JAPANS FOREIGN POLICY, 1945-2003

JAPANS FOREIGN POLICY,1945-2003

The Quest for a Proactive Policy

by

KAZUHIKO TOGO

second edition

BRILLLEIDEN BOSTON

2005

This book was published with financial support fromthe International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS), Leiden, the Netherlands.

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CONTENTS

Glossary ...................................................................................... xiAcknowledgments ...................................................................... xvIntroduction ................................................................................ xviiMaps .......................................................................................... xxii

Prologue: From the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War1. From the Meiji Restoration to the

Japan-Russia War .............................................................. 12. WW I and the Washington Conference ........................ 93. From the Manchurian Incident to the War in the

Pacic ................................................................................ 20

Chapter One. After the War: New Values and thePeace Treaty1. The defeat and new values .............................................. 312. The American occupation ................................................ 353. The new constitution ........................................................ 384. Political reforms and economic recovery ........................ 435. The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty .......................... 466. Japanese security policy and the Japan-US Security

Treaty ................................................................................ 52

Chapter Two. The United States: Political and Security Relations1. The revision of the Security Treaty ................................ 552. The reversion of Okinawa .............................................. 643. Host Nations Support and Guidelines for Defence

Cooperation of 1978 ........................................................ 704. The Western Alliance under Nakasone and Reagan .... 745. The end of the Cold War and Japans Defeat in

the 1991 Gulf War .......................................................... 776. September Eleven and thereafter .................................... 857. The revision of the constitution ...................................... 86

vi contents

Chapter Three. The United States: EconomicRelations1. The situation until the end of the 1960s ...................... 872. Japan-US economic relations in the 1970s .................... 893. Japan-US economic relations in the 1980s .................... 954. Trade conicts from the end of the 1980s to the

beginning of the 1990s .................................................... 1035. Japan-US economic relations in the rst half of the

1990s .................................................................................. 1086. Japans economic situation at the turn of the century ........ 114

Chapter Four. China: Economic Development and Wounded Feelings1. Diplomatic relations with Taiwan and economic

relations with mainland China ........................................ 1192. Establishment of diplomatic relations with the Peoples

Republic of China ............................................................ 1243. The conclusion of the Treaty of Peace and

Friendship .......................................................................... 1314. Relationships over the 1980s .......................................... 1375. Relationships from the 1990s onwards .......................... 1466. Ways ahead ...................................................................... 155

Chapter Five. Korea: South Korean Relations Develop with Complexity, Will North Korean Relations Start?1. Establishment of diplomatic relations with South

Korea .................................................................................. 1572. The rst 30 years: economic relations developed

but political relations were troubled ................................ 1633. The turn of the century: from the Murayama

Statement to Prime Minister Koizumi ............................ 1694. The North Korean situation (until 2001) ...................... 1775. Japan-North Korea relations (until 2001) ...................... 1846. Prime Minister Koizumis visit to North Korea and

rising tension ...................................................................... 189

contents vii

Chapter Six. Asia and the Pacific: Expanding Relations from Bilateral to Multilateral1. Beginning of relations: war reparations and early

policy initiatives ................................................................ 1952. Strengthening the relationship: the Fukuda Doctrine

and the establishment of PECC ...................................... 1993. Development of the Asian economies and the creation

of APEC ............................................................................ 2054. Security cooperation after the Cold War: ARF and

NEACD .............................................................................. 2105. In search of new cooperation: ASEAN plus Three

and FTA ............................................................................ 2146. In the Eurasian continent: India and Silk Road

countries ............................................................................ 2197. To the Pacic: Australia and the Pacic Island

countries ............................................................................ 223

Chapter Seven. Russia: Territorial Disputes andStrengthening the Relationship1. The end of the Pacic War: beginning of the

disconnection ...................................................................... 2282. The San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 ...................... 2313. The Khrushchev period: the Joint Declaration of 1956

and the Memorandum of 1960 ...................................... 2334. The Brezhnev period: Detente and thereafter .............. 2385. Gorbachevs Perestroika: a new overture ........................ 2436. Yeltsins Russia: emergence of a new world .................. 2487. President Putin and future perspectives .......................... 256

Chapter Eight. Europe: Struggle for Relevance1. A prolonged postwar period (19451969) ...................... 2612. Trade conicts with Europe (19691991) ...................... 2643. A wide range of cooperation between Japan and

Europe during the 1990s ................................................ 2684. Asia-Europe cooperation .................................................. 2745. Wounded feelings from the Pacic War: Great Britain

and the Netherlands .......................................................... 2796. An action plan for EU-Japan cooperation .................... 285

viii contents

Chapter Nine. the Middle East: Oil Diplomacy and Issues of War and Peace1. Energy and oil diplomacy in Japan ................................ 2892. Relations with the Gulf countries and wars in the

Persian Gulf ...................................................................... 3003. Relations with the countries involved in the Middle

Eastern peace process ...................................................... 3114. New endeavours to enlarge the scope of foreign

policy .................................................................................. 313

Chapter Ten. Official Development Assistance:From Recipient to Donor Number One1. Japans Ocial Development Assistance (ODA) in

perspective .......................................................................... 3162. Postwar reconstruction and reparations .......................... 3183. Development in volume .................................................... 3214. Qualitative improvement of yen loans ............................ 3245. Regional diversication .................................................... 3256. Forms of ODA and international polemics .................... 3287. Conceptualization eorts of ODA .................................. 3328. Current problems and future perspectives ...................... 341

Chapter Eleven. Multilateral Economic Diplomacy:From Participant to Positive Contributor1. Postwar international economic organizations and

Japans accession ................................................................ 3442. Macroeconomic policy and international nancial

situation .............................................................................. 3483. International trade ............................................................ 3514. Economic assistance through multilateral organizations 3645. New agenda: global environment, population and

infectious diseases, and information technology .............. 368

Chapter Twelve. Multilateral Political Diplomacy:The United Nations and Peacekeeping Operations1. Joining the United Nations .............................................. 3732. The United Nations during the Cold War .................... 3753. After the Cold War: UN reforms and Japan ................ 3784. After the Cold War: multinational forces and

peacekeeping operations .................................................... 384

contents ix

5. September Eleven and Eastern Timor ............................ 3916. Japans participation in Iraq reconstruction and

further challenges .............................................................. 3967. New agenda: disarmament and non-proliferation,

conict prevention, and human security ........................ 399

Conclusion: Past Perspectives and Future Agendas1. Past perspectives ................................................................ 4032. Seven agendas for the future .......................................... 4153. Five unresolved issues from the past .............................. 4224. Epilogue: the ow of history and human eorts .......... 429

Bibliography ................................................................................ 433Appendices .................................................................................. 439Index .......................................................................................... 471

GLOSSARY

ABM Anti-Ballistic MissileADB Asian Development BankAECF Asia-Europe Cooperation FrameworkAMF Asian Monetary FundAPEC Asia-Pacic Economic CooperationARF ASEAN Regional ForumASEAN Association of Southeast Asian NationsASEAN-PMC ASEAN Post-Ministerial ConferenceASEM Asia-Europe MeetingB/D Barrels per DayBHN Basic Human NeedsCDF Comprehensive Development FrameworkCEP Comprehensive Economic PartnershipCIS Community of Independent StatesCOP Conference of Parties to the United Nations Frame-

work Convention on Climate ChangeCSCA Conference on Security and Cooperation in AsiaCSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in EuropeCTBT Comprehensive Test Ban TreatyDAC Development Assistance CommitteeDPRK Democratic Peoples Republic of KoreaEASR East Asian Strategic ReportEC European CommunityECAFE Economic Commission for Asia and the Far EastECSC European Coal and Steel CommunityEEC European Economic CommunityEROA Economic Rehabilitation in Occupied AreasEU European UnionEURATOM European Atomic CommunityEVSL Early Voluntary Sectoral LiberalizationFDI Foreign Direct InvestmentFSX Fighter-Support ExperimentalFTA Free Trade AgreementsGARIOA Government and Relief in Occupied AreasGATT General Agreement on Taris and Trade

xii glossary

GDP Gross Domestic ProductGHQ General HeadquartersGNP Gross National ProductGSP Generalized System of PreferencesHIPC Heavily Indebted Poor CountriesIAEA International Atomic Energy AgencyICRC International Committee of the Red CrossIDA International Development AssociationIEA International Energy AgencyIMF International Monetary FundIMTFE International Military Tribunal for the Far EastINF Intermediate-Range Nuclear ForcesINTERFET UN Sanctioned International Force in East TimorIT Information TechnologyITO International Trade OrganizationJBIC Japan Bank of International CooperationIBRD International Bank of Reconstruction and DevelopmentJDA Japan Defence AgencyJETRO Japan External Trade OrganizationJICA Japan International Cooperation AgencyJSDF Japan Self-Defence ForcesJSP Japan Socialist PartyKEDO Korean Peninsula Energy Development OrganizationKWP Korean Workers PartyLDC Least Developed CountriesLDP Liberal Democratic PartyLLDC Least among Less-Developed CountriesMAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and FisheriesMAPA Manila Action Plan for APECMETI Ministry of Economy, Trade and IndustryMFN Most-Favoured-NationMITI Ministry of International Trade and IndustryMOFA Ministry of Foreign AairsMOSS Market-Oriented, Sector-SelectiveMTCR Missile Technology Control RegimeNAFTA North American Free Trade AgreementNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNCND No Conrmation No DenialNDPO National Defence Program OutlineNEACD Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue

