

policies intended to alter choices and behaviors include

active norm management, changing the conditions inu-

encing behaviors, f nancial interventions, and regulatorymeasures. Each o these policy instruments potentially

inuences personal and social norms in dierent ways and

through dierent mechanisms. Each also carries the dangero backf ring, which is oten called a boomerang eectin theliterature (e.g., Schultz et al. 2007)eroding compliance

and reducing the prevalence o the desired behaviors and the

social norms that support those behaviors (see table 1).

In what ollows, we f rst oer some def nitions and thenreview each o the our types o policy instruments, oer-

ing examples o both how they work to change behaviors

and norms and how they might backf re. We emphasize

here that the scientif c understanding o these issues is arrom complete; there is a woeul lack o inormation on the

policybehaviornorms nexus. We thereore close with some

recommendationsincluding a research agenda or lie sci-

entists, in collaboration with social scientists, which wouldallow greater contributions to this pressing issue o changingpersonal behaviors and social norms to resolve the worlds

environmental problems.

Denitions o terms

We adopt Ellicksons (2001) def nition o a social norm as

a rule governing an individuals behavior that third par-

ties other than state agents diusely enorce by means o

social sanction (p. 3) or those who violate the norm andwith rewards or those who ollow it. We contrast this with

personal norms, which are rules governed by sel-sanctioning

Table 1. Summary o policy instruments, changes in norms, and potential or a boomerang eect.

Policy instrument Examples Process o norm change Potential boomerang eect

Active norms management Advertising, inormation,appeals

Directly inuencing personal norms,inuencing belie about what others are doing

Revealing that others are not doing their part

Changing architecture Making desired behaviorsmore convenient or more

visible

Cognitive dissonance, increasing socialdisapproval or ailure to engage in easy

behaviors, creating targets or social norms(visible behaviors)

Revealing that others are not doing their part

Financial interventions Taxes, fnes, allowances,subsidies

Repeated behavior and experience, signalingthe importance society places on certainbehaviors

Creating an economic rather than moralcalculus, creating more resources orbehaviors that undermine intended goal(subsidies)

Regulations Laws, standards Signaling the importance society places oncertain behaviors, repeated behavior andexperience

Creating incentive to regain lost reedoms,revealing that bad behaviors are morepervasive than previously believed,crowding out other-regarding behavior

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Carter exhorting the nations residents to turn down thethermostat in the midst o an energy crisis are all examples.

This type o social norms management is oten seen as less

coercive and less expensive than other regulatory measures

(Ela 2009).The appeals potentially work on two ronts. The f rst is to

get individuals to revisit and rethink their personal norms.Should they be more environmentally conscientious, health-

ier, more patriotic? The second (and probably more power-ul) is to indicate to recipients that this is an important issue

that many people care about. People may engage in certain

behaviors not because o personal norms but because they

desire the esteem or acceptance o others (McAdams 1997),want to signal their willingness to cooperate (Posner 2000),

or look to the behavior o others to determine their own

behavior, particularly in situations o ambiguity (Lapinski

and Rimal 2005). An emphasis on social importance mayalso cause people to update their estimates o the likelihood

o sanctions or certain activities (e.g., littering, proigate

energy use) and reduce deleterious behaviors accordingly

(Green 2006).The probability o a boomerang eect rom such appeals

is low (except in the most avidly antiauthoritarian subpopu-

lations), but in many cases, they have limited eectiveness.

Household visits immediately ollowing President Cartersspeech, or instance, showed that only 27% o households

had their thermostats set below 65 degrees Fahrenheit, and

there was little dierence between the households that had

and those that had not heard the appeal (Luyben 1982).Campaigns directed against binge drinking on college cam-

puses oten have little eect (Clapp et al. 2003). Similarly,

public campaigns to increase rates o recycling tend to havestrong responses only when a neighbor or block leadermakes a ace-to-ace visit to households (Burn 1991)an

expensive and time-consuming approach in large popula-

tions. However, government inormation about the dan-

gers o secondhand smoke has had a signif cant impact onsmoking behavior through increased social sanctions against

public smoking (Lessig 1995).

Another orm o social norms management involves

providing inormation to individuals or households aboutthe prevailing norms o behaviora descriptive norm.

Thereore, college campuses provide inormation on actual

requencies o binge drinking (which are generally lower

than most students believe them to be); public utilitiesinclude bill inserts showing how a households energy usecompares with that o the local neighborhood. The rationale

or these appeals is that people want to conorm, that they

use inormation about peer behaviors as a yardstick against

which to measure their own behaviors (Schultz et al. 2007).This simple provision o inormation has been shown

to be eective in many cases. For instance, cards including

inormation about how many other guests in a hotel room

had reused their towels increased towel reuse signif cantlywhen compared with cards containing only a proenviron-

mental message (Cialdini 2005). Similarly, in a f eld test o

or reward (eelings o guilt or pleasure) and are ollowedirrespective o what others might think. There is not nec-

essarily a bright line between the two; when people have

strongly held belies, they oten proselytize those belies, and

socially enorced behaviors may eventually become internal-ized (Hopper and Nielsen 1991).

