JVS Fall 2009 Bengali Uskokov-libre

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Journal of Vaishnava Studies

PublisrDeepak Heritage Books

Hampton, Virginia

In Coopration WitDepartment of Philosophy and Religios Stdies

CHristopHer NeWport UNiVersitY

Newport News, Virginia 23606

Snior editorsSteven J. Rosen

( JoUrNal of V aisHNaVa stUDies)Graham M. Schweig

(CHristopHer NeWport UNiVersitY )

Managing editorSteven J. Rosen

Associat editorsE. H. Rick Jarow

( V assar College)

Dsign/ProductionBarbara Berasi

Intrnational Advisory BoardGy L. Beck

(tUlaNe UNiVersitY )

Edwin F. Bryant (r Utgers UNiVersitY )

Gerald T. Carney

(H ampDeN-s YDNeY College) Amarnath Chatterjee

(DelHi UNiVersitY )

Nirmal Narayan Gpta(BeNgali eDUCatioNal f aCilitY ,

Howrah, Calctta)

Barbara Holdrege(UNiVersitY of C aliforNia ,

s aNta B arBara )

Jne McDaniel(College of CHarlestoN)

Joseph T. O’Connell(UNiVersitY of toroNto)


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The Journal of Vaishnava Studies (JVS) is a biannal, interdisciplinary refereed

pblication dedicated to the in-depth stdy of the Vaishnava traditions ofIndia, from ancient times to the present. The jornal presents the researchof Vaishnava scholars and scholars of Vaishnavism, ths representing bothpractitioner and academic perspectives.

Subscribr Information: The Journal of Vaishnava Studies is pblished twotimes a year, Fall and Spring. In the United States, a one-year sbscriptionfor individals is US$42.00; in Canada it is US$52.00 and overseas it isUS$60.00. Back isses are US$47.00 each. For instittions and libraries inthe US and Canada, the annal rate is US$65.00; otside, it is US $75.00. All sbscriptions are to be made payable to “JVS/ A. Deepak Pblishing”and sent to P. O. Box 2130, Poqoson, VA. 23662 USA.

Publising Information: Manscript sbmissions, advertising, books formention and related correspondence shold be sent to the ManagingEditor, JVS, 30 Village Gate Way, Nyack, NY 10960 USA, or by email [email protected]. Manscript sbmissions shold be written in English. If the original isin Sanskrit, Tamil, Hindi, Bengali, or other langages, the athor will be

responsible for the English translation. Special characters, sch as diacriticmarks and/or transliteration techniqes, are determined by the indi- vidal athors. In terms of foreign langage words spelled phonetically oraccording to diacritic systems, therefore, the editors of JVS will not attemptto achieve consistency from one article to the next. Words sch as Krishna(or K®ß∫a) and Braj (or Vraja) will ths be rendered variosly.

Athors are responsible for all statements made in their work and forobtaining permission from copyright owners to reprint or adapt a tableor figre or to reprint a segment of an article consisting of 500 words or

more. To legitimately obtain sch sage, athors shold write to the origi-nal athor(s) and to the pblisher or managing editor of the qoted work. The JVS is a refereed pblication. All entries are reviewed by at least two(anonymos) qalified scholars in the field prior to pblication. For acceptedcontribtions, final editorial decisions, in terms of content and style, rest with JVS editors alone. Opinions expressed in athored articles do not nec-essarily represent the views of the editors or pblisher. Copyrigt ©2009 A. Dpak Publising, Inc. The copyright of all printed

material in JVS rests with A. Deepak Pblishing and the athors. No partof this pblication may be sed, in any form or by any means, withot permis-sion of the pblisher, the Managing Editor, and the athor. Printed in theUnited States of America. (ISSN 1062-1237)


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JOURNAL OF VAIShNAVA STUDIeS

Volume 18 No. 1 Fall 2009

Introduction

Josp T. O’Connll / “Kirtan O Gramin Krishti” (“Kirtan andVillage Culture”): The Final Chapter of Hitesranjan Sanyal’sBangla Kirtaner Itihas (“History of Bengal Kirtan”)

Jason D. Fullr‑/ Bengali Vaishnava Homelands

Alksandar Uskokov /Bengali Vaishnava Epistemology

Kiyokazu Okita /A Bengali Vaishnava Contribution to Vedånta: Baladeva Vidyåbhüsana on the Word ‘atha’ in the Brahmasütra 1.1.1

Lna A. Tanja / Expecting the Unexpected: The Secret of “the Gift”in the Bengali Vaishnava Tradition

Satyanarayana Dasa /The Concept of Bhagavån in Bengal Vaishnavism as found in Jiva Goswami’s Bhagavat-sandarbha

Danurdara Swami/Ûrila Bhaktisiddhånta and Rågånuga-sådhana-bhakti

Graam M. Scwig /Toward A Constructive and ComparativeTheology of Krishna Bhakti for Contemporary Bengal Vaishnavism

Book Rviws

About t Contributors

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Introduction

The religios path known as Vaishnavism can be described as devo-tion to Krishna, Råma, Vishn, or any of his divine incarnations. It isseen by its adherents as a type of monotheism in which worship of a

personal God is the focs. In sheer nmbers, it prevails as the leading reli-gios system over Shaivism, Shaktism, and the many other paths commonlyassociated with Hind dharma . There are ancient scriptral texts that form the basis of this religion: theVedas , the Prånas, the Mahåbhårata (inclding the Bhagavad-gîtå ), theRåmåyana , and the writings of the great åcåryas . Some of these texts dateback to at least the second centry B.C., with an oral tradition that goes backto antiqity. Vaishnavism is known as sanåtana dharma , or “the eternal fnc-tion of the sol,” and adherents also refer to it as bhakti-yoga , or “the devo-tional path throgh which one can link with the Spreme.”

The religion of Vaishnavism is expressed in varios ways throghot theIndian sbcontinent. One sch expression is Bengali or Ga∂îya Vaishnav-ism. This is a form of the religion that began in sixteenth-centry Bengal with the great avatåra /saint Ûrî Chaitanya Mahåprabh (1486–1533), bt which participates in the mch older form of the tradition. It is called gau- ∂îya becase Ûrî Chaitanya proclaimed his mission in the region that wasthen known as Ga∂adeΩa. This extended throghot the sothern sideof the Himalayan Montains and the northern part of the Vindhyå Hills, which is called Åryåvarta, or the land of the Åryans. This portion of India isdivided into ve parts or provinces: Sårasvata (Kashmir and the Pnjab),

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introduCtion


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The JOURNAL OF VAIShNAVA STUDIeS

Kånyakbja (Uttar Pradesh, inclding the modern city of Lcknow),

Madhya-ga∂a (Madhya Pradesh), Maithila (Bihar and part of Bengal), andUtkala (a portion of Bengal and all of Orissa). The celebrated ancient capital of Ga∂adeΩa, or Ga∂a, was sitated in what is now the modern district of Maldah. The seat of the Sena dynasty,this capital was eventally transferred to the ninth or central island on the western side of the Ganges at Navadvîpa, which is now known as Måyåpra(althogh at that time it was called Ga∂apra). Chaitanya Mahåprabhappeared in that area, and so Ga∂îya Vaishnavism natrally took on that

nomenclatre to commemorate the event. There are scholars, however, who arge that since the term “Ga∂îya”refers only to Bengal or Ga∂adeΩa, it is not appropriate as an overall namefor the religios tradition. The ideological aspect of Ga∂îya Vaishnavism,they say, extends beyond the designated parameters of Ga∂adeΩa, and sothey prefer to call the tradition “Chaitanya Vaishnavism” or “Chaitanyaite Vaishnavism,” which is apparently more accrate in the sense that the reli-gion is based on the inspiration and teaching of Ûrî Chaitanya—not on a

geographical location. Addressing this objection, there is a scholarly contingent who have point-ed ot that there is a material Ga∂a (the land in and arond Bengal) anda spirital one—Ga∂a ma∫∂ala—which is the “sacred space” of the samearea. This conception is reinforced by the etymology of the word “Ga∂îya,”for the primary non, gu∂a (anglicized as gur ), which literally refers tomolasses, or sweetness, can be extended to the adjective gau∂a , the nameof the contry associated with Ga∂îya Vaishnavism. This is a grammatical,

poetic, and even spirital derivation, since Ga∂îya Vaishnavism is viewedby its practitioners as the clmination of a long spirital evoltion, like theproverbial icing on an already delicios cake. Adherents consider Ga∂îya Vaishnavism the cap on the Vaishnava tradition—it adds the necessary“sweetness” to a delectable recipe. The secret ingredient, say the Ga∂îyas, isÛrî Rådhå, for it is her sweet devotion to Krishna that embodies the essenceof Ga∂îya Vaishnavism. Her madhu-sneha , or honey-like love, was not fllyrevealed before the time of Ûrî Chaitanya Mahåprabh.

Rabindranath Tagore and others have written abot the profsion with which sgarcane grows in Bengal, and that the sweetness of that regionoverows into many aspects of everyday life, not least in the indigenosreligion. Sch writers are qick to point ot that Ga∂îya Vaishnavism,nlike other forms of Vaishnavism, emphasizes mådhurya , or the sweet

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Introduction

love of God, as opposed to aiΩvarya , or God’s majesty. Conseqently, the

title “Ga∂îya” has deeper implications than one might at rst sspect.Ordinary or conventional nderstanding (såmånya ) of terms sch asGa∂îya tells only one side of the story; bt the tradition gives anotherperspective, one that is infsed with a spirital sensibility ( påramårthika ).

