Keohane Nye Transnational Relations and World Politics a Conclusion International Organization 1971

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Transnational Relations and World Politics: A ConclusionAuthor(s): Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Robert O. KeohaneReviewed work(s):Source: International Organization, Vol. 25, No. 3, Transnational Relations and World Politics(Summer, 1971), pp. 721-748Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706066 .

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TransnationalelationsndWorldPolitics:

A Conclusion

JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., AND ROBERT 0. KEOHANE

\WORLDoliticss changing,ut ur onceptualara-digms avenotkept ace.Theclassic tate-centricaradigmssumeshatstatesre he nly ignificantctorsnworld oliticsnd hat heyct s units.Diverse omesticnterestsave ffectsn nternationaloliticsnly hrough

governmentaloreignolicy hannels.ntersocietalnteractionsrerelegatedtoa categoryf econdarymportance-theenvironment"f nterstateoli-tics.As KarlKaiser aspointedut, he ealityf nternationaloliticsasneverotallyorrespondedo hismodel. evertheless,hemodel as pproxi-matednthe ighteenthenturyhen oreignolicy ecisionsere aken ysmall roupsfpersonscting ithinnenvironmenthat as ess btrusiveand omplexhan he resentne.'Simplificationfrealitys essentialor nderstanding.skepticalcholar

ordiplomat ightdmithat he tate-centricodelmisses uchf he om-plexityf ransnationalelationsescribednthis olume,ut emightrguethatuch simplifications ustifiedecause) indirectonfrontationithtransnationalctorsovernmentsrevail,) transnationalelationsave l-ways xisted,nd3) transnationalelationso not ignificantlyffecthe"high olitics"f ecurity,tatus,rwar.We believehat hesebjectionsretoa large egree istakennd hat broader orldoliticsaradigmsnec-essaryf scholarsnd tatesmenreto understanduch urrentroblemss

the nequalistributionfpowerndvaluesntheworld,he ew ettingf1Karl Kaiser, Transnationale olitik:Zu einerTheorieder multinationalenolitik," olitischc iertel-jahresschrift,969 (Special Issue No. i), pp. 8o-Io9. An Englishtranslationf this mportantssaywillappear n International rganization, utumn 971 (Vol. 25, No. 4), forthcoming.

72I



722 INTERNATIONAL RGANIZATION

United tates oreignolicy,tatesmen'seelingsf "lossof control,"ndthenew typesnd tasks f nternationalrganization.

I. WHY CHANGEPARADIGMS?Beforelaboratingurworld olitics aradigmnddiscussinghese rob-

lemswe setforthurreasonsor ejectinghemajor rgumentsor he de-quacy f he tate-centricpproach.

"GovernmentsinDirectConfrontations"Whentransnationalelationsre discussed,hosewhowish opreservehe

limitedtate-centriciew re ikely o stresshepoint hat,n directonfron-

tations ith ransnationalctors,overnmentsenerallyrevail. obert ilpinargueshis oint nhisessay npart . It scertainlyruehat ationalovern-ments reoften bleto winsuch onfrontationsince hey avemuch reaterresourcesf force ndpopularegitimacy.he FordFoundationan be ex-pelledfrom foreignountryr disciplinedy theUnited tates ongress.A local Catholic ierarchyanbe cutoff rom ome.The assets fa multi-national usiness nterprise aybe nationalized,nd its effortso imposeretaliatoryanctions ay ome o no avail. BM andFordMotorCompanymaybe preventedrom nvestingntheUnionofSoviet ocialist epublics.Invading evolutionaryuerrillas-oruerrillasperatingrom base n anindependenttate-may e decimatedymilitaryorce. t a nonorganiza-tional evel ndividuals hose ttitudesecomeoo cosmopolitanecause ftransnationalontacts aybe deprivedfpoliticalffectivenessthome.

However,he uestionwhowins onfrontations?"s insufficient.tfocusesonly n the xtremeases fdirectonfrontationetween governmentnda nongovernmentalctor.Winningmaybe costly,venforgovernments.Transnationalelations ayhelpto ncreasehese ostsndthus ncreasehe

constraintsn state utonomy.xpelling foundationuts ff esourceshatmaybe vitalto certainmportantroups. s IvanVallierpoints ut,theRomanCatholichurchodays betterble than verbefore o transfere-sourcescross orders.venwhereccess srestricted,t remains significantpoliticalactor. ationalizationf the ocalassets f a multinationalusinessenterpriseayprove ostlyn termsfcapital, echnology,r marketsore-gone.Restrictionsn AmericanusinessnvolvementnEasternuropemaymean hat uchdealingsrehandledhroughuropeanubsidiariesnd thusaremore asilysolatedromheAmericanolitical rocess.t may lsomeanthat hemarkets left oEuropeanivals.2

2 There are currentlyeveralhundredointventures f privateWestern nd Communist usiness n-terprisesn EasternEurope."EuropeEconomic urvey,"New YorkTimes,January6, 1970, pp. 49-73;see also Marshall . Goldman,"The East Reaches forMarkets," oreignAfairs,July 969 (Vol. 47,No. 4), pp. 721-734.



TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS 723

Becauseof the rise in thecoststo nationalgovernmentsf "winning" ndirect onfrontationsithtransnationalctors here re more ncentivesorbargaining.More relevanthan"whowins" direct onfrontationsrethenewkindsof bargains,oalitions,nd alliances eingformed etween ransnational

actors nd between hese actors nd segments f governmentsnd interna-tional organizations.he essays n thisvolumeprovide wide varietyfex-amples: coalitionsbetweenthe Roman Catholicchurchand nation-states;new ecumenical lliancesbetween eligious roups; oalitions etweenocallyowned companies nd governmentso gain protectiongainstforeign om-panies; coalitions etween erticallyntegratedorporationsnd tradeunionsto ensure ontinuityf supplies; coalitions etweengovernmentnd unionsto influencer even helpoverthrow oreign overnments;oalitions etween

scientistso strengthenheir ositionn lobbying orresourcest home;coali-tionsbetween radeunionsto coordinate ressure n multinationalusinessenterprises;oalitions etween oreignntellectualsnd UnitedStates ounda-tions o protectocialscientistsgainst heirgovernments;oalitions etweenrevolutionaryroupsto strengthenheir egitimacyn their trugglesgainstgovernments.

There s considerablearietymongtheactors nvolved,heresourcesvail-able to them, nd the outcomes f their oalitions. or example, oycottsfcompanies nd individualsn the entertainmentorldbyArabgovernmentsare coordinated hroughregional ntergovernmentalrganizations.n oneinstance that involving he NorwichUnion Fire Insurance ocietyn theUnitedKingdom) a boycott roved ffectiven changing he eadership faBritish orporation.n other cases the costsof boycottwere too high,andgovernmentsid notenforce heagreed-uponanctions.3

RobertL. Thornton's ssayon air transport,o takea differentypeofac-tivity,llustrates variety f coalitions nd outcomes hatare suggested yfigure in theintroduction.n the I966 air corridorsontroversytransna-

tional ctor, he nternationalir Line PilotsAssociation,obbied uccessfullyto prevent n intergovernmentalrganization,he International ivil Avia-tion Organization ICAO), fromendorsing he position dvocatedby theUnitedStatesgovernment.n general henongovernmentalnternationalirTransport ssociation IATA), runbyan oligarchyf airlines,sfar trongerthanthe ntergovernmentalCAO inwhich ach statehas onevote nd minorgovernmentsan create bstructions.n somecases airlines avealignedwithgovernmentsor protectiongainst ther irlines r governments.s Thorn-ton describest, Pan AmericanWorld Airways nd Trans World Airlinestacitlypproved fan Alitaliapositionn the ATA that hwartedheUnitedStatesgovernment ositionon charter irlinefares.United Statesairlines

3RobertW. MacDonald,The League ofArab States:A Study n theDynamics f RegionalOrganiza-tion (Princeton, .J: Princeton niversity ress, 965), pp. II8-Is23.



724 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

couldnothave resistedheUnitedStatesgovernments well on their wn.In its rivalrywith Pan AmericanoverSouthPacific ir routesContinentalAir Linesis allegedly ttemptingoenlist he upport f an intergovernmental

organization-theUnited Nations TrusteeshipCouncil-to strengthentsposition. he complexityf thesecoalitionsn thepolitical truggle o allo-cate mportantesourcesn thefield fair transports not caughtby thestate-centric aradigm.Nor,we might dd, do nationalgovernmentslwayspre-vail.

A sophisticatednalysis f contemporarynternationalolitics annotgnorethis variety f bargaining ituations r the differencesn outcomes mongissueareas.The state-centriciew oftenfailsto forecast utcomes orrectly,and state-centricheoriesrenotverygood at explaininguchoutcomesven

whentheforecastsre correct.

"Transnational elationsHave AlwaysExisted"

RaymondAronwas among the first o introduceheconcept f "transna-tional ociety"nto nternationalelationsheory. e usedtheterm odescribecommercialnterchanges, igrationfpersons,ommonbeliefs, eremonials,and organizationshatcrossfrontiers.owever,he arrived t the skepticaljudgment hat transnationalociety s he defined twas relativelynimpor-

tant for understandingasic interactionsn world politics. n his words:"Before 9I4 economic xchanges hroughouturopeenjoyed freedomhatthegold standard nd monetaryonvertibilityafeguardedvenbetter hanlegislation.aborpartiesweregrouped nto an International.he Greektra-ditionoftheOlympicGameshad beenrevived. . religious,moral nd evenpoliticalbeliefswerefundamentallynalogouson either ide of thefrontiers.. . .This example,ikethe similar neof Hellenicsocietyn thefifthentuLry,illustratesherelativeutonomyf the nterstaterder-inpeaceand inwar-in relation o the context ftransnationalociety."4

Aron is certainlyorrectwhen he points o the existence f transnationalrelations efore9I4, as the essayby JamesA. Field,Jr., bundantlyndicates.Moregenerally,s OranYounghas observed,overthebulk ofrecorded is-toryman has organizedhimself orpoliticalpurposeon bases otherthanthosenow subsumed nder theconceptsstate' nd 'nation-state."'