Social norms may exist even when there are governmentregulations constraining behavior. The likelihood that any

o us would get caught and f ned were we to drop a candywrapper in a park, or instance, is very small; we prob-

ably resist littering not because o the state regulations but

because o personal (e.g., Im not the kind o person who

litters) or social (e.g., I wouldnt want others to think I amthe kind o person who litters) norms.

Various authors urther dissect social norms into dierent

categories having to do with, or example, conduct, tasks,

and allocation rules (e.g., Therborn 2002). Our intent inthis article, however, is not to provide an exhaustive review

o social norms (which we have neither the expertise nor the

space to do) but to provide an overview or lie scientists,

rom an interdisciplinary team interested in the issues, othe potential links between policy instruments and social

norms. One useul distinction or that endeavor is that

between descriptive and injunctive norms (Lapinski and

Rimal 2005). The term descriptive norms reers to beliesabout what is actually being done by others (our belie about

how oten others engage in certain behaviors, such as drink-

ing alcohol or recycling), whereas the term injunctive normsreers to belies about what other people think ought to bedone. Only injunctive norms seem to carry a direct threat

o sanction, but individuals oten ear sanctions should they

drit too ar rom the descriptive norm o behavior. As wediscuss below, descriptive norms can play an important rolein governing peoples behaviors.

It may seem ironic to discuss the role o the state in

helping create, strengthen, or sustain social norms when,

by def nition, social norms operate outside o the realm ostate intervention. But just as there is no bright line between

personal and social norms, it is dif cult to understand

social norms absent conditions created by governments and

political processes. As Miyashita (2007) wrote, in discussingthe emergence o an antimilitaristic norm in postWorld

War II Japan, Norms rarely emerge spontaneously: They

are oten [a] reection o underlying material interests

and [the] resulting political struggles. State interventionscan change social norms (e.g., they can allow or sustainedbehavior change even i state intervention ceases), just as

social norms can inuence or constrain what actions the

state can consider.

Active norm management

Governments can actively manage (i.e., try to inuence)

norms through such things as advertising campaigns, inor-

mation blitzes, or appeals rom respected f gures. Give aHoot, Dont Pollute television ads, distribution o inor-

mation on the hazards o secondhand smoke, or President

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energy consumption, Schultz and colleagues (2007) showedthat the descriptive norm, when paired with an injunctive

norm (a smiling ace or lower-than-average energy use and

a rowning ace or higher-than-average energy use) did sig-

nif cantly decrease energy use in a San Marcos, Caliornia,community. (See f gure 1 or some urther examples.)

The descriptive norm approach can, however, induce aboomerang eect. Those who are doing better than average

(drinking less, using less energy) may alter their behaviorstoward the averageeither to conorm or because they eel

that it is unair that others are not doing their part (Blamey

1998). Indeed, in the San Marcos f eld trial described above,

those households using less energy than the average actuallyincreased their energy use by over 8% when presented only

with the descriptive and not the injunctive message.

Descriptive norms and direct normative appeals can alter

behavior, but they seem to work best in situations in whichbehaviors directly and publicly harm others (e.g., public

smoking) or in which there is relative ease o conormity

(e.g., towel reuse) potentially coupled with a ace-to-ace

appeal or a neighborhood ethic.

Changing the conditions infuencing behaviors

Governments can alter peoples behaviors by changing the

conditions (oten called choice architecture) inuencingthose behaviors. This approach was highlighted by Thaler

and Sunstein (2008), who asserted that governments need

not restrict peoples reedom o choice through regulation

but could, rather, alter the architecture o decisionmaking(e.g., product placement, opt-in and opt-out schemes) to

move people in great numbers toward better (healthier,

more prosocial) behaviors. Two primary approaches toaltering choice architecture that could have a signif cantimpact on social norms include making behaviors more

convenient and making them more visible.

Recycling provides an example o the ormer. Relative

to all other interventions or increasing recycling ratesincreased ees or garbage pick-up, local regulations about

solid waste volumes, bottle deposits, inormation cam-

paignsmaking recycling more convenient has had the

single biggest impact on recycling rates. Households withcommingled curbside recycling had higher recycling rates

than did households with separated curbside recycling,

which, in turn, had higher rates than did households with

access only to a drop-o site (Carlson 2001). Moreover,when recycling is made convenient, there is little dierencein recycling rates between proenvironment and environ-

ment-neutral households.