A real Ga∂îya Vaiß∫ava, then, is not one who merely lives in Ga∂a btone who lives for gau∂a : one who lives for the sweetness associated with thelove and worship of Rådhå and Krishna. A Ga∂îya Vaishnava is one who isabsorbed in Rådhå-Krishna and in Chaitanya Mahåprabh—and in their

divine service. Indeed, whether sch a person is called a Bengali Vaishnavaor a Ga∂îya Vaishnava or what have yo, he or she is a servant of theDivine, first and foreforemost.

In this volme, we allow the Bengali Vaishnava tradition to nfold bybeginning with an overview article written by Josp T. O’Connll, one ofthe leading scholars of Bengali stdies in the West. His paper is essentiallya translation of Båõgla Kîrtaner Itihås’ final chapter, which focses on theorigins of Bengal Vaishnavism as a movement. Originally written by Indian

historian Hitesranjan Sanyal in Bengali, O’Connell offers s not only atranslation bt a lengthy introdction and notes, providing special insightinto the work and the tradition. This leads into an article by Jason Fullr who discsses Bengali Vaishnava “homelands,” both in the sense of earthly“regions” that have special meaning for Bengali Vaishnavas (i.e., Måyåpr,Navadvîp, V®ndåvana, and so on) as well as the spirital conterparts ofthese same land areas. Next, Alksandar Uskokov takes s into the complex world of Bengali

Vaishnava epistemology, explaining how the tradition views knowledge assch as well as the varios acceptable methods for acqiring knowledge.Picking p on these self-same methods, Kiyokazu Okita looks at the all-too-pregnant word “atha ” in Brahmasütra 1.1.1, a seminal text in the Bengali Vaishnava tradition, elcidating the insights of traditional Vaishnava com-mentators, inclding Ga∂îya Vedåntists. Lna A. Tanja , too, engagesclassical philosophical thinking as she explores Jacqes Derrida’s theory of“the pre gift” throgh the lens of the well-known Krishna/Sdåmå story, in

which the Lord’s devotee brings Him a gift, expecting nothing in retrn. All sch philosophical meandering reaches its zenith in the Bengalidiscssion of God in His topmost personal form. This is the sbject ofSatyanarayana Dasa ’s paper, which focses on “Bhagavan” as opposed to“Brahman,” or the sweet personal Absolte, known as Krishna, in contrast

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The JOURNAL OF VAIShNAVA STUDIeS

with the amorphos void known as “Spreme” in the varios schools of Advaita Vedånta. Satyanarayana takes s on a jorney throgh traditional lit-eratre and the realizations of the sages, focsing mainly on Jîva Gosvåmî’sBhagavata Sandarbha , a densely philosophical text establishing the sprema-cy of Bhagavån realization and the personality of Krishna. Danurdara Swami then directs or attention to more modern times, when the renowned and scholarly spirital master, Ûrîla BhaktisiddhåntaSarasvatî (1874–1937), proposed novel changes in the established traditionfor pragmatic reasons. Deeply considering the era in which he lived, as wellas his adience, Bhaktisiddhånta chose to de-emphasize the more esotericaspects of Bengali Vaishnavism, and he was criticized for it. DhanrdharaSwami explains this lminary’s decision, looking at his philosophical andhistorical reasoning. In the end, the swami shows, Bhaktisiddhånta was notdeviating from the tradition in the slightest, bt was rather reforming it andbringing it into a modern context.

If Dhanrdhara Swami examines the life, teachings, and motives of oneof the twentieth-centry’s leading Vaishnavas (Bhaktisiddhånta Sarasvatî),Graam Scwig thoroghly analyzes that stalwart’s leading disciple, A. C.Bhaktivedånta Swåmî Prabhpåda (1896–1977), the fonder-åchårya of theInternational Society for Krishna Consciosness (ISKCON), as a brilliantcontemporary theologian. Schweig does this, primarily, by looking at thetexts Prabhpåda chose as his focs, and also by analyzing the all-important words prema, bhakti , and rasa , so fndamental to both the larger Bengali Vaishnava tradition and to ISKCON’s more modern expression of it.

—Steven J. Rosen

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ALeKSANDAR USKOKOV 54

will, I hope, contribte to the originality of this article, going beyond its

expository prposes.Throghot this paper yo will nd bits of comparison to Western phi-

losophers. Clearly my goal is not a serios comparative stdy; that woldreqire a longer article than this. However, I am sre that ideas are likeseeds that can frctify, and ths I did not want to dispense with offering thecomparative in a seedlike form. I assme that or readers are familiar with the metaphysical standpointsof Vedånta in general and of Ga∂îya Vedånta in particlar, and therefore I

will not treat them at all. This also holds tre for the etymology of the word“Ga∂îya.” For the rst ve parts of this paper my principal sorce is theVedånta-syamantaka of Baladeva Vidyåbhüßa∫a,1 and from the sixth sectionon, sbtitled “The Sbject of Knowledge,” I primarily rely on the writings of A. C. Bhaktivedånta Swami Prabhpåda. I will also draw from the Tattva-sandarbha of Jîva Gosvåmî and from two commentaries thereon: Jîva Gosvåmî’sato-commentary titled Sarva-saµvådinî and Baladeva Vidyåbhüßa∫a’s com-mentary titled Tattva-sandarbha-†ippa∫î .

Prlud to t Mtods of Knowldgin t Indian Pilosopical Tradition

Before moving to what Ga∂îya Vedånta recognizes as methods of knowl-edge in the broader context of the Indian philosophical tradition, we needto say a few words abot the general framework of the theory of knowledge.In terms of this framework, the representatives of Ga∂îya Vedånta mainlyaccept the formlations of Nyåya-darΩana. So the rst thing we need to

mention is the terminological distinction between jñåna and pramå . Theterm jñåna can be translated as “knowledge” in the sense of cognition,or content of consciosness. “The characteristic mark of cognition is: theimmediate knowledge that becomes the sbject of the consciosness, hav-ing the form I know.”2 Knowledge is classied as representative (recollec-tion, sm®ti ) and given (experience, anubhava ), and there are two kinds ofexperience: valid and invalid. “Valid apprehension is that in which an object is known as possessing

attribtes it really possesses, e.g., the apprehension of silver arising in anobject where there is silverness. This is also known as the valid knowledge( pramå ) of a thing.”3

“That is non-valid apprehension in which an object is known as having anattribte which it does not have in reality: e.g., the apprehension of silver


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Bengali Vaishnava Epistemology 55

arising in a piece of mother-of-pearl. This indeed is called false cognition

(apramå ).”4 Valid cognition is not only jñåna , content of consciosness, bt also

pramå , correspondence of experience with reality. Obviosly, this is a theo-ry of trth as correspondence. We also have to mention that jñåna is a termsed mch more often with different meanings. It refers to consciosnessas an antonym of insensibility, knowledge as an antonym of ignorance, andso on. Bt, from a strictly gnoseological viewpoint, the distinction between jñåna and pramå mst be preserved. Ths a method of knowledge in the

Indian tradition is always a method of certain knowledge. Therefore bearin mind that by “knowledge” we mean certain knowledge and not jst anycontent of consciosness. In Sanskrit the method of knowledge is known as pramå∫a . Pramå∫a is pramå-kara∫a —an instrment for gaining correct knowledge (Nyåya-bhåßå 5). In Sarva-saµvådinî , the ato-commentary by Jîva Gosvåmî on his ownTattva-sandarbha , he lists ten methods of knowledge prominent in the vari-os schools of Indian philosophy. Baladeva Vidyåbhüßa∫a—in Vedånta-sya-

mantaka and in his commentary on the Tattva-sandarbha —lists nine meth-ods, one less than Jîva. We will go throgh all ten. Bt we will not considerall the nances and differences in the nderstandings of these methods inthe varios schools. There are differences, no dobt, and certainly we willmention some. Bt the actal interest for s is what the representatives ofGa∂îya Vedånta thoght of the ten methods of knowledge, and what thatmeant to them.

Here we shold also mention that these ten methods of knowledge

(apart from Ωabda , testimony) receive no extensive critiqe from Jîva andBaladeva. A good many of them (mainly those which can be sbsmednder the three principal or independent methods) do not deserve anextensive critiqe, and the reasons for this lack of criticism are simple. First,the theory of knowledge oght to be primarily interesting for the possibili-ties of certain knowledge; probable knowledge is interesting to those whofancy mental gymnastics, bt it cannot plead for a central position in anengaged philosophy that ascribes no vale whatsoever to what is temporary

and ncertain. If it is possible to demonstrate in a simple manner that somemethod of knowledge cannot provide certainty, its frther extensive treat-ment is inconseqential.

Second (this reason is connected with the rst), the qestions that sti-mlate the inqiry into the possibilities, methods, and limits of knowledge


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simltaneosly determine the treatment of the inqiry. No matter how

interesting the qestions might be abot a priori and a posteriori knowledgeor abot the natre of the laws of physics and mathematics (in a Hmeanand Kantian sense), they can never be the most essential qestions. What

we really want to know is: Who am I? Is my existence meaningfl or sense-less? Am I sentenced to temporality, or I am eternal? Is there a way to ndot my tre natre?5

The answers are beyond the reach of the faclties of sensal intition,beyond the nderstanding (which, even if endowed with a priori categories,mst still operate with the sensal intitions, becase withot them it isempty; its sole fnction is to make the sense intitions “see”), and beyond themind (which inevitably enmeshes itself in its antinomies and lacks the lumennaturale that St. Aqinas thoght it possessed). Since my breakthrogh, onmy own, into transcendence is impossible, all that is left for me is to hopethat a ray of transcendence or divine light will descend pon me. And thisprespposes sbmission to God’s revelation; at that point, all interest in the

sbtleties of sensal knowledge, the nderstanding, and the mind stops.