Our contention,owever,s neitherhat ransnationalelationsrenewnorthat hey upersedenterstateolitics utthat hey ffectnterstateolitics yaltering he choicesopen to statesmennd thecoststhatmustbe bornefor

4Raymond Aron,Peace and War: A Theoryof International elations, rans.RichardHoward andAnnette akerFox (GardenCity,N.Y: Doubleday& Co., I966), p. I05.

5Oran R. Young,"The Actors n WorldPolitics," n The Analysis f Internationalolitics, d. JamesN. Rosenau, B. VincentDavis, and MauriceA. East (Glencoe, ll: Free Press,forthcoming);ee alsoAdda B. Bozeman, Politics nd Culture n International istory Princeton, .J: Princeton niversityPress, 960)o.



TRANSNATIONALELATIONSNDWORLD OLITICS 725

adoptingvariouscoursesof action. n short, ransnationalelations rovidedifferentetsof incentives,r payoffs,orstates. hese alteredpayoffs erenotsufficiento ensurepeace in I9I4 despite he hopesof menlikeNormanAngell,who argued n I9IO that thewealth, rosperity,nd well-beingfanationdepend in no way upon its politicalpower."6Nevertheless,WorldWar I by no meansrefuteshecontentionhattransnationalelationsnflu-ence interstateolitics; t merelywarnsus against he ncautious ssumptionthat transnationalelations enderwar impossible etween tates inkedbyextensiveransnationalies.

In anycase, the analogybetween 9I4 and I97I shouldnotbe taken tooseriously hendiscussingransnationalelationsnymorethan t shouldberegarded s thekeyto understandingreat-powerolitics. ransnational e-

lations oday ake differentorms han n I9I4, and in ourviewthecontem-poraryformshave greater olitical ignificancehanthepre-I94 versions.On theone hand,mutualsensitivityf societies as increased; n theotherhand, the growthof transnationalocial and economic organizations ascreatedpowerful nd dynamic ransnationalctorscapable of adaptingtochangeand of consciouslyttemptingo shapetheworldtotheirnterests.

SENSITIVITYOF SOCIETIES. he importancef transnationalelations ependslesson thesheer uantityf suchrelationshanon their olitical alience nd

the resultingensitivityf societieso one another. here are two majorrea-sons for thisincreased ensitivity.irst, mproved echnology as removedmanyof theimperfectionsf communicationshatonce helpedseparate o-cieties. econd,as we indicate n the introductionnd as Edward L. Morsesuggestsn his essay, givenvolumeof transnationalctivitymay,paradoxi-cally,have greater ffectsn interdependencehen governmentsre ambi-tiously ttemptingo control heireconomies han in situations f relativelaissezfaire.7 hus,Gilpin's ssertionhat the roleof thenation-staten eco-

nomic as well as in political ife s increasing"n no waycontradictsur as-sertion hat transnationalelations re becomingmore important. n thecontrary,t reinforcesur point. n the iberalnineteenth-centuryorldtrans-national ocietyemainedomewhateparate romnterstateolitics,uttodaythe resultof ambitious overnmentalolicies s that transnationalelationsaffect ntergovernmentalelations nd have themselves ecomepoliticized.New subjects nter herealmof internationalelations. s the May 1971 in-ternationalmonetaryrisismade clear,governments ustoften e concerned

6 NormanAngell,The Great llusion:A Studyof the Relation f Military ower n Nationsto TheirEconomic nd Social Advantage 3rd rev.and enl. ed.; New York: G. P. Putnam's ons, 9II), p. 34.

7RichardN. Cooper,The Economics f Interdependence:conomicPolicy n the AtlanticCommunity(AtlanticPolicy Series) (New York: McGraw-HillBook Co. [for the Council on Foreign Relations],I968); see also Andrew Shonfield,Modern Capitalism:The ChangingBalance of Public and PrivatePower (OxfordPaperbacks n International ffairs)London: OxfordUniversityress, 969), chapter .




withthe nternal conomic oliciesofothergovernments.8his is sometimesreferredo as the"domesticization"f internationalolitics. t mightbetterbe called the "internationalization"f domestic olitics.An importantesult

is that subunits fgovernmentsre provided reater pportunitiesor trans-national ontacts nd coalitions.Byfacilitatingheflow f deas modern ommunicationsave alsoincreased

intersocietalensitivity.ertainly herehave been indirect contagions" fideas in earlierperiods uch as the Europeanrevolutions f I848 or LatinAmericanuniversityeformsn 1917.Field refers o St. Petersburg,myrna,Nagasaki,and Canton as "windowson the West" for the transmissionfculturen an earlier ime.Today, however, elevision as created "windowon the West" in the livingrooms of theelitesof thethirdworld.Widely

separated lites,whether unctionallyimilar ocial groups, tudents,militaryofficers,r racial minorities,ecomemorerapidly ware of each other's ctivi-ties.9 eymourMartinLipsethas notedthat student ultures a highly om-municable ne, themood and mode of it translateeadily rom necenter oanother, ne countryo another."'0ndeed,althoughmany of the leadersofthe student isturbanceshat shookEuropein the late I96os wereawareofeach other's ctivities,heyfirst ame into direct ontactwhen British elevi-sion producers rought hemtogetherfter he events.1"

Not all the politicaleffectsf transnationalommunicationsre so dra-matic.The incrementalrowth, pread, nd changeof knowledge, octrines,and attitudeslter hecontextwithinwhichgovernmentsperate nd changethepayoffsvailable o them.While these deasand attitudesre often rans-mitted ytransnationalrganizations,hey re also transmittedy ndividualsthroughpersonaltravel and communication-subjecto the qualificationsmentioned n Donald P. Warwick's ssay.

TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. Not all types f transnationalrganizations

have increasedn importance. hose withexplicitly oliticalgoals seem tohavedeclined n importance.he close inksbetweenCommunist arties ndthe internationalrigades f the 1930Sfind only the palest of reflectionsntheHavana-basedTricontinentalr theexpeditionsfradical American tu-

8 For example, whenthe NixonAdministration,ithat leastone eye on the 1972 election,witchedsignals nd called foreasingthemoney upply nd loweringnterest ates o stimulate usiness nd em-ployment, he outflow f Eurodollars rom heUnited Stateswas set in motion, nd the stage was setfor monetaryrouble broad."New York Times,May I0, 1971, p. 52.

9"Hating the Pigs," The Economist,August 15, 1970 (Vol. 236, No. 6625), pp. I7-I8, gives anexampleof the similarityf phrasing f demandsby racialminoritiesn the UnitedKingdom nd the

UnitedStates.For a discussion f transnationalommunicationsffectingatterns f militaryoups orinsurrectionsee Samuel P. Huntington, d., Changing atterns f Military olitics Internationalear-book of PoliticalBehaviorResearch,Vol. 3) (Glencoe, ll: Free Press,1962), pp. 44-47.

10 SeymourMartin ipset, The PossiblePolitical ffects f StudentActivism," ocial Science nforma-tion,April I969 (Vol. 8, No. 2), p. 12.

"lAnthony Sampson,The New Europeans:A Guide to the Workings,nstitutionsnd Character fContemporary estern urope (London: Hodder and Stoughton,968), p. 419.




dents o cut ugar ane nCuba.As J.Bowyer ellpointsut, urrentevolu-tionaryuerrillaroups avea transnationalyth o sustainmorale ndlegitimacyatherhan transnationalrganizationo coordinateperations.RobertW. Cox shows hat similarrend wayfrom oliticalrganization

has occurredn abormovements.he nternationalonfederationshatggre-gated abor nterestst a very eneralevel ndengaged rimarilyn trans-national oliticaltrugglesave beenreplacedn prominenceythe nter-national rade ecretariatshich ggregate ore pecificconomicnterestsand organize o coordinateperationsgainstmultinationalusinessnter-prises. he greatereliancef theRomanCatholichurchnrecent earsnmoral nd humanitariannfluence,ather hanon political llianceswithgovernments,s consistentith his rendway rom xplicitoliticalctivity

by ransnationalrganizations.In contrasto politicalrganizations,owever,ransnationalrganizationswhose rincipaloals re social nd economicave ncreasednimportance.These organizations,f course,mayhavevery ignificantolitical onse-quences. yfar hemostmportantfthese rganizationss themultinationalbusinessnterprise.ultinationalnterprisesxisted t thebeginningf thiscenturyutona smallercale ndwithmuchess mportantffects."2oderncommunicationsechnologyasgreatlyncreasedhefeasibilityf mposinga centraltrategyn widely catteredubsidiariesnd consequentlyas in-creased he challengehatenterprisesresent o state overeignty.nlikethose f the Hudson'sBayCompany,he activitiesftoday'smultinationalbusinessnterprisesften onot oincide ith he ecision omainsfparticu-larstates. heir ffectsnworld rade nd productionanbe udged ythefact hat he productionfoverseasubsidiariesf the ten eading apital-exportingtateswas nearlywice hevolume ftrade etweenhose oun-tries."Raymond ernonndicateshat verseasubsidiariesay ccountorapproximately5 percentfworld roduction.inally,multinationalusiness

enterprisesavehadstrongffectsn otherransnationalctors.radeunions,banks,nd public elationsirms ave ll been urednto ncreasedransna-tional ctivityyfollowinghe ead ofthemultinationalusinessnterprise."4

ArnoldWolfersointedutover decade gothat he bilityf nterna-tionalnongovernmentalrganizationsto operates internationalr trans-nationalctorsmaybe traced o thefact hatmen dentifyhemselvesndtheirnterestsith orporateodies therhan henation-state."'5ransna-

12 See MiraWilkins,The Emergence f Multinationalnterprise: merican usinessAbroadfom theColonial Era to 1914 (Cambridge,Mass: HarvardUniversityress,1970).