Making behaviors convenient may strengthen both per-

sonal and social norms. The f rst may occur through aphenomenon that psychologists call cognitive dissonance. In

short, people desire congruence between their belies and

actions. In a classic experiment, Festinger and Carlsmith

(1959) had subjects perorm a very boring task (e.g., repeat-edly turning pegs a quarter turn or an hour). Some subjects

were then asked to do the experimenters a avor by telling

the next subject (actually an actor) how compelling the taskwas. Some students were paid $20 to do this (the equivalent

o about $150 today), others were paid $1, and a control

group was not asked to perorm the avor at all. When asked

to rate the task at the conclusion o the study (not in thepresence o the actor), those paid $1 as persuaders rated the

task signif cantly more positively than did the $20 or controlgroup. Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) concluded that the

$1 group had been orced to internalize the belie aboutinterest because they otherwise had no compelling reason to

mislead the actor ($1 was not enough justif cation or lying).

The students in the $20 group had no such need or inter-

nalization, because they elt that they had suf cient motiva-tion or misleading the next subject. Similar experiments

have subsequently reinorced the existence o this phenom-

enon (but see Bem [1967] or a critique o cognitive disso-

nance theory). To return to the recycling example, makingit convenient may actually cause participants to internalize

the norm required to sustain that behavior; because they are

not being compelled to recycle through regulation or cost,

they may come to believe (through cognitive dissonance)that they are doing it because they value that behavior.

Woersdorer (2010), in examining the emergence o clean-

liness as a social norm, notes the potential or social norms

to become internalized as personal norms: Behaviors origi-nally practiced or the social reward may become rewarding

in themselves, because consumers associate the resulting

positive eelings with the behavior itsel rather than with

the approval o others. At the same time, increasing theconvenience o a behavior can increase the social sanctions

or ailure to participate in that behavior. In the case o recy-

cling, or instance, recyclers understand a ailure by othersto participate when recycling is inconvenient but eel greateropprobrium toward noncompliers when recycling is very

convenient (Carlson 2001).

Governments can also change the architecture govern-

ing behaviors by making them more visible. A undamentalrequirement or an eective social norm is that people are

able to ascertain (either directly or through inerence) when

the norm is being violated (Ela 2009). Not all activities

lend themselves to this visibility, and in some cases, makingbehaviors more visible may violate privacy standards, but

there will be some targets o opportunity here. This could

include, or example, requiring public buildings to have

displays o resource use, making energy meters in apartmentcomplexes more visible, or simply using stickers (e.g., Ivoted today). It remains to be seen how publicizing previ-

ously (more) private behaviors by the Facebook and Twitter

generations might alter the types o behaviors amenable to

molding by social norms.The largest potential boomerang eect rom these

approaches is similar to one already identif ed abovethat

those people who are doing better than average may discover

that others are not doing their part and may reduce theireorts accordingly. Nonetheless, these relatively nonintrusive

measures, although they are not directly targeted at norms,

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Fines can also be an eective way to alter behavior, inpart because they (like social norm management) signal the

seriousness with which society treats the issue. Eectiveness,

however, generally relies on low enorcement costs. In some

cases, imposing f nancial penalties can actually increasethe undesirable behaviors, because what had been controlled

by personal or social norms now becomes a primarily eco-nomic concern. Perhaps the most widely cited example o

this phenomenon was the imposition o a f ne or parentswho were late in picking up their children rom daycare

centers in Haia, Israel (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000). The

imposition o the f ne substantially increased parental

tardiness. This occurred because the previous normativeconstraints on poor behavior (It is not right or me to

orce the daycare attendants to work overtime or no pay)

were annulled by a f nancial contract (I am paying them

to stay late). Frey (1993) made the same point with respectto licenses or pollutiononce they have been paid or, the

payer has secured the right to pollute, with no moral sanc-

tion attached to the activity.

An alternative or complement to the f ne is the subsidy.Governments have used subsidies or such things as pro-

moting charitable contributions, installing energy-ef cient

appliances, and biking or carpooling to work. Paying people

to engage in socially benef cial behaviors can have a posi-tive impact, although subsidy schemes have to be careully

designed to ensure their eectiveness and airness (Macintosh

and Wilkinson 2011). Subsidies can backf re i they increase

the resources that people can devote to behaviors thatundermine the intended goal. A consortium o over 200

partners in the United Kingdom, or instance, has sup-

ported the Change4Lie campaign, encouraging residentsrom across the nation to swap unhealthy habits or healthyones. In one component o the program called The Great

Swapathon, participants receive a 50 book o vouchers

good or healthier oods and activities. There is evidence,

however, that some participants have used the savings toincrease their consumption o unhealthy products (House

o Lords 2011).

Financial instruments can be eective ways o altering

behaviors and may even reinorce personal norms throughthe eects o repeated experience, but their imposition

should be sensitive to their capacity to undermine existing

norms. They work best when the sums involved are signif -

cant relative to household income, when the policy signals

can eectively change both personal and social norms andcan increase the prevalence o desirable behaviors.

