June 2015 Amreli Flood Report - COUNTERVIEW.ORG...5 Background s known to many, India remains quite...
Transcript of June 2015 Amreli Flood Report - COUNTERVIEW.ORG...5 Background s known to many, India remains quite...
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A Report on the Intervention
in the 2015 Amreli Flood
Centre for Social Justice
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Contents
Abbreviations .................................................................................................................. 3
Summary ......................................................................................................................... 4
Key Recommendations .................................................................................................... 5
About CSJ‟s Coastal Campaign........................................................................................ 6
Aims and Objectives ................................................................................................. 7
Methodology ............................................................................................................. 7
The Circle ............................................................................................................... 10
Background ................................................................................................................... 11
Amreli Flood........................................................................................................... 12
Frameworks for the Analysis .......................................................................................... 14
Theoretical Framework ........................................................................................... 14
International Framework ......................................................................................... 18
Constitutional Framework ....................................................................................... 23
Disaster Management Framework ........................................................................... 24
Findings of the Research ................................................................................................ 27
Mitigation and Preparedness ................................................................................... 27
Response and Relief ................................................................................................ 31
Recovery, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation .......................................................... 39
Actions .......................................................................................................................... 44
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 46
Vulnerabilities of Certain Groups ............................................................................ 47
Rights of Victims and Expectations from the State .................................................. 53
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Summary
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Previous Disaster Related Work
CSJ has been engaged in disaster management related work ever since the 2001 Gujarat Earthquake. Mr.
Gagan Sethi of the organisation was also appointed as the rapporteur for monitoring human rights
violations during the relief and rehabilitation efforts, post the 2001 earthquake that took place in Kutch.
We became part of a large network of organisation called „the Kutch Navnirmanabhiyan‟ which
coordinated civil society efforts towards disaster recovery. At the time, we were in constant engagement
with the government trying to ensure that the schemes and policies announced address the ground
realities. Suggestions made by us are reflected in the Earthquake rehabilitation policy framed by the
Government of Gujarat. We also helped monitor the process of distribution of rehabilitation package,
developing our own design for the purpose that we have subsequently utilised for other similar
disasters.
An output of the process was a comparative study of various relief codes and a Model Disaster Code for
the state which was proposed by us. This experience helped us in our efforts with respect to the 2002
riots, which was a human disaster and we played a similar role of influencing policies and ensuring
implementation.
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Background
s known to many, India remains quite vulnerable to natural disasters owing to its geo-climatic
conditions.1 According to a report prepared by the Union Government, “60% of [India‟s]
landmass is prone to earthquakes of various intensities; over 40 million hectares is prone to floods;
about 8% of the total area is prone to cyclones and 68% of the area is susceptible to drought.”2 Every
year, India is witness to multiple occurrences of disasters in its many various regions. The November-
December Coramandal Coast (South India) Floods, the August Assam Flood, the June and July Gujarat
Floods were the major calamities that struck over 2015. The April Nepal Earthquake too resulted in
widespread casualties on this side of the International border. The year also saw droughts being declared
in ten States, most severe in their impact in Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh.3
The recent UNISDR Report titled The Human Cost of Weather Related Disasters 1995-2015 confirms
the high extent of the damage due to weather related disasters in India.4 Between 1995 and 2015, 805
million people in India have been affected by these, a number second only to China.5 The report also
points out the high risk of flood damage in India with around 6,500 people dying as a result of it, just in
the year 2013.6
The risks of cyclones, floods and droughts in particular, have been escalated in recent years by climate
change.7 This is still not to say that disasters of greatest magnitude cannot sometimes be caused by
human actions. Apart from chemical disasters of the scale of the Bhopal Gas leak, certain natural
disasters such as the 2013 Uttarakhand landslide have seen the damage considerably up-scaled due to
1 Disaster Management in India, MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, pg 3 (2005) available at
http://www.unisdr.org/2005/mdgs-drr/national-reports/India-report.pdf. 2 Id. 3 Sayantan Bera, Three drought-hit states to get Rs. 6,794 crore in central assistance, LIVEMINT (December 30, 2015)
available at http://www.livemint.com/Politics/nSSYZszzbaZzyQR0zzVraO/Three-drou
ghthit-states-to-get-Rs6794-crore-in-central-ass.html; Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, Odisha,
Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Rajasthan, Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh were the ten states. 4 The Human Cost of Weather Related Disasters 1995-2015, CENTRE FOR RESEARCH ON THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF
DISASTERS, UN OFFICE FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION (November, 2015)
http://www.unisdr.org/2015/docs/climatechange/COP21_WeatherDisastersReport_2015_FINAL.pdf 5 Id. at 18. 6 Supra note 4 at 14. 7 Deepanwita Niyogi, „India is likely to experience strong relative impacts of climate change', DOWN TO EARTH (July 6,
2015) available at http://www.downtoearth.org.in/interviews/-india-is-likely-to-experience-strong-relative-impacts-of-
climate-change--50420; and KS Rajgopal, Chennai floods due to climate change?, The Hindu (December 13, 2015)
http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/energy-and-environment/chennai-floods-due-to-climate-change/article7980332.ece
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human contribution. And though all disasters are not entirely avoidable, the loss of human life and
property can be considerably reduced when States take steps towards having management mechanism in
place.
Robust mechanisms will equip people to handle disaster situations better as well as call on government
officials to mitigate dangers of the calamity and steer people to safety and normalcy during and after
such a calamity. Human life and well being can equally be protected by extending quick relief to the
victims of disaster. The Amreli flood just as other disasters did this year, raised questions about the
efficacy of the established system of the disaster management.
Amreli Flood
ccording to the Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority in its official report, Amreli district
received a rainfall of 2580 mm on 24th June 2015 which was four times of the annual average
over the last ten years.8 The human death toll in Amreli Districts was at least 47 as confirmed by the
administration with many still missing.9 Around 585 villages were reportedly affected in some way and
110 villages saw some damage and 73 villages were severely affected.10
GSDMA also records the
number of damaged houses to be 3988, the loss of crops to be spread over around 13,700 hectares and
erosion to soil in over 9200 hectares.11
Significant damage to the state infrastructure was also recorded.
The damage was far greater than what was recorded by GSDMA.
Unfortunately for the State, the disaster in Amreli was followed by another flood in a month‟s time in
North Gujarat which led to the death of over 70 people as some reports said.12
The Government of Gujarat declared a relief package of Rs. 300 Crores, after three weeks of the flood,
on 14th July with the damage assessment still underway in the District.13
Against the norms of
8 Amreli Flood Report, GUJARAT STATE DISASTER MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY, i (June, 2015) available at
http://gsdma.org/documents/Amreli_Flood_Report_GSDMA_7.7.pdf 9 Two more bodies recovered in Amreli, flood death toll goes up to 47, INDIAN EXPRESS (July 6, 2015) available at
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/gujarat/two-more-bodies-recovered-in-amreli-flood-death-toll-goes-up-to-47/ 10 Supra note 8 at 3-4. 11
Supra note 8 at 10-11. 12 Gujarat floods: 72 people dead, over 81,000 cattle perished due to heavy rains, FIRSTPOST (August 5, 2015) available
at
http://www.firstpost.com/india/gujarat-floods-72-people-dead-over-81000-cattle-perished-due-to-heavy-rains-
2380592.html 13 Gujarat government announces Rs 300 crore package for flood-hit regions, THE ECONOMIC TIMES (July 14, 2015)
available at
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-07-14/news/64405837_1_150-crore-300-crore-relief-package
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assistance from the SDRF and NDRF circulated by the Union Home Ministry, the State Government‟s
relief package went further by raising the quantum of assistance under some heads of damage, and
including within their policy, farmers with land holding of more than two hectares.14
The Government
also made special provisions offering assistance to small and medium business owners as well as
offering low interest loan facilities.15
Despite of the expanse of the relief package, owing to the usual
issues of implementation, the ground situation at Amreli failed to reflect earnestness on the part of the
Government and its functionaries.
14 CLS/102015/431/S3 dated 15/07/2015 15
PRCh/102015/519356-Ch dated 15/07/2015
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Research Design
Aims and Objectives
his intervention began with the aim of inquiring into the implementation of the relief package
announced by the Government of Gujarat for the victims of the Amreli flood and studying the
conditions that the victims were living in. Experience has shown that while the Governments announce
relief packages that appear generous, they remain poorly implemented and after the public attention has
subsided, victims find themselves left abandoned. It is desirable to have an independent assessment of
the Government efforts keeping the Government and its functionaries in check. This kind of engagement
of the civil society is a crucial aspect of democracy.
Centre for Social Justice‟s larger objective has been to evaluate the disaster management system
consisting of disaster management legislations, plans, policies and institutions and how this system
actually functions. The intervention is also an effort towards remedying the deficiencies that are found
in the system, an effort made by way of our recommendations for policy changes and its better
implementation, and also furthering a rights discourse on disaster relief and recovery in India. This is
with the hope that damage to human life and surroundings from natural disasters can someday be
radically minimised.
