Kegley chapter 8

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Chapter 8: Military Power and the Use of Force

Transcript of Kegley chapter 8

Page 1: Kegley chapter 8

Chapter 8: Military Power and the Use

of Force

Chapter 8: Military Power and the Use

of Force

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Copyright 2010 Cengage Learning

Elements of Power (1 of 3)

Power: the factors that enable one state to coerce another

Power potential: the relative capabilities of a state considered essential to asserting influence over others

Military capability Military expenditures Relative size of economy

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How U.S. Military Spending Stacks Up Against Its Primary Competitors

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Two Measures of Military Power Potential: State Wealth and Size of National Armies

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Elements of Power (2 of 3)

Population size Territorial size Geographic position Raw materials Dependence on foreign raw

materials Technological level and capacity National character

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Elements of Power (3 of 3)

Ideology Efficiency of government decision

making Industrial productivity Trade volume Savings and investment Education level National morals Internal solidarity

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The Changing Character of World Power

Decreased utility of military power Increased importance of technology,

education, and economic growth Military spending:

• Opportunity costs• Peace dividend• Relative burden of military spending• “Guns versus butter”

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Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP

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Defense versus Deterrence

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Defense/Deterrence Continuum

Pure Defense Mixed

Pure Deterrence

walls, land mines

most conventional weapons including ground troops, aircraft, navies, tanks

strategic nuclear weapons

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The Security Dilemma

Prisoner’s Dilemma

2,2 4,1

1,4 3,3

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cooperate defect

cooperate

defect

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Weapons Trade Spurred by Cold War Peaked in 1987 at $82 billion Middle East and Asia are major

recipients Middle East arms race: regional

rivalries United States is leading supplier

• Balance-of-trade deficits • Military-industrial complex

Blowback11

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Arms Deliveries to the Global North and the Global South, 1997–2004

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Weapons of Mass Destruction

Shifts emphasis from defense to deterrence

Began with the annihilation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

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Chemical and Biological Weapons

Growing threat Use by terrorists Prohibited by international law

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WMD and Crisis Stability

Kenneth Waltz argues that the proliferation of nuclear weapons will likely make the world more safe, not less.

Assumes: • Leaders are rational • Civilian leaders have effective control

over their militaries

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High- and Low-Tech Weapons

Precision guided munitions Improvised explosive device (IED)

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Arms Transfer Agreements Worldwide

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Nuclear Weapons in 2008

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United States 5521

Russia 5682

China 130

France 348

Great Britain 185

Israel 100–200

Pakistan 60

India 50

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Nuclear Weapons Nuclear proliferation is likely because the

expertise is widespread, export controls are ineffective, and the materials needed are widely available

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Nth country problem Horizontal nuclear proliferation Vertical nuclear proliferation Nuclear winter

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Nuclear-Weapon Armed Countries, Today and Tomorrow

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Technology and Weapons

MIRVs: Multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles

Firebreak Strategic weapons: Weapons of mass

destruction on ICBMs, SLBMs, long-range bombers

Nonlethal weapons: Incapacitate people, vehicles, communications systems

Smart bombs Biological and chemical weapons

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Compellence 1945–1962

Compellence: When U.S. was dominant nuclear power

Brinksmanship: John Foster Dulles threatened adversaries with nuclear war

Massive retaliation Countervalue targeting: Soviet industry

and population (as opposed to counterforce targeting of weapons)

Arms race

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Nuclear Weapons and the Cold War

Crisis Stability “The threat that leaves something to

chance.”

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Deterrence 1962–1991 Cuban Missile Crisis Requires second-strike capability Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) Nuclear Utilization Theory (NUTs):

advocated by some Americans; nuclear weapons could be used in a war

Strategic Defense Initiative: President Reagan’s “Star Wars”

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Preemption 1991–Present

Did nuclear weapons foster peace? The Bush Doctrine and preemptive

strikes• Preemptive war vs. Preventive war

Preemptive war and just war theory Asymmetrical warfare

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Coercive Diplomacy “An approach to bargaining between

states engaged in a crisis in which threats or the use of limited force are made to force an adversary to reach a compromise”

Ultimatums Gunboat diplomacy Military intervention

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Military Intervention Overt or covert use of force by one

or more states inside another state Covert operations: secret activities Can heighten tensions and lead to

war Nonintervention norm Intervention can be for moral for

humanitarian reasons Failed states

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The Changing Incidents Through Unilateral Military Intervention for Coercive Diplomatic Purposes Since 1945

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Conditions that Favor the Effective Use of Coercive Diplomacy

Clarity of user objectives. Asymmetry of motivation favoring

the user. Opponent’s fear of escalation and

belief in the urgency for compliance. Adequate domestic and international

support for the user. Clarity on the precise terms of

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Web Links (1 of 2)

Incore Institute for War and Peace Reportin

g International Crisis Group War, Peace, Security Guide Arms Sales Monitoring Project

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Web Links (2 of 2)

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists The Henry L. Stimson Center SIPRI Military Expenditure Country

Graphs

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