Financial interventions

Governments can use a range o approaches to alter the eco-nomic calculus associated with behaviors. These approaches

include discouraging some consumptive behaviors byincreasing the price o certain commodities to reect the

opportunity cost to society. So, or instance, a carbon taxcould be levied on gasoline consumption, with the value o

the tax being chosen to reect the costs to society o, as an

example, air pollution and climate change; cap-and-trade

approaches can be used to establish a protective limit (i.e.,the cap) or pollution and to establish market mechanisms

(the trade) to ensure ef ciency in adhering to the limit.

Governments can also discourage certain undesirable behav-

iors by levying a f ne and can encourage desirable behaviorsthrough subsidies.

Economists oten recommend f nancial interventions as

a way o aligning private costs and benef ts with social costs

and benef ts. These interventions can be highly eective inchanging behaviors, particularly when the price increase is

signif cant relative to household income. Price increases,

however, are oten politically ineasible, and there may be

alternative mechanisms or achieving similar outcomes ata lower cost. Price increases can serve to inuence or rein-

orce personal norms by altering consumer experiences.

For instance, Thgerson (2002) ound that the propensity

or consumers to engage in prosocial behavior by buyingorganic wine depended on whether they had previously

purchased organic wine, even ater correcting or personal

norms regarding organic products. In other words, per-sonal experience activated a norm and increased the uturerequency o that behavior. Consumers directed to new

consumption patterns under price increases may experience

a similar behavior-induced norm activation. Permanent

diversion away rom undesirable consumptive activitiescould occur i people have ound or created more desirable

substitutes, even i price increases lapse. This approach can,

however, backf re in the case o snob goodsthose goods

that people consume precisely because they signal the wealtho the consumer. Thereore, increasing the price o such

things as ur coats or Hummers may actually increase the

desire to have these items among certain segments o the

population (Kbler 2001).

Figure 1. Public messages seeking to alter behaviors by invoking a social norm. (a) A poster designed by Ivan Trushinas part o a University o Wisconsin (UW)Stout social-norming campaign. UWStout has launched several o thesecampaigns through the university housing department using student designers in the Housing Design Ofce. (b) A posterin use at Arizona State University to encourage those who are ill to stay home. No direct reerence is made to what othersare doing, but the image conveys the notion that standing out rom the crowd causes unhappiness. (c) A logo on everyresidential recycling bin in Tempe, Arizona, reinorcing the perception that recycling is a community activity that enjoyswidespread participation ([all o] Tempe recycles). Photograph: Ann P. Kinzig. (d) A poster used by the US NationalInstitutes o Health to curtail adolescent drinking. Note the reerence to what most kids are doing (http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/poster.htm).

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dierent mechanisms. Only social norm managementdirectly targets norms. Choice architecture, f nancial instru-

ments, and regulations can all alter social norms by causing

people to f rst change their behaviors and then shit their

belies to conorm to those behaviors. It must be remem-bered that policies will not always change personal or social

normsas is evidenced by the Prohibition example at thebeginning o this articlenor would we want them to. I

people hold deep-seated belies, values, or preerences thatconict with the stated policy goals, they are unlikely to

internalize these goals as personal norms or to participate

enthusiastically in enorcing them as social norms. In other

words, government policies are not being visited on a blankslate o citizen values and preerences. Considering the

impact o preexisting norms and behaviors on the likely

outcomes o government policies designed to alter behaviors

and norms is essential. There is, however, an alarming lacko inormation about how particular policies might intersect

with behaviors and norms to create sustained outcomes

(House o Lords 2011).

When it comes to environmental issues, two dierenttypes o social norms are at play in these dynamicssocial

norms o conormity or cooperation and proenvironment

social norms. Only the f rst type need be present to induce

proenvironment behaviors (although proenvironment per-sonal norms may emerge rom this through, e.g., cognitive

dissonance, experience, or associating the positive eeling

rom social approval or an act with the act itsel). This dis-

tinction is important; norms o conormity and cooperationare ar more universal than are proenvironment norms and

are thereore ar more powerul in inducing proenvironment

behaviors that do not conict with preexisting values orpreerences. In other words, proenvironment values are nota necessary prerequisite to proenvironment behaviors.

A research agenda or lie scientists

Lie scientists have made several seminal theoretical con-tributions on the conditions under which cooperation

might emerge in social groups aced with a collective action

problem. (Bycollective action problem, we mean a situation

in which suf cient cooperation can benef t everyone, butthere is some incentive to cheat or to seek a ree ride. Many

environmental problems that require changes in individual

behavior are collective action problems.) Axelrod and

Hamilton (1981) showed convincingly that the emergenceo cooperation in a group playing a repeated PrisonersDilemma game required some sort o sanction against

noncooperatorsa tit or tat approach. Nowak and his

colleagues (Nowak and May 1992, Nowak et al. 1994) intro-

duced structure to the group, with individuals preerentiallyinteracting with their neighbors, and showed that this could

undamentally alter the outcome (see also Durrett and Levin

1994). Hirshleier and Coll (1988) examined the role o

mistakes in executing strategies. Other scientists have inves-tigated the role that strong reciprocityrewarding coopera-

tors and punishing noncooperatorshas on the emergence

the importance o particular prosocial behaviors, and whenthe instrument has low enorcement costs.

