Key: UM = Unidentified Male Speaker Translator …Conflict Records Research Center CRRC Record...

Conflict Records Research Center CRRC Record SH-SHTP-A-000-630

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Key: UM = Unidentified Male Speaker Translator comments, clarifications, and additions are italicized in brackets

[Time Stamp: 00:08]

[Inaudible, people are arriving and greeting each other.]

Saddam Hussein: Oh, he likes treason and to exploit opportunities, such a mentality―go ahead and read for us, Hamid. Until what time?

Hamid Hammadi: Sir, until 8:30 AM.

Saddam Hussein: 8:30 AM. That might go in the direction you want.

Sa’dun Hammadi: Sir, this is not the most harmful thing. Practically speaking, the Soviet Union is the one that caused us a lot of harm.

Saddam Hussein: Starting with the mobilization in one direction―

Sa’dun Hammadi: From the beginning―

Saddam Hussein: To an incomplete situation, as if he is playing a role. He tricked us; it is a trick!

Sa’dun Hammadi: In the meeting, [Soviet President Mikhail] Gorbachev said, "please, don't think we're here to fool you or trap you." Anyway, whatever the intention, it is practically the same.

Saddam Hussein: It led us to the same result, because we mobilized our people and army in one direction and we switched them to a different direction in the middle of this transformation [inaudible]. Anyway, let us hope for the best!

All: God willing.

UM1: That is true, but our decision was not wrong as far as our citizen―

Saddam Hussein: I believe that the people of this country will completely understand our situation. We accepted everything those who tried to mediate between us and the enemy wanted [pause] and even more.

Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma’ruf: The public position was too much.

Sa’dun Hammadi: Regarding our withdrawal from the border with Iran―

Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma’ruf: In order to avoid the last phase of the conspiracy, we need to withdraw from the borders. Saddam Hussein: Read for us, Hamid.

Hamid Hammadi: Yes, Sir.


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Saddam Hussein: Damn them! We are going to fight them from house to house.

All: God willing.

Hamid Hammadi: Summary of the situation in sectors of the 1st and 2nd Corps, until 08:30 AM on February 24, 1991.

1st Corps: At 02:00 AM on February 24, they heard helicopters and armored units in the direction of Al-Saffari area, in the 45th Division’s sector.

Saddam Hussein: This is the right wing of the 1st Corps?

Hamid Hammadi: Two, we called the commander of the 1st Corps to inquire about the situation in the sector. He mentioned that the situation is normal, except for helicopter movements in the sector of the 45th Division. This is currently being dealt with.

Three, 3rd Corps: [reported that] at 05:15 AM, on February 24, the enemy initiated heavy artillery fire with advancement.

Saddam Hussein: What time?

Hamid Hammadi: At 05:15 AM on February 24, the enemy initiated heavy artillery bombing with advancing of the armored troops in the two sectors of―

Saddam Hussein: Where is the summary that is marked on the map?


Saddam Hussein: The one you have.

Hamid Hammadi: For both the enemy and our sectors, Sir, we do not have the last update marked on the map, yet.

Saddam Hussein: Do you update it up to the minute?

Hamid Hammadi: No, Sir, we have not yet―

Saddam Hussein: Just use the old one.

Hamid Hammadi: Yes, Sir, the old one―I will bring the map now.

Saddam Hussein: Yes.

Hamid Hammadi: With the advancement of armor units into the sectors of the 7th and 14th Infantry Divisions, they were engaged and―

[Time Stamp: 4:56]

Saddam Hussein: This is the far right wing of the 1st Corps and the far left wing of the 3rd Corps and the other corps in between; this is out of Kuwait Province. This is on the shore and is to extend out of the shore inside Kuwait Province.


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Hamid Hammadi: They [the 7th and 14th Infantry Divisions] were engaged and the enemy's armored units stopped. At 08:10 AM, the enemy mobilized tanks between the 14th and 426th Infantry Brigades of the 14th Division; the Corps' course of action was that the Mobilization Commander issued an order for the 3rd Armored Division, to position them on the line to handle the situation.


Hamid Hammadi: There was heavy artillery bombing on Failaka Island. At 08:43 AM, the enemy was able to defeat the 1st Regiment of the 14th Infantry Brigade, and conducted troops dropping by helicopters at the Regiment post. The enemy was still reinforced in the same direction of the 14th Division of the 3rd Corps. The following is the Corps' course of action: Moving part of the covering troops of the 3rd Armored Division to conduct [inaudible], Staff Lieutenant General Sultan was called by phone regarding the situation, and he stated that information about the situation would be sent later.

Summary of the 7th Corps situation until 09:30 AM on February 14. At 08:10 AM, seven helicopters and several [personnel] carriers were seen advancing towards the posts of 434th Infantry Brigade, 26th Infantry Division and they were engaged―

Saddam Hussein: I need to see it. Where is 26th Infantry Division? Where is the map of the situation? Bring the map.

Hamid Hammadi: And a number of carriers are advancing towards the posts of the 434th Infantry Brigade, 26th Infantry Division. They were engaged from a distance and no changes in the Corps sector. The 3rd Corps, on―

Saddam Hussein: Where is this [information]? Have you read in the beginning?

Hamid Hammadi: The 7th [Corps], Sir.

Saddam Hussein: The 7th [Corps], which is?

Hamid Hammadi: The 7th [Corps], which is outside the borders in the direction of the Saudi Arabia.

Saddam Hussein: That means, it [the 7th Corps] is behind the 1st Corps advanced toward Kuwait; the 1st [Corps] is the furthest of the wing, after that would be the 7th Corps, after that is the real action. Read for us, Amjad?

Amjad: The 7th Corps reported seeing seven helicopters and several carriers advancing toward the posts of the 431st Infantry Brigade, 26th Infantry Division. It was engaged from a far distance and no changes were made in the Corps sector.

The 3rd Corps: at 09:10 AM, reports that the enemy is still advancing through the posts of the 1st Regiment, the 14th Infantry Brigade―the 14th Infantry Division. It is possible the enemy is aiming at Al-'Abbas Air Base and the Corps continues engagement and intervention measures.


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Saddam Hussein: Fine. So where is Al-'Abbas Air Base? Where is the regiment covering the troops and Al-'Abbas Air Base? What does he mean? [Said mockingly, referring to the far distance between the base and the troops.]

Hamid Hammadi: Sir, there is a base in the south called Salim Base.

Saddam Hussein: Is it in front of our troops? So how is it close to our troops [said annoyingly]? [Inaudible] is it in front of our troops? In the first post it was in front of our troops. What is this?

Amjad: This is the primary and most recent map, Sir.

Saddam Hussein: Which primary map?

Amjad: The recent map that the intelligence director gave to you.

Hamid Hammadi: This is the Saudi [map].

Saddam Hussein: It is showing the status of the enemy's sectors.

[Time Stamp 10:07]

The 3rd Corps: at 09:10 AM, the enemy is still advancing through the posts of the 1st Regiment, 14th Infantry Brigade, and it is possible the enemy is aiming to attack Al-'Abbas Air Base and the Corps continues to engage [the enemy]. At 09:20 AM, the enemy executed an airdrop using helicopters between post 608 and post 618, in the area of Al-Salman, the 7th Corps’ sector.

Saddam Hussein: This is Saudi Arabia?

Amjad: Yes, Sir. This is in Saudi Arabia.

Saddam Hussein: Where is the battle now? Every minute you say Saudi Arabia, where is your border? Okay―

Amjad: At 09:45 AM ―

Saddam Hussein: [pointing at a map] The 7th Corps is behind the 1st Corps, and the entire right wing is outside the borders of the [inaudible] governorate. This is the 3rd Corps, this is the 29th Infantry Division, this is the 14th Infantry Division, and this is the 11th Infantry Division. Which infantry regiment did he tell you?

Amjad: The 14th Infantry Regiment… the 14th Division.

Saddam Hussein: They are here and this is behind our defense post.

Hamid Hammadi: Yes.

Saddam Hussein: This is the 14th -- part of our defense post, 14? That means they have penetrated this way―

Hamid Hammadi: Yes, Sir


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Saddam Hussein: Now it is clear [referring to connecting the information to locations on the map]. Yes.

Amjad: At 09:45 AM, Staff Lieutenant. General Sultan Hashim called and explained―

Saddam Hussein: What time was it, please?

Amjad: 09:45 AM. Lieutenant General Sultan Hashim called and stated the following:

First, the enemy’s attack on the sector of the 29th Infantry Division failed.

Saddam Hussein: Next.

Amjad: [Second,] the enemy was able to defeat the 1st Regiment, 14th Infantry Brigade―

Saddam Hussein: The enemy was able to what?

Amjad: To defeat the 1st Regiment.

Saddam Hussein: This is the infantry brigade number.

Amjad: 14.

Saddam Hussein: Which regiment?

Amjad: The 1st Regiment of the 14th Infantry Brigade of the 14th Division.

Saddam Hussein: It must be the right wing, since it is closer to the base.

Amjad: [The enemy] was trying to advance toward Al-'Abbas Air Base. All appropriate measures were taken to stop the enemy.

Third, Failaka Island remains under the control of our troops.

Saddam Hussein: They [the enemy] claimed that it was captured at 09:00

Fourth, the situation is good and under control.

Saddam Hussein: Those [troops] have to reinforce the shoulders [of the battlefield] here immediately; this shoulder, if it remained in their positions along with the brigade in depth, it will enclose and capture all of them.

Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma’ruf: How many do you think are there?

Taha Yasin Ramadan: More than one regiment.

Saddam Hussein: I think they have more than one combat unit, [they have] tanks and [inaudible] that are performing some acrobatic maneuvers that make you think they are―yes.

If what Sultan is saying is accurate so far, I consider the enemy's attack a failure. If what he is saying is true it is because our troops get confused sometimes at night, but once it is daylight and


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the defense position is complete, and even if only 20 percent is left, I doubt the enemy could penetrate the post.

Taha Yasin Ramadan: This [the enemy]―cannot surround them at this point, because they cannot―

Saddam Hussein: They will not give up the location. This is the brigade in depth; this means they cannot surround them from this direction, because they would confront the brigade.

This is the 6th Armored Brigade; the enemy assault forces will immediately counterattack them, nothing to worry about so far.

[Time Stamp 15:22]

Taha Muhi al-Din: There has not been an amphibious landing so far?

Taha Yasin: My opinion is if this lasts any longer, then there is a possibility for another landing.

Saddam Hussein: They assigned a junior unit.

Taha Yasin Ramadan:That must mean they are not coming back.

Saddam Hussein: As far as the amphibious landing, if they use the same strategy, the one I gave them five days ago, to destroy all naval bases and all places that can be used for landing and are easy to reach. All of it needs to be destroyed by fire, in order to make a dark cloud above the troops from the other side, like a natural shield, because I mentioned to them the possibility of an attack. Hamid Hammadi: Regarding the wells, I think they burned 190.

Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma’ruf: Maybe 200. They are saying the aircrafts are disabled due to the dust and the smog. Sir, I think they failed, because they have yet to announce anything.

‘Ali Hasan Al-Majid: All what it takes is tanks roll to stir up dust. I think, Sir, they really failed because they have not announced anything; had they have something to announce they would have.

Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma’ruf: If they thought they would achieve a quick victory, then they would have announced it; they would hold a media conference.

'Ali Hasan Al-Majid: They are evil.

Saddam Hussein: They are going to attack by land. Good! They will be defeated.

All: God willing.

Saddam Hussein: This is the 3rd and this is the 4th, the 21st and this is the 16th.

Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma’ruf: They have announced the status of Failaka since last night, right? They must have something in store.


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Taha Yasin Ramadan: It should not be a problem.

Saddam Hussein: Regarding Failaka, three days ago I was with the Minister of Defense asking him how we can withdraw.

Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma’ruf: These are good locations to withdraw from.

Saddam Hussein: He told me it would be difficult at this time to withdraw with one ferry in service; it would be hard to transfer their equipment. They have one mechanized infantry regiment and a naval brigade.

Taha Yasin Ramadan: The naval brigade will fight along with them.

Saddam Hussein: The units are locked there.

Taha Yasin Ramadan: It is the first shock.

Saddam Hussein: If this is the initial shock and what Sultan told me is correct, then the attack has failed.

Hamid Hammadi: Our folks can take the first shock, just as they did in the Iranian War.

Saddam Hussein: This is a damn shock. We are between two political situations. Neither one has been decided on, yet. It contradicts all expectations.

Hamid Hammadi: Well, if you--

Saddam Hussein: When did Comrade Tariq [Tariq Aziz] arrive?

Taha Yasin Ramadan: He has not arrived yet.

Saddam Hussein: What do you mean he has not arrived? They advertised it in the newspaper.

Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma’ruf: Maybe it has been announced for security reasons, as he would arrive through Amman as a trick.

Hamid Hammadi: That is when he left the Soviet Union.

Saddam Hussein: He [Tariq Aziz] left at night?

Hamid Hammadi: He left in the afternoon.

Saddam Hussein: In the afternoon. Look it up in the newspaper: "Tariq Aziz arrives in Baghdad."

[Time Stamp 20:16]

Where is the guy that brings tea? Drink your tea before it turns cold.