The Ten Methods of Knowledge

1. Sense perception ( pratyakßa 6) Sense perception is the basic knowledge from which all other knowledge

comes. Its origin is the contact of the senses with sense objects. “The cog-nition born from the contact of the sense organ with its object is called

pratyakßa , perception, as in: I see this pot with my own eyes.”7 Some phi-losophers in India think that the differentia specica of perception is notthe direct contact of the senses with the sense objects; otherwise, how do

we explain that God sees everything in spite of having no senses? We canexplain this method of knowledge only by the immediacy of cognition, thefact that this knowledge is not a prodct of either prior knowledge or someprocess of reasoning.8 With the langage of phenomenology, we wold saythat perception is the immediacy of the objects to consciosness.

There are two modes of sense perception: indeterminate (nirvikalpaka )and determinate (savikalpaka ). Indeterminate perception is the primarycognitive act, in which the object and its diverse characteristics are notperceived as related. Tarka-saµgraha , the standard manal on the Nyåya-

VaiΩeßika system (written by Annaµbha††a, ca. 1600), describes indetermi-


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nate perception as characterized by the apprehension, This is something . For

example, while perceiving an apple, we perceive something that has a shape,color, fragrance, and so on. However, we do not think of it as an apple.

“Sppose on the rst day of yor examination yo enter the bathroomengrossed in thinking abot the possible qestions and their answers. It isnot nlikely that yo may nish yor bath withot thinking of the watersed by yo as water, as cold , etc. Yet it cannot be said that yo did not per-ceive the water. Bt for a very real perception of it, yor act of bathing can-not be explained. This perception of water and its characteristics, withot

any thoght or judgment of it as water, as liquid, as cold, etc., is the nirvikalpaka or indeterminate perception of it.”9

When we process this aggregate of indeterminate perceptions with theaid of the different categories of predication, we end p with a determinateperception, and then we say that the perceived object is an apple, a cow, or whatever. Ths determinate perception is cognition of the object as markedby some characteristic. At that time the perceived object becomes a sbject(in a logical sense) to which attribtes are predicated.

There is one more mode of pratyakßa , namely recognition ( pratyabhijñå ).Recognition means cognition of something already known by cognition. An example: “This mst be the same restarant that I visited the last time I was in Prage.” Depending pon which sense comes in direct contact with its object,perception is classied as six kinds.10 We have ve external senses and,correspondingly, ve kinds of external perception: visal, aditory, tactile,gstatory, and olfactory. We have also an internal sense organ (anta˙-kara∫a

or manas , the mind), which perceives or states of consciosness—desire,aversion, willing, pleasre, pain, and cognition. The contact of the mind with these psychical states and processes is called mental perception. The school of Nyåya frther classies perception into ordinary and ex-traordinary, and they are on their part sbdivided into categories, bt this isbeyond the scope of or ndertaking.

2. Infrnc (anumåna 11)

“Inference is the instrment of drawing conclsions, as in the example:There is a re on the hill, becase there is smoke. The cognition of re is aconclsion. The instrment of this conclsion is the cognition of smoke.”12 Anumåna is knowledge which follows from some other knowledge. It isactally a process of drawing a conclsion from some mark (liõga ), stand-ing for given knowledge, on the basis of niversal concomitance (vyåpti )


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between the conclsion and the mark. Take the classic example: While

walking in natre, we perceive smoke rising from a hill. This is a sensalcognition—knowledge originating from the contact of the eye with thesensm. Bt this simltaneosly serves as a mark or sign of the presence ofre on the hill. Fire is drawn as a conclsion from the mark of smoke. Andthe conclsion is drawn becase we know that there is a reglar, invariantconcomitance (vyåpti ) between smoke and re.

One more classic example: In s there is the cognition that Devadatta13 ismortal. This cognition comes from the knowledge that Devadatta is marked

with the attribte of hmanity (in the sense of membership in a class) andfrom being acqainted with the invariant concomitance of hmanity withmortality.

Inference as a propositional strctre has members flly correspondent with the terms of Aristotelian logic. To present these members, let s lookat the classic inference in an otline:

- The hill is on re (or there is a re on the hill);

- becase there is smoke; - wherever there is smoke, there is also re.

The hill in this inference plays the role of pakßa , a sbject abot whichsomething is to be demonstrated or afrmed. It is correspondent with theminor term in an Aristotelian syllogism. Fire plays the role of sådhya , that which is spposed to be demonstrated or predicated abot a sbject. It iscorrespondent with the major term in an Aristotelian syllogism. Finally, the

smoke plays the role of liõga , a mark of something, from which a concl-sion is conseqent; or of hetu , a reason for the conclsion; or of sådhana ,a means by which the conclsion is drawn. It is correspondent with themiddle term in an Aristotelian syllogism. In a cognitive sense, the seqence of apprehension corresponds to thedistribtion of the two premises and the conclsion in an Aristotelian syl-logism. What we are cognizant of rst is that there is smoke on the hill (theminor premise). Then we remind orselves that wherever there is smoke

there is also re (the major premise). Finally, we conclde that there mstbe re on the hill. However, as far as the formal expression of or cogni-tion is concerned, Indian logicians claim that it has to follow the otlinedstrctre. And it is appropriate to remember at this point that the word pramå∫a , apart from method of knowledge, also stands for demonstration


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or proof. Ths it is no wonder that the strctre of inference in Indian

logic does not correspond to the strctre of Aristotle’s syllogism, bt rath-er with the strctre of the demonstration, in which the conclsion is givenrst and the argments second. The inference otlined above is called svårthånumåna , an inference foroneself. Indian logicians distingish svårthånumåna from parårthånumåna ,inference for others. They consider that an inference as a conclsive proofappropriate for the comprehension of others has to be expressed in vepropositions, called anvayas , sccessors or members. These members,

exemplied with instances, are as follows:

- assertion ( pratijñå ): Socrates is mortal; - reason (hetu ): becase he is a man; - general rle or niversal proposition, spported by known instanc-

es (udåhara∫a ): all men are mortal; - application of the general rle in the particlar case (upanaya ):

Socrates is a man;

- conclsion (nigamana ): therefore he is mortal.

One remark abot the third member: It seems to me that the instance ismeant to grond or inference in reality and to protect it from the dangerof formalism, in the sense that a tre conclsion can follow from false prem-ises provided the strctre of the proposition is valid. The third member ofthe inference also looks like an attempt to join the niversal qantication with the particlar qantication, thanks to which the major premise wold

not mean: “If there is sch a thing as a man, then that thing wold also bemortal”; bt rather “There is indeed sch a thing as a man, and that thing ismortal.” Indian logicians classify inference—apart from inference for oneself andinference for others—in varios ways and on varios gronds. For s, it isimportant to mention the classication based on the type of relation of themiddle term to the major term.14 A prely positive inference occrs whenthe middle term is only positively related to the major term, and we get the

knowledge of concomitance between the middle and the major term by themethod of agreement in presence. An example:

- All knowable objects are namable; - the pot is a knowable object; - therefore the pot is namable.


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This is actally a niversal, afrmative conclsion drawn from niversal,

afrmative premises. (This inference is correspondent to the rst gre inMedieval logic, known as the Barbara modus .) A prely negative inference occrs when the middle term is only negative-ly related to the major term. It is a reslt of the concomitance of the absenceof the major term and the absence of the middle term. An example:

- That which is not different from other elements has no smell; - the earth has smell;

- therefore the earth is different from other elements.

A mixed inference occrs when the middle term is related to the majorterm both positively and negatively. There is an invariant concomitancebetween the middle term and the major term both in the sense of pres-ence and in the sense of absence. The niversal premise is afrmative whenit is an effect of the apprehension of positive instances, or agreement inpresence; it is negative when it is an effect of the apprehension of negative

instances, or agreement in absence. Examples:

- All smoky objects are ery; - the hill is smoky; - therefore the hill is ery.

And:

- No non-ery object is smoky; - the hill is smoky; - therefore the hill is ery.

3. Tstimony (Ωabda )“Testimony is the word of a trstworthy person, like in the sentence: Thereare ve trees on the bank of the river; or in: He who desires heaven shold worship by performing the agniß†oma sacrice.”15 Baladeva will pay special

attention to testimony after the critiqe of sense perception and inference.For now, sfce it to say that valid testimony refers to the prononcementsof a trstworthy person, and “trstworthy” is he who speaks abot a stateof affairs as it actally is. This testimony can be sacred (vaidika – Vedic; theprononcements of God himself) and mndane (laukika – hman). The


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61

sacred testimony is certain in all circmstances, while the mndane testi-

mony is certain only if the person is trstworthy. The treatment of Ωabda inthe schools of Nyåya and Karma-mîmåµså is very interesting and importantfor the philosophy of langage, bt the scope of or ndertaking gives sno license to dwell on that.