Regulatory measures

Governments can introduce a variety o regulatory measuresdesigned to restrict (e.g., no smoking in public places) or

eliminate (e.g., ban on dumping o toxic waste) individualchoices. Regulations are oten changes in the assignment

o property rights and need not always place the cost onthe entity generating the harm, because an alternative solu-

tion may promote the highest social value at a lower cost.

Rather than tax a polluter, or instance, it may be cheaper

or people aected by pollution to shield themselves romthe harm (Coase 1960). Regulations are oten supported

by other types o government interventions (e.g., f nes or

noncompliance) or are directed toward organizations or

agencies to activate one o the other interventions (e.g.,government regulations requiring utilities to include data on

average use in bills).

Laws and regulations, like f nes, can serve to create or

reinorce social norms merely by signaling to the memberso a community that this is an issue that others think is

important. Some have argued that regulations are inherently

coercive and cannot or should not exceed implied levels o

public permission or such regulations. An alternative view-point is that governments can and even should move beyond

extant levels o public permission in order to shit norms,

allowing public sentiment to later catch up with the regula-

tion (House o Lords 2011). The abolition o slavery in theUnited States (Guelzo 2004) and the ban on smoking in

public places in the United Kingdom are both government

actions that exceeded public sentiment at the time but latergained widespread public acceptance.

Brehm (1966) identif ed conditions under which people

will be motivationally aroused to regain lost behavioral ree-

doms. I government regulations induce this arousal, they

may backf re. The introduction o a new regulation may alsosignal to people that bad behaviors were more pervasive

than they had previously thought, giving them a descriptive

norm against which to judge their own behavior. So, or

instance, a government push against tax evaders may leadpeople to believe tax evasion itsel is widespread or rampant

so that they increase their own propensity to evade taxes

(Chang and Lai 2004), either because they have discovered

a social norm (held by others) or tax evasion or becausethey become resentul that others are not doing their part.Similarly, a study o the use o regulations to increase

environmental quality in rural Colombia (Cardenas et al.

2000) showed that regulation actually caused conditions

to deteriorate. Cardenas and colleagues (2000) concludedthat people tend to strike a balance between sel- and group

interest when making decisions but more highly weight sel-

interest in the presence o regulation, since it is assumed that

the regulation secures the group interest.Each o the government interventions can inuence

both personal and social norms, although they do so through

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to judge and potentially sanction the behaviors o others.These sanctions introduce a motive or deceptiontricking

others into believing a certain behavior is being ollowed

even when it is not. One may water a lawn in the dead o

night, or example, or roll an empty recycling bin to thecurb. (More sobering examples include the drastically di-

erent public and private behaviors o most child abusers.)Scientists could eectively explore the impact o certain

agents engaging in deceptive behaviors; the incentive to doso will rise with the sanctions and will decline or more vis-

ible behaviors.

At the same time, we are not always eective judges o the

behavior o others. People tend, or example, to assume thatother members o their social group are behaving the way

they do (Bicchieri 2006), which may cause errors in agent

judgments about descriptive norms. Conversely, people may

ascribe a greater prevalence o negative behaviors to mem-bers o a group very dierent rom their own social group.

Both deception and errors in judgment will inuence the

capacity or social norms to emerge and persist.

3. More realistic network structures. Examinations o the

emergence o cooperation tend to be ocused on single net-

work structuresor example, the nearest neighbor, a small

world, ully connected. In reality, most o us are simultane-ously embedded in many networks, and each may have a

distinct structure. Social norms are not just enorced in

spatially localized neighborhoods but through more distant

geographic connections sustained through social medianetworks, exchanges o letters and e-mail, and periodic ace-

to-ace visits. Many o us value the approbation o more

geographically distant riends and colleagues over that oour neighbors, but policy interventions are oten targeted atparticular geographies. This has important implications or

the emergence o social norms that need to be explored.