;3RobertL. Heilbroner, The Multinational orporationnd the Nation-State," ew York Reviewof Books,February I, I97I (Vol. i6, No. 2), pp. 20-25.14 See the essaysby LawrenceKrause and RobertW. Cox in thisvolume;see also Herbert chiller,

"The Multinational orporation s Internationalommunicator"Paper delivered t theSixty-sixthn-nual Convention f the American olitical cienceAssociation, os Angeles, eptember970).

15Arnold Wolfers, iscordand Collaboration: ssays on Internationalolitics Baltimore,Md: JohnsHopkinsPress,962).




tional ctorshereforelourishhere ual oyaltiesreregardeds acceptable.In totalitarianocieties,nd nareas nwhich ne versionranotherf nte-gralnationalismas taken old, ual oyaltiesreregardeds treasonousndtransnationalorcess potentiallyorruptingnd dangerous.t is hardtoimagine goodSoviet itizen vowingoyaltyoGeneralMotors orpora-tion or a contemporaryhileannationalistdentifyingimself ithAna-condaCompanyr Kennecottopper orporation.

In themodernized estern orld nd itsancillaryreas he cceptabilityofmultipleoyaltiess taken or ranted.et, his olerationeems o be ex-tendedmore eadilywhenthetransnationalctor s explicitlyconomicnpurposehanwhen t is explicitlyolitical.hus, t seemsess ncompatibletobe loyal o both BM and France,oFIAT andtheUnited tates,r to

theRoman atholichurchndBelgiumhantdoes or loyal itizenftheUnitedKingdom o pledge llegianceo transnationalommunismr forAmericansoidentifyith srael.n theWest, herefore,ationalismroba-blyhindersvertoliticalrganizationcross oundaries ore hant hinderstransnationalconomicctivity.ual loyaltiesmaybe morefeasible henthefociofloyaltyeem o operaten differentreaswithdifferentoals."6Whenthecompetitions directlyolitical,he ndividuals often orcedochoose.

These remerepeculationsbout he easonsor

hemixed rendsntrans-

national rganizations,eflectingheriseof economicctorsn modernizedareasof theworld nd thedecline f transnationalolitical rganizations.Whateverhe reasons orthetrends,owever,he ncreasedcaleofsocialand economicrganizationsndtheirncreasedffectsnthepoliticalensi-tivityfsocietieso eachotheronstituten importantewaspect fworldpolitics.

"Transnationalelationso NotAf#ectighPolitics"

Distinctionsetweenigh nd owpoliticsreofdiminishingalue ncur-rentworld olitics.tanley offmannas describedhis ituationith use-fulmetaphor:The competitionetweentatesakes laceon severalhess-boardsn additiono thetraditional ilitarynddiplomaticnes:for n-stance,he hessboardsfworld rade,fworld inance,f aid and technicalassistance,fspaceresearchnd exploration,f militaryechnology,ndthechessboardfwhathas been alled informalenetration.'hesechessboardsdonot ntail he esorto force."'7offmannbserveshat ach chessboard"

16 According o Harold Guetzkow"multiple oyalties re quite admissible rovided he differentb-

jects are furnishingompatible olutions o differenteeds." Multiple oyalties:Theoretical pproach oa Problem n International rganizationPublicationNo. 4) (Princeton, .J: Centerfor Research nWorld Political nstitutions, oodrow Wilson Schoolof Public and Internationalffairs,rinceton ni-versity,955), p. 39.

17 StanleyHoffmann, International rganization nd the Internationalystem," nternational r-ganization,ummer970 (Vol. 24, No. 3), p. 401.




has rules f tsownbut s linked s wellto othersy complicatednd subtlerelations."igh and ow politics ecome ifficulto distinguish.hus, uringthe nternationalonetaryrisis fMay 971 itbecame lear hat nimplicitbargain ad been trucketween mericanndWestGerman tatesmenndcentral ankers ywhich hewillingnessfWestGerman uthoritiesoholdUnitedStatesdollarswas a condition or a largeUnitedStates rmynEurope.

Thisvolume asshown hat n a number fHoffmann'schessboards,"rissue reas, ransnationalelationsre extremelymportant.s sensitivityoother ocietiesncreases,ew subjects re broughtntothe realm fworldpolitics.ssue reas hatwere ormerlyuitedistinctrom oliticalalculationhave becomepoliticallyelevant,articularlynsofar s governmentsave

attemptedo extend heir ontrol verdomesticconomic ctivity ithoutsacrificinghe benefitsf transnationalntercourse.ince these ssue reasare often f great ignificanceo governments,hey annot e merelyis-missed s "low politics,"llegedlyubordinateo a "highpolitics" f status,security,r war. Butteromes efore uns nNew Zealand's iplomacy.

In these ssue reas, urthermore,orcemaybe neitherppropriateoref-fective.nsofars forces devalued or particularreaof nteraction,rans-national nteractionsnd the activitiesf transnationalelationsre likelyto be important-evenor France, he UnitedKingdom, nd the UnitedStates.

We find urselvesn a world hat emindss more ftheextensivendcurious hessboardn Lewis Carroll's hroughheLookingGlassthanofmore onventionalersionsf that ncient ame.The playersrenot lwayswhatthey eem, nd theterrain f the chessboards ay suddenlyhangefrom arden oshop o castle. hus, n contemporaryorld olitics ot llplayersn importanthessboardsre states,nd thevaryingerrainsfthechessboardsonstraintate ehavior.ome remore uitedo theuseofforce,

otherslmost otallynsuitedo t.Differenthessboardsavor ifferenttates.Forexample, elationsetween orway nd theUnited tatesrequitedif-ferentnshippinguestionshan n questionsnvolvingtrategicrms.Wheninternationalil prices re negotiated,ran s more mportanthan t is onworld rade ssuesngeneral. ighand owpolitics avebecome ightlyn-tertwined.

II. THE WORLD POLITICS PARADIGM

Although eusetheword paradigm"omewhatoosely, ewish omakeit clear hatwe seek ochallenge asic ssumptionshat nderliehe nalysisof nternationalelations,otmerelyo compile listof transnationalnter-actions nd organizations.or are ourconcerns erelycademic.Practicalmen,whobelieve hemselveso be quite xemptrom ny ntellectualnflu-




ences," re usually, s JohnMaynardKeynes once pointedout, unconsciouscaptivesof paradigms reatedby "some academic scribblerf a few yearsback."'"

In the ntroductione defineworldpolitics s politicalnteractionsetweenany "significantctors"whose characteristicsnclude autonomy, he controlof substantial esources elevant o a given ssue area, and participationnpolitical elationshipscross tate ines.Sincewe define olitics n terms ftheconscious mploymentf resources,both material nd symbolic,ncludingthe threat r exercise fpunishment,o induce other ctors o behavediffer-ently han theywould otherwise ehave," t is clear thatwe are positingconception fworld politics n whichthe central henomenons bargainingbetween varietyfautonomousr semiautonomousctors.

The differenceetween urworldpoliticsparadigm nd the state-centricparadigm an be clarifiedmost asilyby focusingn thenature f the actors.The worldpolitics aradigm ttemptso transcendhe"level-of-analysisrob-lem" bothby broadening he conception f actors o includetransnationalactorsand by conceptually reakingdown the "hard shell" of the nation-state."9

This can be illustratedya diagram hatcompares he range of actors n-cluded withinour world politicsparadigmwith that ncluded n the state-

centricmodel.Figure displays hecharacteristicsfactorsn world politics

Position

Governmental Intergovernmental Nongovernmental

A C E

Maximal States as International Transnationalcentral ontrol units organizations organizations

as units as units

B D F

Minimal Governmental Subunits f Subunits fcentral ontrol subunits international transnational

organizations organizations;also certainindividuals

A+ C = Actorsn the state-centricaradigmB + D = ActorsntransgovernmentalnteractionsE + F = Actorsn transnationalnteractions

FIGURE I. ACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS

18 JohnMaynardKeynes,The GeneralTheoryof Employmentnterest nd Money (London: Mac-millan& Co., 1957), p. 383.

19See J. David Singer,"The Level-of-Analysisroblem n International elations,"WorldPolitics,October 96i (Vol. 14, No. I), pp. 77-92.



TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS 73I

on two dimensions:) thedegree o which hey re governmentalrnon-governmentaln positionnd2) the xtento which heyonsist fcoherentand centrallyontrolledrganizationsather han ubunitsf governmentsor of transnationalrganizations.

The first imensionistinguishesctors ccordingo formalosition-gov-ernmental,ntergovernmental,r nongovernmental.t thereforeorrespondsto the "inverted " diagram n figures and of the ntroductionhichillustratesur concept f transnationalnteractions.s a firstpproximationwe found his asily erifiableistinctionusefulwayto dentifyertains-pects f world olitics hat re missed y the tate-centriciew.