glossary xiii

NGO Non Governmental OrganizationsNIEs Newly Industrialized EconomiesNPCSD North Pacic Cooperative Security DialogueNPT Non Proliferation TreatyOAPEC Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting CountriesODA Ocial Development AssistanceOECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-

opmentOEEC Organization for European Economic CooperationOMA Orderly Market AgreementOPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting CountriesOPTAD Organization for Pacic Trade, Aid and DevelopmentOSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in EuropePAFTAD Pacic Trade and Development ConferencePBEC Pacic Basin Economic ConferencePECC Pacic Economic Cooperation ConferencePKO Peacekeeping OperationsPoW Prisoners of WarPPP Purchasing Power ParityPRC Peoples Republic of ChinaRC Republic of ChinaSACO Special Action Committee on Facilities and Areas

in OkinawaSALT Strategic Arms Limitation TalksSDF Self-Defence ForcesSDI Strategic Defence InitiativesSII Structural Impediment InitiativesTAC Treaty of Amity and CooperationTICAD Tokyo International Conference on African Develop-

mentUAE United Arab EmiratesUN United NationsUNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-

mentUNDHA United Nations Department of Humanitarian AairsUNDOF United Nations Disengagement Observer ForceUNDP United Nations Development ProgramUNGOMAP UN Good Oces Mission in Afghanistan and

PakistanUNIIMOG UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group

xiv glossary

UNTAC UN Transitional Authority in CambodiaUNAMET UN Assistance Mission in East TimorUNTAET UN Transitional Administration in East TimorUNMISET UN Mission of Support in East TimorUSTR United States Trade RepresentativeVERs Voluntary Export RestraintsWMD Weapons of Mass DestructionWTO World Trade OrganizationWW I World War IWW II World War II

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all who have encour-aged and helped me in writing this book. It was only thanks to thegood will of so many people that I was able to write this book asone of my rst projects after my retirement from the Ministry ofForeign Aairs in the spring of 2002.

My particular thanks go to the University of Leiden, which becamethe founding father of this project. Prof. Dr. W.R. van Gulik helpedenormously by settling me with this project at Leiden University.Dr. L.E.H. Vredevoogd, and his successor Mr. A.W. Kist, Presidentsof the University of Leiden, as well as Prof. Dr. Douwe D. Breimer,Rector Magnicus of the University, all kindly encouraged me topursue this endeavour.

I owe a deep debt of gratitude to Prof. Dr. Rikki Kersten of theCentre for Japanese and Korean Studies of the University of Leiden,who gave me the opportunity to teach a class at the University,using the draft text of this book as reference material. ProfessorKersten continued to be of invaluable assistance, and her commentson both the content and the language were vital in bringing thiswork to publication. Without her determination and support thisbook would not have been published.

The students of Leiden University who attended my class Japanand the World in the spring term of 2003 have made no small con-tribution to the improvement of the contents of this book throughtheir active classroom participation.

My particular thanks go also to the International Institute for AsianStudies (IIAS) which supported the publication of this book. Prof.W.A.L. Stokhof, Director of IIAS, Mr. Wouter Feldberg and Ms.Josine Stremmelaar, sta members of IIAS, have constantly encour-aged me to bring this project to its completion.

There are many individuals to whom I owe special thanks as well.Mrs. Elizabeth van der Wind-Hamill helped me enormously inimproving the English. Mrs. Muriel Hussin gave me many valuablecomments and advice on the text itself. I am also grateful to Am-bassador Takeshi Kagami for his extremely insightful comments. Ialso owe many thanks to Prof. Dr. Arthur Stockwin of the University

xvi acknowledgements

of Oxford and Prof. Dr. Peter Pantzer of the University of Bonnwho have continuously encouraged me to publish this book.

My friends in the Ministry of Foreign Aairs in Tokyo helped mein gathering information which brought further accuracy to this book,including statistical data, the latest unpublished materials and oldspeeches.

Mr. Albert Hostdt of Brill Netherlands and Mr. Patrick H.Alexander of Brill USA took the vital decision to publish this bookby Brill Academic Publishers. Without them, this book would havenever taken its current shape, and I am immensely grateful for theirdecision. Ms. Tanja Cowall did most of the detailed work related tothe publication. Dr. Koen Donker van Heel contributed immenselyin copy editing. Mrs. Tamaki Yoshida, a student at the LeidenUniversity, helped me a lot in bringing the index into shape. Thankyou very much.

And last but not least, mention has to be made to the AilionFoundation and the Canon Foundation. Both have contributed gen-erously and unselshly, enabling me to write this book. Mrs. CorrieSiahaya-van Nierop of the Canon Foundation followed this projectwith great interest.

All in all, I thank all my friends and members of my family whocontinuously encouraged, helped and supported the writing of thisbook. Without their support this book might never have been published.

INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 1995 I was serving as Deputy Chief of Mission atthe Japanese Embassy in Moscow. President Yeltsin was in power,implementing his reform policy and preparing for the election in thefollowing year. The political situation was very tense. It was inter-esting and stimulating for a diplomat to serve in this historic periodof transition in Russia.

One day, I was conversing with my long-time friend in the RussianForeign Ministry, the then Deputy Minister in charge of Asia andthe Pacic region, Alexander Panov. I began outlining a vague ideaI had, to give lectures at one of the leading universities or institu-tions in Moscow on Japan or Japanese foreign policy.

Is it not useful to give some deeper knowledge on Japan orJapanese foreign policy to a younger generation in Russia? I askedDeputy Minister Panov.

Do you think that a diplomat like me could make a signicantcontribution?

Deputy Minister Panov not only supported this idea, but alsoshowed a great interest in implementing it. Almost instantaneouslyhe suggested that I should focus on MGIMO, the Moscow StateInstitute of International Relations. MGIMO was a university estab-lished during the Soviet regime primarily for those elite students,who were considering a career in the Foreign Service. After thedemise of the Soviet Union, the majority of Russian diplomats arestill MGIMO graduates.

Things proceeded smoothly and in the autumn of 1995 I wasgiven a rare opportunity to give a one-term lecture to MGIMOundergraduate students on Japanese Foreign Policy 19451995. Ispent a fair amount of time during that summer preparing for thelecture both in contents and language. Colleagues and friends werehelpful in gathering material and I devoted all my private Russianlanguage lessons to studying technical and specialized terms. As amember of the Japanese Foreign Service, I had specialized in theRussian language since joining the service in 1968 and had alreadyserved twice at the Embassy in Moscow, in the early seventies andthe mid-eighties. But to cover over a dozen dierent themes on

xviii introduction

Japanese foreign policy 19451995 in Russian required thoroughpreparation.

Despite my initial anxieties, the lectures proceeded very smoothly.In the oral examination, or zachet in Russian, all 23 students passed.

Particularly for a diplomat of my generation, whose memory ofthe Soviet Union was one where freedom of speech was totally sup-pressed, my experience at MGIMO was astonishing. At no timethroughout the course of the lecture was I approached by anyonefrom the university or elsewhere. The content of the lectures wasleft entirely to my own discretion. I felt it a particular honour thatsuch complete trust was shown to a diplomat from Japan, given theprevailing and painful situation regarding the unresolved territorialissue of the four islands located to the northeast of Hokkaido.

When the lectures ended at the end of 1995, there emerged anidea from the university whether the major content of my talks couldnot be outlined in a form of a book or a reader for other students,who had not followed the course. It was another honour for me thatsuch a proposal was oered and I naturally accepted it. For half ayear I struggled with my notes and the recorded minutes of my lec-tures, assisted by an Embassy sta member and native speaker. InJuly 1996, I managed to produce, virtually on the eve of my depar-ture to Tokyo to assume a new post in the Foreign Ministry, a bookin Russian, entitled 50 Years of Japanese Foreign Policy (19451995).

During the latter part of the 1990s, the book has played a dis-crete role, so I hope, in enhancing deeper understanding in Russiaand among Russian speaking neighbouring countries, of the devel-opment of Japanese foreign policy after World War II. On a per-sonal note, I had several surprising encounters when unexpectedvisitors to Japan from Central Asia or the Russian Far East, not tomention Moscow, told me that they had read my book and referredto particular passages that had caught their attention.

