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DistributedPrediction Markets
modeled byWeighted BayesianGraphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: RajDasgupta
Outline
Introduction
Research Problem
Our Solution
Conclusion
Distributed Prediction Markets modeled byWeighted Bayesian Graphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: Raj Dasgupta
C-MANTIC Research GroupComputer Science Department
University of Nebraska at Omaha
UNO Research Fair 2013
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DistributedPrediction Markets
modeled byWeighted BayesianGraphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: RajDasgupta
Outline
Introduction
Research Problem
Our Solution
Conclusion
Outline
Problem: Distributed information aggregation - theinteraction among multiple prediction markets.
Solution: A software agent-based distributed predictionmarket model where prediction markets running similarevents can influence each other.
Experimental validation: Comparison with othermodels and trading approaches.
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DistributedPrediction Markets
modeled byWeighted BayesianGraphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: RajDasgupta
Outline
Introduction
Research Problem
Our Solution
Conclusion
Prediction Market
A Prediction market is
a market-based mechanism used to
- combine the opinions on a future event from differentpeople and,
- forecast the possible outcome of the event based on theaggregated opinion.
Prediction markets operate similarly to financial markets.
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DistributedPrediction Markets
modeled byWeighted BayesianGraphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: RajDasgupta
Outline
Introduction
Research Problem
Our Solution
Conclusion
Event: 2012 Presidential Election
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DistributedPrediction Markets
modeled byWeighted BayesianGraphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: RajDasgupta
Outline
Introduction
Research Problem
Our Solution
Conclusion
Event: 2012 Presidential Election
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DistributedPrediction Markets
modeled byWeighted BayesianGraphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: RajDasgupta
Outline
Introduction
Research Problem
Our Solution
Conclusion
Event: 2012 Presidential Election
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DistributedPrediction Markets
modeled byWeighted BayesianGraphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: RajDasgupta
Outline
Introduction
Research Problem
Our Solution
Conclusion
Event: 2012 Presidential Election
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DistributedPrediction Markets
modeled byWeighted BayesianGraphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: RajDasgupta
Outline
Introduction
Research Problem
Our Solution
Conclusion
Event: 2012 Presidential Election
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DistributedPrediction Markets
modeled byWeighted BayesianGraphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: RajDasgupta
Outline
Introduction
Research Problem
Our Solution
Conclusion
Event: 2012 Presidential Election
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DistributedPrediction Markets
modeled byWeighted BayesianGraphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: RajDasgupta
Outline
Introduction
Research Problem
Our Solution
Conclusion
Event: 2012 Presidential Election
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DistributedPrediction Markets
modeled byWeighted BayesianGraphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: RajDasgupta
Outline
Introduction
Research Problem
Our Solution
Conclusion
Do Prediction Markets Work?Yes, evidence from real markets, laboratory experiments, and theory
I.E.M. beat political polls 451/596 [Forsythe 1999, Berg2001, Pennock 2002]
HP market beat sales forecast 6/8 [Plott 2000]
Sports betting markets provide accurate forecasts ofgame outcomes [Debnath 2003, Schmidt 2002]
Market games work [Pennock 2001]
Laboratory experiments confirm informationaggregation [Forsythe 1990, Plott 1997, Chen 2001]
Theory of Rational Expectations [Lucas 1972, Grossman1981]
and more...
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DistributedPrediction Markets
modeled byWeighted BayesianGraphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: RajDasgupta
Outline
Introduction
Research Problem
Our Solution
Conclusion
Event: 2012 Presidential Election
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DistributedPrediction Markets
modeled byWeighted BayesianGraphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: RajDasgupta
Outline
Introduction
Research Problem
Our Solution
Conclusion
Event: 2012 Presidential Election
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DistributedPrediction Markets
modeled byWeighted BayesianGraphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: RajDasgupta
Outline
Introduction
Research Problem
Our Solution
Conclusion
Event: 2012 Presidential Election
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DistributedPrediction Markets
modeled byWeighted BayesianGraphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: RajDasgupta
Outline
Introduction
Research Problem
Our Solution
Conclusion
Event: 2012 Presidential Election
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DistributedPrediction Markets
modeled byWeighted BayesianGraphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: RajDasgupta
Outline
Introduction
Research Problem
Our Solution
Conclusion
Research Problem
Distributed prediction markets
- Multiple prediction markets running simultaneously havesimilar events.
- The expected outcomes of an event in one predictionmarket will influence the outcome of a similar event in adifferent prediction market.
Inter-market effects: evidence from financial markets.
Inter-market relationship has not been studied inprediction markets.
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DistributedPrediction Markets
modeled byWeighted BayesianGraphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: RajDasgupta
Outline
Introduction
Research Problem
Our Solution
Conclusion
Research Problem
Distributed prediction markets
- Multiple prediction markets running simultaneously havesimilar events.