4. The role of absolute versus relative payoffs. Many game-theoretic treatments o strategic behaviorsrom individual

voter models to multinational treaty negotiationsassume

that an agent will adopt a strategy that has the highest

absolute payo. This contradicts the way many people andeven nations behave. Consider, or instance, the well known

ultimatum game between two participants. Participant 1

is given some money (say $10) and told to make an oer

to participant 2. I participant 2 rejects the oer, neitherparty gets anything. I participant 2 is responding only toabsolute payos, he or she should accept an oer o $0.01

(which is still better than nothing, in absolute terms). In

reality, in many cultures, participants make relatively air

oers and reject any oer below about 20% (Oosterbeeket al. 2004). The latter result suggests that people may be

seeking outcomes that balance absolute and relative pay-

o. This result is also strongly related to cultural concep-

tions o airness and obligation and reects the propensityo people to exhibit both sel-serving and other-serving

behavior.

and maintenance o cooperation (e.g., Gintis 2000, Bowlesand Gintis 2004) and how network structure inuences

outcomes (e.g., Zhong et al. 2006, Chen et al. 2007). Using

a combination o f eld and experimental tests, Janssen and

colleagues (2010) ound that a combination o punishmentand communication was most eective in solving social

dilemmas. The general insights are that cooperative behav-iors are more likely to emerge with repeated interactions in

smaller, more homogeneous communities (or in networksthat can recreate these conditions) that use punishment and

communication to enorce norms and where there are ew

mistakes in propagating strategies or judging the need or

sanctions.Social scientists have made seminal contributions as well;

many o the empirical studies cited in this article origi-

nate in law, psychology, economics, behavioral economics,

anthropology, political science, and sociology. We know, orexample, that the eective management o any commons

requires sensitivity to local conditions, sound monitoring,

graduated sanctions, and conict-resolution mechanisms

(Ostrom 1990). From an analysis o existing environmen-tal treaties, we have learned that successul cooperation

depends on such things as the number o countries involved,

their heterogeneity, their trade relations, and their technical

interconnections (Barrett 2003, Sandler 2004).Signif cantly extending our understanding o environ-

mental policy, behavioral change, and norm emergence will

require contributions rom several disciplines and collabo-

rations across disciplines. Lie scientists have a role to playin this by extending their existing theoretical analyses. To

be eective, scholars o all stripes will have to extend their

capacity to collaborate with decision- and policymakersin order to ensure realism and relevance. We next list f veareas in which we believe lie scientists could contribute

through their scholarship and return in the last section to

the issue o collaboration between scientists and decision-

and policymakers.

1. More realistic policy interventions in collective-action

models. Scientists should introduce perturbations in their

models o cooperative emergence that mimic the policyinterventions described above. These could include an

abrupt change in the payo structure (making some behav-

iors less costly by changing choice architecture or more

expensive by imposing f nes), a change in the viscosity ostrategy switching due to the existence o norms, or theelimination o (potentially dominant) behaviors through

regulations. These abrupt changes could be augmented with

slower timescale changes that represent reinorcement or

erosion o desired social norms, consistent with the litera-ture review above. Scientists could also eectively examine

how combinations o dierent policy interventions and o

the relative timing o deployment play out.

2. The role of error (deception) in displaying and detecting

behaviors. Social norms rely on the capacity o individuals

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o near-term opposition. What needs to be assessed is thepossibility that behaviors and values would coevolve in such

a way that a carbon taxor other policy instrument that

raises prices, such as a cap-and-trade systemultimately

comes to be seen as worthy, which would thereore allow orits long-term eectiveness.

We have some scientif c understanding o many o theseissues but not nearly enough, and the application o our sci-

entif c understanding o how policies inuence social normsis inadequate. The academy, thereore, needs to increase its

capacity to work with policymakers to eectively use exist-

ing knowledge on policybehaviornorm interactions and

to generate needed new insights in a timely ashion.We have three recommendations or improving this

process: (1) the greater inclusion o social and behavioral

scientists in periodic environmental policy assessments;

(2) the establishment o teams o scholars and policymakersthat can assess, on policy-relevant timescales, the short- and

long-term ef cacy o policy interventions; and (3) the altera-

tion o academic norms to allow more progress on these

issues.The academy has extensive experience with policy-

relevant environmental assessments, including, or example,

the assessments conducted by the Intergovernmental Panel

on Climate Change (IPCC), the Millennium EcosystemAssessment, and the Global Biodiversity Assessment.

Achieving any progress on intractable global environmental

issues such as climate and biodiversity change will require

changes in behavior and social norms, but environmen-tal assessments oten include sophisticated biogeophysical

models and analyses and less sophisticated (or absent)

social and behavioral models and analyses (Reid et al. 2010).This imbalance calls into serious question the plausibilityo projections o the (human-dominated) Earth system.