Taha Yasin Ramadan: Gorbachev may not have made a statement following the attack!

Saddam Hussein: Regarding the first letter I sent him, do you still have it?


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Hamid Hammadi: Yes

Saddam Hussein: Please read it and read his response. This was all done tonight.

Hamid Hammadi: “Mr. Gorbachev, the President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

We trusted you and we have placed Iraq‘s honor and the dignity of the Iraqi Armed Forces in this trust. Therefore, we have agreed on your peace proposal, which you had provided to us in spite of all [the] fiscal and mental severity facing the Iraqi fighter. This circumstance we are facing is not easy, especially when the other side did not respond either way. Even though we will keep our promise, Mr. President, we do know that the Americans, especially their president, have no honor and we do not trust them; therefore, we are working only with your peace proposal. We agreed to it because of our strong trust only in you and the Soviet Union. The situation now is getting worse. The Americans send their threats and are planning to deceive Iraq. The way they presented their statement and threats, it seems they have no respect for the Soviet Union’s position. We do not hear your specific, clear response countering their pathetic statements and threats. Our nation and army are confused. We are asking ourselves, “Which one is more significant: the Soviet Union‘s proposal or the Americans’ threats?” Either way, we need to clear up this issue, in order to prevent the Americans from deceiving our armed forces and our people, by your reply to this letter. We thank you for your response.

Greetings to you and to the people of the Soviet Union,

Saddam Hussein.”

Saddam Hussein: What time did you receive the letter?

Hamid Hammadi: Sir, I received it around 6:00 PM. We delivered it to the Russian Ambassador around 10:00 PM.

Saddam Hussein: See why I was worried the last two days? I know how they react.

Hamid Hammadi: Through the Soviet Ambassador―

Saddam Hussein: I made a statement in the name of Comrade Izzat in order to advise the naval forces. Since the communication means are [inaudible]. You made your call to [pause] the Russian Ambassador, what did you accomplish with him? Hamid Hammadi: I visited the Russian Ambassador at seven pm and I asked him to do his best to get us an answer through our Ministry of Foreign Affairs as soon as possible. The answer arrived at 04:30 AM or around 05:00. Saddam Hussein: I received the answer at 4:15 AM. I did not know the answer. I mean, about the attack. Go ahead. [Time Stamp 24:22]


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Hamid Hammadi: “Dear Mr. President Saddam Hussein,

We thank you for your personal letter showing your concerns about the situation that is getting more complicated despite our joint efforts to implement the procedures for a peaceful solution for the dispute. I would like to point out [inaudible] your decisions to agree on a peaceful solution were an extraordinarily important step and changed the entire situation. After we received your letter indicating you have approved the [peace] project we had arranged with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tariq Aziz, here in Moscow, and that it will be approved by the Iraqi government, we quickly took the following steps to implement this project‘s terms: During the last 24 hours we made two long phone calls. The first one was with the American President, George Bush, followed by the leaders of Britain, Germany, Italy, France, and Japan. In fact, I was personally busy all day engaging in these discussions summarized in the following: [inaudible] postponed for a few months, created a new particular situation with exceptional [inaudible] as far as how important it is to find a peaceful solution for the problem. We called on the international coalition to use this opportunity to stop the bloodshed. For the sake of a fast solution for the mentioned peace proposal, we requested holding an exceptional session of the Security Council of the United Nations where the issues of the ceasefire supervision and monitoring and the forces’ withdrawal will be discussed in the same manner as the other issues. At this time, the United Nations members are meeting in New York, discussing the situation. I should say that, in most cases, the reactions to this information are positive, and the efforts made to reach a peaceful solution to this situation are greatly appreciated. At the same time, President Bush still insists on honoring the American party‘s request, and he is not willing to agree to our proposal. The American President claims he is doing this because he believes Iraq is carrying out environmental terrorism, blowing up the oil refining installations in Kuwait, as well as burning the oil fields. Tariq Aziz was clever in his statement at the press conference when he condemned the Americans’ accusations against Iraq. He was prepared to clarify Iraq‘s position along with a meeting in the UN non-alignment committee. This is what we are dealing with now. The United Sates can ignore what they don‘t like in a peaceful solution through the Security Council, and the Americans [can] begin land operations against Iraqi forces in the Gulf. We are taking the toughest procedures to avoid such a turning point of events, and it is still difficult to say whether these procedures are going to be successful. I believe, under these circumstances, that it would be useful and important to announce, openly and clearly, your decision to withdraw all your forces from Kuwait to their locations on August 1, 1990 without delay or reservation. I also believe in this regard it is possible to address a letter to President Bush directly. It is very clear that, at this intense moment, we need a fast solution to end this important situation without argument. My suggestion is that it is very important for Iraq to withdraw its forces from the land. All of this will be discussed in the UN session. A number of nations are expecting that 21 days for the withdrawal of forces to be a long time. This is the timeframe we agreed on. These nations believe this delay is intentional. I suggest that you mention in your statements another timeframe for the withdrawal of forces of 9–10 days. Without doubt, this will create a different impression for Iraq and won‘t present any special difficulties. I replied to your letter promptly because I know how important this time is. We are


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following the situation carefully to avoid any other alternatives, because from the beginning our goal is to protect lives and the honor of the Iraqis and the other Arab nations in the Gulf region.

Sincerely,

Mikhail Gorbachev

02/24/1991”

Saddam Hussein: He still did not answer the question. It is all talk!

[Time Stamp: 30:15]

Hamid Hammadi: Mr. President responded to this letter and I delivered it to the Russian Ambassador at 7:00 AM.

Saddam Hussein: I wrote the letter at 6:30 AM. At this time I had not heard the news of the attack. Therefore, you need to go to the Russian Ambassador and confirm with him the time and the date of my letter. Have him send a cable to Moscow explaining to them that when I wrote this letter I was not yet aware of the attack. Many things will depend on that in the future. We do not want them to say, when things settle down in the future, God willing, that this assurance came to us after the attack.

Hamid Hammadi: “In the name of God, Most Gracious and Most Merciful, to Mr. President Gorbachev, with respect.

I received your response letter around 5:00, 6:00am Baghdad time on 02/24/91. I was very satisfied with its contents and I would like to offer my special thanks for all your hard work in this matter, because any help you offer us during this transition period would make the withdrawal faster, and we will use it to shorten the time, not lengthen it. Mr. President Gorbachev, we carry out our commitments if we make them, and the concern that President Bush and his allies express is nothing but a matter of not trusting us, they do not believe we will abide by what we say, and they are revealing their bad conscience, which is loaded with lies and deceptions. Bush‘s hands are loaded with bloodshed and the killing of innocent people….Now everything has become clear. Finally, I wish you all the luck with your agenda, because your agenda is to help peace, which is the opposite of what Bush, his mercenaries, or his friends are doing. Peace [be] upon you, Saddam Hussein 6:30 AM, Baghdad time.”

Saddam Hussein: When we are in a war, important documents must have two copies in two different locations. What if this location is bombed or burned?

Hamid Hammadi: Sir, I have a file cabinet and a safe.

Saddam Hussein: They are still in the same location. What I want you to do is to have two copies in two different locations.


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Saddam Hussein: You must have at least two copies for such materials. You should send one to the Office of the Presidency and have another with you.


Saddam Hussein: [Reading a headline.] "Tariq Aziz has returned to Baghdad."

UM1: Sir, we sent him at two in the morning [inaudible]―pardon me, Sir.

Saddam Hussein: You see, I told you. I have read all the newspapers, including the ads.

Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma’ruf: That was to trick them, but he arrived via Amman, Jordan.

Taha Yasin Ramadan: When he arrives, we will send someone for him.

Saddam Hussein: Did they broadcast the speech?

UM1: Yes, Sir, they did broadcast the speech.

Saddam Hussein: How about the interpretation of the [Qur'anic] verse, was it the same? Read the speech to the comrades, because it was broadcast on the radio.

[Time Stamp 36:12]

Hamid Hammadi: Yes, Mr. President. I will read it.

In the name of God, Most Gracious and Most Merciful,

"Ye dislike it. But possible ye dislike a thing which is good for you, and ye love a thing which is bad for you. But Allah knoweth, and ye know not" 2:216 Al-Baqara [Qur’anic verse]

To the great people of Iraq, the courageous Armed Forces, for honorable and faithful people everywhere. When the Security Council was preparing to hold a meeting to discuss the Russian peace initiative, which we agreed on, the betrayers, Bush, the despicable, along with the traitor and coward [Saudi king] Fahd, along with those who agreed and planned this awful crime. Those cowards and traitors excelled over those who mastered deception, betrayal and treason―

Saddam Hussein: Those who what?

Hamid Hammadi: [Resuming] mastered deception, betrayal and treason after they abandoned all roads to good humanity. This morning they betrayed us with an extensive ground attack on our forces, and revealed their intentions to the naïve. They betrayed those who signed with them on the dreaded Security Council resolution prior to the military assault, thinking they are defending international legitimacy. They betrayed everybody, but God is greater than all, and capable of anything. He will punish and shame them for their betrayal―

Saddam Hussein: God can―


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Hamid Hammadi: From the beginning, the evil worked on that path of hostility and immorality to harm the people of Iraq and disgrace what they stand for. Eventually, they will realize what they are doing is against the will of God. God will end their evil, aimed at our faithful people. They will realize that the great people of Iraq and its armed forces are not what they anticipated. We are calling on the Iraqi people to fight them with all their means and experience. Fight them, Iraqis, with your belief in God; fight them for every honored woman and innocent child and with all the meaning of manhood and military values that you bear. Fight them and when you defeat them, you will achieve the greatest conquest. If you triumph in this war, you will be rewarded with dignity and honor. Otherwise–God forbid–if our enemy achieves their goal, it will be a shameful Iraqi defeat. It would leave you men, the nation of Iraq, and humanity in eternal darkness. Oh, men! Fight them, as they do not possess the values that make them manlier, more courageous, and more capable than you are. With the engagement, man to man, the supremacy of weaponry would be absent, and would leave the immoral for you to shape into real men. The only thing left to determine the final fate is the faith of the believers and the bravery of the patriotic. Fight them fiercely, as God called upon the believers to battle the infidels mercilessly. Your families, the people of Iraq and of the world are watching you today. Your conduct may encourage people to please God by following His path and honoring the people and the nation. Fight them, as men who believe should. They are the masses of infidels, hypocrites, and betrayers and you are the masses of believers, steadfast and faithful. Fight them, and victory, dignity and honor, will be yours. God is Great! God is Great! God is Great! Victory is great, by the grace of God.

[Time Stamp: 41:00]

Saddam Hussein: Tell me, what did you do with [inaudible]? Go ahead, Comrade Taha―

Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma’ruf: Sir, in fact, this is the last stage of the conspiracy and they are executing it. We were concerned about this before, but we are calmer now. I am talking about myself, personally. I am calmer now than before.

Because the Soviet Union's efforts were late–what I mean is–if this proposal had started earlier, it would have been better. God willing, they will be serious in their efforts, because it came in the last round. Most vital is the determination of our people and our Armed Forces. It is more important than the pressure of the Soviet Union or any other party involved. I am confident that the Iraqi intention and attempts for peace have put us in a stronger position to fight until the end. As they say, "welcome death." Each Iraqi is suffering from the economy, among other things, but now they have an obligation and duty to fight to the end.

This is my estimation. The people's position is now stronger than it was a month ago or two weeks ago. We now know the conspiracy is not only to free Kuwait, but also to occupy Iraq, remove the regime and destroy everything we have worked for. Yesterday, they raided the outskirts of Baghdad and the residential districts in the Al-Hadi area. They attacked homes, including my house, as well as farms. It became obvious; we are starting a sort of punishment. Concerning Al-Hadi district's situation, I believe―

Saddam Hussein: I want to go sit there [referring to a chair in the room].

[Time stamp: 45:11]


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UM2: Concerning the situation with the military―

Saddam Hussein: One of the escorts needs to move the microphone―put it on top of this. Where are those papers?

UM5: Sir, this is the new situation report…

Saddam Hussein: One of you needs to explain the situation [One person agrees.] Please read for us, bring the map— [Tape stops.] Is it marked? Hamid Hammadi: Yes, Mr. President. The 14th Infantry Division arrived at this holding line with the tank Battalion . In addition, advancing the 95th Brigade of the 3rd Corps toward―

Saddam Hussein: That means the 3rd Regiment is part of the covering troops?

Hamid Hammadi: Yes, Mr. President, one of these isolated ones. Here, Sir, the enemy force is estimated to be an armored brigade. Sir, at first they were stationed in front of the covering troops, now they are three kilometers away from the covering troops.

Saddam Hussein: They withdrew!

Hamid Hammadi: Yes, Mr. President. Regarding Bobian and Failaka Islands, we had communication with them until eleven, but then we lost them.

Saddam Hussein: Communication stopped at 11:00 AM. Did they report anything prior to the communication loss? It could be technical problems with their communication device.

Hamid Hammadi: Yes, Mr. President, they were under heavy artillery fire and we had communication with them until 11:00 AM.