As we also indicaten the ntroduction,owever,heres another imen-sionofworld olitics hat he lassic tate-centricaradigm ith ts ssump-

tion fstates s unitaryctors ails o take nto ccount.his second imen-sion, entralizationf control,nvolves herealizationhat ubunitsfgov-ernments ay also have distinctoreign olicieswhich re not all filteredthroughhetop eadershipnd which o notfit nto unitaryctormodel.Thus, cholars averecentlyeveloped "bureaucraticolitics pproach"oforeign olicy nalysis,xplainingecisionsf governmentsn these erms.20

Bureaucraticoliticss not imitedogovernmentsut can be applied onongovernmentalctors s well. Multinationalusinessnterprisesrefre-quently nable o act as unitaryctors,nd we haveseenthat heRomanCatholic hurch,heFordFoundation,uerrillamovements,nd organiza-tions fscientistsrehardlymonolithic.2"urthermore,ust sAmerican ili-tary fficersaynegotiate ith heir panish ounterpartsndCongressmanWilburMills withJapaneseextileompanies,o may ocal divisions f amultinationalusinessnterpriserof theRomanCatholichurchtrikear-gains nd form oalitions ithnational overnmentsr subunitshereof.22

The combinationfthese wodimensionsn figure portrays complexmodel fworldpoliticsnwhich he tate-centricaradigmocusesn only

two fthe ix ells.Another ay f llustratinghis ointsshown yfigure.The state-centricaradigmoversnly our fthe36 possibleypesfpoliti-cally mportantnteractionscross tate oundarieshat re dentifiedythe

20 See, especially, rahamT. Allison, ssenceof Decision: Explaining heCuban MissileCrisis Boston:Little,Brown nd Co., 1971); or, by the sameauthor, ConceptualModels nd the Cuban MissileCrisis,"American olitical cienceReview,September969 (Vol. 63, No. 3), pp. 689-7I8; and also Richard .Neustadt,Alliance Politics New York: ColumbiaUniversity ress, 970).

21 In his essay, "The Multinational orporation:Measuring he Consequences," obertB. Stobaughargues against mages of the multinational usiness nterprise as one economic ntity ontrolled yone 'economicman' in headquarters ather han of what the enterprise eally s: an organization f

numerous taff roups nd subsidiaries,ome of whichare large and powerful n their wn rights ndamong which considerable egotiation akes place." Columbia Journal f World Business,January-February 971 (Vol. 6, No. i), p. 62.

22For detailsabout the Spanish case see Robert0. Keohane, "The Big Influence f Small Allies,"Foreign olicy,pring971 (Vol. i, No. 2), pp. I6I-I82; on thepolitics ftextile uota egislationseetheNewYorkTimes,March6, I97I, p. 51.




world oliticsaradigm.hisgives san deaofthe ichnessfpossiblerans-nationaloalitionshat etermineutcomesn world oliticsnd that renowlargely elegatedo thesubsidiarynd largely ndifferentiatedategoryf

"environment."co co

U)o 1no o _ ) 0 I- U~~~~~~1

Actor~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0 t

izations~ ~ ~~~~~~~~. Conit

C I~~~C .-

0 CO co

E~~~~~~~~crnntoa coan TN CoN T N T

C CU~~~~c C~

Co ~~~~Co 0Eo~~~~c

F Subunits of ransna- TN TN N TN ,N I)TNalso certaTnndividuals

n 0O 0 w U-

Actor

A Statesas units Is TG is TG TN TN

B Governmental ubunits TG TG TG TG TN TN

C Internationalrgan- Is TG Is TG TN TNizations s units

D Subunits f nterna- TG TG TG TG TN TNtional organizations

E Transnational organ- TN TN TN TN TN TNizations as units

F Subunits f trarisna- TN TN TN TN TN TNtional rganizations;also certainndividuals

IS InterstatenteractionsTG = TransgovernmentalnteractionsTN = TransnationalnteractionsTG + TN = TransnationalelationsTG + TN + IS = World oliticsnteractions

FIGURE~. BILATERAL NTERACTIONSN WORLDPOLITICS

Adding he econd imension,entralizationfcontrol,llowsus tospec-

ifya

paradigmfworld

politicshat

brings ogetherraditionalnterna-

tionalpolitics,he bureaucraticoliticspproachoforeign olicy nalysis,and transnationalctors s definedn the ntroduction.et, talsoposes er-tain onceptualroblems.s definednthe ntroduction,ransnationalnter-actionsouldbe easilydentifiedythe nvolvementf nongovernmentalc-




tors.Thus, definition n the basis of formal osition-governmentalr non-governmental-led o a clear delineation etweentransnationalnd inter-state nteractions.his narrowed he issues nd omitted roblems f centralcontrol, ut it did achieve n initially seful implificationnd clarification.Unlike thatof formal osition, owever, he concept f centralizationf con-trol s a continuum-there an be moreor less central ontrol, nd lines thatare drawn will necessarily e somewhat rbitrary. ow, then,do we distin-guish various ypes fbehavior long thisdimension?

Our firsttep s to introduce newtype f nteractionn addition o "trans-national nteractions"nd "interstatenteractions"s definedn the ntroduc-tion.Transnationalnteractions ecessarilynvolvenongovernmentalctors,whereas nterstatenteractionsake place exclusivelyetween tates cting s

units. Transgovernmentalnteractions,owever, re defined s interactionsbetween overnmentalubunits cross tate oundaries. he broadterm rans-national relationsncludes both transnationalnd transgovernmentalnter-actions-all of worldpolitics hat s not taken nto ccount y the state-centricparadigm.

As we have definedworldpolitics, nyunitof actionthat ttemptso ex-ercise nfluence cross tateboundaries nd possesses ignificantesourcesna given ssue area is an actor n world politics. hus, thisconcept f trans-

nationalrelations alls attention o the activities f subunits f governmentsor intergovernmentalrganizations s well as to the behavior f individualsand nongovernmentalrganizations. et, we still need to specifywhen anactor s behaving as a unit" and when its subunits ossess ignificantu-tonomy.

On an abstract evelwe distinguish ransgovernmentalrom nterstaten-teractionsy theextent o which actors rebehaving n conformityo rolesspecified r reasonablympliedby theformal oreign olicy tructuref the

state. he problem fdiscovering eviationsrom ormally rescribedoles sdifficultnd sometimesmpossible ecauseof theambiguous pecificationfrole at high evelsofauthority. onetheless,uch deviationwas found mongEuropean agriculturalministersn theexamplecited n the ntroduction.tlower evels of authorityhetransgovernmentalehavior f those n formalgovernmentalositionssmucheasier o dentify,or xample, hecoalition fUnited States nd Canadianweather ureaus o overcome Department fState decision n control f international eteorologicalesearch.23he diffi-

culties fdelineation n thismurky rea of control re admittedly reat, utitwould hardly e sensible o promulgate supposedly new" paradigm orworldpoliticswithoutncluding eferenceo transgovernmentalolitics.

23 The example s from he essay by Edward Miles in this volume.Our inclusion f this second di-mensions due in largepart o hisarguments.




To explainthismorecomplexworld thestudy f worldpoliticsmustpro-ceedbytheanalysis fparticularssueareas and the relations etween hem.It musttake ntoaccount hedifferencesn thewaythegameof worldpoli-

tics s playedon Hoffmann's ifferenthessboardsr,to escapefrombipolarimagery, okertables.Who are theplayers?What aretheir esources?Whatare the rules?How do theplayers, esources,nd rulesdiffer romgametogame? Most important,ow are the differentamesrelated o each other?Are winnings nd resourcesransferable,nd, ifthey re,at whatdiscount?

A Plan forResearch

We aresuggestingn approach o the tudy f worldpolitics hroughnaly-sis ofdifferentypes f issue areas (whichwe define oosely, ollowing ox,

as unorganized rpartially rganized ystemsfinteraction)nd of therela-tionships etween hem.The elaborationfthisparadigm uggestshree ociforresearch:) analysis fissue reas, ) researchn transnationalnd trans-governmentalctors, nd 3) studiesdesigned o illuminate elationshipse-tweenssue reas.

First,we wouldwant to know thetypes f nteractionnd interdependencethatcharacterizeach issue area.We would further ant to know whatroletransnationalctors laywithin he ssue reaand howtheynteract ith ach

other ndwithcomponentsfgovernments. e would wantto know towhatextentgovernmentsor some governments) ct as centralized nitsor arecharacterizedy transgovernmentaloalitions.We would want to know howthesedifferencesavevariedovertime ndhow they ary n relation osuchfactors s salienceto the public, echnologicalhange, nd the number ndsymmetryf theactors.The essays n part II of thisvolumesuggest fewpreliminarynswers.

The essays n part I exemplifyhesecondresearch ocus.By studying he

internal rganizationf transnationalctorswe can shedlighton therolestheyplay.For example,not all tradeunionsare lured ntotransnationalc-tivity orare theeffectsfall multinationalusiness nterprisesimilar. othare affected y the natureof their nternal tructure. ox points out thatunionsorganized t theplant evelare more ikely o fight he corporationtransnationallynd to developan ideology f internationalism.nions morestronglyrganized t the national evel are more ikely o allywith the gov-ernment nd evidencestrongfeelings f nationalism. ouis T. Wells, Jr.,shows hatmultinational anufacturingnterprisesre more ikely o weakena government'sontrol f economicmatters f the firm s organizedon aproduct asis. t wouldbe interestingo know,forexample,how theadverseeffectslleged by PeterB. Evansvary ccording o differencesn the nternalorganizationf the transnationalctor.