4. Comparison (upamåna )“Comparison is the instrment of knowledge derived from analogy. It islike the sentence: Gavaya is similar to a cow. Analogy is the cognition of

the relation of the name and the object it denotes. The instrment of anal-ogy is the cognition of similarity.”16 Upamåna is, then, the sorce of orknowledge abot the relationship between the word and its denotation. If,for example, we do not know what a wild cow (gavaya ) is, and some experi-enced and reliable forester tells s, “Gavaya is something similar to a cow,”then, if we happen to see some gavaya when we go to the forest and remem-ber the forester’s words, the cognition, “This is a gavaya ,” occrs in s. Inthis way the relationship between the word and its denotation is established.

The instrment, thanks to which this relationship between the word and itsdenotation is established, is the similarity between the gavaya and the cow.This is how comparison is explained in the school of Nyåya.

In Karma-mîmåµså it is nderstood in a different way. Cognition is pro-dced from comparison when, while perceiving an object similar to someobject that we already know, we apprehend that the object we are alreadyfamiliar with is similar to the object we are becoming acqainted with.Ths, if a man knows what a cow is and goes to the forest, he may see a

gavaya and apprehend its similarity to the cow. In this way he can nd otthat the cow is similar to the gavaya .

5. T postulat (arthåpatti 17)“A postlate is the hypothesis of other circmstances as the case, fromthe observation of the (sal) circmstances not occrring. Like in thesentence: The fat Devadatta does not eat dring the day. Becase Devadattadoes not eat dring the day, his fatness cannot be (nder sch circm-

stances). Therefore this introdces his noctrnal eating (as the case ofhis fatness).”18 The postlate is, then, an assmption of a certain fact asthe case of a state of affairs, withot which this state cold not have takenplace. As sch, we se postlates in or daily life. Not nding in the trnkof my car the bag lled with goods from the market that I left there (I went

Bengali Vaishnava Epistemology


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back to the market to by some more things, and I did not lock the trnk),

I conclde (and postlate) with annoyance—and, if I am a fragile natre, intears—that someone mst have stolen it. If I look for my friend at his homeand I cannot nd him, knowing that he is alive, I postlate that he mst besomewhere else; otherwise, we cold not explain why he who is in fact aliveis not home. The adherents of Karma-mîmåµså classify two types of postlate: d®ß†år- thåpatti —postlating a fact which is essential for explaining somethingseen (Devadatta’s fatness or the absence of the bag in the trnk) and d®ß†år-

thåpatti —postlating a fact which is essential for explaining something thatis heard. And for the second there are also contless examples. If my wifeshots at me, “It is over!” I have to postlate the addition “with or mar-riage” to her exclamation to make sense of it. When a word cannot makesense in its literal meaning, we have to postlate a grative meaning. Forexample, in the sentence “Indstry is the key to sccess,” we have to pos-tlate that key is sed in the sense of means ; otherwise, the sentence will besenseless. And when someone approaches me on the streets of Skopje, say-

ing, “Hey gys, can I ask yo something?”19 I have to postlate a singlarnmber, thogh the literal meaning necessitates the plral; otherwise, theprononcement will lack any sense. Arthåpatti , or postlate, is often compared with the disjnctive hypotheticalsyllogism. The similarities between them are nmeros, bt insfcient tosggest fll eqivalence. For the conseqences are what are essential for thehypothetical syllogism, while arthåpatti is a search for the grond or casefor the state of affairs. (Arthåpatti is accepted as an independent means of

knowledge by followers of Karma-mîmåµså and Advaita-vedånta.20) 6. Non-prcption (anupalabdhi )“By the non-perception of a pot its nonexistence [or absence] is ascer-tained. Bt non-perception is absence of perception. Ths, by the proof ofnonexistence we conclde to the nonexistence of the pot.”21 This methodof knowledge is also called nonexistence, absence (abhava ), which is obvi-os from the qote. Nonexistence in this context does not mean absolte

nonexistence, bt absence of the object of knowledge in conditions in which it shold be present. For example, if it is dark and I cannot see thecp on the table (and I know that I have left it there), the fact that I cannotperceive the cp does not give me the right to conclde that the cp is noton the table.


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Only appropriate non-perception ( yogyånupalabdhi ) is the sorce of or

cognition of nonexistence. The argment why non-perception shold beaccepted as a separate means of knowledge is the fact that in anupalabdhi there is no direct contact of the eye with the object of perception, which is exact-ly the criterion pon which the cognition is qalied as sensal. Nor coldit be sbsmed nder inference, for in that case we wold have to spposean invariant concomitance (vyåpti ) of non-perception with nonexistence, which is not the case. For, the niversal afrmative proposition “Whateveris not perceived does not exist” is invalid, and ths we cannot infer from it

to some particlar afrmative conclsion. Non-perception is accepted as anindependent means of knowledge by the followers of the schools of Karma-mîmåµså and Advaita-vedånta.

7. Inclusion (sambhava )“Ten is inclded in one hndred. This assmption of the intellect is calledinclsion.”22 Inclsion is, then, cognition of a smaller qantity that mstbe within a larger qantity. We cold give contless examples: we know

that he who has a thosand dollars has to have one hndred; he who hasa car mst have a steering wheel; he who has three children has to haveone; he who has a ton of coal has to have half a ton (at least ntil consmp-tion). Inclsion is accepted as an independent means of knowledge by theParå∫ikas, the school of bråhma∫as flly conversant with the Prå∫as.

8. Tradition (aitihya )“Tradition is notorios knowledge transmitted in an nbroken chain,

originating from an nknown speaker, like in the sentence: there is a ghostliving in this banyan tree.”23 Tradition is accepted as a separate means ofknowledge by the Parå∫ikas.

9. Gstur (ceß†å )“Some also accept gestre as a means of knowledge. Like, lifting (ten) n-gers may prodce knowledge that there are ten pots, etc.”24 Two modernexamples: the index nger and the middle nger in the position of a V can

signify victory; a st can be indicative of a threat.

10. T words of sags or xaltd prsonalitis (årΩa )This method is flly correspondent with the Pythagorean ipse dixit .


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examination of t Pramå∫as

The materialistic philosophy of Cårvåka accepts only sense perception as a valid method of knowledge. The VaiΩeßikas and the Bddhists, in additionto sense perception, accept inference. Besides these two methods, Såõkhya, Yoga, Jainism, and Vedånta (in the interpretations of Råmånja andMadhva) se the method of testimony. Nyåya accepts comparison, too. Thepostlate is accepted by one branch of Karma-mîmåµså. Another branchof Karma-mîmåµså and Advaita-vedånta also accept non-perception. Along with these six, the Parå∫ikas se tradition and inclsion.25

In Vedånta-syamantaka 1.4–9, Baladeva examines how many pramå∫as can be accepted as independent. He starts with a critiqe of materialism,becase it accepts only sense perception. The Cårvåkas claim that men arein ignorance, fll of misgivings, liable to confsion, and ths have no rightto take a leap in the dark—from what is perceived (e.g., smoke) to what isnot (re). By sense perception it is impossible to be cognizant of that whichis hidden, what is beyond the prview of the senses. And ignorance, misgiv-ings, and mistakes are obstacles for drawing conclsions abot what is con-

cealed. If someone brdened by these shortcomings speaks abot thingsthat lie beyond perception and, conseqently, is ncertain, a sensible per-son will not accept his words. Bt this discorse on ignorance, misgivings, and mixing things p is itselfa demonstration that the Cårvåka philosopher applied the method of infer-ence; otherwise, which sense organ did he apply to apprehend that peopleare in ignorance, fll of misgivings, and erring? And how did he manage toperceive these shortcomings when they are concealed within s, not within

the prview of or senses? So it does not matter how vigorosly the Cårvåkaphilosopher may defend this stance; he himself cancels it in practice. With-ot adopting inference and the knowledge we receive from others, life willbecome impossible. Baladeva mocks the rejection of inference in the fol-lowing way: “Respected follower of Cårvåka, since yo believe only in thedirect evidence of yor senses, why do yo cry so piteosly seeing yor dear wife pregnant by her paramor?”26 Yo did not see it happen—so it did nothappen. Ths, willingly or nwillingly, even one sworn to believing one’s

eyes has to accept inference. Apart from that, by entering into polemics with philosophical opponents,the Cårvåka philosopher infers their standpoints on the basis of the wordsthey have said, and in this way he accepts their words. By his condct hedemonstrates that he nderstood what they wanted to say. And his words


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are also accepted becase he does not indiscriminately speak of the others’

ignorance and so on, bt only after having rst ascertained their words.Only ths will his words make sense to those who are prdent. In this wayhe implicitly endorses testimony as a method of knowledge, i.e., knowledgeof the ignorance of others. VaiΩeßikas accept inference as a valid method of knowledge, bt do notaccept testimony. Rather, they sbsme testimony nder sense perceptionand inference. This is ngronded, becase testimony is or sorce ofknowledge abot what is difclt to obtain throgh sense perception and

inference. For example, or knowledge of the movements of the planetsand stars depends on testimony from others. Practically (perhaps even theo-retically) it is impossible to determine the position of every plant and staron the basis of or perception and inference. We learn from teachers thelaws of mathematics and astronomy sed to calclate the planetary and stel-lar positions; apart from that, instead of doing the calcls orselves, we sepre-calclated ephemerides. So testimony cannot be sbsmed nder per-ception and inference, bt is an independent process we may call adoption.