UM2: Here is the 7th Division and the 14th Division. They think the main attack will occur in this area―

Saddam Hussein: Because it is the shortest way to the city.

UM2: Yes, Sir.

Saddam Hussein: Yes, read us the situation.

Hamid Hammadi: Summary of the situation until 11:15 AM, the 3rd Corps. At 10:30 AM, the enemy was capable of eliminating the 3rd Regiment, 14th Infantry Brigade.

Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma’ruf: The 3rd Regiment, 18th Brigade.

Hamid Hammadi: 3rd Battalion, 14th Infantry Brigade and they turned toward the 2nd Regiment, 14th Infantry Brigade.

Saddam Hussein: [Looking at a map.] Is the 2nd Regiment to your left?

Hamid Hammadi: Sir, this is the 1st Regiment, 18th Brigade.


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Saddam Hussein: No, this is the division. There is a division between every two points.

[Time Stamp 50:38]

Hamid Hammadi: Yes, Sir. This is the regiment. This is the 14th Brigade and this is the 426th Brigade.

Saddam Hussein: It is a regiment; he is talking about a regiment and not division.

Hamid Hammadi: Yes, Sir. This is the regiment and this is the 426th Brigade.

Saddam Hussein: Repeat it.

Hamid Hammadi: The enemy was able to eliminate the 3rd Regiment, 14th Infantry Brigade, and 14th Division and then turn toward the 2nd Regiment, 14th Infantry Brigade. This battle is taking place now at the 14th Infantry Brigade post. One company from the 3rd Regiment of the Brigade is fighting with the brigade. [Inaudible] the same time, they heard screaming and noise in front of 18th Infantry Division coming from Al-Wafrah area direction, the dividing borders with the 8th Infantry Division.

Saddam Hussein: Where are these troops located? Here is the division, here is the brigade and here is the brigade over there in depth, or maybe 10 kilometers or maybe a kilometer for each.

Hamid Hammadi: The 1st Corps, in the phone call at 11:00 AM with Staff Lieutenant General Ibrahim, Commander of the 1st Corps, stated the following:

1st Corps Commander: the enemy’s aircrafts are still raiding the 45th Division’s sector. Helicopters are attempting to destroy all locations; they are trying to perform an air landing to confuse our formations and the division command. Until now, they have not been capable of securing a foothold. There are heavy air raid attacks on the 54th Infantry Division’s sector.

Saddam Hussein: Which one is it, the 45th Division? Or do you mean 54th Division? [‘Abd is heard trying to find the location] ‘Abd, look at the map, there are columns; between every two columns, there is a number at the end.

‘Abd: Yes, Sir.

Saddam Hussein: At the end, in depth. [On the map] inside the lines of the 45 which division is that one?

Hamid Hammadi: Sir, it is 26th, 46th, 31st, 25th, 20th, 34th, 16th, 21st, 3rd, 4th and 7th.

Saddam Hussein: No, I think it is the same corps, the 1st. Look in the depth; this is what they are targeting beyond the Kuwait Province borders.

UM2: From Al-Najaf.

Saddam Hussein: To try to block the road from there. Yes.


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Hamid Hammadi: There are heavy raids on the 54th Infantry Division’s sector. The situation is well under control. 3rd Corps [reported that] at 11:00 AM, the enemy’s armor reached the covering troops of 18th Division, 3rd Regiment, 95th Brigade.

[Time Stamp 55:05]

Saddam Hussein: Which corps?

Hamid Hammadi: The 3rd Corps, Sir.

Saddam Hussein: Islam, where is 18?

Islam: This is the 95th Brigade and this is the 18th Division.

Hamid Hammadi: The enemy is advancing toward Al-'Abdaliyyah, 18th Infantry Brigade in the sector of the 14th Division.

Saddam Hussein: Hamid, your first reading of the Division was wrong. What can you read for me? [Saddam goes over the last part of the reading, making sure the names of divisions and brigades are correct.]

The 18th, 3rd Corps, 95th Brigade. This is our battalion and the enemy advancing to Al-'Abdaliyyah. This is the 14th Division.

Hamid Hammadi: Yes, Sir

Saddam Hussein: Check the 18th Brigade for me.

Hamid Hammadi: The 18th Brigade―Yes, this is the one, Sir―the 422nd Regiment and the 77th Regiment.

Saddam Hussein: Currently, at 11:15 AM, there is no communication with Failaka Island. Yet, we do not consider the enemy to be gaining anything from us. Comrade Taha, continue―

Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma’ruf: Mr. President, I would like to point out something regarding the military statements. The current situation now requires us to keep our statement short and focused. What I mean is that there is no need for a long introduction in our other statements before the campaign. Neither the world nor our people would take them seriously. Honestly, we have to concentrate on brief sentences―verses either from the Qur'an or from a nice phrase, and then get to the point.

Saddam Hussein: Islam, I will write it. Prepare for the situation and I will write.

Islam: Yes, Sir.

Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma’ruf: My opinion is that the summary should be fast for the nation and the rest of the world. What I am trying to say is, keep it comprehensible and concise for our people and the world. Other statements were long and we do not need this now―the situation has changed. Due to the importance of foreign media, we are trying to contact our Arab allies to work with us on media campaigns including news and statements. We need a media campaign because the outside media is very powerful―


16

Saddam Hussein: The campaign will occur after the accomplishments, Comrade Taha.

Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma’ruf: Yes, you are right. Everything will be normal with excellent results, God willing―accomplishing this result―this is normal―they are the ones who started― the attack might start at 5:00 tonight.

Saddam Hussein: They started at 2:00 in some locations.

Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma’ruf: Then announced it at 3:00, Baghdad time.

Sa’dun Hammadi: The weather is bad―raining and thunderstorms.

Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma’ruf: The weather is fine here.

Saddam Hussein: This is not important; they knew the weather situation before they started. Yes, speak, Dr. Sa'dun―

[Time Stamp 1:00:00]

Sa’dun Hammadi: Sir, we have to think about methods to counter the negativity affecting our fighters and our armed forces, which resulted from accepting the withdrawal. I remember that you once talked about―after Al-Muhammarah―and said that there were several and dual reasons for resisting and defeating the repeated Iranian attacks during the battles east of Basra. One of the reasons is that our soldiers started fighting for their honor and not [inaudible]. But there is also the fear factor that played a role in making the leaders, commanders, and soldiers stick to their positions. Also, Sir, you mentioned some procedures to the Party comrades behind the troops and the measures they need to take, which is encouraging combat and bravery on one part, and stopping weakness on the other hand. Human nature is like that; it always needs incentive.

Saddam Hussein: Heaven and Hell. [This means that obeying will lead to heaven and disobeying will lead to hell.]

Sa’dun Hammadi: Yes, one time the incentive is magnanimity and eagerness to rush, and another time it is the responsibility and fear when one thinks he will have responsibility even if he withdraws. Therefore, Sir, we have to take several measures at the public and military level and at all aspects to treat this negative psychological state [of mind] that was caused by the political situation. In addition, I hear about army desertions or that some fighters are not returning to their units. So we need to work on all situations and lift up the morale of our armed forces and reinstate their previous state of mind. To do this, many things need to be done by the party and other organizations in all cities, as well as military procedures. We should have good spirits from now on because the action of our comrades in the army is purely academic and military sometimes. Meaning, for example, if the regiment attacking force is bigger than ours, we will sustain the losses of the regiment if we allow it to withdraw. Therefore, Sir, I believe we should have detailed supervision by you regarding the actions―

[Time stamp: 01:03:30]

END OF RECORDING

Conflict Records Research Center CRRC Record Number SH-SHTP-A-000-931

1

Key: UM = Unidentified Male Speaker Translator comments, clarifications, and additions are italicized in brackets [Time Stamp: 00:01]

[The recording starts mid-sentence.]

Sa’dun Hammadi: The area of Al-Khafji. I don't believe they should be left alone. On the contrary, they should be personally supervised by you in terms of details.

Saddam Hussein: Comrade Sa'di―

Sa'di: Mr. President, we have conformed to the Soviet Union and to the international pressure. We expected, as a result of our conformity, a change in position, especially on the part of the Soviet Union. Therefore, I would like to ask, just for clarification, is it possible to ask the Soviet Union to give us weapons, not necessarily for the frontlines? They were opposed to the fact that the enemy had exceeded the limits and launched attacks on cities. These limits were determined by the Security Council resolutions. Isn't it feasible or appropriate to ask for the support of the Soviet Union in this matter? Even for help with [weapons] for the frontlines. Especially since the Soviet Union was humiliated by the Americans rejecting their mediation. I believe this is a good opportunity for us to exploit these facts.

Saddam Hussein: Comrade Taha―

Taha Yasin Ramadan: Mr. President, I do not believe that any political action preceding the ground battle would be in our favor. I still believe if the ground attack takes place after we reacted politically and conformed, the combat spirits will improve. Especially if perceived this way by the people and the military. It would be as if we pulled back into our borders and are fighting on our grounds. They [the Coalition Forces] have not given us a chance to withdraw. Therefore, I don't believe it would have been advantageous if the ground battle took place a week ago or before the initiative. It would be different if [the ground battle] had started within the first few days. However, it is already postponed. Additionally, in the past ten days ―four or five days before the initiative and a few days after ― you have taken certain measures, including those mentioned by Comrade Dr. Sa'dun―

Saddam Hussein: Call the Chief of Intelligence for me.

UM1: Yes, Sir.

[Inaudible, the chief of intelligence is speaking to Saddam while Tariq Ramadan is speaking]

Taha Yasin Ramadan: [Picks up mid-sentence] including everything mentioned by Comrade Dr. Sa'dun when he was abroad, including the return of [inaudible], the role of the Party, the squads, the pardons, the role of commanders on the frontlines and the defection. Instructions and memos were issued and organizational activities, stimulants, etc. were not only diplomatic, but beneficial as well.

I intended to mention earlier that, I agree with Comrade Sa'di regarding your most recent letter, which you sent without realizing that there would be a ground attack. Is it useful to send a letter


2

to the Soviet Union asking them to clarify their position regarding the ground attack, which has already started? Are they going to comply with the resolution that entitled the United States to attack? Or are they going to affirm that this attack is not in agreement with the international will and Security Council resolutions? The Soviet Union was among the nations that voted for the entitlement resolution. Due to its proposed peace initiative being unsuccessful, the Soviet Union must be looking for other alternative languages. [The peace initiative did] not only state that the allies have exceeded the limits of the entitlement, but that they have continued with the hostilities, despite all initiatives and calls.

[Time Stamp: 05:00]

This is just a query; your last letter was sent before the beginning of the ground attack and the [Soviets’] response was also in the same order. Would you perhaps, Mr. President, consider that we write something better to the Soviet Union?

Saddam Hussein: Yes, we can write a letter regarding the political and military aspects.

Taha Yasin Ramadan: I believe Comrade Sa'di is correct. I do not wish to get into the details of the media aspect. However, the broadcasting should inspire and rally the masses. It should call on the Arab people to revolt and fight against the enemies of our nation and their interests everywhere. Meanwhile, we will continue to increase our efforts and propaganda in an explicit call to all Arab and Muslim masses; a call to rise up and attack the interests of all coalition states without discretion or diplomacy. We have only one, small broadcasting agency, but it can do the job and convey a message that if Arab and Muslim leaders who do not stand up [against the Coalition Forces], they will have to face them [the masses]. Thank you, Sir.

Saddam Hussein: Comrade Muhammad―

Muhammad [Probably either Muhammad Hamza al-Zubaydi, a Regional Command member (1982–2001) who became deputy prime minister in March 1991 and played a key role in suppressing the Shi‘a uprising, or Muhammad Saeed al-Sahhaf, the minister of foreign affairs (1992–2001)]: Mr. President, I truly believe the plot has been accurately executed and the Soviet Union is well aware of that. In fact, it supported the United States in its aggression. Despite all this, I believe it is crucial for us to embarrass the Soviet Union in this phase and escalate our political maneuvering. We accepted the Soviet Initiative while the Security Council was still in session and it was later rescheduled, but the ground attack started anyway at 3:00 AM. So, I believe it is very necessary here―

Saddam Hussein: I think the Security Council decided to reassemble at 6:00 AM.

Muhammad: They convened and the session was later adjourned.

Saddam Hussein: Was [the Council] in session?

UM2: Yes. They received the news and decided there was no point to have the session…

Muhammad: So, what is the point of the Security Council?


3

Taha Yasin Ramadan: Why was there no point for the session? The war was underway, even before the ground attack.

Muhammad: The five permanent members of the Security Council had not yet made a decision regarding the Soviet initiative when the United States decided to launch its aggression. I consider this behavior to be insulting, especially to the Soviet Union. We should make this point the center of attention. Furthermore, I support the arguments of Comrades Sa'di and Taha and would like to add another remark. I believe it is essential for us to take advantage of the situation in some Arab countries, especially countries, which along with their masses, are expressing substantial support for us. Take for example Algeria, where we can dare the Algerian government to provide us with weapons, military equipment, or any kind of support to fight against this American aggression. We can do the same with many other countries that sympathize with our cause such as Tunisia, Mauritania, Yemen and others. We are well aware of what they can offer. But even if we can get a rifle from Mauritania, for example, we can then consider Mauritania to have supported us in such a difficult time. On the other hand, Mr. President, we can test Iran from the Islamic perspective and we can incite the Iranian clerics, parliament and civil organizations in any way we can to gain their sympathy and support, along with other Islamic countries.