My teaching experience in Moscow and the publication of 50Years of Japanese Foreign Policy (19451995) made me realize thatthe combination of teaching and daily work at the Foreign Ministryis very helpful in clearing ones mind and expanding the scope ofones thinking. After my return to Tokyo in 1996, I continued lec-turing, this time at Japanese universities. I gave courses at the SoaUniversity Undergraduate School 199698 and Keio UniversityGraduate School 19992000. In essence my lectures remained thesame. However, this time I added a substantial section regarding

introduction xix

Japanese foreign policy from the Meiji Restoration to World War II.When I retired from the Foreign Ministry in the spring of 2002,

after serving for a short while as ambassador of Japan in theNetherlands, I entered a new phase in my life and thought it to bea worthwhile task to put down in writing a synthesis of Japaneseforeign policy in the era I had lived through. What I wrote sevenyears ago in Russian in Moscow served as a good starting point forthis task.

Thus, from the autumn of 2002 onwards I began to write, thistime in English, primarily for a European and American audience,a reader about the foreign policy of Japan from 1945 to 2003.

While I was in the process of writing my rst draft, I was givenan opportunity to combine my writing with teaching. Professor RikkiKersten of the Leiden University Centre of Japanese and KoreanStudies suggested that I teach a class at Leiden University in thespring term of 2003 and use my manuscript in my teaching. Thiswas an exciting oer!

Some twenty students attended my class Japan and the World.Each week they received a draft text of the chapter to be discussedthe following week. The teaching process naturally gave me furtheropportunity to clarify and deepen the contents of my writing. Someof the comments given by the students have contributed substan-tially to the formulation of this book.

It was against this brief background that my book was written.Much like the one which I wrote seven years ago, this book was

written based primarily on the assumption that the readers did nothave prior knowledge of Japanese foreign policy. Students who arestudying Japan as well as those who have a general interest in thesubject matter are welcome to read this book.

The author naturally is attered if experts on the subject are ableto derive any meaningful impression from the contents of this book.

With these points in mind, my three objectives while writing thisbook were:

First, I wanted to introduce the basic facts, which constituted themajor framework of postwar Japanese foreign policy. I tried to becareful in selecting the most important facts that a reader is advisedto know if he or she is interested in the development of Japaneseforeign policy after World War II.

Second, the intention of the author was to describe not only thefacts, but also to give an analysis of the reason and logic through

xx introduction

which Japanese foreign policy has developed. In other words, know-ing what happened is essential, but knowing why it happened iswhat shapes the depth and meaning of history.

Since the author had been in the Japanese Foreign Service untilquite recently, it is most purposeful to present, as far as possible,the inside views of the Ministry of Foreign Aairs and the gov-ernment of Japan. Naturally all inside views presented here arewritten as I saw them and the government of Japan bears no respon-sibility for their content. But probably the more I could tell my ownviews, the more insights readers could have about the inner per-spectives of the formulation of Japanese foreign policy. I particularlytried to show the interrelationships between the external events whichshaped foreign policy and the internal factors which in many casesconditioned foreign policy.

Third, through my experience in teaching at Leiden University, Ifelt that one of the liveliest discussions in class developed around mypersonal experiences, which I explained candidly. Why not includesome of these experiences in this book? Naturally, there are so manycolleagues of mine who could tell so many inspiring personal stories,but since I happen to write this book, why not tell my experiences?At the suggestion of the students, these episodes are highlighted ina box form in the text. I hope that they will help make the conductof Japanese foreign policy a little friendlier to those newcomers.

In this context, I also did not hesitate to give some accounts onmy grandfather Shigenori Togo, twice Foreign Minister of Japan atthe beginning and the end of the Pacic War, and my father FumihikoTogo, who held a key position in the Foreign Ministry at the timeof the revision of the Security Treaty with America and the rever-sion of Okinawa. I hope that these family experiences may also helpin giving a little more animation to the subject in this book.

After the Prologue, which covers the period from the MeijiRestoration to World War II, this book consists of 12 Chapters.Other than Chapter 1, which describes the postwar situation untilthe conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, each of the 11Chapters is dedicated to individual issues, which constitute majorspheres in postwar Japanese foreign policy.

Given the limited size and the introductory nature of the book Ihad to omit some important aspects, such as Japans policy towardSouth America and science and technology in general. More wordscould also have been spent on Africa and on cultural relations. I

introduction xxi

apologize to the reader for these omissions and those fellow coun-trymen who have been working in these areas.

I also apologize for some inevitable complexity which emerged,because of the vertical structure of this book. The reader must referback eleven times through the course of historical development toobtain a full view of the major events which have taken place overa period of half a century. So as to cope with these structuraldiculties, I endeavoured to give cross references on major inter-secting points and introduce a summary of horizontal analysis in theConclusion.

In closing, let me add that the major portion of this book is ded-icated to the historical analysis of postwar Japanese foreign policy.But writing the history led me to identify seven agendas for futureJapanese foreign policy at the threshold of the 21st century. In addi-tion, as the book shows, the success and failure, the dynamism andlimitations of postwar foreign policy in Japan have been stronglyconditioned by the way Japan dealt with the past. Five limitationsemerged from the past while writing this book.

These seven future perspectives and ve past limitations are sum-marized in the concluding chapter.

PROLOGUE: FROM THE MEIJI RESTORATION TO THE PACIFIC WAR

1. From the Meiji Restoration to the Japan-Russia War

The Meiji Restoration

In 1868, what is called the Meiji Restoration took place in Japan.There are no other events as important and crucial in the historyof modern Japan than those which took place in this Restoration.So much so, that any reader who is interested in Japan must grasptheir essence.

Before the Restoration Japan was a feudal society, orderly, stable,rich and in its own way with a highly civilized culture. It was gov-erned by a class of warriors (samurai ), which eectively controlled theclass of farmers, producers and merchants. The country was dividedand governed by warlords (daimyos) and above the daimyos stood theShogun, the ruling warlord of the Tokugawa dynasty who residedin Edo (present-day Tokyo).

In the early 17th century, the Tokugawa Shogun introduced atight regime of control over political and economic contacts with theoutside world. This policy later became known as the policy of Sakoku,or period of isolation. The country had been cut o notably fromthe Western world for two and a half centuries. The only exceptionwas the relationship with The Netherlands, whose representativeswere allowed to stay on a fan-shaped articial island constructedwithin Nagasaki Bay in Southern Japan.1 The Netherlands were anatural choice for the Tokugawa Shogun to preserve diplomatic rela-tions with, because the 17th century was the Golden Age for theNetherlands. Dutch ships took the lead on the seven seas and mer-chant and other activities expanded.

1 It has long been perceived both in Japan and among Western researchers onJapanese history that, except for the Netherlands, Japan was completely cut o fromthe outside world during the Sakoku period. But recent scholarly works indicate thatthis isolation primarily applied to the West and that Japan had maintained its con-tacts with China and Korea (Leitch, Kato, Weinstein, Japans Role in the Post-ColdWar World, Greenwood, 1995, p. 10).

2 prologue

In 1853 the peace and tranquillity of feudal Japan were shatteredby the sudden arrival of American gun boats, led by CommodoreMatthew C. Perry, at a bay not far from Edo. It is not easy for con-temporary Japanese to truly appreciate the extent of the shock tothe psychology of the Japanese people, but for the Japanese of oneand a half centuries ago, the black, iron-covered, steam engine drivengun boats were surely as shocking as gleaming spaceships from outerspace would be for us today.

At any rate, by the middle of the 19th century the Tokugawa andother feudal leaders came to understand the hard reality that GreatBritain, France, Russia, the Netherlands, Germany, and the UnitedStates were each trying to expand their sphere of inuence by reach-ing out to Asia, particularly to China, so close to Japan. It was apainful process, entailing a lot of confusion and some bloodshed, butit was implemented amazingly fast, and in 1868, the TokugawaShogun relinquished power to a new government, which was shapedby a group of inuential reformist warlords, united under the author-ity of the Emperor Meiji.

The Imperial tradition that originated in Japan from the begin-ning of Japanese history,2 played an important role during her for-mative years and then through the feudal years. During the TokugawaShogunate the Imperial House was carefully preserved as a centreof spiritual and cultural value in Kyoto, the ancient capital of Japan.It then played a critical role in the unication of the country dur-ing these dicult years of Japans modern history.

