Ken Binmore [email protected] Origins of Fair Play.

35
Ken Binmore [email protected] Origins of Fair Play

Transcript of Ken Binmore [email protected] Origins of Fair Play.

Page 1: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

Ken Binmore

[email protected]

Origins ofFair Play

Page 2: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.
Page 3: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

John Mackie’s

Inventing Right and Wrong

Metaphysical moral philosophy

is unsound. Look instead at:

Anthropology

Game theory

Page 4: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

Social Contracts

No bosses

Fair division

The social contracts of pure hunter-gatherer societies have two universal properties:

Page 5: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

Pure hunter-gatherers

Page 6: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

Toy games

dove

hawk

Prisoners’Dilemma

dove

hawk

Stag Hunt

Adam’s strategies

Page 7: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

Toy games

Prisoners’Dilemma Stag Hunt

dove hawk dove hawk

Eve’s strategies

Page 8: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

Toy games

dove

hawk

Prisoners’Dilemma

dove

hawk

Stag Hunt

dove hawk dove hawk

Adam’s payoffs

2 0

3 1

4 0

3 2

Page 9: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

Toy games

dove

hawk

Prisoners’Dilemma

dove

hawk

Stag Hunt

dove hawk dove hawk

Eve’s payoffs

2 3

0 1

4 3

0 2

Page 10: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

Toy games

dove

hawk

Prisoners’Dilemma

dove

hawk

Stag Hunt

dove hawk dove hawk

2 3

0 1

4 3

0 2

2 0

3 1

4 0

3 2

Page 11: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

Nash Equilibria

dove

hawk

Prisoners’Dilemma

dove

hawk

Stag Hunt

dove hawk dove hawk

3

3

11

44

22

22

0

0

30

03

Page 12: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

Coordination Games

left

right

Driving Game

box

ball

Battle of the Sexes

left right box ball

11

11

12

21

0

0

00

00

0

0

Page 13: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

Reciprocal Altruism

indefinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma

2 3

0 12 0

3 1

2 3

0 12 0

3 1

2 3

0 1

2 0

3 1

2 3

0 1

2 0

3 1

2 3

0 1

2 0

3 1

Page 14: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

Reciprocal Altruism

d h

d

Grim strategy

h

2 3

0 12 0

3 1

2 3

0 12 0

3 1

2 3

0 1

2 0

3 1

2 3

0 1

2 0

3 1

2 3

0 1

2 0

3 1

Page 15: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

Reputation and Trust

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are needed to see this picture.Sure I trust him. You know the onesto trust in this business. The ones

who betray you, bye-bye.

Page 16: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

Vampire bats share blood on a reciprocal basis to insure each other against hunger.

Page 17: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

Folk Theorem

efficientequilibria

currentstatus quo

Eve’spayoff

Adam’spayoff

0

Page 18: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

Equilibrium selection

Fairness is evolution’s solution tothe equilibrium selection problem.

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Page 19: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

Equilibrium selection

Fairness is evolution’s solution tothe equilibrium selection problem.

Fairness therefore evolved as a means of balancing power---not as a substitute for power.

Page 20: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

Deep structure of fairness norms

As with language, fairness has adeep structure that is universal in the human species. This deep structure is embodied in Rawls’

original position

Page 21: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

John Rawls’ original position

Veil of ignorance

Comparison of welfare

Enforcement

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I might be Adam and Oskar might be Eve. Or Oskar might be Adam and I might be Eve

Original Position

Adam Eve

Oskar

John

Page 23: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

implicit insurancecontracts

deep structure of fairness?

implicit insurancecontracts

Page 24: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

implicit insurancecontracts

original position

deep structure of fairness?

original position

Page 25: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

implicit insurancecontracts

original position

utilitarianism egalitarianism

external enforcement

self-policing

Who is right?

Harsanyi Rawls

Page 26: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

Modern Equity Theory

What is fair … is what is proportional. AristotleEve

Adam0

status quo

slope is ratio of the players’ context-dependent social indices

Page 27: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

implicit insurancecontracts

original position

utilitarianism egalitarianism

external enforcement

self-policing

standard of

interpersonal comparison

cultural evolution

Page 28: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

.

..

0Adam’spayoff

Eve’spayoff

Utilitarianism and Egalitarianism

The slopes are determined by the standard of interpersonal comparison.

utilitarian outcome

egalitarian outcome

state of nature

Page 29: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

.

..

0Adam’spayoff

Eve’spayoff

Utilitarianism and Egalitarianism

The slopes are determined by the standard of interpersonal comparison.

utilitarian outcome

egalitarian outcome

Page 30: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

.

.

0Adam’spayoff

Eve’spayoff

Utilitarianism and Egalitarianism

The slopes are determined by the standard of interpersonal comparison.

utilitarian outcome

egalitarian outcome

Page 31: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

.

.

0

Utilitarianism and Egalitarianism

The slopes are determined by the standard of interpersonal comparison.

Nash bargaining solution

(x1 − ξ1)(x2 − ξ 2) = c

x1

x2

ξ

Page 32: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

.

.

0

Cultural Evolution: Egalitarian Case

medium-run past

Nash bargaining solution

x1

x2

ξ

.

short-run present

egalitarian solution

Page 33: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

Analogy with language

Chomsky discovered that all languages have a deep structure which is universal in the human species, but the particular language spoken in a society is determined by its cultural history.

Fairness norms similarly have a common deepstructure, but the standard of interpersonal comparison that is necessary as an input to theoriginal position is culturally determined.

Page 34: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

Moral relativism

• Need• Ability• Effort• Status

Social indices always respond to these parameters in the same way, but the degree of response varies with a society’s cultural history.

Page 35: Ken Binmore k.binmore@ucl.ac.uk Origins of Fair Play.

Reform?

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