[Time Stamp: 09:42]

The truth is, Sir, an Iranian cleric was on Iraqi TV yesterday during the Friday religious ceremony. He spoke in Arabic, and was curious about the motive behind the American aggression on Iraq. Iraq has accepted all the demands of the international community, including the unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. I am not sure of this cleric's name, but he had a huge turban and was inciting the audience against the United States and explaining Iraq’s position. In my estimation, there is popular support for us [in Iran] and we should take advantage of it. We should intensify our political efforts in sympathetic Arab and foreign countries, in addition to Iran. As you know, Mr. President, we have gained great experience through our long war with Iran. Most of the comrades here have worked in the field. Therefore, we have to reassess our organization of the popular support. Although I was away for a while, I am aware of the current events. I believe we have to prepare, reorganize and re-arm the popular militias and the civilians. I recall when we were training females in Al-Basrah to participate in the war by supplying fighters with weapons and ammunition. We have to have emergency plans in store for all governorates, especially those most likely to be penetrated. They [the Coalition Forces] claim they have already crossed the borders into Iraqi territory. The will therefore try to make their way into Al-Najaf and Al-Nasiriyyah. They will try to infiltrate through these areas, because our borders with Saudi Arabia are so long. I suggest examining and searching these governorates on the Iraqi-Saudi borders. The popular militias and civilians in these areas should be armed, trained and prepared. Training should not be exclusive to organized and trained fighters, but quite the opposite. Whoever is able to use a gun and is trusted by Ba'thist organizations should be armed and trained. Let it be a street fight, a house to house fight, even females who can participate should help in the fight. I am certain that the comrades who are in charge of these organizations have already considered all these aspects. I am just trying to remind them.


4

Saddam Hussein: They have specific, written instructions that explain to them what to do in different situations. This includes how to maneuver, attack, and defend villages and cities and the types of weapons they can use.

When will the rest of the Command members receive their instructions?

UM3: They already arrived, Mr. President. The instructions include the topics of arming and dealing with border infiltration―

Saddam Hussein: I want more [accomplishments] in this effort.

UM3: Yes, Sir.

Muhammad: I am confident of our victory. Our people can clearly see we are fighting America and what is required of them is…

Saddam Hussein: Time will sort things out. With time, America will end up with England and a few the oil countries. This coalition is not going to last forever, especially after we have taken this new political position.

Muhammad: I believe our people have been strongly holding together since this war started. I truly believe we will achieve victory, God willing, and they will be defeated. We have survived the first strikes on the 16th and the 17th and our people will survive this one, as well. If we can have the Americans lose 5,000 soldiers in this battle―

Saddam Hussein: Five hundred.

Taha Yasin Ramadan: [Inaudible.]

Sa’dun Hammadi: I told the Chinese president that we would win if we lose one [Iraqi soldier] for every one [American soldier killed] or two [Iraqis] for one [American]. He said no.

Saddam Hussein: No, his assessment is right; I told my soldiers four to one.

Sa’dun Hammadi: [The Chinese president] said that "even if we had one [American soldier killed] for every four [Iraqi soldiers killed], you are the victors." He told me that himself.

Muhammad: We have to do our best to inflict as many casualties among their ranks as we can. I am confident of your estimate, Mr. President.

[Time Stamp: 15:00]

Saddam Hussein: Comrade Muhammad, whether it is our artillery or our direct fighters’ fire, as long as they enter the battleground, they are going to bear casualties. Muhammad: God willing, we will achieve victory.

Sa’dun Hammadi: We will need bravery. We need to use methods other than those we were taught at military schools. We can overcome their overwhelming majority and technological superiority by the heroism of our troops.


5

Muhammad: Thank you, Mr. President.

Saddam Hussein: Comrade Sulayman―

Sulayman: In reference to the popular activities and the partisan organizations, they were actively involved in instigating patriotic sentiments until the war started. They were required to put certain military and mobilization procedures into operation prior to the war. We all know, as we learned from you, Mr. President, our greatest teacher and leader, that popular support is essential for the fight. In fact, it is the backbone of the soldiers on the frontlines, in addition to its influence over the political international arena. Now that the ground battle has started, I have noticed that these partisan organizations need to work harder on inciting patriotic sentiments and activities; they need to publicize these issues, because they will definitely empower the operations and boost the morale of the fighters on the frontlines. There were some measures that were recommended to the Mobilization Committee before the war, which you approved and requested be carried out in case of aggression against Iraq. I recall some of these measures as follows: Rallies and prayers are to be held in the mosques and Jihad is to be declared, even on the streets.

There were other measures you requested be postponed because the timing was not appropriate for the events. In brief, the status of the general public, up until the beginning of the war, may have been appropriate for the situation. However, the current situation requires that additional measures be taken―

Saddam Hussein: Motivation.

Sulayman: In order to motivate and support more popular involvement. Some procedures may seem shallow, but, in fact, they help rally and motivate the masses and inspire enthusiasm. Such procedures include parades of popular militias on the streets, the presence of armed personnel in public and public meetings of partisan groups. This battle is a national battle. In fact, it is a battle for our existence as Iraqis, as Arabs and as humans. Therefore, I call on these groups to come out to fight, defend and support their fellow soldiers in any way they can.

My objective is for this grassroots movement to adopt new and unconventional methods and tactics, while they utilize past experiences. Through the advice of my fellow comrades and your valuable leadership, I am certain they will excel in their efforts to strengthen the spirits and the determination of our people. We noticed, as a result of some shots fired in Baghdad, that Bush came out to analyze and comment on the incident, and concluded that the Iraqis were opposed to the war. Our intensions are for the Iraqi people to get more involved and to become enthusiastic and articulate. As for the political situation, in addition to the Soviet Union, we can involve Iran. We can even talk about the involvement of Israel in this war.

[Time Stamp: 20:00]

Saddam Hussein: Why should anyone who wants to join be concerned? There is no difference between America and Israel.

Muhammad: Some of them [Arab nations] made this argument.

Taha Yasin Ramadan: I think this group is not willing to join.


6

Saddam Hussein: They won't join.

Taha Yasin Ramadan: They will make up other motives.

Saddam Hussein: Some have already said, even if Israel joins [the war]―they will not join.

Muhammad: Our people are the foundation [of these efforts], if they are inspired.

Saddam Hussein: When our people have the strength and can express their determination, other Arab and Muslim people will be motivated by the sense of honor and passion.

Muhammad: There is a proverb that says "The bravery of some men emboldens other men; therefore, people will hearten and embolden each other."

Saddam Hussein: This is everyone's duty in relation to their capacities. This includes all institutions. For example, Comrade Muhammad can perform this duty from his work at the Ministry of Telecommunications. He can motivate his own group of people in a precise and technical manner. In addition, those who work at the Economic Committee can dedicate five minutes to demonstrate the significance of this battle, prior to commencing their daily routine. Moreover, when Comrade Taha meets with the Kurds, he can talk to them about this war. He can make it clear to them that this war is not limited to one ethnicity over the other or a certain political agenda over another. This war is against all Iraqis. Mizban, Saddam and others can all work to achieve these goals. We are taking upon ourselves the implication of these duties and the need to perform them from our own position. Regarding the operational aspects, if Comrade 'Izzat were not feeling well or unable to perform his duties at the Organizational Committee, then Comrade Taha could hold the meeting for either the Leadership or the Organizational Committee. The same concept applies if Comrade Taha were occupied. Comrade Sa'di could perform his duties by holding a meeting for the Organizational Committee. This would keep up with the progress and so forth. Thus, there are three approaches to sustain the progress and the operation of the Organizational Committee.

Sa’dun Hammadi: I have a specific recommendation. I believe today should be proclaimed a day of celebration. We should have the broadcasting service announce we are celebrating the beginning of the ground war.

Taha Yasin Ramadan: I do not support this idea at all. It would be a grave mistake. People will take it against us, as they did when we played music at the beginning of the war…

Saddam Hussein: What music?

Taha Yasin Ramadan: A Fayruz [a prominent Arab singer] song. This is war; we will celebrate when we win.

Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma’ruf: Let us wait until we deal them the ultimate blow.

UM4: Mr. President, people left Baghdad in the first two days of the strikes. The city was vacant. We played some patriotic music to let people know that airstrikes were not going to eliminate every soul. In fact, they started to return to the city.

Taha Yasin Ramadan: They did not return because of the music.


7

Sa'di: At least we gave our best effort.

Saddam Hussein: Yes, it was a good effort.

UM4: It was a good effort and I support the idea of the Doctor and the First Vice President. We need to induce more enthusiasm and public support. If the manifestations of demonstrations, armed parades, police and armed youth were not present last week, they need to be today. These manifestations are taking place in Jordan; why shouldn't we have them here, where the aggression has occurred?

Taha Yasin Ramadan: Outsiders will wonder what is wrong with us if they hear we are celebrating.

UM5: Why would we have the popular militias parading if they are supposed to be fighting on the frontlines?

UM4: We do not have to parade, but we can publicize the presence of these forces in public places, especially during the airstrikes. To place a group of a thousand on a city block would be ridiculous, but perhaps a few of these individuals in each neighborhood will have a great impact. The current events, Mr. President, are exactly what you had expected. We were not completely shocked by the ground assault. This is evident by the maps and the drawings we have for our plans. We have to persevere and do what is necessary to keep on fighting and stay connected with our army and people until we achieve victory. I believe diplomatic efforts are also necessary, especially with Arab nations that we are on good terms with. These nations need to make statements against the aggression and encourage their populace to demonstrate and condemn the aggression.

[Time Stamp: 25:00]

On the other hand, the Soviet Union needs to have a clear position regarding these events. They stated yesterday that if the ground attack occurs, they will not condemn the assault, but they will express their displeasure. This is not a good position―

Saddam Hussein: Is that what they claimed?

UM4: Yes. This was their statement: if the ground attack occurs, they will not condemn it, but they will express their displeasure. This is a disgraceful position―

Saddam Hussein: This is indicative of―

Taha Yasin Ramadan: They are accomplices as well―

UM4: In addition, the fact that Gorbachev called Bush and asked him to postpone the ground attack for one more night means that [Bush] has informed him about the ground attack. Whether he did inform him or not, I think, has no value―

Taha Yasin Ramadan: The French publicized this topic―

UM4: Nonetheless, I believe your letters to Gorbachev are of high significance and will rectify the "issue of 6:30," [the statement of Coalition Forces claiming the capture of Failaka] so we


8

don't get [judged by] history. Our citizens are passionate and determined. Whether they use knives, bats, rocks or whatever, this war is with the United States. So, what do we expect?

Saddam Hussein: We will keep fighting. If we can't fight from our positions, we will pull back into the cities, but we will continue the fight.

UM4: Where we pull back is not an issue. The issue at hand is how we can inflict casualties [among the enemy’s ranks].

Saddam Hussein: If I believed we could withdraw our forces and equipment without losing half of them as a result of airstrikes, I would have had them withdrawn today. However, their current positions are much better than any other position they could have inside Iraq. This situation is different than the war with Iran. We announced our withdrawal and we did so without any obstruction, because they did not have air supremacy. [The Americans] would strike our forces―

Taha Yasin Ramadan: They would strike to prove their aircrafts are flying. They will strike for a couple of hours and when they stop they will state it was adequate. What can we do?

Saddam Hussein: They will never state that. The American's objective is to [destroy] Iraq in its entirety, including its willpower.

Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma’ruf: Mr. President, do you think we should leave Kuwait behind with all its buildings and let them have it all?

Saddam Hussein: The most recent battle we had was inside Kuwait City. When we withdraw, we will fight inside cities, because our forces are in control there and can still fight.

[27:45-31:50: original recording is fast forwarded and a part of it is blank.]

[Time Stamp: 31:50]

Saddam Hussein: When are comrades Taha and Sa'dun coming? Call them. Did they receive?―

UM6: Yes, they did.

Saddam Hussein: Go ahead, with the help of God, incite your organizations and your party. The ultimate conclusion of this battle is Iraq is here to stay and they will leave.

[Inaudible background talk.]

Saddam Hussein: We cannot read the future. The war started and we must continue to the end, when we will achieve victory by the will of God.

All: God willing.

Saddam Hussein: Go ahead, with the help of God.

[Inaudible.]

UM6: To them.


9

Taha Yasin Ramadan: The military will dispatch a vehicle. The volunteer Arab forces were processed and named today, like, Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir for the Egyptians. The Syrian forces need a name [inaudible]. What do you think, Doctor? What is the reason for celebration today? I think the whole Arab population is listening to songs.

Saddam Hussein: There is a song called "I Crossed the River."

Sa’dun Hammadi: You guys are taking the issue sarcastically. I am going to be honest with you. We are facing an enormous backlash as a result of demoralization and fear of the war. We must confront it. What does it mean when a man like me stands before a press conference, states that we receive martyrs with celebration, and the audience responds with a standing ovation? Is it true, when someone dies, people receive his corpse with joy? It is extremely important for our fellow citizens to understand we are content, at ease and not afraid of the war. I did not say we have to hand out sweets. But our radio broadcasts must not express any sorrow, because our people will perceive this attitude as that of the defeated and depressed. We can understand this, but this can become extreme.