It is now of paramount importance to understand how the Meijigovernment leaders saw the world and what conclusions were derivedfrom their vision. The Meiji government leaders were aware thatJapan was surrounded by incomparably strong imperialist powers.For Japan, to survive and remain as an independent nation, therewas an absolute necessity to understand exactly where she stood andwhat she should do, so as not to be engulfed by these imperialistpowers. Thus from 1871 to 1872 for nearly a full two years, thenewly established government sent an extraordinary mission to America and major European countries, headed by ve top leaders

2 One of the oldest narrative histories, the Nihonshoki, says that the rst Emperorassumed the throne in 660 BC. Historians maintain that it was around the 7th cen-tury that the Imperial system came into existence.

prologue 3

of the new government under the leadership of Tomomi Iwakuraand accompanied by more than 40 of the best and brightest of thenew Meiji government. Their eagerness to learn, their humblenessand courage in facing the unknown, their intelligence to absorb thingsfundamentally new, while displaying a natural pride in the cultureand history from which they originated, all left a strong impressionin the countries they visited.3

The delegation came back to Japan with a shared understandingthat, for Japan to coexist with the countries they had visited, Japanshould become strong. The ultimate criterion of strength was mili-tary power, but that strength could be developed only if it was basedon a strong and stable political structure and a powerful, prosper-ous economy. Fukoku-Kyohei, which meant rich country and strongmilitary became the motto of the time. Japan therefore focussed itsenergy primarily on the internal development of politics, industry,trade, society, education, and the military. Realism became the keyapproach of the Meiji government, to ensure the survival of thecountry.

Foreign policy agenda: revision of unequal treaties and border demarcation

At a time when the Meiji governments eorts were directed pri-marily towards the creation of a strong government based on a strongeconomy, two major issues weighed heavily in the area of foreignpolicy. These two issues were essential if Japan was to secure equalfooting with the Euro-American powers of the international com-munity. Both issues commanded the general support of the Japanesepeople.

The rst issue was the revision of the unequal treaties, which theTokugawa Shogunate was forced to conclude during the 1850s withthe United States, the Netherlands, Russia, Great Britain, France,Portugal and Prussia (Germany). These treaties included special clausesto grant consular jurisdiction to foreigners. They were allowed to

3 The Iwakura Mission travelled altogether for 632 days, visiting the following12 Euro-American countries and other Southeast Asian countries as well: USA,UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Russia, Denmark, Sweden, Italy,Austria, and Switzerland (S. Izumi, Dodotaru Nihonjin (The Dignied Japanese), Shodensha,1997, p. 91).

4 prologue

live inside the foreign residential area, where they were subjected toconsular jurisdiction and exempted from Japanese jurisdiction. Otherclauses in these treaties deprived Japan of the right to determine itsown customs duties. Both clauses gave one-sided privileges and benetsto the other contracting party. The revision of these clauses becamean essential task for successive foreign ministers and as a result oftheir strenuous eorts the consular jurisdiction clauses were abro-gated by 1899, but customs duties clauses were only revised by 1911.Indeed, it took 40 years for Japan to overcome this issue, whichsymbolized the burden under which the Meiji government had startedits governance.

The second agenda was that of border demarcation with the neigh-bouring countries.

With Russia, with which Japan had to demarcate the northernborder, the Tokugawa Shogunate had already concluded the Treatyof Commerce and Friendship in 1855, which dened the southernlimit of the Russian border from the Kurile Islands down to theisland of Urrupu and the northern border of Japan up to the islandof Etorofu. Whereas the sovereignty of Sakhalin was left undenedin this treaty, a new Treaty of Exchanges concerning Sakhalin andthe Kurile Islands was concluded in 1875, stipulating that Sakhalinbelonged to Russia and the Kurile Islands to Japan.

In terms of the southern border, Japan and China went throughcomplicated negotiations over the islands of Okinawa. Japanese con-trol over the islands was considerably strengthened by the beginningof the 1880s, but the nal settlement had to wait until the Japan-China War in 1895.

In the 19th century the islands of Ogasawara, located to the southof Honshu, the main island of Japan, had been visited by severalBritish and American vessels, and at the same time immigrants arrivedfrom Japan. Japans announcement to exercise sovereignty in 1875was met with basic understanding by other interested parties, suchas the US, the UK and Germany.

The Korean peninsula and the Japan-China War

Thus over the 1880s Japans internal political, economic and mili-tary strength gradually began to accumulate. Some of the borderissues were being resolved. The Meiji Constitution was enacted in1889. Against the background of these developments Japan began

prologue 5

to conceptualize more acutely her position in Far Eastern Asia andthe world.

The overall consensus of the government and intellectuals of Meiji,based on their realism, was probably that the Euro-American nationspower was simply overwhelming in contrast to that of the Far EasternAsian nations, including Japan.

The only credible way for Japan to overcome that situation wasto continue to become stronger, even at the expense of becomingdierent from the surrounding Asian nations. In 1885 such a viewwas crystallized in the formula presented by a leading intellectual ofthe era, Yukichi Fukuzawa, in his well-known paraphrase Datsu-A-Nyu-Ou, which meant Getting out (=Datsu) from Asia (=A) and enter-ing into (=Nyu) Europe (=Ou). In another words, catching up withthe West became a real motto of the time.

Admittedly, in the debates among intellectuals and philosophersthere were some views that Japan should become united with otherAsian countries such as China or Korea, against the oppression ofWestern imperialism, but those views were not shared by the major-ity and were in general kept outside the scope of governmental policy-making.4

By the 1890s these internal, external and conceptual develop-ments led Japan to a search for a stronger basis to implement a pol-icy of catching up with the West. The key question which emergedwas the notion that Japan needed to secure the surrounding areasto ensure her own security and development. A statement made in1890 by Aritomo Yamagata, one of the prominent leaders of theRestoration, outlined the necessity for Japan to protect the cordonof sovereignty, which meant the area under Japanese sovereigntywithin the demarcated border, and the cordon of inuence, whichmeant those adjacent areas, where Japans own security was alsoaected.

In actual terms, for the leadership of the Meiji government, thearea within the cordon of inuence primarily meant the Koreanpeninsula. The Korean peninsula in fact stretched from the continent

4 In 1885 a minority opposition party leader, Tokichi Tarui, published his thesescalling for a unication of Japan and Korea and its alliance with China to countera Russian threat. His view did not command much support (M. Ikei, NihongaikoushiGaisetsu (Overview of the Japanese Foreign Policy) 3rd Edition, Keio University, 1997, pp. 6364).

6 prologue

to the Japanese islands like a dagger and it could be so perceivedthat the geopolitical conditions of the peninsula made it a conduitfor threats from the continent to Japan. In 1872, just after the returnof the Iwakura Mission from its trip abroad, it already became aserious political issue whether Japan should not take more eectivemeasures to keep the peninsula outside the sphere of inuence ofother powers, such as China or Russia. That approach was thenrejected as being too hasty and premature, but from then on, theseunderlying motives did not disappear.

The rst real contention over the Korean peninsula developedwith China in the middle of the 1890s.

In the spring of 1894, an agrarian-religious revolutionary move-ment called the Ton-Haku rebellion began in Korea. The Koreangovernment, faced with the danger of a revolutionary movement,decided to invite Chinese military forces into their country in aneort to suppress that movement. The Japanese government saw fur-ther danger for an expanded role by China in the peninsula anddecided to send its own army to counter the Chinese move. Afterthe suppression of the Ton-Haku rebellion Japan successfully pres-sured the Korean government to break o its special relationshipwith China. China could not accept that situation and war brokeout between Japan and China in July. In the course of half a year,to the surprise of everyone including Japan, a swift victory overChina both on land and at sea was attained and in April 1895 thetwo countries agreed on a peace treaty. The major achievements forJapan were the independence of Korea, the annexation of Taiwan(Formosa) and the Pen Fu islands (Pescadores) as well as the Liaotungpeninsula, and a sizable reparation payment of 300 million yen.

The unexpected victory brought great relief, rejoicing and a senseof achievement for the Japanese people. Six days after the signatureof the peace treaty, however, Russia, Germany and France made acommon demarche against Japan to renounce the rights of annex-ation of the Liaotung peninsula. Russia took the lead in this TripleIntervention. Though stunned by this totally unexpected demarche,the government had carefully discussed the three options it couldtake: to reject it, to convene a multilateral conference or to acceptit. Japan had no further military capability to risk a war against thethree intervening countries. Foreign Minister Munemitsu Mutsu main-tained strongly that a multilateral conference carried the risk ofunleashing other issues. There was no other option than to accept

prologue 7

the intervention. The news of the return of the Liaotung peninsulapermeated the country like a high voltage electric shock from gov-ernment leaders to the man in the street. Soho Tokutomi, a well-known intellectual at the time, wrote: I may say that the return ofthe Liaotung peninsula has practically determined the fate of the restof my life. After I heard the news, I virtually became a dierentperson. All my reection and consideration boils down to the ques-tion of a lack of power. If you do not have power, then any justiceor action is not as valuable as a half penny.5 That became themood of the country and the whole nation recharged its energy towork, work and work to make Japan a strong country, politically,economically and militarily.