Similarly, urther esearch houldbe focused n theprocess f formulationof "private oreign olicies."The Roman Catholicchurchhas very xplicitprocedures. he Ford Foundation, s described y PeterD. Bell, seemsdelib-erately o shunsuch questions. et,they re unavoidable.At what point, orexample,does a transnationalrganizationwithdraw rom country? oesa foundation ehavemore ike a church r more ike a bank? How areprivateforeign olicydecisionsmade?24

The thirdmajorresearch ocuswould explore helinkagesbetween ssueareas. Here theessayby Gilpin is very uggestive. ilpin arguesforthepri-macyofthe securityssuearea and suggests hat n the postwar eriodtherewere explicitbargains, etween he United States nd the Federal Republicof Germany West Germany)and between he UnitedStates nd Japan, y

which securityesourceswere exchanged ortrade nd financial enefits. eargues urtherhat hanging onditionsmayundo these argains nd adverse-ly affect ransnationalctivity. ne problemwithGilpin's rgument, owever,is that any situation f reciprocal dvantage an, often ncorrectly,e inter-preted s a result f bargaining; ne might hen nfer hat f one set ofbene-fits s altered, he otherwill likewise hange.Butin the absenceof clearhis-torical vidence bouttheperceptionsnd actions fdecisionmakershe nfer-ence that conscious argainwas madeand maintained ver periodof timeis not necessarilyalid. There is a danger here of interpretinghe pasttoomuch n terms fthepresent:UnitedStates ecisionmakersn the 950S weremuch less concerned bout America's nternational inancialposition hanthey re in 1971.Thus,even fbargainswerestruck etween heUnitedStatesandWestGermanynd the UnitedStates nd Japan,t s not clearthat hesebargains nvolved n interplayf issue areas.They can also be interpretedsolely n terms f mutual ecurity:heexchange fbasesor assured ccesstoa forward osition n return or protection. ince then economic lementshavebecomemore mportant. inally, ven fJapan n particulars now re-

ceiving conomic dvantages hat annot ontinue ecausepolitical onditionshavechanged, t does notnecessarilyollow hat he contradiction ill be re-solved n the direction frestrictionsn transnationalnteractions.t mightalso be resolvedwithin he economic ssue area by increasinglypening heJapanese conomy o Americanbusiness-that s, by an extension f trans-nationalrelations. et, regardless f the validity f Gilpin's conclusions, isapproach raisescrucial questions hat are ignoredwhen analysts ragment

24 Transnationalctors, ike governments, ay be unable tomake decisions ue to bureaucraticolitics.

CharlesP. Kindlebergerites a major oil company hatwas unable to reconcile he opposingviewsofits subunits n regard o oil imports nto the United States nd thus had no position n thisseeminglyvital ssue. See his essay, European Integrationnd the International orporation,"n WorldBusiness:Promise nd Problems, d. Courtney . Brown Studies of the ModernCorporation) New York: Mac-millan Co., 1970), p. 105; see also, by Kindleberger,ower and Money: The Economics f InternationalPolitics nd the Politicsof Internationalconomics New York: Basic Books, Publishers,970), p. 13.




reality nto "strategic"nd "economic" ectorsnd deal onlywithone or theother.

Thus,our third esearch ocus, ndGilpin's ssay, oint ocrucial uestions

ofworld politics.What bargains re struck cross ssueareas? How fungibleare resourcesn a given ssuearea-how easily ransferablerethey oanotherpoker table?Does dominancen the securityrea provide statewith ever-age in another rea in which t may be weak? To whatextent re all issueareas politicized, nd to what extent an some of thembe insulated rompolitical competition? nswersto such questionswould shed lighton theelusive oncept f"power" nworldpolitics. f thepokergamesare notclose-ly interconnectednd resources re onlyfungible t a discount, ow useful sa concept uch as power, esting s it does on theanalogywithmoney n an

economic ystem?In summary, e believe hattheessays n thisvolume upport urconten-

tion that the state-centricaradigm provides n inadequatebasis for thestudy fchangingworldpolitics. ransnationalctors ometimesrevail vergovernments.hese "losses" by governmentsan oftenbe attributedo therising ostsof unilateral overnmentalction n the faceof transnationale-lations.For a state-centricheory his s representeds "environment." utit is theoreticallynadequateto use the exogenousvariables f the environ-

ment to accountfor outcomes n the interaction f various ctors n worldpolitics. tate-centricheories re not verygood at explaining uch outcomesbecause hey o not describe hecomplex atterns f coalitions etween iffer-ent types f actorsdescribed n the essays.We hope thatour "world politicsparadigm"willhelptoredirectttentionoward he ubstancef nternationalpolitics,n which the major theoreticals well as practical uestions an befound,and away from the relatively nenlighteningpplication f subtlereasoning r sophisticated ethodologyo problems hathave been narrowlydefined y a limited heoretical utlookor the wrongunitsof analysis. er-

hapsfor while we have had enough omputer-assistedoting nalyses f theUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly xceptfor the routine escriptive urposeofkeepingup with recent rends.We may even have a sufficiencyf macro-historical tudiesof "bipolarity" nd "multipolarity"hat focus entirely nthestrategicevelofinteraction.he "worldpolitics aradigm" oesnotpro-videscholarswith n instant evelation,ut t does provide hemwith t leastonepath oward elevance.

III. ASYMMETRY AND THE ALLOCATION OF VALUES

Broadening hescope of internationalolitics eyond he state-centriciewprovides clearerunderstandingf and base forfurtherhought bout oneof themost mportanttructural roblems f currentworld politics-the x-




tremelysymmetricelationsetweentates.We havebeen truckythe ackof seriousheorizingbout his spect f nternationalelations.his s attrib-utable t least n part o theprevalencef the tate-centriciew.The myth

ofstate overeigntynd the mphasisn securityssuesmake heworld eemless mbalancedhan t is. The popularityurrentlynjoyed y a varietyftheoriesf imperialisms one result f this acuum.n the ntroductioneexplain urreasonsorbelievinghat heword imperialism"bscures orethan t enlightens.onetheless,heproblem f asymmetricelationshatunderliesheoriesf mperialismsboth eal and mportant.

Transnationalctivitysvery nequallyistributed.ensitivityo ts mpactvaries reatly. ultinationalusinessnterprises,oundations,rganizationsofscientists,nternationalrade nion ecretariats-allavetheir riginsn

advancedWesternountries. jell Skjelsbaek's ataon the distributionfinternationalongovernmentalrganizationshows hatn I966, 53.5percentofall national epresentationsame rom astern urope nd 5 percentromCommunist sia.Moreover,8.7percent f theheadquartersf all interna-tional rganizationsere ocatedn thedeveloped orthwest.ataon trans-national ctivityy ndividualsasshown similar atternf distribution-greater articipationy ndividualsrom evelopedWesterntates.25

Several actorsccount or hisuneven istribution.mong hemostm-

portanteem obe: i) modernization,) decreasedosts f ransportationndcommunication,nd3) pluralisticdeology. kjelsbaekrgues hat hespe-cializationhat ccompanies odernityreatesn increasingumber f dis-crete nterestsith capacityoorganize irst ationallynd later ransna-tionally. he increasedconomicpecializationf advanced ountrieseadsthem o become ach other's esttrading artners.he simple atternfindustrialountriesradingmanufacturesor aw materialsrom oor oun-tries asbeengreatlymodified.radebetween evelopedmarket conomycountriesccountsor pproximatelyne-halffworld rade, hile he hare

of essdevelopedountriesand ofraw materials) asbeendeclining.26Several ssaysn this olume iscuss he ffectsf decreasedransportation

and communicationsosts.Advancesn communicationsechnologyaveplayed major ole nfacilitatinghedevelopmentf a centraltrategyormultinationalusinessnterprises.awrence rause rgues hat apid om-municationsavegreatlyncreasedhe ensitivityfmoneymarketso eachother, point einforcedythe nflux falmost2billion oWestGermanyina fewdays uringMay 97I. While hese evelopmentsncommunications

technologylso affectessdevelopedountries,hey enerallyouch nlysmall lite ndpenetratehese ocietiesessdeeply.25 RobertCooley Angell,Peace on the March:TransnationalarticipationNew Perspectivesn Politi-

cal Science,No. i9) (New York:Van NostrandReinholdCo., I969).26 Michael Zammat Cutajar and Alison Franks,The Less Developed Countries n World Trade: A

Reference andbook (London: OverseasDevelopment nstitute,967); see also Shonfield.




Not only does the economic nd social structuref the developedmarketeconomy ountriesmake them the locus of transnationalctivity,heirpre-vailingpluralisticdeology rovidesmuch more egitimacyorsuchactivities

than is available n Communist ountries r in many ess developed tates.Moreover,s Cox illustrates,ransnationalctors endtodevelop deologies ftransnationalismoadd to their egitimacy,husreinforcingheir ositionsnareasofstrength.t is now stylishor orporationso be "multinational."

If transnationalismas becomethe deology f someoftherich,national-ism remains he deology fmany fthepoor. n many fthenewstates rans-national rocessesre (or seemtobe) remnantsfcolonialrule.Politics ftenrevolves round nationalists' ffortso diminish ransnationalies. Transna-tional ctors riginatingn richcountriesrevulnerableo charges f illegiti-

macy. n many ess developed ountriesnsecure olitical litesturnto na-tionalist deologies n an efforto integrater distract opulationswhichareundergoing ocial mobilization t rates oo fast or heir nstitutionso handle.In these ircumstancest is not surprisingofindresentmentf transnationalactors hat eem to threaten n already haky enseof sovereign ontrol. heability o tolerate public "defeat"by a transnationalctor is smaller nBolivia han nBelgium.

We arenotarguing hattransnationalctors lwaysweakengovernmental

controln lessdeveloped ountries. n thecontrary,hesuperior erformanceof multinationalusiness nterprisesn payingtaxesand increasing xportsor theactivitiesfPlannedParenthood r theFord Foundationn thefield fbirth ontrolmayactuallyncrease overnmentalapacities. or arewe argu-ing that ll elites n lessdeveloped ountries esist ransnationalelations.n-deed, governmentallites are oftenhappy to have their ountries ain theresources f capital, echnology,nd markets hatmultinational usiness n-terprisesan provide. ocal tradeunion elites re often appy o gain the or-ganizational esourcesrovided y nternationalnions.Local universitylites

are frequently leasedto gain the material nd moral support f the FordFoundationwhich diminishes heirvulnerabilityo control y theirgovern-ments. he local Catholic lergy s oftenwilling o have the support f addi-tional esourcesromRome.