Taha Yasin Ramadan: Go down to the street and find out what people are looking for. I do not wish to be depressed, yet I do not wish to [seem so happy either]. Newscasters must have a very strong and determined tone of voice.

[Time Stamp: 35:00]

Sa’dun Hammadi: I did not claim we should celebrate - I want us to seem content and accepting, not contempt or depressed. We have to affirm we are pleased and that we welcome the war.


Saddam Hussein: Were communications restored?

UM7: Yes, Sir.

UM8: Communications with Failaka are restored.

Taha Yasin Ramadan: Thanks be to God, thanks be to God. I believe when Failaka lasts for an extra hour, they must feel the pressure of being surrounded by water. Though, this is a significant indication [of resolve]. [To Taha Muhyi-al-Din Ma'ruf] Communications with Failaka are restored.

Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma’ruf: That is great. [Speaking sarcastically] they [the Americans] accomplished [something], it’s only an island and they accomplished it.

Taha Yasin Ramadan: They landed in the first day with about 1,700-1,800 [soldiers] an hour [inaudible].

UM9: They bombed [inaudible]. Can you believe a super power would do that?

Taha Yasin Ramadan: This one next to us? They only need to bomb something close to us and everything will fall apart.


10

UM10: America the Super Power targets a Foreign Minister!

Taha Yasin Ramadan: [Inaudible] what is left of Baghdad after yesterday?

Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma’ruf: Residential homes were targeted, too.

Taha Yasin Ramadan: Was your house destroyed?

Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma’ruf: Only half. I sent Jamal to check it out for me. He said that the damages were obvious and the windows were smashed. We left [inaudible] in the trunks of our cars. I thought they would take it and distribute it to the neighbors…

[Time Stamp: 40:28]

[Inaudible, Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma’ruf, Taha Yasin Ramadan and others are whispering, discussing personal things, like cars, homes, money, friends, etc.]

[Time Stamp: 48:36]

Saddam Hussein: I believe today was the best fight. When it comes to certain things, Americans are―may God help us.

Taha Yasin Ramadan: It was meant as a threat. It cannot be the longest one―

Saddam Hussein: Why would America come to fight?

Sabir: That was a direct one, directly into Kuwait. They have targeted the 14th Division, because Al-Manaqeesh is the fastest way to the city. I believe they are determined to arrive at the city tomorrow, the 25th.

Taha Yasin Ramadan: How are they going to fight in the city?

Sabir: In the main directions. The idea was for the 4th Corps to shift towards Al-Mizla' and the amphibious landing is expected to take place in Ras al-Sibya.

Saddam Hussein: All sea ports have been destroyed; we destroyed all ports.

Taha Yasin Ramadan: Where would the amphibious landing take place?

Sabir: Would they use helicopters for the amphibious landing?

Saddam Hussein: Yes, by helicopter. They would be hesitant to land their troops inland, because they may suffer serious losses. However, [the enemy] is still monitoring the situation, since the start of [this operation]. The enemy only had minor skirmishes with some of our troops until 2 o'clock.

[Time Stamp: 50:00]

Saddam Hussein: Until 2 o'clock, correct?

Sabir: Since the announcement of [operations] yesterday, there have been continuous skirmishes with the 3rd Corps.


11

Saddam Hussein: Yes, a couple of skirmishes.

Sabir: But, between the time of the announcement and 4 o'clock, there was nothing but continuous skirmishes.

Saddam Hussein: They would not have announced it if they had not prepared their offensive. Once they announced the offensive, it was understood that our troops would be ready and prepared to counter attack with artillery, etc.

Sabir: Mr. President, up until two hours after the announcement, there were only some clashes with the covering troops from the 14th Division―with the regiment. The covering troops of the 14th Division have been clashing with the enemy since before yesterday.

Saddam Hussein: Continuously.

Sabir: Therefore, I have stayed in touch with Lieutenant General Sultan [Hashim Ahmad], and [I was told] there is nothing unusual on the frontline, other than the covering troops [engaging the enemy]. The other thing I need to mention is the French in Al-Busayyah. They are suffering major losses in Rafhah. As you know, Mr. President, we do not have enough forces in regional-Salman direction; there are 30 to 40 kilometers between brigades―

Saddam Hussein: They can fire artillery at them.

Taha Yasin Ramadan: They [the French] will start screaming if they lose a few soldiers.

Saddam Hussein: Listen, Sabir. I have said many times before the war started and I will say it again. If only 20% of our forces use their fire power, the enemy will not be able to accomplish anything. Just 20%.

Taha Yasin Ramadan: True, only if there was no negligence or dissent―

Saddam Hussein: As long as there is no negligence or disorder.

Sabir: Mr. President, for now, things are under control and there are no major issues. I call Lieutenant General Sultan every five minutes and check with the intelligence officers every time I talk to him. Things are under control.

Saddam Hussein: Great job.

Taha Yasin Ramadan: What forces are these?

Sabir: This is a sector of the 6th Division. [The attack from] Al-Busayyah would worry me a little more if the [6th Division] were to be attacked from the front. The right wing of the guards―yesterday, the Army Chief of Staff shuffled the forces and pulled the covering troops―

Saddam Hussein: So they won't be destroyed.

Sabir: He pulled them to the front. [The right wing guards] replaced the covering troops and have remained there since the morning.


12

Saddam Hussein: This is good, so they can use their artillery. Does our artillery have enough range?

Sabir: Yes it does, Sir. And today, the weather was on our side, thank God. They were not able to fly, the weather was so bad.

Saddam Hussein: What about the oil fields? Have we set them all on fire?

Sabir: Yes, Sir. They were all set on fire. Yesterday they announced that these 350 km long black clouds were obstructing their ability to fly sorties.


Saddam Hussein: Please, have a seat so Hamid can read the letter; I have not revised it yet. Diplomats have not been helping me in writing; I have to do it myself.


Saddam Hussein: They are good men, but sometimes I rush to my pen and start writing.

Hamid Hammadi: [Reading a letter from Saddam Hussein to President Mikhail Gorbachev]

In the Name of God, the Almighty and Most Merciful,

The Honorable President, Mr. Gorbachev,

It is ironic and complex for us to communicate with you by sending three letters via your embassy in a 24 hour period during February 23rd and 24th. Therefore, I plead with you to be patient and may God reward you for all you do. Mr. President, if you carefully examine our two letters―

Saddam Hussein: [Inaudible.]

Hamid Hammadi: [Resuming] Mr. President, if you carefully examine our two letters, you would find that our suspicions and worries regarding the treacherous stance taken by Bush, his allies and his agents were justifiable. Bush is currently doing what he intended to do; he launched his deceitful ground attack on Iraq at the same time the Security Council was debating your initiative. We accepted this initiative earlier, as discussed with our Foreign Minister, Tariq 'Aziz.

[Time Stamp: 54:55]

We will not talk here about what we expect to transpire as a result of the ground attack. We are determined, by the grace of God and the faith and heroism of our armed forces, to defeat [the enemy] and undermine his imperialistic and aggressive objectives of destroying Iraq and the region. We are here to talk about the unmistakable insult that was directed by Bush, not to Iraq, but to you personally and the Soviet Union in particular. This is evident of a clear betrayal and is a cowardly act. After all these facts, do you or any of your comrades in the leadership have any doubts as to the intentions of Bush and his allies? Their intentions are to control not only the region, but the world, through his continuous control of the region. Are there any reasons to


13

postpone a decisive stance towards this disregard of world peace and security? Is there anything else that may require the Soviet Union to stay put after George Bush used it to pass a resolution at the Security Council, which entitled him to use force against Iraq?

[Audio is missing.]

[Audio resumes] by neglecting the accomplishments of the Iraqi people and their present-day successes. In addition to his most recent aggression, by initiating the ground attack after Iraq declared its correct approval of your initiative―

Saddam Hussein: Correct? [It should be] unambiguous [approval]. I was writing too fast and erred. I wrote “correct” instead of “unambiguous.”

Hamid Hammadi: [Resuming] after Iraq declared its unambiguous approval of your initiative, what is your position going to be politically and militarily? All these developments intend not only to destroy Iraq, but to eliminate the role of the Soviet Union so the United States can control the fate of all humanity. By military position, we simply mean supplying Iraq with weapons necessary to defend the future of the Iraqi state, the properties of Iraqi citizens, their lives and their right to have a decent life. These aspects, as you have indicated in a previous occasion, were not intended to be implied in the resolutions of the Security Council. The American aggression was, in fact, a plot that was deliberately planned by the Americans against our armed forces. We had just changed our position, stated before the 15th of February, to accepting the initiative on the 15th of February and the consequent details that were discussed and agreed upon between you and Tariq Aziz in Moscow. We changed our position after we planned our tactics and mobilized our people and our armed forces. We were unable to substantiate the position that you reached with Tariq Aziz, because of the treacherous and cowardly aggressive acts of the so-called "Coalition Forces" under the leadership of Bush, the enemy of God and humanity.

Mr. President, your clear and direct response is extremely essential, not only for our friendship and its future, but for history and for future generations.

I would like to assure you that our determination to resist this treacherous aggression is much greater and deeper at all levels. Furthermore, the invaders will not succeed in achieving their ambitions, God willing. Though we are not in support of shedding more blood or more complications, this is the will of God, which is above all wills. God is great.

Saddam Hussein.

Saddam Hussein: Is this what you requested?

Taha Yasin Ramadan: Yes, Sir. This is it.

Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma’ruf: Very good.

Saddam Hussein: Dear diplomats, Dr. Sa'dun, is this good? Fine, rushing was responsible for only one error, “correct” instead of “unambiguous.”

UM11:'Abd-al-Jabbar Al-Muhsin issued a statement.

Saddam Hussein: This is what I wrote.


14

Sabir: Sir, we need [to make a statement] regarding the statement of Comrade 'Abd-al-Jabbar Al-Muhsin. [The Americans] claimed they occupied Failaka at 0630 hours.

Saddam Hussein: This is a lie.

Sabir: Yes, Sir, the situation in Failaka is still under control and things are normal.

Saddam Hussein: Just claim our forces have deterred the enemy. As long as they have said that, you can just say they were using heavy artillery and deterred the enemy. Say Failaka is under the control of our forces and there is no evidence that it was occupied by enemy forces.

Sabir: There are more of these stories, Sir.

Saddam Hussein: Deny and talk about all of them; give the exact details of each incident. For example, you can say they eradicated a covering force here, or destroyed a regiment there and so on. However, the situation is well under control and enemy forces have been inflicted with losses as a result of our artillery.

Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma’ruf: Regarding the French―

Sa’dun Hammadi: If we say "a regiment was destroyed," the people will think of it as a defeat. They will not understand these terms―

Saddam Hussein: Then they need to know the details. Let it be. You say you can give the details, but what kind of details are you going to disclose?

Sa’dun Hammadi: How many in the media have to disclose 100% of the facts?

Saddam Hussein: Not 100%. We cannot say, for example, they engaged the covering forces, which consisted of a regiment and was at X distance from the line of defense and was fighting for X hours and so on. Doctor, the entire world is watching and can understand these terms. Military experts know exactly what happens when a regiment fights American forces and 30 other countries for three hours. Additionally, the regiment is within the covering troops and is not situated in its original defense location.

Let us leave this matter to Sabir and Muhsin to prepare a statement.

Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma’ruf: But we need to remain consistent without lengthy statements―

Taha Yasin Ramadan: They do not need to be lengthy―

Saddam Hussein: They do not need to be lengthy. They can immediately start with, "I ask God for mercy."

UM12: They have to be focused―

Saddam Hussein: Yes, but they must be related to people―

Taha Yasin Ramadan: They have to have statements.

Sabir: Mr. President, can I get your permission to go and see the ambassador?


15

Saddam Hussein: Yes, go see him. I am going to revise my statement, parts in the introduction and the conclusion. You fill in the rest.

UM11: Comrade Tariq will arrive at 6 o'clock.

Saddam Hussein: Is this a trick?

Taha Yasin Ramadan: Mr. President, if he came via Jordan, he would be targeted. I don't know why he decided to come via this route. He should avoid it.

Sa’dun Hammadi: He can return via Jordan or Iran, but they announced it―

UM11: Would he come via Iran?

UM12: Is he in Jordan?

Saddam Hussein: He told me he intends to return via Jordan in order to brief King Hussein.

[Time stamp: 01:03:17]

END OF RECORDING

Conflict Records Research Center

CRRC Record Number SH-SHTP-A-000-666

1

Key: UM = Unidentified Male Speaker Translator comments, clarifications, and additions are italicized in brackets

[The recording starts mid-sentence. It seems that Saddam is reading a statement.]