Another serious realization, which occurred in the foreign policyarena, was that in facing the three countries intervention, Japan didnot have any ally to support the Japanese cause. The danger of iso-lation in the conduct of foreign policy was the single greatest lessonthe Meiji leadership had had to learn. Thus there emerged strongsupport to seek an alliance with a major power in world politics.Japans search for an ally met with a positive reaction on the partof Great Britain, which increasingly shared an acute common con-cern over the expansionist tendency of Russia in the southern andeastern part of the Eurasian continent. The rst Anglo-Japanesealliance was concluded in 1902.

The Russo-Japanese War

After the Triple Intervention, it was the relationship with Russia thatbecame the most sensitive for Japan. Russia not only took the leadin the intervention, but also acquired the Liaotung peninsula underlease. Faced with mounting pressure from this gigantic neighbourfrom the north, the most delicate area for Japan was once again theKorean peninsula. Some inuential Japanese6 argued that a reason-able balance was to let Korea stay under the Japanese sphere ofinuence and let Manchuria, which was between Korea and Russia,remain under the Russian sphere of inuence. This concept was

5 Ikei, op. cit., p. 76.6 Top Meiji leaders like H. Ito, K. Inoue and others shared this view (Ikei,

op. cit., p. 83).

8 prologue

then called the concept of exchange between Korea and Manchuria.When Russia concluded an agreement with China in 1902 on Russiaswithdrawal from Manchuria, the situation seemed to have improvedsubstantially. The repeated failure of Russia to withdraw its troopswithin the prescribed deadline of the agreement, but moreover, somesigns that Russia was taking concrete steps to establish a militarypresence in Korea, ignited a deep anxiety among the Japanese lead-ership. Thus the tension between Japan and Russia mounted.

The war broke out in February 1904, and again, the Japanesemilitary gained a fast and unexpected victory. On land, the armysecured the Liaotung peninsula and in March 1905 gained a majorvictory at Shenyang. The navy secured an unprecedented victorywhich would long be remembered in the history of naval battlesat the Tsushima Straits against the Baltic Fleet in May 1905.

The Meiji government, with its acute sense of realism, graspedevery opportunity to conclude the war. It was fully aware that thesupply of materials, weaponry, logistics and nance simply did notallow the continuation of warfare for long. Under President TheodoreRoosevelts mediation, the peace treaty negotiations took place inAugust 1905 at Portsmouth on the east coast of the United States.The treaty was signed in September 1905: in addition to the recog-nition of Japanese supremacy in Korea, both Russia and Japan agreedon the withdrawal of their troops from Manchuria; Japan gained theright to lease the Liaotung peninsula and the right to control thesouthern Manchurian railroad between Changchun and Ryuushun;Japan also annexed the southern half of Sakhalin Island.

The people of Japan believed that the content of the 1905 PeaceTreaty was miserably poor in contrast to the dramatic victory achievedon the battleeld. No reparations and the land they acquired wasjust the southern half of Sakhalin! They took it as an outrageousbetrayal of the country. Demonstrations reached a dangerous levelwhen a delegation headed by Foreign Minister Jyutaro Komura cameback from Portsmouth and a curfew had to be introduced to pro-tect the delegates on their journey home.

There was a serious dilemma for the government in its relationswith the people through the media. The leadership was well awareof the weakness of the position of its own country. However, it wasessential for the government not to let this recognition of its ownweakness be made known to Russia. This knowledge could haveweakened the Japanese position both on the battleeld and at the

prologue 9

negotiating table. Information therefore simply could not be disclosedto the public. The Japanese people only had access to successivenews reports on the outstanding victory on the battleelds and there-fore developed an illusionary vision of the strength of the countryas well as a false expectation of the anticipated gains from the 1905Peace Treaty.

Despite all these diculties and complications Japan won the warand with this unexpected and unprecedented victory the rst phaseof the post-Meiji Restoration ended. Japans victory was generallywelcomed by the Asian countries, albeit that the complications relatedto the outcome of the peace treaty made Japan feel that 40 yearsof united eorts to catch up with the West or Datsu-A-Nyu-Ou allowedher to climb the ladder very quickly. To the surprise of the Japanesethemselves more than anyone else, Japan had nally achieved hergoal of being equal with other major players of the internationalcommunity.

2. WW I and the Washington Conference

The psychological impact of the Russo-Japanese War

The second phase of the post-Meiji Restoration started with a verydierent psychological set-up. The objective of climbing the ladderhad been fullled and Japan saw herself at the top of a plateau,where it had more freedom for choices and options. But that free-dom was combined with a dilemma and a contradiction which madethe Japanese implementation of foreign policy a more complex andintricate exercise. Six points are worth mentioning regarding the psy-chological make-up of the Japanese during this period:

(1) First, an inevitable inclination to the notion of the Gospel ofPower cannot be negated. Japan itself now became a much biggercountry comprising Korea, which it annexed in 1910, the southernhalf of Sakhalin, Taiwan and the Pescadores. The primary area ofits sphere of inuence now moved into the southern part ofManchuria.

(2) Second, an acute sense of realism stayed active among someof the government leadership and intellectuals and they knew wellthat victory came not only through military power, but also by acareful coordination of external relations to avoid isolation and to

10 prologue

create allies. For them, it was essential to ensure a good under-standing among the major Euro-American powers on the conductof Japanese policy in the East-Asian continent. In many instances,they were aware of the danger of a growing perception of the yel-low peril theory, and therefore in some instances even carefully dis-tanced Japan from identifying itself with Asiatic values.

(3) Third, in the private sector, on the contrary, those views iden-tifying Japans future with Asia and Asiatic values gained furthermomentum against the background of the Japanese victory overRussia. A well-known statement by Tenshin Okakura, a philosopherand artist that Asia is a single unity was pronounced in 1902.There emerged harsh criticism from private sector intellectuals thatgovernment policy seeking understanding among Western nationswas too compromising and void of ideals. It is also interesting tonote that among those private sector views in support of Japanspositioning in Asia, the voices emphasizing Japans specic and lead-ing role became more prominent than those who stressed the neces-sity of equal partnership with Asian countries.

(4) Fourth, in the new era of complexity, among the optimiststhere emerged a new concept that given the unique achievementJapan had made over the last 40 years, she might have a specicmission to full to the betterment of the world, namely to act as acatalyst for the harmonization of Western and Eastern values. Thatconcept was labelled as To-Zai-Yuuwa. To meant east, Zai meant west,and Yuuwa meant harmony or fusion: Harmony of East and West.As romantic and idealistic as it may sound in retrospect, this notiongrasped the hearts of many intellectuals in the period after the Russo-Japanese War.

(5) Fifth, among the pessimists, however, the post Russo-JapaneseWar situation created a call for a new identity. Japan, which triedto catch up with the West, was still very dierent from the realWest. She was obviously dierent and wanted to be dierent fromthe rest of Asia. What is Japan and who are the Japanese? Whatspecic values can Japan introduce as a lone, new-born country fromthe Far East? Pessimists could not nd an answer to this question.

(6) Last, in the area of domestic policy, it should be noted thatthe decades which followed the Russo-Japanese War until theManchurian Incident were generally recognized as a lively period,in which various democratic movements gained strength. Within therights and obligations of the Meiji Constitution, the rst prime min-

prologue 11

ister from political parties was selected in 1918 and in 1925 a uni-versal manhood surage law was enacted.7

The foreign policy agenda after the Russo-Japanese War

The victory over Russia fundamentally changed Japans relationshipswith the major powers surrounding her in the Asia-Pacic region.

First and foremost, the United States, which acted as a mediatorin concluding the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, began to harbour seri-ous concerns on the nature of Japans rapidly growing power.

In Eastern Asia the United States was concerned that the wayJapan was expanding its inuence to Manchuria and possibly Chinawould go directly against American interests, embodied in the OpenDoor Policy expressed by Secretary of State John M. Hay in 1899.In 1905, at the time the peace treaty was negotiated in Portsmouth,a leading railroad owner Edward H. Harriman visited Japan andmade an agreement on the joint management of the southernManchurian railroad, which Japan was going to gain from Russia.This agreement was later revoked upon the return of Foreign MinisterJyutaro Komura from his peace treaty negotiations at Portsmouth.Komura was convinced that the railroad, which was going to becomethe key element for the governance of southern Manchuria, had tobe owned by Japan. In 1909 Secretary of State Philander C. Knoxput forth a proposal to place all Manchurian railroads under inter-national control, but the proposal could not be accepted by Japan,which already saw Manchuria as a vital area under its sphere ofinuence.

In the Pacic it was the growing strength of the Japanese navythat troubled America. Admiral Heihachiro Togo, who commandedthe historic victory at the Tsushima Straits over Russia, became morea symbol of a threat than of glory. America began serious eorts toexpand and strengthen her own naval power. In 1907, the rstAmerican plan, called the Orange Plan was drafted, the purposeof which was to counter a possible war against Japan in Pacic. Inthis newly emerging and tense situation, Japan also saw it as nec-essary to create an even stronger navy. It became the objective for

7 This period is also known as the Taisho democracy, after Emperor Taisho,who reigned from 1912 to 1926, between Emperor Meiji and Emperor Showa.