These assessments need to be augmented to systematically

examine the behavioral implications o potential environ-

mental policies and environmental changes, using bothcase studies and more generalized syntheses and theoreti-

cal evaluations (Alston 2008). The Millennium Ecosystem

Assessment has, or instance, spawned eorts to establish the

Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platorm on Biodiversityand Ecosystem Services with considerable input rom the

social sciences (Perrings et al. 2011); more integration o

this sort is needed. The emerging Millennium Alliance or

Humanity and the Biosphere provides another potentialplatorm or bridging these gaps and developing oresightintelligence (Ehrlich and Kennedy 2005). Although the

IPCC has long incorporated the social sciences, the mini-

mal role o the behavioral sciences, while still modest, has

notably expanded in its Fith Assessment, now under way.Funding agencies should consider withholding support or

assessments that are not suf ciently inclusive o social and

behavioral sciences; a more constructive approach might

entail including resources and support or designing eec-tive collaborative processes in addition to the resources or

conducting the assessment itsel. This support might include

Biologists have long known that it is relativenotabsolutef tness that determines evolutionary outcomes;

this may also explain the importance placed on airness in

human social groups. Exploring when and under what

circumstances absolute or relative payos prevail and howthat prevalence inuences perceptions o airness and the

adoption o cooperative strategies would be an importantcontribution to the literature.

5. The role of viscous (i.e., slowly changing) and fuid (i.e.,

rapidly changing) norms and behaviors. Biologists have long

grappled with the paradox o viscosity (Ehrlich and Levin

2005). Organisms must balance the need or evolutionaryinnovation (mutations) required to adapt to changing and

novel conditions with the need to maintain a unctioning

phenome. This requires a balance between adaptability and

stability, between rapid change and conservatism. The needor conservatism may, at times, impose suboptimal strategies

on organisms with respect to extant conditions.

We see many o the same dynamics in the emergence

and maintenance o norms. Many norms persist even aterthey appear to have outlived their useulness (Elster 1989),

but this conservatism may be playing an important role in

maintaining a culture or society. When is rapid change ben-

ef cial, when is conservatism benef cial, and what viscosityexists in the capacity o cultures to switch between the two?

Does it benef t society to have some behaviors and norms

be uid, while others are viscous, and, i so, which behaviors

and norms can tolerate uidity? What does this mean orthe policy interventions that governments might make to

alter behaviors?

Conclusions

Much o the political debate on particular policy instru-

ments is ocused on their near-term ef cacy or popularity.

In light o the above discussion, however, it is clear that

structural changes need to be made that would allow societyand policymakers to more eectively assess the longer-term

implications o policy proposals. Initially unpopular or only

modestly popular measures may gain wider acceptance

i they prompt reinorcing changes in how people def nethemselves and their society, particularly i the changes

are aided by innovations that make their implementation

easier or more eective. For instance, a poll o American

opinions on global warming suggested that the public byand large opposes taxes on gasoline or electricity as a wayo combating global climate change and, instead, avors

stricter uel- and building-ef ciency standards (Leiserowtiz

2009). Although standards may be the path o least resis-

tance, many environmental economists view taxes andother market-based instruments as a more ef cient means

to internalize the external costs o consumption. Political

scientists have ound that people have come to accept other

taxes as normative ater they have been convinced that thetaxes eectively address shared concerns (Bobek et al. 2007).

A carbon tax might thereore prove eective even in the ace

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In order to play an eective role, then, the academywill, itsel, need to reect on its own proessional norms as

potential obstacles to constructive engagement. The social

norms o the academy have evolved to serve important

ends but not necessarily ones relevant to acilitating societalresponses to global challenges. Academic norms can also

impede eective engagement and communication with thelay public (Fischho 2007). Just as the evolution o social

norms can lag behind the needs o society as a whole, sci-ence may be behind the times in how it organizes itsel and

trains and rewards its members. Thought leaders in the

academy need to draw on what we know rom the research

summarized aboveincluding the roles o incentives andregulations, the interplay between behaviors and values, and

the appeal to standards in communities outside o the acad-

emy with which academics may identiyto begin ques-

tioning and potentially changing existing academic norms(Ehrlich et al. 2012). Where this cannot be done or where

it would compromise important goals o scholarship to do

so, academic institutions need to establish new departments

or institutes that can complement traditional academicstrengths with greater societal and policy engagement. Such

measures would have to come with the recognition that

business-as-usual academic practices are unlikely to achieve

the requisite integration; centers will have to be armed withnew reward structures and knowledge o the best practices

in integration i progress is to be made.

There is room or optimism. In much o the world, there

is growing awareness that we ace potentially catastrophicglobal environmental problems and that signif cant shits

in policies, technologies, and behaviors will be required to

address them. Thereore, many people are primed to acceptsolutions that evoke social norms involving our sharedresponsibility to the environment and to other people, and

many policymakers are searching or policies that can have

long-term impacts on behavior and environmental out-

comes. The academy needs to do what it canand morethan it is doing nowto deliver on this more promising

environmental uture.