Methodology
entre for Social Justice through its initial survey conducted between 7th and 16
th September, 2015
reached out to 16 affected villages in three of the most affected Talukas in Amreli: Bagasara,
Vadiya-Kukanvav and Liliya. Eight of the villages selected were those adjacent to the highways and
main roads, and 8 of the villages were those which did not lie on any of the main roads. Considering
these as the main criteria, 8 of the 16 villages were around the top of the list of most affected villages in
the flood and 8 villages were around the bottom. These criteria were chosen to make the sample diverse
and representative of villages differently placed in terms of damage. The 16 villages were Gawadka,
Juna Vaghaniya, Khari, Paniya, Babapur, Chanpathal, Nana Gokharvada, Mota Gokharvada, Jamka,
Khijadiya, Mota Ujala, Sanadi, Vavdi, Khakhariya, Vankiya and Vitthalpur.
In the 8 villages where the number of affected families was relatively less, we sought to cover all those
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who were affected while in the villages with greater damage, it sought to cover about 20% of the
affected families.
We interviewed 1055 persons with the help of 9 volunteers and 5 supervisors. The interviews were
based on a set of predetermined questions printed out in a form on which the responses were also
recorded. The form is part of the annexures. Each question references entitlements that were part of the
package announced by the Gujarat Government.
The research was action oriented. In the process of gathering data whenever the victims expressed any
need, we drafted applications for them and had them sent. These applications were for the demands of
resurveying, processing claims, legal assistance from DSLA inter alia, depending on the needs of the
victims.
We also talked to government officials at the District and Taluka levels including the District Collector,
District Development Officer, Chief Medical Officer, Superintendent of Police, Secretary of the Amreli
District Legal Services Authority, and Amreli and Vadiya-Kukanvav Taluka Development Officers. In
the villages, we interviewed the Sarpanch when available. This exercise was to verify that they were
aware of the functions they are obligated to discharge and the extent to which they discharged them. We
also got crucial insights into how they perceived their own work during the flood.
We file applications under the Right to Information Act for obtaining data from the official records on
the damage and the relief distributed, policies and plans that are not available in the public domain, and
reports that reveal the actions undertaken by various government officials.
On a second visit on 9th and 10
th December, group discussions took place in three villages: Chandgarh,
Devaliya and Vitthalpur, to reassess the situation after more than 5 months of the floods with the focus
on the agricultural labourers, those who had lost their houses and those who had not suffered damage to
their agricultural lands.
Centre for Social Justice works with a defined entitlement and availability framework that is called „the
Circle‟. The Circle is brought into action with the process of identification and assessment of issues
internally (step 1). This leads to increasing of awareness and filing of individual claims and then to the
monitoring of claims and their follow up (steps 2 & 3). This is followed by the conversion of individual
issues into a collective issue (step 4). The Circle is brought into conclusion by addressing larger policy
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concerns to prevent such issues from recurring (step 5).
At the centre of this framework is the analysis of whether laws and policies relevant to a particular issue
do not exist at all, exist but are not implemented, or exist but work against already vulnerable groups
carried out in light of fundamental rights and international instruments. A similar three step analysis is
carried out for responsible institutions. These analyses requiring in large part desk work form the second
part of the research.
The Circle
Identification and Assessment of Issues
Increasing Awareness and Filing of Claims
Monitoring and Follow up of Claims
using RTI and Otherwise
Converting Individual Problems into
Collective Issues
Identifying and Addressing Policy
Concerns
Laws & Policies 1. Exist but not implemented 2. Do not exist
3. Work against the vulnerable
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Findings
he rainfall of 2580 mm that Amreli received on 24th June, 2015 was excessive by any measure. In
comparison, the average annual rainfall in the district is only 609 mm according to official
records. This rainfall was the result of a deep depression that developed on 23rd June in the north-east
Arabian Sea. The resultant flood was reported to be the worst that the district had seen in ninety years
although not much is known about this other big flood ninety years ago. Even with a low average
rainfall however, flooding of low lying areas in Amreli is not exactly a rare occurrence, taking place
every year or every couple of years. Some of the people CSJ interviewed reported damage to their
farmlands in the previous monsoon as well. There were also those who had faced clogging of water in
their homes on previous occasions. The immoderate rainfall on 24th June can be imagined to have then
caused a far greater damage.
It is understood that the magnitude of the rains and the damage could not have been foreseen by the
administration but a flood risk zone identification carried out by the Gujarat State Disaster Management
Authority sometime in the last decade as part of the creation of the Gujarat Hazard Risk & Vulnerability
Atlas does disclose flood vulnerability of the river basins in the district. The State Disaster Management
Plan 2015-2016 prepared by GSDMA notes: “Concentrated runoff resulted by heavy rainfall cause flash
floods in the small river basin of Saurashtra and Kutch because of their fairly impervious catchments
(rocky or black cotton soils) and steep sloping upper catchments.”16
It goes on further, “The flood prone river sections were identified from settlement level analysis. Flood
prone river sections in Saurashtra extend to the upper basins due to the presence of dams which have to
resort to emergency discharge during heavy rainstorms.”17
The Plan claims that much of Gujarat is, in
fact, flood prone.
16 Supra note 36. 17
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Flood Hazard Risk Zonation- Gujarat Hazard Risk & Vulnerability Atlas- GSDMA
Likewise, the District Disaster Management Plan also accepts Amreli‟s vulnerability to floods and other
natural disasters. It even recorded one death due to floods in 2014. It has further admitted to an
insufficient capacity in dealing with bigger disasters.
The vulnerability atlas was prepared by GSDMA so that risk reduction activities could be carried out by
it and the State Government.18
Neither the knowledge of vulnerability nor the intention to reduce it ever
18
Supra note 36.
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translated into concrete steps towards mitigating disasters. When you consider the National Disaster
Management Authority guidelines on floods that spell out clearly the steps to be undertaken by the State
Government and Disaster Authorities towards mitigating flood, the omissions are difficult to explain.
The steps that the Flood Guidelines ask the State Governments and the State Disaster Management
Authorities to take are: studying the efficacy of structural measures and carry out these measures; carry
out other non-structural measures; modernising and strengthening flood forecasting and warning
systems, building capacities of government officials and communities, installing robust response
systems; and preparation of flood management plans and their implementation.19
These particular
measures were required to be taken in phases and completed by 2012.
The structural measures include construction of embankments, improvement of river channels,
improvement of drainage systems, desilting of rivers, treatment of catchment areas and afforestation,
anti-erosion works, improving capacity of dams, regulating reservoirs, etc.20
The need for studying the
utility of these measures before carrying them out has been expressed by NDMA since some of the
measures are counterproductive in many cases.
The non-structural measures include importantly, implementing flood plain zoning regulations or
enacting a legislation for flood zoning in order to regulate construction and other human activity in flood
plains. A model flood plain zoning Bill is a part of the Guidelines. These also cover creating flood
shelters and flood proofing of buildings which can act as shelters.
With the exception of implementing flood response systems in the form of the Incident Command
System (ICS), working of which may itself need reviewing, the Government of Gujarat and GSDMA
has done very little to absolutely nothing in carrying out said measures. While the State has
conspicuously never taken an initiative to enact a flood plain zoning law, the absence of regulations or
even plans thereof, studies for implementing structural measures anywhere in the State, or a dedicated
flood management plan has been confirmed by us through an RTI query to the GSDMA.
The forecasting system, if any, in the district of Amreli, had not worked and some of the District
Officials confirmed to us that they received information only once the flooding had begun, from the
19 Supra note 35. 20
Supra note 35.
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officials at village level. No warning was received by people in most of the affected villages, as they
recount. When asked about any kind of training given to them to effectively deal with disasters, a man in
Chandgarh pointed in the direction of a board put up by authorities that apparently read the measures to
be taken during a flood situation. CSJ could not find anyone who had been given a training to deal with
the floods.
The people of Amreli and the authorities alike were found severely underprepared for a disaster of this
scale yet, they would have still found themselves in trouble if the scale of the flood was much smaller.
The unforeseeability and the magnitude of the disaster cannot work as an excuse when the State
Government and GSDMA has shown unwillingness to carry out clear instructions. All disasters are, after
all, unforeseeable by varying degrees and State Governments should be required to show at least some
initiatives in order to escape responsibility. Regions such as South Gujarat are perhaps more vulnerable
to floods than Saurashtra and the State Government actions (or lack thereof) leave these regions
thoroughly exposed to tragedies. States repeatedly show unwillingness to take Central guidelines
seriously but if this results in avoidable damage, the responsibility must be pinned down on the State
Government and other authorities.
A possible reason for the neglect of these clearly laid down guidelines is that the State of Gujarat has not
implemented the Disaster Management Act, 2005 and does not seem to be in a mood to do so. In 2013,
CAG published its report on “Performance Audit of Disaster Preparedness in India” in which it assessed
the disaster management capabilities of central bodies and various States.21
It was noted at the time that
the State Executive Committee, which is supposed to be the executive body of the State Disaster
Management Authority had yet to be constituted in Gujarat. The District Disaster Management
Authorities, the executive bodies in each district too had not been established in the state.22
In Amreli thus, the disaster management system does not function as DDMA instead has a slightly
ambiguous system under which most of the responsibilities have been delegated to an officer sitting at
the District Emergency Operation Centre or the District Development Officer. Unsurprisingly, the
District Collector at Amreli appeared unaware of his responsibilities and the progress of the relief
21 Performance Audit of Disaster Preparedness in India, COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL OF INDIA (2013)
available at http://164.100.47.132/paperlaidfiles/HOME%20AFFAIRS/Disaster-Preparedness%20-%20English%20-
%20Highrised.pdf 22 CAG noting several problems in India‟s disaster mitigation and preparedness mechanism found that, “NDMA‟s project
management capacity was deficient. As a result, none of its mitigation and vulnerability mapping projects was completed.”