12 prologue

the Japanese admiralty to create eets of 8 battleships and 8 cruisers.To make the situation worse, discrimination against Japanese emi-

grants, who established themselves primarily on the west coast of theAmerican continent after the Meiji Restoration, erupted. In 1906the city of San Francisco gave an order to segregate Japanese stu-dents from studying with other white children. In 1913 a law wasenacted in California to exclude the rst generation of Japanese emi-grants from land ownership. These developments confused and irri-tated the Japanese leadership and fuelled anger and strong emotionamong the public.

Notwithstanding those emerging diculties, the leadership of thetwo countries displayed a sense of realism that it was not in theinterest of either country to go on a collision course. The 1905Katsura-Taft Memorandum, which recognized Korea and thePhilippines as within each countrys respective sphere of inuence,was one example. The 1908 Takahara-Root Agreement, in whichboth countries agreed to preserve the status quo in the Pacic regionand to observe in China the independence, territorial integrity andthe principle of equal opportunity for third powers, was anotherexample.

In contrast to the emerging tension with the United States, therelationship with Russia, with which Japan had fought a desperatewar, improved phenomenally. The rst accord was concluded in1907, primarily based on the necessity for both sides to ensure post-war stability and the preservation of a balance of power in southand north Manchuria. That rst accord developed into the secondaccord in 1910. It became clear that both countries shared a com-mon concern vis--vis the United States for their expanded economicactivities in Manchuria. The third accord was concluded in 1912,and nally the fourth one in 1916. The fourth accord was evenlooked upon as an alliance between Russia and Japan.

The nature of the Japanese-British alliance also changed. Fromthe European point of view, Germany rather than Russia emergedas a major threat to the status quo. From that point of view Britainhad no objection to the enhanced relationship between Japan andRussia as outlined above, as well as the strengthening of the Japanese-French relationship, which came to be realized by the Japan-FranceAccord of 1907. Thus the alliance relationships of Britain, Franceand Russia, each supported by Japan, a newly emerging power inthe Far East, took shape. These complex multilateral relationships,

prologue 13

rather than a narrowly dened bilateral relationship with Japan, cameto be preferred by Great Britain. That arrangement also suited Japanwell.

At the same time, Great Britain had another serious reason todistance itself somewhat from Japan. The growing tension betweenJapan and the United States increasingly put Britain in an awkwardposition. In the event that a crisis should occur between Japan andthe United States, Britain did not want to put itself in a position tohave to ght against the United States. Thus the third Anglo-Japanesealliance in 1911 excluded America from the objective of the agreement.

World War I and the Paris Peace Conference

In August 1914 World War I broke out in Europe. There Japansaw a great opportunity to show her new role in global politics andto expand and strengthen her position, particularly in Eastern Asia.It cannot be denied that the notion of a Gospel of Power gainedfurther momentum.

When asked by Great Britain to join the war on 7 August, Japansent an ultimatum to Germany on 15 August and declared war on23 August. Given the alliance relationships with the British, Frenchand the Russians, that was a natural choice.

The area where Japanese activities were expected to be performedwas not in Europe but in the Far East. The rst Japanese objectivewas to take over German interests in the region. Japan immediatelyattacked and occupied Chintao, a major German basis in the regionlocated on the Shandong peninsula. The Japanese navy occupiedsome of the South Pacic islands which had been under Germancontrol as well.

The second, and probably a more important objective for Japan,was to establish her sphere of inuence rmly inside China, wherepolitical turmoil had been mounting for years. In October 1911 arevolutionary movement exploded there, which led to the establish-ment of the Nanjing Provisional Government headed by Sun Yat-sen in January 1912. In Beijing, after reigning for 300 years, theQing Dynasty resigned and in February 1912 a new republic led byYuan Shi-kai, the leader of the northern warlords, was created.

The country was politically far from being united, but a strongfeeling of nationalism united the people. The notion of the sphereof inuence on the part of outside powers was losing its traditional

14 prologue

ground. But, in a situation where world power attention was directedprimarily to Europe, Japan saw a unique opportunity to enlarge hertraditionally accepted sphere of inuence. In January 1915, Japanpresented its 21 Clauses to the newly formed Chinese government.They included such clauses as Japans right to inherit German priv-ileges over the Shandong peninsula, to extend her special privilegesin Manchuria and Mongolia, and to dispatch her counsellors innancial or military administration to the Chinese government. TheChinese were violently opposed to the Japanese requests, particularlythe last part, where Japan requested her right to intrude on inter-nal matters in China. After ve months of bitter and thorny nego-tiations an agreement was reached on the basis of 14 clauses, excludingall parts related to Japanese intrusion to internal matters. Japanachieved certain policy objectives, but severe psychological damagewas done to the Chinese government and people.

In 1918 the war was terminated and the Peace Conference wasconvened in Paris in January 1919. Japan was invited there as oneof the ve principal victor countries together with Great Britain,France, Italy and the United States. It was the rst occasion, whereJapan was included in such a multilateral forum as one of the lead-ing countries of the world. It was an honourable occasion and thedelegates to the conference went there with a strong sense of pride.

However, as it turned out, the conference oered many opportu-nities for Japan to think seriously about the future of her foreignpolicy. How to ensure Japans right over the Shandong peninsulaand the South Pacic islands, which she inherited from Germany,was, in a practical sense, the only area for Japan to speak out uponand defend her interests. After prolonged and bitter debates, par-ticularly with the Chinese delegation, Japan achieved her objectiveto secure her rights on the Shandong peninsula. But this in turninvited an outburst of anti Japanese feeling in China, as a result ofwhich the peninsula was given back to China only three years later.Thus the 1919 Peace Conference resulted in enhanced anti-Japaneseemotions in China, further complicating diculties for future Japanesepolicy there.

On all other issues related to the question of global peace, secu-rity and justice which were of major importance for many delega-tions, such as the question of the establishment of the League ofNations, the Japanese delegation remained virtually mute and waseven labelled as the silent delegation. From the point of view ofsubstance, the foreign policy thinking of the delegation was ill-equipped

prologue 15

to follow major issues of future decades. The only exception, whereJapan made a conspicuous proposal in relation to global issues, wasthe proposal to include a clause into the League of Nations Charteron racial equality, which was not adopted but is still rememberedas a farsighted step towards the future.

There was also a huge vacuum of professional experience to par-ticipate in multilateral foreign policy. Thus the conference was instru-mental in assisting Japan to comprehend her fundamental weakness.

The Russian Revolution and Allied intervention

Another important world event occurred during World War I, namely,the Russian Revolution. Great Britain and France, in particular,became much concerned with the fate of this neighbouring countryand decided to go ahead with intervention. The United States wasmore cautious in her approach but they decided to go ahead in July1918, when they heard news that Czechoslovakian troops were caughtby a Bolshevik surge in the central part of Siberia. Japan waitedcautiously until the US decision was taken, but once the decisionwas taken, following the US, her activities became more conspicu-ous than others. In August 1918 Japan dispatched troops to Siberia.By autumn their numbers totalled 73,000, eight times more thanagreed upon with the United States, occupying a tangible part ofSiberia and Northern Sakhalin. The army stayed in Siberia until1922, as the last troops to have occupied Soviet territory.

It took another three years, until 1925, before Japan and the newlyborn Soviet Union fully normalized their relationship based on theConvention of Basic Principles. Japan withdrew from NorthernSakhalin in the same year but acquired the rights for oil excavationin the northern part of Sakhalin.

The intervention left a deep scar in the mind of the Soviets aboutJapans actions in their homeland. Japanese casualties numbered3,500 plus huge expenditure and brought relatively small benets. Itbecame a bitter lesson and a clear warning for Japan in relying toomuch on the Gospel of Power.

The Washington Conference and foreign policy under the Washingtonian order

Now that the two major events of the 1910s, World War I and theRussian Revolution were over, the major countries of the world gath-ered in Washington from November 1921 until February 1922 to

16 prologue

discuss acute outstanding issues pertaining to the peace and securityof the world. As the situation in Europe was basically resolved bythe Paris Peace Conference, the outstanding crucial issues whichremained were primarily those related to the Asia-Pacic region.

To this day opinions vary in Japan on the evaluation of this con-ference. Some maintain that it was a process of unwilling Japanesesubordination to American pressure, which dominated the arena.Others argue that it represented serious eorts on the part of Japanto associate with and contribute to the emerging new values in inter-national relations. There are also views, that whether it was a will-ing or unwilling process, Japan managed to preserve her sphere ofinuence over Manchuria and keep her power base as she thenintended. Whichever the evaluation, Japan took an important deci-sion to adhere to the conclusion of the 1919 Peace Conference,which set the basic tone of international relations during the 1920s.