- The expected outcomes of an event in one predictionmarket will influence the outcome of a similar event in adifferent prediction market.
Inter-market effects: evidence from financial markets.
Inter-market relationship has not been studied inprediction markets.
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DistributedPrediction Markets
modeled byWeighted BayesianGraphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: RajDasgupta
Outline
Introduction
Research Problem
Our Solution
Conclusion
Our Solution
1 A software agent-baseddistributed prediction market model:
- comprises of multiple, parallel running predictionmarkets,
- uses a graphical structure between the market makers ofthe different markets to represent inter-market influence.
2 A graphical game-based algorithm that determines thebest action for the participants in the prediction marketusing our proposed model.
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DistributedPrediction Markets
modeled byWeighted BayesianGraphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: RajDasgupta
Outline
Introduction
Research Problem
Our Solution
Conclusion
Model of the Distributed Prediction Market
Model using a framework from the field of game theoryin microeconomics, called graphical games.
Model interaction as a game.
Game consists of a set ofplayers,actions,and a specification of utility (monetary gain)for each action.
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DistributedPrediction Markets
modeled byWeighted BayesianGraphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: RajDasgupta
Outline
Introduction
Research Problem
Our Solution
Conclusion
Model of the Distributed Prediction Market
Weighted Bayesian Graphical Games
Weighted: use weights to model the influence of onemarket maker on others.
Bayesian: used to model the uncertainty of one marketmaker about the other market makers and incorporatedifferent types of market makers.
Graphical Games: allows to capture the interactionbetween multiple market makers.18 / 24
DistributedPrediction Markets
modeled byWeighted BayesianGraphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: RajDasgupta
Outline
Introduction
Research Problem
Our Solution
Conclusion
Bayes-Nash Equilibrium
Propose an algorithm to calculate the equilibrium of thegame efficiently.
Determines the best action for the market makers ineach prediction market using our proposed model.
The best action gives the maximum utility to eachmarket maker.
We prove that our algorithm guarantees truthfulrevelation by the market makers.
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DistributedPrediction Markets
modeled byWeighted BayesianGraphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: RajDasgupta
Outline
Introduction
Research Problem
Our Solution
Conclusion
Simulation ResultsComparison
For comparison we use two well-known techniques fortrading
Greedy strategy
Maximizes immediate utility.Does not consider the types of the market makers.
Influence-less marketConventional single, isolated markets:
- the market price is determined by the market makerbased on that market’s traders’ decisions only.
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DistributedPrediction Markets
modeled byWeighted BayesianGraphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: RajDasgupta
Outline
Introduction
Research Problem
Our Solution
Conclusion
Comparison to other strategies
Market makers using our Algorithm obtain 56% moreutility than the market makers following the next bestgreedy strategy.
Interacting market makers in a distributed predictionmarket are able to improve their utilities and predictprices with less fluctuations.
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DistributedPrediction Markets
modeled byWeighted BayesianGraphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: RajDasgupta
Outline
Introduction
Research Problem
Our Solution
Conclusion
Comparison to other strategies
Market makers using our Algorithm obtain 56% moreutility than the market makers following the next bestgreedy strategy.
Interacting market makers in a distributed predictionmarket are able to improve their utilities and predictprices with less fluctuations.
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DistributedPrediction Markets
modeled byWeighted BayesianGraphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: RajDasgupta
Outline
Introduction
Research Problem
Our Solution
Conclusion
Neighborhood.
Market makers with a small number of neighbors getless utility than when the number of neighbors is larger,
But this relationship is not linear.
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DistributedPrediction Markets
modeled byWeighted BayesianGraphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: RajDasgupta
Outline
Introduction
Research Problem
Our Solution
Conclusion
Neighborhood.
Market makers with a small number of neighbors getless utility than when the number of neighbors is larger,
But this relationship is not linear.
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DistributedPrediction Markets
modeled byWeighted BayesianGraphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: RajDasgupta
Outline
Introduction
Research Problem
Our Solution
Conclusion
Benefits of our research
Information aggregation is pervasive...Internet-based social networks, sensor networks, dailylives of people, etc.
Our novel framework for distributed prediction marketsleads to several challenging and important directionsthat can help to gain a better understanding of thedistributed information aggregation problem.
Shows how the related markets can affect each other.Can be used to take some of the guesswork out ofbuying/selling securities.
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DistributedPrediction Markets
modeled byWeighted BayesianGraphical Game
Janyl JumadinovaAdvisor: RajDasgupta
Outline
Introduction
Research Problem
Our Solution
Conclusion
Thank You!
Questions?
http://myweb.unomaha.edu/∼ jjumadinova
C-MANTIC Research Group
http://cmantic.unomaha.edu
This research has been sponsored as part of theCOMRADES project funded by the Office of Naval Research.
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