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process.
A PIL was also filed before the Supreme Court based on the CAG report back then asking for the DM
Act to be implemented by the Centre, NDMA, seven States including Gujarat. It is known that notices
were issued to the respondents asking for the Act to be implemented in “letter and spirit”.23
The State of Gujarat continues to implement the older GSDM Act, 2003. Purely on Constitutional
grounds, the later DM Act, 2005 should prevail over the GSDM Act since they both concern a subject
not in any of the three lists in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and by default, the Parliament
that has the power to make laws on residuary subjects. Gujarat should have therefore replaced the earlier
structures with those prescribed by the Central Act. The hard consequence of not adopting the DM Act is
that some of the crucial functions that this act outlines have been ignored. The implementation of
NDMA‟s Flood Guidelines for instance would have been a statutory function of the DDMA but without
a DDMA, no body has been made responsible to carry this part of the function out. Similarly, since the
SEC has not been notified, there is little clarity if all or any of the specific powers given to SEC,
particularly those that relate to mitigation, are currently being carried out. This situation raises serious
questions of accountability.
It is true that there was a substantial failure to carry out of any mitigation related activity, that this had
fundamentally to do with the non-existence of adequate structures is one way to understand it. On the
whole, this is not a simple failure to perform statutory duties but one that, very likely, led to the violation
of fundamental right against deprivation of life.
Response and Relief
istrict Administration put up a sincere first response to the flood. According to the GSDMA
Report, the Air Force operating from their Jamnagar base assisted them when called upon. The
deployment of two helicopters on the day of the flood could not have been adequate and this was
subsequently increased to four on the following day. Two teams of NDRF also arrived on the night of
the flood and by the following day three teams were in deployment. Report shows that 254 people were
23 SC asks Centre to implement Disaster Management Act, FIRSTPOST (September 23, 2013) available at
http://www.firstpost.com/india/sc-asks-centre-to-implement-disaster-management-act-1128081.html
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airlifted and in all, 614 people were rescued and 5500 people were evacuated. The evacuation and
rescue figures do tell us that the response saved the lives of many but considering that over 1,37,000
were severely affected, the figures appear small. This is supplemented by the testimonies of a large
number of victims, whether it was that they were stuck on the terrace of their houses for days or that
they had to rescue themselves from dire situations and find shelter in the homes of their friends and
relatives living in a different village.
Report also shows that 41,000 water packets and 11,500 food packets were distributed and if this was
correct, the number is still quite small. Because there were no relief camps in operations during and after
the flood, these services were not available to a much larger number of victims. This has been confirmed
by senior District officials and persons who are responsible for camps on paper. Basic services could not
have, in any way, reached a significant portion of the affected population, something also confirmed by
the interviewees.
Nonetheless, to its credit the response teams worked hard to have the basic services such as electricity,
healthcare and road connectivity was restored within a few days at most places. Necessary public
infrastructure also did not take very long to be repaired though some of the roads do continue to lie in
their unrepaired states. The Primary Health Centre at Kukanvav which was completely flooded was back
in operation the following day. People in most villages visited by us were aware of primary health
camps taking place in their villages though not everyone accessed it. The Health and Medical
departments in the District let us access documents that show deployment of quick medical response
teams that arrived from outside the district.
The relief operations began with an initial assessment that was carried out at the village level. A second
damage assessment survey was later carried out based on which the relief sum was evidently decided.
This was done by taluka (block) level officers. The biggest howlers were made at this stage of the relief
process. A reasonably high number of persons (269 people or 25%) attest that the survey teams did not
even visit their homes or localities. Many said that the teams only visited houses closest to the main
road.
Caste based discrimination has been very apparent in the process. Dalit colonies and some OBC
colonies in many villages were those that were completely left out from the survey. This has been the
case in Chandgarh and Kukanvav.
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In Kukanvav, several persons from the Dalit and Devipujak colony24
were sitting in protest against the
neglect by the State Government. Kishorebhai Solanki, a Devipujak was one of the persons from the
colony who had joined the Amreli MLA Paresh Dhanani in his fast-unto-death.25
On 18th August,
Kishore self-immolated on the road when his family of agriculture labourers was away working. It took
Kishore‟s death for taluka level officers to finally notice his colony and they soon carried out its survey.
While Kishore‟s family did eventually receive relief, most of the other families in the colony had to
continue to wait. When met with and asked about the suicide, the Kukanvav Taluka Development
Officer and an associate said that they should not be faulted for the death since Kishore had not made a
petition to them expressing his desire to kill himself. If he had, they would have carried out a survey
earlier.
Harsukhbhai Makwana, a dalit agricultural labourer hung himself to death when relief refused to come.
This reason is reported in the initial report of the Police and is what is maintained by his uncle and other
kins. Their caste and occupation may not be co-incidental. The suffering out of the flood fell
disproportionately in the laps of particular sections of the society and this is abetted by State‟s policies.
The report will deal with this aspect a little later.
Even where the surveys were carried out, people were denied adequate or any relief. Adequacy here is
defined by entitlements under the relief package not normatively. The discrepancies are severest in cases
of assistance for loss or damage to house and for damage to crops and agricultural land. In CSJ‟s survey,
only 173 of the 982 people who suffered damage to their houses received any assistance. 691 of the 982
were people who had either completely or substantially lost their homes.
372 people had suffered from serious damage (loss of 3 inches or more of top soil) to their farmlands yet
none of them had received assistance. Similarly, crop loss of over 33% was suffered in farms of 352
people and only 6 had received assistance for this. 8 out of these 454 people who had lost their animals
received assistance. This was at a time when senior district officials claimed that 60% of the people had
already received farm assistance and 90% had received other assistance. Frequency tables based on the
data collected are a part of the Annexures.
24 25 Congress MLA Paresh Dhanani goes on fast-unto-death to demand relief package for flood-hit Amreli, THE INDIAN
EXPRESS (July 10, 2015) available at http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/congress-mla-paresh-dhanani-goes-
on-fast-unto-death-to-demand-relief-package-for-flood-hit-amreli/
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Three months after the initial survey, the situation had virtually not improved. CSJ met some of these
people again in December and January and none of them had received assistance.
An assistance of Rs. 7000 for loss of household goods and a cash dole, as CSJ discovered were the most
commonly distributed items. There were however 376 and 259 entitled persons respectively, who did
not receive even this. The problem with the distribution of cash dole was that administration found it
convenient to distribute it uniformly for 10 days.
Cash dole is given for subsistence against the loss of livelihood and there were many whose livelihood
continued to be jeopardy. If the administration had to make a crude calculation of the cash dole period, it
should have decided on 30 days, given that this is the “default” period for cash doles under the Central
Government‟s norms of assistance. The period itself is extendable to 60 days first, and then further if
State Executive Committee decides so depending on the ground condition. Instead of monitoring
progress, the cash dole was prematurely capped at ten days on the second day of the flood, official
circulars reveal. Amreli district and indeed many residents deserve a far greater livelihood assistance.
The state of normalcy has not in fact returned till the time this report goes into publishing.
It was the Taluka level officials who should bear most of the responsibility for the fiasco that was the
relief process. The Kukanvav TDO according to residents of the taluka left Kukanvav on the day of the
flood only to return after two months‟ leave. Responsibility cannot be evaded by the District officials
including the District Collector and the DDO, on whom the DC had entrusted the responsibility of the
process. There was a clear failure of supervision at this level.
As mentioned earlier, the State Government had expanded the scope of relief beyond the norms of
assistance set by the Central Government. The relief policy gave some respite to medium and large
farmers who were earlier excluded. It also came up with a special assistance to small and medium
business owners in addiction to offering them loans on low interest rates.
Assistance for loss of crop, damage to business, as well as loan facilities etc. are essentially special
livelihood protecting measures befitting certain occupational groups. The assistance for damage to land
may be argued to benefit a larger population including everyone whose livelihood is dependent on it
such as sharecroppers and agricultural labourers. The relief policy excludes any measure directed
towards protecting livelihood of certain groups of people. These groups include mainly agricultural
labourers, sharecroppers and cattle rearers.
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The assistance for loss of animals is capped at 3 large milch animals and 30 small animals. Cattle rearers
at any time might have 100 or more heads of cattle and the relief package does not take the occupation
into account. Cattle rearers ought to be a special category in themselves and a sensitive policy would
have closely tailored relief for all major occupational groups.