The trouble ies in the gap between lites and masses n less developedcountries. he increasedmutual ensitivityf societies hat s created ytrans-nationalrelations ouches nlya tinyproportion f the population.As elitesare absorbed nto a transnationaletwork, he gap between lites nd masses

is increased nd intolerable olitical ensionsmay be created.Transnationaltradeunionactivitymay create grossly verrewardedlabor aristocracy"ttheexpenseof thewelfare f peasants.One effect f multinational usinessenterprisesr American oundationsmay be the reinforcementf a local sal-ary structureeared to the world economy ather han to local social condi-




tions.This in turnwould meana grossly nequitable lass structure.xperi-mentationwith altered ncentivess curtailed y the threat f brain drainsincemobile ndividuals an escapethecountry.he creation f a single lobal

economy s rational, erhaps, o achieve ptimal llocation f globalresources,but it is also a severe imitationn national utonomy. he transnationallymobile re rewarded t theexpense f thenationallymmobile.

As Cox observesn his essay, Historically,he geographicallyased powerof the statehas been the onlypower capable of counterbalancingnequalforces n the interest f welfare.... A Canadian-typeolution of opennessto transnationalorces]maybe feasiblewheremostofthe population artici-pates in the transnationalociety. t is, however,ikely o raiseconsiderabletensionsn countriesn whichthere s a sulbstantialopulationmarginal o

or outside he transnationalocietynd in whichthere re greatdisparitiesnincomes nd life-styleshichmaybe furtherxaggeratedy a continuationftransnationalelations."2

IV. UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

The issuesraisedby transnationalelationsre relevant o all countries,rat leastto all modernizedWestern ountries. et, as we indicate n the ntro-

duction, ransnationalhenomena aise specific nd unique problems or heUnited States.From a transnational erspectivehe UnitedStates s byfarthepreponderantociety n theworld.

United Statespreponderancen transnationalctivities as its origins nAmericanpatterns f social organizationnd the American style" s wellas in the size and modernityf its economy.As Field points ut,Americansin thenineteenthentury ere active ransnationalists,venwhen theUnitedStateswas by no meanspredominantn the world.Now, the size of theUnitedStatesmeans that ts argest ocialunits,ncluding omecorporations,

foundations,nd universities,ften aveannualbudgets reaterhanthose fthe governmentsf thecountriesn whichtheyoperate. urthermore,s aresultof thismodernity merican conomic echniques re oftenmore ad-vancedthan thoseof countries n which UnitedStates-based ransnationalactors escend.Thus,by virtue otonlyof sizebutalsooftechnologicalead-ership, heUnitedStates s somewhatessvulnerable o the effectsf trans-nationalrelations hanare other ocieties.28

This situation aises mportantssuesforUnitedStates oreign olicy. irst,

it meansthat he term neo-isolationism"s highlymisleading henwe think27 Cox, n thisvolume, . 584.28 See KennethN. Waltz, "The Mythof National nterdependence,"he International orporation:

A Symposium,d. Charles P. KindlebergerCambridge,Mass: M.I.T. Press, 970), pp. 205-223; andRaymond . Vernon, Internationalnvestmentnd Internationalrade in theProductCycle,"Quarterlyjournalof Economics,May 966 (Vol. 8o,No. 2), pp. I90-207.




in transnationalather hanstate-centricerms.AlthoughUnited Statesgov-ernment oreign olicy may be turningnward, hesame is notnecessarilytrue fthe private oreign olicies f tstransnationalctors. hus,an analogy

to the 930S is inappropriate.econd, tmeans thatthe preponderantize ofthe UnitedStates s one of the majorproblems f contemporaryorld poli-tics. From a state-centricerspective he UnitedStates seems highlycon-strained ythe structuref world politics, lthough nalysts aveoften ver-stressed he constraintsnd underemphasized nited Statesfreedom f ac-tion. Yet,from he perspectivef transnationalelations he UnitedStatesoften eems o have toomuch freedom f action-whethern exportingnfla-tion to Europe or unwittinglyndertaking he "Coca-Colonization"f theworld. t would be difficulto arguethat he UnitedStates s too constrained

intransnationalelations.UnitedStatespolicytowardthe thirdworld looks particularlyifferent

when viewed in transnationalerspectivehan it does when conceived nterms f the state-centricodel. Futureproblemsn UnitedStatesrelationswith less developed ountrieswill increasinglyevolve round theactivitiesof UnitedStates-based ransnationalctorsrather han around thecold-warand anticolonialssues fthe past. n many ases t maybe extremelyifficultto avoid the collisioncourse that Vernonforesees. he interests f United

States-basedransnationalctors re often ncompatible ith the nterests-ofgovernmentshatdesire omaintain rextend ational olitical ontrol. nlyif the Americangovernments able to disengage tself omewhat rom heinterests f United States-based usiness nterprises,nd only if Americanstatesmenre willing omake short-termacrificesf nterest, ill itbe possi-ble forthe UnitedStates o play a creative ole n these onflicts.

If Evans werecorrect bout the limitationslaced on national utonomyand economicdevelopmenty the activitiesf multinationalorporations,complete isengagementf theUnitedStatesfrom he thirdworldmightbe

beneficial.n ourview,however,uch a complete isengagementouldprob-ablynot produce utonomous ationaldevelopmentn most poor countriesbutwould involvehighcostsbothforthese ountries nd to some extent orthe United States.We believe, herefore,hat UnitedStatesforeign olicyshould attempto assist oorcountries o control, hoosebetween, nd profitfrom ransnationalctors.n some situationsomplete isengagement aybenecessary;n others, moreactivepolicymay have greater enefitsorbothparties. nsofar s possible, s we indicaten sectionVI of this ssay, oopera-

tion nhelpingess developed ountriesontrol ransnationalncursionshouldbe soughtfromotherdeveloped tates hrough ntergovernmentalrganiza-tions.

"For a dissenting iew see KennethN. Waltz, "International tructure, ationalForce, and theBalance of World Power," ournal of Internationalffairs,967 (Vol. 21, No. 2), pp. 215-23I.




Yet, ftheUnited tates asbeenpredominantn transnationalelations,it doesnot dominatell the ssuesn whicht is interested,orcan thopetoremains immunerom he ffectsf transnationalhangesnthefutureas it has n theyears inceWorldWar I. Vernon ointsut hat ulturalat-ternsnd antitrustegislationroduce more rm's-lengthelationshipe-tween overnmentndbusinessn the United tates han s true fotherdeveloped ountries,ndAmericanusinesseaders ave recentlyegun ocomplainbout his spectffreenterprise.30ernonlso rgueshatAmeri-can laborhasbeenoneofthefewclear osersnwelfareermsat least nthe short un) as a result fthe hift fproductionbroad. dwardMilesshowshat heUnited tatess ess redominantn the cean ssue rea hannouter pace. horntonotes hat heUnited tates oesnot lwayswin n the

IATA. Krausepoints utthat lthough heUnited tates s lessvulnerablethan therountrieso ossof controlnthemonetaryield,t s still ulner-able osome xtent,nd tno onger asthe ower nilaterallyomake olicyinthis ield s it oncedid.

If we looktoward hefuture,t s apparenthatAmericanominance illbe furtheriminished.his snot ikelyobe welcomed y heUnited tatesgovernmentor, s Vallier rgues, country hichperceivesenefitsromitscurrentositionn transnationaletworksillbe likelyoattemptopre-serve he ystem-a ew andsubtle orm,omemightrgue,f mperialism.Yet,EuropeanountriesndJapanregenerating ore ransnationalctorsof their wn, ftenwithmore irect overnmentalupporthan sprovidedin theUnited tates.3'omepeople rgue hat heUnited tateswillhave ocopewith hese hallenges-byncreasingovernmentalupportorUnitedStates-based ultinationalusiness,s some ndustrialistsesire,y erectinghigherariffarriers,rbyothermeasures.inceneithertatismorprotec-tionisms likely o be attractiveo mostAmericaneaders,necan expectattemptsofind ther olutions,erhapsy negotiatinghangesn thepoli-

ciesof"Japan,ncorporated"r CommonMarket ountries.n any ventheoutcome ill be onlypartiallyeterminedyAmerican olicies,nd the f-fortsf other overnmentsillbe equallymportantnshapinghefuture.

The growthf transnationalelationslso raises number fimportantquestionsbout hemanagementfUnited tates oreignolicy.World oli-ticshasbecomemore omplex. neresponseo thishasbeen n increasenthemachineryfformalntergovernmentaliplomacy.n I914 theUnited

30 For example,William H. Moore,chairman f the board of BankersTrustCompany,was recentlyquoted to have said that "the governmentnd the private ector, or the good of theUnitedStates, re

going to have to join hands n manyprojects."New YorkTimes, July 3, 1971, pp. 43, 45. Whenbusi-nessmagazinesdiscuss Japan's xport ctivities,he same theme-the need for more active cooperationbetweenbusiness nd governmentn the United States-is often tressed.

31 Stephen Hymer and Robert Rowthorn, Multinational orporations nd International ligopoly:The Non-American hallenge," n Kindleberger; ee also Louis Kraar, "How the JapaneseMountThatExport litz," ortune,eptember970 (Vol.82, No. 3), pp. i26-131, 170. 172.