Acknowledgments

This article arose rom discussions at a meeting sponsored

by the James S. McDonnell Foundation, Newport Beach,

Caliornia, 2022 January 2009. We thank Baruch Fischho,

Susan Fitzpatrick, Charles Perrings, Barbara Boyle Torrey,and two anonymous reviewers or their helpul insightsand comments. Lin Ostrom was a coauthor o this article,

although it was submitted, accepted, and published ater her

death. Her f nal communication to us was on the day beore

she died, signaling her acceptance o coauthorship and mak-ing suggestions or improvement. Incredibly, her message

included no mention o hersel or o her situationthat she

might be writing her words rom a room and a bed she was

never again to leave. She dedicated hersel to the last to whathad always been central to her: advancing the knowledge

needed to make the world a better place. Indeed, the world

examining the norms and practices that currently precludesuch inclusion, with insights into best practices or breaking

them down.

Assessments are generally conducted within the academy,

ater consultation with policymakers regarding their scopeand remit. But a persistent gap between science and policy

remains, and f lling that gap will require new innovationsin academypractitioner collaborations, including greater

and more intensive collaboration among the producers andusers o knowledge (Sarewitz and Pielke 2007). The acad-

emy should work with policymakers at all levels to establish,

deploy, and support teams o scholars and policymakers to

evaluate the potential impacts o dierent policy interven-tions on behaviors, social norms, and intended outcomes.

These teams would be characterized by equally important

(but dierent) roles or the academics and policymakers

and should increase both the capacity o scientists to con-duct policy-relevant research and that o policymakers to

understand the nature and dynamics o complex systems.

They would dier rom assessments in the timescale on

which they are operating (e.g., an evaluation o near-termpolicies rather than longer-term orecasts o environmen-

tal change) and in the greater intensity o collaboration

between scholars and practitioners than what characterizes

most assessments. Teams might be supported by permanententities that maintain communication with policymakers;

these will dier among nations but could be attached to the

United Nations and its subsidiary bodies in the international

context. One potential model is a national commitment oscientif c talent in the service o United Nations agencies.

Policymakers at national and international levels could

convene these teams to tackle specif c problems. To be eec-tive, the deliberations should be transparent, and the resultsshould be communicated to the appropriate sectors o the

public. These teams could also be charged with anticipating

crises and evaluating potential policy responses in advance,

since detailed evaluation in the midst o a crisis may beproblematic; such emergency preparedness would prob-

ably ocus on the immediate eects o policies on behaviors

rather than on changing social norms, because this is likely

to be o greatest relevance in a crisis.This will not be easy. Despite repeated calls or a more

constructive relationship between scientists and policy-

makers, there are ew innovative organizations or processes

to improve collaboration (Driscoll et al. 2011). There havebeen some recent advances, including the IDEAS Factory,run by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research

Council in the United Kingdom and designed to bring stake-

holders and scientists together in a acilitated, innovative

environment, to increase the applicability o science to real-world problems. Similarly, the newly established National

Socio-Environmental Synthesis Center in the United States

seeks to increase the prevalence o actionable science (Palmer

2012). The success o both o these and o related eortswould require altering the way we do science and how we

def ne the questions o interest.

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Ann P. Kinzig ([email protected]) is a proessor in the School o Lie Sciences

at Arizona State University, in Tempe. Paul R. Ehrlich is the Bing Proessor o

Population Studies in the Department o Biology at Stanord University, in

Stanord, Caliornia. Lee J. Alston is a proessor o economics and environmen-

tal studies at the University o Colorado at Boulder. Kenneth Arrow is the Joan

Kenney Proessor o Economics and a proessor o operations research in the

Department o Economics at Stanord University, in Stanord, Caliornia. Scott

Barrett is the LenestEarth Institute Proessor o Natural Resource Economicsin the School o International and Public Aairs at Columbia University,

in New York, New York. Timothy G. Buchman is a proessor o surgery and

anesthesiology at the Woodru Health Science Center in Atlanta, Georgia, and

is also afliated with Emory University, also in Atlanta. Gretchen C. Daily is

the Bing Proessor o Environmental Science in the Department o Biology at

Stanord University, in Stanord, Caliornia. Bruce Levin is the Samuel Candler

Dobbs Proessor o Biology in the Department o Biology at Emory University,

in Atlanta, Georgia. Simon Levin is the Moett Proessor o Biology in the

Department o Ecology and Evolution at Princeton University, in Princeton,

New Jersey. Michael Oppenheimer is the Albert G. Milbank Proessor o

Geosciences and International Aairs in the Department o Geosciences and

the Woodrow Wilson School o Public and International Aairs at Princeton

University, in Princeton, New Jersey. The late Elinor Ostrom was a distin-

guished proessor and the Arthur F. Bentley Proessor o Political Science in the

Department o Political Science at Indiana University, in Bloomington, at the

time o this articles preparation. Donald Saari is a University o Caliornia,Irvine, Distinguished Proessor, Mathematics and Economics, at the Institute

or Mathematical Behavioral Sciences at the University o Caliornia, Irvine.

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76: 724730.

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