Saddam Hussein: In the nation of Arabs and Islam. O, benevolent in the world, the deceptive enemy has carried out its evil assault against the front of the 14th, 18th, 29th, 8th, 26th, and 45th Divisions of the 3rd, 7th, and 1st Corps of Jihad and faith, and also on the brave Naval Infantry Forces in Failaka Island. As to the aggressors mentioned, the assault began at 0400 hours, meaning at 4:00 this morning, February 24, 1991. Despite the time that has elapsed, and just as our Commander Saddam Hussein expected, as he said in his speech this morning, the enemy continues to fight at the front of most divisions and troops ― at the front of most divisions of the covering troops who are small in number, but who are believers in God, who gave them more strength and guidance. We are saying that the enemy continues, in most of the combat axes, to drown in his own blood and shame before the fronts of the covering troops, who do not exceed the infantry regiments in number, at the defense position of each division that we mentioned. In addition, the enemy has made contact with the front of other regiments of some brigades of the original position. Despite all that has happened, our faithful men were able to drive off the first surprise attack and contain the malicious attempted attacks on the front of all divisions and corps that we already mentioned. In general, our troops are in the best possible shape given the current situation. So far, the enemy’s attack has failed completely and the scoundrel enemy continued calling for help while drowning in his blood at the front of the 26th, 45th, 29th, and 8th Divisions. Furthermore, on Failaka Island, our troops remain steadfast, thwarting the attempts of the deceptive enemy, contrary to what they announced about being able to bring the island and our troops under their control. The combat continues with the troops at the front position of the 14th and 18th Divisions, and the situation is under excellent control. The attacking enemy troops are being exposed to the deadly fire of our brave troops. This is how our troops absorbed… [Saddam stutters] the enemy’s attack.

Tariq Aziz: Good morning, Sir.

Saddam Hussein: Hello.

Tariq Aziz: [Laughing.]

Saddam Hussein: What a pleasant surprise! Are you up to surprises like Bush? [Laughing.]

Tariq Aziz: God willing, Sir, you and Iraq will be victorious and proud.

UM1: Thank God for bringing you back safe.



2

[They all exchange greetings to start the meeting.]

UM2: [Whispering.] This is theirs, Sir, [inaudible] written on it.

Saddam Hussein: Yes, in general.

UM2: Yes, Sir, I will [Inaudible].

Saddam Hussein: [Apparently continuing reading] and our troops, in general, are in the best possible shape they can be in given the current situation. The scoundrel enemy’s attack has so far failed completely and he has continued calling for help while drowning in his own blood at the front of the 26th, 45th, 29th, and 8th Divisions. Furthermore, on Failaka Island, where our troops remain steadfast, thwarting the attempts of the deceptive enemy, contrary to what they have announced of being able to bring the island and our troops under their control. The combat continues with the troops at the front position of the 14th and 18th Divisions, and the situation is under total control. The attacking enemy troops are being exposed to the deadly fire of our brave troops. Our troops have thus absorbed the enemy’s attack and thwarted the attack of the army of 30 countries. This way―

Tariq Aziz: They contained…

Saddam Hussein: Contained, yes… contained… our troops have thus contained the enemy’s attack and thwarted the attack of the army of the 30 failing countries, led by Bush, the enemy of God and humanity. We have the right now, and will also have it in the future, God willing, to chant with a strong and loud voice, “O, what a sweet victory with the help of God. God is great and let the despicable be defeated!” Huh?

UM1: [Inaudible.]

Saddam Hussein: [Laughing.]

UM1: [Inaudible.]

Saddam Hussein: Give it to Comrade Latif so that he can take it.

UM1: Yes, Sir.

Saddam Hussein: And tell Comrade Jabar not to announce any local news.

UM1: Yes, Sir; whatever you say.

Saddam Hussein: Comrade Latif, you can go now because you still have other political obligations to fulfill so that our people can hear about the development of our army. [Apparently addressing one of his staff] Escort Comrade Latif.



3

UM3: Yes, Sir.

Saddam Hussein: Something happened yesterday. I exchanged letters with him [unspecified] yesterday; have you seen them? That is to say, I was worried yesterday, just as if I knew he would betray us, this scoundrel!

Tariq Aziz: But the Soviets, I mean, in addition to weakness, and even [inaudible], I was with them yesterday. I mean we met around 11:00 yesterday morning.

Saddam Hussein: Is it possible that their intelligence service is not aware of this?

Tariq Aziz: Primakov. They did not say they received such news. We discussed the future measures they will be implementing at the Security Council, and he [Primakov] told me about the communications conducted by Gorbachev. When we were leaving, Primakov told me, “[Inaudible, Saddam was clearing his throat] they shortened them.” I said, “Yes, I talked with him, with the president, and the other one last night. We have a large force and millions of tons of equipment, not to mention the weapons [inaudible]. He insisted. I said, “Look, Primakov, do not ask me for anything, you will be attending the Security Council meeting and if you wish to shorten the period by one, two, or three days, that is up to you. I mean do not ask me for three days. I talked with Gorbachev on the phone because he was busy and could not meet with me. I thanked him for his efforts, saying “Mr. President thanks you for your efforts and we want you now to be firm in handling the American aggression.” “We will do our best in laying out the new foundation that we will keep,” he replied. I left around 2:00 in the afternoon. We arrived in Amman and they said that the Security Council meeting had begun. We continued following the news of the Security Council meeting on CNN and other media networks until night time. They showed the Soviet ambassador, who stated, “We have our proposal and the American statement. We can do―

Saddam Hussein: Reconciliation.

Tariq Aziz: Reconciliation between the two. It is important to have this reconciliation. I was really tired. I went to bed by 11:30, but woke up by midnight and stayed up until the morning [inaudible].

Saddam Hussein: Let us hope for the best, God willing.

Tariq Aziz: Let us hope for the best, God willing. Sir, these are dogs, and if we do not cause them to bleed, we will not get any results.

Saddam Hussein: Yes



4

Tariq Aziz: They have been striking us for 38 days and they have not suffered any losses. We must―

UM4: Today we will have the fewest possible losses.

Tariq Aziz: We suffered a lot of material losses, so let them loose and let them get slaughtered. Let us pray to God to grant us success to slaughter any number of them. This is what is going to help us get results. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs told me yesterday, when we were in the car, “Bush is going to be in a very difficult position because ― what is the statement? It is true that our statement implies threat and warning. However, the elements ― for instance, he is asking for one week to withdraw while we said three weeks. Okay, between one week and three there is one week of [inaudible, voices overlapping].

[Time stamp: 10:35]

UM4: [Inaudible] time.

Tariq Aziz: As for the prisoners, we said three days while he said two. These are things… in any political or military action. One should not really elaborate on such an issue.

UM4: The sanctions are still [inaudible].

Tariq Aziz: No, regarding the sanctions, of course this [inaudible].

Saddam Hussein: He meant it.

Tariq Aziz: No, he meant it.

Saddam Hussein: He meant it.

Tariq Aziz: He meant it. He even said it in his speech. He said, “If the sanctions were lifted, Saddam Hussein would use his materials to build his military force and [inaudible]. However, it is those other ignoble people like Mitterrand and [inaudible].” He said they are considerate. The initiative, Sir, had an echo [was welcomed] [inaudible] the news in Moscow is limited since there are not many news sources; however, there are many countries like Germany, the Pope, Italy―

Saddam Hussein: Italy and Spain.

Tariq Aziz: And Spain and all non-alignment countries. They all had the capability to scrutinize. But he is a dog. The goal, Sir, is obvious. Regardless of the [inaudible] of the Soviet initiative, it means keeping the Iraqi army as is. They want to strike the army. It is clear.



5

UM5: Do you think, Abu-Ziyad [Tariq Aziz], that it is within the initiative? I mean it appears that Bush intended in his plan to strike the Iraqi army. This means the army will be struck, should we accept.

Tariq Aziz: Yes, yes.

UM4: He has been saying for a week that our air cover must remain above our flags.

Tariq Aziz: What they have been saying to start with―

[Time stamp: 12:25]

Saddam Hussein: The air cover must remain over Kuwait, and the Kuwaitis will be able to enter the city. Practically, they will be behind our troops stretched along the coast, and they would block the transportation roads. Do our troops have the ability to go along the shoreline and then come back?

UM4: Al-Zubayr is to the right [inaudible].

UM5: Yes, Sir, we have a plan for the coast, but they still have to pass by the intersection of cover, like your Excellency had mentioned.

Tariq Aziz: Sir, where are the axes of the attack? Is it also like it was planned through Saudi Arabia and―

Saddam Hussein: It is not going to arrive.

UM2: Yes, Sir.

Saddam Hussein: Do you have any indication? Maybe the escorts do.

Tariq Aziz: No, let them join, Sir, we are―

UM4: The Americans and the French are attacking now.

Saddam Hussein: I wish they came at that time!

Tariq Aziz: [Inaudible.] The French are attacking?

UM5: Yes.

Saddam Hussein: They are attacking. They are by the division sitting and crying.

Tariq Aziz: The French?




6

UM5: [Inaudible.]

Saddam Hussein: They were asking for help when they had not even participated yet!

Tariq Aziz: They are just one division. This Mitterrand is a fox [“fox” is used to describe someone sly, inaudible].

UM4: [Inaudible.]

Saddam Hussein: Mitterrand is very despicable.

Tariq Aziz: Despicable.

UM5: The attack began with the 14th Division that is in the direction of the Al-Manaqish axis that we talked about, and said it is the shortest way to Kuwait.

Tariq Aziz: To the city.

UM5: To the city. The attack started [inaudible]. The attack or the contact began more than 36 hours with the covering troops.

Tariq Aziz: The advancement of the British division was correct [i.e. succeeded] at the beginning of the attack. I told the ambassador, but he said, “No, these are just skirmishes.” Yesterday, the Jordanians―Hussein Bin Shaker―said this is the Western style of the ground attack [inaudible].

Saddam Hussein: Probing.

Tariq Aziz: The armors, weapons and [inaudible] before starting the attack.

Saddam Hussein: Hmm!

UM5: The attack started on the covering troops that continued―

Tariq Aziz: This is the same British Division in its location?

UM5: Yes, they drew out the British Division by testing it the day before yesterday.

Tariq Aziz: Yes.

UM5: However, it was the American division along with elements from the participating Egyptian division that started the attack on the 14th Division that is here.

Tariq Aziz: Egyptian?



7

UM5: Egyptian. It is also possible that the armored brigade did not arrive with the American-Egyptian division. It was the assessment of our people that it is an entire armored division, but our assessment is a division plus a brigade… an armored division plus a brigade. The division continued engaging where it had first seized one of the front regiments of the 83rd Brigade and then the 426th Brigade. Approximately two hours ago, they were able to seize most of the front positions of the front regiments. It is possible that in a short period of time the front positions of the division [inaudible]. They are trying to head toward Al-‘Abdaliyah because it is located on the [inaudible] road leading directly to Kuwait, and also so that they can be behind the 7th Division that is holding the northern wing of the division’s main axis. The 7th Division is still [inaudible]. They also launched an offensive on the covering troops of the 29th Division; they are still fighting but have not accomplished anything yet.

UM4: Where were the French? Were the French in Al-Msayyed?

UM5: The French were at Al-Msayyed which is located to the north of Hafr al-Baten; Al-Msayyed leads to Al-Nasiriyyah. I believe they want to strike the right wing of the Republican Guard troops, or to force the Republican Guard forces to come out in their direction so that the air force can strike the Republican Guard troops and eliminate them.

Saddam Hussein: The Republican Guard troops should come out today then and slaughter them if the air force is not efficient.

UM5: Yes, Sir. It is a little bit far, Sir.

Saddam Hussein: Far, yes; if it is far then no.

UM5: [Inaudible] in the day time. The 8th Division attacked the covering troops in Al-Ansar and they reached the Al-Shahid army. The armored brigade attacked the 18th Division located by the coast that is near and also leads them directly to Al-Ahmadi city. They seized the 3rd Regiment of our 95th Brigade, along with the covering troops pushed to the front more than four or five kilometers.

[Time stamp: 18:10]

Tariq Aziz: But it was not a big force!

[Overlapping voices.]

UM5: The 26th Division―

Saddam Hussein: What is the name of the American armored division?

UM5: I do not know exactly, Sir.



8

UM4: But they said it is at the battlefront of the…

UM5: It is at the―

Saddam Hussein: At the division front?

UM5: At the 14th Division’s front, Sir. Exactly across from the 14th Division, there is the 3rd Mechanized Egyptian Division, the 24th Mechanized Division, and the 1st American Division. One of them, Sir; I do not want to say which one if I am not sure.

Saddam Hussein: That is fine.

[An unidentified male mumbles in the back mentioning the Egyptian division.]

UM6: They were saying in the news―

UM5: The French…

UM6: There was an airdrop attempt to the south of Iraq, [inaudible] the palace and so on; I mean on Bobian and so on.

Saddam Hussein: They all have troops.

UM5: These are the two directions, Mr. [inaudible, in response to UM6]. The first direction is at the 26th Division toward Al-Qusayyer, while the other one toward Rabha. To the north of the 1st Division they have the 101st Division and the 82nd Paratrooper Division.


UM5: I mean I would like to point out, Sir, that one should pay attention to this situation, Sir. That is to say, we are moving the Republican Guards out of fear of this situation. As Your Excellency remembers, the last report, it was about taking precautionary measures regarding this sector, Sir.