Stateswasrepresentednonly enforeignapitals.n I970 it wasrepresentedby117embassies,inemissionso internationalrganizations,7consulates-general,6 consulates,our pecial ffices,nd nine onsulargencies. t the

same ime, owever,he ncreasedensitivityfsocietiesnd the nternation-alization f domesticolitics ave edto a situationn which very abinetdepartmentndfifteenf3I principalgencies utsideheCabinet avere-sponsibilitiesequiringctionsbeyond ational orders.n someembassiesDepartmentf State ersonnelccount or s littles 20 percentf the otal.In London n theearly 96os,44 distinctederal ureaucraciesererepre-sentedn theUnited tates mbassy,lthoughn Moscow where ransna-tionalrelations ere very imited) he embassyeflected ore raditionalformsfdiplomacy.82

Increasedontact etweenubunitsf differentovernmentsoth hroughbilateraliplomacyndrepresentationn multilateralrganizationsnhancesthe ikelihoodftransgovernmentaloalitionsnd makes entral ontrol fforeign olicymoredifficult.he situations evenfurtheromplicatedyprivate oreignolicies hat nteract ithpublic nes.On issuesnvolvingoceanresources,or xample,tis easy o magine coalitionetweennter-national il companies,ome lementsn thePentagon,ertainureaucraticunits f theDepartmentf the nterior,nd some egmentsf other overn-

ments acingn opposingoalitionetweennternationalcientificrganiza-tions, heDepartmentf State, ther lementsftheDepartmentfthe n-teriornd the Departmentf Defense,nd certain oreignovernmentalunits. uchsituationsaise erious uestions ot ust about hedemocraticcontrolfforeignolicy ut bout ny ontrolfforeignolicy.

V. Loss OF CONTROL

The increasedomplexityescribedn our worldpolitics aradigm elpsus understandhe seeming aradox hat tatesmenn a countrys prepon-derantnworld oliticss theUnited tates ftenomplain bout "lossofcontrol''ver heirnternationaloliticalnvironment.eople n governmentoften laim hat hey pendmost f theirime ust ryingo find utwhat shappening,nd somehavebeenheard o question hether coherentor-eignpolicys possiblena period frapid, isorientinghange. s we arguein the ntroduction,owever,o speakof a "lossof control"s somewhatmisleading.tates avenever een nfull ontrolf their xternalelations,

32 Henry M. Wriston,Diplomacy n a Democracy New York: Harper& Brothers, 956), p. 26;Ellis Briggs,"AmericanDiplomacy-The Pelican in the Wilderness," oreign ServiceJournal,March1971 (Vol. 48, No. 3), pp. 38-40; see also John ranklinCampbell, he ForeignAffairsudgeFactory(New York: Basic Books,Publishers,971). For these itations nd statistics e are indebted o a semi-narpaperprepared t Harvard UniversityorJosephNye by G. RobertDickerman f the UnitedStatesInformationgency USIA).




quite apartfrom he mpactof transnationalelations.n 1914, forexample,the structuref the nterstatealanceof power everelyonstrainedtatesmen.Today thecomplexityf bureaucracyn modernwelfare tates nd theweak-ness of institutionsn many ess developedcountrieslso contributeo thestatesman'senseof lossof control. inally, he mpactoftransnationalela-tionscreates "control ap" between heaspirationsorcontrol veran ex-pandedrangeofmattersnd thecapabilityo achieve t.The problems nota loss of legal sovereigntyut a loss of political nd economic utonomy.Moststates etain ontrol vertheir olicy nstrumentsnd areable topursuetheirobjectives. hey are just lessable to achieve hem.33

It seems learfrom hese ssays hat his ossof controlsnotuniformor lltypes f stateobjectives. overnmentsometimesct as loosely elated oali-

tions of bureaucracies,ut theyalso have central xecutive nd legislativeorganswhichtry o integratehesecoalitionsntoa coherentwhole.Whenthesecentralpoliticalorgansare successful,he unitarymodel of statebe-haviorbecomes fairapproximationf reality,nd we wouldexpect o finda lesser olefor ransgovernmentalnteractionsr for ransnationalelationsngeneral. t seemsthatcentralgovernmentalontrol endsto be strongernmattersfsecurityhan n issues f economicwelfare; he"myth" fnationalsecurityemains n importantesource f executive ontrol,nd chief xecu-

tives re ikely ospend largeproportionf their ime n securityssues. ut,

as GrahamT. Allisonhas shown, ven n this reabureaucraciesompete ointerprethemyth.34t is in thenature fbureaucraciesoresist olicyntegra-tion that sacrificeshe nterestf their pecialdomainsfor thesakeof someallegedlymoregeneral nterest.hus,a lack ofdefinitionf whatconstitutes''security"may ead tobureaucraticragmentationven n this rea.

As Evanspoints ut, omegovernments aybe as concernedbout ossofcontrol ver ultural utonomynd national dentitys they reaboutdifficul-ties n assuring heir ecurity gainst rmedattack. ome countries,uchas

Burma,havebeenable to isolate hemselvesrom ransnationaletworks,utat considerable conomiccost; other countries ave attemptedmore selec-tively o limit he mpact r freedom f actionoftransnationalrganizationsand transnationalommunication.or less developed tates hesepolicies repolitically ttractiveut difficulto carryout effectively.ontrollingrans-nationalcommunicationmaybecomemore difficulthendirect atellite-to-home broadcasting ecomesfeasible, nd, as multinational opperand oilfirms evelopgreater esourcesn politicallytable reas, herewards fna-

tionalization aydecline.`533 We are indebtedfor this point to Richard Cooper, "Economic.nterdependencen the I970'S,"

World olitics, orthcoming.34 Allison,Essence of Decision; or Allison,American oliticalScienceReview,Vol. 63, No. 3.35 For an interestingiscussion f the perils as well as benefits f nationalizationee TheodoreH.

Moran, "The Multinational orporation ersus the EconomicNationalist: ndependencend Domina-tion n Raw Materials," oreignPolicy,December 97I, forthcoming.




The sense f oss ofcontrols probably ost cute, t least mong evel-opedcountries,nregardo welfarebjectives.n part his eflectshe xpan-sionofthetasks f governmentnresponseopopular ressure.s govern-

mentseekto extendontrolver heir wnsocieties,hey ecomencreas-

inglydependentn transnationalorcesmpingingn them rom utsidetheir oundaries.spirationsor ncreasedomesticontrolroadenhe angeof relevantssues tthe ransnationalevel, hus omplicatingheproblemfcontrollingheexternalnvironment.omplexityndfrustrationnforeignaffairsreamong he onsequencesfthemodernapitalistelfaretate.

While he ange frelevantssues t the ransnationalevelhasbeengreatlybroadenedythe ntroductionf thewelfaretate,echnologyas ncreasedthemobilityffactorsnd the ensitivityfmarkets,ndsocieties,oonean-

other. dvancesn transportationndcommunicationsechnologyredestroy-ingthe ragmentationfmarketshatsa necessaryonditionor utonomousnationalolicies. orse, rause, vans, ernon,nd othersrovideumerousexamplesf ossofcontroln thewelfarerea, argelys a resultftechno-logical ndorganizationalhange.

Facedwith his ituation,overnmentshat reunwillingo take passivepositionave hreemajor olicyptions:) They anattempto restorerag-mentationf marketshroughnilateralefensiveolicies,lthoughhismay

invite etaliationndeventuallyrove armfulothewelfareftheiritizens;2) they anfollowggressiveoliciesfextraterritorialxtensionf nationallawstocovermobile actors,utthismay lsobreed esentmentndcostlyretaliation;) they an adopt ooperativeoliciesnvolvingoint oordina-tion fpolicy hroughnternationalnstitutions.36

For most tatesooperativeolicies aveobviousdvantages:onflictanbe reduced y oint ction ndpolicies oordinatedor ptimal esults.et,asKaiser ointsut nhisessay,hismay eadto anotherind f oss fcon-trolnwhichegislaturesndother emocraticallyesponsibleodies ontinue

to ose nfluenceobureaucratsndtechnocrats.nceagain he lose inkagebetween omesticnd internationalolitics ecomeslear, nd thedangersas well as theopportunitiesf such nterconnectionsecomemorereadilyapparent.

Cooperativeolicies fresponseo transnationalelations ay trengthentiesof interdependencerhelpcreate ew internationalrganizations,utthey o notnecessarilyo either.tatesmaydecide, or xample,o amendthe rulesof an existingnstitutionike theInternationalonetaryund

(IMF) tocreatereaterxchangeate lexibility,opingoweaken hemutualsensitivityhroughhebalance-of-paymentsechanismndtorestore cer-taindegree f"fragmentation."henet ffect aybea reductionffriction

36 Cooper, WorldPolitics, orthcoming.n addition, ooper suggests n exploitativer parasitic olicyoption,for example, ax havensand flags f convenience,pen to a few small countries.




by restrictingnterdependence.his wouldbe a jointdefensiveolicy atherthan unilateralne.Morefrequently,owever,ooperativections likelyto create ew internationalnstitutionso cope with ncreasingnterdepen-dence. hisbrings s to ourfinal oncern-theew tasks hat ransnationalrelationsreate or nternationalrganizations.

VI. TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Increasesn the mportancef transnationalelationssually eflecthetwindynamicorces f advancingechnologyndorganizationalophistica-tion.Large organizationsuch as multinationalusiness nterprisesrofitfrom ew technologynd helpgeneratevengreaterechnologicaldvances;

theiruccessestimulateompetitorsndother hreatenedrganizationsntotransnationalctions a means fprotectingheirnterests.et, ransnationalrelationsnd the dvanceshat romotehem ftenmpose ignificantxter-nal costs n interestroups r governmentshat annot e controlledithoutjoint nternationalction.By and large,however, overnmentsnd secre-tariats f intergovernmentalrganizationsavebeen lowto respondo thischallenge.