Agricultural labourers having no control over the production forces are, by and large still completely
unemployed. Between June to December, when a family of four could make Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 80,000,
most had only earned a maximum of Rs. 10,000 this time and many still completely unemployed. This
situation is expected to persist for another agricultural season. For agricultural labourers who lost their
homes, the circumstances were extreme. A family of six in Motha Gokharvada faced severe damage to
their house and were not given any kind of assistance for this. They took a loan and now all adult
members of the family will do provide labour to pay off their debts in an arrangement which in
definition is bonded labour.
The cash dole, in most cases the only relief that the labourers received was barely adequate. The same
family in Motha Gokharvada were given a cash dole of a grand total of Rs. 520, not even the amount for
ten days that was being uniformly supplied. It didn‟t help that it was a family of Dalits. Dalits in
Chandgarh were also given cash dole for merely two days. In the case of Vitthalpur, CSJ noted that
while all of the agricultural labourer population was unemployed five and a half months after the flood,
the land owners of the same village had resumed cultivation in over 60% of their lands. This is because
the cultivators in this village employed migrant labourers to work in their fields for lower wages. The
agricultural labourers in Vitthalpur were employed by cultivators outside the village. The problems of
the migrant labourers will also be dealt with later.
Agricultural labour is one of the biggest occupational group in Amreli. It is also dominated by the more
vulnerable sections. According to Census of 2011, around 31.95% of the all workers in Amreli are in
agricultural labour.26
The percentage is at 46.78% for women workers. For dalits, the number is at high
at 70%. In contrast, only 7% Dalits are cultivators, those who may have their livelihood protected.27
Rest of the agricultural labour population must mainly be made up of OBCs. A neglect of this
occupational group coupled with existing caste and gender structures, has the potential to increase the
26 District Census Handbook-Amreli, DIRECTORATE OF CENSUS OPERATIONS GUJARAT (2011); 31.80% of all workers are
categorized as other workers that may include non-agricultural labour. 27
Though there might still be no guarantee of this.
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inequality between classes, genders and castes. As it stands, the agricultural labourers have been the
most affected, and dalit and women agricultural labourers find themselves in the intersection of
vulnerability.
As alluded to earlier, it is perhaps not a coincidence that the two persons committing suicide were
agricultural labourers from Dalit and other marginalised sections. The strain felt by these groups is
indeed the worst.28
It is CSJ‟s case that the extension of assistance for the protection of certain
occupations was arbitrary and discriminatory. It thus fails the test of reasonable classification under
Article 14 of the Constitution. A law may create a classification for its applications but it must always be
based on reasonable and intelligible differentia, the differentia must have a rational basis and the
differentia must have a nexus with the object of the law. The Government resolutions mentioning the
items of assistance is a law itself. It is section 12 of the DM Act that supplies objects to the Government
resolutions and the items therein and it includes “restoration of means of livelihood.”. Further, equal
protection under Article 14 applies to grants of privilege and largess as these affect rights of persons.
According to the Supreme Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India
and Ors. [AIR 1979 SC 1628] “every action of the executive Government must be informed with reason
and should be free from arbitrariness.”
The assistance grant (“law” for the sake of simplicity), is in violation of Article 14 since the differentia
does not have a rational basis and has no nexus with the object of the law which is restoration or
protection of livelihood in general. The only basis offered by the Government officials is that it is
difficult to identify agricultural labourers. This hollow reasoning is sought to be applied to sharecroppers
as well. It may require some effort but Census does manage to identify people practicing different
occupations. Social Impact Assessment which identifies the interest holders, under the Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act of 2013 covers not just land owners but other people whose
livelihood depend on land. This allows the process to be inclusive. This was a shift away from a regime
that tied interests necessarily to ownership and documentary proofs. LARR has shown the possibility of
taking broader interests into account and this must be replicated in other instances of law making.
The law also indirectly discriminates against constitutionally protected groups such as Scheduled Castes
28 J Zhang, Psychological tensions found in suicide notes: a test for the strain theory of suicide, Archive of Suicide
Research, Vol. 12(1), 67-73 (2008); Zhang has proposed a strain theory of suicides. Of the four strains that lead to suicides,
he names deprivation strain and coping strain as two.
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and OBCs and is thus suspect in the context of Article 15. Even if the classification appears neutral, by
fact of the societal structures that are reflected so strongly in practice of occupations in Amreli, a
protected group begins to be impacted disparately. One can also point to Section 61 of the DM Act that
prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sex, caste, community, descent, or religion in the relief
process, to say certain occupational communities (and these actually form communities in the village),
have been discriminated against.
Section 12 of DM Act refers to the need of creating special provisions for widows and orphans. Norms
of assistance defined by the Centre and the GRs of the State both omit this clause. The arbitrariness and
weaknesses of the relief package are failures of both the Central Government and the State Government
and these require to revised. In the aftermath of disasters when relief process mainly and directly
benefits some groups who also happen to be already better off, this furthers inequality.
In Amreli district, the land owners, on the whole, already enjoyed a position of privilege as well as
control over the land resource. Even with the failure of the implementation process, they have been able
to resume cultivation on some part of the land employing a lesser number of people. Not many of them
could claim to have faced problems of survival. They may be worse off but not as much as the
agricultural labourers. The agricultural labourers in Amreli on the other hand face severe unemployment
today. Since they barely made their ends meet even before the flood, it is their survival that is at stake
here.
During a situation of disaster, none of the fundamental rights ought to be abrogated, this includes also
the right to life. The right to life found under Article 21 has been taken to mean the right to a dignified
life, much more than a mere existence [Maneka Gandhi v. UOI]. This right, by way of subsequent
judgements of the Supreme Court has now taken a wide meaning that includes such things as the right to
livelihood [Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180], right to shelter [Chameli
Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1996 SC 1051] and right to maintenance and improvement of public health
[Vincent Parikurlangara v. UOI, AIR 1987 SC 990].
The right to rescue, relief and rehabilitation after a natural disaster has also been in recognised as an
aspect of Article 21 by the Gujarat High Court in the post-2001 Gujarat Earthquake case of B.J. Diwan
v. State of Gujarat [AIR 2002 Guj 99].
While most of the human rights articulated under UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR are already part of our
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fundamental rights framework, the contents of these can give a wider meaning to these guarantees as
well as a wider understanding of the duties of the States to protect them. The practice of referring to
International human rights instruments for this purpose has been adopted by the higher courts in India.
Article 25(1) of the UDHR for instance states: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate
for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical
care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness,
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.”
This should mean that in a situation like a disaster that is beyond the control of the victims, they will
continue to have the right to security and in all cases, a right to an adequate standard of living adequate.
It flows that the State must play its part in the protection of these rights.
A liberal expression of the rights which are affected during natural disasters figures in the IASC
Operational Guidelines on the Protection of Persons in Situations of Natural Disasters. These rights are:
(i) rights related to physical security and integrity (e.g. protection of the right to life and the right to be
free of , arbitrary detention, and threats to these rights);
(ii)rights related to basic necessities of life (e.g. the rights to food, drinking water, shelter, adequate
clothing, adequate health services, and sanitation);
(iii) rights related to other economic, social and cultural protection needs (e.g. the rights to be provided
with or have access to education, to receive restitution or compensation for lost property, and to work);
and
(iv) rights related to other civil and political protection needs (e.g. the rights to religious freedom and
freedom of speech, personal documentation, political participation, access to courts, and freedom from
discrimination).29
Domestic laws of various countries including India‟s own, have adopted these guarantees in different
ways. US, for example enacted the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act in 1988 and
one of its provisions allows an unemployment benefit to be paid to a person rendered without work after
29 Protecting Persons Affected by Natural Disasters, INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMMITTEE OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES
ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND NATURAL DISASTERS (June, 2006).
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a disaster and this assistance could last till as long as the unemployment persists with an outer limit of
26 weeks.30
One could say this is not a guarantee considering the discretion of the President involved
but it is nonetheless a proactive measure mindful of the livelihood interest that is affected and absent
from the laws of other countries such as India. It is important to both identify measures such as these
and ensure their enforceability.
In the case of Amreli, even the enforceability of the relief policy was obstructed at times by arbitrary
documentary requirements. The administration kept ration card as the limiting criterion for identifying
beneficiaries for all kinds of losses. First, such a criterion had no backing in law. Second, the criterion
was completely arbitrary considering the object of relief. Third, if such a criterion is employed, the
purpose of assessment and survey which is identification .of actual loss and beneficiaries, is defeated.
The rigid use of this criterion has resulted in the complete denial of assistance to the significant migrant
population from outside the State and many of the locals who lost their ration cards during the same
flood. CSJ also found several cases where members of a family who had two separate houses were given
assistance for damage to only one house since they had a common ration card. It is only
commonsensical thus to distribute relief against actual loss and not create an artificial hurdle for people
to cross before they are given relief. Even if the migrant population is domiciled in other parts of the
State or outside the State, or do not possess any ration card, the law cannot discriminate against them.
Recovery, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation
ost-disaster recovery is an oft forgotten part of the disaster narrative. After the media frenzy is over
and people have been given immediate relief, another struggle has begun for a large part of the
population. An unfair recovery phase just following an inequitable relief process will further widen the
gap between the rich and the poor. On the other hand a fair and just recovery may bring people out of
poverty and reduce the wealth gap. In states such as Bihar and Assam where floods occur almost every
year, the recovery phase has the potential to bring the destructive flood cycle to an end.