The rst agreement made was on naval arms reduction. The keyissue was the ratio to be applied to battleships between the UnitedStates, Great Britain and Japan. Japans basic position was to achievea ratio of 10:10:7, but it nally agreed to the proposal made byAmerica, that of 10:10:6. There remained within the Japanese navydiering views on the adequacy of this agreement, but the majorityin Japan accepted it as an unavoidable compromise. As a footnote,this agreement was supplemented later in 1930 at the London NavalConference on cruisers and other auxiliary ships with a ratio of10:10:6.97.

The second agreement was on China. A treaty was signed by allnine participants of the conference: the USA, Great Britain, France,Italy, Japan, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and China. It wasan incarnation of the traditional open door policy maintained byAmerica. Those fundamental clauses such as respect for the sover-eignty, independence and territorial integrity of China, as well asthe right to equal opportunities in trade and commercial activitiesfor foreign countries, were included. The fact that the treaty did notderogate the existing rights of foreign governments over China norinclude any clause on measures to be taken against a violation ofthe treaty, allowed Japan to maintain her sphere of inuence inManchuria and elsewhere. The treaty embodied, however, new prin-ciples of international relations which went beyond the traditionalthinking of imperialism and the notion of respective spheres of

prologue 17

inuence. It was not without importance to note that Japan abidedwith those newly emerging principles.

The third agreement was on the Asia-Pacic region in general.By that time, the Anglo-Japanese alliance had signicantly lost itsraison-dtre, because both Russia and Germany, which could havebecome their common threat, were fundamentally weakened. Americanuneasiness concerning the alliance had to be taken into account aswell. Thus an idea emerged to restructure the alliance so as to includeAmerica. France was invited as a fourth partner with a view to softenan inated impression of American participation. Thus a quadrilat-eral treaty, comprising America, Britain, Japan and France, wassigned to replace the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

The talks within and at the fringe of the conference became instru-mental as well for Japan in engendering two decisions mentionedabove, the return of the Shandong peninsula and the withdrawalfrom Northern Sakhalin.

In 1924 Kijuuro Shidehara became Foreign Minister for a periodof three years. After an interval of two years, he was re-appointedin 1929 for two-and-a-half more years. As one of the plenipoten-tiaries of Japan to the Washington Conference, Shideharas politicalthinking was deeply rooted in the spirit which governed the conference.

First, he maintained strongly that Japan should follow the majortrend of international relations. From that perspective he emphasizedthe importance of a new foreign policy aiming at justice, peace andthe role of the League of Nations, but in reality it was a reectionof the importance he attached to Japans relations with America andGreat Britain.

Second, a strong emphasis on economic rather than military pol-icy was sought. One of his reasons to further the relationship withthe United States was based on a sober recognition, that about onethird of Japanese trade was shared with the United States. On thecontinent, such measures as the 21 Clauses demand against China,or the Siberian intervention against the Soviet Union were coun-terproductive, just fuelling nationalism against Japan and inviting sus-picion by surrounding countries. A more peaceful approach to expandeconomic interests was preferred.

Third, his approach was characteristic for non-intervention in theinternal aairs of China. It conformed well to the two principlesmentioned above, but at the same time, it was based on a certain

18 prologue

realism related to the internal situation in China. China was in tur-moil. The new government in Beijing, established in February 1912under the leadership of Yuan Shi-kai, could not reconcile its rivalryvis--vis the revolutionary government in Nanjing led by Sun Yat-sen. In 1921 Sun Yat-sen created a new Nationalist Party Governmentin Kwantong. In the same year the communist party was formed.In 1924 the Nationalist Government and the communist party wentinto the rst round of coalition. In 1926 the Nationalist Governmentunder the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek began the gigantic NorthernExpedition and established a new government in Nanjing in 1927.To take sides in any of these movements seemed to be dicult andrisky. The wisest policy was to stay away from internal turmoil.

Shidehara s approach created a fresh image, a new approach toforeign policy, which combined external, economic and military ele-ments within a unied structure. Unfortunately, his position gradu-ally met with severe opposition, particularly from nationalistic forcesinside the country.

The rst attack was on his China policy. For many, his approachseemed to be too weak, conciliatory and lacking creative ideas forthe preservation and consolidation of Japans interests in China. Itbecame the primary reason for his resignation in 1927.

During his second tenure of oce from 1929 criticism of his eco-nomic policy mounted again. The worldwide recession, which explodedduring the same year, made Shideharas position not very convinc-ing in the eyes of many Japanese. Shidehara was, on the one hand,a strong advocate for the protection of Japanese economic rights andprivileges, but his fundamental thinking to rely on the principle ofopen trade with China sounded less convincing under the extremerecessionary international economic situation, for those who main-tained the necessity of preserving the traditional sphere of inuencefor Japans economic interests.

On his approach towards the harmonization of foreign policy withAnglo-American forces, towards the end of the 1920s, emphasiz-ing Asiatic values and the necessity for Japan to adhere to its des-tiny within the surrounding countries under her sphere of inuencebecame more vocal in many echelons of society. They maintainedthat Japan needed to expand her inuence to areas which ensureda self-sucient basis for economic development, that not onlyManchuria and outer Mongolia but China in its entirety had to beviewed from that perspective, and that the American approach shown

prologue 19

at the naval disarmament talks, emigration issues, or the creation ofthe Washingtonian order was not conducive to the national interestof Japan.

Foreign policy orientation to emphasize Asia and Japans role inAsia, thus far a minority view and held primarily by the limited pri-vate sector to seek an expanded sphere of inuence, thereafter becamemore vocal. In various echelons of society the Japanese militaryforces, primarily the army, became the chief advocate of this view.

Between 1927 and 1929, Giichi Tanaka became the Prime Minister,concurrently serving as Foreign Minister. He took a more active,interventionist and sometimes militaristic policy towards China, whileemphasizing the necessity of preserving an economic approach andpaying due attention to the understanding of the major surroundingcountries such as the United States or Great Britain.8

At any rate, we have reached the end of the second phase of pre-war history. It was a period when Japanese foreign policy was seri-ously searching to nd a way to ensure its national interest. TheGospel of Power directly inherited from the victory of the Russo-Japanese War was clearly there. However, that was not the onlytheme. A sense of realism, idealism, new directions for economic andpacist tendencies, all of these directions were there.

As we now enter the third stage, from the Manchurian Incidentto the War in the Pacic, we see that these various trends gradu-ally converged in a single direction towards Pearl Harbour in December1941. But that conversion was not a predetermined direction devoidof hesitation, confusion, and eorts to choose the future course ofthe nation from several alternatives, which then still seemed to exist.

8 Giichi Tanaka, a former army general, has often been portrayed as represent-ing military views during his tenure as Prime Minister. But Akira Iriye maintainsthat, although Tanaka did not have the non-interventionist and economy-orientedapproach characteristic in Shidehara, Tanakas position reected the traditionalimperialist type of balance of power approach under the Meiji government. Tanakadid not share the militaristic approach of securing Japans primary interest by phys-ical power and, if necessary, intrigues, characteristic in the Kwantung army. Hetherefore stood somewhere in between Shidehara and the military (A. Iriye, NihonnoGaikou ( Japanese Foreign Policy), Cuukou Shinsho, 1995, p. 101).

20 prologue

3. From the Manchurian Incident to the War in the Pacic

The Manchurian Incident

When the world plunged into the global recession in 1929, Japanwas not spared. All aspects of life on the Japanese mainland, in theannexed territories, and in those areas under her sphere of inuence,suered. Notably, a sense of crisis emerged in Manchuria, particu-larly among the leading ocers stationed there, called the Kwantungarmy. They were convinced that the national interest of Japan couldonly be secured through the establishment of a self-sucient areafor its economic development and that it was absolutely essential tokeep Manchuria rmly under the Japanese sphere of inuence. Theybecame worried about the way the Manchurian economy was hitby the world recession, such as the decline in the soybean market.They were also fundamentally troubled by the behaviour of the localManchurian leader Zhang Xue-liang. His father was assassinated bythe Kwantung army in 1928, and Zhang Xue-liang assumed an overtpolicy of support of the Nationalist Government.

In September 1931 the Kwantung army blew up a railroad nearShenyang. Based on the pretext that it was instigated by Chineserebels, the Kwantung army moved fast to occupy a vast area ofSouthern as well as Northern Manchuria. The government in Tokyorepeatedly tried to stop their escalation, but in vain. Public opinion,partly frustrated by the economic and political diculties at home,ardently welcomed this development of securing and consolidatingan area under a Japanese sphere of inuence.

The incident rapidly developed from a military to a political one.In March 1932 a new independent Manchurian State was estab-lished under the heir of the former Qing dynasty and Japan recog-nized it as an independent state in September. The reality, however,was that not only the diplomatic and military policies of the coun-try but also internal matters fell under Japanese governance in manyinstances. A puppet state, as we now call it, was created.