Saddam Hussein: Which sector?

UM5: The sector that is in the direction of the [inaudible]. Although they are two limited attacks, Sir, or the beginning of two limited attacks in the direction of Al-Qusayyer and Salman, in the direction of Salman that leads to Al-Samawa. However, the main thing that makes it complete is the [inaudible]. The 101st Division and the 82nd Paratrooper Division have not yet moved from their positions. Therefore, their presence here, Sir, requires one’s attention to the left wing. In our last report, we suggested placing a reserve division by Karbala, for which Your Excellency had previously given guidance in this regard and yet we said it is a matter of deliberation. Therefore, Sir, we were reassured of Turkey yesterday [inaudible]. We have an armored Republican Guard



9

division that we keep as a precaution; meaning so that we will not be forced to move from the Kuwait region, Sir, an armored Republican Guard division or an armored division of the 7th Corps and let it fight with the air force.

[Time stamp: 21:10]

Saddam Hussein: They should not move. Where would they go?

UM4: So that they will not come.

Saddam Hussein: So that they will not come to the city?

UM5: We have the division in Turkey, about which Your Excellency reassured us that there is nothing to worry. We have an armored division, why don’t we bring it so that it becomes a self-acting force―

Saddam Hussein: I say let us lure them so that they will come… let them enter the city…

Tariq Aziz: Let them enter the city.

Saddam Hussein: So that it will turn into a cemetery for them.


Saddam Hussein: I did not want to play with our reserves while we were on the verge of a war, which is why I did not agree with the suggestion.

UM5: Excuse me, Sir, the thing that encouraged us to approach Your Excellency with the suggestion is because you previously told us, “Here, you have the division; you can move it whenever you want to in the direction of―”

Tariq Aziz: By God, I [inaudible].


UM5: That is the reason.

Saddam Hussein: Yes, since the attack has started now, let us keep our balance.

UM5: Yes, Sir.

UM4: But the French and the Egyptians―

Saddam Hussein: Because what caught my attention was the resignation of the new Minister of Defense.



10

Tariq Aziz: Who is he?

Saddam Hussein: The Turk. This means he asked us for the same thing. It means with the ground attack being imminent, he asked us to prepare the participation plans to engage us.

Tariq Aziz: No, we must not accept.

UM5: This is his nephew; the nephew of the Minister of Defense, Sir.

Saddam Hussein: And he resigned?

UM5: And he resigned.

Saddam Hussein: Yes, this means he is not convinced of his position.

Tariq Aziz: [Inaudible] Guzel.

Saddam Hussein: Guzel is a traitor and an agent like Hosni [Mubarak].

Tariq Aziz: He cut all relations with us.

UM5: No, if this should happen we would have no choice but to strike [inaudible].

Saddam Hussein: No, let them. To the contrary, let them come to Karbala city, and it will become their cemetery.

UM4: I believe it will have a [inaudible] benefit?

Tariq Aziz: It has a political benefit.

UM4: A political benefit and―

Tariq Aziz: I wish the people of Karbala [inaudible].

UM4: I mean [inaudible].

Tariq Aziz: An Islamic city―

Saddam Hussein: Even a military benefit. They will enter the city.

UM4: They will not be able to bear it.

Tariq Aziz: Until Iran joins them.

UM4: However, I believe the French will get something. They will not go back. [Inaudible] their regiments [inaudible].



11

UM5: Well, they attacked two combat groups. I believe they are two combat groups, and each group consists of 12 tanks but with heavy helicopters. Their force has helicopters, about 200-300 helicopters.

Saddam Hussein: To support the force.

UM5: And we are still working on the armor in the front, preparing them to fire at the helicopters that were firing at the troops from a distance.


UM7: Let them stay in front of us so that we can strike them.

UM5: We fear the movement of the troops in the front.

UM4: Yes.

Saddam Hussein: Let us say their air superiority limits our movements a bit.

UM5: In addition to this Sir, you know the situation of our units, thanks to Your Excellency. That is to say, it is a small possibility, but there are 30 kilometers between each brigade; it is a gap. Tariq Aziz: The important thing is that our units’ attack against that army be strong.

Saddam Hussein: By God, our units remain excellent.

UM5: At six o‘clock, they made an announcement saying, ―Since our assault, five hundred have surrendered,” [inaudible], just as I spoke with so and so, such as the Staff Brigadier General Abud from the force, he read me a correspondence, stating, “Until now,” meaning eleven-thirty, saying, “Until now, the army corps has been hit with more than five hundred artillery shells.”

Tariq Aziz: Now it is downgraded to a media and psychological war.

UM5: In addition, they began saying, “Sections of Iraqis began surrendering by the thousands.”

UM4: Yes, the media is dirty.

Saddam Hussein: What would they give―they would announce things they hope would occur or that they expect to occur.

UM5: This is what encourages them, Sir. They have a different picture than what they expected.

Saddam Hussein: I have said that before.

UM5: Through those who went to them; whoever goes talks like them.



12

Tariq Aziz: Whoever goes to them is a coward.

Saddam Hussein: Do you expect him to say other than what he wishes for others? [Laughing.]

Tariq Aziz: [Inaudible.]

[Time stamp: 25:50]

UM4: We are waiting for the weather to get better.

Saddam Hussein: This means their weather forecast is incorrect!

UM4: There are storms.

Tariq Aziz: Are there storms at the airport?


Tariq Aziz: Flights are not heavy over the airport.

UM5: It was very limited to the point where the 3rd Corps commander moved the tank battalion of his mechanized regiment to be behind the 14th Division and within the [inaudible].

Tariq Aziz: Sir, Bush rushed into the ground attack and [inaudible, voices overlapping].

Saddam Hussein: Because of the political position.

Tariq Aziz: They were in a rush. They did not expect us to agree [to the 22 February Soviet ceasefire proposal]. They thought we would put forth other conditions. So, when they realized that… Saddam Hussein: They expected us to disagree with the Soviets and it would then become a conflict between the Soviets and us, next, they would continue to—So that they could say “Now you see the other side of them!” Tariq Aziz: The statement you also issued―he wanted to play on your speech; even the Soviets, when I arrived in the airport, he said, “Did you hear the speech of the President [Saddam Hussein]? It was strong and tough. Is there any change? Are you here to say the same?” I said, “No, I have instructions from Mr. President, [inaudible] positive [inaudible], because Mr. President gave a tactical and enthusiastic speech for the Arabs and not the political front.” So, when I went, he gave me more details on the speech when we met with Gorbachev. They are―I don’t know about the Soviets, we have a position [inaudible]. When he tried―

Saddam Hussein: However, when I realized they were going to play around, I thought we must―



13

Tariq Aziz: Yes, Sir.

Saddam Hussein: Get the Command to issue a statement on our behalf.

Tariq Aziz: I did receive the statement and I called the [inaudible]. I said, “This is not just a statement, but also a statement with a confirmation on the [inaudible] of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, because there is no [inaudible]. It became a race against time, that is to say, we talked for hours―

Saddam Hussein: But the most important thing to me was to make sure there would not be any confusion.

Tariq Aziz: Yes.

Saddam Hussein: Regarding the Soviet initiative and our approval of it.

Tariq Aziz: There is not any confusion.

Saddam Hussein: So, the last thing is that, yesterday at 11:00, we issued a statement in the name of the Deputy Director of the Revolutionary Command Council attacking Bush, his devious methods, his stands against dealing with the Soviet initiative, his persistence in continuing the aggression, and that our troops are not going to be deceived by playing on words in this direction. Wasn’t the statement issued?

UM2: Yes, Sir.

Tariq Aziz: I held a press conference, Sir―

Saddam Hussein: And we emphasized in the statement our commitment to what Tariq agreed on.

Tariq Aziz: At 12:00, [inaudible], I delivered a very short statement before the international press and [inaudible], saying that the Soviet and Arab initiative is approved by the [inaudible], and read them its elements. I also denied Turkey’s allegations regarding the oil wells and this [inaudible]. The Revolutionary [Command] Council called for an investigating committee [inaudible].

Saddam Hussein: We did not deny it in the way that [inaudible].

Tariq Aziz: I denied it; I am the one who did it.


Tariq Aziz: I did this [inaudible].



14

Saddam Hussein: That is to say, let an investigation committee come and examine the locations being struck in Iraq and anywhere else, including other locations in Iraq and Kuwait. Tariq Aziz: I understood the language of the statement; however, I was forced to―

Saddam Hussein: In order for the committee to see which one of these locations was struck for military purposes and which one was struck for others.

Tariq Aziz: But I was able to handle the situation and said “These are American allegations and we hereby ask―

Saddam Hussein: They would not agree, because the committee would find out that all the targets were struck in Iraq for non-military reasons, while we struck the oil wells for military reasons and to cause obscurity [i.e. to darken the skies]. Tariq Aziz: They came out at night [to check] and said there were 200 wells.

Saddam Hussein: We set them all on fire.

[Time stamp: 31:00]

UM4: [Inaudible] it will become blacker. Once the rain stops the density will increase, because the rain is going to wash away the smoke. Aviation might continue to be a problem, which would work out to our advantage because their ground forces rely on their air force, Mr. President.

Saddam Hussein: Generally, we rely on our fighters, because of our experience in the eight straight years of war. Tariq Aziz: What we need to watch out for is the media.


UM4: Because even our front units and their commanders are not safe.

Saddam Hussein: But what is important here is that our artillery does not stop when the enemy’s troops infiltrate in depth. What used to happen to us before when we did not receive accurate information on the location of our troops and the enemy’s troops? Therefore, the enemy’s troops would continue bombing freely because no artillery was firing at them and confusing them. Therefore, any firing on the enemy’s troops, even in the direction of Al-Wafra, would exhaust them, even if it were the firing of artillery alone!

[Inaudible background talk, voices overlapping.]

Saddam Hussein: Now these troops that infiltrated and that broke through the defensive position and entered, the ones that were said to be trying to shift, are they under fire?



15

UM7: Lieutenant General Sultan told me that Lieutenant Salah was very satisfied with his arrangements; the same issue Your Excellency talked about.

Saddam Hussein: He is an experienced man, poised, and detailed.

UM7: He said a tank battalion and a mechanized regiment from the 8th Brigade would stay on the road. He told them from the beginning, Sir, there was a concentration on the 14th Division near Karbala, because it was in the direction of―therefore, he pushed the 8th Brigade [inaudible, Saddam is clearing his throat].

Tariq Aziz: This is the zone of the 3rd Corps in Al-Hasib.

Saddam Hussein: Huh?

UM7: So he pushed the tank battalion, Sir, directly to the positions behind the division and he said the artillery was active. I asked him about it several times and he said, “It is very active, free, and organized.” He brought more battalions to support the 14th Division. I said [inaudible, voices overlapping]. He replied, “No, there is no aviation.”

[Inaudible background talking, voices overlapping.]

Tariq Aziz: From Traibil to Baghdad and on the road to Jordan, we did not hear the noise of any aircraft.

UM8: From where?

Tariq Aziz: From the Jordanian borders to Baghdad―we were going 150, 140, and sometimes 180, but no―

UM4: Was it cloudy on your way?

Tariq Aziz: No, it was sunny.

Saddam Hussein: Nothing happened.

Tariq Aziz: Ours was sunny but the clouds were far away.

Saddam Hussein: Maybe over there [inaudible, voices overlapping].

UM8: Didn’t they destroy the road?

Tariq Aziz: We did not take the new road but rather the old one. No matter how much it is struck, even if it has one pothole, one can go around it because the road is not high, but low. The important thing is to see the pothole during the daytime.



16

Saddam Hussein: But it is dangerous at night and one can [inaudible].

Tariq Aziz: Sir, they have advised us now not to come, because I arrived in the afternoon and said we should leave at night. He said, “No, do not leave at night, because we now have the political correspondence group that knows the road; they know the last stop.” Therefore, we brought three of them who were going to accomplish a task. They became our guides and came with us in the same car. They were guiding us and pointed out the potholes for us so we would avoid them [Saddam talks aside with someone a low voice]. The road between Traibil and Rutbah, which is 120 kilometers, is in good condition and there is nothing.

UM4: No, I believe―

[Time stamp: 36:00]

Tariq Aziz: The rest has some interruption. But the old road is fine, we had a Mercedes and we were going an average of 140 kilometers.

Saddam Hussein: That was good.

Tariq Aziz: It took us less than five hours from the Iraqi side to Baghdad.

UM4: But Mudhar Badran was going 260 on the highway.

Saddam Hussein: 260?

Tariq Aziz: We were going 220 on the highway. Between Traibil and Rutba we were going 220.

[UM4 is talking in a low voice in the back, probably to Saddam.]

UM4: You can fly the helicopter at 180.

Tariq Aziz: The helicopter [laughing].

UM4: Helicopter [inaudible].

Tariq Aziz: What a road. It was excellent; this was the first time I took it.

UM4: We are talking about the highway here [inaudible].

Tariq Aziz: This road has three car lanes each way.

UM4: [Inaudible.] This is considered the best, longest, and fastest highway in a single country that runs from the south to the borders [inaudible]. It is continuous. It is possible to see a highway like this one between countries, but not within one country.