Comparison cannot be accepted as an independent method of knowl-edge. Depending on its form, it is sbsmed nder perception, inference,or testimony. The cognition occrring in s when we hear the sentence“Gavaya is something like a cow” has the natre of received knowledge(ågama ), which is, no dobt, in the realm of testimony. However, the cognition that the word “gavaya ” signies something similarto a cow (i.e., the process of apprehending the relationship between thename as a sign and the thing signied) is a prodct of inference. This is

how cognition takes place in comparison: “That word which is employed bythe elders in a certain sense (as a sign for a denotatum ) is expressing exactlythat sense (it is sing its primary signicative force), nless the word hassome other force (some grative meaning); like the word ‘cow’ is signify-ing cowness. The word ‘gavaya ’ is sed as something similar to a cow. Thiscognition is comparison indeed.”27 This qote from Vedånta-syamantaka is very cryptic, and we have to nfold it. According to traditional Sanskrit poetics, words have three signicative

fnctions known as Ωabda-v®ttis , or forces of a word. The primary signicativeforce of a word is its literary or dictionary meaning. If it is a general name,it stands for the generic natre of the class,28 bt also for all the separatemembers of that class. We learn this primary signicance of the words fromor elders. The following is a classic example29 of how this goes on. A small


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child still nable to talk hears the older brother tell the middle brother:

“Bring a cow.” Then he notices that the middle brother performs someactivity. And knowing from personal experience that every action presp-poses some knowledge (for, even in order to play with something he knows that he has to get that thing, and perhaps also to nd it), he concldes thatthe activity of the middle brother was indced by something that he learnedfrom the older brother. In short—a sentence prodces knowledge, andknowledge indces one to act.

Bt the child does not yet know what the specic words in the sentence

mean, and that learning is accomplished by the processes of åvåpa (changeto a fresh word in a sentence) and udvåpa (removal of an old word in asentence). The next time the older brother tells the middle brother: “Bringa horse.” The yongest brother again notices that the middle brother isindced to action, bt he also notices: (1) in the prononced sentencesomething remains the same (“bring”), while something changes (instead of“cow,” now it is “horse”); and (2) in the middle brother’s action somethingremains the same (he brings something), while something changes (instead

of a cow, now it is a horse). So the child concldes that the word reoccr-ring in the sentence refers to that which reoccrs in the action, namely theact of bringing, and that which changes in the sentence refers to that whichchanges in the action. Ths the word “cow” in the rst sentence has to referto the cow which the middle brother broght, and the word “horse” in thesecond sentence has to refer to the horse the middle brother broght. The primary meanings of words are classied into two categories: (1)rü∂hi —conventional30 sage, according to particlarity, generic character,

or attribte—“He is ∂ittha .31 This is a cow. This is white.”32 and (2) yoga —the meaning derived from some other word formed by the addition ofan afx—e.g., the word påcaka (chef) is formed from the root pac , whichhas a sense of “cooking” and the agent sfx “ka .” The second signicative force of the word is lakßa∫a-v®tti , or the secondarysage of the word, which implies something nexpressed. The classic exam-ple is “a cowherds’ village in Gaõgå.”33 Becase it is impossible for a villageto be in a river, that which is not stated has to be inferred: It is a cowherds’

village on the bank of the Ganges.The third signicative force of the word (gau∫a-v®tti ) is the grativeor metaphoric sage. Ths when we hear that “Devadatta is a lion,”34 Devadatta is referred to as sch, not becase he is a lion bt becase he hassome qalities similar to a lion’s (strength, corage and so on).


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In comparison we are spposed to be learning the primary force of words.

So bearing this in mind and looking at the qotation from Vedånta-syamantaka, we cold otline the process of comparison in which we learn the pri-mary meaning of words as one inference:

- assertion: the word gavaya refers to something similar to a cow; - reason: becase the elders se it in that sense; - general rle with an instance: words sed by the elders in a par-

ticlar sense signify that primary sense, nless there is some gra-

tive sense (sch as “cow” signifying “cowness”); - application: this is a case in which the elders se the word gavaya

to signify something similar to a cow; - conclsion: the word gavaya is sed to signify something similar to

a cow.

Ths we have the comparison, in which the relationship between the nameand the object named is actally a process of inference.

However, the cognition of similarity with the cow prodced by the directcontact of the senses with a gavaya is sensory knowledge. Ths comparisonin any case cannot be considered an independent means of knowledge. And as for the postlate, it is also in the scope of inference, of the prelynegative type. The whole syllogism can be presented in an otline:

- assertion: Devadatta eats at night; - reason: becase he is fat, and he does not eat dring the day;

- general rle with an instance: he who eats at night cannot be fatif not eating dring the day, jst as he who eats neither dring thenight nor dring the day is not fat;

- application: he is not like that (that is, he is fat); - conclsion: therefore he eats at night.

Non-perception cannot be accepted as an independent method of knowl-edge, either, becase the nonexistence of the object is actally perceived.

In non-perception there is a direct contact of the eye with the space qualied by theattribute of nonexistence of the object. Inclsion is also traditionally sbsmed nder inference, becase “onehndred” means not being bereft of ten; this is a sfcient condition forinferring that ten and other qantities are inclded in one hndred.


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Tradition as sch is not at all a method of valid knowledge, for the credi-

bility of the originator of the belief transmitted in the tradition is ncertain.If it is established that the originator is a trstworthy person, then traditionis in the scope of received knowledge (ågama ) or testimony. The sameholds tre for the athority of the sage (årßa ). If he is trstworthy, his wordsare accepted as testimony; otherwise, he cannot be a sorce of accrateknowledge. Gestre is testimony sing the services of inference. Ths, after examining all the methods of knowledge, we come to the con-

clsion that three of them are independent: sense perception, inference,and testimony. The other seven are within the scope of the other three andths are dependent. Baladeva sbstantiates this with a qotation from theManu-saµhitå .35

Critiqu of Sns Prcption and InfrncIn the next two paragraphs of Vedånta-syamantaka , Baladeva examines whether sense perception and inference offer the certainty we need in

philosophy. As for sense perception, it is able to reach only what is in theimmediate proximity of certainty and yet at an appropriate distance. It can-not grasp what is very far off, like a bird ying, or what is too close, like theeyelids. Perception also depends on or mentality. When we are distrbed,excited, or immersed in thoghts, we might not notice what we wold oth-erwise certainly notice. “My mind was not present; I did not see it.”36 Thalesdid not fall in the ditch by accident.

Sense perception cannot grasp that which is covered, still nmanifested,

mixed, or minte. Ths we cannot perceive the planets and the stars cov-ered by the snshine. We cannot taste yogrt that is there in the milk aspotency, becase it is not manifest. We cannot see the drops of rain mixed with a reservoir of water, and althogh atoms exist, we cannot see thembecase they are too small. As Bhaktivedånta Swami Prabhpåda concldes,“Under these circmstances, whatever we are experiencing at the pres-ent moment is totally conditional and is therefore sbject to mistakes andincompleteness. These mistaken impressions can never be rectied by the

‘mistaker’ himself or by another, similar person apt to commit similar mis-takes.”37 As for inference, we shold remember that inference is anumåna —

knowledge following pon some other knowledge. Therefore its certainty,provided the process of inferring is condcted in a valid way, will depend


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on the certainty of knowledge from which the conclsion is drawn.38 We

can easily realize that errors in perception will case errors in inference.Perception is ncertain even when all the necessary conditions for certaintyexist. Sometimes it creates illsory impressions. We can remind orselvesof a good magician who demonstrates how to saw a girl in half, thogh we know that this cannot be the case. And if he is exceptional, like DavidCoppereld, the impressions will be that mch stronger: Everything is ne with s; we are alert and following his every movement; what he is tryingto do is impossible—bt lo!—the State of Liberty is gone.39 The instance

cited by Jîva and Baladeva is a classic example in Indian philosophical texts:Seeing the illsory severed head of someone we know, we conclde thatit belongs to Devadatta or Yajñadatta,40 bt it is not so. In sch circm-stances the certainty whether sense perception is valid can only come fromsomeone who knows the reality—for instance, Coppereld himself. In itsabsence, the probability of errors in the inference is inevitable. Also, when we conclde from something perceived to something nper-ceived on the grond of the invariant concomitance of the nknown with

the known (like the concomitance of re with smoke), we can make anerror becase we lack certainty of the existence of the case (hetu ) in thepredicate of the conclsion (sådhya ). Baladeva gives the following example:“The re has been extingished by rain, bt there is still smoke rising abovethe hill, and it contines for some time. [Not knowing this,] one concldesthat there is re on the hill becase of smoke.”41

There is a reason why people as sbjects of knowledge cannot pretendto certainty from perception and inference. We are brdened by for in-

nate shortcomings, known in Sanskrit as bhrama, pramåda, vipralipså , andkara∫åpa†ava . Bhrama means erring becase of misidentifying something forsomething else. The classic example pervading all Indian philosophy is see-ing a man in a post becase the conditions of perception are inappropriate. Another classic example is seeing a snake in a rope. Mistakes in cognitionalso condition or practical activities. Swami Prabhpåda often gave theexample of Mahatma Gandhi; thogh warned that he might be assassinatedat a meeting, he still decided to go there, and it happened.