There are several important principles articulated in various International frameworks that may inform
the recovery process on the ground. Surprisingly, many of these principles have been integrated into
India‟s disaster policies and plans. The Amreli District Disaster Management Plan adopts the
30
42 U.S.C. 5177
P
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International Strategy for Disaster Reduction‟s definition of recovery which is, “decisions and actions
taken after a disaster with a view to restoring or improving life and assets of the stricken community,
while encouraging and facilitating necessary adjustments to reduce disaster risk.”31
It goes on to say, “Recovery and reconstruction (R&R) or comprehensive rehabilitation is the last step in
cycle of disaster management. In addition, this is the phase of new cycle, where the opportunity to
reconstruction and rehabilitation should be utilised for building a better and more safe and resilient
society.”32
Later, the need for reestablishment of adequate housing is clearly laid out in the section on
long term recovery program under the plan.
National Policy of Disaster Management has treated the incorporation of disaster resilient features to
„build back better‟ as the guiding principle of the reconstruction process.33
This follows developments in
the International scene since 2004 that have now culminated in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk
Reduction34
featuring „building back better‟ as one of the key priorities for States and the international
community.
The concept also finds mentions in the State Plan and the District Plan. The reconstruction approach that
these policies and plans have adopted is the „owner driven‟ approach. There is a good justification
behind adopting this instead of a government led approach or what is called an „agency driven
reconstruction‟. The problem with the latter approach according to a World Bank Report titled Safer
Homes, Stronger Communities35
, is that it gives the control over the process to Government contractors
who may use „exogenous building technologies‟, incompatible designs and construction materials, etc.
The owner and community participation is limited by the approach and it will usually lead to their
dissatisfaction with the result.
An owner driven reconstruction approach is on the other hand is participatory and the owners will
ultimately have the control over designs, construction materials. Even if the owners rely on contractors
31 Supra note 37. 32 Supra note 37. 33
National Policy of Disaster Management, NATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY (2009). 34 At the Third United Nations World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in March 2015, UN Member States and
other stakeholders adopted the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 to replace the previous Hyogo
Framework. Sendai Framework expects the outcome of: “...substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives,
livelihoods and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses,
communities and countries.” 35 AK Jha et al., Safer Homes, Stronger Communities: A Handbook for Reconstructing after Natural Disasters, THE
WORLD BANK, pg 96 (2010) available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/2409
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to carry out the construction, there will be accountability to the owners. This ensures, as the World Bank
Study suggests, highest levels of satisfaction.36
Unfortunately, various levels of the Government seem to have an unclear understanding of this
approach. The relief policies adopt a purely „cash approach‟ under which the State merely provides a
cash assistance for the loss of homes. ODR approach differs from this in the way that it involves both
technical assistance to the owners and Government oversight. It is more suited to achieving the objective
of building back better and resilient houses. A cash approach, whether or not the assistance is adequate
might leave people as vulnerable against future disasters. But where the assistance is inadequate and the
financial conditions of the victims are already poor, the victims cannot just build back better, they
cannot build back at all. This is also the case in Amreli. The reconstruction process is not helped by the
prices of commodities having risen after the disaster.
While ODR approach has been tried in India before such as after the 2001 Gujarat Earthquake,
Governments continue to use cash approaches most commonly despite its lessons. According to a paper
that recounts the experience of the cash approach, “...after the severe floods in Bihar of 2008, the
Government of Bihar gave cash compensations to the flood victims who lost their houses. Two years
after, the floods the Government of Bihar realised that the cash compensation did not allow people to
build back disaster resilient houses and thus recently started a large-scale owner-driven housing
reconstruction programme.”37
What Amreli needs is the adoption of an ODR approach, one that is consistent with International
frameworks and our policies, one that ensures the outcome of more resilient homes and community, and
one that also gives effect to constitutional guarantee of shelter under Article 21.
For this the Government might have to supervise reconstructions, give technical inputs, for partnerships
with NGOs, facilitate materials at an affordable rates and, in cases, revise the assistance. Under the relief
package, the Government currently gives an assistance of Rs. 9,000 for the loss of a hut. The assistance
can only enable, if at all, the reconstructions of huts. Considering that the people who live in huts are
36 37 Jennifer Barenstein, The role of communities in post-disaster reconstruction. A call for owner-driven approaches,
TAFTERJOURNAL N. 50 (August, 2012) available at
http://www.tafterjournal.it/2012/08/01/the-role-of-communities-in-post-disaster-reconstruction-a-call-for-owner-driven-
approaches/
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already those with the least means, this meager assistance will in no way ensure resilience against future
floods.
The district administration has also passed on the opportunity to use existing housing schemes such as
the Indira Awaas Yojna and Mukhyamantri Awaas Yojna to ensure people have safer homes after the
flood and they need only refer to their own disaster management plans for this suggestion.
Restoration of livelihood is the other important part of the recovery process and the administration has
shown similar indifference towards this. The DDMP again discloses the need for the efforts to restore
jobs that were lost and restore the economic base of the disaster areas as part of the long term recovery
programme and yet again the administration has failed to live up the goals it has set for itself. The plan
itself is deficient in carving out more concrete measures to protect livelihood but MNREGA finds a
place at one place in the plan.
In Amreli, a large part of the rural population is in agricultural labour and the impact on this group has
been noted earlier in this report. Had Amreli implemented the MNREGA properly, it would have taken
some pressure off land. However CSJ failed to find any agricultural labourer in Amreli to have ever
received work under the Act, though there were some who had job cards under it.
The administration and the Panchayat could have implemented the Act in the aftermath of the disaster
and initiated a process of identifying beneficiaries but by all account the administration was
unsympathetic to the livelihood issue. The utilisation of MNREGA will be one path to restoration and
perhaps only a short term one. This itself may not guarantee the long term recovery of the agriculture
labourers. MNREGA can be clinically used to carry out repair work in every village. There are tracts of
land where houses stood on which reconstruction is not possible. Using the Act to have the land leveled
serves dual purposes.
There are of course several other groups facing a similar livelihood crisis. The Gujarat Earthquake
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Policy launched by the Government of Gujarat had gone some way in
protecting livelihood of many occupational groups. The Government set up funds for self employed and
cottage industries, Handloom-Handicrafts parks and organise vocational training programs for artisans
and workers. There was of course nothing in particular for agricultural and other labourers but needs in
all situations ought to be assessed locally. In Amreli, the livelihood needs are different and the State is
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expected to assess these before making recovery and rehabilitation plans, both in the short term and the
long term.
The effective rehabilitation of groups such as sharecroppers and agricultural labourers might require
ensuring that the agricultural fields are fixed in time and this involves more than mere cash assistance to
farmers. There are of course many farmers, most of them small, who also find themselves struggling.
Many farmers tell CSJ that after the cyclones of 1982, the Government had the land leveled and repaired
at their own cost. It is perhaps possible to use NREGA for this purpose.
A measure such as this appears prudent from the point of view of not only securing livelihood of
families dependent on land but also of ensuring food and economic security of the region. The Rabi
harvest season, when wheat is grown in the area is ongoing. The crops have not been doing well, many
farmers tell CSJ. Overall output is expected to be acutely reduced. The Kharif harvest of cotton
supposed to start in July had already fared worse. Food security remains compromised in the region for
many reasons. Right to food is another fundamental right that CSJ has found abridged. With those
without the means of livelihood already finding it difficult, the ration.
Finally, coming to healthcare which is another primary right, there are both positive and negative things
to report. As mentioned, there were health camps at several places and there were no reported epidemic
of any kind. What was perhaps forgotten was psycho-social counseling in the recovery phase although
there are clear references to this in our policies for a reason that was visible in the suicide of Meeraben
Ravrani. Meeraben left her house during the flood and returned to find a part of it damaged. This led her
to experience severe mental and emotional distress, according to her family. She continued to be in
distress for about two weeks without any medical assistance. On 20th
July, she set herself on fire and
passed away within a few days at the Government Hospital in Rajkot. Her death can only be considered
a failure of the guarantee of life under our Constitution.
What follows is that while we know that the recovery processes carried out by the Government must
both take care of the basic rights and ensure inclusivity in these processes, the Government in the case
of the recovery process in Amreli seems to have failed on both of these counts. The State and Central
Government will do well by taking a look at the Sendai Framework. The framework makes investment
in disaster risk reduction one of the four priorities for States. Towards this, the framework asks the
States, “[t]o strengthen the design and implementation of inclusive policies and social safety-net
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mechanisms, including through community involvement, integrated with livelihood enhancement
programmes, and access to basic health-care services, including maternal, newborn and child health,
sexual and reproductive health, food security and nutrition, housing and education, towards the
eradication of poverty, to find durable solutions in the post-disaster phase and to empower and assist
people disproportionately affected by disasters;”
The framework accepts the importance of recovery period as well as the period when there is no
practical threat of a disaster in building resilience for future potential disasters. The offices of the
disaster agencies must work round the year and any policies and laws that Governments take towards
guaranteeing fundamental rights and equality must be with the mind to have them preserved as much as
possible even during the worst disasters.
