8/10/2019 July Decisions

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July Decisions

Previous enclave strategy lasted only a month

Joint Chiefs of Staff believed the situation in Vietnam had deteriorated too much, that substantial

forces needed to be sent

o Westmoreland requested 150,000 troops be sent

o

McNamara requested 100,000 troops and the call up of 236,000 reserve troops

Believed delaying action would leave the US with the option to leave, or suddenly

expand forces

LBJ decided to ignore both, seeking to stave off defeat in the short run, while offering a good

chance of a settlement in the future

In late July, LBJ became visibly upset with the inability of the South Vietnamese to progress and

improve, and the refusal of the North Vietnamese of any talks

Realising the cost of an NLF victory was too high, LBJ continued with the idea of gradual build-up

of forces

o Aimed to keep build-up quiet, so it wouldnt appear that the US was becoming very

invested

Didnt want to attract attention of USSR and US public

At the decisions, LBJ showed greater awareness than his advisors ever did, expressing doubt over

the true effectiveness of US troops, and how fragile the public support was

The decisions were the stage for George Ball, the only powerful politician with open opposition to

the war, a platform to show his opinions

o He believed that the US should cut their losses in Vietnam and focus on maintaining

European and NATO alliances

o He realised that an increase in troops was no guarantee, and more troops meant it would

become harder to leave

Ball was ignored because he did not offer sharp, consistent and easily followed advice, and that his

recommendation of leaving Vietnam was not as easy as he made it out to be

Belief was that if LBJ took Balls advice, he would have to change all his lieutenants and advisorswho had exaggerated national pride and belief in Americas ability

Clark Clifford offered some opposition, claiming that China and the USSR wouldnt allow Vietnam

to stop fighting, and so doubted that the US could outlast them, but eventually joined LBJs side

Economist John Kenneth Galbraith took issue with LBJ suggesting the future of mankind lay in

Vietnam, telling the President that he would be taking all of the blame if it failed

All opposition failed because it would need the President and his advisors to think again, but they

were all fixed and blind to the idea of US supremacy.

The Wise Men panel said that any fraction of the US aims would be a defeat, that a neutral

government would be a failure

Eventually, it was agreed that an additional 100,000 troops to the already 90,000 would be a good

balance of success n Vietnam without alerting too many people to the advance President said that he regretted that we were embroiled in Vietnam. But we are there

McNamaras idea of calling up reserves was dismissed as it needed to appear that it was simply a

continuation of policy, rather than a new program altogether

Congressional leaders were informed on July 27, met with all-around support

o Mike Mansfield offered some opposition, claiming a victory wouldnt really achieve

anything

LBJ stressed his Great Society to distract people from his controversial increase in Vietnam

When Henry Fowler argued that the war was causing prices to rise, putting a strain on the

economy, the White House warned him to be quiet