Pramåda means inattention or intentness on something else, becase of which, that which is within the sensal grasp goes nperceived. We havealready hinted at this in the critiqe of perception. Here we can offer theexample Baladeva gives in his commentary on Tattva-sandarbha : “Becase ofthis ( pramåda ), we don’t listen to the song, althogh it is sng in or prox-


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imity.”42 This intentness on something else manifests also on the ontologi-

cal plain: Being absorbed in the body, we fail to notice or real natre asspirit. That is why pramåda is often referred to as illsion. Vipralipså refers to the omnipresent tendency of cheating. The classicexample given by Swami Prabhpåda is that of the salesman who claimsthat he will make no prot from s, thogh we know that this cannot betre. Baladeva’s example is: “Becase of this, the trth is not revealed to thedisciple, althogh it is known (to the teacher).”43

The forth innate shortcoming is kara∫åpa†ava —imperfection or weak-

ness of the senses. We need not elaborate on this; it is a notorios fact. Ba-ladeva’s descriptive example is: “Becase of this, althogh the mind is xed,one does not become cognizant of the object as it is.” In other words, one iscomposed, his attention is well-directed, bt still he cannot become cogni-zant of the object becase it is simply not within the range of perception. In terms of the methods of knowledge, bhrama, pramåda , and kara∫åpa†ava are pecliar to perception and inference, while vipralipså is an error of testi-mony (however, this error, nlike the other three, is not fatal).

T Natur of Tstimony If perception and inference cannot provide certainty even in daily life, theyare all the more incompetent for establishing a contact with a reality of anextramndane and inconceivable natre, namely God. So what is left for sto examine is the character of testimony. Baladeva claims that testimony as the word of a trstworthy person doesnot case fallacios cognition. If, for example, someone who deserves

nconditional confidence (becase of being experienced and havingspotless character) tells s: “There are precios stones in this mine”, this will prodce a correct apprehension in s, thogh we do not have directexperience. Not only that, testimony is the primary manner by which welearn abot the world, from the percepts of or elders, at school and theniversity, and today from the mass media and so on. Baladeva44 lists a fewcharacteristics of testimony in the process of cognition of mndane objectsand gives illstrations for them one by one.

1. Testimony is a process of knowledge independent of perception andinference. The proof of this is that there are facts which we do not forma cognition of by perception and inference, althogh we have employedthese processes. Baladeva gives a simple example (perhaps too simple, btnevertheless illstrative): Ten men cross a river. They want to be certain thatall of them arrived safe. One among them conted the others from one to


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nine, bt forgot to cont himself. Everyone else did the same, bt the reslt

did not change. Ths they began to lament, having lost the tenth man.Some wise man passed by there, and nding ot the case of their grief, heplaced them in a row. Then he conted them from one to nine and to their joy declared to the tenth, “Yo are the tenth!” 2. Testimony annls (corrects) perception and inference. Baladeva’sexample refers to the power of mantras sed by an expert physician whiletreating the patient. One of these mantras is sarpa-daß†e tvayi vißaµ nåsti :“Althogh yo were bitten by a snake, there is no poison in yo.”45

3. Testimony is not contradictory to perception and inference. For exam-ple, “One drg alone removes the disorder of the three bodily hmors;”one cold know this from an Ayrvedic text or doctor—in Ωåstras one doesnot find logically impossible statements—and perhaps experience thereslt by taking the drg.46

4. Testimony can se the services of perception and inference as an ills-tration or a corrective. An example of the rst: testimony claims that heat isthe remedy against cold, and this is conrmed by perception. An example

of the second: We hear that iron can ct anything earthly ( pårthiva ), andon this basis we conclde that iron can ct diamonds; however, sense per-ception shows that this is not the case. Althogh earthly, diamonds ct iron.This corrects the testimony, and we conclde that iron can ct anythingearthly except diamonds. 5. Testimony can also be of service to perception and inference. Forexample, travelers trobled by cold spot smoke rising from a nearby hilland conclde that there is re there. They start off in that direction to get

warm. On their way they meet a man who tells them: “There is no re onthe hill; it was recently extingished. However, on the next hill yo will cer-tainly nd re.” 6. Testimony is the best way to learn abot things beyond the reach ofperception and inference, sch as the position of the planets in the zodiac,the times of solar eclipses, and so on. All this may sond interesting, bt the navoidable qestion is: Is therereally a sorce deserving nconditional trst? What abot the hman ten-

dency of cheating, hanging above testimony like a gillotine? For—apartfrom learning abot the world, which cannot be done withot condencein teachers, bt which is irrelevant for existential qestions—the doctrinesof the sages abot that which is beyond the world are variegated. As welearn from the Mahåbhårata , one cannot establish oneself as a sage orphilosopher nless one stands in opposition to other philosophers. This


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being the case, who is the one deserving or condence? Gatama, Ka∫åda,

Kapila, Patañjali, Yåjñavalkya, or Ûå∫∂ilya? Bddha or Ûaõkara? Plato, Aristotle, or Aqinas? Descartes, Kant, or Hegel? Hsserl, Bergson, Scheler,or Heiddeger? Or Newton, Einstein, or Planck? Who is an åpta-purußa , atrstworthy person? Well, in the ltimate analysis, no one. If somethingcomes from a man, it has to be brdened by his shortcomings and cannotplead for certainty. For testimony to be absoltely certain and trstworthy, ithas to come from God himself. And ths we come to the point at which ortreatment of the problem has to trn 180 degrees. Seemingly we will make

an nwarranted leap, bt eventally everything will fall into place.

T Subjct of KnowldgIf we say that the tre natre of a person is spirit, this will sond like amere repetition of something old; no one will lad s for an epoch-makingnovel idea. For this is exactly what Plato, Descartes, Berkeley, and Schelerhave claimed, to name jst a few. This is what Ga∂îya Vedånta also claims.However, there is an epoch-making novelty in what Ga∂îya Vedånta means

by saying man is spirit.47 And it is this: that my natre as spirit manifests inthe fact that I never come in toch with matter. As spirit I am qalied by consciosness. Bt apart from being spirit, Ihave impressions of the world, which is not spirit. Bearing in mind thatcognition can represent only that which is similar, how is it possible thatsomething different from my natre reects in me? This qestion is oneover which philosophers in the West often dispted. Berkeley, for example,claimed that my knowledge of the world is possible becase both the world

and I share the same natre; the world is an idea appropriate for spiritand withot a material carrier, for if it had sch a carrier, I cold not haveformed a cognition of it, becase the only things that spirit is capable ofknowing are ideas. Marx and his followers wold also eqate the natre ofthinking and being, bt at the opposite end, by saying they are both matter,and ths their connection is nproblematic. Descartes postlated two sb-stances harmonized in a parallelism made possible by God. The soltion to this problem offered by Ga∂îya Vedånta is different

from these three. It is tre that I am spirit, bt in my present condition thisspirit is in a potential state, is seedlike, and its role is to give life to what bynatre is dead—the body. My self-conception, the way I experience myselfin sch circmstances, cold be called an empirical, impre self—imprebecase I identify myself with something I am not. Namely, althogh I am


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pre spirit, I consider myself to be matter, or the body I se.

As an empirical self, my microcosm is composed of a few elements. We already have mentioned the rst element, what in Sanskrit is calledahaõkåra , the principle of identication by which I identify myself withmatter thogh I am spirit. Swami Prabhpåda calls it the “false ego.” Thesecond element, or layer of my microcosm, is the mind (manas ), bt notmind in a Kantian sense. The manas is the focal point of my conation, theaspect of mental processes or behavior directed toward action or changeand inclding implse, desire, volition, and striving. The third element or

layer is the intelligence (buddhi ) or nderstanding. Together these threemake p citta —empirical, impre consciosness.

Now, for cognition of what is arond me, I need senses, ve in all: hear-ing, sight, toch, smell, and taste. That which is “arond” me refers tothe sense objects: sond, form, tactile impressions, aroma, and avor. Foraction I also need senses, ve in all: arms, legs, voice, ans, and genitals. If we consider the empirical consciosness as representing the false ego, themind, and the intelligence and cont them as one, then these sixteen form

my subtle body .48 Apart from this sbtle form, I also have a gross body that acts as the bear-

er of the sbtle one. It is composed of earth, water, re, air, and ether, andtheir modications, in the form of the sensory and active organs.

All of this is matter: ne, sbtle matter on the one hand and gross, cor-poreal matter on the other. This is precisely why it is possible to establishthe connection between the world as the object of knowledge and myself asthe sbject of knowledge. What I may ordinarily consider spirit (the sbtle

body) is actally matter with a semblance of spirit, being energized by spirit.The sbtle body is similar to both matter and spirit and is their mediatelink. Ths I, being spirit, am the sbject of knowledge—something thatmatter cold never be. Matter cannot be the sbject of cognition becaseit is dead. I am the sbject of cognition, yet I do not come in direct contact with matter. As “myself” I am only a seedlike potency; my real natre isnmanifest, bt capable of manifestation. I am the sbject of knowledgethrogh the complex of the sbtle, material body, which makes my medi-

ate contact with matter the object of knowledge. So I am the sbject ofknowledge “not as myself”—eternal pre sol—bt as the conditioned solcovered by the gross and sbtle bodies. We will go throgh this same analysis the other way arond. There is a world arond me consisting of ve elements: earth, water, re, air, and


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ether. These elements come in contact with me, as the sbject of knowl-

edge, throgh the sense organs. This contact generates perception. Theve objects of knowledge are rdimentary or sbtle elements, representa-tive of the gross elements. The vibrations transmitted throgh ether casecognition of sond. Fire or light cases cognition of form, air of toch, water of taste, and earth of smell. And ths Berkeley was right—there is nosond, form, toch, taste, and smell otside of me. However, this does notmean that there is nothing that is not an idea.These sense objects are processed by the mind. The mind is attracted by

some of them and replsed by the others—acceptance and rejection is itsfaclty.49 While doing this, it can se the services of the intelligence. Therole of intelligence is to illminate the natre of the objects deemed attrac-tive or replsive by the mind. Intelligence has ve states, conditions, ormodications (v®ttis ): dobt (saµΩaya ), misapprehension (viparyåsa ), cor-rect apprehension (niΩcaya ), memory (sm®ti ), and sleep (svåpa ).50