Recent evelopmentsn ocean echnologyndthe awofthe eaillustratethis oint. sMiles bserves,n ess han decade he upposedaturalimitsto nationalurisdictionssumed ythe 958 UnitedNations onferencenthe Law ofthe Sea wererapidly ushed utward y corporationsngagedin underseaxploration.he UnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyas beenable to agree hat he eabed hould e the ommon eritagefmankindutunable oagree n where hat eritageegins. he exploitationnd develop-mentof modern echnologyy transnationalrganizationsavethereforecreated ifficultolitical roblemshatmay exceed he capacitiesf inter-governmentalrganizationso find niversallycceptableolutions.

Transnationalrganizationsre alsopartiallyesponsibleorproblemsfpollutionndwastage f natural esourceshichwillbe the ubjectf theUnitedNations onferencentheHumanEnvironmentn I972.Moredra-matically,ransnationaluerrilla roupshaveaccentuatedroblemsf airsafety y spectacularijackingsf airplanes.n quieterways,networksfscientistsave collaboratednpressingor ntergovernmentalooperationnscience olicies,nd United tates-basedoundationsavetaken he ead nsensitivereas uch s birthontrol.he most ignificantransnationalhal-lenge o nternationalrganizationsrises,fcourse,rommultinationalusi-nessenterprises.ernon uggests numberf ways o reduce rictionhatwill dependon coordinationf national conomic olicies hroughnter-nationalnstitutions,nd Cox mentionshat he nternationalaborOrgani-zation ILO) isbeginningo take ccountfthe mportancefmultinational




business. aul Goldberg nd CharlesKindleberger ave elsewhere uggestedthepossibilityf a "GATT" to monitormultinational usiness nterprises."7

A largerquestion,however, hattransnationalelations ose for nterna-tionalorganizationss the problem f asymmetry.cience nd technology,sused by transnationalrganizations,re having ambivalentffectsn worldeconomic nterdependencen the I970s-linking richcountries nd reducingtheir nvolvementsith poor countries. hus,theNorth-Southleavagemaybe widenedrather hanbridged y the ncreasingmportancef transnationalrelations.

Such asymmetriesre boundto lead to resentments,articularlyn thepartof countries hat trive o develop n indigenousmodern dentity.heseprob-lemsare particularlycuteforthose ountriesn which only a small partof

the population enefitsrom ransnationalelations. esentmentsfthetrans-national nteractionshat mpingeon local culture nd of the narrow litesthat benefit romtheseprocessesmay lead to internal trifend increasingself-isolationy poorcountries. ne might oncludefrom he essaybyEvansthat such a periodof isolation nd separationwould be beneficial. nly inthis way, one might rgue,will the thirdworld achievenew societieswitheconomic ndcultural utonomy.

Isolationwould,however, ave costs s well as benefits. hese costswouldincludenot only theloss of the potential enefitsf capitaland technologybutalso thegreater angerthatdeveloped ountries ould turn ncreasinglyinward as well. Producersn richcountrieswould develop"safe" resources,forexample, hale oil and nuclear nergy,nd syntheticubstitutest highercosts.Then, following he classicpattern f producers revailing ver con-sumers n questionsof economicnationalism,ariffs nd protectiveuotaswould be erected roundthe WestEuropean nd Americanmarkets.38ncein place thesebarrierswould be hard to dismantle. uch a situation s notlikelyto be healthy or theobjectiveswhich theUnitedNations was estab-

lished o achieve.To the extent hat the UnitedNationsbecomes imply n arena for ha-

ranguesover intergovernmentalid and an administratorf technical ssis-tance,financial upport eceived romrich countrieswill recede to a levelsustained nly by a humanitarianonstituency.erhapswithgenerationalchangethis constituencyill grow.A more maginativetrategy ould beforthe UN todevelop apacities hatwould assist essdeveloped ountries odeal with transnationalelationsnd thusenablethem o avoid being caughtonthe aissezfaire rstatist-isolationistorns fthedilemmawe have ketched.

37Paul M. Goldberg nd CharlesP. Kindleberger,Toward a GATT for nvestment: ProposalforSupervision f the International orporation,"aw and Policy n Internationalusiness, ummer 970

(Vol. 2, No. 2), pp. 295-325.

38 See Harry G. Johnson, d., EconomicNationalism n Old and New States Comparative tudyofNew NationsSeries) (Chicago: Universityf ChicagoPress, 967).




Obviously,he UN cannotplay thisrole alone,but its secretariatould pro-vide leadershipn theestablishmentf impartialmonitoringf transnationalrelations,reation f tribunals o mediatedisputes, nd creation f a divest-mentfund to ease disengagement.

Kindleberger as arguedthatharmonizationfrulesforthe multinationalbusiness nterprisesnecessaryf the nstitutions goingto be effectivenpro-motingworld welfare.He has suggested conferencen the multinationalcorporationnder heauspices f theUN and thecreationf"an internationalagencywhichwouldcollect nformationn direct nvestmentn a systematicbasis,overall nd case by case, and would have power to prohibitn invest-ment thatsubstantiallyeducedcompetitionn a given commodity,venifboth governmentsonsented. . . " In addition, there houldbe an inter-

nationalOmbudsman,taffed y experts rom he smaller ountries,owhichcompanies ould appeal if theywerebeing unduly queezedby overlappingsovereigntyf two countries. . . it would be desirable ftheyboundthem-selves n advanceto adhereto itsdecision."40

The idea that theUnited Nationsshoulddevelop a capacity o monitor,mediate, nd establish ormsfor transnationalconomic ctivitiess an ex-cellent one. The idea of employing he tired old institutionf conferencediplomacys a mistake. iven thepolitical chisms ftoday'sworldtheclassic

modelofthediplomatic onference ith closely ssocialtedecretariatsboundto drivethe developed ountries o create shadow" nstitutionshere busi-ness can be done." The suggestionhat theUnited NationsConference nTrade and Development UNCTAD) developa capacity o oversee he ac-tionsof multinationalorporationss unlikely o be accepted ven by menofgoodwill n Washington. imilarly,many spects f inspectionnd moni-toring f governmentalehavior avebecome too difficultoliticallyor theUnitedNationsSecretariato handleby itself. he task of monitoringheproblems reated y transnationalconomic ctivitiesn the 970S would bestbe handled by institutionsnlyindirectly elated o theGeneral Assembly.The role of theassermblyand the reasonfor t least ome inkage) is todis-cuss,criticize,nd publicizedecisions eached n smaller nd less overtlyo-litical odies.4"

Transnational elations resent pportunitiess well as problems or n-ternationalrganizations.he hard shellofnational overeigntyppears essdaunting rom transnationalerspective.nternationalrganizationsrovide

'9 Charles P. Kindleberger, mericanBusiness Abroad: Six Lectures on Direct InvestmentNew

Haven, Conn:Yale Universityress,969), p. 207.40 Ibid.41One of theusefultasksundertakeny UNCTAD has been to study nd publicize heactivities f

the liner conferences-importantransnationalctors n ocean shipping. ee J. S. Nye, "UNCTAD," inThe Anatomy f Influence:Decision-Makingn International rganizations,d. RobertW. Cox andHarold K. Jacobson New Haven, Conn: Yale Universityress, orthcoming).




meetings nd myths hathelp foster nd legitimate ransnationalersonalcontacts nd transgovernmentaloalitions.Transnational nd transgovern-mental ctors an be seenas potentiallliesfor he secretariatsf nternationalorganizations. reater fforts ight e made to involve herepresentativesfnationaland internationalrivate ssociations irectly.42ore institutionalimaginationwill be neededin thefuture f governmentsnd internationalorganizationsre to copewiththe problems osedbytransnationalelationsand to avoid the classic internationalrganizationyndrome f designinginstitutionso fight he ast battle ather han to prevent he nextone.

VII. A FINAL WORD

This volumedoes notattemptoprovethat tates re obsolete.We do notcontend hat ransnationalelations illnecessarilyringworldpeaceorevenreducethe likelihood f certain ypes f conflict. ransnational elationsredependent n thepolitical elations etxveentates s well as vice versa, ndworldpeace in the futurewill surely ependnotonlyon theforms akenbytransnationalctivitiesut also on thecreativityhownby leadersof states,international rganizations,nd transnationalrganizationshemselves.

Although ransnationalelationsre notentirely ew,they rean important

partof worldpolitics,nd their mportance as been increasingnthe years

sinceWorldWar II. The essaysn thisvolume howwhywe believe hat hesimplificationsf the state-centricpproachdivert he attentionf scholarsand statesmen wayfrommany mportanturrent roblems nd distort heanalyses f others.We have suggested "worldpoliticsparadigm" hat n-cludestransnational,ransgovernmental,nd interstatenteractionsnthehopeof stimulating ew types f theory, esearch,nd approaches o policy.Wethink hat hese ssays,written ithin common rameworknd in responseto our specific uestions,llustrate hepotential tility four approach.The

authors osemanydifficultroblems, ut they lso attempto provide omesuggestions,fnot olutions.

We plead guilty, owever, o raisingfarmorequestions hanwe or ourauthors nswer.These questions re amenableto research rom normativeas well as an empirical ointof view. We hopethattheywill stimulate ewtypes fscholarlyesearch rojectsnd graduate heses. utthe questions renot simply academic."We alsohope that heywill stimulate ewpolicyper-spectivesn thepartofstatesmenn governmentsnd internationalrganiza-

tions. f thesenew perspectivesontributeogreater nderstandingf worldpolitics,whichmay indirectlyontributeo peace and justice, hen this m-perfect olumewill have succeeded.

Keohane Nye Transnational Relations and World Politics a Conclusion International Organization 1971

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