China strongly objected to the Japanese moves and immediatelytook the case to the League of Nations, where heated debates began.In January 1932 the Secretary of State of the United States, HenryL. Stimson made the American position clear, namely that it didnot approve of the Japanese action. Though there was an absenceof any concrete sanctions or measures to curb the Japanese moves,

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on a moral basis, the US clearly sided with the Chinese position.Meanwhile, a mission from the League of Nations headed by SirVictor A.G.B. Lytton was sent to the Far East and a report was for-mulated in October 1932. The report advised that Manchuria bekept under the Chinese sovereignty with extensive rights for self-determination and that an agreement should be reached betweenJapan and China on the nature of this status. The special status ofManchuria in relation to Japan, as it was recognized by the Leagueof Nations, was not enough for Japan, which insisted that the newlyborn puppet state should be recognized by the international com-munity. A vote on the report took place on 24 February 1933, with44 votes for the report, one against (from Japan), and one absten-tion, which was Thailand. The Japanese delegation ceremonially leftthe room and one month later Japan formally withdrew from theLeague of Nations. The realistic avoidance of isolation learned inthe aftermath of the Japan-China War in 1895 thus met with severedefeat.

For Japan the independence of Manchuria became essential tosecure this area under its own sphere of inuence and to ensure thedevelopment of a self-sucient economy, particularly in terms of nat-ural resources. After the Manchurian Incident Japanese external pol-icy began to bear a strong notion of national interest and nationaldefence, which was primarily aimed toward establishing a self-sup-porting sphere of inuence, based, above all, on military power.Various policy options and ideas as they had appeared after the vic-tory of the Russo-Japanese War and developed through the 1910sand 1920s, were gradually replaced by this single direction. Thenotion that Japan was the leading power to represent a new Asiabecame strong in supporting this direction.

The military took the lead in this direction, and the governmentin general supported it. On the domestic front, the Taisho Democracywas gradually replaced by rigid control, restricting freedom of thoughtand expression.9 Though society was lled with tension, the major-ity of the Japanese people, either with ardent enthusiasm supportedit, or, with tacit approval, acknowledged it.

9 The Peace Preservation Law which had already been enacted in 1925 becamethe basis of control.

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Undeclared War with China

After Manchuria came under Japanese control in the form of thepuppet state, the primary attention of the army and some of theTokyo-based leaders shifted to the situation in China. China wasstill in turmoil. The nationalist government nally unied the coun-try in December 1928, but the leadership struggle between the nation-alists and the communists was far from over. It developed into anopen ght between the two political forces, but strong Chinese indig-nation against Japans oppressive moves was the underlying reasonthe nation united.

Admittedly there was serious concern in Japan that a deeperinvolvement in China would not ensure a stable sphere of interest.But Japan actually chose a path toward deeper involvement.

In July 1937 a minor clash between Japanese and Chinese troopsnear Beijing took place, which became the beginning of the UndeclaredWar with China. In September 1937 the second round of coalitionbetween the nationalists and the communists took shape. Faced withstern opposition from the nationalist government now united withthe communist forces, the Japanese military actions spread to thesouth, and in December 1937 they attacked Nanjing, where later itbecame known that the worst atrocities during the war with Chinawere committed by the Japanese army.

In the latter part of 1937 some eorts to seek an armistice withChina had been conducted, but by early 1938 no agreement hadbeen reached. Although further eorts to reach a ceasere were notterminated, the emphasis now shifted to the establishment of a regimethat would be friendly to Japan. After series of endeavours, consul-tations and manipulations, a puppet government headed by WangChing-wei was established in March 1940. From the point of viewof seeking accord with the real ghting power, namely the nation-alist-communist government, this step was nothing but another steptowards further complications.

Relations with global powers in Europe

From the time of the withdrawal from the League of Nations, whileengaging itself in the exercise of strengthening her sphere of inuencein Manchuria and China, Japan also tried to re-establish a viablepolicy of alliances with the major powers of the world, in continu-

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ation with her policy of realism to avoid isolation and seek under-standing of Japans policy objectives. At the aftermath of the Man-churian incident, there were at least three options open to Japan inthis regard.

The rst approach was to regain the condence of Great Britainand America. Some maintained that it might be possible to resortto the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Others tried to exert inuence toimprove relations with the United States. An attempt was made byJapan to conclude agreements such as the Takahara-Root Agreementof 1908, but all these eorts did not bear fruit.

The second approach was to seek harmony with Russia, possiblyin the form of a nonaggression treaty. It did not prove to be suc-cessful either.

Thus the third approach began to acquire a higher priority. Thatapproach was to enter into a new alliance with Germany and pos-sibly with Italy. At a time when Japan was expanding her activitiesaround the Chinese continent, in Europe Adolf Hitlers Germanywas rapidly gaining power. Increasingly, military ocers, politiciansand foreign ministry ocials emerged, who sympathized with andadmired the German success in dismantling the existing status quo.

In 1936 the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded between Japanand Germany. This step led to serious deliberation in 1938 and1939, whether or not to conclude an alliance between Japan, Germanyand Italy. Hitlers invasion of Poland in September 1939 heightenedthe debates between those who supported Germany and those whothought that further action to narrow the proximity with Germanymight fatally alienate America. The nal decision regarding the con-clusion of the treaty was taken by Yosuke Matsuoka, a retired ForeignMinistry ocial who became the Foreign Minister in July 1940. Hisstrategy was that stronger ties with Germany and Italy would con-solidate Japans position and allow her to enter into a reasonableagreement with America. Thus in September 1940 the so-calledTriple Alliance was concluded.

Although the idea of concluding a nonaggression agreement withRussia failed, the necessity to ensure a more secure relationship withthis country, which undoubtedly was gaining strength under her newleader Iosif V. Stalin, came to be shared by many government lead-ers and diplomats. Particularly the two border incidents which tookplace in 1938 at Lake Khasan (Zhangufeng) outside the northernKorean border in the Soviet Union and in 1939 at Nomonhan

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(Khalkhin Gol) near the Outer Mongolian border in northern Man-churia, where Japan was overwhelmingly defeated, created a seriousconcern among the army about the possibility of a direct clash withthe Soviet Union. On Stalins side, he also found reasons to enterinto accord with Japan with a view to prepare for a possible clashwith Hitler. Foreign Minister Matsuoka seized this opportunity andin April 1941 a neutrality pact was signed between Japan and theSoviet Union.

Relations with America until the Pacic War

Whether it was so intended or whether it was a result of severalchains of events which led to an unavoidable consequence, towardsthe end of the 1930s tension between Japan and the United Statesrose to a dangerous level.

For America, Japans rigorous way of expanding her sphere ofinuence from Manchuria into mainland China simply could not beoverlooked.

In July 1939 America decided to abrogate the Treaty of Commerceand Navigation with Japan as a rst step to introduce sanctionsagainst Japan. After the expiration of the treaty in January 1940,America introduced an approval system for the export of gasolineand scrap iron. It caused economic damage to Japan, but contraryto US expectations, rather than adopting a more conciliatory policywith regard to America, Japan developed an acute fear of a possi-ble shortage of basic industrial and strategic resources such as oil orsteel, and decided to further expand her sphere of inuence to ensurethose resources, this time in September 1940 to the northern partof Indochina, where there had emerged a power vacuum becauseof Frances defeat in Europe.

To make the situation worse, Hitlers decision to attack Stalin inJune 1941 and the initial amazing victories over the Soviet armyinvigorated the Japanese army, and in July 1941 it entered the south-ern part of Indochina. The United States almost immediately reactedto this and froze Japanese assets in America and in August declaredan overall embargo on oil to Japan. At that point the imminent dan-ger of war should have been felt by everyone.

Last minute eorts, however, to avoid the war continued. Alreadyin April of that year a draft Understanding was proposed by theAmerican side, based on some agreements which had been negoti-

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ated among private individuals of the two countries, concerned aboutthe state of aairs. The key issues were the Triple Alliance andChina. On the alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy, Japanunderlined its defensive character and the US stated her intentionnot to take active part in the war in Europe. On China, Americaagreed to recommend to the Chinese government a settlement withJapan, with such conditions as ensuring Chinas independence, theJapanese armys withdrawal, recognition of Manchuria, and an opendoor principle. Yosuke Matsuoka, however, upon his return fromMoscow after signing the Neutrality Pact, refused to accept this draftUnderstanding as a basis for negotiations and came up with a totallynew and rigorous proposal, which naturally disappointed the Americansand was rejected by them. Thus the rst opportunity, if any, of anal stage agreement was gone.

In July Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, having realized thatForeign Minister Matsuokas approach to the US was not conduciveto bring about peace with America, reshued his cabinet and selecteda new Foreign Minister. In August, after the turmoil from Japansmove to southern Indochina and the sharp American reaction againstit, Konoe still fervently hoped that a summit meeting with P