With a similar outlook, the framework also stresses on sustainable development as an important guiding
principle. According to the framework, “The development, strengthening and implementation of
relevant policies, plans, practices and mechanisms need to aim at coherence, as appropriate, across
sustainable development and growth, food security, health and safety, climate change and variability,
environmental management and disaster risk reduction agendas. Disaster risk reduction is essential to
achieve sustainable development...”38
While the claim is that disaster risk reduction leads to sustainable development. Yet, we find the reverse
to also be true even as sustainable human development focusing on the objectives of ensuring the right
to livelihood, housing and food as well as the right to equality help communities cope with disasters
better.
38
Supra note 28.
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Conclusion
his report has been an attempt to bring to light the conditions of the victims of the Amreli flood
and the functioning of the disaster management system in relation to the flood. The Amreli flood
was certainly much less destructive than the November-December Coramandel Coast floods that
ravaged Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Puducherry taking ten times as many lives. The latter tragedy
getting the attention it did is understandable and there is only so much sense in a comparison.
Yet, Amreli flood and the experiences of the victims should be talked about because they could provide
lessons that other disasters may not. The Coramandel Coast floods were reported by the media and
writers as urban disasters since much of the impact was felt by Chennai. There were important lessons to
be taken away that concern urban planning. The rural impact of the floods was less talked about. Amreli
on the other hand has lessons to offer about dealing with rural tragedies. This report does not have much
to say about rural planning, there is a feeling that this area is ignored by experts on the subject and it is
necessary to take it up. However, this report does focus on the structure of rural societies particularly the
vulnerable groups within and its relation to floods.
Besides this, this report also focuses on group and individual character of the suffering caused by
disasters. The magnitude of a disaster seen in terms of numbers is perhaps not as relevant when there are
severe violation of individual and group rights.
In the end, all disasters and similar interventions speak to usual defects of the implementation of relief
policies and usual oversights of the recovery processes. If the action oriented research behind this report
helps remedy these, it will make the research valuable in itself. Yet, if researches and reports like this
one manage to push (or hopefully, alter) the present discourse on disaster risk reduction and
management and effect changes in laws and policies, it will surely be a big victory for civil society. It
will also, CSJ believes, lead to a safer and happier society.
The two main themes of this report were (i) the relation of the vulnerabilities within the structure of
rural societies with disasters; and (ii) the rights of the victims and the duties of the State towards the
victims. It might be useful to recapitulate some of the points made and also throw up some new ones.
Vulnerabilities of Certain Groups
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ulnerability is tied into the meaning of disasters, the word signifying an overlap of a threatening
event („hazard‟) and existing vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities would include those of physical
infrastructure but also those owing to societal structures. As a disaster management report by the Central
Government also puts it:
“Poverty and risk to disasters are inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing. The poor section of the society is worst affected in case of disaster. The situation further aggravates due to the
compulsion of the poor to exploit environmental resources for their survival, increasing the risk
and exposure of the society to disasters, in particular those triggered by flood, drought and landslides. Poverty also compels the poor to migrate and live at physically more vulnerable
locations, often on unsafe land and in unsafe shelters. These inhabitations of the poor at such
locations are either due to the fact that there is no other land available at reasonable cost or it is
close to the employment opportunities. The inhabitations of the poor people on marginal land are prone to all types of disasters. The type of construction of these houses further deteriorates the
condition. These dwellings made up of low cost material without giving much consideration to
technical aspect are easy targets of various hazards.”39
It does reveal a entrenched understanding of vulnerability so it is sad that government‟s relief policies
have seldom reflected this or do much to reduce the pressure on the poorest. Within the poorest sections,
certain socio-economic groups are likelier to face an elevated risk of disasters. A variety of factors
including the region, the kind of disaster decide what groups are most affected and these might face
risks in distinct ways. In India, women, children, dalits and other marginalised castes will commonly
figure amongst these. Landless agricultural labourers in most parts of the country will be one of the
occupational groups that is vulnerable. In the regions, which sees people migrating from other parts of
the country, the migrant population is also quite vulnerable. As mentioned, all of these groups suffer in
distinct ways as they did in Amreli, and they deserve to be examined separately.
Agricultural Labourers: The plight of the landless agricultural labourers in Amreli has been detailed in
this report. The district has a significant population of agricultural labourers and the number for those
that have fallen victim to the flood is also subsequently high.
Their vulnerability comes primarily from their landlessness which gives them little control over the
resource they depend on. Landlessness and engagement in manual labour is considered as one of the
seven indicators of rural deprivation according to the Census and at 5.37 Crore rural households, the
39 Disaster Management in India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, pg 14 (May, 2011) available at
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/india/docs/disaster_management_in_india.pdf
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largest category.40
The intersection of this with any of the other indicators, it is said, invites far graver
circumstances than what the Census data would read on the surface.41
In Amreli, a household of agricultural labourers finds seasonal employment in the field for 6-8 months,
earning perhaps Rs. 70,000 on an average. The harvest of cotton that usually starts around July failed to
take off in the disaster affected areas of Amreli and consequently this left the agricultural labourers
without work. Indeed, the farmers also suffered from loss of crops as well as soil erosion, a higher
relative income and savings would have helped out in their struggles. This is less true for smaller
farmers with land holding of less than one hectare. The agricultural labourers who can even otherwise
manage mere sustenance, find survival during the floods. Many of the farmers after 6 months of the
calamity, have managed to resume cultivation in a part of their lands, leading to some prospective
income, the sheer number of people in agriculture labour and the number of people dependent on one
person‟s land ensures the relative deprivation of this group.
Government‟s own relief policies do little for agricultural labourers. While cultivators can get assistance
for loss of crop and land, labourers do not get any for the loss of work owing to loss of crop. Ownership
of the means of production continues to be the determinant of entitlement and that widely debunked
„trickle-down‟ effect seems to be the principle (if one were to read the policies most charitably.) It is
another thing that the relief distribution to farmers has been made a mess of by the administration
leading to a distress for both these groups. Even if the cultivators can be helped, this will not uplift the
labourers.
Policies should protect all interests that are tied to loss of property but fundamentally target livelihood
loss. This is at least the stated purpose of providing relief under our law. One thing to note is that when
in a recovery phase, a group is attempted to be compensated (to use it broadly) and an already deprived
group is ignored, this has the potential to further income inequality. This, besides policies to secure
livelihood of all, targeted policies to deal with inequality are necessary for sustainable economic growth,
if one is searching for a developmental narrative. The reason tied to protection of fundamental rights
could also stand alone.
40 Provisional Data of Socio Economic and Caste Census (SECC) 2011 for Rural India Released, PRESS INFORMATION
BUREAU, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF FINANCE (July 5, 2015) available at
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=122963 41 Landlessness key to rural deprivation, census says, THE TIMES OF INDIA (July 13, 2015) available at
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Landlessness-key-to-rural-deprivation-census-says/articleshow/48047026.cms
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Dalits: Involvement in landless agriculture labour and being a member of SCs or STs are both indicators
of deprivation under the SEAC. If the two overlap, the relative deprivation is instantly higher. As
reported, 70% of all working Dalits in Amreli are agricultural labourers, whether main or marginal, and
only 7% of the Dalits are cultivators. Of the non-working population, likely to not being in the working
age group, most might still be dependent on members of their family in agriculture labour. Dalits in
Amreli are hence intrinsically linked to this occupation and the vulnerabilities of the occupation
naturally affect the Dalits.
The other ways that Dalits are affected is by the conditions of their living and rural spatial divides. That
most Dalits live in Amreli live in kaccha houses (a third deprivation indicator under SEAC) is an
observable fact if the Census/SEAC does not report on this. Dalit households are also likely to be
located on the periphery of a village and face the first impact of floodwater onslaught, a fact supported
by people‟s versions of the event. These facts resulted in pervasive destruction of their houses. This is
seen in the case of the recent flood in Tamil Nadu, particularly in the Cuddalore district, where a
research suggests that an overwhelming majority of the houses, livestock and crops belonged to Dalit
housholds.42
As CSJ‟s survey shows, the number for people who received assistance for damage to their homes was
very low and Dalits will be forced to carry a bigger share of this burden. Of course, the assistance
provided is inadequate to build a complete house, a fact betrayed by the sight of unfinished houses
across villages in Amreli. When the assistance, if at all received, is not adequate and the income is low
by virtue of their occupations, there is scant hope of putting back together a house that is safer against a
future hazard. This leads to a increased vulnerability in the following critical season.
That societal disease of caste discrimination, made itself visible in the survey process and many
residential colonies of Dalits and other marginalised castes were ignored in the survey process. Some of
the specific examples have been cited in this report. Another survey carried out after the flood in Tamil
Nadu reveal related patterns of discrimination against Dalits.43
42 “No Respite For Dalits in Disaster Response, Tamil Nadu”: Report of Initial Findings from Immediate Needs
Assessment and Monitoring Responses towards Affected Dalit Communities, NATIONAL CAMPAIGN ON DALIT HUMAN RIGHTS
AND SOCIAL AWARENESS SOCIETY FOR YOUTHS (December, 2015) available at http://reliefweb.int/report/india/tsunami-2015-
floods-no-respite-dalits-disaster-response-tamil-nadu-report-initial 43 J Balasubramaniam, Caste Discrimination in Relief: Tamil Nadu Floods 2015, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY, Vol.