Philosophy is in the domain of intelligence becase the origin of philoso-phy is in dobt. The essential property of philosophy is dobt; dobt gives

rise to the impets for philosophical speclation. To deal with philosophicalqestions, Aristotle said, one needs free time, schole , or the leisre gained bybeing a free man (not a slave) and by not having to work for one’s mainte-nance. Leisre is a reqired accidental, bt leisre is no garantee that one will engage in philosophy. Moreover, philosophizing can end in either mis-apprehension or correct apprehension. Bt we will say more on this later. My state of pre spirit in sch circmstances is in a state akin to sspen-sion. Perhaps it is most appropriate to compare it to a dream. While dream-

ing, I preserve the concept of my identity and remain a knower of cogni-tion, bt that identity can take new and different variants, some of which Icold not even imagine while awake. Althogh apprehensive in reality, inmy dream I cold be the main hero in some battle. My son cold all of asdden appear as my grandfather, and my grandfather cold trn ot tobe my lover. There is no need to enmerate examples—that cold go onad innitum . What is crcial here is that the dream is my illsory state, albeita real one, and so is my condition of identifying with the body. It is illsory,

bt real. I remain the sbject of knowledge, bt I consider myself some-thing I am not. Sitated within the heart of this body, which is compared toa tree by the Upanißads,51 I, like a bird tasting the frits of the tree, hallci-nate, dreaming the dream of material existence.


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God as t Sourc of Crtain Knowldg

Next to me, in the same heart, on the same tree, is another person, another“bird.” Unlike me, who is hallcinating—enjoying and sffering the dreamlife—that person is flly awake, observing my condition while I am bothawake and asleep.52 The Upanißads call him the Paramåtmå, Spersol,or God. Althogh capable of breaking my dream life by force and pttingan end to my sorrow, God does not want to interfere with my freedom. Inreglar circmstances his role is to take care of the exection of the law ofkarma. I myself cannot break my dream, bt to indce him to do that for

me, I have to become disgsted with dreaming and have to want to awaken withot reservation or second thoghts. The fact that God does not interfere with my dream does not mean he isninterested in me. In many ways, bt withot sing force, he tries to pointot the inappropriateness of my misidentication with something I am not.One of these ways is that from him, within my heart, constantly emanatestre knowledge. “Krishna, or God, is sitated in everyone’s heart. As yobecome pried, He speaks. He speaks always, bt in or impre condi-

tion, we cannot hear.”53 Apart from that, sing pre sols as media, hereveals the knowledge of himself in the form of holy scriptres. In Sanskritthese scriptres are known as Vedas. Veda actally means “knowledge,” andknowledge cannot be an exclsive possession of a single cltre. In thissense Swami Prabhpåda said on nmeros occasions that even scriptresthat are nominally not Vedic, i.e., the Bible and the Koran, can be acceptedas “Vedic” revelations. The idea is this: the Vedas as sond (Ωabda ) transmit knowledge of God,

and in that sense they are not hman creations. Even more, Ûrîmad-Bhåga- vatam says that the Vedas are God himself, his own emanation, flly identi-cal with him.54 For the benet of the sols misidentifying with matter, heappears either personally (as Vyåsadeva, the literary incarnation of God, toedit the previosly aral scriptral testimony of himself and preserve it in writing)55 or throgh “pre sols” active in varios cltral environments.The differences in cltral environments and the volme of the knowledgerevealed throgh specic pre sols make for mch of the differences

between scriptres. These are seeming differences, becase the essence ofscriptre is to teach s to love God. Swami Prabhpåda often sonded this theme: “People shold not bekept in darkness; they shold be broght into the light. Therefore in everyhman society there is a religios instittion of some sort. What is the pr-


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pose of Hindism, Mohammedanism, Christianity, or Bddhism? The pr-

pose is to bring people to the light. That is the prpose of religion.”56 “So the prpose of religion is to train people how to love God. That is the

prpose of all religion. Whether yor religion is Christianity or Hindismor Mohammedanism, the prpose of yor religion is to train yo how tolove God, becase that is yor constittional position.”57

“It does not matter whether yo are a Christian or a Hind or aMohammedan. Jst try to develop yor love of God. Then yor religion is very nice; otherwise, it is simply a waste of time.”58

“I do not say that Christians shold become Hind. I simply say, ‘Pleaseobey yor commandments.’ I will make yo a better Christian. That is mymission. I do not say, ‘God is not in yor tradition; God is only here inors.’ I simply say, ‘Obey God.’ I don’t say, ‘Yo have to accept that God’sname is Krishna and no other.’ No. I say, ‘Please obey God. Please try tolove God.’”59

The pre self has self-evident knowledge (svata˙-siddha-jñåna ). This knowl-edge reqires no evidence. It is Veda . In the empirically cognizable world of

matter this Veda manifests as the for Vedas , the Upanißads, Bhagavad-gîtå ,and in other traditions and cltres as the Bible, Koran, and so on.60

Fiv Stags of Spiritual Knowldg Althogh the Vedic sond is objective and self-evident, it is still sudurbod- ham ,61 very difclt to nderstand by someone conditioned by matter. Weare deaf and blind, for the knowledge that emanates from the Lord is rightat hand—yet we see it not. The Vedic sond is difclt to comprehend

becase the heart (along with the spirital sense of hearing) is covered bythe false ego. Therefore, there is a need for this sond to become intelligi-ble to or empirical senses. “Since one cannot visally experience the pres-ence of the Spersol, He appears before s as a liberated devotee. Sch aspirital master is none other than Krishna Himself.”62

God as the Spersol appears before or visal and aditory perception asa liberated devotee, a spirital master, to give s knowledge abot himself.This transmission of spirital knowledge sometimes goes on in an nbro-

ken chain of teachers (guru-paramparå ).63 For the teacher’s testimony to beåpta-våkya (testimony from a trstworthy sorce), he has to be qalied bytwo conditions:64 namely, he has to be xed in the Vedas (Ωabda ) and in theSpreme ( para ). Jîva Gosvåmî’s commentary is illstrative: “Learned in theVedas , becase of being dedicated to deliberation; xed on the Spreme,


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in his manifestations as Bhagavån and so on, thanks to direct experience

(vision).”65 According to the testimony of Bhaktivedånta Swami Prabhpåda,66 the

Vedic process of knowledge has ve stages:67

1) pratyakßa – direct sense perception; 2) parokßa – knowledge received from others; 3) aparokßa – realization; 4) adhokßaja – experienced knowledge gained from the realm that

is napproachable by the senses; 5) apråk®ta – the highest spirital knowledge.

The rst three stages are common to both empirical and spirital knowl-edge and are relative to the three independent methods of knowledge(sense perception, inference, and testimony). One learns throgh one’ssenses, or he makes inferences, and he learns from others what is notdirectly available. And this is also the case in spirital knowledge. Becase

one cannot see God in one’s own heart and cannot hear or properly nder-stand his words, the knowledge of God incarnates before his visal andaditory perception (the verse qoted above says såkßåt —direct experience)in the form of a self-realized gr. Thanks to the direct contact with scha self-realized teacher, the disciple eventally can testify as to how spiritalknowledge is practiced. Then comes the stage of parokßa . If pratyakßa was “before the eyes” or “withone’s own eyes,” parokßa means “with someone else’s eyes.” Now the disciple

hears abot what is not within the range of the senses and literally seesthrogh someone else’s eyes. A lcid example: “. . . at midnight we mightcall a friend living thosands of miles to the west of s and ask if he sees thesn. Hearing his report, ‘Yes, it is a snny day here,’ we see the sn throgh parokßa vision.”68

After this comes the stage of aparokßa : “not with someone else’s eyes,” i.e.,“with one’s own eyes.” This does not refer to direct sense perception, bt torealization of what has been heard. On the basis of the training ndergone,

a disciple is now capable of nderstanding the scriptres himself. Or henderstands the Vedic sond (Ωabda ) by sing methods of reasoning andinference.

And in this stage we can position the role of philosophy.69 If it is basedon revelation, it serves as a means of realizing revealed trths and ends in


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correct apprehension (recall the ve conditions of intelligence: dobt, mis-

apprehension, correct apprehension, memory, and sleep). On this level ofknowledge, sense perception also changes. Now it is not jst ordinary andsimple sense perception; it becomes learned, edcated sense perception,molded by the word (Ωabda ). Thanks to what he has learned from testimo-ny, the disciple can now see reality as it really is—as God sees it. What henow sees are not objects with independent or mysterios existence, objectsof contemplation or enjoyment, bt rather transformations of God’s ener-gies. He observes the world throgh the lenses of what he has learned, as

we do in any life condition. This sense perception, based on revelation, isfree from the for defects of conditioned hman life (imperfect senses,mistakes, illsion, and cheating).70

Even if it is ngided by revelation, inference on that which is beyondordinary perception can see glimpses of light. For example, while dream-ing I am in all kinds of conditions and circmstances. Sometimes I amhappy. Sometimes I am scared, perhaps becase I am being chased by atiger. Nevertheless, what is constant in dreams is the fact that I remain the

same, thogh constantly changing bodies. A dream ends, and the dreamexperiences and adventres also come to an end. In some sense I die, btI am reborn in the next dream, and everything starts anew. Althogh whileawake I am aware that the wakefl state has a higher reality, higher than thedream life, what is the garantee that this life is not also jst one dream ina chain of dreams I have, while my higher, spirital natre is asleep? In anycase, philosophical reasoning shold shake my conviction that I am matterand that death has to be the end of everything.