17

Tariq Aziz: Yes, but can the Jordanians complete this highway to reach Jordan?

UM4: Yes.

Tariq Aziz: I mean between Jordan and us.

UM4: We [inaudible] it supposedly they [the Jordanians] who would finish it and [inaudible].

Tariq Aziz: The road is destroyed. They brought me in the helicopter to Amman.

UM4: Mr. President, God help us today and tomorrow; these two days. Whoever comes today―

Saddam Hussein: God is gracious; God willing!

UM4: [Inaudible] we do not need him.

UM5: We do not need him.

UM4: Two days… we shall strike them with the artillery for two days.

UM5: Even today, Sir, if they [the enemy] do not accomplish anything―

Saddam Hussein: Even if they do not accomplish anything within 24 hours, they will get injured.

UM5: Do not expect anything from them. Sir, these initiatives―I mean our initiative and the Soviet initiative offer great moral support to our troops. I mean here is the group of―

Saddam Hussein: They started feeling that there is hope.

UM5: Yes, Sir.

Saddam Hussein: I mean there are changes that can possibly take place.

UM5: Excuse me, Sir, not only that, but the ranks were telling the officers, “Our Command did what it could” [voices overlapping].

Saddam Hussein: This is the public…

UM4: This is at the public level, Sir!


Saddam Hussein: People felt the same way.




18

Saddam Hussein: And not just within the military, but also among people.

UM4: Yesterday and the day before, every family I would see [inaudible].


UM4: [Inaudible] yesterday and the day before.

Saddam Hussein: Our people have become aware!

UM4: That is why I said our people have changed following the initiative, as well as the army, for sure.

Saddam Hussein: Triangles.

UM4: In addition to the other measures that took place in the last weeks, our army [inaudible].

Saddam Hussein: Did you not give cars?

UM4: No.

Saddam Hussein: Several cars, huh?

UM4: No, I did not. We just prepared them.


UM4: We still have two days, and once they arrive in the locations, [inaudible]. There is no problem, Mr. President, [inaudible] because the rest―out of 100 originally, [inaudible], the 600 or 700 he was going to bring, and the 300 are the ones we wanted to distribute. [Inaudible] there is nothing wrong with it.

[Time stamp: 40:15]

Tariq Aziz: Well, the transportation cars are not running great, but are still running despite the bombing―

UM4: Have we assigned drivers? The Jordanians [inaudible, laughing].

Tariq Aziz: Going back and forth.

UM4: Yes.

Tariq Aziz: I said―this Palestinian, Yasser ‘Abd Rabboh, said you see the driver holding a cigarette in his mouth and sitting [inaudible].



19

UM4: The Iraqis are really predatory animals, there are some good Jordanians, but they do not kill four! [Laughing.]

Saddam Hussein: Well, they are not experienced in combat.

UM4: Yes, but they are all heroes.


UM4: I mean here at the Jordanian-Iraqi Joint Transportation Company, I just sent them a driver [inaudible]. I mean they are civilized, Mr. President!

Saddam Hussein: Yes, yes.

UM4: The first time they told me [inaudible]. I said, “Why? [Inaudible].” Two drivers for each car. This driver is for the pick-up and that one [inaudible].

Saddam Hussein: Yes, helping him.

UM4: The truck driver?

Saddam Hussein: Yes, yes, and keep him company on the road.

UM4: No, we finished in 12 hours [inaudible].

UM7: [Inaudible] Abu-Usama.

UM5: [Inaudible.]

Tariq Aziz: Didn’t Abu-Usama tell you about the joke that happened over there? Abu-Usama arrived at night, and the next day I took him with me to Moscow and Peking.

Saddam Hussein: He told us. He said, “I was at what’s it called and then Tariq showed up…

Sa’dun Hammadi: No, he was sitting and then ―

Tariq Aziz: I was there before him and then Dr. Sa’doun came. Abu-Usama and I were sitting. I conferred with him and said [inaudible] [Dr. Sa’doun Hammadi laughs].

Sa’dun Hammadi: I said, “Give me the paper [inaudible].

Tariq Aziz: No, I said, “Hey boy, bring the paper. Where is the paper? You need to bring the paper now.”




20

[All laughing.]

Tariq Aziz: After that, [inaudible]. You told me and I believed you [all laughing].

UM7: And the one on China, you also told him about the one on China.

Tariq Aziz: No, I did not read the one on China because I know Abu-Usama [inaudible] the paper and sign it. I had Ziyad hand it over to him at night [Laughing].

UM4: He said he did not go [inaudible] today.

Tariq Aziz: No, I asked him, “How is Abu-Usama?” This man is a friend of his son. He replied, “it is all because of you, I told him goodnight, but he did not answer, the doctor. [Perhaps a reference to Dr. Sa’doun Hammadi].

[All laughing.]

Tariq Aziz: I said he has the right not to [inaudible].

Saddam Hussein: But this time he would not have answered you had you told him. You can back from China and the Soviet Union and you are still asking him what happened in the Soviet Union! Problems.

Tariq Aziz: We are done dealing with the Iranians this time.

Sa’dun Hammadi: Yes.

Tariq Aziz: The Iranians are courteous, which causes delays. I mean they do not accomplish work quickly and they delay people. All day―

Saddam Hussein: Like all new revolutions, they talk too much.


UM4: How about the president of [inaudible], watching TV and [inaudible]. Every meeting [inaudible].

Saddam Hussein: Is there any news? When the group discussion starts with everything [inaudible].

Tariq Aziz: They do not work, Sir. I have been talking a lot with the Iranians lately. I talked to them more than once.

UM4: [Inaudible.]



21

Tariq Aziz: This axis is still far, I mean in Hafr-al-Baten!

UM4: No, [inaudible], close.

Tariq Aziz: Huh?

UM4: [Inaudible.]


UM4: [Inaudible.]

Saddam Hussein: [Inaudible.] Where is the 54th Division?

UM5: The 45th, Sir… over there, Sir.

[Inaudible short conversation about the 45th Division.]

UM4: Well, if this is the way they will continue working―

Tariq Aziz: Do you think they are now―

Saddam Hussein: This is the 54th.

[Time stamp: 45:30]

UM5: The 54th is in the 1st Corps sector, Sir, the right wing, and the 45th is in the 7th Corps wing.

Sa’dun Hammadi: But the position?

UM5: The position, yes. This is the position, Sir, the French position, right?

UM4: Yes.

Tariq Aziz: The French [position] is here?

UM4: Yes.

Tariq Aziz: You mean not in this battle.

[All answer no.]

Tariq Aziz: Here are the Americans.

UM5: The Americans were at the 26th. They were the ones who came to [and attacked] the covering troops.



22

Tariq Aziz: Hmm.

UM5: The French also came and attacked the covering troops. However, they remained in the attack location.

Saddam Hussein: By God, by the troops!

UM5: By the troops. Yes, Sir.

[Inaudible short conversation.]

Saddam Hussein: With the artillery they want to [inaudible].

UM5: They continue in their attack, Sir.

Tariq Aziz: The French Division attacked Al-Dlayb Brigade and during their leave, they went to the market to have a French style haircut [inaudible] [All laughing].

[Inaudible short conversation.]

Tariq Aziz: This is new in Al-Basra?

UM5: In Basra, yes.

UM4: No, but it is on the old road.

UM5: This is Al-Nasiriyyah, Sir [inaudible].

UM4: [Inaudible.]

Saddam Hussein: From over there. [Inaudible short conversation] Where the [inaudible] Nasiriyyah do borders end?

UM5: Sir, Al-Shuyoukh market is here.


UM5: Go down. [Inaudible short conversation.] In the direction of… here is Al-Shuyoukh market, Sir, and this is Al-Nasiriyyah. Here is Al-Samawa. [Inaudible short conversation] after that, there is Al-Diwaniyyah. Here is Al-Najaf.


UM5: It was in the direction of Karbala, Sir.

Sa’dun Hammadi: Huh?



23

UM5: The Americans were in the direction of Karbala.

Saddam Hussein: Where?

UM5: This one, Sir, is in the direction of Al-Salman, I mean it leads to Al-Samawa. This is the 54th Division and this is Al-Samawa.

Saddam Hussein: [Inaudible] 54th?

UM5: This is the 53rd, Sir. I mean the 54th, Sir. The map is not clear. Focus on the axis, Sir, so that you can get the picture. Let us start with Al-Nasiriyyah. The 7th Corps that ends with the 45th Division, Sir. The wing of the 45th Division goes in the direction… I mean the 26th and 45th go in the direction of Al-Nasiriyyah. Therefore, Sir, any direction within this axis would mean the south; I mean it goes to Al-Nasiriyyah either after planning or… according to our analysis, even if it is exaggerated, [inaudible],however, we were predicting they would have to take this direction in order to go to Al-Nasiriyyah.

Saddam Hussein: On the road and [inaudible].

UM5: Yes, Sir, they would have to cross the entire southern sector, in order to strike the Republican Guard or Al-Qurneh.

Tariq Aziz: They have indicated this on the map, because it is easy to enter this way, isolate the troops, confine our line of communication, and conduct a Marine landing here to the north of Kuwait city, I mean the Bobian region and so on, and at the same time, they would control [inaudible].

UM4: [Inaudible.]

Tariq Aziz: No, it has been drawn, Sir, in [inaudible].

Saddam Hussein: I do not know if you remember, but I had my reservations even regarding the 1st Corps. I insisted on keeping it at the defense wing because we were exhausted and I wanted it to rescue our troops [inaudible].

[Time stamp: 51:02]

UM4: The airdrop, Abu-Ziyad [Tariq Aziz], has become a problem now.

Saddam Hussein: [Inaudible] all troops.


UM4: In addition, we made sure that the airdrop bases [inaudible].



24

UM5: Your Excellency, being over protective sometimes…

UM4: Only by airdropping…

UM5: Does not allow us to carry out the missions, [inaudible], Sir.


UM5: There will be exaggeration. I suggest to Your Excellency [inaudible, other people talking] that we take some of the Kuwaiti troops. I suggest controlling the three units we have by us so that we will not be affected by this big concentration.

Saddam Hussein: Because if it is from the direction of our wing [i.e., flank], our wing would become weak, and this would allow them to penetrate.

UM5: Excuse me, Sir, I did not mean from the direction of our wing, rather to increase the watch troops in Kuwait to avoid being surrounded, especially in the last stage, Sir.

Saddam Hussein: It is [inaudible] some time. However, this issue creates a problem for us. That is to say, you either stay by force or leave for good.

UM5: Yes.

Saddam Hussein: We cannot do it 50/50. Otherwise, we would stay there.

UM5: We are―

Tariq Aziz: No, thank God, it is good.

Sa’dun Hammadi: One last remark, Sir. You may still notice that the Americans came here to spread information, such as handing over this much and 1,200 while this allegation has no foundation. In addition, [inaudible], when we issue a statement, the first thing we should say is, “These are American troops,” if they were American. We should say it. We do not mind submitting an estimate, stating they had this many casualties and this many losses in materials. I mean we must say, this reaches [inaudible]”―

Tariq Aziz: [Inaudible] when he says―

Sa’dun Hammadi: But to say, “We stopped them and so on. Things in general…”

Tariq Aziz: When he says that we occupied Failaka, we must say, “Bring photographers and we will show them Failaka.”

Saddam Hussein: Why do we have to talk about specific matters here, bring [inaudible]!



25

Sa’dun Hammadi: The specifics of our losses, Sir―

Saddam Hussein: [Inaudible] How can we talk about the enemy’s losses without seeing them?

Tariq Aziz: If you allow me, Sir, I have a comment on this idea.


Tariq Aziz: In order to expose the American allegation, we should say that we did occupy Failaka. When we broadcast an announcement, we should say, “We challenge you. Bring photographers and let them see what is happening in Failaka.”

UM4: We should make a statement about it.

Tariq Aziz: Yes. “As for the prisoners, if you really say you captured 10,000 people, we challenge you to show them on TV,” because they prohibited…Sir, yesterday, Cheney ordered a stop of the media. If they come and say, “We have 10,000 prisoners; we challenge you and we will show them on TV. If you have journalists, [inaudible].”

UM5: [Inaudible.]

UM4: [Inaudible] the Minister of Defense?

Tariq Aziz: No, No, it was the [American] president’s order. Their president issued an order not to give any information at all. Even that last one, the one who gives the daily briefing at the Pentagon told me, “There will be no more briefings. From now on no more briefings because our lives are in jeopardy in [inaudible].”

Sa’dun Hammadi: He lied. If we―

Tariq Aziz: If they talk this way, we will challenge them and say―

Sa’dun Hammadi: If we do not issue information and neither do they, how is American public opinion going to count the losses?

Tariq Aziz: There will be lots of lies!

Sa’dun Hammadi: Therefore, [inaudible. From this point on, the quality of the audio rapidly deteriorates.]

Saddam Hussein: [Inaudible] noticeable statement.

Tariq Aziz: However, we should make an effort [inaudible, voices overlapping.]




26

[The rest of the audio is inaudible.] END OF RECORDING

Key: UM = Unidentified Male Speaker Translator …Conflict Records Research Center CRRC Record...

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