51(2) (January 9, 2016).
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To be sure, anything done to benefit the agricultural labourers and those who have lost their homes will
also help a large number of Dalits but there is a scope for a more specific actions such as punishing the
perpetrators of caste discrimination.
Women: Like dalits, some of the problems of women overlap with those of agricultural labourers.
31.95% of all workers in Amreli must be agricultural labourers according to Census data but the
percentage of women employed in this sector is high at 46.78%. 72.62% of women in Amreli are
categorised as non workers, most of them probably contributing as home caretakers.
Women along with senior citizens, children and the disabled form special interest groups within
International frameworks as well as India‟s policies. While there are some special biological needs
associated with gender such as those reproductive and menstrual, much of their vulnerability is
constructed by society. This construction is very much a part of the disaster relief and recovery phases.
Ownership or at least the control over land is exercised by the men. This is true in Amreli. The
assistance for loss of land or in fact any loss of property were given unevenly in the name of the male
members of a household. It could just be that the bank accounts in a household are held by men, itself a
product of gender bias, but for whatever reason, the assistance was received and probably controlled by
men.
In a group discussion that CSJ conducted on the issue of land related assistance, not a single women was
in representation. On other issues, women formed a minority, till their presence was asked for by CSJ.
The lesson from the effort to involve women in the discussion was important. Women are simply not
allowed to be involved in the post-disaster discourse. When women were then given a space to voice
their problems, they were more vocal and articulated different kinds of grievances. The grievances of
men are more usually restricted to the quantum of the assistance fixed by the Government that they did
not receive, it was some of the women whose demands connect directly to fundamental rights. A case in
point is the demand for alternative land for resettlement in Vitthalpur and CSJ‟s report has benefited
from experiences of women.
The responsibility to look after the children, the elderly, the sick and the injured after is usually on the
women as the primary care giver in a family and the work burden increases substantially after a
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disaster.44
The emotional burden also piles on exposing them to issues of mental health. Though
certainly, men being given the gender role of providing for the family also exposes them to similar
problems which leads to the understanding that gender roles contribute heavily to suffering.
Gender equality remains a bigger battle to fight but disaster relief and recovery processes must not
further gender inequalities, these should close these gaps. Any assistance given should empower women
or at least jointly, both. It is also important to have women equally represented in the discourse, the
policies are after all written mostly by men at the behest of men, leaving problems of women ignored or
misunderstood.
Migrants: Admittedly, CSJ has not been able to dig deeper into the issues of the migrants population.
The number of migrant population in the district could not be ascertained in the absence of records
maintained by the State, though most are understood to be labourers. They come from both within the
state as well as from neighbouring states such as Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. Some migrants that it
met told CSJ that they did not receive the benefits under the relief policies primarily, for the lack of
required documents and this appears to be the case across Amreli. It has been pointed out that the
document on the basis of which relief granted was ration card that was locally issued and most migrants
did not possess this. A similar ordeal was faced by those who had lost their documents during the floods
and could not obtain a duplicate ration card.
Intuitively, migrants are also less likely to have permanent houses and this adds to the vulnerability. It
can be more strongly asserted that those in agricultural labour earn less than the local population, which
can explain the demand and supply of migrant labour in rural areas. This is observed in Vitthalpur where
the farmers employed migrant labourers and not the labourers residing in the same village. That a
documentary requirement of ration card is without any sanction of law is one thing, but if migrants did
suffer from loss they should be given assistance in principle. The fundamental rights protection applies
equally to everyone.
Rights of Victims, Expectations from the State and Conceptions of Justice
44 Women and Disaster Relief, HUMANITARIAN COALITION available at http://humanitariancoalition.ca/info-
portal/factsheets/women-and-disaster-relief
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ncidents of natural disasters have consistently questioned the efficiency of the current system of
disaster management. However at a more fundamental level, these incidents question the role of the
State and its responsibilities towards ensuring the rights of its citizens in disaster situations.
As mentioned, the right to livelihood, shelter, health, food and safe drinking water have all been
considered by the Supreme Court as parts of a person‟s right to life under Article 21 at various points of
time. Besides the right of existence itself, these are some of the rights that come to be threatened in a
disaster situation.
The duties of the State in relation to these rights is an uncertain territory. The Supreme Court has fixed a
positive duty of the State to protect right to life and the State too appears to have taken these up by way
of legislations such as National Food Security Act, 2013 and MNREGA, 2005. Certainly, these
legislations may not be crystallisations of fundamental right guarantees in the same way that the Right to
Education Act is, however even if the link between a statutory right created by these laws and the larger
right is tenuous, it can still be easily imagined.
Legislations like the DM Act create new institutions and processes but if these processes are informed
by the fundamental rights, only then will they really be useful. An act like the DM Act that deals with
disaster management, is a legislation that naturally deals with fundamentally rights of people. It is not
enacted for the purpose of creating jobs for civil servants or increasing bureaucratic processes though
this increasingly what it looks like.
The focus is unfortunately on the processes themselves and not the outcome. The outcome of the
disaster management system ought to be achievement of fundamental rights. Everything ranging from
the chosen beneficiaries to the quantum of assistance to the way mitigation of disasters is carried out
lacks an imagination, imagination that is necessary to achieve fundamental rights not offer it lip service.
Of course, it also reeks of indifference.
When one compares progressive International frameworks and India‟s disaster policies, one, again finds
that India has only managed to borrow certain processes and concepts from these but has failed to make
its policies in line with the spirit of the frameworks. This would perhaps require a closer reading and
deeper understanding of frameworks. A close reading of the Sendai framework‟s guiding principles and
set of priorities, will tell you that the framework demands for an outcome oriented system. The primary
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focus of the framework on poverty reduction, inclusiveness and elimination of inequality, sustainable
development and protection of human rights is not even easy to miss.
Certain theories of jurisprudence might also help us determine the extent of State‟s responsibilities. Two
theories are mainly relied upon to justify State‟s active role in a disaster situation, the social contract
theory and the moral theory. These theories have been clearly elaborated in the context of disasters by
Naomi Zack though they have been expressed in some form earlier.45
The Social Contract theory in particular is very useful in evaluating the scope of State‟s responsibility in
a disaster situation take it farther than where Fundamental Rights jurisprudence stands at the moment.
The theory itself imagines the creation of the State as an outcome of an agreement between people most
commonly understood to be living in a „state of nature‟.46
The quality of life in this „state of nature‟ is
disputable but it is without political order.47
When individuals adopt political order, they do so by
surrendering some of their rights in favour of having some of their rights protected by an authority.
Modern Constitutions, particularly the bill of rights within them are considered today as manifestations
of the Social Contract. The Indian Constitution too has been proclaimed by the Supreme Court as one.
In Zack‟s view, a disaster situation resembles a Hobbesian state of nature where the actual physical
destruction is often followed by the “profound breakdown in civil society which is made worse by the
dysfunction of government.”48
This situation according to Zack is a second state of nature which will go
on till Government action restores order. The presence of the Government in people‟s lives, after the
original state of nature ensures that only the Government can restore it. The persistence of this state
could even lead to withdrawal of people‟s loyalty towards the State.
To establish a situation as a second state of nature, the burden will be to demonstrate the absence of
45 Naomi Zack, Philosophy and Disaster, HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS 2, Article 5 (April 2006) available at
https://www.hsaj.org/articles/176 46 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651); John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1689); Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Of the
Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right (1762); These are considered to be the foundational texts on the Social Contract Theory. Each theorist differing with each other on several issues. 47 To Hobbes, the life in state of nature was “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short”. It wasn‟t so bad according to Locke.
To him, it was “a state of perfect freedom of acting and disposing of their own possessions and persons as they think fit
within the bounds of the law of nature... The natural state is also one of equality in which all power and jurisdiction is
reciprocal and no one has more than another.” 48 According to Zack: “The destruction of an existing society‟s material basis of human life does not return human beings
to an original state of nature, because it does not return them to conditions under which self-sufficient survival is possible. It
is not possible to “return” to some manner of “living off the land” after most modern disasters.”
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Government albeit temporary. However, if the a second state of nature is established, obligations of the
State (used interchangeably with the Government) flow quite easily from this fact. Very simply put:
“Any obligation of government concerning second states of nature would have to stem from the basic
principles of social contract theory. The argument based on social contract theory for the obligation of
government to prepare for and respond to disaster would go like this: Government has a continual
obligation to benefit those governed by rendering them better off than they would have been in the first
state of nature. The temporary dysfunction of government in disasters results in a second state of
nature for those governed. Therefore, government has an extended obligation to render citizens better
off than they may be in a second state of nature. That is, government is obligated to ensure adequate
disaster preparation and planning, for all probable disasters, in precisely those ways in which the
public has demonstrated its inabilities.”49
This theory is therefore helpful because once the source of State‟s obligations are reimagined: (a) it
settles the question of why the State has a positive obligation to secure people‟s basic rights (read:
Fundamental rights under the Constitution); and (b) it demands an outcome oriented response by the
State instead of a process oriented response.