Nice examples of sch philosophical reasoning are fond in Plato’s Phaedo and in Descartes’s inference of res cogitans . Bt if this philosophizing is not joined with revelation, it cannot provide a transition to the next stage ofknowledge, adhokßaja . Thanks to spirital practice, a disciple is able to risefrom the stage of intellectal realization of trth to the level of personalinsight. This insight is a personal experience, bt not throgh the materialsenses. Now the adept can see reality as it is, thanks to spirital vision orthe vision of the heart (remember that God is in the heart). To express the

whole idea: he is now emerged in direct contemplation of God. The fth stage, apråk®ta , refers to the fll development of or spiritalnatre and to the transition from passive awe and reverence and contem-plation characteristic of the previos stage to or mtal relationship withGod.


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Conclusion

Singling ot the most signicant elements of Ga∂îya epistemology—testi-mony, the sbject of knowledge, and God-realization—let s consider theirpossible contribtion to epistemology in general. First, it seems to me that Western philosophy has not paid de analyticalattention to testimony as a method of knowledge—attention which is dobt-less merited. In or own philosophical conceptions, testimonial knowledgeis either taken for granted or ridicled. The rst approach is nphilosophi-cal – a theory of knowledge shold examine the means by which we acqire

knowledge. We implicitly se testimony as a method of knowledge from or very birth, bt testimonial knowledge is not in voge with philosophers.

Ridicle, the second approach to testimonial knowledge, is jst as ncriti-cal as the rst. We do not have to qote from methodology textbooks, which say that accepting the method of athority is nscientic—theirathority has already convinced s that athority has no place in scienticknowledge. However, Thomas Khn’s “Strctre of Scientic Revoltions”clearly shows how mch scientic knowledge—or any knowledge, for that

matter—depends on athority, testimony, or a paradigm. Second, I nd that the nderstanding of the sbject of knowledge in theGa∂îya Vedånta is an original one and deserves serios attention as a pro-spective soltion to the sbject-object relation. Indeed, I consider it to bethe most important contribtion of this school to general epistemology. Third, as far as the process of knowledge of God is concerned, I think thatthe details revealed in the Ga∂îya Vedånta tradition cold also be signi-cant for other religios traditions. For if God is one, then the paths leading

to him cannot be all too different in the varios traditions. Ths a ray oflight from one tradition cold shine in the other traditions, too.

endnots 1. The athorship of Vedånta-syamantaka is a matter of dispte. The workmay have been written by Baladeva’s gr, Rådhådåmodara Dåsa. We willtreat it provisionally as Baladeva’s work. In one sense the athorship isirrelevant, since what is presented in Sarva-saµvådinî (Jîva Gosvåmî’s own

commentary on Tattva-sandarbha ), in Baladeva’s commentary on the Tattva- sandarbha , and in Vedånta-syamantaka is pretty mch one and the same. Forpractical prposes I have chosen to follow Vedånta-syamantaka . 2. Jånåmîty-anuvyavasåya-gamyaµ jñånam eva lakßa∫am iti bhåva˙ . (Tarka- saµgraha-dîpika 3.16, translation by Swami Virpakshananda.)


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3. Tad-vati tat-prakårako ’nubhavo yathårtha˙. Yathå rajate idaµ rajatam iti

jñånam. Saiva pramety ucyate . (Tarka-saµgraha 3.19, translation by Swami Virpakshananda) 4. Tad-abhåvavati tat-prakårako ’nubhavo ’yathårtha˙. Yathå Ωuktåv idaµ rajatam iti jñånam. Saiva apramå ity ucyate. (op. cit ., 3.20). 5. A good illstration for this is the qestion posed by Sanåtana Gosvåmîto Ûrî Caitanya Mahåprabh:

‘ke åmi’, ‘kene åmåya jåre tåpa-traya’

ihå nåhi jåni—‘kemane hita haya’

“Who am I? Why do the threefold miseries always give me troble? If I donot know this, how can I be beneted?” (Ûrî Caitanya-caritåm®ta, Madhya-lîlå 20.102) In this connection, Bhaktivedånta Swami Prabhpåda wold fre-qently say that these are the qestions that make one hman—they are ordifferentia specica —not simply asking any qestions, inclding those abot a priori and a posteriori knowledge or the laws of physics and mathematics.

6. The etymology of the word is prati-akßa˙ : before, or in front of, the eye. 7. Artha-sannik®ß†am indriyaµ pratyakßam. Gha†am ahaµ cakßußå paΩyåmîtyådau . (Vedånta-syamantaka 1.3) 8. Cp. Chatterjee and Dhirendramohan Datta, An Introduction to Indian Phi- losophy, University of Calctta, 1984, pp. 174-5. 9. op. cit., p. 179. 10. Pratyakßaµ tåvan mano-buddhîndriya-pañcaka-janyatayå ßa∂-vidhaµ bhavet. (Sarva-saµvådinî , 9).

11. The etymology of the word is: after (anu ) knowledge (måna )—knowl-edge following some other knowledge. 12. Anumiti-kara∫am anumånam. Girir vahnimån dhümåd ity ådau. Agny-ådi- jñånam anumiti˙. Tat-kara∫aµ dhümådi-jñånam . (Vedånta-syamantaka 1.3) 13. Devadatta is the Indian Socrates, a character referred to as a represen-tative of the hman race in propositions (Socrates is mortal, becase he is aman…) Literally Devadatta means God-given. 14. Cp. Satischandra Chatterjee and Dhirendramohan Datta, An Introduc-

tion to Indian Philosophy , University of Calctta, 1984, pp. 191-3. 15. Åpta-våkyaµ Ωabda˙, yathå nadî-tîre pañca-v®kßå˙ santi. Yathå cågniß†omenasvarga-kåmo yajetety ådi. (Vedånta-syamantaka 1.3) 16. Upamiti-kara∫am upamånam. Go-sad®Ωo gavaya ity ådau. Saµjñå-saµjñî- sambandha-jñånam upamiti˙. Tat-kara∫aµ såd®Ωya-jñånam . (ibid.)


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17. The etymology of the word is artha-åpatti —spposition of a fact. Or

translation of artåpatti as postlate is in a Kantian sense: for the possibil-ity of some state of affairs, it is necessary to postlate some conditio sine quanon that is effecting this state of affairs and which cannot be dedced frompremises. And we will remember that Kant postlated God’s existence notas something dedced from ethical premises bt as the niqe principle with which it is possible to explain the ethical premises of moral life. 18. Anupapadyamånårtha-darΩanenopapådakårthåntara-kalpanam arthåpat- ti˙. Pîno devadatto divå na bhuõkte ity ådau. Iha divåbhuñjånasya pînatvam

anupapannaµ tat tasya naktaµ bhojitvaµ gamayati . (Vedånta-syamantaka 1.3) 19. This is an example from a cltral context. Similar (drastic) examplesfrom the American context wold be addressing someone as vanilla face ormidnight. 20. For arthåpatti , compare Satischandra Chatterjee and DhirendramohanDatta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy , University of Calctta, 1984, pp.325-327, and G. Prathapa Simha, Arthåpatti: A Critical and Comparative Studyof the Views of Pürva Mîmåµså, Advaita Vedånta and Nyåya-VaiΩeßika Systems, Sri

Venkatesvara University, Tirpatti, 1991. 21. Gha†ådy-anupalabdhyå gha†ådy-abhåvo niΩcito ’nupalabdhis tüpalabdherabhåva ity abhåvena pramå∫ena gha†ådy-abhåvo g®hyate. (Vedånta-syamantaka 1.3). 22. Ûate daΩakaµ sambhavatîti buddhau sambhåvanaµ sambhava˙ . (Ibid.) 23. Ajñåta-vakt®katågata-påramparya-prasiddham aitihyam, yatheha ba†e yakßonivasatîty ådau . (Ibid.) 24. Aõguly-uttolanato gha†a-daΩakådi-jñånakarî ceß†åpi kaiΩcana månam ißyate.

(Ibid.) 25. Compare Vedånta-syamantaka 1.2 and G. Prathapa Simha, Arthåpatti: ACritical and Comparative Study of the Views of Pürva Mîmåµså, Advaita Vedåntaand Nyåya-VaiΩeßika Systems, Sri Venkatesvara University, Tirpatti, 1991, pp.28-9. 26. Cårvåka tava cårv-aõgî jårato vîkßya garbhi∫îm pratyakßa-måtra-viΩvåso ghana-Ωvåsaµ kim ujjhasi (Vedånta-syamantaka 1.5) 27. Ya˙ Ωabdo v®ddhair yatrårthe prayujyate so ’sati v®tty-antare tasyåbhidhåyî.

Yathå go-Ωabdo gotvasya. Prayujyate ca go-sad®Ωe gavaya-Ωabda iti tasyaiva so ’bhid- håyîti jñånam upamånam eva . (op.cit. 1.7) 28. In Sanskrit it is called jåti , and it means gens or species, dependingpon whether its members are individals or classes. 29. Compare Note 107, pp. 185-7, in Swami Virpakshananda, Tarka


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Saµgraha, With the Dîpika of A∫∫ambha††a and Notes , Sri Ramakrishna Math,

Madras, 1994

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