To put it differently, the government reflects the representation of the will of people and they elect
government in order to be governed and in safeguarding their entitlements for a dignified life. The State
is hence duty bound to take positive measures to minimize the effects of disasters and work through
different policies in rehabilitating and restoring the lives of people. Only State can do this. The Social
Contract theory helps the project of full realisation of fundamental rights, it would help the governments
and the courts understand just why is that the State is expected to bear the responsibility to bring victims
of a disaster out of their condition and the ramification of not doing so.
Some theories of justice are perhaps tied to this. John Rawls‟ conception of justice as fairness has been
drawn into the debate by many.50
The conception is based on two principles often referred to as the
Liberty Principle and the Equality Principle.51
The second of these is further a combination of what is
called a Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle and the Difference Principle, with the former taking
priority over the latter. The Difference Principle has been described to say inequalities are to be tolerated
only when they result in greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of the society.52
This is seen
49 Supra note 16. 50 Alcira Kreimer and Margaret Arnold, ed., Managing Disaster Risk in Emerging Economies (2000); 51 John Rawls, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT, 42 (2001). 52
Timothy Beatley, Towards a Moral Philosophy of Natural Disaster Mitigation, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MASS
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as a justification for distributive justice. Surely a situation such as disasters that affects the poor more
than the rich is undesirable and its remedy to this may be compensating the least advantaged groups
more than those above them.
A final point on the question whether compensation is a more appropriate relief device than mere
assistance. Assistance is given only to cover part of the loss. As seen in Amreli, this is often not adequate
if the aim is to ensure that normalcy is returned. For example, even the highest assistance of Rs. 95,000
will not be enough to build a complete and resilient house much less Rs. 9000 given on account of loss
of a hut.
A compensation system might not be appropriate itself if families only receive the cost of a hut if they
were to lose one as this will not ensure resilient shelter in the coming season. The system will have to go
beyond loss but ensure consistence with rights and international frameworks.
This is much easily justified when the fault of the State is apparent. The omissions of the mitigation
measures in the case of Gujarat and its contribution to the damage are somewhat apparent and corrective
justice puts a greater burden on the State to compensate people for their loss. However it is also true that
the principle of no fault liability exists in some spheres of law and this system is justified foremostly by
its need.
EMERGENCIES AND DISASTERS, Vol. 7(1), pgs 5-32, pg 14 (March, 1989) available at
http://www.training.fema.gov/hiedu/downloads/ijems/articles/towards%20a%20moral%20philosophy%20of%20naturall%20
disaster%20mitigation.pdf
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Recommendations
To the Amreli District Administration
Having accepted victim‟s grievances under the High Court‟s orders, redress them assuming good
faith, within a reasonable time frame.
Keep the grievance redressal mechanism open until a court appointed system is place and provide
original assessment forms based on which assistance was decided, available at the Taluka offices,
free of cost to enable victims to file grievances.
Carry out well re-assessments in all the affected villages with the proper supervision of either the
District Collector or the District Development Officer.
Dispense with the criterion of asking for Ration Cards to give the relief instead provide relief
against actual loss.
When giving future relief, transfer the amount in the account of an adult female.
Identify particularly Migrant labourers who have not received any assistance due to the
documentary requirements and provide them relief against their losses.
Based on the grievances received, identify major gaps in the implementation of relief and take
actions against Taluka level officers responsible for negligence and deliberate dereliction of duties.
Take strict actions particularly against officers whose actions and omissions amounted to
discrimination.
Through the District Programme Coordinator under the Act, ensure implementation MGNREGA in
the District by providing work to persons with job cards and also restart the process identifying
people for job cards prioritising those whose livelihood has been most affected due to the flood.
Similarly, identify potential beneficiaries from the victims of the flood for housing schemes such as
Indira Awaas Yojna and Mukhyamantri Awaas Yojna.
Identify victims of the flood as beneficiaries under Antyodaya schemes and take any other measures
to ensure security of food and basic means in the District.
To the Government of Gujarat
Implement the Disaster Management Act, 2005 in the states and replace existing structures with the
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structures given under the 2005 Act.
Carry out a flood impact assessment of the regions affected and assess particularly the impact on
livelihood, agriculture, food security, healthcare and overall on development and poverty.
Frame separate flood reconstruction and rehabilitation policies that may be implemented in the two
flood affected regions in Gujarat.
Establish reconstruction guidelines, material banks, public private partnerships and take other
measures to ensure reconstruction of houses keeping in mind the „build back better‟ principle.
Increase the quantum of assistance ensuring that people have safer homes before the coming
monsoon season and in particular provide assistance that is equivalent to that for loss of pucca
house, for the loss of huts.
Provide higher assistance for people unable to rebuild their houses with their own money and
provide benefits under other Government housing schemes ensuring that all victims to have lost
their houses have safe houses before the next monsoons.
Provide special assistance to sharecroppers as well as cattle rearers who have not been accounted
for under the previous package.
Provide cash dole assistance for 30 days to everyone and provide cash dole to people whose
livelihood has or had not been restored till the day it is or was.
Draft and enact a law on Flood Plain Zoning based on the model Flood Plain Zoning Bill circulated
by NDMA.
As one of the few States to not have done so already, implement the National Food Security Act
without any further delays.
To the Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority/ State Executive Committee
Assist the flood impact assessment of the situation in Amreli and recommend the provision of cash
dole for a greater period of time till the livelihood has been restored.
As the planning, monitoring and coordinating body for post-disaster reconstruction, draft the
reconstruction and rehabilitation policy and recommend measures to ensure rebuilding of a more
resilient society including material banks, public private partnerships for reconstruction of houses
and to ensure restoration of livelihood by creating temporary and permanent options.
Include concrete measures for rehabilitation in the State Plan and ensure the inclusion of concrete
measures in the District Plans.
Carry out hydrological and morphological studies evaluating the efficacy of structural measures
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including construction of embankments, improvement of river channels, improvement of drainage
systems, desilting of rivers, treatment of catchment areas and afforestation, anti-erosion works,
improving capacity of dams, regulating reservoirs, etc. across the State following the NDMA Flood
Guidelines.
Prepare specific flood management plan for the State and ensure its implementation.
Prepare flood plain zoning regulations till a law on the subject can be passed.
To the Union of India
Amend the Disaster Management Act to include penalty for non compliance of the Act by the
concerned District and State officials.
Adopt a compensation based system of relief instead of inadequate and arbitratry assistance.
At the least, increase the quantum of assistance under the Norms of Assistance keeping in mind the
objective of securing fundamental rights of the victims.
Involve civil society organisations, academics, practitioners in a consultative process for fixing the
assistance making it broader than the consultations carried out by the Finance Commission and
overall consider gradually moving to compensation based system.
To the National Disaster Management Authority
Ensure adherence of the disaster management system to the Sendai Framework keeping in mind the
principles of sustainable development, poverty and inequality elimination and bringing it in line
with Fundamental Rights under the Constitution.
Frame the national guidelines on recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction that has been kept
pending for years by adopting strategies mentioned in the Sendai Framework and other International
best practices and in light of constitutional provisions.
Carry out wider consultative process to frame plans and guidelines including civil society groups
with experience in the process and academics from the sciences and the social sciences.
Ensure the implementation of all NDMA guidelines in every State through their Policies and Plans
and monitor particularly the carrying out of mitigation measures before the oncoming monsoon
season.
Provide inputs to the State of Gujarat in framing the reconstruction and rehabilitation policy for the
Amreli Flood.
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Actions
he present intervention was not designed as purely an academic enterprise, but rather an action
led research. The volunteers that carried out the main survey were trained as paralegals by CSJ
and survey team responsibly drafted applications on behalf of the victims wherever something major
was amiss. These applications were usually collective at the level of every village and kept forward such
demands as surveys where they hadn‟t been carried out before, resurveys where discrepancies were
high, legal aid from the District Legal Services Authority.
The team which included lawyer-supervisors provided free advice to people to enable them to file
individual applications and wherever it was felt that individuals would not be able to do so themselves,
CSJ drafted the applications for them. CSJ team also encouraged people to file RTI queries at
Government offices to find out the status of the assistance that should have come their way.
For people that CSJ could not directly assist at the time, it left them with pamphlets with basic
information of the entitlements under the Government relief package and the phone numbers of its local
office operating jointly with centre of „Nyayika‟, a legal service delivery enterprise. This was an option
many people availed.
CSJ and Nyayika managed to reach a large number of people this way. Since the irregularities in the
distribution process were too many and the issues with the relief and recovery process went very deep,
there was a need to raise these issues collectively.
A couple of petitions are pending before the Gujarat High Court on the issue. An order was passed by
the High Court in these cases asking the District Collector as well as the District Legal Services
Authority to accept applications on behalf of victims that had not been given assistance. Subsequent to
this order CSJ and Nyayika, went back on the ground to create awareness about the said order and
persuade people to file applications to these authorities.
Appendix
T